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Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Preventing and Defending Against Clandestine Nuclear Attack

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Preventing and Defending Against Clandestine Nuclear Attack

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Published by John Greenewald
The DSB addressed this threat in previous studies conducted in 1997 (also chaired by Richard Wagner) and 1999/2000 (chaired by Roger Hagengruber). Much has changed since then. The 11 Sept. 2001 attacks demonstrated the intent of terrorists to inflict massive damage. Nuclear proliferation has proceeded apace, with North Korea and Iran achieving nuclear weapon capability or coming closer to it, and it could spread further. The United States is engaged in a war against terrorism, and DoD is beginning to devote significant effort to combating WMD. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been established. Thinking about the threat of clandestine nuclear attack has changed, and some efforts to explore defenses have begun. However, one thing has not changed: little has actually been done against the threat of clandestine nuclear attack. The DSB Summer Study on Transnational Threats (1997) first developed the ambitious idea of a very large, multi-element, global, layered civil/military system of systems of scope sufficient to have some prospect of effectively thwarting this threat. There was little resonance with this vision (outside of the Task Forces in 1997 and 2000), but since then, and especially since the attacks of 11 Sept. 2001, it has begun to be discussed more widely. This report will revisit such a national/global system, largely as context for the main focus of the Task Force: DoD's roles and capabilities. Following briefings from many government agencies and subject matter experts, the Task Force arrived at its basic findings and recommendations in early 2003. Since then, those results have been discussed in over 40 meetings within DoD and elsewhere, leading to certain refinements. This report reflects the outcomes of that process and weaves together viewgraphs used in the discussions with elaborating text.
The DSB addressed this threat in previous studies conducted in 1997 (also chaired by Richard Wagner) and 1999/2000 (chaired by Roger Hagengruber). Much has changed since then. The 11 Sept. 2001 attacks demonstrated the intent of terrorists to inflict massive damage. Nuclear proliferation has proceeded apace, with North Korea and Iran achieving nuclear weapon capability or coming closer to it, and it could spread further. The United States is engaged in a war against terrorism, and DoD is beginning to devote significant effort to combating WMD. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been established. Thinking about the threat of clandestine nuclear attack has changed, and some efforts to explore defenses have begun. However, one thing has not changed: little has actually been done against the threat of clandestine nuclear attack. The DSB Summer Study on Transnational Threats (1997) first developed the ambitious idea of a very large, multi-element, global, layered civil/military system of systems of scope sufficient to have some prospect of effectively thwarting this threat. There was little resonance with this vision (outside of the Task Forces in 1997 and 2000), but since then, and especially since the attacks of 11 Sept. 2001, it has begun to be discussed more widely. This report will revisit such a national/global system, largely as context for the main focus of the Task Force: DoD's roles and capabilities. Following briefings from many government agencies and subject matter experts, the Task Force arrived at its basic findings and recommendations in early 2003. Since then, those results have been discussed in over 40 meetings within DoD and elsewhere, leading to certain refinements. This report reflects the outcomes of that process and weaves together viewgraphs used in the discussions with elaborating text.

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Published by: John Greenewald on Nov 10, 2010
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02/18/2014

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 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force
on
 
Preventing and Defending AgainstClandestine Nuclear Attack
 
June 2004
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology, and LogisticsWashington, D.C. 20301-3140
 
Report Documentation Page
Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering andmaintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, ArlingtonVA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if itdoes not display a currently valid OMB control number.
 
1. REPORT DATE
 
JUN 2004
 
2. REPORT TYPE
 
N/A
 
3. DATES COVERED
 
-
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
 
Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Preventing andDefending Against Clandestine Nuclear Attack
 
5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
 
5b. GRANT NUMBER
 
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
 
6. AUTHOR(S)
 
5d. PROJECT NUMBER
 
5e. TASK NUMBER
 
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology,and Logistics Washington, DC 20301-3140
 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATIONREPORT NUMBER
 
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
 
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
 
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORTNUMBER(S)
 
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
 
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
 
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
 
The original document contains color images.
 
14. ABSTRACT
 
15. SUBJECT TERMS
 
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
 
17. LIMITATION OFABSTRACT
 
UU
 
18. NUMBEROF PAGES
 
58
 
19a. NAME OFRESPONSIBLE PERSON
 
a. REPORT
 
unclassified
 
b. ABSTRACT
 
unclassified
 
c. THIS PAGE
 
unclassified
 
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
 Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18

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