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happened as far as I can tell.) There has been increasing chatter in recent days that
the CC discussion has been serious and that there may be doubts over the
suggestion constellation. I hear age is a factor (as always, perhaps) and Vinashin may
still be in play. I don’t know much more at this point, but not having any official news
after the plenum was supposed to have ended seems to strongly suggest that things
are still in a serious state of flux.
Apparently they are holding an extra day of meetings. Is there precedent for this?
ANSWER: Yes, they even have held meetings up to the 11th hour, especially at the 9th
Congress. Either the plenum was extended or the Central Committee passed
outstanding issues to the Politburo/expanded Politburo (mo rong is the expression)
for resolution. An expanded meeting would include Politburo members and
additional members from the Central Committee (or elsewhere it that is what was
decided). This extra day does not preclude even more meetings or even another
Central Committee plenum.
[client name deleted] December 21:
I heard from one source it was the full CC meeting again today. Broadly speaking,
what would you say it means?
ANSWER: The original 14th plenum was about par for the course in length. An
extended session may mean that an attempt is being made to resolve those issues
on which consensus is lacking now rather than prolong the process up to the
congress. The congress is supposed to be a short 4‐5 day set piece affair that
demonstrates party unity (the last congress went for 8 days). In the past it was not
unheard of for the congress dates to be shifted as well.
You are the only person to suggest what the issues in question might be and they
seem reasonable to me. I would also speculate that the leakage of who has been
“approved” for top positions may also be an issue. As I noted earlier, the outgoing
Central Committee passes its recommendations/nominations to the Congress for
consideration by party delegates. They will elect the new Central Committee. It is the
new Central Committee that will elect the Politburo and party Secretary General and
make clear which Politburo members will hold state posts (president, prime minister,
chair of the National Assembly). Party delegates in January 2011 may once again
demand a greater say in the process such as another straw poll with a choice of 2 or
3 candidates rather than just one.
[client name deleted] December 23:
No doubt you’ve seen the official statements on the 14th plenum.
Have you gleaned or heard anything interesting?
ANSWER: Yes I have read the materials released after the 14th plenum. It is typical –
a summary of the closing speech (not sure I saw the opening speech), and a
summary of the work completed. Sometimes extracts from the resolution are
released.
Nothing earth shattering has emerged.
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The Congress dates were released and it looks like an 8‐day congress. From the 4th
congress (1976) to the 9th congress (1996), congresses averaged 4‐5 days. The tenth
congress was 8 days. This suggests that congresses, while designed as set piece
affairs, and now more engaged in leadership selection and policy‐making which
takes more time.
The Central Committee ritualistically took note of the input from various bodies,
mass organizations and society. Now the draft policy documents can be polished and
‘word smithed’ for presentation to the congress. There is no indication yet what
major changes if any were made. But the news media suggest a higher profile for
natural disasters and climate change.
The Central Committee unanimously approved the nominees for the new Central
Committee. But since more are nominated than the targeted size of the new Central
Committee, all factions can be satisfied for the moment. Left unstated was what
other leadership recommendations were made. I should point out that although
delegates may demand a choice, there is no mechanism to force an individual to run.
Nguyen Van An withdrew last congress as a nominee for party secretary general
once the feelings of delegates were known in a straw poll.
I also note that 12 international organizations based in Hanoi will be invited to send
representatives. These are not listed. Foreign diplomats will attend the opening and
closing ceremonies as usual. There will be a media frenzy with 150 foreign journalists
present.
My bottom line is that much is being withheld for the moment.
[client name deleted] December 29:
For a story I’m writing today, have you been able to draw any conclusions from the
14th plenum in terms of personnel and economic policy issues? One line in the
communiqué after the event seems to have caught the eye of people here – that the
plenum agreed that some issues were unresolved and that they would be taken up
after the Congress. The personnel issues (at least at the top) don’t seem to be the
problem. So, what issues have they not worked out?
ANSWER: Yes it is clear from the resolution issued at the end of the 14th plenum that
there were a number of unspecified complex problems on which it was unable to
achieve consensus despite prolonged consideration and that further research would
be undertaken and provided to the 11th congress for consideration. The final
wording of the basic draft policy documents, however, has been approved. These
unresolved complex problems are likely to be dealt with at the congress and passed
on the new leadership but not released in public.
On unresolved issues: these relate mainly to internal party administrative and
organizational affairs – policy and implementation mechanisms – on a number of
issues related to dealing with which party echelon has the power to discipline party
members and party branches; the procedures for resolving internal complaints made
by party members against party officials and administrative procedures; the
expanded role of party delegates at party congresses; election procedures for the
forthcoming 11th party congress; and the demarcation of powers and responsibility
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between the Central Committee, Politburo and Secretariat as spelled out in new
work regulations to be adopted.
There are hints that consensus has not been achieved on other major issues that are
dealt with only in general terms in draft policy documents to be put before the 11th
congress. It seems that the congress will consider and approve specific policies in the
following areas but that implementing resolutions may not be made public: defence,
security and foreign relations; economic and social policy; “party‐building” and
reform of the government political system. Each of these categories would include –
but would not be limited to – the following issues: first, relations with China and the
United States; second, Vietnam’s economic model and reform of state‐owned
enterprises; and third, a reduction in the number of government ministries and
streamlining the number of advisory bodies.
[client name deleted] December 30:
And a follow‐up, if I may: Would you agree with a comment from another analyst
here that with Trong as party chief, Sang as president and Nguyen Sinh Hung as
parliament chief (which appears to be a very likely outcome now), Dung’s power as
PM may be checked? (The idea being that Sang and Hung are not allies and both
wield considerable clout on their own. Also, Trong is a compromise candidate.
Relatively weak.)
(By the way, I’ve heard from a few people that Ho Duc Viet is going to resign from
the Central Committee. Some scandal that’s got everyone surprised. Not sure of the
details. May be using health problems as a cover.)
ANSWER: Pham Quang Nghi, party boss of Hanoi who has served the maximum of
two terms, is also rumored to be in line as chair of the National Assembly. Your
information would suggest this is no longer the case.
Nguyen Sinh Hung has been a conservative break on Nguyen Tan Dung. Dung sought
to oust him as first deputy prime minister in 2006 and failed. Kicking Hung upstairs to
the National Assembly would free Dung’s hand to reduce the number of deputy
prime ministers and appoint his own supporters. This would enhance the Prime
Minister in his office.
As for the larger picture, the Vietnamese system is always been one of balance. I
have long argued that the era of the party strongman ended with the death of Le
Duan in July 1986. Until Nong Duc Manh, no secretary general has served two
complete 5‐year terms in office. Nguyen Phu Trong has impeccable ideological
connections, is a party man through and through and will be in the mould of past
secretary generals. If Truong Tan San were party secretary general there would be
the potential clash of two strong rival personalities Sang –v‐ Dung.
My bottom line is that Dung retains substantial if not slightly enhanced power in his
role as prime minister. If he had lost to Sang, Dung would command little authority.
The office of state president which Sang is likely to occupy carries some legal but
little substantive power.
Nguyen Tan Dung will always be answerable to the Politburo. Dung will be
constrained by Truong Tan Sang and Nguyen Sinh Hung in their roles as Politburo
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members. It is not clear that Trong would side with this duo. It looks like the new
Politburo will be enlarged to 17. It is still too early to see what the balance of power
will be until new members are announced.
The real measure of Dung’s power will be revealed after the elections for the
National Assembly. Dung must receive Central Committee endorsement for his
nominees as ministers. He won the right to make his own personal nominations this
past term. Of the 22 current ministers about 5 (I would need to consult my notes)
will be retired due to age. The test will be how free Dung is to nominate his deputy
prime ministers and ministers.
Once Dung has his Cabinet in place, his power will be determined by the extent to
which the Politburo plays a proactive role in economic policy making. These
dynamics are subject to the separate dynamics of a new Central Committee to which
all Politburo members are responsible.