espoused by Sherman Kent in the 1950s and 1960s. …Frans Bax, the founding Dean of the CIA’s Kent School, enumerated a list of principles for intelligence analysis, includinga focus on policymaker concerns, avoidance of a personal policy agenda, intellectualrigor, a conscious effort to avoid analytical bias, and a willingness to consider other judgments.
In sum, the principles form a rudimentary code of ethics that all intelligenceanalysts should follow as they do their analysis.”
Recent “additional work on the applicability of ethics to intelligence analysis—includingthe derivation of ethical principles and the development of a professional code of ethics —is being done by” members of the International Intelligence Ethics Association(IIEA).
In addition, the January 2007 Intelligence Community Directive Number 200--which articulates the principles that govern the ODNI’s oversight of intelligencecommunity analysis--appears to be an extension of the Kent School’s analytic principles,thereby expanding and deepening the analytic code.
One issue that has not yet been addressed is the question of which “client” the analyst hasthe greatest obligation to. Dr. Clemente and I have pointed out that a “characteristic of every profession is a distinctive code of ethics which promulgates ideals of service to asociety’’
as well as to the client, who, in the case of intelligence analysis, is the decisionmaker. But the nature of the code can matter a great deal in terms of the autonomy of theintelligence analyst and his or her relationship with decision makers.Specifically, the agency model ‘‘takes the professional to be the assigned agent of thewill or decisions of the client . . . who directs the professional to achieve the client’saims’’ within constraints defined by the norms of the profession.
By way of contrast,the fiduciary model ‘‘sees the professional as acting in the best interest or for the benefitof the client’’ with ‘‘authority to act . . . ceded to the professional’’ based on trust.
Inthe absence of a formal code of ethics, controversies have continued to arise over theappropriate relationship between intelligence and decisionmaking.”
Most intelligence analysts appear to embrace a fiduciary model, and for the most part sodo most decision makers. But complications for analysts arise when either the decisionmaker embraces the agency model—in which the analyst is perceived to be on the staff of the decision maker, and will provide analysis that supports his or her policy preferences
Jack Davis, ‘‘Sherman Kent and the Profession of Intelligence Analysis.’’ The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occasional Papers, Volume 1, Number 5, November 2002. The entire list of these principles can be found in Marrin’s “CIA’s Kent School: Improving Training for New Analysts.”International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Vol. 16. No. 4. (2003). 630-631.
Marrin and Clemente. “Modeling….” 652.
Marrin and Clemente, “Modeling…”, 652. Also see the IIEA website at: http://intelligence-ethics.org/
For an adaptation of ICD 200 into a code of ethics, see: John Lunstroth. “Analyst’s Code of Ethics.”Unpublished paper. February 23, 2007.
Stephen F. Barker, ‘‘What is a Profession?,’’ Professional Ethics, Vol. 1, Nos. 1&2, 1992, pp. 73–100.
Carol Gould, ‘‘New Paradigms in Professional Ethics.’’ Professional Ethics, V1, N1&2, 1992. 144–45.
Marrin and Clemente. “Modeling…” 648.