vary, depending on the target, Allied dispositions, terrain, time, and changes inbattle conditions, it generally is best to entrust an infiltration raiding attack to asmall number of men operating under cover of darkness. This is especially truewhen each team is composed of only two or three men, who try to infiltrate Alliedpositions without being detected by searchlights and other warning equipment.”On Peleliu it was considered that the most promising targets were Allied tanks(whether on the move or organized into a strongpoint within a bridgehead), firepoints surrounded by simple obstacles (including land mines), signal liaisoncenters, warning and searchlight installations, Allied commanders, and bunched-up troops.“In counterattacks executed under intense bombing and artillery fire,” theJapanese said, after Peleliu, “the recommended strategy is to send a largenumber of infiltration and close-combat teams to probe into the enemy lines frommany directions and along a wide front. Within the enemy lines four waves of these teams will attack at night according to a ‘saturation plan.’ It is particularlyimportant that the enemy’s tanks and artillery, the backbone of his combat power,be destroyed. In advancing for this purpose, personnel must take all possibleadvantage of the terrain—small caves, folds in the land, shell craters, andthickets. After infiltrating, the teams should keep themselves concealed within theenemy’s lines for one or two nights, so that the enemy can be caught off hisguard by means of surprise attacks on a subsequent night.”The Peleliu operations led the Japanese to recommend the use of smallamphibious commando teams equipped with small boats (collapsible and other improvised boats, small rafts, and at times even small landing barges), gasolinein drums, incendiary equipment, mines, depth charges, and small arms. Theteams attempt to harass Allied landing craft under cover of darkness, while theraiding parties are launching surprise attacks in beachhead sectors. Also,amphibious commando teams may be supplemented by “suicide swimmers”.
During the past winter it was discovered on Morotai that certain “fundamentalinstructions” had been given to Japanese soldiers who had been selected, or who had volunteered, to lead small raiding parties in commando operations.Leaders were to select men who were “daring, quick, healthy, and conscientious”or were to use experienced men. Uniforms—and presumably equipment, too—were to be as light as possible. The danger of leaving footprints was stressed,and the use of rubber-soled canvas tabi was recommended.Flanks were to be kept moving, and precautions taken not to invite air bombardment. Raising parties were not to linger in any one place. Everyone was