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What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of WelfareAuthor(s): Ronald DworkinSource:
Philosophy and Public Affairs,
Vol. 10, No. 3 (Summer, 1981), pp. 185-246Published by: Blackwell PublishingStable URL:
Accessed: 25/07/2009 22:20
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RONALDDWORKIN
What IsEquality?Part1:Equalityof Welfare
I. Two
THEORIES OFEQUALITY
Equalityis apopularbutmysteriouspoliticalideal.Peoplecanbe-come equal(orat leastmore equal)in onewaywiththe consequencethat theybecomeunequal(ormoreunequal)inothers.Ifpeoplehaveequalincome, forexample,theywillalmostcertainlydifferintheamountof satisfactiontheyfindintheir lives,and viceversa.Itdoesnotfollow,ofcourse,thatequalityis worthlessasan ideal.But itisnecessaryto state,more exactlythan is commonlydone,whatformofequalityisfinallyimportant.Thisis nota linguisticorevenconceptualquestion.It doesnotcallfora definitionofthe word"equal"or ananalysisofhowthatwordisusedinordinarylanguage.Itrequiresthatwedistinguishvariousconceptionsofequality,inordertodecidewhichof theseconceptions(or whichcombination)statesanattractivepoliticalideal,ifanydoes.Thatexercisemay bedescribed,somewhatdif-ferently,usinga distinctionIhavedrawninothercontexts.Thereisa dfferencebetweentreatingpeopleequally,with respecttooneoranothercommodityor opportunity,andtreatingthemasequals.Someone whoarguesthatpeopleshould bemoreequalin incomeclaimsthata communitythatachievesequalityof incomeisonethat reallytreatspeopleas equals.Someonewhourgesthatpeopleshouldinsteadbeequallyhappyoffersa differentandcompetingtheoryaboutwhatsocietydeservesthattitle.Thequestionis then:whichofthemanydifferenttheoriesof that sort is the besttheory?Inthis two-partessayI discussoneaspectof thatquestion,whichmightbe calledtheproblemof distributionalequality.Supposesome
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I98I
byPrincetonUniversityPressPhilosophy&PublicAffairs
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no.3
0048-3915/8I/030185-62$03.IO/I
 
i86Philosophy&PublicAffairs community must choosebetween alternative schemes fordistribu-tingmoney and otherresources to individuals. Which of thepos-sibleschemes treats people asequals? This is onlyone aspect ofthe moregeneral problem ofequality, because it setsaside a varietyof issuesthat might be called,by way of contrast, issuesabout politicalequality.Distributionalequality, asIdescribe it, isnotconcerned withthedistribution of politicalpower, for example, orwith individualrightsother than rights tosome amount or shareof resources. Itisobvious, I think, that thesequestions I throwtogether under thelabel ofpolitical equality arenot so independentfrom issues ofdistributionalequality as thedistinction mightsuggest. Someonewhocanplayno roleindetermining,forexample,whetheranenviron-ment hecherishesshould bepreserved frompollutionispoorerthansomeonewho can play animportant role in thatdecision. Butitnevertheless seems likely thata full theory ofequality, embracing arange ofissues including politicaland distributionalequality,isbest approachedby acceptinginitial,eventhoughsomewhat arbi-trary, distinctionsamongtheseissues.Ishall consider twogeneraltheoriesofdistributionalequality.Thefirst(whichI shall callequalityofwelfare)holdsthatadistributionalschemetreats people asequals when it distributesor transfers re-sourcesamong them until nofurther transferwould leave themmore equalinwelfare. The second(equalityofresources)holdsthatittreatsthem asequalswhenitdistributes or transfers sothat nofurthertransfer would leave their sharesof thetotalresources moreequal.Each ofthese twotheories,as Ihavejuststatedthem,isveryabstractbecause, as we shallsee, there are manydifferent inter-pretations of what welfare is,andalso differenttheories about whatwouldcount asequalityofresources.Nevertheless,evenin thisabstractform,it should beplainthatthe twotheories willofferdif-ferentadviceinmanyconcretecases.Suppose,forexample,that a man ofsome wealth hasseveral chil-dren,oneofwhomisblind,another aplayboywithexpensive tastes,a third aprospective politicianwithexpensiveambitions,anotherapoetwithhumbleneeds, anotherasculptorwhoworksinexpensivematerial,and soforth. Howshall he drawhiswill? Ifhetakesequal-ity ofwelfare ashisgoal,thenhe willtakethesedifferencesamong
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