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Robert D. Rupert, “
Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind 
”, Oxford UniversityPress, 2009, $55. ISBN 978-0-19-537945-7Reviewed by Mirko FarinaSchool of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh“Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind” defends an embedded view of cognitionaccording to which cognitive processes can causally depend on environmentalresources in hitherto unexpected ways but cognitive systems are located inside theheads of biological organisms. Rupert firmly rejects the thesis of the extended mind(EMT) according to which cognitive processes can sometimes spread across brain,body and world. In
Cognitive Systems
he surveys most of the arguments that havebeen offered in defence of EMT and makes a valiant (but ultimately unsuccessful)attempt at refuting them one by one. The volume however isn’t entirely negative. Partthree of the book develops in detail Rupert’s alternative somewhat conservative viewof cognitive systems as computational systems located inside the heads of organisms,and of cognitive processes as the manipulation and transformation of internal mentalrepresentations. The volume is organized around three main parts. Part one of the book is mostlymethodological and largely devoted to the investigation of how to demarcate cognitiveprocesses from non-cognitive background conditions. In chapter two, in the attempt todelineate cognition, Rupert introduces three desiderata (conservatism, simplicity andscientific feasibility or empirical progress) that are used as theoretical virtues to set upgrounds for distinguishing a causal contribution from a cognitive one. Rupert deploysthese three desiderata against EMT. Particularly, he asserts that all the criteria EMTenthusiasts have put forward for determining the boundaries of a cognitive system failto meet his three theoretical virtues. The only account of the cognitive, he thinks, thatsatisfies his theoretical virtues is an embedded one, which takes cognitive systems tobe characterized as an integrated set of internal, biological mechanisms interactingwith an ever-changing cast of external materials to produce intelligent behaviour.Part two of the book looks at the arguments for EMT and attacks them with a view todefending a system-based approach. More specifically, Rupert calls into question thefunctionalist credentials of EMT defending the view that the causal roles which aredefinitive of our mental states should be individuated using the fine-grained details of human psychology as described by cognitive psychology as our benchmark. Chapterfive assesses a number of empirical studies that have been used to motivate EMT andshows how these studies can be reinterpreted so as to support an embedded accountof cognition. Rupert further emphasises the virtues of his system-based approach andargues that “
the acceptance of the embedded alternative encourages researchers tokeep clearly in mind the important asymmetries
(between the organism and theexternal resources),
while in no way encouraging them to neglect the interface with or heavy dependence on the environment 
(p.107). Rupert takes such asymmetries tocount against EMT. He reasons that internal biological processes make a causalcontribution to cognition that is very different from anything located in the externalenvironment. These differences (between the biological and the external), hecontinues, preclude the causal contribution of the external environment from countingas cognitive. However according to some proponents of EMT, it is precisely thesedifferences in causal contribution that motivate EMT. The external makes a causalcontribution that is different from but complementary to the contributions of processestaking place inside the head. The complementarity of the inner and outer enables usto cognise in new ways that go beyond what we could achieve on the basis of the barebiological processes taken in isolation. I shall tackle this point in greater detail later inthis review. For now, let me add that Sprevak (2009) has also noticed a potentialstand-off in Rupert’s argument. We can redescribe the empirical evidence for EMT inways that favours an embedded view but all this shows is that the empirical evidence
 
doesn’t decide between extended or embedded. It doesn’t support EMT but nor doesit favour an embedded view.Part three develops the system-based approach in much more detail focussing onrepresentation and computation. In this section of the book Rupert aims to develop apositive account according to which cognition is located inside the boundaries of theorganism. He does so on the basis of the arguments from empirical success proposedin chapters two and three. These arguments largely rely on methodologicalconsiderations, which favour an organismically bounded perspective that seems toprovide the best account of explanation in cognitive psychology. Rupert also attemptsto demonstrate how his embedded account can accommodate everything that EMTwants to say without abandoning the traditional computational framework. It shouldbe noted that many proponents of EMT such as Clark, Wheeler and Wilson also acceptthe computational framework. They argue for what Robert Wilson has dubbed “widecomputationalism”. (Wilson, 1994). The book finishes up with a chapter on embodiedcognition and with some work in cognitive linguistics. Rupert carefully distinguishesembodied from extended approaches. The volume centres around two themes. One is the notion of integration, the second isthe need for a mark of the cognitive. In the rest of this review, I intend to attackRupert’s account of integration from a complementarity standpoint [Menary (2007,2010); Sutton (2010); Rowlands 2010] and cast some doubts upon those views thattake the mark of the cognitive to be necessary for cognitive science.Rupert defines a cognitive system
“as an integrated set of 
stable and persisting
mechanisms that contribute distinctively to the production of cognitivescience’s explananda” 
. (Rupert, 2010, p. 344). On his account, a mechanism counts ascognitive and therefore becomes a part of an integrated cognitive system, when itcontributes to the production of a wide range of cognitive phenomena across a varietyof conditions. The organism is taken as an integrated physical entity whosepersistence and relative durability explains the persistent appearance of theintegrated set of cognitive capacities realized by the organism itself. But there areother ways of thinking about integration that are consistent with the soft-assembly of cognitive systems on the fly, and that therefore call into question Rupert’s persistenceand durability requirement
1
. Different components of a soft-assembled system canplay quite different roles and have different properties while nevertheless combiningto make complementary contributions that enable flexible thinking and acting. Abiological cogniser tight coupled with the right kinds of environmental resources, canpermit the organism to perform cognitive functions that it wouldn’t be able toaccomplish in the absence of such external resources. This tight coupling can providethe right kind of temporary integration of the internal and external for the organism toaccomplish its goals. There is no need for the integration to last beyond theorganism’s successful performance of a task. The asymmetry point aforementionedbecomes particularly relevant here. Extended cognition doesn’t require a fine-grainedfunctional isomorphism between inner and outer processes. We get something new byworking in mutual partnership with the external environment, something that wewouldn't get from the biological taken on its own. The complementarity
 
between theinternal and external therefore
“directs our attention to rich, full, and oftenidiosyncratic cognitive ecologies in which the computational power and expertise isspread across a heterogeneous assembly of brains, bodies, artifacts, and other external structures” 
2
. (Sutton et al. 2010). This is why, I think, the human biologicalcogniser and the environment need to be taken as a complementarily integratedsystem of cognitive analysis, with neural, bodily and environmental components
1
See Clark(2001;2003), Sutton(2010), Menary(2007).
2
Also seeHutchins (2010); Tribble and Keene (2010) for similar arguments.
 
making equal contributions in the performance of cognitive tasks. The second central theme of the book is the mark of the cognitive. The need for amark of the cognitive has been famously promoted by Adams & Aizawa (2008) andRupert (2004) and more recently endorsed by Weiskopf (2010a, 2010b). Its necessityhas been postulated, even if with dissimilar goals, by some friends of EMT [seeRowlands (2008) and particularly Wheeler (2005, forthcoming)]. However, Clark (2008,2010a,2010b) and Sutton (2010) have resisted this claim on the grounds that itunnecessarily complicates EMT. Let me dig a bit more into this. According to Rupert,EMT needs a mark of the cognitive if it is to succeed in arguing that the environment isplaying a constitutive role in the emergence of a cognitive process. The need for sucha mark follows from the necessity to distinguish factors that are genuinely parts of acognitive system from factors that only causally contribute and don’t have anyconstitutive involvement. Rupert individuates the locus of such a mark in the organismand his view of cognitive systems, discussed above, is taken as a measure todistinguish what is cognitive from what is not. Particularly, Rupert believes that whathappens within the biological cogniser (the set of mutual interrelations between bodyand brain) can entirely account for cognition. What is external to the bio-physicalarchitecture of the organism can only ever make a causal contribution. The debatearound the mark of the cognitive famously emerged from the discussion of the causal-constitutional conflation. Some people assume (and Rupert certainly stands amongthem) that this conflation entails the need for a mark of the cognitive. Rupert providesone that entails that an external resource can make a cognitive contribution tobehaviour only if it corresponds in a fine-grained way with the causal contribution of our inner states. There are specific psychological effects for instance (e.g. negativetransfer, primacy and chunking effects) that we do not find in cases of extendedmemory. Because of this failure of fine-grained correspondence we shouldn’t treat useof external resources in memory tasks as cognitive uses. We should say instead thatthe external resource is only making a causal contribution.Now, as I stated above, Clark (2008, 2010a, 2010b) believes that the attempt toidentify a mark of the cognitive is unlikely to bear fruit
3
. First of all Clark denies thatthe differences in fine-grained functional role of the external and internal matter,arguing instead that the sort of functional equivalence that counts for the parityargument is determined at a fairly coarse-grained level. If the cognitive were markedout by a fine-grained correspondence, this would prevent us from attributing cognitionto creatures that are appreciably different (either biologically or psychologically ) fromus. The demand for a fine-grained correspondence requires us to scale new heights of neurocentrism and anthropocentrism. Cognition, as far as Clark is concerned, doesnot necessarily necessitate minds that work in the same fine grained ways as humanminds work. Additionally, since the differences between “
external-looping (putatively cognitive) processes and purely inner ones will be no greater than those between theinner ones themselves” ( 
Clark, 2010a
 ),
it is likely that the inner goings-on, postulatedby opponents of EMT, will turn out to be a motley crew
.
Clark has in fact brilliantlynoticed, that we already possess a practical grasp on the kinds of coarse-grainedbehaviour patterns that we presume to be characteristic of key cognitive processes,such as the holding of a standing (dispositional) belief (Clark, 2010b). A very basic andrelatively liberal appeal to folk psychology would therefore suffice to guide us inworking out what counts as cognitive and what does not. Wheeler has recentlydisagreed arguing that EMT needs ‘‘
a scientifically informed, theory loaded,locationally uncommitted account of the cognitive
”. (Wheeler, 2010). Clark hasresponded that such a quest is unnecessary and unlikely to succeed. The
 
shape andthe contour of any such a theory will always and ultimately be determined by whatone takes as central examples of real-world realisers of cognitive processes. (Clark,2010b).
3
Also see Sutton (2010); and Menary (2007) for similar arguments.
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