not to mock, lament, or execrate, but to understand human actions; andto this end I have looked upon passions, such as love, hatred, anger,envy, ambition, pity, and the other perturbations of the mind, not inthe light of vices of human nature, but as properties, just as pertinentto it, as are heat, cold, storm, thunder, and the like to the nature ofthe atmosphere, which phenomena, though inconvenient, are yet necessary,and have fixed causes, by means of which we endeavour to understandtheir nature, and the mind has just as much pleasure in viewing themaright, as in knowing such things as flatter the senses.5. For this is certain, and we have proved its truth in our Ethics, that men are of necessity liable to passions, and so constituted as topity those who are ill, and envy those who are well off; and to be proneto vengeance more than to mercy: and moreover, that every individualwishes the rest to live after his own mind, and to approve what heapproves, and reject what he rejects. And so it comes to pass, that, asall are equally eager to be first, they fall to strife, and do theirutmost mutually to oppress one another; and he who comes out conqueroris more proud of the harm he has done to the other, than of the good hehas done to himself. And although all are persuaded, that religion, onthe contrary, teaches every man to love his neighbour as himself, thatis to defend another's right just as much as his own, yet we showed thatthis persuasion has too little power over the passions. It avails,indeed, in the hour of death, when disease has subdued the verypassions, and man lies inert, or in temples, where men hold no traffic,but least of all, where it is most needed, in the law-court or thepalace. We showed too, that reason can, indeed, do much to restrain andmoderate the passions, but we saw at the same time, that the road, whichreason herself points out, is very steep;  so that such as persuadethemselves, that the multitude or men distracted by politics can ever beinduced to live according to the bare dictate of reason, must bedreaming of the poetic golden age, or of a stage-play.6. A dominion then, whose well-being depends on any man's good faith,and whose affairs cannot be properly administered, unless those who areengaged in them will act honestly, will be very unstable. On thecontrary, to insure its permanence, its public affairs should be soordered, that those who administer them, whether guided by reason orpassion, cannot be led to act treacherously or basely. Nor does itmatter to the security of a dominion, in what spirit men are led torightly administer its affairs. For liberality of spirit, or courage, isa private virtue; but the virtue of a state is its security.7. Lastly, inasmuch as all men, whether barbarous or civilized,everywhere frame customs, and form some kind of civil state, we mustnot, therefore, look to proofs of reason for the causes and naturalbases of dominion, but derive them from the general nature or positionof mankind, as I mean to do in the next chapter.------1. Ethics, iv. 4, Coroll. iii. 31, note; 32, note.2. Ibid., v. 42, note.------------------------CHAPTER II.OF NATURAL RIGHT.