Quick background which, BTW, does not make me right about any of

my opinions.  But you have to admit, I have seen a pretty stretch of

the electric utility industry, covering 75 years.  I fell into the power
industry as a law firm associate, then moved into being a hybrid
legal / technology consultant, working in the industry for over 2
decades during the nuclear build-out, rate cases (covering much else,
that defines the time  frame). In that time I spent a over a year (with
some fellow attorneys) dredging up, studying and writing  analytical
papers on corporate decision-making going back to the 1930's,
worked on rate and anti-trust cases which involved study (and some
direct contact with executives), and worked closelly with (and in many
cases socialized with) a generation of persons now dominant in the
power business here in NC include the current CEO of Progress
Energy, one of Jim Rogers's chief lieutenants at Duke  Energy (also a
law school classmate), the current and 2 past chairs of the utilities
commission (current was also a law school classmate), the head of
the utilities public staff, etc., etc.  Between the mid-1970s and 1990, I
consulted for Texas Utilities, CP&L (now Progress) and Duke here in
NC, SCE&G and Virginia Power, on plant and rate issues.  Don't get
me wrong, I was not a big shot, I was a functionary, first a law firm
associate, then a technology consultant.  I was Zelig.  But I saw all of
it up close, and I know how they think.
 
My apologies for the length as well, but I think you'll see why. This is
obviously pretty much off the top of my head; I have cited stats and
other references from memory, rather than checking as if I'd written
an article.  I'm pretty sure that they are correct, or close.
 
I believe that the coal article misses a major probable development
that will greatly alter the medium term future of power consumption,
and thus the demand for central station generation, and thus, coal. 
The article takes the central station, baseload model of power
requirements, and thus generation, as a given. I believe that will not
be the case.
 
The fundamental question relates to whether the central station /
baseload model, where power is generated in bulk at central station
plants, and transported out to millions of customers over 1,000s of
miles of lines is the desired growth mode.  Big plant generation will
play a huge role for decades, no matter what direction we take, but is
it where we want to go?
 
An anecdote and simplistic example.  A neighbor was in the auto
resale business and so required a simple car lot.  He rented the land,
set up a basic modular structure, lights, etc. The facility was open for
maybe 20-25 hours / week.   At some point, he became frustrated
with dealing with the local power company, and did the following:
 
- obtained several partly damaged but usable solar panels surplus
from the state
 
- took a pile of car batteries (which he has, because of this line of
work)
 
- linked the two together.
 
- plugged in his junction box.
 
And voila, an off the grid power solution.  It wasn't pretty.  He (of
course) had to turn everything off each day when he leaves.  He had
no backup through link to the grid or otherwise.  Most people couldn't
cobble such a system together, and most people don't have 25 car
batteries lying around.  Which are ridiculously inefficient for this
purpose to begin with.  And yet, it worked.  Tweaked with better 'stuff'
at a few points?  It represents at least a major part of the future, and
an exemplar of switching away from sole reliance on central station
power.
 
First, a comparison with the central station model.  Let's look at a
simplified version of the central station model, coal-fired variety. Let's
also leave aside all the necessary precursors (dig giant holes, buy
very expensive equipment, train a bunch of guys, go through very
expensive licensing, build railroads) and get to the day to day.
 
1 - dig coal
2 - bring coal to surface
3 - put coal on train
4 – deliver coal to power plant
5 - stuff coal into generating facility
6 – burn coal
7 - do all that sequestering stuff, usually not locally
8 - transport power through lines
9 - switch in neighborhood of use
10 - divert to house or business
11 - turn on electric-powered device and use
12 - user pays utility at the end of the month
 
Now look at the 'eccentric man's car lot' model, again, leaving  aside
the startup items.
 
1 - turn on electric-powered device and use
 
Puts the car lot model in perspective, doesn't it?  Who wouldn't favor
that approach, all other things being equal?
 
Let me be clear where I'm going with this.  At some point in the not
ridiculously long future (certainly well before 2050), the notion that
electricity generated 200 miles away is the preferred power source
will be thought absurd for most usages.  Sure, the burn and ship (or
nuke and ship) method will be with us for a long time; there are some
applications for which the critical mass of power is simply too large for
current technologies other than large central station (the steel plant,
say).  Even those will, however, diminish on any number of fronts.
 
The downward slope of demand for central station will also be
enabled by continued efficiency gains of the average appliance,
computer,  machine, etc., as well as serious emphasis on basics like
insulation (both technical and just plain old technique).  That
downward draw will also have further enabled the distributed,
generate it near where you use it, model, and in turn have provided a
positive loop incentive for it.
 
I know that, as you say, many of the computing analogies don't apply;
power generation is subject to no Moore's law, turbines will only get
incrementally more efficient, all that. But the basic model (central vs.
distributed, mainframe vs. PC)?  That analogy applies in spades. 
The certainty that central station baseload (certainly focusing on coal,
but including nukes and large hydro) will continue to dominate is
closely analogous to the attitude held by all the smart people in
computing way back when.  Mainframe vs. PC. Distributed vs.
central.  Put power out there where regular people can configure and
use it vs. keep it among the priesthood.  We know how that one ends.
 
So, given that no one would choose the nasty, expensive, complex,
rickety 12 step process if the 1 step process would do, why did the
central station model win out?  We all know the answers, of course,
relating to reliable onsite methods being far less available, but also to
the key 'use it or lose' it factor relating to electricity.  The growth of
storage technologies (batteries, etc) changes the whole equation.
 
So the next question arises, why (other than habit, and the need  to
preserve a business model revolving around central station
generation) would we continue to choose central station for most
uses?  Why wouldn't we move toward the onsite / nearby model for
many of our uses?  How much do we have to 'fix' about the messy
car lot example above to make it the winner for many usages?
 
- Batteries, of course, are the key, and the better they get, the more
profound the change. Batteries are the enabling technology for
everything else.
 
- Those batteries get better every year, if only incrementally.  More
important,  they get cheaper every year.
 
- Solar panels (among other technologies) get better every year. 
Much,  much more important, they get cheaper and more reliable.
 
- Setup becomes more practical, and more people and businesses
are available to provide reliable, inexpensive service.  The service
industry approaches critical mass, even as we speak.
 
The final link in the chain is, ironically, the grid itself, backed by what
will (at first) be mostly central station power.  Various technologies
support, and regulations provide backing for, easy and relatively
inexpensive integration to the grid.  Onsite / nearby adopters are no
longer forced to work without a net, and can stick their toe in, e.g.,
Walmart getting a really pretty amazing 13% from solar panels, etc, in
their new stores, while still getting the rest conveniently and reliably
from the grid.
 
The only real question is money; when are the panels, batteries and
other equipment cheap enough, and how does that happen?  Review
of one of the article quotes provides the answer:
 
"He pointed out the huge engineering achievement it has taken to
raise the efficiency of solar photovoltaic cells from about 25 percent
to about 30 percent; whereas “to make them useful, you would need
improvements of two- or threefold in cost,” say from about 18 cents
per kilowatt-hour to 6 cents."
 
Comparing technical efficiency to cost is apples to oranges. 
Assuming the panels and batteries are compact enough to fit the
space (easy with home or office), cost is all that counts.  While
efficiency is a factor, being able to mass produce the things cheaply
is far more significant.  That 3-1 fall in price comes from
manufacturing experience and volume; think flat screen TVs (which
are WAY more complicated to make than solar panels).  On a more
specific, household level, lets face it, if I'm in that 'post-Home Depot'
market and don't have enough juice to accomplish my needs
(whether running a workshop, the car lot or my house), I'm unlikely to
say 'dang, if only I can wring some more efficiency out of that solar
cell. damn that 30% technical limit!'.  I'm going to say 'I need me a
few more of these, I'll be back from the Home Depot in an hour'. 
 
So, how did Home Depot get into the equation?  Friedmann's
analysis also ignores the commercial tipping point factor; sure,
Livermore and their peers, various startups and some big business
have put in lots of money in trying  to improve efficiencies, but have
spent little of that in trying to mass produce cheap, reliable panels. 
No criticism, that's not their gig. That part comes when the relative
efficiencies have crept upward, and perceived demand has gotten
sufficiently high (maybe with the help of a tax break or two).  Once it
happens, the next steps are incremental, but of the fast-forward
variety.   Design firms and manufacturers start to squeeze out costs,
and Home Depot starts to squeeze supply chain.  A new generation
comes along that is 2x 'competitive' costs, and gets snapped up by
early adopters. Home Depot starts to realize they can sell these to
every consumers and contractors in America.  Everybody gets better
at all of it, and prices fall to 1x.  And fall some more. 
 
That process is well underway here and there, you've seen high end
housing, the solar panels running huge electric fences (why run
transmission lines all the way out  there, after all) and supplying other
farm and ranch needs?  It's specialty now, but if everybody is looking
to hook up a house battery and solar chargers ...
 
If I'm right, and the dominant role of central station soon to be
undermined for major parts of the market, how is it that all the smart
guys are missing it?  I have the greatest respect for the competence
and dedication of most people in the industry I worked with (a few
exceptions, as anywhere).  But historically, their judgment deserves
no more, and in many cases less, deference with respect to one key
element; major changes in the structure of how  the power market
works.  The miss it, collectively, pretty much every time.
 
The best example occurred mainly through the 1970's.  Up to that
point, power usage (and thus generation) had risen pretty much in
lockstep with population and economic growth.  The rise of nukes in
the 60's  and  70's was seen a s a way to match that expected /
projected growth; nuclear plant orders went through the roof.  TVA
ordered something like 17 units at 7 locations.  These were not just
some line item in a planning document, they signed on the dotted
line, putting up major money in down payments.  They ended up with
3 or 4.  Several of the rest got partial starts and were abandoned or
semi-abandoned; they dropped $600 million into the Bellefonte units
before having the creditors come in and take back anything of value
(against any logic, they are attempting to revive the plant).  The
percentage is relatively typical; in no case did any utility I'm aware of
end up taking even 1/2 of the orders.  Many 2 unit plants resulted in
buildout of 1 unit, with expensive holes in the ground (e.g., $100
million at Texas Utilities Comanche Peak unit 2, now filled in with dirt)
resulting.
 
For all these utilities, these orders and cancellations were expensive
and ultimately at least somewhat embarrassing, one reason the
regulators (who had, after all, approved these expensive orders and
shared the blame) let them rescind them so easily (and with so little
publicity).
 
Basically, the cancellations had little to do with the fact that the plants
were mostly nukes, and everything to do with the over-order which
they had engaged in. The 1970's saw a demand flattening, against all
past experience; there was growth, to be sure, just not what past
growth predicted.  The run to order plants ran into a fundamental
(and, as it turned out, long term) change in usage patterns and a
decoupling of economic growth from the electricity usage curve. The
flattening was a result of a combination of maturing of the market
(everybody gets that first freezer and air conditioning, returning the
market to replacement), manufacturers finally putting some attention
on more efficient units, and other factors.  Relatively few units have
been built since (and that's 30 years!).   Literally no industry insiders
saw it coming.
 
Does coal still continue to play a role for some decades?  Of course. 
Does  clean coal therefore matter?  Absolutely.  Mainframes  still
matter, and they are better than ever (based on advances in PC-
driven chip and application design,  but who's counting).  But
recognizing that coal / central station is an endgame, not the wave of
the future, dramatically changes everything, including where the
smart money goes next and how we control it.
 
Whether the US or China (or both) gain the most?  I'm out of ink,
leave that one to you.