distinguish these modes of mutual recognition according to the constitutivecontribution that each makes to enabling a distinct form of relation-to-self; inthis connection, I wasaided by the factthat it wasrather easy to see how ErnstTugendhat’s related discussion
could be developed in a way thatsupplemented the familiar aspect of self-respect with a consideration of theother two dimensions of basic self-condence and self-esteem. Thusemerged, out of a somewhat forced reinterpretation of the young Hegel(inuenced, in particular, by the results of my work on the concept of theperson), the distinction between the three modes of recognition – love, rights,and solidarity –with which I am still working today, albeit ina modiedform.In
The Struggle for Recognition
, I had not really worked out whether thesethree modes were to be conceived of as constants of human nature or as theresult of historical processes. The whole tone and argumentation did clearlysuggest that the various forms of recognition could only have been intendedas universal conditions for positive human relation-to-self; at the same time, Ihad given the distinction between legal respect and social esteem a historicalfoundation, at least in so far as I had interpreted it as the result of thetraditional concept of honour splitting into a universalistic moral element anda meritocratic element.
I now distinguish much more sharply than in myoriginal approach between ‘anthropological’ starting conditions and histori-cal contingency: although the human form of life as a whole is marked by thefact that individuals can gain social membership and thus a positive relation-to-self only via mutual recognition, its form and content change during thedifferentiation of normatively regulated spheres of action.
In this way, it alsobecomes clearer how to view the internal link to the second theoreticaldomain mentioned in Heidegren’s title. I currently see the connectionbetween philosophical anthropology and social theory as lying in thenormative conditions for social integration: individuals can become membersof society only by developing, via the experience of mutual recognition, anawareness of how rights and duties are reciprocally distributed in the contextof particular tasks. In this way, the use of the concept of recognition allowsthe normative implications that are necessarily inherent in every social theoryto emerge from both directions: from one direction, individual opportunitiesfor a positive relation-to-self depend on conditions that are social in character,since they comprise normatively regulated forms of mutual recognition; fromthe other direction, a given society’s chance of meeting with the uncoercedsupport of its members depends on its ability to organize the relations of recognition in a way that enables the individual development of those positiveforms of relation-to-self. I am thus more strongly convinced than ever beforethat an account of society will end up on the wrong theoretical track unless itis developed, from the outset, in terms of normative concepts.Of course, none of these points touches the two issues that Heidegrenplaces in the centre of his reconstruction. He is quite right that I am not
Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions