engulfed in combat with drug traffickers laying siege withgrenades, anti-tank weapons, rocket-propelled grenadelaunchers, and automatic weapons? Would the NationalGuard be an option at an absolute minimum?
Let us not forget that as far back as August 2005, NuevoLaredo, Mexico experienced that firepower as well as themurder of police, police leaders, and local governmentofficials. Was it not incredibly obvious to the U.S., as well asMexico, that this was a real threat to both sides of the border?The local U.S. consulate even had to close for a few days!
During the period of 2005 to this very day, both the U.S. andMexican governments have continued to politically second-
guess what is fact from fiction, and played “name the problem”
that has been graphically witnessed by countless victims.Is it narcoterrorism or not narcoterrorism? Is it an insurgencyor not; is it transnational organized crime; is Mexico apotentially failed state; or is it just simply about the drug tradeand supply and demand?
In truth, it is simply about the slaughter of people and an
fiance of the rule of law. A chess game that muststop.
It appears that Calderon has personally set aside the issue of
political costs of decisions made on Mexico’s homeland
security. Calderon has asked for U.S. help and received it,this evidenced in the takedown of many of those in theprincipal organized crime hierarchies in Mexico.
Yet this is not about the quantity or seizure of drugs in whichsuccess is measured. The demand will easily outlast thesupply. And transnational criminals will always chase themassive profits in U.S. contraband demand
whatever is indemand.The viable issues of concern regarding a sustained militaryeffort in Mexico are weaknesses of the military in criticalcriminal justice procedures, from criminal law, evidencerecognition/collection, investigation for prosecution purposesand related matters, to secure convictions
all of which arefundamentally law enforcement responsibilities.The palpable results of combined military and police efforts inMexico, with U.S. assistance, have created setbacks to thetraffickers. This is evidenced clearly in some redirecting ofdrug routes through the Caribbean and South America toEurope. Too, other organized crime activities such asextortion, kidnapping for ransom, murder for hire, and humantrafficking are on the increase.
So, once cohesive cartel power structures have finally provento be penetrable. Yet how will success be truly measured tosatisfy critics and those that second guess actual interdiction