Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Corpuz © 1989
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In order to bring this to a happy conclusion......let us
display unimpeachable honor in social relations and
refined manners toward our fellow men, in every way
striving for our redemption and common liberty; and
finally, I repeat that you should promise and engrave
upon your breast, thus making it known to all, that in
case any foreign power should attempt to deprive us of
any part of this Archipelago, we would exhaust all our
energies and resources, and struggle as long as the
breath of life remains, in defense of our national
integrity. Aguinaldo's message to town presidentes,
Kawit. Cavite (3 August 1898)
I swore to myself and to the God of my ancestors that as
long as I lived I would stand by America regardless of the
consequences to my people or to myself.
The Nacionalista campaign for independencewithoutnationalism ended
with the inauguration of a republic in the Luneta on 4 July 1946. A special
bloc of seats in the grandstand was occupied by a group of aging veterans of
the Revolution, many dressed in their old rayadillo (thin striped cotton
duck) uniforms. The sun broke through the morning drizzle as the Filipino
tricolor was hoisted up the flagpole.
The proteges and successors of the OsmeñaQuezon tandem took over
after the war. One of their first measures was to authorize “backpay,” and so
they collected salaries for all the war years during which they did not serve.
A lively issue for some time was that of collaboration with the Japanese
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Moreover, because of the establishment's weakness or servility relative to
the United States, the nationalism of the left had to be essentially defined
by antiAmericanism. Although unavoidable, this narrow definition of
nationalism almost exclusively in terms of pro or antiUnited States
policies or measures distracted the Filipinos from a positive or holistic
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understanding and practice of nationalism.
The absence of a nationalistic commitment at the top levels of leadership
had a subtle and unappreciated result. It allowed the deterioration of a vital
national institution: the civil service. The civil service or bureaucracy is the
only instrument through which government can execute the laws, manage
the public affairs, and serve the people. The colonial civil service was
efficient, partly by design and partly because its task was simple: to
administer a colony. The occupation regime was concerned neither with
transforming nor democratizing Filipino society. It merely set up an elitist
system of government and politics.
When the old colonial bureaucracy became the civil service of a republic,
the tasks of government not only expanded but became more diverse and
complex. The leaders talked of democracy, social justice, and development
through modernization and industrialization. The bureaucracy therefore
had to perform an expanded array of functions. But then the first thing that
the political parties did was to destroy the neutrality of the service.
By the 1950s political influence through letters of recommendation and
similar pressures from party leaders had become common and then decisive
in appointments to key career positions. Technical and professional
qualifications became secondary and often as not ignored. By the 1970s the
assault by the parties had virtually destroyed the competitive examinations
system. Most of the political proteges at the lower levels were dead beats,
repelling the public by their uselessness; they spent office time peddling
items of clothing and jewelry or food to office mates. The more privileged
were "1530s"; they reported on the 15th and 30th each month only to collect
their salaries. Meantime, the civil service commission lost control over entry
into the service. By the 1980s politics had reduced the commission to an
ineffectual personnel records office.
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Every president allowed his party to inflict more politics on the service.
The latter was “strengthened” over and over by reorganization. This meant
harassment or reorganizing out of the misfits appointed in the past
administration and replacing them with new misfits, who would in turn
leave or be separated during each new administration. No president called
for a return to the tried and true systems of recruitment on the basis of
proper qualifications, merit selection via competitive examinations,
probationary training and career development, incentives, job ratings, and
so forth. These were too humdrum measures for presidents who thought
they were statesmen; they did not bother to protect the organization that
delivered services to the people.
The long neglect of social justice during the elitist politics of the
American regime, the deterioration of the civilian bureaucracy since 1946,
and the attendant and galloping corruption that was eroding government
itself into the late 1980s, meant omission or failure to provide basic services
to the lower classes, especially the rural masses. These services were
simple: roads, good seed, schooling, medical attention, and judicial redress.
Their denial to the rural folk, institutionalized as social injustice, was the
foundation of the agrarian unrest since the 1920s; of its growth into a
communistoriented movement on the eve of World War II; and then of its
emergence as a fullblown revolutionary movement in the 1950s.
The Marcos administration thought to undercut rural support of the
insurgency through “countryside development” and civic action programs.
These were palliatives that could never make up for the generations of
political neglect or civilian government failure, but there was little choice.
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But instead of renewing the civilian government to enable it to deliver
services to the barrio folk on a continuing basis, Marcos assigned what were
basically civilian programs to the least suitable arm of government: the
military. The rural folk had to muse: "When the soldiers leave, what then?
Back to the old neglect, the same inefficient and corrupt system? Or will the
soldiers be with us always?" The problem would therefore grow. So long as
the civil service was not revitalized, the governments would fail to serve the
barrios, and assigning civilian work to the military would only confuse it,
without adding to the efficiency of the civilian government.
The cancer in Filipino politics was the party system. Academic writing
about the parties viewed them as sociological phenomena. We learn that the
Filipino political party has no organizational members, and therefore no
membership lists. We learn that it has no party funds, and therefore no
honest financial and accounting records, but that millions and millions of
pesos are spent in the course of an election campaign. We learn that
campaign expenditures normally cover the cost of private armies, printing of
fake and sample ballots, vote buying, and preparing election protests before
the votes are in. The parties are said to have no philosophies of government
or politics, and the system breeds “political butterflies” or turncoats who
always defect toward the party with the spoils. Among others, finally, it is
said that the system has a democratic byproduct because the treasure
spent by the parties is redistributed among the poor.
The party system was all these, but the proper measure of it is ethics.
The system was, as it had been since 1907, almost destitute of nationalism;
it was, since 1946, guided by no shred of social ethics except opportunism. It
almost invariably corrupted honorable men and women, making the honest
dishonest. It twisted civic values; it miseducated the youth; it was a dark
and impenetrable screen that concealed every longterm national interest
from the electorate.
Worst of all, the party system was a consistent failure at its societal
function: to instruct the community on political issues and structure public
opinion so as to produce electoral decisions about the direction of the
national life, as a guide for government. The system allowed the people only
the knowledge, after the elections were over, that this candidate won and
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that one lost. The Filipinos never knew what the new gang in government
meant to do. After the dead in “electionrelated incidents” were buried, the
winning candidates would confess that their victory meant the triumph of
nationalism and democracy, which enlightened nobody.
Filipino politics was unique that way. Maybe cultural factors rather than
the party system per se would explain why candidates in local elections
always strove to get 100 per cent of the votes with a big fat ZERO for their
opponents, in as many precincts as possible. This meant a prodigious, total,
noholdsbarred and noquartersgiven effort. It was not politics; it was war.
But the presidential candidates were driven by the same atavistic urges.
Their goal was no less than to destroy, extinguish, or annihilate the
“enemy.” Filipino politics was quite unlike politics in most mature and
stable democracies where the majority parties win the mandate by slim
electoral pluralities. Hence it may be said that in every Filipino president
beats the heart of a tribal chief.
Nevertheless, the seeming intensity of politics characterized only a sub
sector of the nation. It was the hallmark of electoral politics in the urban
centers, especially in Metro Manila where provincial governors, city mayors,
and even town mayors from all over the country had second homes. In the
provinces politics was feuds among the combative families and fiestas for
the folk.
That the politics of the metropolis seemed to be the politics of the country
was because the media, especially the print media, was almost totally a
Manila affair; it was modern, ebullient, and sensationoriented, enlivened
by hundreds of columnists. Filipino journalism had not produced a great
reporter for years. That the languages of public affairs were historically
foreign languages Spanish and English since 1900, English after World
War II, with Tagalog picking up later – added to the divide between Manila
and the rural areas. But the media's concept of politics was limited to
electoral politics. It regarded the permanent poverty of rural life and neglect
of the rural areas by government in moral terms, not as pragmatic political
issues – that is, matters basic to the operation of the political community.
The media could not register the rural masses' indifference to national
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The people in the pueblos during the nineteenth century had a saying:
“The governorgeneral is in Manila, far away; the king is in Spain, farther
still; and God is in Heaven, farthest of all.” The distance between the rural
folk and their rulers was not only geographical; it was political distance, and
this distance became deeply embedded in the memory of the folk.
This distance continued into the 1980s. The rural folk's relationships
with the communists were different. The NPA insurgents spoke and dressed
like the barrio folk, showed sympathy for them and gave them hope and at
times promised to avenge their abusers. The barrio people reciprocated,
because the governments in Manila and the tenant in Malacañang were
remote and inaccessible. To the barriofolk the presidents were much like the
governorsgeneral. To them a tenant in Malacañang was little more than a
celebrity of the season, with the exception; perhaps, of Magsaysay. Between
them there was no political bond.
For instance, in 1988 the President declared that her family's hacienda
was to be subject to land reform. But there was silence, no news of jubilation
or gratitude from the tenants. This silence was their response to
Malacañang's historic neglect.
The rural folk's indifference was in fact a primary factor for the stability
of the political and governmental system. Had they become direct
participants or activists in politics, had they had their own organizations
and candidates in elections (not spurious “farmers federations” headed by
urban lawyers in Manila offices staffed by their relatives and financed by
foreign foundations), the political system would have been subjected to
radical change long before the 1980s.
It might be said that “the discipline of the oath of loyalty to the United
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States” governed the politicians from 1907 to 1946. Thereafter they were
free of any checks except what each fancied. The resulting deterioration in
administrative institutions and in politics in turn led to unmet needs,
frustrations, and injustice. The lack of one recognized unifying or guiding
value in politics and society had to lead to crisis.
The escalation of violence in the vocabulary of politics was a reflection of
the violence in the streets of Manila, in the countryside, and in Marcos'
relations with his political enemies when he staged his coup d' etat of 1972.
It was an antidemocratic but constitutional coup.
Many Filipinos would recall that the martial law regime began well. But
it was strained by the oil crisis of 1973, the growing insurgency, and
economic crises that massive foreign debts could only partly relieve. Its anti
inflation measures during the early 1980s only mopped up the “excess
liquidity of the poor.”
The Benigno Aguino assassination in 1983 united all the people that
Marcos had hurt and hounded since 1972 in a vast antiMarcos front. When
this front began to move, it was against an isolated Marcos. The general
perception was that he was an aging, ailing man, with a bad case of
megalomania, prone to play loose with the constitution, quick to violate his
own decrees, unwilling to rein in the outlandish and acquisitive instincts of
his wife, and with no sure loyalty from the restive military.
The Filipinos thought that these were their very first coups. In fact they
had repeatedly watched their elections progressively deteriorate into
institutionalized seizures of political power by violence: the violence of
money, murder, and deceit. The Marcos coup altered the old balance in
Filipino politics. The new postMarcos alignment was precarious, featured
by the entry of “causeoriented groups” cheek by jowl with anachronistic
parties and new coalitions, an activist clergy, as well as by an openly
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political role for the military. Filipino politics would never be the same
again, and an obvious relapse into old habits that were surfacing anew
during the eve of the 1990s could only mean that the Filipinos had not seen
their last coups.
The US military bases issue was the archetypal test. Needless to say, the
existence of the bases not only had a divisive effect on the people. The bases
issue was a distorting and contaminating factor in Filipino politics. The
persons did not matter. The outs would assail either the presence of the
bases or the terms of the agreement, while the tenants in Malacañang
would defend them. But once in office, the erstwhile critics became the
champions of the bases. This was because of the “realities”: their weakness
under American pressure, their imagined need for American aid dollars, so
that the bases metamorphosed from “magnets for nuclear attack” into “vital
defenses of democracy against the communist threat.”
There was the case in December 1984 when Mrs. Aquino and some men
who later became leading figures in her administration signed a brave
declaration stating, among others, that “foreign military bases on Philippine
territory must be removed.” And predictably, soon after she was in the
presidency, Mrs. Aquino executed a neat volteface, declaring that she would
keep her options open until 1991. The presence of the bases by virtue of an
utterly obsolete agreement would continue to be a pollutant in Filipino
politics.
Most Filipinos failed to realize that the American position on the bases
issue was in firm pursuit of the national interests of one of the most
nationalistic countries in the world. Filipinos, a charming people, clung to
righteousness and emotion. They would not devote months of intensive
studies to their policy problems. They knew that they had something that
the United States wanted, but their own understanding of nationalism was
limited from want of its practice, and so they always ended up pleading in
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vain for rentals, and the Americans would never pay.
The Filipinos inexplicably treated the bases agreement just as if it were a
treaty, not an executive agreement between two chief executives. After the
1983 review, for instance, the US President wrote to Manila that he
intended, on a besteffort basis, to seek the approval of the US Congress to
appropriate the funds agreed upon during the review. The Filipinos could
have moved for termination of the agreement during the 1988 US
presidential election period, on the perfectly valid ground that the US
President was a lame duck president, and that it was desirable to deal with
his successor. After the 1988 review agreement Mrs. Aquino received a
letter from the outgoing US president that was similarly worded to the
latter's 1983 letter to President Marcos.
They did not realize that the United States global “projection of force”
visávis the USSR meant that the use and deployment of the Clark and
Subic capabilities covered the vast Western Pacific Region (from Vladivostok
down) and all the way again around until the Indian Ocean Region and
Persian Gulf area. Such missions and deployment in such far regions of
Philippinebased United States weapons and equipment and support
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facilities completely destroyed the mutuality of interest with the Philippines
that was a basic principle of the 1947 agreement.
Worse, the Filipino flag flying over the bases was needlessly degraded. It
became the symbol of some hollow sovereignty, mocked every time a foreign
country's war craft were launched beneath it for destinations and missions
unknown to the Filipinos. The negotiators of the 1979 sovereignty
amendments imagined that they had scored legal points, when they had
succeeded only in exposing the nation's flag to derisory mockery.
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of nationalism than have been shown so far in the presidency.
That the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) rebellion broke out
only in 1972 was clear evidence of the patience of the Muslim Filipinos. The
nonMuslims called it “the Muslim problem” when in fact it was a Christian
problem. It was a ghost from the Spanish era. The Christian lawyers in the
Malolos Congress suffered from the mental baggage from their Spanish
heritage and did not appreciate Aguinaldo's call for fraternity in a federal
union with the Muslims. The Muslims were not part of the Revolution
because they were not part of colonized Filipinas; moreover, they had been
at war with the Spaniards since the sixteenth century. The rebellion of the
MNLF was the inevitable fruit of neglect by the Christian governments,
since 1914, of the worth and integrity of the Muslim Filipinos. Rizal saw the
Muslims as part of the Filipino nation since 1892; Aguinaldo wanted them
to be part of the Republic.
The MNLF separatist rebellion was a more serious problem than the
challenge from the communist insurgency. This was because the country's
territorial integrity would remain intact even after a communist victory,
while an MNLF victory would mean impairment of the national territory.
One possibility toward this outcome would be: if the Christian Filipinos
played tough but were illprepared on the military bases issue, what would
prevent the US CIA from turning to the MNLF and offering support toward
the establishment of a breakaway Muslim state in the south in return for a
US base in Zamboanga, Basilan, or Dadiangas, etc;? Some of the Filipinos'
more difficult problems overlapped, because the problems were all results of
the fading away of the nationalism of the Revolution.
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somewhat like a tribal chief making obeisance to some Great White Father.
The Filipinos took it in stride, perhaps because they did not sense the
problem. Nonetheless, someone might some day raise the matter as an
impeachable act, most seasonably during the period of jockeying before a
presidential election.
The government dealt with the debt problem with cutanddried financial
and economic approaches. Petulant cries of “unilateral repudiation” were
heard briefly. But there was no suggestion that the President call upon the
financiers, managers, and workers of a nation that had the thirteenth,
fourteenth, largest population in the world to liquidate the foreign debt with
honor. There was no suggestion, for instance, that the leadership excite and
inspire the labor force in a crusade of pride, discipline, and effort to liberate
the children from the burden of their elders' debts. If half the labor force
were inspired to produce an incremental US$500 each annually, for
example, the additional value would be US$6 billion. The pesodollar
exchange rate would also improve in the process, and the US$28.5 billion
foreign debt could be liquidated within a decade. But the leaders shunned
the nationalistic solution. It was easier to seem to be working hard,
planning, regulating, controlling the economy, imposing new taxes, and the
like, instead of firing up the people and their resources of pride and energy.
In the meantime, the government would turn to a well used repertoire of
methods of mendicancy: outstretched hands for aid, appeals for moratoria,
for grace periods, restructuring, etc.
The problems of the late 1980s were tough: the dead weight of the party
system; a damaged civil service; the foreign debt; the intrusive shadow of
the United States; social injustice and the communist insurgency; the
MNLF separatist rebellion; the alienation and indifference of the masses.
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the traditional parties did not accommodate them; the politicians saw the
masses simply as votes, not as the heart and rationale of a social democratic
party program. The communists elected to be doctrinaire; they remained
illegal when they could have mobilized the new voters and served as their
voice in electoral politics. The masses remained unorganized, a floating vote
and a sleeping force. By 1987 some 85 per cent of the Philippine population
had been born after World War II, without any personal memory of the
colonial period. A new political ethic was needed, perhaps also a new
political system.
What the Filipinos needed during the drift of the earl postMarcos years
was fresh animus, to be called upon and enrolled in worthy and noble tasks.
What they awaited, while they were still in a waiting mood, was that their
leaders inspire and rally them, to employ government to eliminate injustice,
to unite them into the nation that their heroes envisioned when they
believed that every Filipino was “a son of God in this land.”
Beyond their role in 1986, the groups were early signs of new trend. They
could not organize as parties during the martial law regime because the
latter was inhospitable even to the traditional parties. But they did not form
into parties even in 1987. This was important. Some of them had dissolved
because they were merely antiMarcos and Marcos was gone. The diehard
leftists went back underground because they could not coexist with the
military element in the coalition that Aquino needed to stay in power. But
there were others that could not join the traditional political parties that
surfaced soon after. This was because they stood for an array of social and
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political values and aspirations, as well as discontent, that they felt so
deeply and could not entrust to any of the old parties to symbolize or
represent.
By 1988 many of the 1986 activists had retired, disillusioned, unwilling
to join or ally with the majority LABAN (Fight) parties that wore new
names but had oldpolitics leaders. It was the nonintegration of these
elements that was significant. They needed a “new politics” in order to
survive. When they decide to return to politics and use “people power” in
their own behalf and not just to install some establishment personality in
office, the process of their reentry will herald the presence of those populist
blocs that were needed to expel or transform the anachronistic and
dysfunctional party system. During the late 1980s the parties that were
exhumed from the 1960s, as well as the new alliances made up of old faces
and habits, were dinosaurs. They were unfit to guide the civic life of the
young adults and citizens into the eve of the twentyfirst century.
Inside of a generation, perhaps before the end of the century, Filipino
politics will go through civil war or revolution or coup d'etat. The primary
reason will be the proven incapacity of the political system – its leadership
and institutions – to serve the basic needs of the masses and to win over the
politicized youth. A civil war would be violent. A revolution or coup d' etat
would be either violent or peaceful. The children of the 1980s who will
discover that they would be paying off the graftridden foreign debts of their
elders will be an obvious part of the disaffected. These extraconstitutional
processes will create either the new democratic leaders or new dictators. It
is too early to tell, but perhaps even the new authoritarian leaders would
not be viewed as worse than their predecessors, who ignored the
nationalism of the Filipinos' first and one true Revolution.
On the eve of the 1990s, time was running out on democracy in the
Philippines. But the Filipinos might, against all odds, keep the nation
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intact. They were, after all, the first people in Asia to wage a nationalistic
revolution against western colonialism; they did it all, they took their
destiny into their hands, and triumphed, and founded the first Asian
republic with a democratic constitution.
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