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History, Memory, and the Historian: Dilemmas and Responsibilities

Author(s): Saul Friedländer


Source: New German Critique, No. 80, Special Issue on the Holocaust (Spring - Summer, 2000),
pp. 3-15
Published by: New German Critique
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History, Memory,and the Historian:
Dilemmas and Responsibilities

Saul Friedlander

On July 9, 1942, Henry Montor, the President of the United Pales-


tine Appeal, asked Richard Lichtheim, the representative of the Jewish
Agency in Geneva, to send him a 1500-word article reviewing the posi-
tion of the Jews in Europe. "I feel at present quite unable to write a
'report'," Lichtheim answered Montor on August 13, "a survey, some-
thing cool and clear and reasonable. .... So I wrote not a survey but
something more personal, an article if you like, or an essay, not of
1500 words but of 4000, giving more of my own feelings than of the
'facts.'. . ." Lichtheim ends his accompanying letter with "all good
wishes for the New Year to you and the happier Jews of 'God's own
country'." Lichtheim's essay, entitled "What is Happening to the Jews
of Europe," opens with the following two paragraphs:

A letterhas reachedme from the United States,asking me 'to review


the position of the Jews in Europe.'This I cannotdo becausethe Jews
of Europeare today no more in a 'position' thanthe watersof a rapid
rushingdown into some canyon, or the dust of the desert lifted by a
tornadoand blown in all directions.

I cannot even tell you how many Jews there are at presentin this or
that town, in this or thatcountry,becauseat the very momentof writ-
ing thousandsof them are fleeing hither and thither,from Belgium
and Holland to France(hoping to escape to Switzerland),from Ger-
many - because deportationto Polandwas imminent- to Franceand
Belgium, where the same ordersfor deportationhavejust been issued.
Trappedmice runningin circles. They are fleeing from Slovakia to

3
4 History, Memory, and the Historian

Hungary,fromCroatiato Italy... At the sametime,thousandsare


beingshiftedunderNazi supervisionfromthe ghettoof Warsawto
forced-labor campsin thecountryfurthereast,whileotherthousands
just arrivedfromGermanyor Austriaarethrownintothe ghettosof
Rigaor Lublin...
We do not know whether, when Lichtheim sent his "essay," on
August 13, 1942, he was privy to the informationthat five days earlier
his Geneva colleague, GerhardRiegner, had conveyed to the State
Departmentand the ForeignOffice. In fact, the plan for a generalexter-
mination of EuropeanJewry that Riegner transmittedto London and
Washington had already been implemented for months; by August
1942, close to a million and a half EuropeanJews had been extermi-
nated. Yet, even if Lichtheim'sdescriptionof "whatwas happeningto
the Jews of Europe"was factuallyfalse because it missed the defining
aspect of these events, total physical extermination,it conveys in words
not to be forgotten,somethingthat defies directexpression:the sense of
despairand doom of tens and tens of thousandsof Jews fleeing "hither
and thither"like "trappedmice runningin circles," as well as - unre-
portedby him, but sensed throughouthis essay - the suffocatingterror
of the remainingmillions.
"I am burstingwith facts,"Lichtheimwent on, "butI cannottell them
in an article of a few thousandwords. I would have to write for years
and years. . . . That means I really cannot tell you what has happened
and is happeningto five million persecutedJews in Hitler's Europe.
Nobody will ever tell the story - a story of five million personaltrage-
dies every one of which would fill a volume."

As strangeas HenryMontor'sdemandfor a 1500-wordreporton the


situationof the Jews in Europemay appearto us today, it can, in a way,
be consideredas paradigmaticfor most representations and commemora-
tions of the Shoah; Lichtheim'sanswer expresses an opposite mode of
evocation.On the one hand,a reportprovidesprecisefactualinformation
offeredwithin strictlimits and usuallyarounda centralidea that gives it
coherence;on the other, Lichtheim'sanswer is an outburstof pain and
despairthat,in principle,rejectsthe possibilityof orderandcoherence.
Over the last decades, the memory of the Shoah has crystallized
aroundthese two poles. Whereasthe first one meansclosure, the second
Saul Friedldnder 5

indicates an open-endedprocess of remembrance.In other terms, the


first is embodied in set rituals and in organizedpresentationsranging
from textbooks to museums, from monumentsto public commemora-
tions. This public memorydemandssimplicityas well as clear interpre-
tation; its aim, unstated and maybe unperceived, is to domesticate
incoherence, eliminate pain, and introducea message of redemption.
The second domainknows no rules. It disruptsany set renditionamong
those who imagine this past - the immense majoritynow - and those
who still rememberit. In the testimoniesof those who remember,both
expressionsof the past resurface:the organized,oft-rehearsednarration
on the one hand,the uncontrolledandchaoticemotion,on the other.
In the long run,the memoryof the Shoahwill probablynot escape com-
plete ritualization.Yet, to this day at least, an open-endedrepresentation
of these events seems presentin the Westernworld and possibly beyond.
More so, it appearsto be growingas time goes by. After interpretingthe
paradoxicalexpansionof this memoryand pointingto the complex inter-
action between the memoryof the Shoahand the writingof its history,I
conclude by dwelling on the challenges and responsibilitiesincumbent
upon the historian.In this domain there can be no credo, merely some
reflectionsaboutcompellingassignmentsandunresolvedquestions.

The Expanding Memoryof the Shoah


The two decades following the war can be characterizedas a periodof
virtualsilence aboutthe Shoah:The consensuswas one of repressionand
oblivion. Adult contemporariesof Nazism still dominated the public
scene. Even the survivorschose to remainsilent, since very few people
were interestedin listening to them (even in Israel) and since, in any
case, theirown maingoal was social integrationanda returnto normalcy.
In the mid-1960s, a first wave of debates shook these defenses. The
generationborn duringor toward the end of the war was moving into
the limelight. Mainly in Europe,the students' unrest of the late 1960s
and its sequels called into question various aspects of contemporary
culture as well as the lies and the obfuscation regarding the Nazi
period. The major turmoil occurredin Germany,but the famous slo-
gan of the French students, "We are all GermanJews" [nous sommes
tous des juifs allemands], intendedto protest against the expulsion of
the Jewish student leader, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, had more than one
meaning. At the same time, in Marcel Ophuls's The Sorrow and the
6 History,Memory,and the Historian

Pity, France witnessed a first rift in the constructionof the mythical


self-representationof its history during the war years. However, this
returnof the past was quickly neutralizedby theoreticalabstractions
about all pervasive "fascism," produced mainly on the extreme left,
and by the extremepoliticizationof the debates.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a second wave of controversies
opened the way for a growing subjectivityand weakened the hold of
some of the theoreticalconstructsof the previous decade. An expan-
sion of autobiographicalliterature,among Germansand among Jews, of
deeply probing and innovative films, as well as the quest for the his-
tory of everydaylife underNazism createda new, more direct confron-
tation with the past. However, some of these endeavors,in Germanyin
particular,also carriedan unmistakableapologetic urge and early post-
modem representationsof the Nazi era were not devoid of perversefas-
cination. Strangelyenough, it was a mass media event, the screeningof
the NBC miniseries "Holocaust"in 1978-79, that became a turning
point all over the West, drawing increasedattentionto the extermina-
tion of the Jews as the defining event of the Nazi period. Over the last
decade, this past became even more present,particularly,it seems, for
the thirdpostwargeneration,the "generationof the grandchildren," fol-
lowing the fierce debates of the 1980s in Germany, known as "the his-
torians' controversy,"and as an indirect sequel of the downfall of
communismand Germanreunification.
The durationof the phases varies in differentnationaland religious
contexts. For example, the periodof "amnesia"may have been particu-
larly lengthy and the passage to broader awareness quite abrupt in
France and, even more so, in Switzerland.In France, the surge of a
national memory of Vichy's anti-Jewishpolicies found its first major
expressionsome twenty years ago, first on the judicial level then on the
political and institutionalone, as well as in the intellectualand artistic
domains.As for the unexpecteduproarover the role of Switzerlanddur-
ing the war, it has led to fierce public controversyabout the material
and financialexploitationand defraudingof Jewish victims, not only in
that country,but throughoutEurope.This debate,it has to be added,has
contributedto the reappearance,in Switzerlandand possibly elsewhere
in Europe,of a kind of anti-Semitismthat seemed to be a thing of the
past: an anti-Semitismof the middle classes that is "salonfdhig"or, in
otherwords,openlyacceptableagain.
Saul Friedldnder 7

The religious domain may have an even more lasting impact on the
presenceof the past thanthe nationalone. Establishinga Carmelitecon-
vent at Auschwitz was a minor mattercomparedto the storm that may
eruptaroundthe imminentbeatificationof Pius XII, if maintained.The
entire set of controversiesregardingthe role of Christianity,its anti-
Jewish teachings and its traditionalhostility towards the Jews - all of
which providedthe obviously involuntary,but historicallyunavoidable
backgroundto their extermination- would reappearagain. Thus the
presence of the Holocaust in western consciousness resembles that of
some sort of lava rising ever closer to the surface and announcedby
ever strongereruptions.Yet, recognizingthis growing presence of the
past does not explain it. Let me turnto three possible interpretations:a
an
generationalfactor, ongoing demand for justice, and the transforma-
tion of Nazism into the metaphorof evil for ourtime.

The generationalfactoris the first explanationthatcomes to mind.The


"generationof the grandchildren," mainlyamongEuropeans(Germansin
but
particular) among Jews as well, has now acquiredsufficientdistance
in
from the events terms of both the sheer passage of time and personal
involvementto be.able to confrontthe full impactof the past. Thus, the
growing rise of the memory of the Shoah could be interpretedas the
gradualliftingof collectiverepression,inducedby the passageof time.
This interpretationcould be understood,metaphoricallyspeaking, as
"working through"but also, possibly, as a collective "returnof the
repressed."Are we now readyto face the worst aspects of this past or is
the repressedreturning,as the historianDominickLaCapraexpressedit,
in the form of "reneweddisavowal in certainquarters... and commer-
cialized, politically tendentious, and self-interested (if not porno-
graphic)representationsin otherquarters?"'
In other words, are we mainly witnessing a gradual lifting of
defenses or could one argue that, simultaneously,the growing aware-
ness of the past is also due to very differentimpulses, such as the fas-
cination with the aesthetics of Nazism that flourishedin the 1970s, or,
more recently,the growing diatribesof negationistsand the activism of
radicalright-winggroups?

I. DominickLaCapra,Representingthe Holocaust:History, Theory,Trauma(Ith-


aca: Comell UP, 1994) 189.
8 History, Memory, and the Historian

Generationsare not merely categories of time but also clusters of


shared formative experience. In terms of experience, those Germans
who served in the Wehrmachtwere far apartfrom adolescents merely
two or three years younger,who at the end of the war were only "Fla-
khelfer,"that is, those who manned anti-aircraftbatteries.One single
year could make a majordifference.While this issue demandsa longer
disquisition, suffice it to mention here that mainly in Germanythere
often is an age group (or generational)element in what I called the
returnof the repressed.
In the 1980s, the "Historians'Controversy"took place among schol-
ars who, with the exception of two out of some twelve of fourteen,
were all membersof the Hitlerjugendgeneration,having all been ado-
lescents in the ThirdReich. Theirpositionswere sharplydivided, as we
know, but the intensityof the debatestemmed,in partat least, from the
impactof these long-buriedexperiencesand their refractionthroughthe
prismof laterpoliticalchoices.
Last year, MartinWalser's outburstand the standingovation that he
received at the Friedenspreisceremony in Frankfurt,or the accolades
frompeople like von Dohnanyior Augstein,carriedonce more the signs
of an age group. Ignaz Bubis, however clumsily or angrily, expressed
the outrageof a memorymuchless deflectedor reinvestedby time.

In a letter to Karl Jaspers,HannahArendtwrote on August 17, 1946:


"The Nazi crimes, it seems to me, explode the limits of the law; and
that is precisely what constitutestheir monstrousness.For these crimes,
no punishment is severe enough. It may well be essential to hang
G-ring, but it is totally inadequate.That is, this guilt, in contrastto all
criminalguilt, overstepsand shattersany and all legal systems. That is
the reason why the Nazis in Nurembergare so smug. They know that,
of course. And just as inhumanas their guilt, is the innocence of their
victims. Humanbeings simply can't be as innocentas they all were in
the face of the gas chambers. . . . We are simply not equipped to deal,
on a human, political level, with a guilt that is beyond crime and an
innocencethatis beyondgood andvirtue."2
Arendt's letter is a cri du coeur that made much sense in 1946; yet,

2. HannahArendt,KarlJaspers,Correspondence1926-1969, eds. Lotte Kohler&


HansSaner;trans.Robert& RitaKimber(New York:HarcourtBraceJovanovich,1992)54.
Saul Friedldnder 9

even today, many people would opt for such an absolutestand in regard
to Nazi crimes. The present-dayjudicial process is basically not at issue
anymore (the Papon trial in France was possibly the last major court
case regardingNazism and relatedcrimes) but the demandfor an abso-
lute, uncompromising,and almost metaphysicaljustice remains,mainly
in the communityof the victims. It also appearsin segments of Euro-
pean society somehow involved in the collaborationwith Nazism. There
it becomes a demand for distinctionsbetween degrees of involvement,
of responsibility,and of guilt. On all sides, the quest for justice focuses
on the shapingof memoryandcontributesto the growthof memory.
The demandfor justice is also fueling fierce debates on comparative
victimizationwithin the Nazi system of terrorand exterminationitself
and among various terrorand exterminationsystems, the Stalinist and
the Nazi, for example. Over the last three decades or so, some of these
debates have spread to the American scene. The growing demand of
diverse ethnic minoritiesfor the recognitionof theirown historicalheri-
tage, one that would offer a tale of sufferingand triumph,is leading to
overt confrontationsabout degrees of historicalmartyrdom.In this con-
text, the Holocaust has become a focus of resentmentand the demand
for justice fuses with increasinglyacrimoniousargumentsaboutthe his-
torical comparabilityor exceptionalityof the exterminationof the Euro-
pean Jews. Mainly, the adoption of the Holocaust by popular culture
has increasinglyadded a peculiar dimension to its image in the con-
sciousness of vast sectorsof U.S. andWesternsociety.
Nazism has become the centralmetaphorof evil of our time. In our age
of genocide and mass criminality,apartfrom its specific historicalcon-
text, the exterminationof the Jews of Europeis now perceivedby many
as the ultimatestandardof evil againstwhich all degreesof evil are mea-
sured. Such a perceptionof Nazism was already present before and
mainly duringthe war among the Allies, in occupied Europe,and even
amongresistancegroupsin Germanyitself. Afterthe war, HannahArendt
identifiedNazism with "radicalevil." Her later notion of the "banality
of evil" was no contradiction.In our epoch, radicalevil is linked to the
utterbanalityof its perpetrators,the Eichmannsof this world.
The most extreme insult that one can hurl against any brutalbehavior
is to compareit with Nazism, the worst tag applicableto a hated leader
is the comparison with Hitler. And, incidentally, the only Christian
name that may have disappearedfrom the repertory after 1945 is
10 History,Memory,and the Historian

"Adolf." In other words, Nazism and evil have become so naturally


intertwinedthat this identificationtriggers an ongoing and expanding
process of representationbut also of recall by association:"Schindler's
List," "Life is Beautiful," The Reader; Kosovo, Le Pen, Heider; gay
bashing,mercy killing, abortionor anti-abortion,and so on. But doesn't
that ever spreadingreferencemean an ever growing dilution, and ever
growing simplification,and ever growing vulgarization?Moreover, is
the process self-triggeredor does it fulfill a functionin oursociety?
I wish to suggesthere a link betweenthe simplificationin the represen-
tationof Nazism and the Holocaustin popularcultureand the functionof
this simplifiedrepresentation in our society. By functionI do not mean to
dwell again upon the politics of identityof variousgroupsin this coun-
try nor upon the diverse forms of instrumentalization of the Holocaust.
Morerelevantwould be the urge of the Catholicchurchto make sure that
believers today and in the futurebe convinced that at the time of its
greatestchallenge,the Papacywas resolutelyon the side of the victims
andthatthe Vicarof Christstoodundauntedagainstevil in ourtime.
The most basic function of this representationof evil is inherentto
the self-image of liberal society as such. Nowadays, liberal society is
not faced with any concrete enemy; its existence was not threatened,
even before the complete demise of communism.But, in orderto iden-
tify its own ideals and the natureof its institutions,any society needs to
define the quintessentialopposite of its own image. Due to its unques-
tionablehorror,to the immensenumberof its victims, to the heroic sac-
rifices demandedto achieve victory over it, Nazism did and does fulfill
the functionof the enemyper se. This is true for the United States but
also, for differentand no less obvious reasons, for present-dayliberal,
democraticGermanyand for the westernworld more generally.In fact,
few are the regimes that, since 1945, would have chosen to identify
with the Nazi model.
The memory of the exterminationbut also that of the suffering and
the agony imposed by Nazism or that of the fateful commitments
demandedof those willing to resist it remainsa landscapeof death on
the backgroundof which choices were made that still appearto many as
the most importantever decided upon in modem times. In a world in
which such choices have all in all disappeared,the memory of the
Shoah is paradoxicallylinked to a simplified, watered down, yet real
andprobablydeep-seatedlongingfor the tragicdimensionof life.
Saul Friedldnder 11

On Memoryand History
It may have become evident, from what has been said until now, that
the various facets of the expandingmemory of the Holocaust create a
whole array of dilemmas in the writing of its history. The impact of
generational change on the transformationof the historiographyof
Nazism and the Shoahhas often been mentioned.3The personalmemo-
ries of those historians who were the contemporariesof Nazism do
indeedfind theirexpressionin distinctformsof emphasisor avoidance.4
More specifically, it has been argued that emotional involvement in
these events precludes a rationalapproachto the writing of their his-
tory. The "mythic memory"of the victims has been set against the
"rational"understandingof others. I certainlydo not wish to open old
debatesbut merely to suggest thatGermanand Jewish historiansas well
as those of any other backgroundcannot avoid a measureof "transfer-
ence" in regardto this past. Of necessity, such involvement impinges
upon the writing of history. But the historian's necessary measure of
detachmentis not hinderedtherebyprovidingthe presence of sufficient
self-awareness.It may indeed be harderto keep one's balance in the
other direction;whereas a constantlyself-critical gaze might diminish
the effects of subjectivity,it could also lead to other, no lesser risks,
those of unduerestraintandparalyzingcaution.
The main aspect of the interactionbetween the memoryof the Holo-
caust and its historiography belongsto the moraldimensionof the events,
thatis to the demandforjustice andto Nazism as a metaphorof evil.
In the early 1980s, German historians seized upon the TV show
"Holocaust"and similar media representationsin order to criticize a
black and white, so-called moralisticrepresentationof Nazism. In the
unfolding "historians'controversy"and in the debate about the histori-
cization of National Socialism, among other themes at stake was this
"moralistic,""black-and-white" dimension of the representationof the
events and, thus,the limits of theirhistoricization.5
3. See in particularNorbertFrei,"Farewellto the Eraof Contemporaries: National
Socialism and Its HistoricalExaminationen routeinto History,"History& Memory9.1/2
(Fall 1997): 59ff.
4. See, in particular,MartinBroszatand Saul Friedliinder,"A Controversyabout
the Historicizationof NationalSocialism,"Reworkingthe Past: Hitler, the Holocaust and
the Historians'Debate, ed. PeterBaldwin(Boston:Beacon, 1990).
5. The most profoundcommenton this debateand its implicationsis to be found
in JoimRilsen, "The Logic of Historicization:MetahistoricalReflections on the Debate
between FriedliinderandBroszat,"History& Memory9.1/2 (Fall 1997): 113-44.
12 History,Memory,and the Historian

To this day, the intertwiningbetween the writingof the historyof the


Holocaust and the unavoidableuse in its interpretationand narrationof
implicit or explicit moral categories remains a major challenge. It is
aroundthese sharedmoral categoriesthat history and memoryencoun-
ter one of their central differences. It may well be that the apparent
dichotomybetween a necessarily"detached"historyof National Social-
ism and the no less unavoidablepresenceof a moraldimensionin deal-
ing with this epoch may find its resolutiononly in the sensitivity and
creativeintuitionof the historian.
In the memory of the contemporariesand increasinglyso in present
day perception,the exterminationof the Jews may have become one of
the defining events of our time. Yet it seems impossible to situate its
historical place. How can historical inquirydefine the significance of
Chelmno,Belzec, Sobibor,and Treblinka,sites whose sole functionwas
immediateextermination?6
Approximatelytwo million victims were murderedat these sites alone
within a year or so. How can the significance of such events be inte-
grated in the interpretationof our epoch as they neither influencedthe
course of the war, nor any majortrend in postwarhistory, and as, for
many historians,so brief a span of time is but the foaming crest on the
waves of long duration?Is the real impact of this history solely in the
memoryit has left?
Historical writing about the Holocaust has increasinglyattemptedto
circumventsuch problemsby focusing on the mechanismsthat led to
the "Final Solution"within Nazism itself, or on the logistics, the tech-
nology and the bureaucraticprocesses of its implementation,on the
agencies of exterminationand the behavior of the perpetrators.For
example, in regardto his The Destructionof the EuropeanJews, Raul
Hilbergstatedthathe had mainly concentratedon the "how"ratherthan
on the "why" of that history. Such historical inquiry into the mecha-
nisms of the "Final Solution"is the very basis of our knowledge and
undoubtedly,remainsa primarytask. But, ultimately,the "why" over-
shadowsall otherconcerns.
It goes without saying that majorissues of interpretation,of historical
roots, of historicalcategories, have also been addressedfrom the very
beginnings of this historiography.We all know at least some of these

6. Arno Mayer, WhyDid the HeavensNot Darken? The "FinalSolution"in His-


tory (New York:Pantheon,1989).
Saul Friedlinder 13

interpretations:the special course of German history, anti-Semitism


(eliminationistor not), fascism, totalitarianism,modernity.It is at this
level thata peculiarresponsibilityof the historiancomes to the fore.

On the Historian's Responsibility


The historiancannot be and should not be the guardianof memory.
The historian'sgaze is analytic,critical,attunedto complexity,and wary
aboutgeneralizations.But the historianshouldnot avoid the precise def-
inition of interpretiveconcepts and categoriesin a domainso wide open
to extraordinaryflights of imaginationor malicious denials in interpre-
tive endeavors. Moreover, on a very different level, historiansshould
dare to challenge the complacencyand routinealreadyexisting in their
domain. Regardingthe first issue, let me choose the continuingdebate
about the comparabilityof Nazi and Stalinist crimes within the frame-
workof two similartotalitarianregimesas a briefillustration.
Totalitarianismas a key interpretivecategory is on the rise again.
Decades ago duringthe cold war, it helped to fight communism;today
totalitarianismis used to bury communism historically by trying to
show that Stalin's crimes may have been worse than those of Hitler. In
eastern Europe, first and foremost, but also in France and to a lesser
degree in Germany,this revival of the "GreaterEvil" theory has some-
times taken strangeaccents. We are not confrontedwith Arendt's query
into the origins of totalitariansystems but with a crusadeof sorts, aim-
ing to demonstratethat totalitarianismis the explanationof it all and
that on the scale of mass criminalityStalinwas first, Hitler in mere sec-
ond place. It certainly is a legitimatequery, but one that demands, for
example,thatthe followingbe considered.
The fall of 1942 the Wehrmachtwas aboutto cross the Volga at Stal-
ingrad.Had the Germanssucceeded,they would probablyhave brought
about the militarycollapse of the Soviet Union, a significantprolonga-
tion of the war, the non liberationof Auschwitz in January1945 and the
complete exterminationof the remnantsof EuropeanJewry. Are there
many people today who, notwithstandingtheir knowledge of Stalinist
crimes, would declare in retrospect,that they wish the Wehrmachthad
crossedthe Volga?
The majority that still would answer negatively remains, I believe,
influencedby a vague intuitionrelatedto a historical-philosophicaldis-
tinction most admirably expressed by the French-Jewishintellectual
14 History,Memory,and the Historian

RaymondAron. Aron's anti-Stalinismwas straightforward and uncom-


promising from the immediate postwaryears onward, but, nonetheless,
he clearly perceivedthe differencebetweenNazism and communism,as
Arendtdid in her "Questionsof MoralPhilosophy"and as many histori-
ans do to this day. Aron identifiedthe quintessentialdifferencebetween
the two regimes at the conceptuallevel - and there indeed it lies: "For
those who wish to 'save the concepts',"Aron wrote, "thereremains a
differencebetween a philosophywhose logic is monstrous,and one that
lends itself to a monstrousinterpretation."7
It remains the historian'sprime responsibilityto probe the concrete
aspects of such distinctionsand to work throughthe details of related
arguments.Thereinlies the majorchallengeas well. In the face of sim-
plified representationsof the past, the historian'sduty is to reintroduce
the complexity of discrete historical events, the ambiguity of human
behavior,and the indetermination of wider social processes.The task is
daunting due to the difficulty conciliatingthe nuancedresultsof schol-
of
arship and the necessaryreferenceto historical,but also moral/philosoph-
ical categories.In the face of a phenomenonsuch as Nazism, however,
such tasks are not yet sufficient.Thereis, as mentioned,a run-of-the-mill
historyof the Holocaustthatdemandsto be thoroughlyquestioned.
Some two years ago, the BerkeleyhistorianThomasLaqueurwrote a
highly perceptivecritiqueof what he called the "businessas usual"his-
toriographyof the Holocaust,one that"fails to confrontboth the partic-
ular moral breakdownthese events imply and the subjectiveterrorthat
they inspired."8For Laqueur,as for myself, only the integrationof the
individual fate within the historical narrationcould eventually enable
the historian to overcome the dichotomy between the unfathomable
abstractionof the millions of dead and the tragedyof individuallife and
deathin the time of extermination.
In otherwords, how can we rendera historyof the Holocaustwherein
not only the historyof the victims as a collectivityis included,but one
which also comprisesthe narrationof the events accordingto the vic-
tims' perceptions,as well as descriptionsof theirindividualfate?Laqueur
evoked the thousandsof shortbiographicaldata and picturesof children
deportedfromFrance,collectedby Serge Klarsfeld.These childrencould
7. Tony Judt, TheBurdenof Responsibility:Blum, Camus,Aron, and the French
TwentiethCentury(Chicago:U of ChicagoP, 1998) 154.
8. Thomas Laqueur,"The Sound of Voices IntoningNames,"LondonReview of
Books (5 June 1997):3.
Saul Friedldnder 15

not speak in their own voice, but the little that could be found aboutthe
life and deportationof a boy of eight or a girl of three sufficed, pre-
cisely because it was so little.
The victims' testimonies cannot enlighten us about the internal
dynamics of Nazi persecutionsand exterminations,but they put Nazi
behaviorin its full perspective;they describethe face to face encounter
of the perpetratorswith the victims duringthe persecutions,the deporta-
tions, and the killings. But, mainly, the victims' testimonies are our
only source for the historyof theirown pathto destruction.They evoke,
in their own chaotic way, the depth of their terror,despair, apathetic
resignation- andtotal incomprehension.
The integrationof the victims' voices radicallywidens the narrative
span. This integrationhas to be complementedby the historian'seffort
to find correspondinglynew concepts that would express, however
inadequately,the breakdownof all normsand the dimensionsof suffer-
ing thattraditionalhistoriographycannoteasily deal with.

Wittlich (in the Mosel region), November 10, 1938. The synagogue
has been set on fire, the Jewish shops have been destroyed.HerrMarx,
the butcher,as most Jewish men, has been shoved into a truckabout to
leave for a concentrationcamp. On the street, in front of the ruined
shop, amongjeering SA men, FrauMarx stands wailing: "Why do you
do this to us? What did we ever do to you?" And, on both sides of the
street, the Marxs' life-long Germanneighborsstand at their windows,
watching her - in silence.
Was it fear, was it hatred,was it just plain humanindifferenceto the
despairof today's outcastswho had been yesterday'sfriends?The most
elementary human ties had disappearedand the tornado evoked by
Lichtheimin his anguishedletterhadnot even started.

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