Turkey and the West: A Mutually Beneficial AlliancebyTomi MaxtedTransatlantic CommunityDecember 2010

ntroduction

The European rhetoric today surrounding the Turkish European Union accession bid is very different from the rhetoric of the mid 2000s. The aura of optimism among policymakers sparked by the opening of accession talks in 2005 has been overtaken bydeeper doubts surrounding the viability of a Turkish Europe, and discourse has shiftedfrom assessing the progress that Turkey has made in meeting the terms of the

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tocriticizing the Mediterranean power over its shortcomings. Among the most outspokenvoices on the issue have been French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel, anddefinitive of recent discourse was Sarkozy¶s statement in 2007 that he did not consider Turkey a part of Europe.

The caustic remarks of these leaders and others have led to astagnation of talks, but the discord between the stances of these elites and the actions of the EU show signs of hypocrisy. For example, economic criteria has proven to be a loose benchmark for membership, for Turkey¶s GDP and GDP per capita in 2009 were bothhigher than those of recent EU entrants Bulgaria and Romania, and its budget deficit as percentage of GDP was 2.25 percent in that same year.

Thus, there must be moreimportant determining factors in accession talks than the codified criteria, and there must be more implicit criteria that factors into the final decision. The Turkish case points totwo implicit criteria that are critical in EU expansion policy: Christian mien and the balance-of-power politics of the European Union. The EU is heavily rooted in these principles, and any country that is perceived to unbalance this careful stability will never be accepted into the EU. Turkey¶s mission is to convince the principal actors within theEU that it will not cause instability nor reorganize the status quo.This purpose of this paper is to explicate the underlying factors of stability withinthe EU and to find possible remedies to mitigate European concerns and Turkishambitions. The following questions must be answered: In light of stalling negotiations,what other means can Turkey utilize to advance EU accession talks? Is there a panaceafor Europe¶s discontent? Is the EU really the best option for Turkey? This paper willargue that Turkey has two main safety valves through which it can improve dialogue and build trust with key European partners. First, Turkey must strengthen its transatlantic partnership with the United States. A strong relationship with the US can help Turkeycurry favor with the central powers in Europe. The problem with the current relationshipis that it is focused on security concerns, but broader economic ties could lead to aconvergence of national interests. With proper expansion of the relationship, the UScould be more invested in Turkey¶s global role and could increase its efforts to engagethe EU on key issues. Second, Turkey must prioritize its role in NATO, and it must play akey role in the refocusing of the organization if it wants to allay fears of politicaldisharmony in the minds of Western politicians. NATO is seen as primarily a Westernorganization, and if Turkey can convince its Western allies that it shares their values andgoals, it could persuade these allies that Turkey is a harbinger of stability. Turkey hasmade great strides to attain the elusive EU membership since the early 1990s,exemplified by the opening of accession talks in 2005, but the Mediterranean power, justly or unjustly, must prove itself to be even more committed to the economic and political ideals of the West if it ever hopes to realize its dream of the European Union.More importantly, Turkey should also convince its European partners that Turkish Islamis not like Wahhabism or the conservative Islam found in Iran, but rather, that it is muchmore moderate and compatible with European culture than popularly thought. Finally,

even progress on these fronts may not solve the debate, as there is no cure-all solution for the delay in accession negotiations. If trends continue to progress in the same manner even after a significant Turkish policy shift, it may come to bear that EU accession is notin Turkey¶s best interests and other types of partnerships with European countries mightserve the Mediterranean power better.

ooted Norms of the European Union and Barriers to Expansion

The priority of the EU is to maintain stability, and the urgency for this need hasonly been exacerbated by the recent financial crisis. Unfortunately, another priority of theEU can also serve as a hindrance to this desired stability: EU expansion. Expansion has been a slow and laborious process, and as the EU expands, candidate states will bescrutinized more heavily to ensure that their accession will not undermine the stability of the European community. Turkey has been scrutinized even more heavily than mostcandidates, and it is possible that Turkey¶s delays in implementing political reform havecost the country dearly. Since the early 2000s, xenophobia and inward attitudes havegrown dramatically across the European continent, and Turkey is finding it increasinglydifficult to gain popularity with a European constituency. This change in attitudes has been reinforced by recent rhetoric from key European leaders who have hinted that evenif Turkey completes all the reforms necessary, it may not be accepted into the exclusiveclub of European states. For example, Valéry Giscard d¶Estaing ominously declared in2002 that, ³Turkey has a different culture, a different approach, and a different way of life«[Turkey¶s accession] would mean the end of Europe.´

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This theme has beenelaborated by other prominent figures, most recently by Sarkozy¶s reaffirmation thatTurkey is not European and Merkel¶s lugubrious claim that multiculturalism in Germanyhas failed (important because four percent of Germany¶s population is of Turkishorigin).

The implications of these sentiments and statements are two fold: first, thatthere is an identity in the EU that Turkey cannot claim to be a part of, and second, thatTurkey¶s accession is increasingly associated with instability. Perhaps Jonathan Davidsonoutlined the real issues facing Turkey best during an event at the National Press Club inWashington, D.C. in 2005: ³The arguments for and against Turkish accession to the EU,in my view, can be grouped«into two groups: the identity issues, i.e., religion, culture,Turkey¶s affinity with Europe; and the issues of scale, i.e. the huge size of Turkey, the population«´

Davidson reaffirmed the implications made by other European leaders,and in his statement, he asserted that there is an identity within the EU and that Turkeydoes not seem to cut it as a European country in the perceptions of those that matter.The foundation of EU stability and identity rests on two pillars²Christianity anda delicate balance of power. There is much debate within the EU about finding a commonidentity, and there is considerable disagreement on many aspects of this identity, there isone element that assumes a resonant role in European politics²Christianity. Critics of this view will argue that the EU is not officially Christian, and two attempts to codify aChristian identity have been rebuffed by secularist forces. Furthermore, it has been proven that while a large majority of Europeans are officially Christian, many of them areunsure of their faith. For example, a 2005 Special Eurobarometer Survey found that only52 percent of EU citizens believed that there is a God, and 18 percent stated that they didnot believe in a God or any other spirit or life force.

But the major decisions within theEU are not made at the citizen level; rather, it is the elites that exert control over political