You are on page 1of 22

"1

~ ..a.
::J" en
CD
<
OJ
C
CD
0
_..,
-0
::r
0
(J)
0
"C5
zr
-< 00 00

-

I I

II-

o a-

.(1) -

o

Z

co o

...c 0.

CO I-

m o

..Q OJ

i i··

I'

I

f'

I 1·

I

I~

I j.

I

I

"' ....... J,,~

150b-151e

There is another point also in which those who associate with me are like women in child-birth. They suffer the pains of labour, and are filled day and night with distress; indeed they suffer far more than . women. And this pain my art is able to bring on, and also to allay.

Well, that's what happens to them; but at times, Theaetetus, I come across people who do not seem to me somehow to be pregnant. Then I realise that they have no need of me, and with the best Will in the world I undertake the business of match-making; and I think I am good enough-God willing-at guessing with whom they might profitably keep company. Many of them I have given away to ~!:'?-Q!Q.J,1i/ and a great number also to other wise and inspired persons. .

Well, my dear lad, this has been a long yarn; but the reason was that I have a suspicion that you (as you think yourself) are pregnant and in labour. So I want you to come to me as to one who is both the son of a midwife and himself skilled in the art; and try to answer athe .questions I shall ask you as well as you can. And when I examine J,what you say, I may perhaps think it is a phantom and not truth, ,'and proceed to take it quietly from you and abandon it. Now if this

happens, you mustn't get savage with me, like a mother over her first-born child. Do you know, people have often before now got into such a state with me as to be literally ready to bite when I take away some nonsense or other from them. They never believe that I am cloblg this in all good-will; they are so far from realising that no God can wish evil to man, and that even I don't do this kind of thing out of malice, but because it is not permitted to me to accept

a He and put away truth. •

So begin again, Theaetetus, and try to say what knowledge is.

And don't on any account tell me that you can't. For if God is willing, and you play the man, you can. I

THEAET. Well, Socrates, after such encouragement from you, it would hardly be decent for anyone not to try his hardest to say what he has in him. Very well then. It seems to me that a man who knows something perceives what he knows, and the way it appears at present, at any rate, is that knowledge is simply perception.

Soc. There's a good straight answer, my son. That's the way to speak one's mind. But come now, let us look at this thing together, and see whether what we have here is really fertile or a mere windegg. You hold that knowledge is perception?

6. A famous Sophist who specialized in fine distinctions of meaning between closely related words. Plato usually refers to him with dismissive irony.

271

b

c

CDl~

d

i:;· ': ·:i

."

i

."

,
e I !
" !
I. ·.i
II'
l ,
.,
r
'!
) i
I i
"
'.
i
~.
I
,
I ,
I
! .-
"',
..d.: .. J
.1..,. oJ- ....• _" ~. . ,:~.' .' .~ ....

!

,

,1

f1

________ ----------~----------------~Ick~q'~t

auo isn] S! Jlas.}! U! tpIt{M SUNlOU S! Cllal{l lEll.} ,uoall.} inn uaaur I -A.I0<ll{1 A.reU!PlO ou AJUIE.}Ja:! S! 'MOU 'sN.} pue 1noA nat II,I ';)05 ,SalEl;)OS 'lelH Aq uaaur nOA op lEllM 'J3V1IH..L

,sf!dnd UMO S!ll oi aU!Jpop liU;)aS e ss "lon.J.J, al{l paruaAal all ,If!llM 'sn JO PMO.I;) UOWlllO;) . aIp .IOJ aIPP!J e SF mo S!ll.} md sdaqrad all PIa laldoad luaps -nruro aSOln JO auo selo.8Elold SFM ';:J.Iaq '1001 'AES I 'lng ';)05

'slEadde H os 'i!IV!lH.l 'aSpa[MOID( smaq se-~u!Jlaun PUE 'S! tEllM jo sAEMle Sf 'ual{l 'uo}Jda;)lCla ';)05 'tl{S!J lIE suraas .Jt?l{t 'saA 'J3V1IH.l 'wall.} SaA!a;)lad all se lI:)OS pmpJA!pU! al{l lOl "Ile s.8uNl telll 'A[lualedde 'slInsaJ H oS 'leqt a'l!I s.8u!lJ-l PUE lOll JO aSF;) aq.J lI! -uoudaarad sa aWES all.} S! 'ualll 'SSUflIl JO Supead&e al{..L ';)05 'saop J! 'saA 'UIVKH.L l,H SaA!aJlad all, suaaur .sraodda H, uorssardxa S!l.{llng ';)05 'saA '~H:V!lH.l lsn JO ll;)ea Ol srsadda H MOl{ sI SIll.} puy ';)05 '.Jell.} Aes asnur aM H SE S'lOOI H '~!lV1IH.l

lPID:) .JOU 'lal.JlO allllOJ pul:! 'PIO;) sIaal OlJM aUG aq.} lOJ pjoo S! H AUS pue 'se,IO.8u10ld Ol ualSH aM nel{S 10 lPlm lOU lO PIo:! SF 'JIasH Aq 'JIasH PU!M aqllEl.{l Aes 01 ~1l10~ aM ale aSE;) lEl{l ut 'ualll naM ';)05

. 'u<lddEll saop ATup?.Jja;) .}El{..L '.L!lV!lH..L

lPIO:> ,uaA .Ial{lo alit PUE PIO:> laq.}el slaa} sn JO auo lEqllQ ltOU lal.Jlo <l4l PUE pjoo slaa} sn JO auo '~U!MOJq SF PU!M aWES a1.Il uaqM tel[l uaddeq sauruauros H i,usaop MON -dn W!ll MOnO} sn laT 05 'asuasuou 'lTEl PInoM UEW as!M e lUl[l Ala'ITI lOU Sf H 'HaM ';)05

'SAE5 aq lEt{M 5! tEql 'saA 'l.!lV!lH..L lUEW e Bu!aq tpea I PUE nOA-noA lOJ S! II os 'noA Ot sreadda n SE pue Jaw ro; S! H os law oi sraadds ~U!41 4;:H~a SE -JUtfl 'sN.} a)fH BU!l{laWOS 11 stud aq let{l MOID( nOA ual{.L ';)05 'uaHo 'saA ·.L!lVHH.l

lasJnO:> JO 'SIl{.} peal aAEl{ nOA ,'lOU ale Aal{ttE1{1 'lOU alE 4;)!l{M S~UJl.fl al{t JO pus 'alEh<ll{llEl{l 'ale q;)!l{M S~u!l{t aq.} JO :sBU!41 ITe JO amseaur aql Sf ueW, tet{.} 'MOU){ nOh 'SAllS all 10d 'AEMlualamp e laqWl lI! H md all ArUO 'SU!l{t awes ,uaA al{l PIES aH ·UJt?lu!eW Ol pasn se,roBElold lel{M Sill afHM mo auroo aA,nOA aBpaIMOU){ JO nmocoa AleUIPlO ou S! S!l{l JalalI )fOOl lng ';)05

'saA ·I.!IVlIHl

sruaravstrj,

p

,.'

\

\

q

tst

160d-162b

285

TREOD. That's a better way of putting it, Socrates; do as you say.

Soc. Well then, Theodorus, do you know what astonishes me --E-about your friend Protagoras?

TREOD. No-what is it? , c

Soc. Well, I was delighted.with his general statement of the, theory, that a thing is for any individual what it seems to him to be;

but I was astonished at the way he began. I was astonished that he

did not state at the beginning of the Truth that 'Pig is the measure

of all things' or 'Baboon' or some yet more out-of-the-way creature

with the power of perception. That would have made a most impos-

ing and disdainful opening. It would have made it dear to us at

once that, while we were standing astounded at his wisdom as

though he were God, he was in reality no better authority than a, d

tadpole--let alone any other man.

Or what are we to say, Theodorus? If whatever the individual judges by means of perception is true for him; if no man can assess another's experience better than he, or can claim authority to examine another man's judgement and see if it be right or wrong; if, as we have repeatedly said, only the individual himself can judge of his own world, and what he judges is always true and correct: how could it ever be, my friend, that Protagoras was a wise man, so

wise as to think himself fit to be the teacher of other men and worth e

/71arge fees; while we, in comparison with him the ignorant ones, needed to go and sit at his feet-we who are ourselves each the measure of his own wisdom? Can we avoid the conclusion that Protagoras was just playing to the crowd when he said this? I say nothing about my own case and my art of midwifery and how silly we look. So too, I think, does the whole business of philosophical discussion. To examine and try to refute each other's appearances and judgements, when each person's are correct-this is surely an

extremely tiresome piece of nonsense, if the Truth of Protagoras is 162

true, and not merely an oracle speaking in jest from theimpenetra-

ble sanctuary of the book. " ~

THEOD. Protagoras was my friend, Socrates, as you have Just remarked. I could not consent to have him refuted through my admissions; and yet I should not be prepared to resist you against my own judgement. So take on Theaetetus again, He seemed to be following you very sympathetically just now.

Soc. Now, Theodorus, supposing you went to Sparta and were b

visiting the wrestling-schools. Would you think it right to sit and

watch other men exercising naked-some of them not much to look

f~· "<

" .,,'

I , ,

~' "

t .. !

~, l

I _ ,

:\'

, ,

,

\'

"

'\

-.- -

..

.. __ ... ~.--,-- ..... ~ .. - .. - ....... ---',

ur

p

op U<lW JO At!.IOfEW al{l Jnq 'llaswrq n paAan<lq aq asoddns 'PUEl{ .Iaqlo al(l uc{ lauo au 10J alUt S! alOlM. aq Lp!l.JM 1{11UJ., s!l.Jl ual(l '(n aAauaq lOU op paap1I! Ol"{M) aldoad JO At"f.IOfEW ;nn llEl{l alOID Aut? /amseaur al"{l S! UEW lEl(l aAa![aq lOU PIP JIasUI!l.J aq ~U1soddns leql 's!l.Jt AEs lOU at{ lsnw urasUIJl{ S9l0~"E!lOld JO 19l"{M PUV ';)05

'a19l AUE 19 'AloalfJ al{l 01 ~lI!PlO;)::l"E! 1 AES isnur aM 19l"{M.. S! ll~l{l n sn S'{001 H 'nom! lspuEsnotp JO suar atp lOJ as{Ellnq 'Jf3smoA .la, ann S! lE'lM ~~pn( ua'll a.Ie nOA lB'll A9s 01 sn lUl!M nOA op ual.Jl ':)05

'aJq!ssod AIUBumq Sl1"E!ql aNno.Il al"{l [[t! am aA"!2 put:! 'sA9s lawoH sa ',spUl!Snol"{l JO suai pUB spU1~sn01.H, .I!<lq+ 1I! 'SalEl;)OS /op Aatp SMomy uaAll'aH °<lOHH.L ,asTeJ ale Sll"{~notp .InOA pue suotspap mOA ll?l{l Ploq Ol"{M 'ansoddo alP :>JU!1fl oqM suosrad JO AW.I"E! lSM B 'aUI!l .uaAa 'noA lStI!Eae dn as!! alatIl saop lO ,alUl S! luaUla~pn{ mOA 19q1 aa.xae SAEM{ll" aM· OQ lP!plaA lUOA asp!l!D ABw sn 10 lSiU alfl 19t{l alq!ssod H l,US! lng 'noli lOJ illUl S! Juama~pnf lnoA lEtp St!.IO~E10ld qnM. awns -S9 sn 1ill 'am oi ~lI!qNwos moqe luawa~pn( e ssardxa ual(l pus PUfUI UMO .moA lI! uotspap '" 01 aUIO;) nOA asoddns 'rr<lM ';)05

lleql S! MOH '<lorn! 'sS1I!l(l II'" JO amseour a\{l S! Ul!UI 19tH Aloal.{l S!ql-uaAPP uaaq SEtI AlOaql mo lEl{l sm 01 S! H laA PUV ';)05 'saleDos 'aAanaq PlUOJ auo gll!lIl 13 lOU s)lnH 'oN '<lam!

l.AIaS{E' g~pnf .IO ~.uElO~! S! .moqq~F'IU s!lJ s'lliNllaAa auo ou 1El"{1 puanroo 01 parsdard aq S9J02E10lcI JO IOo1.ps al.{l JO auoAU13 P{llOM. 'noA P{l10M 'snlopoalJl'~ ,IOa 'asreJ pUE ann t{loq ara sluawa2pn( ueumq l"Elql ~afill Sf l13qM agpn( SA"E!M{"E! lOU op uaur 19q1 'Alaweu '2U!l.Jl auras aq-J ol saWOJ H 'AEs aM. 1,MtJ . ~lPNM ,AlasreJ saumeuros put! AJIUl seuruauros a~pnf Aallllt!l{l 10 l<:lfill S! l"E!t{M. a~pnr 'UO!sU;);)O AliMa uo 'uam IIl? l"E!q, A9S 01 aM a:r;y lluaUlll.8lB mOA JO <J)[t!w 01 aM. alB 'selO!3gto1d 'uat.H leqM ';J05

- 'aSIDO;) JO Isax 'aoaRl

~JuaUIagpnr aSl"E!J JO .lalll?UI t! S! aJ\llU, .. ~Otili! aTIlIM. 19upfU!tI-J at1.ll S! UIOpS!M lEl"{' aA<Jnaq A:aqt PUV ';)05 .1 -uotsnpuoo .I<:It{l0 ou aq UB;) a.lal.Jl '0.011111 .

- , lsaAlasUIal.{t 2UOUIE a;)U13.IO~! pun.,.

UIOpS!M \.{loq JO aJualsp<a aql ~ aAanaq,bp u<:Im·ll?q:nnq Aes a.h\~ uao aSIa lln.{M. 'saSl?J asa'l-J ~ UJ. 'pEal al(l· <l)("E!l 01 pue ,,;:;lPBal Ol arqe a.m Aat{llBql iM.anaq oqM uaur OSI"E! PU!J nOA 'S'llOM. ueumq nu JO uopoanp al.{llo, pua sa.In.ll?an SU!A!I lalHo .IoJ pm saAlaswaqllO!

1.6"

I

'!I

'f

;

"

11

. ')1'

I , ! l ~

, \

. '

\',

.. -i.

.:", ..

\

1

\: ,

'-

. ';'

..

.

. .

". 4~ ~ I • 'J,'

, .. "

• j ...

298

THEAETETUS

b

not agree with him; then you see-to begin with-the more those to whom it does not seem to be the truth outnumber those to whom' it does', so much the more it isn't than it is?

THEoD. That must be so, if it is going to be or not be according to the individual judgement.

Soc. Secondly, it. has this mo,t exquisite feature: Protagoras admits, I presume, that the contrary opinion about his own opinion (namely, that it is false) must be true, seeing he agrees that all men judge what is.

THEoD. Undoubtedly.

Soc. And in conceding the truth of the opinion of those who think him wrong, he is really admitting the falsity of his own opinion?

TREOD. Yes, inevitably.

Soc. But for their part the others do not admit that they are wrong?

THEOD. No.

Soc. But Protagoras again admits this judgement to be true, according to his written doctrine?

THEOD. So it appears.

Soc. It will be disputed, then, by everyone, beginning with Protagoras-or rather, it will be admitted by him, when he grants to the person who contradicts him that he judges truly-when he does that, even Protagoras himself will be granting that neither a dog nor the 'man in the street' is the measure of anything at all which he has not learned. Isn't that so?

TREaD. It is so.

Soc. Then since it is disputed by everyone, the Truth of Protagoras is not true for anyone at all, not even for himself?

c

d

THEOD. Socrates, we are running my friend too hard.

Soc. But it is not at all clear, my dear Theodorus, that we are running off the right track. Hence it is likely that Protagoras, being older than we are, really is wiser as well;25 and if he were to stick up his head frOiU below as far as the neck just here where we are, he would in all likelihood convict me twenty times over of talking nonsense, and show you up too for agreeing with me, before he ducked down to rush off again. But we have got to take ourselves as we are, I suppose, and go on saying the things which seem to

25. Because the refutation of the thesis that everyone is equally wise establishes that some are wiser than others-- and who should this be (Socrates suggests with savage irony) but Protagoras himseH?

• ~ ·d ': •••

~ ~' .'

=:

aIe lulF sSlI!lI1lnoqa :WqM, 'AllS fll?l.{S aM ,'Sllm~lllO.Id 'u3qI., ':::>05 'S! H 'OO!iHl

LOS 1ll1fl1fusI ,'UIN 10} Sl Arrea1 llll{M pus 3Nl S! .}t:!l.{M. S~lI!l.{l aq fwal.{l sanrapadxa aq Sll a.rn Aaq.} lllql S>JU!lIl aq uaqM os ~f[asUIflllI!l.{l!M s'slI!l{l asalJl}O UOr.z3lr.z:> 3ql seq ali 'uo!lda:>xa lno1.fl!M SU!lF JO PU?llllt{l {Ie pun lq~n pue Meaq pUll alNM JO-AllS aydoad nOA Sll JlsSUJ1.fl nt? }O arnsaaur aql S! u-eWII 'SlllOSlllO.Id 'MON, :(sMalA ames alJ.} SaSS3}0Id OlJM 3UOAUll OJ ro) SlllO~lllold Ol uopsanb a md sJaI 'ualF amo;:) ':::>05

'AJU!1?ll<'l:> 'saA, 'OOaHl q

',alUltlJ, fIll:> Apadold Aew 3M SUNl JO pup{ SNl '~WO;) 01 aWH aq1 U! IllJasn sq 01 SU!og ;;Ullll3ql SMuI a'lew aM 'a1llls!Sal 3M ualJM snlfl !aUlH anunj l.{llM 'n a'f1'll I Ipawa:>uo;) axe s2UNl asaqj, 'sSuolaq ,{Tgasn Sf teqM, qJ!llM Ot s8UNl JO ssep ayoqM aq1 moqe uopsanb II md IlJ8p.u auo 'Ul:!3W I 'suofsnpum mo l{l!M aa.I8e Ot AIllllauaS aydoad laS or Ala'flI aroin 1ms aq pUt:! AeM tU<U<'IJRP IcnHl?1 e U! la»em sM md :rq2rw a.M MON ';)05

'SiUUTIllJ ale al3lll tEl{l am 01 surass H 'ooaHl LsamTIll} JO zaqumu 13 sAuMye al;;RH am lO lpafqo sM aAap.pll deMIE At!lffiwwo:> II saop PUV ';)05

'nE ttl lOU lOU tIO 'ooml fin

lMa~ U! p3fqo laqlo amos aAll\{ AllW uOHllI~ar'fUN,J nOA op IO-'tlWlad AtPlldu:> pun ,Juam<ilipnf SH JO slfUITI 3lll sa .mJ OS-H 01 fUJasn asour a.m sa SMlll tpns s3'{llm SAUMye AHunurmo:> y ':n Sfill:> H aureu laAateqM 'satulsfSar n uaqM tESWre 1uawwaAo8 e llll{l SNl AIaros Sf H ';)05

'paa.I8y 'amlRl

_ . 'pandde S~ l! tPNM Ot 8up.fl alJt Ma~ U! SlllJ mq .rllJasn~

ameli a.gt·tnQql? SupfJllltOU S! a\{ tel{lfual{l/asoddns sn ta,} ';)05 a

'P~PU! PlnoM H 'ao!IHl

H! 1,uPlnoM 'luawrill.re .mo JO aweS ll'sU?lllW aq PlnoM. .Jllql tnq ~ ffUJ3sn, pallt1:J Sf n 11l1H sueeur aq 'asmo:> JO 'ssaIun-Iaplo paqS!IqlltSa al{l Sf 11 sa SuoI os 'ItlJasn S!Afillal Isaqsnqt?lsa pue 'IllJ -3SU S)JUJ1fl Al!UmlIWO;) II laAaleqM..1Ul{t puanroo 01 3.In.JUaA ffiM. aq :j.lll{l :>!Olaq os auoAull PUY J32uo{ ou aM /poof am s2U!l{llelJM JO uopsanb II S11! uaqM 'pUllll lal{lO al{l uo 'paqs!Iqllls3 os SU!llUIaJ:; H St! 2uOI Sl! JOJ pun At!Unwmo;) It?lfJ 10J 1q8p pus isn] Sf laqM..

S! Anllnpe Jq:>ns sa saqsnqelsa pUt! fttPl!l pua tsn~ aq Ol sappap p

AtfUUWWO:> AUt! JaAalllqM tet:p ~tU~ 01 Apeal All:>3J.I3d aIll Aal{l

alaH "tQ2p pue lsnf sJ 1el{M }O suopsanb U! 1seallou--ase:> AJaA3 lsom{ll U! aldpU!ld l!aql uodn puais 0t paredard 313M A3l{l lUtp pres aM. pUt! ~aq Ot UI!1.{ at uraas Al)tH 13A3llli..{M I).re SAllM{t! s2U!lP Jl1np~wU! AlaM .IOJ lelfJ PIol{ OqM put? ~uOHOW: U! S! lel{l 8U!aq e

90£

I .,~

, .. ",

," ....

, ..

.

l.~ _' _,

", .

<.

..

\

, .,

'J

177c-179a

307

going to be in the future? Has a man the criterion of these within c

himself? When he thinks certain things will be, do they actually hap-

pen, for him, as he thought they would? Take heat, for example.' Suppose the ordinary man thinks he is going to take a fever, and that

his temperature will go up to fever point; while another man, this

time a doctor, thinks the opposite. Do we hold that the future will confirm either the one judgement or the other? Or are we to say that

it will confirm both; that is, that for the doctor the man will not have

a temperature or be suffering from fever, while for himself he will?'

TREaD. That would be absurd.

Soc. But, when there is a question of the sweetness and dryness

of the next vintage, I presume it would always be the grower's judge- d

ment that would carry authority, rather than that of a musician?

TREaD. Of course.

Soc. Nor again, in any question of what will be in tune or out of tune, would the judgement of a teacher of gymnastic be superior to that of a musician-c-even about what is going to seem to be in tune to the gymnastic master himself?

THEOD. No, never.

Soc. Or suppose a dinner is being prepared. Even the guest who is going to eat it, if he has no knowledge of cooking, will not be able to pronounce so authoritative a verdict as the professional cook

on how nice it is going to be. I say 'going to be', because we had better not at this stage press our point as regards what is now pleasant to any individual, or what has been in the past. Our question for the moment is, whether the individual himself is the

best judge, for himself, of what is going to seem and be for him in

the future. 'Or,' we will ask, 'would not you, Protagoras, predict

better than any layman about the persuasive effect that speeches

in a law-court will have upon anyone of us?'

TREOD. And in fact, Socrates, this at any rate is a point On which Protagoras used to make strong claims to superiority over other people.

Soc. Of course he did, my dear good fellow. No one would have paid large fees for the privilege of talking with him if he had not !been in the habit of persuading his pupils that he was a better judge .than any fortune-teller-or anyone else- about what was going to

be and seem to be in the future."

TREOD. That's true enough.

179

31. An alternative text yields: 'if he really was in the habit of persuading his pupils that, even about the future, neither a fortune- teller nor anyone else can Judge better than one can for oneself.

e

,

;. :/

1

!

I

I

I

I

I I

I

·183c-185a

315

THEAET. Yes.

Soc. Now supposing you were asked: 'With what does a man see white and black, and with what does he hear high and low notes?' You would reply, I imagine, 'With his eyes and ears.' THEAET. I should, yes.

Soc. Now as a rule it is no sign of ill-breeding to be easy in the use of language and take no particular care in one's choice of words; it is rather the opposite that gives a man away. But such exactness is sometimes necessary; and it is necessary here, for example, to fasten upon something in your answer that is not correct. Think now. Is it more correct to say that the eyes are that with which we see, or that through which we see? Do we hear with the ears or

. through the ears?

THEAET. Well, I should think, Socrates, that it is 'through which' we perceive in each case, rather than 'with which.'

Soc. Yes, my son. It would be a very strange thing, I must say, if there were a number of senses sitting inside us as if we were Wooden Horses, and there were not some single form, soul or whatever one ought to call it, to which all these converge-something with which, through the senses, as if they were instruments, we perceive all that is perceptible.

THEAET. That sounds to me better than the other way of putting it.

Soc. Now the reason why I am being so precise with you is this.

I want to know if it is with one and the same part of ourselves that we reach, through our eyes to white and black, and through the other means to yet further things; and whether, if asked, you will be able to refer all these to the body. But perhaps it would be better if you stated the answers yourself, rather than that I should busy myself on your behalf. Tell me: the instruments through which you perceive hot, hard, light, sweet-do you consider that they all belong to the body? Or can they be referred elsewhere?

THEAET. No, they all belong to the body.

Soc. And are you also willing to admit that what you perceive through one power, you can't perceive through another? For instance, what you perceive through hearing, you couldn't perceive through sight, and similarly what you perceive through sight you couldn't perceive through hearing?

THEAET. I could hardly refuse to grant that.

Soc. Then suppose you think something about both; you can't possibly be having a perception about both, either through one of these instruments or through the other?

d

e

185

c

.. >

,

f

\

\

...

• ,I'

316

THEAETETUS

b

THEAET. No.

Soc. Now take a sound and a colour. First of all, don't you think this same thing about both of them, namely, that they both are?

THEAET. I do.

Soc. Also that each of them is different,irom the other and the

same as itself?

THEAET. Of course.

Soc. And that both together are two, and each of them is one? THEAET. Yes, I think that too.

Soc. AIe you also able to consider whether they are like or unlike each other?

THEAET. Yes, I may be. .

Soc. Now what is it through which you think all these things about them? It is not possible, you see, to grasp what is common to both either through sight or through hearing. Let us consider another thing which will show the truth of what we are saying. Suppose it were possible to enquire whether both are salty or not. You can tell me, of course, with what you would examine them. It would clearly-be neither sight nor hearing, but something else.

THEAET. Yes, of course; the power which functions through the tongue.

Soc. Good. Now through what does that power function which reveals to you what is common in the case both of all things and of these two-I mean that which you express by the words 'is' and 'is not' and the other terms used in our questions about them just now? What kind of instruments will you assign for all these? Through what does that which is percipient in us perceive all of them?

THEAET. You mean being and not-being, likeness and unlikeness, same and different; also one, and any other number applied to them. And obviously too your question is about odd and even, and all that is involved with these attributes; and you want to know through what bodily instruments we perceive all these with the soul.

Soc. You follow me exceedingly well, Theaetetus. These are just the things I am asking about.

THEAET. But I couldn't possibly say. All I can tell you is that it doesn't seem to me that for these things there is any special instrument at all, as there is for the others. It seems to me that in investigating the common features of everything the soul functions through itself.

Soc. Yes, Theaetetus, you would say that, because you are hand-

c

d

e

, ,'r

, ',"

..

;'

I i

q

'<lStl ];) 'Iv l~UWl1Jq+ SMOID{ oqM. UOS~;}d t! aq ~aAa aq m.M. '~UN+ t! JO q~n.q. 3\{l1t! 1a~ 01 SUU} ueur t! J1 puy ';)05' '3N!ssodllI! s,H 10N 'J.llVlIH~ It:{lnIllE la~ 01 ~tI!aq 11:1 la~ uaAa lOU saop OqM 3U03WOS 10J alq!ssod H sl MON ';)05 -os SI A{1.I!t!:J.I3:l 1l:!t:{l'S3X "LllVIIH~

.;1 'UOlleJ

. -npa pua 3Iqnoll JO leap poof l:! .stI!AloAU! 'luawdoJaAap snonpJ.e pue ~uoI e JO Hns~'U aq1 se AfUo 'op Aal{l uaqM. 'aWO:l ssausnoaf -l:IlUeApe l!3ql puaSutaq l!a\fl SUWJ.eSal SuoHtlJroIe:l :j.ng 'ApOq <lql q~nolq1 JUOS aql l.peal q:lNM. sa:mapadxa 3lJl 'ueaw I ~Uloq ale knp se uoos sa all.!a:llad 01 aNe Afieltlll!li al\? 'a:JUJe sJeW!Ue pus uaw 'Sa.ImealJ IJe tt::JNM. s2U!41 awos ale a.I<llH snlJl PUV ';)05

'Alpalqnopun 'sax '.tllVIIH~

_"" 'laq10ue auo 41!M. waql areduroo 01 SU!SJ.1 Aq sn 10J uorspop

e tpt!al 01 sldwa»e 1[asH mos aql a13H 'lualamP s1 l;}lleW al.{l I 'uomsoddo sNl JO 'U!E~e 'S1.I!aq al{l pue ',Ial{l0ue suo Ol uoursoddo .I!aql-ale Aaqlll!tj.l p~ al."(l-8U!aq .qal.{l Spl\?8al se Ing ';)05 'S;} A . .tav:ilHJ. mos S! 1eqM JO sseuijos allJ A{J.l!UW!S put? 'pleq S1 1llqM JO ssaupreq 31{l s;:lA!a:llad mos .nn lm..rI tpno; qSnol1{:j. S11! lllql Aes nOA l,upmoM '..MOU 'lseJ oS}ON ';)05

'alUlIlJ O:j. uOHeral lI! nrasard put? isnd JO 1[asH UNl!.M. UOHl!JmJeJ e ~1IpJl!UI aq 01 suraas H a.IaH 'laqlout! suo ql!.M. parsduroo 5e aAe\:{ Aal..Jl ~1Ifaq a'll sall! -urexa [nos aql 'fUN:j. I 'ne aAoqe 'asaql U! ~OOI asaql'saA_ '~B:vml

lpeq put? poo~ 'AI~n pua Inmnllaq moqa 11ll.{M ';)05 'saA '.Lavml l:j.ua.IaJnP pue auras 'a'ffiUn pus a){f[ oSIV ';)05 '.JIasH Aq la+.re mo satpeal RasH mos al.{1 1J:lNM S~U!1{l al.{1 ~uourn +1 md pjnoqs I _ .r.tlVIIHl. . '2UNlAJaAa sanredurocoe ll?l{l8U!l{lawos 5'1 'fit! aAoqe 'leq1 10d lSU!aq md nOA op sssp 'PNM U! MON ';)05

'as aq 01 aUI 01 ursas s<JOP :j.l 'rraM ·.lB:V!IHl '001 H 'fU!1.{1 01 nOA palut?M I lnq 'JIasAw 11{~no1.{l I leqM seM sm '1[as:n q8nol1{l put? auoJe sraprsuoo H 1{:l!1{M sla1{lo a.rn alal{l' sla.M.od ATIPOq a1{l qSnol1{l sSU!1{l auros sroprsuoa JUos a1.Jl aI!1{M 'letp nOA oi suraas H n ){ttl1 JO umoure :j.91)A e aUI paaas aAtll{ nOA ~UlUl poo~ e aUX; I auop aA1?q nOA 'aUIOSpU1?l{ 21.I!aq saptsaq PUV 'SA1?S <lwospueq se S! eurospusq lOd !t 'n <lAeq PlnO..M sruopoaqj, sa AI~n lOU pun aUIOS

9fH

, . ,

· ..

187

318

THEAETETUS

d

THEAET. I don't see how, Socrates.

Soc. Then knowledge is to be found not in the experiences but in the process of reasoning about them; it is here, seemingly, not in the experiences, that it is possible to grasp being and truth.

THEAET. So it appears.

Soc. Then in the face of such differences, would yo~ both by the same name?

THEAET. One would certainly have no right to.

Soc. Now what name do you give to the fonner-seeing, hear-

ing, smelling, feeling cold or warm?

THBAET. I call that perceiving-what else could I call it? Soc. So the whole lot taken together you call perception? THEAET. Necessarily.

Soc. Which, we say, has no share in the grasping of truth, since

it has none in the grasping of being.

THEAET. No, it has none.

Soc. So it has no share in knowledge either. THEAET. No.

Soc. Then, Theaetetus, perception and knowledge could never be the same thing.

THEAET. No, apparently not, Socrates; we have now got the clearest possible proof that knowledge is something different from p'erception.

e

b

Soc. But our object in beginning this discussion was not to find out what knowledge is not, but to find out what it is. However, we have made a little progress. We shall not·now look for knowledge in sense-perception at all, but in whatever we call that activity of the soul when it is busy by itself about the things which are.

THEAET. Well, the name, Socrates, I suppose is judgement. Soc. Your opinion, my dear lad, is correct. Now look back to the beginning. Wipe out all that we have said hitherto, and see if you can see any better from where you have now progressed to. Tell me again, what is knowledge?

THBAET. Well, Socrates, one can't say that it is judgement in general, because there is also false judgement- but true judgement may well be knowledge. So let that be my answer. If the same thing happens again, and we find, as we go on, that it turns out not to be so, we'll try something else.

Soc. And even so, Theaetetus, you have answered me in the way one ought-with a good will, and not reluctantly, as you did at first. If we continue like this, one of two things will happen.

c

'l~TI t¢lU::lPAEM or J:lM.od ::llfl S! p::ll ::lTdrueX:ll0tI ·s:lf.lTIEnb A1EtlI?d JPlfI JO :l1ns:lJ E

...... 'W"H~·

a ::JEtp Sl:lMOd ere s;}!lTI-enb A.l-epUO);}S ::ll!qM 'S:P;}!qo JO S:l~l;}dOJd

. :l!S1:q :lIe S::lf.lHEnb ,{.rem!ld :s.tatffoi! snssea. sa!:/..wi!o.ul 'UO?s.J,;}d. :/.S.4!tI ::l~}JlfI :l.:re :ll:lH ·UE:lUI s~m.lfI ~U:lldlP.P Amm :llE :l1;}lfI1-etp :lOS 01 1ue~10dUI! S! ~I 'S:l~nenb "",.,".",-,~." If:ltp JO Sl)::lJ:P ::llfl JO :;Jsn-e);}q s:P::lfqo 01 omqtnre ;}M. lElfI sou.rcdord .""1IU!!;"" A1EPUQ);)S ::l1~M. '::llm-eu y-e)!SAqd lpIJl JO osm~)::lq :lAEq AW;}l

l-eq:l S;)f1,J:ldOld ;)lE s;}f-I!yenb A1EWpd :AIlJ~nOl AJ:lA l! rnd OJ, ·s::lf.l!yenb pUE £.t111U'!.4i! U;)::lM.l::lq U0f-l)U~S'fP ::lIJl JO UO!Sl::lA AFE;} tre S! S~J, (·MOU , . lOU prnOM ::lM_ -uonour ';>dEl.}S 'nrs :s:p;>[qo JO S;)f.ll::ldOld IE[.IEds S:lSI1 SJ!SAqd l-eIJl !nJU!lfI O;)YTIED) ·slJ;)fqo ;)lfI JO S::lf-l.I::ldO.ld IE::lJ ::lJE SJOpO 'sptmos 'S;):)SE:). lElfI 'A-[U;):>y-elS!UI ')[U!IJl AOtp :relfl os 'n::lms pm 'punos ';)lSE:).

. sUon-esU;}S ::lAEq 01 S~U!:;Jq UEUInl.} ;)SnE:) sourcdord ::lsoq.L ·S::lq"!.lJS::lP SJ!SAqd "s~~o ::llfl are SlJ::l[qo IEJ!s,{qd JO sonrcdcrd {E:ll ::llJll1!lfI ~U!nil]l:! S! O:lTI{ED

(:llOl~j3-eS II OiJl!l11[)) ·S3ut11U ;ua1U :/.nq ilu'!tt:{.ou aq os iJlliJ!pq I ... .43:/.:/.111 :J'U ·S.J,oPO . ';punas 'S:J:/.S11:/. '('no sn U? 3:/.!:JX:J Plno:J q:J!qt1t. .. , , (UO!:/.OUt .JO 'iJi!11qs (3Z!S .(,!3q:/. :'"'F&j4.43q:/.O <f1u?q:/.iu'l'1 S3,pOq 1'l'1U.43:/.xa U! S:/.S1X3 :wq:/. :/.11q:/. :JtI.3,!pq ;JOUU11:J I :/.ng

:M.0!A J!lStllP .l;)lfIEJ -e j3Ufss:;JJdx:.:l ptre :s :-.e:Wlll! ~U!lp.M. 'O::lTneD mOlJ rrormonb E s1 :ll::lH ·~I::lU::l pUE 'uo~om 'ddl:!qs ., 511 !pns 's)!sAqd JO SE;)P! J!Sl:!q ;)lfI UO P;)s-eq PPOM ;}lJl JO ;).ITIlJ!d -e oaur S~ll!lfI

I .» S:l[.lTItmb {Emd::l:lJ;)d .r:n.po pITe 'sIT;)WS 's.lOTO:l 'S;)lSE~ 19 oa M.ol{ P;)];)PUOM • • OlJ\:lll{ sroqdosopqd pm ~sf-IU::lpS ':;:JJU;)PS JO sA:-ep ApE::l ::lIJl mOli{

'lli::llJllnoqE

f ljE] rerrueu ::>!SBq Al;)A E lOU S! lEl.}l poy 's~upq tremnlJ 01 U:l::l'& ))"001 A::llfllElJl

5! uonnnoo U! ::lARq Ire A::Ilfl ~li!lfI snO:Aqo asotn ::ll[l. 'S;)[.Il;)dOld :)U;).l;)J)!P AUEm ;)Am! pue" 's;)Z~s pUE s;)d-eqs TIE III ;)U1D:l s~o:lJl U;);)I~JOd 'Pl.40M aq:/.Jo S;J:J3!QO 31i/.tnrl ro =u. aSD o.L t1t.OH PU11 silu~ra U3:J.t[) ;)1J!T S;)T1"9 lJl!M s))"ooq pug lOU op nOA rnq ',call11A £W S11M U3:J.t[) ttWH pm S30:/.11UU'.L U:J:J.JD P31 .. l;I ::l)[!I S1Jooq ::lJe ;).l::lql, '1;}l.}lP 'S~ll!lJl U~::l.l~ 10 S~U!lfI par moqe s))"ooq :>!tPU::lPSUOU ou ere dl;)tp 'l:;:J:u-em l-el.}l.lOtI 'S~UJ1P U::l:;l'& 10 S~U!IJl p:l.llnoq-e SM-ey J!t[.lU;)PS {El;}U::l~ au ;).re ;)l;}lfI csrreooq s~ lElJ.L 'sj3IIIlJl U::l::l.l~ 10 S2U!lfI p::ll moqe s~ooq J9pU::IPS au ::lIU ::I.l::llJ:). :IUS: 'slUl:!qd;}p ;).re qJ!t:{M. S~U!IJllO umrmun)o posoduroo s'BU!IJl moqa SM.EI )9~U::lPS {E.l;)U;)~ ;).lU ;)1;}l.}l ::lsnu;)oq Sf lEql. 'slueqd;)p :moqe s))"ooq J!f!lU::lpS ere ;)l;}q~ 'UIn!UEm JO S;}P.l:;ldOld ';)ljl ~noqE s))"ooq :>Y!lU;)PS ;)ll:! ;}1;)q.L

06f

'suaws

pue SJOIO:> 51'! ipns 'sa!l!ll?nb A.iepuoJas s:Pi:l!qo oi alnqpUI?

or sn asneJ ,(a41 's:pa{qo JO simJadoJd jI?J!SA4d J!seq

aJe sa!l!Jl?nb A.i!lW!Jd

:i~ '.

version, nonrelational versus relational: primary qualities are ~:~<~.F.~Iilt.I~ properties that objects have in isolation, while secondary qualities are that objects have in relation to observers. For example an object is

it will seem red to a normal observer under standard conditions.

Third version, real versus illusory: primary qualities are real properties of . secondary qualities are purely subjective. Objects are not really red;

people sometimes have red sensations from looking at objects.

. Galileo was defending the third version. Most philosophers who have a primary-secondary quality distinction have defended the first or second version. And the most frequent example is not taste, sound, or but color. For on the subject of color there is a very striking contrast

.~·'h~twr;I;U the picture of the world we get from science and the way it normally to us. The world seems a bright and dappled place, filled with objects of many different colors. That is one source of its beauty. Moreover, an object's color seems a real property of it, like its size or weight. Objects can tbange in color - they can fade or be painted. But so too can they change in size or weight. And yet when we think of the world scientifically, all this , disappears: objects are complexes of material particles' that are too small to

have any colors at all. (What color is an electron? No color.) And color does aot come in at all when we use scientific theories to explain what objects do. (At any rate when we use physics and chemistry. Color plays a role in biology.) The world of science seems colorless. As the German poet Goethe said, 'Grey, my friend is all theory, Green the golden tree of life'. (This might be a reason for rejecting the scientific picture of the world. Idealists Like Berkeley would

.~' think so. See Chapter 15, Section 3.)

'1 Rather than say that colors are simply illusions, philosophers usually

! . think of them as real, but not basic properties of objects. To see what this

It ,f

I. means, consider how, according to contemporary science, colors are j.. produced. Suppose that white light strikes an- object and reflects off it towards 1 a person's eyes. The person will see the object as colored; which color the



; . person sees the object as having will depend on the wavelengths of the light

reflected. Very crudely, long wavelengths make the object look red, and as the wavelength gets shorter the object will be yellow, green, and eventually blue. (The whole story is actually much more complicated than this.) Moreover, we are beginning to understand how the lye and the brain translate light of different wavelengths into color sensations. So we understand in scientific terms roughly what happens when, for example, red objects reflect long wavelength light towards people, who then see them as red. So 'red' does relate to the basic physical properties of objects, in two ways. First there is the way objects reflect light of different wavelengths. Second there is the way this reflected light causes people to see the objects as colored. And these two ways

i 'I

Deep Illusions

t ,

~ I

391

Z6£

'. unsp All~nb A.IEPUW;)S-AnWpd ;)qlJO SUO!Sl:lA ;);)lql:lql ITE:);)l M.ON

,," ' " lUOP;) " •

i)[lEP ;)q:t U! par S:lSO.I ::UV (£) (d:,}S lOum, ;;lM. lEq:t siOTO:J llup:ls :lq A;;ltp PfTlO:) 'STEp:tS;;lll;;l:tEJ:tX:l

~tp lOJ P;;ll JO PU!)[ q'IqM. SE p;;lg!SSEP :I;;l:3 sBu!tp q'!l{M. llu!pmlsnpun

noll :lAEl{ :lM pUE sloTa:> ;;lS;;lql .IoJ S:lWEU OU ;;lAEq ;;lM 'sloT0:> :llE1Ed:;JS

:IN

, :l:ll'lfl Sf par JIBJ :lM. lEqM. WOl{M .I0J STEp:lS;;llJ;:)lEJlX:l :llE ;)l::lq::t osoddng (z)

<P;;ll M.OU SSEJ:3 sI ·uo as poy '01 P;)sn SSE1B A-eM. :;Jql :mOAJ::lA;;l 01 ~iJoI pootq poy '0:] p;)sn poojq AEM ::>ql ::lUOA1;;JA:l 01 S)jOOJ SSEl:3 :3U!UJOW

jx:lU :ll(l pUE 'll{ll!U ;;lUO s;)zhreq:> W::l1SAS renS!A mumq :JtP csoddng (I)

UnOA qlIM. ;;J::lJBE srotpo ocr) ':JJ'e strouscnb :lql in Sl:lA\Sm mOA lEqM )(U!qllSl!d 'W:Jql JO q:JE;;l alaN pUE s~A tpoq BUP;;lMSUE 10J SUOSE:ll lmZl!U;;l:tU! ~)Jn :ll;;ll{~ 'lOID:) rnoqe suonsonb :l;;l.Il{:] are ;'}l;;Jql M.Ops:

':lJU:lPS Aq P:;lqIJ:>s;;lP SE ppOA'!. :;ltp ur :;l:)Eld E pug UE~ moqe ;;llE:> :;lM sBu!tp :tEtp '::Il!soddo ;;ltp p:JmbE :JAEl{ sroqdosojrqd l:JtpO S:JSlD :;lS;)q1 JO fIE ut PUV 'S;)A!I mo 01 JEl]A 51 :teq:t Bll!ql:;lwOS .IoJ urooa au S:;lAE:;lI AllJE;)l JO :;lltll:>!d :J9!lU:;lPS :llfl lEtp p:;lnZin :;lAEq sroqdosojrqd :lWOS S;)SE:> ;}s;np ne uI ';}JfI JO BU!llE:JW :ltp ptre 'hlf.lU:lP! lEuosl;;ld 'IW"- ;};}lJ '1010:> ssrosrp IlJ'M l:lldEqJ 5!lf~

'SUO!Snm doop :s!tp :J)[!T :J.IE 'lnoqE Ald;};)p ;}JEJ :lM. SAEM. 'ppOM. :;Jtp ;)qpJSJP ;)M. SAEA'!. ;;lq:l JO AUEW on.n S! WS!JElmEu J! sdeql;)d '~!re:lJ ul :aU!t{lAUE oa puodS;}JJOJ lOU op l{:lIl{.M. S;;l:>U:lp:ldx;) mo :lqP:JS:lP UIl::> :;lM. skeM. 'J!BEUl ptre ':;ll'C) ':pnr ;})(!I ;}1'C srojoo sdEqJ;}d ')[:JnT poof nOA JA~ TI!M. l'Cql op UlD nOA SBU!tJllOU are :;ll:;ltp poy '~:)nT Ul;}tp S:l)('CW lEl{l ;;lA-eq Jlcio;}d ouros leql A:!1:;Jd01d Aue lOU s1 ;}.l;)tp anq ':lldwex;} 10J ';}Tdo;}d or uoddeq s2~ ~JnI S:lW!l:lUlOS '~:lJ aou :;lJE :>rllew 10 :llEJ JO )[:ml U:;lq:l 's1 11 )j1I!ql sn JO )SOlU lEtp ::>J-erd JO Pll!)[ ;}ql S! PJlOM. ;}tp JI ·pp0M. :;ltp)O crruard J9~U:;l!:)S ;)q:t 01 BupJOJ::l'C ':)~-eUl JO ;;J:tE] 10 )[,nr :;l)[!l ::>q U;)ql proOM. JOl0:) 's:;l!lJ::>doJd tpns au ::>lE AT~::lJ ;}l;;Jql csneooq U! 19 lOU op SJOI0::l- UO~:>U!lS1P ::It{l JO UO!Sl;;JA Pl1'lfl :lql U! se - lEql ;:)[q!ssod OsrE S1 l1 lna 'U0!l::lU!lSP ;)tp JO UO!SJ;}A pUQJ;}S Jql S! lEtp - :q ;}A!;):>J;;ld :;lM. AEM. ;)tp JO luq ;}UOre ppOM. :ll{:] JO lOU AlJ;}dOJd E se P:lU!PP :3Upq Aq JO - :;lAOqE u0!l:>uPSIP AlH:eub A.repuQ:);;ls-AJellIpd ;)lp JO UOrSJ;)A lSlg ;}tp Sf lEI.p - sidcotroo ::lg!lU;;J!:>s JO suuai l1! P;;JU9;;JP ~U!:;lq Aq U! 19 treo II ·Ue lE l1! 19 lOU S;}OP l! lEql Aes 01 lOU S1 S!l[~ ·ppOM. ;)t{l JO JlnlJ!d J9!lU:;lPS ;;Jql OlU! AHSE;) 19 aou S:;lOP l'elP luq sn oa ~;}1 Al;}A SW;);}S lEql ~Ufl[l;}WOS S! :]! csrreoaq Al[dosorrqd 10J :lIdureJ(::> ruauodun UE S! 1010:)

';;JAoqe P;)qp:>S;)P uOp:Jupsrp A::t!JEnb ,(.rePUOJ:lS-AJEwpd ::>lfl JO SUO!Sl;}A pUOJ;}S ptre lS19 ;)tp 01 PUOdS:ll10:)

, I

!We. can reality. fays We

lId the rat the to our posite, :ience.

ns for ers to



next looks

three ruble r the

11:

() n () n (I () r; t> (~ (') () (') () () () (~ ()

( ) .( I

First version) properties versus powers: primary qualities are basic physical of objects, while secondary qualities are powers that objects have as of their primary qualities. For example red is the power to reflect long light.

Second version, nonrelational versus relational: primary qualities are

properties that objects have in isolation, while secondary qualities are that objects have in relation to observers. For example an object is if it will seem red to a normal observer under standard conditions.

Third version, real vtrsus illusory: primary qualities are real properties of :.;~5':~J:,ble.C[l;, secondary qualities are purely subjective. Objects are not really red; but people sometimes have red sensations from looking at objects .

Deep Illusions

. (a) Suppose you answer No to question (1) above. Which of these three versions should you agree with? (b) Suppose you answer No to question (2) .~' above. Which of these three versions should you agree with? (c) Suppose you i,.:. answer No to question (3) above. Which of these three versions should you

I.

agree with?

Which of the following reasons for giving a No answer to question (3) could someone give while still believing most ·of what contemporary people ,.. normally believe?

i

.1

t.

.~ (i) Roses become purple when light is not shining on them. ~

!j (ii) In the dark, roses are not reflecting long wavelength light at any person's

eyes.

(iii) In order to know what color roses are in the dark we would have to look, but we couldn't do that while it was still dark.

l' Which of the following reasons for giving a Yes answer to question (1) could , someone give while still believing everything that twentieth century people 1 normally believe (except perhaps about color)?

(i) Everyone wouldsay 'Grass looks red now'.

(ii) Grass would now have the same capacities to give us color sensations that blood used to.

(ill) The perceptions we would now have would show that ourearHer perceptions were illusions.

Which of the following reasons for giving a Yes answer to question (2) could someone give while still believing everything that contemporary people normally believe (except perhaps about color)?

393

:;)jdurex~ )[JEJl-;)JEJ ::Jq:) '(~!) uonoofqo 0:) S;)nd::ll ::l::l.n.p ;;'IE ;;'Il;;'lH

<0:) AId::Jl E pug 0:) pEq A;;'Iql P;;'I] PTI10M :)U;;'IUlmbE ;)lfl , ~sn :JUO;JWOS :)Eql 'lu:;lwmhE ;nll 01 suotnolqo JTljl::lMOd ::J.re :JS:Jql]O lP!lIM

':Jre S;;):ll:]lnS J!;;)ql uo siods A~ lnq P:;lJO[O:) lOU ;)ll: S:P:J!qo ::lI01{M (A!) 'lU:JJ;)lHP TIE ;).I,klq,L 'TIE re JOIO:> OU ;)E 5;)jTI:l::lIOUl ;;lIp ~U;);).ni

51 n,{"qdOl0ftl:l ;;np ~P;)l ::JlE s::l!.mq ::Jql ~U;);).rii S! jE::J! ;)q4 :;mN 51 ;)P1sffiq =u (~O

. 'W::ltp 11l ~U~OOj ;;).lE ;)M. MOt{ UO sptradap tnoos A:;lql MOq :l:l::ldS;;lJ

s)lP tn SlOIO) SE JUlES ;)qllsnf ;;'IJl'! sodeqs OS 'dn ::lSOp AJ::lA W01] U;)::lS U;)t(M ~deqs p::J~~Br JTljM:J1J! tre :;l)I!1 PUE 'keME Sp.lEA parputrq B UlO.l] U;)::JS U;)t(M

~AO UE ;):1(!1 'keA1.B S;)T!W WOl] U;);:)5 U::Jt(M rop E :J)IH )[001 AEW )[JEll-;)JEl V (~) 'AEME :););)] :J::llt(l :)noqB mOl] ll.f~H ::J11t(M

, pOO~ l;)Pun re P::l)[OOI u::JqM. ::JABq 0:) SID;;I;;IS l! 1010:) ;)t(l rnq 'AEM t(J!t(M

Atre lE P:;l)[OOI :JAEt( oi SW;);)S 11 1010:) ;)t(l lOU S! l:l;)!qo tre JO 1010) :Jq,L (0

·W;)tp. lB )J00I ;)M MOq JO Ap.u;)pu;)d;)PU1 P;).10JO) Afitr.J.1 lOU ;)lB SP:lfqo OS 'ne lE S.10I0;) OU ;):lS nOA odooso.rorm UOW;)P tre ~no.np SIp:> JO sared lB ),(001 nOA J! U:lqJ, ·U::l;).rlj sf llAqdo . .lOJq:l ;)ql AJUO ·S.10I0:l lU;).1;)JJfP W;)J8 sIP' JO sared pm Sfi;)J lU;).1;)JJfP ';)do:lso.:r:l!W -e ~n0.ll.fl JE:lI y-enp!A!P1l! ue ;)upIreX;) nOA U::lqM U::llJJ, 'sMOIl;)A puc spar puc sU;);).rli lU;).1;)JJ!P AUCW W;);)S hlJl S::l!.l.l;)q puc S;)Atr.JI l-enp!AfPUf uo smoJ nOA U;)qM U;)l'{.L ·U;);).t2 M.Oll::lA SW;);)S II 'l! 01 .1;);rc;)u 1;)~ nOA U;)IJM. ';)P!Sll!lJ ;)ql JO ared SE 'AEM.E .ng WO.1J U;);)S U::ll'{M. U::l:l.t2-qs!nyq )JOOI AEW JTIlJ E JO eprs ;)tp uo qsnq V

'P:J10I0:l lOU ;;IE 51:J:Jfqo lEt(llJU!kes 10J lU;;lmnihE tra S1 ::JJ;)H (SUo!snm ;)q or SlOTa:> ~UWllOJ ;;lpBW ::lq UK) ;:ISllJ 1l]0 Po!)[ lElJ1lA 'SlOTO::> UBIfll;)IflBl SlOpO pUB 'sptmos 'SJl5el lJU!ssms!P S! o:JTIJBO :mg: (" ,suo~snm ::JJ1l S::J!lWnb AJ1lpUDJ::lS,) 'U0!l:JU!lS!P Al!fBnb illpUQ);;lS-A.reurp:d ::It(l ]0 UO!S,l::lA pl!t(l ::n.jl Slg ::llOno· O;;lTIJBn ;)t(,L

'JOfO:> E P::lfr-e:l ;)q TT::JM ss ll.f~!lli ,P::JJ, TJE::J :;1M lEql S:JPBl.fS JO ;;l~U1l1 ;;)If-I.]O ~;)sqns Any (~) 'w;;Il1l ptrersropun tree ::lM. J;)l.fPt(M .I;,}UEm

lOU S;}OP :1! 'Ol lJu!pllodS::ll ;)lE A;;)t(l lEt(l scurodord ;)lE :ll;:lt(l SE ~UOT SV (~) 'SUEmnq Ullt(l ;;lSJ;)A!lID

:It(l JO lJll1PUB1S.I;;lpUn J::lll::lq lpnm -e ;}Al:t( O~ orns ;}lll SJEPlS::lll;;)~BnXa (r)

~. .

(

'.; I

,

! :

• !

i,

;!JJ!PDJd U! I.qdoSOf!1.(d

JU' , .'

¥:' .<.:

.' shapes are illusions too.

can measure shapes, but we cannot measure the colors of objects, and argument shows why .

. the shapes an object seems to have, from different distances and Jil'l!COOn:s, are similar and related, while the colors it has VaIY wildly.

Deep Illusions

of these are replies that someone using the argument would be forced and which are simply replies they might choose to make? ... Which replies says something true?

NoW here are three replies to objection (iii):

.' A hillside cannot be blue if it is made up of green and red parts.

The smallest parts of an object, its molecules and atoms, have no colors, so color is not a real property of the whole object.

The individual leaves will seem different colors when seen from different

,

! 1

1

.. I ,

of these express in a different way the same ideas that are found in the '. argument, and which of them say something beyond what is found in the 1rgument? ... Which of these replies says something true?

.: Color is just an example. There are many other aspects of the world that

science or simply careful thought might show to be illusions. One of these is :. ~ human freedom. When people think about what it is like to make decisions, or to perform deliberate actions, they often have an overwhelming sense of their own freedom. It is very hard to put this impression into words coherently, but for many people it is a striking and vivid fact about their own mental lives. As striking and vivid as the colors of objects around them. And just as a naturalist view of the world threatens the colors, it threatens the sense

of freedom.

The sense of freedom can be illustrated with some examples. Suppose that you are facing a hard decision. You have been offered a high-paying and interesting job, but to take it you would have to drop out of university. You want the job and you also want to study and get a degree. You think about it for days and you do not find any conclusive reasons for either choice. Both desires are strong and you cannot say which is stronger. The day comes when you have to accept or reject the job. You think about it one last time and you suddenly find your mind dear: you will stay at university and get a very similar job in a few years' time.

'f i

395

You might also like