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Wong, JasonSocial Studies 10aNicolas PrevelakisOctober 17, 2007
Of Sympathy, Justice, and Self-Interest
Behind enemy lines two years ago on a foreboding mountaintop inAfghanistan, four Navy SEALs were confronted with a critical moral dilemma. Theyhad been sent behind enemy lines to kill or capture a Taliban leader who controlledbetween 150 to 200 fighters. However, they had just been discovered by threeunarmed Afghan goat herders. Their discovery by these three Afghani goat herders jeopardized the Navy SEALs’ mission, and furthermore put their lives at stake.
Withno reliable way of guarding these goat herders, what should these Navy SEALs do?To sympathize with these goat herders and let them go would be to risk their lives if these goat herders were colluding with the enemy. To act in their self-interest wouldbe to terminate three potentially innocent lives but, if their act were discovered, bringon domestic and international media attention which could potentially lead to criminalcharges and/or political and diplomatic consequences for their country. Therefore,considering these circumstances, what action should the Navy SEALs take and howwould we justify that action?In a case such as the real-life example described above, Adam Smith’s
Theory of Moral Sentiments
leaves much to be desired in reconciling sympathy withself-interest to attain justice. When attempting to apply his theories on sympathy,self-interest, and justice, it is difficult to come to a conclusive decision on whatSmith’s prescription to the individual or to society would be. In
Theory of Moral
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This case is based on Marcus Luttrell’s book,
Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of Seal Team 10
. An interesting discussion on this casein terms of army’s rules of engagement can be found in Diana West’s article for
The WashingtonTimes
titled “Killed by therules”http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070817/EDITORIAL04/108170016/1013
Wong, Jason
Of Sympathy, Justice, and Self-Interest
Page 2 of 8
Sentiments
, Smith claims that the rules of justice are the “only rules of morality whichare precise and accurate; that those of all the other virtues are loose, vague, andindeterminate.”
In this manner, Smith promises more than he can deliver as justiceis not necessarily as precise and accurate as he claims. Basically, Smithoverreaches in trying to define justice to fit too many different parts of his theory, andthis overuse confuses the reader’s understanding of justice and how to determine just actions.In the same paragraph that he describes justice as precise and accurate,Smith explains that justice can be compared similarly to the rules of grammar
. Thisrelationship between the rules of justice and the rules of grammar is hard tounderstand, and consequently impinges on our understanding of what he meanswhen he talks about justice. First of all, the comparison between justice andgrammar is confusing because Smith describes justice as “precise and accurate”,but the rules of grammar are neither necessarily precise nor accurate—so thiscomparison does not seem to fit and should not be used if we are to understandSmith’s first claim that the rules of justice are precise. Grammar is neither necessarily precise nor accurate because often the well-written essay cancircumvent the typical rules of grammar. Second, in many ways, one can argue thatthe rules of grammar are “loose, vague, and indeterminate” according to the specialcircumstances of the sentence and the paper at large. In this comparison, the rulesof justice can be concerned with both the microcosmic and macrocosmiccircumstances of the situation, just as the rules of grammar deal both with the
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Smith, Adam
Theory of Moral Sentiments
Page 327 §1
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Smith, Adam
Theory of Moral Sentiments
Page 327 §1 he writes “the first may be compared tothe rules of grammar… which present us rather with a general idea of the perfection we ought toaim at”
Wong, Jason
Of Sympathy, Justice, and Self-Interest
Page 3 of 8microcosmic circumstances of the sentence and the macrocosmic circumstances of the paper at large. Therefore, if the comparison between the rules of justice and therules of grammar are apt, then Smith would mean to say (but doesn’t) that the rulesof justice can vary depending on the circumstance. Since there are two ways of reading this comparison, it is hard to specifically envision what Smith sees as justifiable actions in morally ambiguous cases where sympathy and self-interestconflict. It is in these circumstances that we might need a guide on the theory onmoral sentiments the most.To start from the beginning, there are two important questions that must beascertained in order to codify a series of principles of morals, for Smith. The first, heasks, is “wherein does virtue consist?” Secondly he wonders how, and by whatfaculties, can we come about an answer for the first question, and prefer it to others.In other words, what is virtue, what actions are virtuous, and how do we differentiatethese actions from others, which we would distinguish as wrong or unjust actions?To answer the first question, Smith declares that virtue exists either in propriety,prudence, or in benevolence
. To answer the second, Smith declares that theprinciple of approbation, which is “the power of the faculty of the mind which renderscertain characters agreeable or disagreeable to us”
, is accounted for in three wayswhich are self-love, reason, and sentiment
. What does this all mean?
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Smith, Adam
Theory of Moral Sentiments
Page 267 §4 “If the character of virtue, therefore,cannot be ascribed indifferently to all our affections, when under proper government anddirection, it must be confined either to those which aim directly at our own private happiness, or tothose which aim directly at that of others. If virtue, therefore, does not consist in propriety, it mustconsist either in prudence or in benevolence.”
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Smith, Adam
Theory of Moral Sentiments
Page 314 §1
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Smith, Adam
Theory of Moral Sentiments
Page 315 §2 “Self-love, reason, and sentiment,therefore, are the three different sources which have been assigned for the principle of approbation.”
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