Welcome to Scribd, the world's digital library. Read, publish, and share books and documents. See more
Download
Standard view
Full view
of .
Save to My Library
Look up keyword
Like this
1Activity
0 of .
Results for:
No results containing your search query
P. 1
Power Shifts and Security Henry Kissinger

Power Shifts and Security Henry Kissinger

Ratings: (0)|Views: 28 |Likes:
Published by AxXiom

More info:

Categories:Types, Research
Published by: AxXiom on Oct 23, 2010
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

Availability:

Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
See more
See less

05/23/2012

pdf

text

original

 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Global Strategic Review 201010 September 2010 EMBARGOED UNTIL AFTER DELIVERY 
T
HE
8
TH
IISS
 
G
LOBAL
S
TRATEGIC
R
EVIEW
 
‘G
LOBAL
S
ECURITY
G
OVERNANCE ANDTHE
E
MERGING
D
ISTRIBUTION OF
P
OWER
 K
EYNOTE
A
DDRESS
 
P
OWER
S
HIFTS AND
S
ECURITY
 
F
RIDAY
10
 
S
EPTEMBER
2010EMBARGOED
 
UNTIL
 
AFTER
 
DELIVERY
D
R
H
ENRY
A
 
K
ISSINGER
 
F
ORMER
US
 
S
ECRETARY OF
S
TATE
 
AND
N
ATIONAL
S
ECURITY
A
DVISOR
 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Global Strategic Review 201010 September 2010 EMBARGOED UNTIL AFTER DELIVERY 
NOT TO BE RELEASED UNTIL AFTER DELIVERY 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIESGLOBAL STRATEGIC REVIEW SPEECHBy Henry A. KissingerSeptember 10, 2010Thirty-four years ago, I had the honor of delivering the first Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture for theIISS. Alastair had been a friend, an occasional critic and a permanent inspiration. The annualconference opening today is a tribute to his vision. In 1976, I selected as a theme a quotation byAlastair, as follows:
Structural changes,
Alastair wrote,
are occurring in the relative power andinfluence of the major states; there has been a quantitative change of colossal proportions in theinterdependence of Western societies and in the demands we make on natural resources; and thereare qualitative changes in the preoccupations of our societies.
He then posed the question:
Canthe highly-industrialized states sustain or recover a quality in their national life which not onlysatisfies the new generation, but can act as an example or attractive force to other societies?
1
In1976, I answered that question with an emphat
ic “
yes.
 I would be more ambivalent today. The changes Alastair considered fundamental, at the time, werethe first relatively minor stages towards the globalized world economy and the world of proliferatingnuclear weapons. Then, the geopolitical or strategic dividing line ran through the center of theEuropean continent. Today, it would be impossible to draw one dividing line, to find a commondenominator for all the fault lines that divide the contemporary world.The overriding theme of my speech then, based on my experience as Secretary of State, was how tomanage the U.S.-Soviet rivalry in a way that preserved stability and protected nations that relied onus while maintaining the peace. At the time of my Buchan lecture, the Soviet influence wasstrategically advancing into southern Africa. But, in essence, the bipolar framework prevented anuclear holocaust and, in time, permitted massive peaceful changes of the international order.Compare this, if you will, with the contemporary world. The center of gravity of world affairs has leftthe Atlantic and moved to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. European unity has progressedsubstantially. It has also accelerated a change in the perception regarding the legitimate exercise of 
1
 
Change Without War: The Shifting Structures of World Power 
, The BBC Reith Lectures1973 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1974), p. 18.
 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Global Strategic Review 201010 September 2010 EMBARGOED UNTIL AFTER DELIVERY 
national power that started with the experience of the two wars.The European Union has diminished the importance of the sovereign state, but it has not yetembedded itself in the hearts of its population. With a reduction in the centrality of the sovereignstate, it has become more difficult to frame policies in terms of national interest and to use force forspecific strategic objectives. Military objectives are being limited to peacekeeping or inflated intouniversal enterprises, such as promoting human rights, enhancing the environment or fighting globalterror. Military missions and foreign interventions are defined as a form of social work. Wars inwhich Atlantic countries have been engaged in the past two decades have become extremelycontroversial, tearing the domestic consensus. F
undamental asymmetries in today’s strategic
landscape have opened up.While America was pronounced a hyperpower by a European foreign minister, a new challenge tothe international order arose that challenged the concept of the Westphalian settlement based onsovereign states, but which has proved difficult to handle by the Westphalian state system: theemergence of radical Islamism. Inherently transnational, it rejects the established notion of sovereignty in quest of a universal system embracing the entire Muslim world.A different attitude towards strategy exists in Asia, where major countries are emerging intoconfident nationhood, and the t
erm “
national interest
has no pejorative implication. For example,China has announced a number of 
core interests
which are, in essence, non-negotiable and forwhich China is prepared to fight, if necessary. India has not been similarly explicit, but it has, by itsconduct in the region it considers vital, a propensity for strategic analysis more comparable to early20th-century Europe than the European Union
’s
tendencies in the 21st century. Vietnam hasdemonstrated a ferocious readiness to vindicate its definition of national interest.In these circumstances, the classic concept of collective security is difficult to apply. The propositionthat all nations have a common interest in the maintenance of peace and that a well-conceivedinternational system, through its institutions, can mobilize the international community on its behalf is belied by experience. The current participants in the international system are too diffuse topermit identical or even symmetrical convictions sufficient to organize an effective global collectivesecurity system on many key issues, including nuclear proliferation.A good example is the issue of nuclear proliferation. The United States and some of its allies treatthese issues as a technical problem. They propose means of preventing it and offer internationalsanctions as a remedy. Korea
s and Iran
s neighbors have a different, more political or geostrategicperspective. They almost certainly share our view of the importance of preventing nuclearproliferation around their periphery. China cannot possibly want a nuclear Korea, or Vietnam forthat matter, at its borders or a nuclear Japan, nor Russia nuclear-armed border states
likelyconsequences of the failure of non-proliferation policy. But China also has a deep concern for the

You're Reading a Free Preview

Download
/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->