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STRA
TEGIC
S T R
P E R S P E C T I V E S
Who Will Keep the Peace? The Role of Peacekeeping ina Future Israeli-PalestinianPeace Accord
By Justus Reid Weiner, Avinoam Sharon andMichelle Morrison
E
xEcutivE
S
ummary
The conventional wisdom is that the success o a uture peace agreementbetween Israel and an envisaged Palestinian state would require the support o aninternational peacekeeping mission.
This study reviews the history and relative success and ailure o peacekeepingmissions in the region, as well as the salient actors that contribute to theprospects or success or ailure.
In certain situations, there would appear to be a clear preerence or a UN-mandated peacekeeping mission, while other situations would seem better suitedto non-UN-mandated multinational peacekeeping operations, and still othersituations would appear best suited to bilateral peacekeeping without any oreignparticipation.
Bilateral peacekeeping has shown itsel to be eective along the Israeli-Jordanianborder, and bilateral security cooperation with multinational oversight hassucceeded along the Israeli-Egyptian border.
Given the inherent limitations o peacekeeping in conronting spoilers, it maywell be that primarily bilateral security arrangements, rather than an internationalpeacekeeping mission, presents the best course.
WHO WiLL KEEP tHE PEacE?
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Contents
I. Introduction
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3II. Assessing
the Success and Failure o Peacekeeping Missions in Israeland Along Its Borders
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4A. What Is “Peacekeeping”?
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4B. Tools or Assessing Success or Failure o a Peacekeeping Mission
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6C. United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Deployed in the Arab-IsraeliConict
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61. United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)
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62. United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I)
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73. UNEF II
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84. United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)
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95. United Nations Interim Force or Southern Lebanon (UNIFIL)
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10D. Non-United Nations Peacekeeping Missions
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131. Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai (MFO)
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132. Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH)
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143. Multinational Force in Lebanon (MNF)
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17 III. UN-Mandated Versus Non-UN-Mandated Missions:Factors or Success and Failure
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18A. The Mandate
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18B. Political Support
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19C. Bias or Perception o Bias
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20D. Rules o Engagement
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21E. Command and Control
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22F. Financing
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24G. Troop Composition
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25 H. Involvement/Commitment o the Parties
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26I. Spoilers
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26J. Regional Players
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27 IV. The Israeli Calculation: Risk Versus Benet
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28A. Best-Case Scenario
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29B. Worst-Case Scenarios
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30V. Conclusions
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WHO WiLL KEEP tHE PEacE?
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i. i
ntrOductiOn
The establishment o a peacekeeping orce is widely accepted to be an essential parto any uture Israeli-Palestinian peace. The nal-status settlement proposed by theClinton administration specied “security arrangements that would be built around aninternational presence.”
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In discussing the issue o security, American diplomat DennisRoss, who was one o the American negotiators o the 1995 Interim Agreement on theWest Bank and the Gaza Strip and the 1997 Protocol Concerning the Redeployment inHebron, and who served as President Clinton’s Middle East coordinator, has written: “Thekey lies in an international presence that can only be withdrawn by the agreement o both sides.”
2
Among the most prominent nongovernmental initiatives recommending the inclusiono peacekeeping orces are the “Geneva Accord”
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and the Bipartisan Statement onU.S. Middle East Peacemaking, entitled “A Last Chance or a Two-State Israel-PalestineAgreement,” drated and signed by ten ormer senior U.S. government ofcials andpresented to the administration o U.S. President Barack Obama (the “BipartisanStatement”).
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Although the need or a peacekeeping orce appears to enjoy broad support, it shouldbe noted that the “Road Map”
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proposed by the United States, the European Union,Russia, and the United Nations (together “the Quartet”) in 2003 does not suggest theinclusion o peacekeeping orces, although it does envisage a monitoring mechanismor its interim phases. Similarly, the 2002 “Arab Peace Initiative”
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does not include anymention o peacekeeping orces. Tellingly, however, ormer U.S. National SecurityAdvisers Brent Scowcrot and Zbigniew Brzezinski, both o whom were among theauthors o the Bipartisan Statement, have pointed out the need or supplementing theinitiative with a multinational peacekeeping orce.
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It is against this background that the authors set out to examine, rom an Israeliperspective, the easibility o establishing a orm o multinational peacekeeping orce aspart o a uture Israeli-Palestinian peace accord.
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