Aquinas on Lying (according to ST 2a2ae.110.1) Phil 311 – Dr.

Tobias Hoffmann

When is something a lie? (= What specifies the lie; from where does the lie take its species?)

Do I want to deceive?
Do I think it is false?

talking to deceived?
Do I intend falsity?
Do I say something

Is the person I am

Is there falsehood

Is there falsehood

Is there falsehood
“materially”?

“effectively”?
“formally”?
false?

1. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes

2. ” ” ” ” no ” ” ”

3. yes yes yes no yes yes yes no

4. ” ” ” ” no ” ” ”

5. yes no no no yes yes no no

6. ” ” ” ” no ” ” ”

7. no yes yes yes yes no yes yes

8. ” ” ” ” no ” ” ”

9. no yes yes no yes no yes no

10. ” ” ” ” no ” ” ”

11. no no no no yes no no no

12. ” ” ” ” no ” ” ”

Comments:
• According to Aquinas, only statements that are false “formally” are lies.
• To intend actually to deceive a person (a falsehood effectively) makes the lie only more
complete; but even when you intentionally say something false, it is a lie formally. In fact,
even if I say a lie in jest, without the intention to deceive the person, it is still a lie.
• To call a statement false “effectively” does not depend on whether someone is actually de-
ceived, but only on whether I want to deceive someone (#1, #2)
• The actual effect on the person is irrelevant (compare the even numbered with the odd
numbered cases) ⇒ the actual effect does not change the moral character of my action.