200 nulear weapons by 1954, and delivery o hal this number would devastate the United States. Te Joint Chies o Sta made a biologial warare a-pability a high priority, and the Air Fore put themin the same organizational level as nulear weap-ons. Te Air Fore aquired 500-lb lusters o theM114 4-lb biologial bomblet with bruellosis romthe Chemial Corps. Tis was an interim item orstrategi attak against Soviet ities to augment thenulear arsenal.
Interest in biologial weapons waned signiantly one the number o nulear weapons in the inven-tory ould saturate potential targets. Te Eisen-hower administration started developing a SingleIntegrated Operational Plan (SIOP) to oordinatenulear delivery systems. Te rst omprehensiveplan, SIOP-62, envisioned delivering 3,200 nulear weapons against the 1,060 targets throughout theSino-Soviet blok in a preemptive attak, and 1,706nulear weapons against 725 targets in retaliation.Tis hange in strategi nulear planning produedan over-kill making strategi biologial weapons al-most irrelevant. Te role biologial weapons wouldadopt exploited areas other weapon systems were in-apable o ahieving: LAC, CI, and LOA.
Large Area Coverage (1958 – 1969)
Seeking a new edge ater the Soviet Union detonatedits rst nulear weapon the United States initiated aprogram to build a hydrogen bomb. When a nule-ar weapon designer asked General Curtis LeMay orhis requirements or a nulear weapon design, Le-May retorted “Why don’t you guys make a bomb toblow up all o Russia.” Te deterrent onept o theCold War embraed
destrucion o the enemy.Te United States detonated its largest nulear de-vise (15 Mt) during operation CASLE BRAVO in1954 at Bikini Atoll. Not only did the devise havealmost three times its designed yield o 6 Mt, itsallout traveled o ourse over an area ar more ex-tensive than originally estimated (Figure 4). I usedin a ombat, signiant thermal and blast destru-tion rom suh a devise would aec an area o 80- 200 square miles; serious-to-lethal allout overing50,000 square miles. Te impac on national poliy thinking was dramati.Te Chemial Corps at one time advertised bio-logial weapons as apable o overing the widtho a ontinent. Te laim resulted rom a series o large-sale eld trials with simulants that when ex-trapolated with the inecive dose and aerobiology o military biologials indiated the easibility o neutralizing targets tens to hundreds o thousandso square miles in size. A 1952 eld trial with simu-lants demonstrated the tehnial easibility o over-ing tens o thousands o square miles with a theoreti-ally inecive aerosol. Te impliations o this eldtrial went pracially unnotied until 1957 when theUnited States and Great Briton simultaneously andindependently investigated the LAC onept.Te British were dissatised with weather onditions while planning biologial eld trials with simulantsin southern England in 1957. Tey thereore deid-ed on onducing the trials as operational exerisesevery six weeks regardless o weather in September1958. Tese exerises indiated spray attaks 100 –300 miles long ould readily produe 50% asualties100 – 150 miles downwind; an employment oneptor an o-target attak, only requiring a mean windprole predicable within 45 degrees to target.Te Chemial Corps onduced operation LAC(Large Area Coverage) in 1957 – 1958. It was thelargest series o open-air experiments o its kind,measuring overage over the onterminous United
Figure . The Mt CASTLE BRAVO burst in asserted the strategic importance o radiological allout.