out there, it's so easy that it's impossible to ignore. Criminals don't care if the attack issexy or not, they just want money - so it's not really important to me what some people inthe security world tend to think - I'm much more interested in reality. I think it gets a badrap because it's not as sexy as other exploits, but if I can own your network with a fewlines of JavaScript or worse yet a single line of HTML if we're talking about CSRF, Ipersonally don't care how cool other exploits are - they're just far less likely. XSS andCSRF are here to stay.
DS
: Why are XSS errors so easy to make?
RH
: Output encoding is a simple concept, but no one tends to understand how many waysthere are to bypass basic output encoding. Just because out encoded something to landin HTML doesn't mean your buddy who is working on the same code won't throw it intoJavaScript space, or CSS space, or somewhere else. It's really hard to know wheresomething is going to be used unless you're in control of every aspect of the code. Andeven then it requires that you know about the vulnerability. It's easier to get it wrong thanright.
DS
: What are some examples of the damage XSS flaws can cause?
RH
: They have been shown (in various examples) to break into internal networks, takeover your local computer, steal credentials, phish usernames and passwords, changeinformation in websites, port scan, etc... etc... Really, aside from hiding your car keys anddating your wife, XSS is capable of just about any bad thing you can think of. It's the swissarmy knife of client side vulnerabilities.
DS
: Talk me about your book "Detecting Malice". Why people should read it and whoshould read it?
RH
: I wrote Detecting Malice as an extension to my blog. I thought it would be a good ideato give security practitioners, programmers, analysts and so on, the insights that I've hadover the years. I tried to make it extremely easy to read, even though it goes over somevery complex topics. I used lots of real world examples, even if in some cases I had to bevague to protect the innocent or guilty. A lot of the various security vendors have boughtthe book and are talking about how they can try to implement some of the ideas in their code. Now that would be interesting!
DS
: What is the next area of application security to pay attention to?
RH
: Inter-protocol exploitation is a hugely under-researched area of security. I'd love tosee someone really tackle that one, and prove how weak Mozilla's black-list port blockingreally is. You'd think after attacks against VOIP, Sendmail, IMAP3 and IRC they'd agree awhitelist makes a lot more sense, but I think they're worried about breaking things. I hatethat we have to break the browser more than it already is for them to do what's right, butthat's where we are, I guess.
DS
: What are your plans for the future? Any exciting new projects?
RH
: I have more projects than I know what to do with. But I'm shutting down ha.ckers.orgas soon as I get to 1000 posts. I think after years of running that site, I need a well-earnedbreak. Unfortunately, I more busy than ever, so my plans are to grab a few beers with id(the guy who runs the network) and then get back to work. There's no time to rest in thisbusiness!
DS
: To end this interview, do you have some final words to our portuguese readers?
RH
: Yeah, if you love security, don't let the people at the top of the security industry dictatethe terms by which you do your research, disclose your vulnerabilities, or do your job. You
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