Professional Documents
Culture Documents
views or policies of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), or its Board of Directors, or the governments they
represent. ADB does not guarantee the source, originality, accuracy, completeness or reliability of any statement,
information, data, finding, interpretation, advice, opinion, or view presented, nor does it make any representation
concerning the same.
1
Center for Natural Resources and Environmental Studies, Vietnam National University at Hanoi
2
Arizona State University, US
1
Mekong Delta 47 37 23 16 10
Source: VHLSS data in World Bank 2009
2
Highlands). But in absolute numbers of poor, the RRD and Mekong Delta remain
significant as well. And some wealthier households are also likely to be sensitive to
damage, as well as urban ones. Furthermore, areas with substandard housing
(Mekong Delta) and few household assets are also likely to be at risk.
The RRD include 9 provinces: Bac Ninh, Ha Nam, Ha Noi, Hai Duong, Hai
Phong, Hung Yen, Nam Dinh, Ninh Binh, and Thai Binh (Table 3). It is the most
densely populated region of the country, with a total population of 17,649,700
persons (2003 statistics). The population density is the highest nationwide with
1,225 persons per square kilometer, and can be explained by many factors (Khanh
Tran et.al., 2001). The intensive farming system that requires extensive labor is one
of the most important reasons. Favorable natural conditions for production and
residential purposes are no less important. In addition, a high density of industrial
clusters and a dense network of urban areas also explain such a high population
density in the RRD.
Table 3. Population of Red River Delta Provinces
Average population Area Density
(Thousand) (Km2) (Persons/km2)
Ha Noi 3,289 921.8 3,568
Vinh Phuc 1,190 1,373.2 867
Bac Ninh 1,028 823.1 1,250
Ha Tay 2,561 2,198 1,165
Hai Duong 1,732 1,652.8 1,048
Hai Phong 1,827 1,520.7 1,202
Hung Yen 1,156 923.5 1,252
Thai Binh 1,868 1,546.5 1,208
Ha Nam 825 859.7 960
Nam Dinh 1,991 1,650.8 1,206
Ninh Binh 928 1,392.4 667
Total 18,400 14,862.5 1,238
Source: GSO, 2007
3
Due to the high pressures of population, the per capita cultivation area is very
low in the RRD, only 400 m2 per person which is equal to only half of the national
average (GSO, 2007). Given the limited land area and dense population, intensive
cultivation is therefore the key solution in the region. The RRD has a high potential
for food and food stuff production and is the second largest rice basket of the nation,
after the Mekong Delta in the south. Land used in agricultural production in the RRD
includes more than 700,000 hectares, counting for 56% of the total natural land of the
RRD. Rice is the most critical crop in terms of cultivation area and productivity. Rice
growing covers 88% of land area used for growing food crops in the area and it
accounts for nearly 14% of the total rice area in the country (GSO, 2007). Thai Binh
has been the leading province in rice productivity with 61,600 kg/ha in 1999, and
productivity can reach 8-10 tons/year in some communes of the province.
Aquaculture in fresh and salt water areas has developed quickly in recent years, but
has not yet reached the importance of agriculture. Only 580,000 ha of water surface
in the area is used for aqua farming.
Climate change in the RRD. The RRD has a strong monsoonal climate with
large differences between the wet and dry seasons (see Figure 2). Around 80% of
the total annual rainfall occurs during the 6 month monsoon season from
approximately late May to early November, with an average rainfall of 1900 mm/yr
(Bui Nam Sach, 2004). Some of the main climate pressures in the northern part of
Vietnam include:
• Typhoons from the South China Sea which bring sudden and torrential rains
and high winds to coastal areas. Typhoons and storms are most frequent in
the fall months, and while the RRD is somewhat protected from Pacific storms
by the shielding effect of the Philippines and Hainan island of China, a
number of the strongest category storms do hit the RRD with some regularity.
On average, the RRD is hit by 6 typhoons a season.
• Storm surges which arise during typhoons or in strong winds. Because much
of the coastal region of the RRD is not much higher than 1 m above sea level,
an area up to 20 km inland from the coast is vulnerable to storm surges that
bring salt water intrusion inland.
• Sudden rainfall events have occurred with some regularity in the RRD, and
can lead to very quick flash floods and localized inundation.
Figure 2. Variation in Precipitation and Frequency of Storms in Wet and Dry Seasons in
Southeast Asia, 1956-2006
4
DRY SEASON ACTIVITY
Floods from both rains and typhoons are extremely serious in the RRD,
because of the high population densities of people living there, and the proximity of
much of this population to either river streams or to the sea in coastal areas. The
major causes of floods in RRD have been highlighted in a report by Ministry of
Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE). They include a dense system of
rivers, low-lying topography, sea level rise, difficult circulation of flood water caused
by degraded quality of water supply and drainage systems, pressure on the dyke
system caused by rapid urbanization and high population growth, and limited
capacity in weather forecasting. From 1976 to 2003 floods in the RRD killed 15,835
people, inundated 2.7 million of ha of agricultural land, caused the destruction of
22,766 ships, and devastated 13.4 million of houses. In total, the economic damage
has been estimated at 3.5 billion USD (Dang, 2004).
5
billion cubic meters capacity), and at least two more are in the construction stages
(the Tuyen Quang reservoir with 1 billion cubic meters and Son La reservoir with 2
billion cubic meters capacity)(Bui Nam Sach, 2004). The French-built Day River
Barrage also is used for flood control. The entire system works both for flood control
and drainage as well as for irrigation; nine main irrigation reservoirs provide sufficient
irrigation for 60,000 ha, but the current capacity only regulates around 6% of the
annual water flow.
In much of the downstream, flood and irrigation infrastructure was built more
than 40 years ago, and some dates as far back to the French colonial era in the early
1900s; it is estimated that the majority of RRD flood infrastructure is now old or of
poor quality (Figure 3). Every year with strong storms, hundreds of kilometers of
dikes are damaged or leak. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
(MARD) has estimated that for the next two years alone (2009-2010) 2,500 billion
VND are needed for system upgrades, while local governments need 2,651 billion
VND for smaller canals and construction of pumping stations (VNA, 2008). Another
major challenge is improving the land use planning, as currently much land which is
designed for agricultural production has been converted into industrial land, or urban
land, without flood prevention measures. Related problems include the loss of forests
around the RRD which no longer retain water, leading to greater volumes
accumulating in flood prone areas. The system is further complicated by multiple
overlapping management responsibilities, from Provincial Irrigation and Drainage
Management companies, District Irrigation Enterprises, and Commune Agricultural
Cooperatives that are supposed to manage polder irrigation and drainage, while
inter-provincial dyke systems are managed directly by MARD.
Figure 3. Typical sluice gates on a low-height dike in Kien Xuong district,
Thai Binh province
These challenges are likely to become more acute under climate change.
Several government ministries have noted in the past 10 years, natural disasters
have tended to be more unpredictable with an increase in frequency, intensity, and
type. Economic costs of this damage are likely to increase in the future, and
demonstrate the need for better understanding of how low-cost methods for
adaptation to extreme floods can be developed.
The 2008 Flood in Chuong My district. For the residents living in the flood
diversion zone, the 2008 flood was the worst they had ever experienced. Eight
communes of Chuong My, which are located on the left bank of Bui River, were
6
flooded, with Nam Phuong Tien and Tien Tien communes the most flooded areas,
accounting for more than one tenth of the total area of Chuong My district (field
survey, 2009). The water level was lower than that of the last great flood in 1971, but
the 2008 flood caused worse damage as villagers explained that they now have more
to lose than their parents in the past.
During the 2008 event, 318 out of 498 households in Tien Tien hamlet were
flooded and all of the households in Nhan Ly were flooded. More than 4,000 livestock
were killed. According to village leaders, the loss in aquaculture was even more
serious. Total loss for Tien Tien hamlet was estimated at 10 billion Vietnam Dong.
There was also one death reported. The 2008 event took place because the local
people were not cautious, the head of Tien Tien hamlet said. According to him the
villagers were more on alert in the past as floods and typhoon occurred frequently.
But since the Da Reservoir was made in 1982 there had been no major flood, and no
need to use the Day river diversion, so the villagers had let down their guard and
were not well prepared when the floods did come. In terms of impacts of the 2008
flood, the whole of Nhan Ly hamlet of Nam Phuong Tien commune was flooded for
one month and 318 out of 498 households in Tien Tien hamlet of Tan Tien commune
were flooded. Water ran into the houses of over 50% of the total studied households
and flooded at the level of over 1m high. Only 4% of the studied households were not
flooded in their homes during the event. The largest number of households received
over 1 meter of water into their.
Figure 4. The headman of Nhan Ly village shows where the flood waters rose to in
2008
The 2003 flood in Kien Xuong province. The climate event that caused the
most serious damage in Kien Xuong province is the flood of 2003. Heavy rains from
the 10th of September to the 14th brought severe floods throughout effected
provinces including Nghe An, Thai Binh, Nam Dinh, Lao Cai, and Ha Tinh, with both
the Song Con and Thai Binh Rivers over flooding in several areas. 15 people were
reported dead, and 31,000 km2 were affected. The flood magnitude was 2.8. The
total area of rice cultivation affected by inundation exceeded 120,000ha; of which
60,000ha was in Thai Binh Province (half of this area was totally destroyed). The
7
damage caused to aquatic production was also large. $38 million in property losses
were reported.
In Kien Xuong’s Tra Giang and Quoc Tuan communes, large rain events such
as the one in 2003 cause a rise in the water level in the nearby Tra Ly River and in
low-lying areas of the communes. Since these communes lies next to a long sea
dyke and with low geography, especially in agricultural areas, the communes are
frequently suffering from floods, storms and inundation. While this area is usually
flooded and waterlogged every year, the severity of damage to crops depends on the
duration of water-logging. When the water level of the Tra Ly river is higher than the
water level in villages and fields, the dike overtops and even pumping stations cannot
prevent the problem. The drainage system canals function very poorly, preventing
water from draining out to the river, as most canals are blocked by water hyacinth
plants which grow very fast due to the richness of fertilizer that is washed out from
the rice fields. Additionally, a number of families that did not have land in the inland
areas of the commune have moved to the dyke area. They have built houses right
next to the dyke, causing landslides, and as a consequence, weakening the dyke.
Nearly 60% of the interviewed households agreed that the 2003 flood event
caused serious damage to their household economy and livelihood. In Kien Xuong,
the number of households that had decreased income from agriculture was fairly high
(95% of the total interviewed households in compared to 44% of households in
Chuong My). The income from agriculture in 2003 decreased 56% in comparison to
the agricultural income of 2002. The reason why the damage was higher in Kien
Xuong is that agriculture was affected by the flood event in Sept 2003 just before the
rice harvest time, causing complete lost of the Summer-Autumn season of rice.
The consequence of floods and storms in the RRD not only includes
damages and destruction of houses or land but also has negative impacts on daily
life of the local people. Damages caused by floods have proved to be the most
serious among other natural disasters in the Delta. Over 100,000 deaths are
attributed to floods in the past 30 years, and the number of people affected
economically is over 3 million. Heavy rains and strong floods also lead to changes
in agricultural production, and prices of everyday foods such as rice and vegetable
often increase highly and unstably during climate events. The increase in market
price is one of the immediate impacts that occur right after every flood. The news of
Vietnam News Agency (on 24th November 2007) reported that there was the highest
ever increase of rice price in the RRD after the flood in various provinces. The price
for 1 kg of rice increased from VND 4,500/kg to VND 5,500/kg. A sharp increase in
prices of materials and labor in agricultural production was blamed for the drastic
jump in rice price. These high price increases have caused food safety problems,
such as speculation in rice, or forcing the farmers to sell young rice (before harvest)
for much lower prices (http://www.kinhtenongthon.com.vn/2007/Nov).
8
And Oxfam UK predictions show that the impact on spring rice may be more
serious especially in the north where yields are expected to decrease by 17% by
2070 in contrast with the south of the country where yield would decrease by 8%. A
recent World Bank study also shows that climate change has a strong negative
impacts of on change in crop yields in different regions of Vietnam, including an up to
40% decline in production in areas like the Central Coast and Central Highlands.
For the residents living in Chuong My, the 2008 flood was the worst they had
ever experienced. According to the cadres, the biggest loss was in aquaculture.
Either their fish (ducks…) were washed away or got diseases or they could not sell
them due to the flood which blocked roads and left no means of transportation. The
loss was reported at 10 billion Vietnam Dong for a small hamlet like Tien Tien.
Nearly two third of the households also agreed that the flood event of 2008 caused
very serious damage to their aquaculture (see Table 4 ) and thus their household
economics.
Table 4. Value of lost income of main sources in Chuong My due to 2008 flood
Value Agriculture Livestock Aquaculture Other
Total income 795,767,727 2,016,650,769 337,884,906 1,729,607,143
of 2007 (in
VND)
Lost income -175,068,900 -786,493,800 -358,158,000 -242,145,000
(in VND)
% decrease -22% -39% -106% -14%
in 2008
Source: Household survey, 2009
The villagers in Kien Xuong also suffered serious loss from aquaculture. But
the number of households that had decreased income from agriculture was fairly high
(95% of the total interviewed households in compared to 44% of households in
Chuong My) and their lost value in agriculture was also significant (see Table 5). The
income from agriculture in 2003 decreased 56% in comparison to the agricultural
income of 2002. The reason why the damage was higher in Kien Xuong is that
agriculture was affected by the flood event in Sept 2003 just before the rice harvest
time, causing complete lost of the Summer-Autumn season of rice.
Table 5. Value of lost income in Kien Xuong due to 2003 flood event
Value Agriculture Livestock Aquaculture Other
Total income 721,669,000 1,004,219,231 275,675,108 1,505,000,000
of 2002 (in
VND)
Lost income -404,134,640 -261,097,000 -252,846,000 -15,050,000
(in VND)
% decrease -56% -26% -92% -1%
in 2003
Source: Household survey, 2009
When we looked at this loss in the aspect of poor versus rich households, we
found that in both cases, the rich people seemed to have much greater loss in terms
of absolute value compared to the poor (Table 6). The rich household loss in
livestock (including aquaculture), for example, was almost 7 times bigger than that of
the poor. But when we looked at how significant the loss was to the whole household
picture, we found that the flood had caused much more adverse impacts on the poor.
The percentage of loss was much greater to the poor than the rich. For example, the
9
poor lost 65% of their income from livestock while the rich lost 35%. Regarding crop
damage, the poor lost 70% of their income while the rich lost 33%.
Table 6. HH sensitivity to economic damage from floods in the Red River Delta
HH Time to Crop Property Livestock Relative Relative
recover damage damage (including Livestock Cropping
(days) (absolute) aquaculture damage damage
) damage % %
(absolute)
Poor (n=93) 367 1,666,495 1,638,387 868,186 -65% -70.5%
Middle 298 1,449,141 281,739 1,429,326 -31% -37 %
(n=92)
Rich (n=93) 458 3,572,817 2,430,430 5,352,248 -35% -33%
Significance * (p=.034) (p-.120) **(p=.000) (p=312) **
(p=0.001)
CRES 2009, unpublished data
But it should be noted here that wealthier households had higher amounts of
damage in absolute terms because they often invested in more risky economic
schemes (i.e. aquaculture ponds, large flocks of ducks, etc). As a result, it actually
took the rich longer to recover from floods than middle income or poor households.
As a result, it actually took the rich longer to recover from floods than middle income
or poor households (see Table 6). At the same time, the poor were also vulnerable
because they had fewer options to protect and evacuate their homes. Only middle-
income households seemed to be less vulnerable to climate damage than others.
10
construction must be taken from elsewhere, thus making the current dyke system
vulnerable. The average height of dykes is relatively low, ranging from 6-8 m. Some
parts are located right at the river bank; some parts have a height that is lower than
the river water. For example, the dyke along Thai Binh river is not high enough, and
in the flood season, the water level inside the dyke is 3-6m higher than that outside
the dyke. This causes high pressure on the dyke and its foundation. In 1945, 1969
and 1996, the water level was higher than 13m and it broke the dyke. There are also
many lakes along the dykes, making water drainage more difficult, including drainage
of flood water. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) have
invested in improvement of the dyke foundation, strengthening and retaining wall
construction at the places where dyke expansion is not possible, growing grass and
planting trees on top of the dykes to retain waves and encourage waterproofing.
Diversifying livelihood
The floods cause traumatic damage to the livelihoods of the local people in
the study sites. This is clearly seen in the change of household income after the
event. In the case of Chuong My, since the event occurred in 2008 the baseline year
for income was 2007 and for the case of Kien Xuong the baseline year before the
event was 2002 and the year of the event was 2003. The data form the survey
reveal interesting facts (Table 7). Before the year of the event, on average each
household in Chuong My earned twice as much income as compared with their
counterparts in Kien Xuong. On average each household in both districts earned
almost the same from remittances at VND 0.4 million. In 2007, the average
household in Chuong My earned the most income from livestock (VND 13.5 million
per household) . Meanwhile the average household in Kien Xuong earned the most
income from self-employment business. The next large source of income for the
average household in Chuong My was from government salary at almost VND 2.6
million. The second most important income source in Kien Xuong was also
government salaries, tied with livestock at VND 2.0 million. Income from fish ponds
and self-employment business were the third important sources for the household in
Chuong My at VND 2.2 million. In Kien Xuong, the next large source of income of the
11
average household was from fish pond and aquaculture. Agriculture was the fourth
important source of income of the average household in both district at VND 1.1
million for Chuong My and VND 1.4 million for Kien Xuong.
Table 7. Household income and change of income after the event
CHUONG MY
Source of Baseline After climate event
income income (2007) % HH with % HH with % HH with
Decrease Same Increase
Agriculture 5,362,145 48% 55% >1%
Livestock 13,547,181 99% 0.01% >1%
Aquaculture 2,281,756 67% 33% 0%
Salary and wage 11,290,134 36% 64% >1%
labor
KIEN XUONG
Source of Baseline After
income income (in 2002) Decrease Same Increase
Agriculture 4,770,247 96% 4% 0%
Livestock 6,573,933 52% 47% >1%
Aquaculture 1,761,166 42% 58% 0%
Salary and wage 6,690,080 18% 80% 2%
labor
Source: Household survey, 2009
12
non-farm jobs for the local people as well, such as harvest and transportation of the
vegetables to other places. The villagers also said they did not waste their land
when adding this one more crop. The head of Kien Xuong district DARD said these
winter crops have high productivity and they are providing sufficient amount of food
for the RRD and reserve a good amount for exports.
Figure 5. Typical vegetable fields along the Tra Ly river in Kien Xuong on right, and
irrigated rice fields behind the dyke on the far side of the river
The local villagers said that building permanent houses is the most effective
adaptation option. However, this option is not feasible for the poor. Table 8 below
shows the degree of permanence of house by district. The majority of households
(71%) in Kien Xuong had permanent houses and 28% had semi permanent houses.
Meanwhile in Chuong My more households had semi-permanent houses (51%) than
those had permanent houses (46%). The percentage of those who had not
permanent houses account for a very small number – 3% for Chuong My and only
1% for Kien Xuong.
13
Table 8. Degree of permanence of the house
Status of the house Chuong My Kien Xuong
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
Permanent (e.g. all wall
are made of brick or
strong wood) 69 46% 107 71%
Semi permanent (e.g.
part of wall is brick, &
other is wood) 76 51% 42 28%
Not permanent (e.g. no
brick, but only wood or
bamboo or other) 4 3% 1 1%
Total 149 100% 150 100%
Source: Household survey, 2009
After the floods, all the households participated in cleaning up activities. They
first cleaned their wells and water tank, yards and then joined their neighbors to clean
up roads and canals to clear water flow. The most common activities taken by the
villagers at Chuong My and Kien Xuong after the events are as follows:
• Treating water sources for the family and cleaning the environment
• Recovering production activities (repairing dams, paddy fields and ponds)
• Repairing/strengthening houses and family damaged items
• Contributing person-days and money to local government to recover disaster
damage
14
• Coping with financial shortage (withdrawing money from savings, selling
assets, borrowing money )
Being asked about the needs, a lot of the villagers and cadres asked for
financial support to improve the local dyke, drainage system, and inter-village roads.
The local dyke system needs consolidation yearly and it is important that such work
has to be done before the flood season comes. Some villagers and leaders
suggested for specific improvements such as installment of a larger volume pump
station, or collection of money to clear up azola in the canals before the typhoon and
flood season comes. One recent advantage has been that the road system in
Chuong My commune was upgraded as a way of responding and adapting to the
occurrence of floods and typhoons. The local cadres explained that this road helps
to evacuate the villagers more efficiently.
15
institutions. Plans and actions are made in accordance to the warning. For example,
in Thai Binh, depending on the information on the urgent storm heading to red river
delta or the urgent command from SFPCC or when the warning of level 2 and up
sign, all committee members have to be present at their appointed site. When
warning of Level 2 and up, and of huge storms is given, all members of all
committees must be present at sites and units they are in charge of.
At household level, most of the villagers in both Chuong My and Kien Xuong
said they received warning before the floods took place in their areas. There is a
difference, though, in the number of people who said “yes” or “no” to the question if
they received any warning about the floods. In Chuong My only one fifth of the
interviewees said they did not receive any warning in advance, whereas one third of
the Kien Xuong interviewees were very affirmative about the fact that they did not
know any thing about the flood until it came. The fact that the flood that took place in
Chuong My (Hanoi) in 2008 followed a fierce 2-day rain and it happened in the
capital city so the media released forecast and news about it frequently. The
inundation in Kien Xuong (Thai Binh), on the other hand, was not so alarming. Thus,
the news about the event was not extensive.
The villagers claimed a number of sources for warnings and they listed
relatives, neighbors, national government, local government, NGO, broadcast and
print media (radio/TV/newspaper) and some other sources. Local government and
mass media seem to be the most effective sources in the sense that more people
received news and warnings about the events from these sources (compared to
other). In Kien Xuong, one third (36%) of the interviewees claimed they received
warnings from the commune People’s Committee and hamlet cadres for at least 3
hours to at most 8 days before the event took place. In Chuong My, nearly half
(43%) of the interviewed villagers reported that they were given warnings by their
local commune and village cadres for at least 1 hour to at most 8 days. But quite a
few of them said they got the warning 1 day (24.8%) or 2 days (14%) before the
event came.
The villagers were quick to react to the warnings, yet, it took them quite some
time. In Chuong My, most of the villagers took 4-6 hours (37%) to move rice, clothing
and some other essential belongings to another places. The villagers who had to
evacuate livestock took more time, from half a day (7.4%) to 2 days (17.4%). In Kien
Xuong, the villagers either spent 3 hours (13.2%) or more time (up to 3 days – 2.6%)
to respond. As mentioned earlier that the event in Thai Binh was not as drastic as in
Chuong My, the Thai Binh villagers spent less time on evacuating their household
belongings.
16
Figure 6. River diversions often lack strong dikes, and can easily overflow
into neighboring fields
6. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Long term adaptation options / activities such as changes in housing styles
(concrete, 2 story houses); diversification of farm incomes; change in crops and
varieties grown, engagement in non-farm activities… are very limited in terms of
engaged households as well as types of activities. There have been very few ‘hard
adaptation’ measures taken by individual households, such as to protect their
farmland from flood by building small impoundments or drainage systems.
Longer term adaptation options are lacking, both at the household level and
policy and responses by government authorities. There are limited adaptation
responses at either the household or the government level that either address the
drivers of overall vulnerability or ones that directly confront climate change
processes.
Adaptation strategy for both households and policy levels need to include
both “soft” and “hard” options. Such distinguishing is necessary, as the government
tends to focus attention on the hard adaptation options: those that are more
expensive, more likely to attract donor funding, but variable to climate impacts while
households tend to choose “soft” (behavior) options which are simple and not costly.
As of yet, however, there is no strong advocacy lobby to put these soft options on the
table.
17
REFERENCES
Bui Nam Sach (2004). "Country/ Organizational Report: Red River Basin Planning
Management Organization." Presentation to Training Program on Integrated Water
Resources Management and Strengthening of River Basin Committees, 26 July - 6 August
2004, Bangkok, Thailand.
Dang, Tran (2004). Canh giac truoc nhung hiem hoa thien tai. People’s newspaper. Volume
27(805), 4 July, 2004. Pg. 4 -7.
DFID (2004). The impact of climate change on the vulnerability of the poor. London: DFID.
Few, R. and Pham Gia Tran (2010). Climatic hazards, health and poverty: exploring the
connections in Vietnam. Working Paper 19, DEV Working Paper Series, The School of
International Development, University of East Anglia, UK.
General Statistic Office. (2007). Hien trang su dung dat phan theo dia phuong (Tai thoi diem
2007) http://www.gso.gov.vn/default.aspx?tabid=386&idmid=3&ItemID=7305
Hai, Nguyen. (2008). Mot vai Van de ve Quan ly Tong hop Tai nguyen Moi truong Luu vuc
Song Hong. http://www.nea.gov.vn/Sukien_Noibat/Luuvuc_Song /Tintuc/ Nghien%20cuu/
tin3.htm (6 January 2009)
Khanh, Tran Tien and Le, Nguyen Khoa Dieu. (2001). Nguyen Nhan Lu lut Lon o Dong bang
Song Hong. http://www.vnbaolut.com/lulutSH_uni.htm
Mai, C. V., M. J. F. Stive, et al. (2009). "Coastal protection strategies for the Red River Delta."
Journal of Coastal Research 25(1): 105-116.
OCHA Regional Office for Asia-Pacific (2008). Asia-Pacific Region - Historical Monthly
Climate Data. Bangkok, UN Office on Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
Poverty Task Force (2002). Reducing vulnerability and providing social protection. Localizing
MDGs for Poverty Reduction in Vietnam Project. Hanoi.
Swinkels, R and C Turk (2004). Poverty and Remote areas: evidence from new data and
questions for the future. Background paper for the PAC conference, 24-26 November 2004 ,
World Bank, Vietnam.
VNA (2008). Vietnam ask emissioners to aid worst-hit nations to tackle climate change.
Vietnam News Agency, Dec 12, 2008.
World Bank (2009). Country Social Analysis: Ethnicity and Development in Vietnam. Social
Development Department, World Bank, Washington DC.
18