UN Mission in SudanCivil Affairs DivisionConflict Profile
may also have been SAF soldiers. After the Abyei Roadmap, SAF is obligated towithdraw outside of the Abyei Interim Area. This yet to be fully implemented.Meiram and Heglig fall notably outside the Area.
The Missiriya have bad memories of the period after the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement. The creation of the Southern regional government followingthe end of the first civil war in 1972 brought challenges for the Missiriya. Thesouthern regional government, though weak in some respects, had far more powers than the northern provincial governments along its borders. Southernadministrators, army, and police tended to give local Dinka the sort of support insuch disputes that northern administrators had given the Baggara before 1972.Mobile police units patrolled the grazing grounds and often clashed violentlywith the Missiriya. From the late 1970s to the outbreak of civil war in 1983, theMissiriya were involved in numerous violent incidents. Taking positions in thenorthern-backed PDFs, the Missiriya were involved in some of the most intenseand brutal fighting of the war and targeting of civilians, especially south of Abyei. The war shattered relations between the Missiriya and Dinka Ngok, butthe tribe maintained good relations with the Nuer in northern Unity State largelydue to their affiliation with SAF.
Partly due to the faltering pace of CPA implementation, especially the AbyeiProtocol and border demarcation, there has been reluctance on both sides toredeploy their forces. The presence of the SPLA north of the 1/1/56 line has ledto numerous accusations from the Missiriya of checkpoints on migration andother movements, tax extortion from migrating herds, harassment, assault, andmurder. Many Missiriya state that this is reminiscent of the post-1972environment. They currently have little faith that their migrations and grazing – on which their livelihood as a nomadic community depends – will be guaranteedas stipulated in the CPA.The SPLM/A is aggrieved by the lack of progress over the implementation of the Abyei Protocol and what it claims to be a violation of the CPA on behalf of the NCP. The movement of SPLA and SAF troops around the Abyei area andother border locations is part of the maneuvering for advantage being played bythe two parties.
Threat & Risk Issues
MissiriyaMigration &Grazing rights
short and longterm
)Although the Abyei Roadmap has brought an element of stability to the regionfor the time being, continuing hostility between the Missiriya and the SPLAmeans the annual Missiriya move into the south will being a continuing source of instability. This will be increasingly so if Abyei is to secede with South Sudan, placing an international border across the Misseriya’s path.
SPLA Presence North of the 1/1/56 Line
Both the SPLA and SAF maintain troop presence north and south of the 1/1/56line in violation of the CPA. Continued SPLA presence north of the border antagonizes Missiriya nomads, especially former PDF soldiers and armedcivilians.
Given the current level of tension any interference with migration and grazing or harassment of nomads will generate violent clashes.
Armed Missiriya Nomads
Many in the SPLM demand that the Missiriya migrate into the south unarmed.Armed Missiriya entering southern territory will generate a hostile response fromthe SPLA.
A resolution of the 1/1/56 border or the final Abyei area border that is