special article
1948: The Crucial Year in the History of
Jammu and Kashmir
Rakesh Ankit
The involvement of the British in Kashmir even after
India’s and Pakistan’s independence, British realpolitik,
crystallisation of Cold War politics and an “idealist” infant
United Nations – all had major roles to play in the
imbroglio between India and Pakistan over the state. A
historical overview of the events in 1948 that “sealed the
fate of Jammu and Kashmir” is presented here after
perusing papers of the British government of that time,
which have been released after 60 years.
Rakesh Ankit (rakesh.ankit@gmail.com) studied history at Delhi
and Oxford.
Economic & Political Weekly  EPW   march 13, 2010  vol xlv no 11
1
1
948 was a fatal year for Jammu and Kashmir. Containing
partisan politics, a year-long war, diplomatic deliberations
and nationalistic public space, 1948 set Kashmir on the path
to where it is today. It saw India’s military capabilities being
e­xhibited in spring (March-June) and winter (October-December),
Pakistan’s moral position being undermined by the involvement
of its army in summer (May) and its admission in autumn
(­August), and, British interests being achieved by its nationals
present in warring military-bureaucratic machines. The year
which saw the exit of Mahatma Gandhi, Mohammad Ali Jinnah
and Louis Mountbatten from the political scene of the sub-­continent
began with the Kashmir crisis reaching the United Nations and
ended with the agreement on the ceasefire which was proclaimed
on 1 January, to come into effect from 5 January 1949.
If 1948 had the realpolitik of the British interests in south Asia,
central Asia and west Asia affecting the evolution of the Kashmir
conflict and shaping the international response to it, it also saw
the idealism of the United Nations Commission on India and
P­akistan (UNCIP) set up by an infant United Nations. Over and
above all, 1948 showed the continuity of the British involvement
and its very definite perceptions about the origin, evolution and
the impact of the Kashmir crisis on the Imperial/Commonwealth
defence strategy – best personified by the elevation of generals
Roy Bucher and Douglas Gracey to the post of the commander-in-
chief of the Indian and Pakistani armies, succeeding generals
Rob Lockhart and Frank Messervy, respectively.
This essay is a political history of Kashmir in 1948 which has
been overshadowed by the Indian independence and Partition of
1947. It shows that 1948 is, in many ways, more important in the
subsequent history of India-Pakistan relations over Kashmir as
well as the international involvement in the subcontinent. It was
in 1948 that the combustion of 1947, in Kashmir, assumed matu-
rity and fulfilment. The tragedy of 1947 was essentially commu-
nal while 1948 saw disparate issues – British interests, Indian
outrage and Pakistani resentment competing over Kashmir.
The spontaneity of the differences in Kashmir (Poonch and
Gilgit) in August-September 1947 as well as the raid of October
gave way to greater planning and organisation in 1948. Gone
were the hasty calls to communalism or nationalism; the
­whimsical decisions and decision-makers of 1947-48 saw dis­
putants digging heels. Interests were entrenched, ideologies
­clarified and intents established.
Most importantly, 1948 saw the crystallisation of the Cold War
politics on the “internationalisation” of the Kashmir crisis.
49
speciAl article
E­specially, of the overwhelming British (and by the end of the
year American as well) attempt to safeguard its vital interests in
the region with respect to the simultaneously emerging Cold War
[political and geostrategic (aimed at the former communist
S­oviet Union in central Asia) and economic and religious (aimed
at the “Islamic” west Asia)].
At a time when weak and fragile India and Pakistan had just
begun to recreate themselves, they jostled with each other for the
control of Kashmir for different reasons. While they knew what
they wanted they were not allowed to pursue it the way they
wanted by the considerable presence of British individuals and
geostrategic interests. The undeclared, limited war of 1948 was
fought between groups, not properly led and armies, not even led
by their own nationals.
International Geopolitics
Avoiding the existing, essentially domestic, historiography, this
paper focuses on the international geopolitics of 1948 and Kash-
mir’s role in it due to its location, the deeper significance of its
impact on British relationship with the Arab-Muslim world as
well as the former communist Soviet world due to its dominant
Muslim composition and political accession to India and the
h­istorical continuity of British concerns on the north-west of the
Indian subcontinent. It argues that throughout 1948, the British
contained the actual fighting in Kashmir and dominated, not un-
naturally given their familiarity, the discussions at the UN. They
attempted to bring in the US as an influential mediator between
India and Pakistan, with the result that by the mid-1950s the US
involvement in the subcontinent was set in stone. It was 1948
which saw the transformation of a regional conflict to a national
question and then an international concern. The domestic dis­
abilities of 1947 gave way to international involvement in 1948 as
the dominating feature of the Kashmir conflict.
The year 1948 shocked the British imperatives, the Indian
­innocence and the Pakistani insecurities. For the former, it set in
stone the strategic necessity to confront the former Soviet Union
in the e­ntire volatile and difficult region from Turkey to Tibet
thus providing the ultimate prism through which Britain per-
ceived events in this arc. For the latter two, it so drilled the re-
spective sets of nationalist passions, emotions of bitterness and
distrust and p­olitical imperatives that anything about the other
became fundamental to everything about the self. Having mined
the archives and observed the prejudices therein, I think that the
various p­ositions in 1948 were more subjective than each realised
but less so than the others charged. Since 1948, “too many truths
have been buried”.1
2 e­xploit the Kashmir conflict “as an additional factor” to this end.13
As 1948 opened, the Kashmir conflict was the last thing Britain
needed – for two reasons. First, the British military minds held
that they needed both India and Pakistan to secure “the peace,
welfare and security…from the Mediterranean to the China Sea”2
and to confront the “intrigue from Sinkiang and intervention
from north” with “implications far beyond Kashmir”3 but was
now forced to choose one. Second, they had been worried about
the weakening strategic hold in Palestine and Greece, unhappy
50
with the increasingly autonomous and assertive American
i­nvolvement there “without due regard to British interests”,4
a­nxious about Egypt and Iraq and arguing for “…a pan-Islamic
federation/Arab league…to thwart Russia”.5 Against this back-
drop, the Kashmir conflict made them concerned about losing
control of Pakistan as well.
Losing Pakistan was not an option for London. The British
chief of staff (COS) had underlined this five times between May
1945 – when Pakistan was but an idea of a few – and July 1947,
when it was about to be a reality for all. They had first reported to
W­inston Churchill that Britain must retain its military connec-
tion with India in view of the “Soviet menace” for India was a
valuable base for force deployment, a transit point for air and sea
communications, a large reserve of manpower, and, had air bases
in the north-west from which Britain could threaten Soviet mili-
tary installations,6 then repeated to Clement Attlee the impor-
tance of these north-west airfields.7 In July 1946, they identified
the crucial arc from Turkey to Pakistan, in view of essential oil sup-
plies, defence and communications requirements, with the R­ussian
threat.8 In November 1946, they summed up that “Western India”
(post-1947 Pakistan) – with Karachi and Peshawar – was strategi-
cally and ideologically crucial for British Commonwealth inter-
ests.9 Five weeks before Partition, the COS concluded:
The area of Pakistan is strategically the most important in the conti-
nent of India and the majority of our strategic requirements could be
met by an agreement with Pakistan alone. We do not therefore con-
sider that failure to obtain the [defence] agreement with India would
cause us to modify any of our requirements.10
It was with this mindset that the British COS observed the out-
break of hostilities in Kashmir in October 1947. One of its civilian
counterparts, the Commonwealth Relations Office (hereafter
CRO), saw a weak Pakistan facing a materially stronger and
a­ggressive India and envisaged the possible downfall of Pakistan
with the probable participation of the frontier tribes, Afghans
and Soviet Russia. It foresaw either the emergence of another
Palestine situation on a greater scale or the disappearance of
P­akistan with considerable effects, in both cases, on west Asia.11
Consequently, it advised help to Pakistan to prevent its collapse
which would be “understood as Her Majesty’s Government’s
(HMG) failure as Partition plan was sponsored as a British Act of
Parliament” and to prevent “collapse and chaos along the NWFP
– North West Frontier Province – (which) will profoundly affect
imperial strategy…even at the risk of ruining our present entirely
friendly relations with the ­Indian government”.12
The CRO believed that “powerful forces in India, which bitterly
resented Partition, were determined to bring about the collapse
of Pakistan…by the method of economic pressure” and would
This belief was strengthened by such reports as Claude Auchin-
leck’s (Supreme Commander, India-Pakistan, 1947) sent six weeks
into Partition:
I have no hesitation whatsoever in affirming that the present India
Cabinet are implacably determined to do all in their power to prevent
the establishment of the Dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis. In this,
I am supported by the unanimous opinion of my senior officers, and
indeed, by all responsible British officers cognisant of the situation.14
march 13, 2010  vol xlv no 11  EPW   Economic & Political Weekly

The Russia Angle
Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, too, shared this axiomatic concern
that India did not play fair in the division of military and eco-
nomic assets leaving Pakistan in a difficult situation which would
be worsened by India’s control over Kashmir.15 The CRO further
cautioned that Russia was bound to be interested “in what is hap-
pening next to the Soviet border”16 and felt that Kashmir ought to
go to Pakistan, otherwise it would be “overrun from the north-
west and lost to the British Commonwealth”.17 The overarching
conviction in 1947 was “to back Pakistan (over K­ashmir) in the
interests of Imperial Defence”18 to avoid repercussions elsewhere
given its “huge Islamic aspect”.19 In 1948, it became imperative to
stop a desperate Pakistan from making overtures to Russia20 and
this was shared with the Americans to cooperate on policy at the
United Nations.21
The Foreign Office (hereafter FO) too viewed the Kashmir con-
flict as a religious war which “might be used by Russia as a pretext
for intervening”.22 It felt that the “Russians tend to favour India as
against Pakistan”.23 Moreover, any initiatives had to keep in mind
“the present difficult position over Palestine” which made any
“talks about HMG being unfair to Pakistan (over K­ashmir) undesir-
able”.24 It reminded the Muslim countries via its embassies:
HMG might easily have handed over the whole of India to the Hindu
majority. But they loyally protected the Muslim minority, even to the
point of facilitating the creation of a separate independent Muslim state
by going out of their way. This is what the Muslims themselves demand-
ed. We have recognised Pakistan as a Dominion and have supported its
admission to UNO. We would always come to Pakistan’s help.25
As Pakistan’s political existence was not considered by the FO
“as a good risk”,26 there was to be no question of “throwing the
Muslim lamb to the Hindu wolf over Kashmir”27 where events
were rapidly deteriorating. On 9 August 1947, the Muslim Poonch
started to stir against the Hindu Srinagar. Maharaja Hari Singh
responded by getting rid of his Prime Minister Ram Chandra Kak
two days later. On 14 August, Kashmir signed a “standstill agree-
ment” with Pakistan which was violated by the latter from 9 Sep-
tember onwards when it cut off the supplies of sugar and petrol to
Kashmir. There then followed a whirlwind of changes in key
personnel(s). On 29 September, brigadier Henry Scott (chief of
staff, J&K State Forces, 1936-47) left Kashmir and was succeeded
by brigadier Rajinder Singh. On 6 October, Sheikh Abdullah was
released in Srinagar whereupon he travelled to Delhi to meet
J­awaharlal Nehru. On 11 October Mehr Chand Mahajan took over
as the new prime minister from brigadier Janak Singh who had
been holding the temporary charge since Kak’s ouster. Four days
later, Mahajan complained to Clement Attlee and Liaquat Ali
Khan against the violation of Standstill Agreement by Pakistan;
on 18 October, he repeated his complaints to Jinnah. Liaquat and
Jinnah denied these charges and invited Mahajan to Karachi for
parleys on 19 and 20 October, respectively.
Hari Singh’s Appeal
While these communications were producing little results, from
20 October onwards the events on grounds moved with discon-
certing speed. On that day the first raiders started for Poonch,
Domel and Baramulla entering Muzaffarabad two days later.
Economic & Political Weekly  EPW   march 13, 2010  vol xlv no 11
special article
On 24 October, New Delhi received the first formal appeal
from Hari Singh as well as an informal tip-off which George
Cunningham (governor of the NWFP, 1937-46 and August
1947-48) sent to Rob ­Lockhart, the commander-in-chief (C-in-C),
August-December 1947. Events of the next three days are still a
topic of controversy.
On 25 October, Hari Singh left Srinagar for Jammu. The Times
reported that Muslim tribesmen from Pakistan had entered
­Kashmir and cut the road from Rawalpindi to Srinagar. Lockhart
started preparing military plans and officers were sent to Srina-
gar to assess the situation along with V P Menon. Nehru outlined
the Indian attitude to Attlee. The next day, Attlee wrote to both
Nehru and Liaquat urging them to “restore order in Kashmir”.
Indian military plans were being finalised as the officers and
M­enon reported back from Srinagar. On the morning of 27,
V P Menon left for Jammu and got M M Batra (Hari Singh’s d­eputy
prime minister) to sign the Instrument of Accession and the
I­ndian troops landed in Srinagar.
Lawrence Graffety-Smith, the UK High Commissioner in Paki-
stan (1947-51), spoke for many when he sent this report to London
two days after Kashmir’s accession to India:
Indian government’s acceptance of accession of Kashmir [was] the
heaviest blow yet sustained by Pakistan in her struggle for existence.
Strategically, Pakistan’s frontiers have been greatly extended as a hos-
tile India gains access to NWFP. This will lead to a redefinition of the
Afghan policy for worse. Second, Russian interests will be aroused in
Gilgit and NWFP which creates a new international situation which
HMG and the US government cannot overlook. Third, there is a serious
threat to Pakistan’s irrigation systems; hydroelectric projects from the
accession [all five rivers draining the Pakistani Punjab flow from I­ndia,
three through Kashmir] and finally, two-three million Kashmiri
­Muslims will worsen the already massive refugee problem with five-
and-a-half million Muslims having been driven out of East Punjab.28
On 31 October, the CRO emphasised Kashmir’s “unnatural
a­ccession to India”, given its Muslim population, transport and
communication links and the trade relations with Pakistan estab-
lished by the 1870 customs agreement. It also noted that Pakistan
had been heavily weakened by the refugee problem and it had
considerable difficulty in imposing its authority over local offi-
cials. Finally, India had been unnecessarily provocative by
a­ccepting the provisional accession of Kashmir and sending Sikh
troops with no prior consultation with Pakistan.29 The CRO had
been kept aware of the events in Kashmir in 1947 by W F Webb
(the British resident in Srinagar, till February) and major
W P Cranson (formerly of the Indian Political Service, but
a­ttached after independence to the UK High Commission in
I­ndia), in addition to Henry Scott, in particular the threats made
by the Pir of Manki Sharif, the economic blockade imposed on
Kashmir by Pakistan and the intent of invasion on behalf of the
tribesmen in Hunza, Dir and Chitral.30 It had anticipated the pos-
sibility of Pakistan moving beyond threats of invasion, border
raids and the economic blockade31 but opted against “intervening
with the government of Pakistan for obvious reasons”.32
George Cunningham’s diary entries from 6 October 1947 on-
wards establish the involvement of Rawalpindi and knowledge/
approval of Karachi in the entry of tribesmen into Kashmir.33
In his correspondences with E F L Wood (Lord Halifax) and
51
speciAl article
Louis Mountbatten, he confirmed that “official eyes have been
closed to make the facilities for the tribesmen available”.34 Twenty
years later, an embittered Iskander Mirza in exile in London re-
membered “all those dishonourable intrigues so very rampant
since the very i­nception of Pakistan” in a letter to Olaf Caroe (Gov-
ernor of the NWFP until August 1947), “…what did the politicians
do to Sir George. Behind his back they pushed tribesmen into
Kashmir...”35 Cunningham – along with Caroe – believed that the
Kashmir crisis lay intertwined with the imperatives of Pakistan’s
and, by extension, Asian subcontinent’s defence against Russia in
the NWFP and against Afghanistan and Iran in Baluchistan.36 They
were strongly supported by Robert Francis Mudie (governor of
West Punjab, 1947-49), who looked upon Pakistan as “the barrier
which prevents Communism spreading south of the Himalayas”
and “should be preserved intact”.37
Split in London
The views of Cunningham, Caroe and Mudie did not go unchal-
lenged. By the end of 1947, London was well and truly split.
S­tafford Cripps and Pug Ismay (with powerful support from
Mountbatten) were pro-India whereas Bevin and Philip Noel-Baker
were pro-Pakistan. The two British high commissioners meanwhile
were engaged in their own “telegraphic war”.38 Prime Minister At-
tlee – who had old links with Nehru which were never the same
after 1948 – tended to look at “Pakistan as the more valuable ally
and India as the more valuable partner”; an equivocation which
general Frank Messervy (C-in-C Pakistan, 1947-48) interpreted as
being pro-Pakistan.39 While the former camp wanted the prime
minister to pressurise Jinnah “to stop fighting” – in effect charging
him with major responsibility for the raid,40 the latter group ex-
pressed doubts “whether Jinnah could a­ctually have stopped the
movement of tribesmen however ardently he  had desired” and
successfully counselled against sending such a message.41
By the end of 1947, “the movement of tribesmen” and the war it
caused were already two months old. In November – the first
month of the battle – raiders occupied Bhimber, Rajouri, Rawalkot
and threatened Kotli, Poonch and Naoshera. Indian troops res­
ponded by freeing Baramulla and then entered Uri – 65 miles
west from Srinagar – driving back the raiders. On 17 November,
Jhangar was relieved and the following day the raiders were
pushed out of Naoshera. In the last week of November, raiders
and Indian troops exchanged Mirpur and Kotli, respectively. In
December, Indian military plans for winter were finalised – relief
of Poonch, advance on Bhimber and control of Jhelum valley “as
far west as possible” even as the raiders reoccupied Jhangar.
3 South Africa were cautioned that, “in view of the Palestine situa-
On the first day of 1948, India took the Kashmir issue to the UN
acting on the advice Mountbatten had given to Nehru almost a
month ago (9 December). On the same day, the CRO appraised
the UK delegation in New York that:
Pakistan cannot be held blameless regarding the entry of tribesmen into
Kashmir in that encouragement and assistance were given by l­ocal gov-
ernment officials in the NWFP and no authoritative disapproval of tribal
action has been uttered by any high official of the Pakistan Government.
On the other hand, the Pakistan Government is not militarily strong
enough to control the tribes by force and any attempt to do so might
52
raise a conflagration on the whole frontier. These c­onsiderations, how-
ever, do not condone the apparently tacit acceptance of tribal incursions
by the Pakistan Government and so there r­emains a handle for the Indi-
an Government to point to Pakistan as aggressor.42
While the permanent representative of England (“His ­Majesty’s
Government” (HMG)) at the UN – since its inception – had been
the redoubtable Alexander Cadogan, for the deliberations on
Kashmir, Attlee appointed Philip Noel-Baker who also headed
the CRO (1947-50). He too was worried that
Incursions now taking place in Kashmir constitute an “armed attack”
upon Indian territory in view of their scale and of the fact that Kashmir
has acceded to the Indian Union. This is so irrespective of whether f­orces
in question are organised or disorganised or whether they are control-
led by, or enjoy the convenience of, Government of Pakistan. India is
therefore entitled to take measures which she may deem necessary for
self-defence pending definitive action by Security Council to restore
peace – prima facie – repelling invaders but possibly pursuit of invaders
into Pakistan territory. Security Council could not decide out of hand
that India was not justified in so doing in the case envisaged.43
Thus, given its importance, Pakistan’s physical survival was
the first “most important consideration” for which Noel-Baker
was to dissuade India from invading Pakistan from East Punjab
by invoking Article 51 of the UN charter.44
In the United Nations
The first hint of the diplomatic line that Britain was going to adopt
in the UN came at the end of the first week of 1948 when Graffety-
Smith made it clear to the CRO that there is no use in taking into
account the Indian claim to a legal obligation to d­efend Kashmir
as it was unlikely to command acceptance in P­akistan.45 Three
days later, the CRO – while spelling out the “­important considera-
tions affecting our attitude in the Security Council” – cautioned
Noel-Baker to be “particularly careful to avoid giving Pakistan the
impression that we are siding with ­India. In view of the Palestine
situation this would carry the risk of aligning the whole of Islam
against us”. Bevin at the FO, too, invoked the “Palestine parallel”.46
Noel-Baker was, however, also warned to be careful in his ­handling
of the Indians “on account of their emotional condition [and] their
respect for legal processes”.47
On 12 January 1948, the CRO wrote to its high commissions in
Washington, Delhi, and Karachi and to its UN delegation in New
York to ensure that “any action taken by the Security Council
should not prejudice our strategic requirements in India and
P­akistan”.48 Attlee himself listed these in a message to Cadogan:
“check hostile Afghanistan, discourage ‘Pathanistan’ and inde-
pendent Kashmir (otherwise) Russia would cause mischief”.49
Simultaneously, British missions in Australia, New Zealand and
tion, we must avoid giving Pakistan impression that we are siding
with India against her (as) this would carry the risk of aligning
the whole of Islam against us”.50
It was clear that the CRO did not see “how Pakistan govern-
ment could be expected to get tribesmen out of Kashmir without
first putting their own force in”.51 While it agreed that
There is evidence to show that transit facilities, the use of Pakistan
t­erritory as a base for operations, the active participation of
Pakistan nationals, the provision of equipment from Pakistan – and
march 13, 2010  vol xlv no 11  EPW   Economic & Political Weekly

later on – active help by Pakistan officers, including training and guid-
ance were given by Pakistan [It complicated this straightforward as-
sertion by distinguishing between] toleration of, or inability to pre-
vent, aid from being given and active giving of aid. Secondly, distinction
must be drawn between the actions of the Pakistan government and of
Provincial governments on the one hand and those of certain of their
officials and nationals on the other. Finally, the timing of any ­established
aid must be seen in relation to the general course of events.52
Even as Gopalaswami Ayengar presented the Indian case at
the UN Security Council (UNSC) on 15 January, the CRO moved to
express sympathy with the difficult situation faced by Pakistan:
Because of the resentment amongst the tribes of the NWFP, the attacks
on Muslims in East Punjab, Poonch and Jammu and the decision to
send Sikh troops by India into Kashmir. Second, any attempt to stop
the movement of the tribesmen would probably have involved P­akistan
in a major frontier war which they were in no state to undertake.
Third, the establishment of the Dominion of India in Kashmir was a
substantial blow to their prestige. Fourth, it gave India access to the
NWFP tribal areas with all the scope for mischief-making which this
involved. Fifth, it reduced Pakistan’s hopes of pruning their defence
budget by a friendly accommodation with the tribal elements. Sixth, it
placed India in a position to control some of the headworks of
P­akistan’s irrigation systems and hydroelectric projects. Finally, there
was also the fear that there might occur in Kashmir a repetition of the
events in the East Punjab whereby Sikhs and Dogras carried out large-
scale massacres of Muslims designed to change the entire composition
of the population.53
The fact that the Pakistan’s government was involved with the
raiders, repeatedly denied by Zafrulla Khan (foreign minister of
Pakistan, 1947-54), was revealed to Noel-Baker as early as 16 Jan-
uary by Graffety-Smith who wrote:
Undoubtedly, staging camps [have been] occupied by tribesmen…­
appreciable leakage of Pakistani equipment [has occurred] through
junior army and police officials…undoubtedly petrol-transport-food
[has been] provided. [There is an] embarrassing great gap between
proclaimed theory by Pakistan leaders and actions of their
s­ubordinates.54
Noel-Baker chose to not merely ignore but bury this in the
face of Pakistan’s strategic utility against “Russian aggres-
sion”.55 He was convinced that “Russia’s game is to prevent a
settlement (on Kashmir) and then to bring about anarchy and
chaos”.56 Further, he held that even if Pakistan closed its
K­ashmir frontiers, there would still be heavy bloodshed before
the Muslim resistance in Kashmir was overcome and that
I­ndia’s plan for the preparation of the plebiscite was unfair as
opposed to Pakistan’s “practical plan for stopping the fighting
and securing a fair plebiscite – similar to almost every point to
the British brief”.57
Britain used its position as the country with unrivalled influ-
ence in, and knowledge of, the subcontinent to manipulate the
UNSC. Exactly who was pulling the strings behind the scenes
throughout these negotiations is shown by a telegram sent by the
UK delegation to the CRO three weeks into 1948. It refers to the
resolution of 17 January 1948 moved by Van Langenhove, the
­Belgian chairman of the UNSC, and assures London that “the fact
that he is largely guided by us is not known…and we take every
precaution to ensure that it is not known…”58 Three days later,
the UNSC passed a resolution (39) establishing a three-member
UNCIP, the membership of which was later enlarged to five by the
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special article
resolution (47) of 21 April. Given that Bevin did not want the UNSC
to be involved in Kashmir for the fear of the Soviet Union or a
Soviet satellite,59 it is not surprising that Britain was willing to go
to such lengths and put at stake its relationship with India. Noel-
Baker believed that “it seems…worthwhile to accept risk of un-
popularity and possible subsequent difficulty (with India)…since
war (between India and Pakistan)…would make strategic re-
quirements unattainable”.60 He was convinced that “Pakistan’s
separate identity r­emained a challenge to Hindu ideology and ac-
tion and India was determined to prevent any progress in con-
struction and consolidation of Pakistan”.61 The FO was sympa-
thetic about Pakistan’s “inherited responsibility for [the] NWFP”,62
more so because the Afghan government which was “critical of
Pakistan’s policy in Kashmir” might “encourage tribes to make
difficulties for Pakistan”.63 While all these manipulations were
taking place the hostilities were resumed on the battlefield. On
23 January – after a lull of four weeks – Indian troops attacked
and captured Kot. In the first week of February, Naoshera saw
battle; in mid-March, Jhangar was freed again by Indian forces
and a month later, I­ndian troops entered Rajouri.
Indian Angst
The bewilderment that emerged in India, quickly giving way to
resentment and hatred, was best presented by Mountbatten’s
complaint to Attlee:
India’s complaint was passed over at the request of Zafrullah Khan,
backed by Noel-Baker on 31 January to the extent that the cart was put
before the horse, i e, the plebiscite has become the first issue…I am at
a loss to understand why India who has been brought to her present
predominant position in Asia largely through British efforts in the past
and which is the only country which is now likely to give a lead in the
Far East, is being treated this way. The policy which you initiated and
which I have endeavoured to carry out during the past year is now
b­eing compromised by the leaning towards Pakistan’s cause and Noel-
Baker’s obvious antagonism to India.64 Similarly, the other ‘very pro-
Indian’,65 Cripps pointed out to Attlee that ‘the issue [is] whether the
action of Pakistan in permitting and encouraging the passage of
tribesmen across their territory to attack Kashmir was an act of
a­ggression against India?’66
A word about Noel-Baker’s “obvious antagonism” would not be
out of place here. Condemning the Indian view on Kashmir as
“unrealistic”, the “anti-Indian”67 Noel-Baker wrote that
the UNSC will not condemn Pakistan as aggressor because it will not
rule out events before the accession of Kashmir to India [and] the
s­ingle point of Pakistan’s complicity in the alleged aggression against
Kashmir cannot be the end-all of the task of the Council.68
Noel-Baker doubted India’s legal case, dismissed its political
case, held Hari Singh responsible for all that was wrong with
Kashmir, drew parallel with the Junagadh situation and argued
for Pakistan’s equal interest in Kashmir on security grounds.69
What – apart from Noel-Baker’s “obvious antagonism” – con-
sumed the UK delegation to UN was “power politics” and “strate-
gic consequences of the creation of the exposed situation of Kash-
mir”.70 And similarly the widely held view at London was that it
was “morally and practically binding on us that the maximum
pressure should be exerted on India to bring them out of the
n­arrow legalism of their case”.71
53
speciAl article
However, “the narrow legalism” of India saw the establishment
of Sheikh Abdullah’s government on 5 March. In April 1948, the
US offered Pakistan free training courses for officers72 even as
Britain became very concerned about the situation regarding
military supplies in Pakistan. Graffety-Smith repeatedly made it
plain that banning the supply of military equipment by Britain
“would cause grave and dangerous resentment in Pakistan”.73
Cunningham wrote to the CRO, on 18 April 1948 that “it is enor-
mously important to help [Pakistan] on the two matters of Kash-
mir and munitions supply [and] officer’s training”, else “Pakistan
might easily slip out of the Commonwealth”.74 On 4 May 1948, al-
most a 100 days before Pakistan publicly admitted the presence
of its troops in Kashmir, Graffety-Smith unambiguously con-
firmed to the CRO that not only Pakistan troops, but also two
B­ritish officers (Lt Col Milne and Captain Skellon), were in
K­ashmir looking into the refugee problem and that General
Gracey “is certainly aware of all that goes on”.75 However, it was
swiftly decided that no useful action could be taken with the
P­akistan government on the matter at that stage, not only be-
cause it could be disclosed that General Douglas Gracey (C-in-C
Pakistan, 1948-51) was the source of information, but because the
refugee problem and potential collapse of Pakistan’s economy
and administration weighed heavily in British concerns such that
it condoned the presence of troops and sought to justify it by
c­iting “defensive purposes”.76 General Roy Bucher (C-in-C India,
1948-49) and Gracey, in regular touch, had met between 26 and
28 March 1948 to apprise each other of the military strategies of
the two dominions and formulate defensive positions on both
sides so as to prevent the outbreak of an all-out war.
British Leanings
Against this backdrop it is remarkable that throughout May 1948,
Bucher refused to believe the existence of Pakistan regular bat-
talions in Kashmir, even when, on 19 May, Gracey had admitted
to the presence of two mountain guns, three to four battalions
and even a couple of British officers in Kashmir for “defensive
purposes” to stop the Indian advance beyond Mirpur, Poonch,
Uri.77 The reason though was best summed up by Bevin in sepa-
rate letters to Attlee and Noel-Baker to whom he stressed that he
was “most anxious not to lose the confidence of the government
and people of Pakistan” given “the trend of feeling” there for two
all-important reasons: “serious consequences to the already diffi-
cult relations with the Muslim world” and “Russian penetration”.78
Further, it was feared that any action would lead to a certain col-
lapse of Pakistan because Britain would have to issue “stand down”
instructions to its officers serving in the Indian and the Pakistani
armies. For the latter this would mean the crippling loss of 460
British officers including those serving in the important posts of
the C-in-C, COS, quarter-master general of forces, etc.79
And so the regular troops of the two dominions finally faced
each other from May onwards. India launched its spring offen-
sive along the Uri-Domel road up to the Pakistan border on 18
May. Early success came in the form of Tithwal but the advance
was halted a week later. In June, Indian moves towards Muzaf-
farabad and Chinari-Chakothi were halted, as well. Indian army
found success at Kargil and Drass, instead.
54
The CRO finally informed Washington about the “indisputable
presence” of Pakistan troops in Kashmir on 26 May 1948.80 The
Americans accepted their view that “it will be better not to probe
this matter further with Pakistan (this is probably because the
Americans want to remain on friendly terms with Pakistan in
spite of the tension over Palestine and the embargo on the sale of
arms)…”81 The FO considered the Muslim world as a whole and
any deterioration in Pakistan’s situation in Kashmir was not con-
sidered in British interests there,82 more so, since the creation of
Israel. The Palestine imbroglio was thorny not only because of the
misunderstandings it had created in the Anglo-American special
relationship but also because it, along with the upcoming Presi-
dential election, made the Americans unwilling to take a lead
r­egarding Kashmir.83 Accordingly, the UK delegation was directed
on 8 June 1948 to “avoid, if possible, any discussion in the Security
Council of the presence of Pakistan troops in Kashmir…”84
Letters exchanged between Noel-Baker and the Defence Min-
ister A V Alexander in June 1948 admitted the presence of “three
battalions of Pakistan troops in Kashmir for some weeks” and
agreed to “not press any enquiries about these…”85 The presence
of the troops, it was argued, was necessary “to bolster the local
Muslim morale (and) to prevent a great disruptive flow of refu-
gees into Pakistan territory” and it was agreed to “not indicate
whether we regard it as true or not”.86 As the summer of 1948
began, the British “official mind” was plagued by the fears sur-
rounding “stand down”, “mass migration”, “strategic advantage”,
“the cry of Islam in danger” and “the communist menace”.87
The fact that the FO and the CRO “knew in advance about the
decision to send regular Pakistan troops into the state [Kashmir]”
is also confirmed by Bucher who shared it with A C B Symon
(deputy high commissioner India, 1946-49) and Terence Shone
(high commissioner India, 1946-48) in July 1948. While Symon
wanted to “let the matter rest so that no ill-feeling is generated”,
Bucher “did not know what to do”!88 Shone revealed the extent to
which Bucher exercised influence on the Indian cabinet to the
CRO by claiming that the prolonged Indian silence on the pres-
ence of Pakistan troops in Kashmir was due to the service chiefs,
“particularly Bucher counselling them to keep quiet. He has a lot
of influence with the PM, Sardar Patel and the Defence Minister
and is a very restraining influence on the Cabinet”.89
Meanwhile, on 16 June 1948, the UNCIP began its first formal
session at Geneva. Its members were Czechoslovakia (Josef Kor-
bel – selected by India on 10 February), Argentina (Ricardo J Siri
– selected by Pakistan on 7 May), Belgium (Egbert Graeffe – nom-
inated by the UNSC on 23 April), Columbia (Afredo Lozano –
nominated by the UNSC on 23 April) and USA (J Klahr Huddle –
nominated by the UNSC on 7 May). On 7 July, it reached India and
met Girija Shankar Bajpai on 13 July. On 4 August Zafrulla Khan
in Karachi met the UNCIP and dropped the “bombshell” (as later
called by Josef Korbel) of the presence of 3 brigades of Pakistani
regular troops in Kashmir. On 13 August, for the first time, it pro-
posed a ceasefire resolution. While Pakistan responded inconclu-
sively to the resolution in a memorandum on 19 August, the fol-
lowing day India accepted the resolution “in view of clarifica-
tions”. On 25 August, the UNCIP endorsed Indian interpretation
and acceptance of the resolution and answered the Pakistani
march 13, 2010  vol xlv no 11  EPW   Economic & Political Weekly

memorandum two days later. Expectedly, Pakistan rejected the
resolution on 6 September.
Gracey’s detailed presentation in front of the UNCIP in August
1948 is the best elaboration of the British concerns about the mili-
tary engagements of the year: the northern territories of Gilgit and
Hunza, along the Afghan, Soviet and Chinese frontiers and the
western territories of Muzaffarabad and Mirpur, along the border
with Pakistani Punjab. Gracey sought to i­mpress upon the mem-
bers of the UNCIP that if India gained an upper hand in the above-
mentioned areas then it would mean facing
the Indian army on the long Pakistan border within 30 miles of strate-
gic railway leading from Peshawar through West Punjab to Lahore…
Occupation of Bhimber and Mirpur will give India the strategic advan-
tage of…sitting on our doorsteps, threatening the Jhelum bridge
which is so vital for us. It will also give them control of the Mangla
headworks placing the irrigation in Jhelum and other districts at their
mercy…Furthermore, loss of Muzaffarabad-Kohala would have the
most far-reaching effect on the security of Pakistan. It would enable the
Indian Army to secure the rear gateway to Pakistan through which it can
march in any time it wishes…It will encourage subversive elements such
as Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan... If Pakistan is not to face another
serious refugee problem…if civilian and military morale is not to be af-
fected to a dangerous extent; and if subversive political forces are not to
be ­encouraged and let loose in Pakistan itself it is imperative that the
­Indian army is not allowed to advance beyond the general line
­Uri-Poonch-Naoshera.90
While Gracey also believed that apart from Kashmir on
H­yderabad too, India was “putting Pakistan into an impossible
position”91 and communicated as much to Bucher, the latter
h­imself was sympathetic that
Pakistan is unable for political reasons to stop the movement of tribes-
men from the NWFP, or of inhabitants of the Western Punjab into Kash-
mir. There is considerable enthusiasm in Pakistan for the liberation of
Kashmir.92
Bucher felt it “well-nigh be impossible for Pakistan” to resist
this religious enthusiasm.93 He moderated general Carriappa’s
proposal in June 1948 of air attacks on Jhelum bridges at
K­ohala and Lachhman Pattan; Mirpur and Gilgit because of
political consequences as well as his belief that Kashmir
affair weakens both India and Pakistan thus making the “rapid
spread of Communism all over Asia all the more likely”.94 He was
to later a­cknowledge that “a friendly Kashmir is very vital to
­Pakistan in terms of defence, water supplies and the n­ecessity to
keep the NWFP quiet, in view of Pakistan’s lack of power”.95
So whereas domestically the British generals were working
over time to calibrate the conflagration according to their needs,
internationally Josef Korbel, a member of the UNCIP, felt that
Kashmir had become the “plaything of Power Politics”.96 The
CRO, for its part, kept cautioning the delegation to bear in mind
that “the Indians should not attribute any initiative to us”.97
L­ondon had a lot to feel unhappy about. India did not appreciate
either “the practical difficulties of getting the tribesmen out of
Kashmir” or “the anxiety in NWFP and West Punjab for the fate of
Muslims in Kashmir” – issues important enough for the FO “to
justify incurring some degree of ill-will from India”.98 India as
“the bigger partner” had committed the “original fundamental
error” over Kashmir. As if this was not enough, India’s foreign
policy made “no sense in the present conditions of the world”.99
Economic & Political Weekly  EPW   march 13, 2010  vol xlv no 11
special article
Nonetheless, given India’s size and significance, it was always a
dilemma to
whether…take more active steps to save Pakistan, thereby risking
I­ndia’s secession from the Commonwealth or risk Pakistan’s collapse,
thus losing an incalculable amount of prestige and influence in the
Muslim countries.
By October 1948, the FO seems to have made up its mind that:
With the darkening world situation, that corner of the world repre-
sented by Persia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India is bound to be one
of the danger spots in Soviet schemes for expansion. The main bar to
unity in this region is the Kashmir dispute, and we cannot help feeling
that this dispute should be viewed in the light of the wider considera-
tions mentioned above.100
By November 1948, Britain had also intensified its efforts to
contextualise the Kashmir issue in Cold War terms in order to
persuade the US to take a greater interest. Cadogan personally
requested George Marshall (US Secretary of State),
to secure the services of General Eisenhower in view of the signifi-
cance of the Kashmir issue in the wider setting of recent developments
in South-east Asia and Far East, viz, spread of communism; Soviet
military threat in NWFP and recent Communist successes in China.101
In the same month Marshall visited the subcontinent and, after
meeting the Pakistan premier Liaquat Ali Khan, was impressed
by the latter’s appreciation of the need for the restoration of sta-
ble conditions in both the Indian subcontinent and west Asia “at
this time of tension with the Soviets”.102 The FO knew that
M­arshall was unenthusiastic about playing a leading role in
K­ashmir partly because of his own unhappy and unsuccessful
personal experience of playing peacemaker between Mao and
Chiang in 1946 and partly because he, not unnaturally, saw
K­ashmir – as a Commonwealth dispute – a British headache.
Bevin, therefore, personally warned Marshall:
Kashmir was on the Soviet frontier. Russia might well intervene as she
had in Greece and China, playing on the tribes and on communal
f­eeling. Whoever controlled the valley of Kashmir controlled the
s­trategic and commercial communications between India, Pakistan
and C­entral Asia.103
Also, there was always a sense that “if we give the Americans
the impression that we are trying to get them to pull one of our
chestnuts out of the fire, we are unlikely to obtain their full
c­o-operation”104 as “[we have] many favours to ask of them and it
would not do to exhaust our credit by being too persistent over
Kashmir”.105
A ‘Commonwealth Problem’
In August 1948, there had been 300 British officers and 43 other
ranks in the Indian Army. The numbers for Pakistan were 460
and 340, respectively. By November 1948, the figures were 230
(India) and 440 (Pakistan).106 No surprise then that the Ameri-
cans maintained that Kashmir was a “Commonwealth problem”
and were content to provide only sympathy and support to
B­ritain, owing to its “little interest and knowledge” as well as
a­lready having “too many international commitments”. More­
over in the beginning the US was not totally convinced about the
British approach to the Kashmir problem. In early 1948 it had
some key objections. The legality of the instrument of accession,
55
speciAl article
for one, was not in dispute for the US nor was Indian sovereignty
over Kashmir. Consequently, it was not willing to endorse either
the presence of Pakistani troops in Kashmir or a UN takeover of the
administration of the region.107 The fact that by late 1948 these
objections were overcome in the light of Cold War politics108 shows
the relentless and “dutiful” advocacy done by Britain for Pakistan
– more so in the light of J F Walker’s report which came out in
­November – to prevent any anti-British feeling in Pakistan.109
In Delhi, with the winter offensive of the Indian army about to
start, Bucher, anxious to avoid a clash with Pakistan, was advo-
cating a defensive stance and was trying to avoid any “precipitate
action on the part of… Carriappa” to the extent that he promised
to send general McCay (COS Pakistan, 1948) a personal signal
should the Indian government “double-cross” him over the res­
triction of advance during winter months into Mirpur-Kotli-
Bhimbar-Domel-Muzaffarabad.110 With his “relative detach-
ment”,111 Bucher had, according to Shone,
Not only been ready to receive advice, he has constantly sought it and
his influence – which has been considerable – has undoubtedly been
an accommodating force. With Carriappa’s appointment (announced
on 5 December 1948) our influence in military circles will therefore
diminish and may disappear altogether.112
In this last phase of the conflict, hostilities intensified as Indian
troops captured Pir Badesa, after advancing west from Naoshera
from 15 October. The famed “tank battle” at the Zoji la pass
(16,000 feet above sea-level) was fought on 1 November. Drass
which had gone back to the raiders in August was recaptured in
mid-November as were Pir Kalwa and Mendhar which linked
Jammu and Poonch garrisons. Kargil was reoccupied on 24 No-
vember but then general Bucher stopped the Indian advance to-
wards Kotli, Bhimber and Mirpur. The respective air forces saw
action in the last month of the war when the Indian Air Force
bombed Palak, behind Kotli in the direction of Mirpur and the
Pakistani Air Force responded by attacking Naoshera-Beri Pattan
area damaging the strategic Beri Pattan bridge. When India
a­ccepted the ceasefire proposal on 23 December, its army was
launched in a final advance to Kotli.
Bucher’s opposite number came in for even higher praise from
Shone’s opposite number. Graffety-Smith reported to the CRO
when the ceasefire was less than a fortnight away:
I am very well aware that General Gracey’s impulsive behaviour tem-
perament leads him to consider the situation less frigidly than General
Bucher. But I believe this to be more or less irrelevant, for any British
officer commanding the Pakistan army must consider present opera-
tions in Kashmir as more immediately critical and dangerous than
they may appear in Delhi. Pakistan’s political and certainly her eco-
nomic existence will be in the gravest jeopardy if West Kashmir falls
into unfriendly hands. [There is no doubt; I take it, in the mind of
HMG] Fighting is now going on in areas peculiarly vital to Pakistan’s
survival. There seems to me a great difference in the relative urgency
of these considerations as they affect each Dominion and I doubt
whether an attitude of detachment, however possible in Delhi is
p­ossible or indeed permissible in the Pakistan C-in-C.113
This partisanship on the part of the British was privately
a­cknowledged in India. Shone admitted to Girija Shankar Bajpai
(secretary-general, Ministry of External Affairs India, 1947-52)
that, “the Pakistan military operations must have been done,
56
probably on the advice and certainly with the concurrence of
s­enior British officers”.114 Nehru twice sought the withdrawal of
these “senior British officers”, in August and December 1948. On
both occasions, Attlee demurred and gave the following reasons.
First, enforcement of a stand down might drive Pakistan to des-
perate measures. Second, some of the retired officers now serv-
ing in Pakistan might defy the orders and stay on as volunteers.
Third, popular feeling against Europeans might be roused in
­Pakistan such that their evacuation might become necessary at a
time when the aircraft required could probably be found only by
d­iverting them from Berlin. Fourth, Pakistan might leave the
Commonwealth. Fifth, the hostility of the world’s Muslim popu-
lation towards the UK might be increased. And, finally, an inter-
nal collapse in Pakistan might result, producing chaos from
which the communists would profit.115
Debate in UN
Accordingly, the debate in the UNSC concerned not so much
­India’s complaint against Pakistan as Pakistan’s demand that the
future of Kashmir be considered in view of its own vulnerability
with respect to its unstable northwest frontier, an area that was
of great strategic importance for the retreating empire, the
emerging Commonwealth and the anti-communist block. On
22 Novem­ber, the first Interim Report was prepared by the UNSC
which was tabled at the Security Council and debate on Kashmir
resumed three days later. Ceasefire proposals were laid out on 11
December which India accepted on 23 and Pakistan on 25 Decem-
ber. As 1948 ended, Britain was engaged in persuading India not to
take any step which would force Pakistan to commit its air force
which would have given India the leverage to force the reluctant
Britain to issue “stand down” orders. The “refugee” issue, the So-
viet “threat”, the tribal problem and the “Muslim Block” cards were
relentlessly played by the CRO and the FO throughout 1948.116
4
From the first resolution introduced in the Security Council on
21 April 1948, rejected by both India and Pakistan, to the UNCIP
r­esolution of 13 August 1948, which India accepted and Pakistan
rejected and finally, the ceasefire proposals of 11 December 1948,
which both accepted, the two issues of Kashmir’s accession to
I­ndia and India’s original complaint of aggression against Paki-
stan were slowly overshadowed by the question of the terms and
conditions for a plebiscite. Noel-Baker’s delegation to the UN
oversaw this crucial shift of emphasis. British behaviour was
dominated for British purposes for which a secure and strength-
ened Pakistan was a necessity and for that Kashmir, or at any rate
territories west to a certain line, was a necessity. Pakistan was
clearly the more valuable ally and its position was given “maxi-
mum latitude in interpretation” to prevent disadvantageous mili-
tary and/or diplomatic positions. The focus remained on avoid-
ing a full-scale inter-dominion war as well to ensure for Pakistan
a comparable diplomatic position to that of India. While Kashmir
can be called a “Commonwealth issue” in 1947, in 1948 it played
itself out against complex and dynamic international conditions
which made Britain keen to, first, ensure that India did not strike
back at Pakistan in accordance with Article 51 of the UN charter;
march 13, 2010  vol xlv no 11  EPW   Economic & Political Weekly
 special article

second, overcome the problem posed by Kashmir’s legal acces-
sion to India which brought the matter of state sovereignty to the
forefront; third, underplay Pakistan’s multifarious involvement
in the tribal invasion; and finally, ensure that the focus of the
UNSC firmly remained on the question of a ceasefire linked with
arrangements for a plebiscite. Britain had made up its mind that
“the point at issue is how to stop the fighting and bring about
conditions under which a fair plebiscite can be held rather than
arbitration between India and Pakistan”117 within five days of the
crisis reaching the UN. This meant steering the discussions
t­owards a ceasefire and plebiscite plan away from India’s original
formal complaint of aggression against Pakistan and from
P­akistan’s involvement in the invasion. This worked well in the
January-April negotiations but became difficult with the entry of
Pakistan’s regular army into Kashmir from May 1948, informa-
tion which was publicly shared only in August 1948 when Z­afrulla
Khan admitted to it in front of the UNCIP whereupon it was
a­ccepted as a fait accompli.
London knew that India’s case was built largely on the “accept-
ance of the Maharaja’s accession” which it dismissed within a day
so as to treat the two dominions as “equal parties in dispute”.118
As the Attlee administration summed up a year later:
What in retrospect seems questionable about India’s action was not
the despatch of troops to Srinagar, but the failure to seek the coopera-
tion of the Pakistan Government and propose the despatch also of a
Pakistan c­ ontingent and also their acceptance of the Maharaja’s acces-
sion. This was highly provocative to Pakistan, particularly as there
were good grounds for thinking that the Maharaja, and possibly also
the Government of India, had been waiting for an opportunity to bring
about this accession.119
Then there was the Indian prime minister’s prickly personality
and “moralistic” foreign policy – highly unsatisfactory for Lon-
don and Washington in the face of “advancement of Communism
in Asia”.120 Archibald Nye (high commissioner to India, 1948-52)
was unimpressed by the “unrealistic Indian thinking on foreign
affairs”.121 Nye had,
No doubt that India has sinned more than Pakistan. Nehru is very
emotional – not disposed to see reason. The problem is a psychological
one – what tactics to adopt with this particular man in these special
circumstances to achieve our objects’. [The answer for Nye was to]
‘put aside the merits of the case – its legalities and technicalities’ as
‘this is no time to think of rights and wrongs’ and ‘[the] details of [the]
debate must be risen over to give a broad view.122
In March 1947, the Truman doctrine had been announced; in
June 1947 the Marshall Plan and Britain was naturally keen to
extend this increasing US involvement in west Asia, central Asia,
the Indian subcontinent and east Asia, in view as much of her
own declining abilities as of the consolidation of communist
forces in China and Indo-China.
The thrust of the British policy during 1948 was to “adjust our
relations with India [and] avoid infuriating Pakistan”.123 To that
extent they left India in no doubt that a political settlement was
necessary in Kashmir, as opposed to a juridical consideration.124
The preferred policy – acknowledged as “extremely unfortunate”
– then was, to force the issue with India “in view of the grave
consequences to our relations with Pakistan”.125

notes
1 Mark Kurlansky, 1968 (London: Vintage, 2005),
p xviii.
2 26.11.47, F 15639/8800/85, FO 371/63574, The
National Archives (here after TNA), Kew.
3 November 1948, Tedder to Elmhirst, ELMT 3/1,
Elmhirst Papers, Churchill Archives Centre (here-
after, CAC), Churchill College, University of Cam-
bridge.
4 11.3.47, Middle East Strategy Security Assess-
ment, 7/2/1, Pyman Papers, Kings College London
(hereafter KCL).
5 6.8.47 and 22.6.48, Middle East Strategy Security
Assessment, 7/2/2 and 7/2/3, Pyman Papers,
KCL.
6 19.5.45, PHP (45) 15 (0) Final, L/WS/1/983-988,
India Office Records (here after IOR), British Li-
brary.
7 18.4.46, Chief Of Staff (COS) Report No (46) 19 (0),
TNA.
8 10.7.46, Cabinet Papers (46) 267, CAB 129/11, FO
371/52563, TNA.
9 29.11.46, COS (46-47) L/WS/1/1030, Tp (46), TNA.
10 7.7.47, COS Tp (47) 90, TNA.
11 14.10.47, F200/102, Mountbatten Papers, IOR.
12 22.10.47, F200/103, Mountbatten Papers, IOR.
13 25.11.47, CRO to its missions worldwide, DO
35/3178, TNA.
14 28.9.47, Auchinleck to London, MUL 1262,
Auchinleck Papers, John Rylands Library (here
after JRL), University of Manchester.
15 3/6/9.1.48, F 452/6/85/G, FO 371/69705 and
24.12.47, Bevin to Mountbatten, F 16771/8800/85,
FO 371/63574, TNA.
16 26.2.48, CRO to its missions worldwide, DO
133/73, TNA.
17 10.11.47, Carter’s minutes, DO 142/493, TNA.
18 29.12.47, Scoones to Gordon-Walker, GNWR 1/6,
Gordon-Walker Papers, CAC.
19 1.12.47, Scoones on Kashmir, MSS Eur D 714/84,
IOR.
20 13.5.48 and 14.5.48, F 6983/6/85 G and PM/48/52
(Bevin to Attlee), FO 371/69717; TNA.
21 11.5.48 and 14.5.48, London to New York and
Washington, F 7041/6/85 and F 1377/6/85/G, FO
371/69717, TNA.
22 6.11.47, F 146/86, FO 371/63570, TNA.
23 23.10.47 and 5.11.47, F 14218/8966/85 and F
14722/8800/85, FO 371/63574 and 63571, TNA.
24 20.11.47 and 1.12.47, F 15381/8800/85 and F 15821,
FO 371/63568, TNA.
25 4.12.47 and 6.12.47, Telegram Nos F 16039/8845/47
and 752, FO 371/63568 and 63571, TNA.
26 27.11.47, Inverchapel to FO, F 15700/8966/85, FO
371/63574, TNA.
27 20.11.47, 1.12.47, 16.12.47; F 15381/8800/85, F
15821, F 16424/8966/85, FO 371/63574, TNA.
28 29.10.47, Graffety-Smith to Noel-Baker, No 158,
L/PS/13/1845 b; Pol 134/48, L/WS/1/1148, IOR;
also see 17.12.47, Cunningham to Halifax, MSS
Eur D670/9, Cunningham Papers, IOR.
29 31.10.47, No 1158, L/PS/13/1845b; also see 11.12.47,
Cunningham Diary, MSS Eur D670/6, Cunning-
ham Papers, IOR.
30 16.10.47, Scott’s report, Pol 1401/47, IOR.
31 16.10.47, Rumbold’s note on Scott’s report, Pol
1401/47, IOR.
32 16.10.47, Rumbold’s note on Mahajan’s request for
restraining Pakistan to Attlee and 25.10.47, Rum-
bold’s note to Attlee summarising the above de-
velopments, L/PS/13/1845b, IOR.
33 See MSS Eur D 670/6, Cunningham Papers, IOR.
34 See MSS Eur D 670/6 and 670/9, Cunningham
Papers, IOR.
35 26.7.68, Mirza to Caroe, F 203/2, Caroe Papers, IOR.
36 13.6.46, speech by Cunningham at the RIIA (ref.
No8/1244); 4.2.48, speech by Caroe at the Royal
Institute of International Affairs ( here after RIIA)
(ref No8/1498); also see MSS Eur D 670/6, Cun-
ningham Papers, IOR.
37 11.11.48, Mudie to Maurice Hallett, MSS Eur D
714/84, Mudie Papers, IOR.
38 P Patrick, DO 142/524, TNA.
39 See MSS Eur D 670/6, Cunningham Papers and
R Pearce (ed.), Patrick Gordon-Walker: Political
Diaries 1932-1971 (London, 1991), p 22, 169, 172,
174; also see, 11.11.48, Noel-Baker to Gordon-
Walker, GNWR 1/6, Gordon-Walker Papers, CAC.
40 31.10.47, Ismay to Noel-Baker, No 1142 and Shone
to Noel-Baker, No 1144, L/PS/13/1845b, IOR.
41 31.10.47, Noel-Baker to Ismay, 374/36 and Attlee
to Ismay, Pol 1486/47, L/PS/13/1845b, IOR.
42 31.12.47, London to New York, No 4459, L/
WS/1/1148, IOR.
43 1.1.48, New York to London, No 2, L/WS/1/1148,
IOR.
44 3.1.48 and 6.1.48, London to New York, Nos 30
and 66, L/WS/1/1148, IOR.
45 7.1.48, Karachi to London, No 23, L/WS/1/1140, IOR.
46 6.1.48, Sargent to Attlee about Bevin’s views, FO
800/470 IND/48/1, TNA.
47 10.1.48, London to New York, No 131, L/
WS/1/1148, IOR.
48 12.1.48, Nos 85 and 110, L/WS/1/1140, IOR.
49 21.1.48, F 1099/42, Attlee to Cadogan, FO
371/69706, TNA.
50 12.1.48, Nos 13, 14 and 23, L/WS/1/1140, IOR.
51 14.1.48, London to New York, No 196, L/
WS/1/1148, IOR.
52 16.1.48, Pol 133/48, L/WS/1/1148, IOR.
53 16.1.48, Pol 134/48, L/WS/1/1148, IOR.
54 16.1.48, Graffety-Smith to Noel-Baker, No 22
(339), L/WS/1/1141, IOR.
55 20.1.48, Noel-Baker to CRO, No 135, L/WS/1/1141,
IOR.
56 9.2.48, T No 470, Noel-Baker to Shone, FO
371/69710, TNA.

Economic & Political Weekly  EPW   march 13, 2010  vol xlv no 11 57
speciAl article
57 20.1.48, Noel-Baker to CRO, No 140, L/WS/1/1141,
IOR.
58 21.1.48, New York to London, No 158, L/WS/1/1141,
IOR.
59 14.2.48, F 2383/6/85, FO 371/69709 and 15.4.48,
F 5514/6/85, FO 371/69715, TNA.
60 28.1.48, Noel-Baker to FO, No 189, L/WS/1/1141,
IOR.
61 10.2.48, Pol 6632/48, L/WS/1/1599, IOR.
62 27.1.48, Cadogan to FO, T. No 357, FO 371/69707,
TNA.
63 12.1.48, G. Squire to FO, F 488/6/85, FO 371/69705
and 29.1.48, F 1472/6/85, FO 371/69708, TNA.
64 24.2.48, Mountbatten to Attlee, No 459, L/
WS/1/1141, IOR.
65 4.4.48, GNWR 1/6, Gordon-Walker Papers, CAC.
66 26.2.48, Cripps to Attlee, PREM 8/1455/2, TNA.
67 4.4.48, GNWR 1/6, Gordon-Walker Papers, CAC.
68 27.12.47, Noel-Baker to Shone, T. No 1590, DO
142/543, TNA.
69 See NBKR 4/419 and 420, Noel-Baker Papers, CAC.
70 17.3.48, New York to London, No 910, L/
WS/1/1141, IOR.
71 18.3.48, Karachi to London, No 265, L/WS/1/1148,
IOR.
72 12.4.48, Washington to London, L/WS/1/1187,
IOR.
73 23.4.48, Karachi to London, No 412, L/WS/1/1141,
IOR.
74 18.4.1948, Cunningham to Carter, MSS Eur
D670/9, Cunningham Papers, IOR.
75 4.5.48, Karachi to London, No 465, L/WS/1/1142,
IOR.
76 8.5.48, Delhi to London, No 1303, L/WS/1/1142,
IOR.
77 12/19/29.5.48, Karachi to London, Nos 1393, 1499
and 1657, L/WS/1/1142, IOR.
78 13.5.48, Bevin to Attlee, Ind/48/24, FO 800/470
and 9/10.8.48, Bevin to Noel-Baker, F 11799,
11800/85/G, FO 371/69721, TNA.
79 14.5.48, Karachi to London, Pol. 8144/48, L/
WS/1/1599 and 9.6.48, Delhi to London, No 1804,
L/WS/1/1153, IOR.
80 26.5.48, London to Washington, No 2566, L/
WS/1/1152, IOR.
81 2.6.48, Washington to London, L/WS/1/1143,
IOR.
82 20.4.48, Denning to Bevin, F 11800/6/85 G, FO
371/69721, TNA.
83 28.5.48/4.6.48, F 7595/6/85 G and F 7931/6/85,
FO 371/69718, TNA.
84 8.6.48, London to New York, No 2569, L/
WS/1/1152, IOR.
85 15.6.48 and 19.6.48, No G 2275/30, Y. No 20, L/
WS/1/1142, IOR.
86 18.6.48, London to New York, L/WS/1/1142,
IOR.
87 23.6.48 and 29.7.48, Pol. 8869/48 and No 2535,
L/WS/1/1599 and L/WS/1/1143, IOR; 25.6.48,
speech by Messervy at the RIIA (ref. No8/1558)
and 21.6.48, Gracey to Elmhirst, ELMT 3/1, Elm-
hirst Papers, CAC.
88 28.7.48, Delhi to London, No 2519, L/WS/1/1143,
IOR.
89 4.9.48, Delhi to London, No 1844, L/WS/1/1142,
IOR.
90 Quoted in Josef Korbel, Danger in Kashmir (Princ-
eton: PUP, 1954), pp 138-39.
91 30.8.48, Gracey to Bucher (DO No 008/4/C-in-C),
Bucher Papers, Templer Study Centre, National
Army Museum (here after NAM).
92 File No 8310-154-105, Bucher Papers, NAM.
93 17.11.47, Bucher to Baldev Singh, No 6/C-in-C;
24.9.48, Bucher to Elizabeth Bucher, File
No 7901-87-6-1, Bucher Papers, NAM.
94 24.6.48, Bucher to Patel and Elmhirst; 13.12.48,
Bucher to Elizabeth Bucher, File No 7901-87-6-1,
Bucher Papers, NAM.
95 January 1951, 7901-87-6-3, Bucher Papers, NAM.
96 13.9.48, Delhi to London, No 3194, L/WS/1/1145,
IOR.
97 2.10.48, London to New York, No 125, L/
WS/1/1145, IOR.
98 11.6.48 and 6.9.48, FO to CRO, F 8230/6/85, FO
371/69719 and 12711/6/85 S/24, FO 371/69721,
TNA.
99 28.9.48, Grey to Cadogan, F 13613/6/85, FO
371/69721, TNA.
100 21.10.48, DO 142/521, TNA.
101 9.11.48, London to Washington, No 11995, L/
WS/1/1153, IOR.
102 10.11.48, Karachi to London, No 366, L/
WS/1/1153, IOR.
103 27.10.48 and 6.12.48, Bevin to Marshall,
Ind/48/33, FO 800/470 and T. No 12938, DO
142/522, TNA.
104 11/12.11.48, F 15818/6/85 G and Sargent to Attlee,
PM/OGS/94, FO 371/69723, TNA.
105 17.11.48, F 16051 G, FO 371/69723, TNA.
106 20.11.48, Karachi to London, No 540, L/
WS/1/1153, IOR.
107 16.2.48, G. F. Curson (New York) to CRO, L/P and
S/13/1939, IOR.
108 26.11.48, New York to London, No 127, L/
WS/1/1153, IOR.
109 18.11.48, Karachi to London, No 1395, L/
WS/1/1187, IOR.
110 27/29.11.48, Karachi and Delhi to London, Nos
1458 and 1461 L/WS/1153, IOR.
111 24.12.48, Graffety-Smith to Nye, S/24, DO
142/524, TNA.
112 6.12.48, Delhi to London, No 4193, L/WS/1/1217,
IOR.
113 19.12.48, Karachi to London, No 1550, L/
WS/1/1144, IOR.
114 20.12.48, Delhi to London, No 4359, L/WS/1/1144,
IOR.
115 23.12.48, Attlee to Nehru, No 4390, L/WS/1/1144,
IOR.
116 10.12.48, Karachi to London, No 80, L/WS/1/1144,
IOR.
117 5.1.48, Outward telegram from the CRO to its
missions worldwide, L/P and S/13/1948, IOR.
118 28.10.47, Shone to CRO, L/PS/13/1845b; 29.10.47,
Noel-Baker to CRO, 8/47, L/PS/13/1845b; 29.10.47,
Graffety-Smith to CRO, No 158, L/PS/13/1845b;
30.10.47, Noel-Baker to Ismay, 374/36, L/
PS/13/1845b; ‘appreciation of the Kashmir situa-
tion’, L/PS/13/1845b and Pol 134/48, L/
WS/1/1148, CRO, IOR.
119 Document No Pol 134/48, File No L/WS/1/1148,
IOR.
120 2.5.49, Noel-Baker to Attlee, DO 142/529, TNA.
121 21.6.49, Nye to Percival Liesching, DO 121/71,
TNA.
122 28.12.48, Nye to Noel-Baker, DO 121/71, TNA.
123 5.3.48, GNWR 1/6, Gordon-Walker Papers, CAC.
124 24.1.48 and 27.1.48, From New York to London,
T Nos 195 and 223, FO 371/69707, TNA.
125 10/20.9.49, Gordon-Walker to Liesching, DO
142/537, TNA.

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58 march 13, 2010  vol xlv no 11  EPW   Economic & Political Weekly