Luca Casartelli Université de Genève

Winter School: Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milan

Luca Casartelli, Ph.D. Université de Genève
26-27-28 January 2010
casartelli.lc@gmail.com

 “The
man is world-forming”:
Heideggerʼs considerations towards
a phenomenology of action  

1) In the first part of this paper I will show some phenomenological considerations about the role of the action:
the action has to be primarily described in a phenomenological way in order to be clarified. I will repropose
some examples of Gallagher&Zahaviʼs book in order to show the genesis and the original field of the “common
matters of phenomenologically different actions”.

In order to explain phenomenologically the human acting, it is necessary to clarify the role of the practical
action. At the beginning of the chapter entitled “Action and agency”, Gallagher&Zahavi write:

Our way of being in the world, according to many phenomenologists, is characterizes primarily in terms of practical
action [...] In our everyday lives we are pragmatists. To put it differently, our primary way of encountering worldly
entities is by using them rather than by theorizing about them or perceiving them in a detached manner.1

In this way, as Whitehead did, I can affirm that we are where we are able to produce effects. A “simple thing”
is not simply a “thing among the others things”: it is handling, it is ready-to-hand because we take care of
things. For example, there is the knife used to cut a slice of cake, the knife that killed a man, the knife that
was sold in Milan, etc. Our world is a practical world; it is the world that we use, modify, handle; in this world
we move, we live: we are beings-in-the-world and we relate to things in different ways. Phenomenologically
we have to underline the importance of the object-as-intended, namely the object as experienced 2 .
Furthermore, the spatiality of the lifeworld is also structured by contexts of use. If our lifeworld had been
captured by a geometrical spatiality, we would have had different experience of it. Measured in centimeters, I
am much closer to the glasses I am wearing than to the computer screen I am looking at, or the phone that I
am using is nearer than the person I am talking to. Instead, in the phenomenological approach (namely
speaking in terms of meaning or significance) the relations are reverse. Thanks to Heidegger, we can say
that an “objectively” long distance on an easily travelled way can be much shorter than an “objectively”
shorter distance on a difficult way. In the everyday life we habitually use this type of reasoning when we take
the longer (but faster) road by car. So we can say that our first relationship with the world (with the things and
with the space) is a practical one. Now, I want to discuss how we can distinguish phenomenologically the
experience that usually the natural attitude of cognitives science consider superimposable. What can we say
about the experience? How can we phenomenologically argue about it? The natural attitude asserts that
there is a neutral view capable of showing the “real things”, without the mutable outcomes of the first-person
perspective. On the contrary Gallagher&Zahavi:

Some people mistake phenomenology for a subjective account of experience; but a subjective account of experience
should be distinguished from an account of subjective experience. In a similar way, some people confuse an objective

1S.Gallagher and D.Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind, Ed.Routledge, New York 2008, p.153.
2 Phenomenologists call the “act-object relation” the “correlation structure of intentionality”. Husserl distinguished the object as
experienced (noema), the mental act that intends the object (noesi), and the object-that-is-intended (object itself).
1
Luca Casartelli Université de Genève

account of experience with the idea that we can understand subjective experience by turning it into an object that can be
examined using third-person methods.3

So, there is not any pure third-personal perspective as there is not a “view from nowhere”. Supporting this
naif belief means accepting the objectivist illusion. There is, obviously, some third-personal perspective but
these are perspectives from somewhere. In a phenomenological view we have to reflectively dwell on the
givenness of intentional consciousness in order to discern the different moments of experience. Indeed,
every intentional experience possesses two different but inseparable “moments”: the “intentional quality of
the experience” and the “intentional matter of the experience”. The former refers to the idea that every
intentional experience in an experience of specific type, being an experience of judging, hoping, desiring,
remembering, etc. The latter pertains to the idea that every intentional experience is also directed at or about
something. Clearly, we can combine the same quality with different matters, and vice versa the same matter
can be combined with different qualities. These argumentations refer back to an important passage:
phenomenologically it is very hard to identify two (or more) experiences as the same experiences. It is very
doubtful to argue that “x,y,z” are the same actions observed from different positions. Quoting Gallagher:

Despite the similarity and perhaps the identity of the actions at the motor level, however, these are two different actions
at the level of intentions.4

A phenomenology of actions has to explain how we can observe the same common elements at the motor
level (or neurological level if we analyze thoroughly in this way) but in the same time we understand a
difference of meaning. So, how can we explain that the same action is not equivalent? What can we say
about this difference in the equality? The answer has to be found in the phenomenological perspective of
action and in the intentional givenness of consciousness: the different intentional givens (remembered,
regretted, judged, etc.) can take root in the common physical elements (the body movement, the airplane
landing, the glass of poison, etc.): in this way a non-phenomenological view mistakes the experience and
unifies the givens. On the contrary, a phenomenology of action tries to underline the common physical
(“mechanical”, “motor”) elements of different intentional givens. Only with a phenomenological analysis of the
action we can argue meaningly about our experiences and go beyond the ingenuous prejudice of natural
attitude. The purpose of a phenomenological perspective is to clarify the datives of manifestation, showing
the phenomena strictly as they appear to us (without “superstructure” of natural attitude). This purpose
coincides with the idea of phenomenological description of act, and I can report some interesting examples:

Consider the following examples. You are sitting comfortably in your seat:
1) For no apparent reason, I ask you to get up and open the door. You do.
2) I ask you to open the door if you have a question. Perhaps this is a little silly, but then you have a
question, and you get up and open the door.
3) You hear a knock at the door and you are expecting a friend to visit, so you get up, walk to the door and
open it.
Are these three actions of yours equivalent? We think that the answer is obviously “yes” and “no”. In some narrow
sense, yes, assuming that your physical starting point is the same in all three cases, and you make the same
movements to get the job done. We could say, yes, these movements are “mechanically” or motorically the same; they
are the same in terms of the movements involved. But, no, they are clearly different actions if we try to specify them in
terms of contexts and goals, or more generally, intentions. Under an intentional description we would say that in 3) you
are opening the door for a friend; in 1) you are simply following an abstract instruction; and in 2) you are indicating that
you have a question. The intentional action is different in each case, but also the intentionality of consciousness- what
you are aware of when you are acting- is different.5

3 S.Gallagher and D.Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind, p.19.

4 S.Gallagher (in press), Multiple aspects in the sense of agency, New Ideas in Psychology, p. 2.
5 S.Gallagher and D.Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind, p.154-155.

2
Luca Casartelli Université de Genève

The Gallagher&Zahaviʼs analysis leads us to propose some considerations about the importance of
phenomenological attitude regarding the issue of action and human acting 6. In fact we cannot limit ourselves
to the natural attitude if we want to clarify phenomena as they appear to us. The phenomenological attitude
demands to attend to the world strictly as it appears, namely the world as it is phenomenally manifested. This
purpose allows us to differentiate the several degrees of the act: the common sense speaks about “action”
as a simple and non-problematical thing. Phenomenologically, we have to see the phenomena and I will try
to present some phenomenological considerations about the acting to disclose the intentional subjectʼs
genuine experience.

2) In the second part of the paper I will pose some considerations about the wide “experiential field” where we
can distinguish an extensive range between reflex movements and intentional actions, between the
worldlessness and the world-formation. This commitment allows us to explicate the basis of the research
work about the phenomenology of action. I suggest some considerations starting from Gallagher&Zahaviʼs
book [A], and then I will approach Heideggerʼs reflections [B].

[A] The difference between movement and action and some reflections about notion of agency

A phenomenological attitude asks to attend to the world strictly as it appears; a phenomenological

perspective about action problem involves a reflective approach about first-order and high-order experience.
With Gallagher&Zahavi we can say:

So what is that makes a movement an action? Before we answer that, letʼs take a closer look at the different kinds of
movements that can be discerned in the range between reflex movement and intentional action. There are some
movements that are neither reflex nor intentional.7

In “The Phenomenological Mind” we can find widely developed analysis about movements that are neither
reflex nor intentional. The first class of movements is called “subintentional”, and it refers to
OʼShaughnesseyʼs analysis. When I am listening to someone telling an exciting story my foot may be tapping
with enjoyment or anticipation. Obviously, it is neither a reflex movement nor an intentional action on my part;
it has no goal and there is nothing that may support the idea of intentional action. In a second time,
according to Gallagher&Zahavi, we can speak about what they call “movements with organizing intention”.
These are intentional movements even though we cannot say that they are part of the proper description of
the full-blown intentional act. The example of the friendʼs visit may clarify this situation: in fact I have to get
up out of my chair, walk across the room and then twist the doorknob. All such movements are included in a
specific purpose: to open the door and to let my friend in. In a certain way they are organized by the
intentional action, even if in a narrow sense they are not intentional movements; for this reason, if you stop
me before I reach the door and ask me what and why I am doing it, I would surely say that I have to open the
door to welcome my friend with open arms. There is one other class of movements located, say
Gallagher&Zahavi, between subintentional movements and intentional movements. Rowlands calls these
“preintentional movements”, but we may call them “prenoetic movements” because they happen without our
knowledge or awareness. Nevertheless many situations are very doubtful; the pianist example shows how

6 The phenomenological description is a very important element of phenomenological attitude; phenomenology is a methodology that
uses examples to clarify the experiential givenness, and these examples express the phenomena as they appear to us. There is a
famous Husserlʼs anecdote that speaks about the optical misunderstanding of manikin: I watch someone in the corner of the road, I
think that he is a man, but it is wrong: it is a mannequin. These descriptions permit us to understand what and how a phenomenological
attitude has to explain the experience. A genuine description of the subjective experience is the element that permits us to disclose a
new perspective about world, beyond natural ingenuity. This paper tries to help to disclose a new phenomenological attitude about
action and human act.
7 S.Gallagher and D.Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind, p.155.

3
Luca Casartelli Université de Genève

many difficulties we find trying to clarify about the intentionality or non-intentionality of a movement.
Rowlands suggests other examples of preintentional movements, hoping to enlighten the problem: saccadic
eye movements. Quoting Yarbusʻ works, he shows how saccadic movements serve and subtend intentional
action: in fact saccades are specified by the task one is engaged in8 . These elements suggested in the
Gallagher&Zahavi book help us to understand our topic but they are not resolutive because they do not hit
the point 9.
The history of philosophy, in fact, could show us this issue and help us to approach it in a more basic way.
Plato knew very well the Socratesʼ dilemma about his imprisonment and all Socratesʼ moral doubts;
everybody remembers the tragic end of the philosopher, but in the same time nobody thinks that Socratesʼ
legs, conducting him to the prison, caused his death. We believe that Socrates (Socratesʼ selfhood?
Socratesʼ soul? Socratesʼ brain?) decided not to escape from his condemnation, and for this reason his legs
conducted him to the prison. It was not the movement of his legs to bring him to die, but it was Socrates
himself that decided not to escape from death. It would be also very interesting to remember the Husserlʼs
analysis of Ideen II 10 ; we can find an important distinction between “motivation” and “natural causality”.
These arguments offer again the idea that it is different to explain an action from a perspective of motivation
or natural causality. At the same time it is a paradigmatic example of phenomenological attitude to
experience, with it we can genuinely describe the “openness to the world”. When we ask about a human
comportment, we do not research a physical or motor answer but we refer to another type of explanation.
Quoting “The Phenomenological Mind ”:

This implies that to understand an action is to know not what caused it in a purely physical sense, but rather what
motivated or justified it, either in general or in the eyes of the agent.11

So we have to say that in the Gallagher&Zahavi distinction between movement and action we find again an
essential point of a phenomenology of human acting. This simple example reminds us an important
consideration of the issue, and it links our research about action and movement to a more general and
fundamental part of human act. These Gallagher&Zahavi considerations can help us to propose a
phenomenology of action analyzing severals degrees of consciousness of human act. We have to distinguish
movements and actions because in a specific way we have to underline the elements of human act and his
specific peculiarities. The main issue that we have to approach is well expressed by the philosophers:

For a movement to be an action it has to be goal-directed and intentional. A movement that is a reflex, or passive, or
subintentional, or preintentional is not an action, although it might be interpreted as an action from the outside, that is,
by some other person.12

The idea that some external observers could misunderstand the genuine development of phenomena is
suggested by Carlo Sini, an interesting and original italian philosopher. He presents the misapprehensions
about the dogʼs experience observed from a human perspective:

8 S.Gallagher and D.Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind, p.156: “If you are asked to view a certain group of people with the task of
judging how old the people are, versus remembering the clothing they are wearing, versus locating them vis à vis certain objects in the
room, etc., it turns out that your eyes saccade differently for each task. These different ways of scanning the environment relative to task
are not reflex, although they are automatic and non-conscious. As a result, the eye movement happens in a way that totally escapes my
awareness so that if you stopped and asked me whether I knew that my eyes were moving this way or that, and whether I intended
them to move in such ways, I would certainly say no”.
9 Comparatively, in an approach more strictly phenomenological we can obviously remind the Merleau-Pontyʼs analysis about

phenomenology of action.
10 E.Husserl, Idee zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, vol.II, Kuwer Academic Publishers B.V.,

1952, Italian version edited by E. Filippini, Idee per una fenomenologia pura e per una filosofia fenomenologica, vol.II, Torino 2002,
Einaudi. From here Ideen II.
11 S.Gallagher and D.Zahavi, Ivi, p.157.
12 S.Gallagher and D.Zahavi, Ivi, p.156.

4
Luca Casartelli Université de Genève

Proposing another example: my dog dreams. You can understand how -while it is sleeping- he whimpers and whines,
how he roughs out some woofs and then he suffocates them; in the same way a dormant man speaking in his sleep
pronounces little bit of words. We ascertain these elements. Nonetheless we can suppose to have to “explain” it. We
would say, presumably, something like: in the dogʼs head many images happen; for example the dog imagines to see
the neighbors' cat. The image starts emotional and muscle reactions, held down by the sleep. They are “psychical
events” that fire embryonal vocal and behavioral answers. These answers about the dogʼs experience appears to us in
the external reality, and in this way we ascertain them. [...]

Nonetheless, it is important to explain genuinely the givenness of experience, and Sini comments in
this way:

It is different from what we thought about; the “evidences” -which we refer to- have to be genuinely and fully described
without neglecting any parts. When we try to do it the situation changes considerably, so we will see some things that at
first were unperceived. [...] To conclude: the phenomenon observed is not the “psychic experience” that the dog can do,
but it is vice versa the fact that -for us- something is assuming the sense of psychic experience.13

It is very important to emphasize this significative reference because it opens the perspective to the animal
the reign; this ouverture will be more interesting when, in the following part of the paper, we will present
Heideggerʼs position. At the same time, in a different but non-contrasting way, Gallagher&Zahavi speak
about the purchase of a dress: “Why did you buy that dress?”. The answer, obviously, cannot be simply that
the neurons in prefrontal cortex has fired; neither could it be that the hand has taken the money from the
wallet, or that the seller has made a wonderful packet. We have to expect something of a personal
explanation, where we give some good (or even not so good) reasons that we can count as motivation for
acting as we do. They say that no amount of neurophysiology could permit us to find an answer explaining
this kind of issue, in the same way no amount of neuroscience will explain why Neville Chamberlain after the
Munich Agreement in 1938 declared that the peace had now been preserved.
Nevertheless, we have to return to the distinction between action and movement to try to advance in our
project of phenomenology of action. Quoting again “The Phenomenological Mind”:

What makes a movement intentional- what makes it an action? What does it mean to have an intention to act? We said:
all intentional movements -all actions- are goal directed. So to have an intention to act means that we have some kind of
goal in mind. But this raises other questions. Where precisely do we locate the goal? [...] But are we assuming too much
when we talk in this ordinary way about action? The assumption is that action is intentional if I am acting with a goal in
mind, or, to say it another way, if I am in some sense deciding to act for a reason.14

We can say that the main question is: “What makes a movement an action?”. The answer - in
Gallagher&Zahavi perspective -it is connected to the intentionality and the finalist element. A simple example
could clarify this philosophical position: imagining to have an handgun, and suppose my finger slipping on
the trigger; an external observer might suggest that I committed an act of murder if the bullet, unluckily, kills
someone. Admitting that I could claim that I did not do it intentionally, I could be convicted of accidental
homicide or manslaughter, but not murder. If my defending counsel should failed, I would be convicted for a
movement rather than for an action. Therefore -in Gallagher&Zahavi perspective- there is not an
unintentional action, although there could be unintentional movement or unintentional consequences of my
action. Moreover, we have said that some intentional movements are goal-directed (and we call them the
actions); so “to have the intention to act” signifies “to have some aims in the mind”. Now we have to ask:
where can we place the aim? In Thorʼs example Gallagher&Zahavi try to clarify that the most appropriate
question about the goal of the action lies somewhere between “Why are you pressing your hand against the

13 C.Sini, La mente e il corpo: filosofia e psicologia, Jaka Book, Milano 2004, p.27-29.
14 S.Gallagher and D.Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind, p.157.
5
Luca Casartelli Université de Genève

arm of that chair?” and “What do you ultimately want from life?”; on the contrary the most appropriate answer
lies somewhere between “Because I am getting up” and “Because I want to be happy”. In fact the more
distant someone gets from actual movement -say the philosophers- the less satisfying the answer is as an
answer to the question. For these reasons we become to think that to understand an action we have to know
not what caused it in a purely physical sense, but rather what motivated or justified it, either in general or in
the eyes of the agent. We have been brought in this direction by Husserlʼs analysis of Ideen II and also by
Socrateʼs anecdote.
Another very important element in the research about the phenomenology of act is the concept of agency. In
a general way I can say that the sense of agency is the experience that “I am the one who is causing or
generating the action” 15. Nonetheless several theories and brain-imaging experiments show that there is not
consensus about how to define the sense of agency. Elizabeth Pacherieʼs position distinguishes “future-
directed intentions”, “present-directed intentions” and “motor intentions”; it is a very interesting perspective
and it could be very useful to explain the doubts about the role of the action16 . To get over the difficulties and
the misunderstandings, I will go back to phenomenology quoting Gallagher:

In some cases the sense of agency in construed in terms of bodily movement or motor control, in others it is linked to
the intentional aspect of action. For some theorists it is the product of higher-oder cognitive processes, for others it is a
feature of first-order phenomenal experience. In this article I propose a multiple aspects account of the sense of
agency.17

However, over the doubts and over the multiple perspectives that we can engage, we can confide us to The
Phenomenological Mind analysis; in this way we can say:

In its proper sense, we understand agency to depend on the agentʼs consciousness of agency. That is, if someone
intentionally causes something to happen, that person is not an agent (even if they are a cause) if they do not know that
they have intentionally caused it to happen.18

In other words, if someone or something (or some animals) causes something to happen, that person or
thing (or animal) is not the agent (even if they might be the cause) if they do not know in some way that they
have caused it to happen. So, if an action is something goal-directed and with an intentional reference (“If
there is deliberation and decision to do something, then it seems a clear-cut case of intentional action”), then
someone has agency when he knows to be the agent of the action. The main point of the argumentation is
this one: we can phenomenologically describe an action without sense of agency, namely an action
(therefore something goal-directed and intentional) without the agentʼs awareness to be an agent. Agency
concerns something about awareness to be the actor of an action. In the Gallagher&Zahaviʼs perspective an
action can be realized by an actor that has not awareness to be the actor, although this actor has carried out
the action following an aim and involving an intentional reference. In other words: we can understand that
agency depends on the agentʼs consciousness of agency. In “The Phenomenological Mind”
Gallagher&Zahavi try to clarify the concept of agency distinguishing two ways in which the notion enters into
intentional action: an experiential sense of agency and an attribution of agency. The former accompanies the
action at the pre-reflective level, that is the first-order level of consciousness; this is the level at which I have
a sense that I am moving, even if I am not aware of the exact details of my movement. The latter is
connected to the questions about my action. If someone asks me whether I did something (Did you drink a
cup of coffee this morning?) I can respond positively or negatively. I thereby attribute a certain action to

15 S.Gallagher (in press), Multiple aspects in the sense of agency, New Ideas in Psychology, p.4.
16 S.Gallagher, ivi, p.3.
17 S.Gallageher, The Natural Philosophy of Agency, Philosophy Compass 2, 2007, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, p.1.
18 S.Gallagher and D.Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind, p.158.

6
Luca Casartelli Université de Genève

myself. I might make attribution on the basis of memory, but the memory would not be there if originally I did
not have an experiential sense of agency for the action. Quoting Gallagher we can add:

The subject reflectively realizes and is able to report that he is the cause of his movement or thinking. For example, he
can say ʻI am causing this actionʼ.19

It is evident, in this moment, that the experiential sense of agency is more basic than the attribution of
agency, which depends on it. Many considerations may be propose about the notion of agency, and recent
significant research in a number of disciplines focus on it. Nonetheless the consensus is difficult. We do not
want to continue these analysis even if their development could show us more particulars of the issue.
Briefly we have to underline some elements about Gallagher&Zahaviʼs position: presenting a
phenomenology of action they distinguish a simple movement from a true action (that is intentional and goal-
directed). Besides this characterization we can discern other differentiations going around the notion of
agency. These arguments permit us to be genuinely loyal towards the phenomena as they appears to us in
the world; we are doing phenomenology in the moment when we see the phenomena without hypothetical
building and artificial constructions of thought. Itʼs time to pass to Heideggerʼs reflection.

[B] Heideggerʼs considerations about phenomenology of action.

[B1] “The stone is worldless”, “the animal is poor in world”, “man is world-forming”.
We can extrapolate some very interesting analysis about phenomenology of action in Heideggerʼs 1929-30
lecture course presented at University of Freiburg 20. The English translation is realized by William McNeill
and Nicholas Walker and it is edited in “The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude,
Solitude” (Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Usa 1995)21. In this course we can find
three fundamental theses about the relationship with the world: the first one affirms that the stone is
worldless; the second one that the animal is poor in world and the last one that the man is world-forming.
Obviously we have to clarify these argumentations in order to connect them to Gallagher&Zahaviʼs
phenomenology of action. The different manners to rapport to the world depend on the different nature of the
beings, vivant or material thing, human (Dasein) or animal. We can approach this theme making reference to
some of Heidegger considerations:

The stone is without world. The stone is lying on the path, for example. We can say that the stone is exerting a certain
pressure upon the surface of the earth. It is ʻtouchingʼ the earth. But what we call ʻtouchingʼ here is not a form of
touching at all in the stronger sense of the word. It is not at all like that relationship which the lizard has to the stone on
which it lies basking in the sun. And touching implied in both these cases is above all not the same as that touch which
we experience when we rest our hand upon the head of another human being. The lying upon..., the touching involved
in our three examples is fundamental different in each case.22

19 S.Gallagher, Sense of Agency and High-Order Cognition: Levels of explanation for schizophrenia, European Society for Philosophy
and Psicology, July 2002, Lyon, p.34.
20 Properly, Heidegger does not speak about “action” and he does not use the expression “phenomenology of action”. Nevertheless, I

am convinced that Heideggerʼs ontical analysis about “world” can be connected with the Gallagher&Zahaviʼs perspective about action.
Obviously, it would be necessary to ask why Heidegger does not approach directly a phenomenology of action. We can hypothesize to
find the answer in the ontological field. I have to thank C.Di Martino and F.P.De Sanctis for their interesting comments about Heideggerʼs
perspective.
21 M. Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt – Endlichkeit – Einsamkeit, Frankfurt am Main 1983, Vittorio Klostermann

Verlag, Italian version edited by P.Coriando, Concetti fondamentali di metafisica. Mondo – Finitezza - Solitudine, Il Melangolo, Genova
1999; English version edited by W.McNeill and N.Walker, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysic: World, Finitude, Solitude, Indiana
University Press, Bloomington Indiana 1995.
22 M. Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysic: World, Finitude, Solitude, §47 p.196-197.

7
Luca Casartelli Université de Genève

Indeed we can say that the stone lies upon the earth, but does not touch it. If we throw the stone into the
river, then it will lie wherever it falls. The stone follows the circumstances, crops up here or there, amongst
and amidst a host of other things; nevertheless everything around the stone remains essentially inaccessible
to the stone itself. The stone is worldless: it signifies that the worldlessness can be characterized as not
having access to beings. The stone lies on the path, it rests on the path without be aware of lying on the path
and without intending to lie on the path. We can find very different situations with animals: in Heideggerʼs
analysis the animal is poor in world:

The lizard basking in the sun on its warm stone does not merely crop up in the world. It has sought out this stone and is
accustomed to doing so. If we now remove the lizard from its stone, it does not simply lie wherever we have put it but
starts looking for its stone again, irrespective of whether or not it actually finds it. The lizard basks in the sun. At least
this is how we describe what it is doing, although it is doubtful whether it really comports itself in the same way as we do
when we lie out in the sun, i.e, whether the sun is accessible to it as sun, whether the lizard is capable of experiencing
the rock as rock. Yet the lizardʼs relation to the sun and to warmth is different from that of the warm stone simply lying
present at hand in the sun. 23

It is true -and Heidegger exposes it very clearly- that the lizard cannot propose a mineralogical analysis
about rocks; then, the sun where the rock is warming is not given for the lizard as sun; at the same time we
cannot say that the lizard is amongst the other material things (the rock, the tree, the bush, etc.). Heidegger
suggests that what we identify as the rock and the sun are just lizard-things for the lizard. When we expose
the example about the lizard lying on the rock, we ought to cross out the word “rock” in order to indicate that
whatever the lizard is lying on is certainly given in some way for the lizard, nevertheless the lizard does not
know the rock as rock. Indeed, if we observe philosophically the empirical experiences of positive science,
we can find some important elements that permit us to understand the typical dealing with the world of the
lizard. It is not simply lying on the rock: the lizard is not put on the rock in the same way the stone is put on
the path, because if someone moves it far from the rock the lizard will try to reach the warm rock again. In
this way the lizard is not simply subsisting nearby the rock and amongst the other things because it has a
special relation with the rock, with the sun and with all the material things. Another consideration can help us
to clarify the specific set of relationships between animals and material things. We observe a beetle crawling
up a blade of grass: we are tempted to say that it is a “blade of grass” as such but if we observe the
phenomena as they appear to us, we have to say that the blade of grass is simply a beetle-path on which the
beetle specifically seeks beetle-nourishment, and not just any edible matter in general. So we have to
suggest some observations: the animal can surely deal with something, and these relationships are not
casual but they are connected with the structural nature of the animals. In this way, quoting Heidegger:

The animalʼs way of being, which we call ʻlifeʼ, is not without access to what is around it and about it, to that amongst
which it appears as a living being. It is because of this that claim arises that the animal has an environmental world of its
own within which it moves. Through-out the course of its life the animal is confined to its environmental world, immured
as it were within a fixed sphere that is incapable of further expansion or contraction.24

These reflections bring us to consider the animal poverty in world in the sense of has and does not have
world. The issue is very hard to explain because we meet two apparently conflicting propositions. We can
follow again Heideggerʼs words:

If by world we understand beings in their accessibility in each case, if such accessibility of beings is a fundamental
character of the concept of world, and if being a living being means having access to other beings, then the animal
stands on the side of man. Man and animals alike have world. On the other hand, if the intermediate thesis concerning

23 M. Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysic: World, Finitude, Solitude, §47 p.197.
24 M.Heidegger, Ivi, §47 p.198.
8
Luca Casartelli Université de Genève

the animalʼs poverty in world is justified and poverty represents deprivation and deprivation in turn means not having
something, then the animal stands on the side of the stone. The animal thus reveals itself as a being which both has
does not have world. This is contradictory and thus logically impossible. But metaphysics and everything essential has a
logic quite different from that of sound common understanding.25

The ambiguity about animalʼs has and does not have world can be clarified only if we arrive to present a
meaningful interpretation of the concept of “world”. If we use the term “world” as the totality of beings we
meet innumerable contradictions and ambiguities; the clarification of the notion of “world” involves the
presentation of the third thesis: the man is world-forming. I will anticipate Heideggerʼs clarification about
“world” and then I will explain it using comparatively the third thesis about world-formation:

The naive concept of world is understood in such a way that world basically signifies beings, quite undifferentiated with
respect to ʻlifeʼ or ʻexistenceʼ, but simply beings. In characterizing the way and manner in which the animal lives we then
saw that if we can speak meaningfully of the world and world-formation of man, then world must signify something like
the accessibility of beings. But we also saw in turn that with this characterization we get caught up in an essential
difficulty and ambiguity. If we determine world in this way, then we can also say in a certain sense that the animal has a
world, namely has access to something that we, for our part, experience as beings. But then we discovered that while
the animal does have access to something, it does not have access to beings as such. From this it follows that world
properly means accessibility of beings as such. Yet this accessibility is grounded upon a manifestness of beings as
such. Finally, it was revealed that this is not a manifestness of just any kind whatsoever, but rather manifestness of
beings as such as a whole.26

We can underline four principal steps in this Heideggerʼs argumentation about the concept of “world”: first, he
naively considers the world as the totality of beings; then, he tries to attribute to the concept of “world” the
sense of “accessibility of beings”. Nonetheless he has to continue the research because it is not adequate;
so he underlines the necessity to explain the world as the “accessibility of beings” and as the “accessibility of
beings as such”. Finally, he finds that it is still not enough so he considers the world as “the manifestness of
beings as such as a whole”. The third thesis, “the man is world-forming”, allows us to open the perspective
towards the last section of Heideggerʼs phenomenology of action and explains the “manifestness of beings
as such as a whole”.
Presenting again reflexively the four steps, we can clarify some important elements. We have presented the
thesis about poverty of world between the other two, which asserts that the stone is worldless and that man
is world-forming. Naïvely, we could say referring to the first of the four steps: poor in world implies poverty as
opposed to richness; so, in a certain way, poverty implies less as opposed to more. In this first sense, the
animal has less in respect of what is accessible for it, in respect of whatever as an animal can deal with: the
man seems to be richer because his world is greater in range and far more extensive in its penetrability,
constantly extendable not only in its range but also more deeply penetrable. This explication has the
suspiciously self-evident clarity that disappears as soon as we continue the research and it refers to the
wrong supposition where the world is considered as the whole of beings. With Heidegger we can observe:

For we immediately find ourselves in the greatest perplexity over the question concerning greater or lesser
completeness in each case with respect to the accessibility of beings, as soon as we compare the discriminatory
capacity of a falconʼs eye with that of the human eye or the canine sense of smell with our own, for example. However
ready we are to rank man as a higher being with respect to the animal, such an assessment is deeply questionable,
especially when we consider that man can sink lower than any animal. No animal can become depraved in the same
way as man.[...] Thus it should be clear from everything we have said that from the outset this talk of poverty in world
and world-formation must not be taken as a hierarchical evaluation.27.

25 M.Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysic: World, Finitude, Solitude, §48 p.199.
26 M.Heidegger, Ivi, §68 p.284.
27 M.Heidegger, Ivi, §46 p.194.

9
Luca Casartelli Université de Genève

So the first step proposes to consider the world making reference to the accessibility of beings. In this way
the man is richer than the animal because his rapport with the world is more profound and deeper about
beings. In this first sense the man would be richer of world than the animal; nonetheless Heidegger has
suggested that this richness is very doubtful, and the experience shows us the erroneousness of this
position. The second and the third passage try to fix the attention on a very important point: the accessibility
of beings and in a particular way the accessibility of beings as such. Indeed usually we use and we deal with
the beings: we take a pen, we grasp it, we write with it, etc. We can as well say that an animal also uses and
deals with some beings: my dog looks for his bone to gnaw it, the bee tries to find its apiary, etc. Nonetheless
neither the dog nor the bee has the being as such, that is the bone as such and the apiary as such: they use
the beings, they have some kind of relationship with the beings but they have not the access of beings as
such, they cannot recognize the being as such. Here, we meet an important point of Heideggerʼs theory: the
accessibility of beings as such is the specific structure of the metaphysic practice. Indeed the peculiarity of
metaphysic action is the possibility to be in relation and to be positioned face to face with the beings as such.
An example that will be developed in details in the next part of the paper is that of the cat and the mouse; the
cat could be interested in the mouse or desire to catch it and then eat it. The cat observes the mouse only
inside a practical situation, only inside a situation of (its) life. Contrary the man could have another different
experience: he can fear the mouse, he can be worried about its presence but he can think about the mouse
as such too, independently and separately from every practical connection. The reifying practice of
metaphysic human language brings us to see, to observe, to deal with things as things, thing as such.
Contrarily the animal can only be inserted in a practical situation with (a lot of) things: properly we cannot say
that the cat looks for “the mouse”, but we have to show how the cat is behaving with respect to the mouse;
the mouse for the cat is not “a mouse” but it is “cat-food”, “cat-enemy-to-hunt”. The last step in Heideggerʼs
argumentation tries to explain that the world, for the Dasein, is not a manifestness of just any kind
whatsoever, but rather manifestness of beings as such as a whole; therefore “as a whole” signifies “in the
form of the whole”. So we can conclude quoting Heidegger again:

We shall now describe the site of the problem in a preliminary fashion by explaining in general what we mean by world-
formation. According to our thesis, world belongs to world-formation. [...] For it is not the case that man first exists and
then also one day decides amongst other things to form a world. Rather world-formation is something that occurs, and
only on this ground can a human being exist in the first place. Man as man is world-forming. This does not mean that
the human being running around in the street as it were is world-forming, but that the Da-sein in man is world-forming.
We are deliberately employing the expression “world-formation” in a ambiguous manner. The Dasein in man forms
world: 1) it brings it forth; 2) it gives an image or view of the world, it sets it forth; 3) it constitutes the world, contains and
embraces it.28

We have been obliged to limit our considerations in this paper trying to show all implications and difficulties
that we always meet when we present a phenomenology of action. Heideggerʼs analysis permit us to pose
the guiding-problem of acting from a different perspective. We can suggest some other elements before
proposing the comparison between Gallagher&Zahaviʼs position and the Heideggerʼs.

[B2] The humanʼs comportment and the animalʼs behavior: some comparative considerations about captivation, drive and
action.
Heideggerʼs phenomenology of action tries to distinguish specifically human comportments from animal
behaviors. Phenomenologically, it is necessary to separate physical identities of phenomenologically different
experiences, for example when we observe a dog and a man crossing a river (the former behaves itself
towards the river, the latter has the comportments connected to the particular situation). Following
Heideggerʼs example we can easily understand the issue:

28 M.Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysic: World, Finitude, Solitude, §68 p.285.
10
Luca Casartelli Université de Genève

When we observe that the stone gets warm in the sun, the leaf flies about in the wind, the worm flees from the mole, the
dog snaps at the fly, we can certainly say that in all these cases we are concerned with processes, with unfolding
events, with a series of stages in these movements. But we can also easily see that this way of looking at the events
misses the decisive thing in the case of animals: the specific character of the wormʼs movement as escape, the specific
character of the moleʼs movement as pursuit. We cannot explain escaping and pursuing simply by applying theoretical
mathematics or mechanics, however complex. Here a quite primordial kind of movement reveals itself. The escaping
worm does not merely appear within the context of a sequence of movements which begin with the mole. Rather the
worm is escaping from the latter. This is not simply an event, but rather the escaping worm behaves as fleeing in a
particular way with respect to the mole. And the mole for its part behaves with respect to the worm by pursuing it. Thus
we shall describe seeing, hearing, and so forth, and also assimilation and reproduction, as a form of behaviour, as a
form of self-like behaviour [Sichbenehmen]. A stone cannot behave in this way. Yet the human being can, he or she can
behave well or behave badly. But our behaviour -in this proper sense- can only be described in this way because it is a
comportment, because the specific manner of being which belongs to man is quite different and involves not behaviour
but comporting oneself toward...The specific manner in which man is we shall call comportment and the specific manner
in which the animal is we shall call behaviour.29

Phenomenologically the decisive thing that we have to present in Heideggerʼs example is the escape of the
worm and the pursuit of the mole. Readapting a famous J.H.Meadʼs example, we can show the different
experience that we describe about a man and a dog facing a river30 : both of them want to cross the river
because they are hungry, and on the other part of the river they see steaks and cakes. Not finding bridges or
different ways to cross the river, the man decides to cross it swimming while grasping a tree trunk: he arrives
to the other side. The dog, seeing a tree trunk and grasping it too, manages to cross the river. The common
sense could say: both of them (the man and the dog) have crossed the river grasping a tree trunk. In fact,
this affirmation appears quite simple and obvious, but phenomenologically we can underline some important
differences: genuinely we have to say that the man has seen a trunk and then he has thought that with it he
could cross the river. He has considered a lot of possibilities (to try to find another way to cross, to look for a
bridge, to build a small boat, etc.) and then he has chosen the trunk; he can choose the trunk as a possibility
to save himself because he has the accessibility to the trunk as trunk, so he can evaluate that possibility
comparatively with others. From another perspective we can say: contrasting a lot of alternatives he
imagines the consequences and the probability of success about each solution, and evaluating all those
givens he takes the trunk. Having the accessibility to the trunk as trunk the man can anticipate the outcomes
of such solution and he can take an aware choice. Differently the dog has not the trunk as trunk or the trunk
as such, so the dog grasps the trunk to cross the river, cʼest tout. With this affirmation we want to say that the
dog has an objective (the steak) and an intentional means (the trunk); its action is only apparently
characterized by these elements: I want to explain that the most important thing to underline in the crossing
of the dog is the hunger that pushes it to the steak. With Heidegger I could say: the dog behaves with
respect to the steak crossing the river and reaching it. If the dog had not been hungry, it would not have
crossed the river and it would not have considered this possibility (differently the man can consider
everything without the impetus to do it). In this sense the behaviour of the animal is not a doing and acting,
as in human comportment, but a driven performing [Treiben]. Returning to Heidegger:

Rather behaviour is precisely an intrinsic retention and intrinsic absorption, although no reflection is involved. Behaviour
as a manner of being in general is only possible on the basis of animalʼs absorption in itself [Eingenommenheit in sich].
We shall describe the specific way in which the animal remains with itself -which has nothing to do with the selfhood of
the human being comporting him- or herself as a person- this way in which the animal is absorbed in itself, and which

29
M.Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysic: World, Finitude, Solitude, §58 p.237.
30G.H.Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Ed. by Charles W. Morris. University of Chicago, Chicago 1934; Italian version by R. Tettucci,
Mente, Sé e Società, Giunti-Barbera, Firenze 1966.
11
Luca Casartelli Université de Genève

makes possible behaviour of any and every kind, as captivation [Benommenheit]. The animal can only behave insofar
as it is essentially captivated.31

These considerations try to show us that there are two different kinds of experience: the first one is the
human experience of comportment that conduct us to action. It is the kind of experience that involves the
accessibility to the beings as beings, the beings as such. The second one is the animal experience of
captivation that brings them to have behaviors; this one is linked with the animal capacity and it is limited to
its disinhibiting ring. Indeed the animalʼs specific manner of beings is the openness of captivation: the typical
animal behaviour is encircled by its ring constituted by the reciprocal drives. In another way: the animal
cannot anticipate the consequence of its drives before realizing them, so it is brought to realize everything
that its disinhibiting ring suggests. The dog is hungry and it sees a steak: it has an objective and it organizes
itself to solve (intentionally) the problem. If the food is its objective, then the trunk is the instrument to realize
its objective. Differently the man has a scenery in front of him: he is hungry, so he needs something to eat.
On the other side of the river he sees a steak, he would like to eat it so he starts to consider numerous
possible ways to reach it. The solution that he decides to take depends on his personal attitude to danger,
his intelligence, his capacity to discover new ways, etc. He has a plan, a strategy. If the dog and the man
take the same solution (to grasp a trunk and to cross the river) we have to underline that phenomenologically
their experiences are not equivalents. The dog behaves taking the trunk and crossing the river, on the
contrary the man comports taking the trunk and crossing the river. The possibility to value the scenery is
structurally closed to the animal, so in this sense we can speak about animal captivation as an essential
moment of animality.
There is another important consideration that suggests the specificity genre of human experience compared
with the animalʼs; we quote Heidegger again:

We usually employ the world “captivation” to describe a particular state of mind in human beings, one which can persist
for a greater or lesser period of time. We use it then to refer to that intermediate state somewhere between
consciousness and unconsciousness. In this sense we can say that captivation is also a psychiatric concept. From
everything we have said so far it should by now be obvious that in talking of captivation as the essential structure of the
animal there can be no question of simply transferring this state known to us from our own human experience into the
animal as a permanent trait of the latter. We certainly cannot think of the animal as a permanent trait of the latter. We
certainly cannot think of the animal as permanently captivated, in distinction from human beings- which would mean that
in principle the animal might also be free of this state. We do not understand the term captivation to mean simply an
enduring state present within the animal but rather an essential moment of animality as such. Even if in elucidating the
essence of this captivation we orient ourselves in a certain way with reference to the human state in question, we must
nevertheless draw the specific content of this structure from out of animality itself. That means that we must delimit the
essence of captivation with a view to animal behaviour as such. Yet behaviour itself is grasped as that specific manner
of being which belongs to being capable, i.e., to instinctual and subservient intrinsic self-diverting and self-proposing.32 .

The principal point of this argumentation speaks about the essentiality of the structure of captivation into the
animal in opposition to the human possibility to behave. Indeed the dog cannot “choose” to take the trunk
because the dogʼs disinhibiting ring leads it towards the steak through the trunk. Differently the man has the
openness of scenery, and he can consider a multiplicity of alternatives (connecting to the personal history,
the social commitment, the cultural context, etc.); nonetheless sometimes we could observe a man taking
suddenly the trunk, without an aware reflection about the different possibilities. The common sense usually
makes reference to “instinct”, that is something approximately nearer to animal behaviour then human
comportment. So we have to consider the human possibility not to act but to behave. This possibility,
obviously, has to be understood phenomenologically: if the man takes suddenly the trunk to cross the river

31 M.Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysic: World, Finitude, Solitude, §58 p.238-239.
32 M.Heidegger, Ivi, §58 p.239.
12
 Luca Casartelli Université de Genève

without consciousness reflection about the alternatives, we have to speak about a particular kind of action. It
is not, we can say it definitely, a reflection so fast that the interval is not clearly observable; we cannot refer
to an hypothetical unconscious reference that could explicit the hidden motivation to act: in the human
comportment it is phenomenologically very difficult to find some unconscious reasons (if phenomenology is
the science of phenomena that appear, how could we justify any unconscious manifestations of the
consciousness?). So when we speak about human instinct we have to intend “instinct”. In this sense the man
has the possibility to stop himself and to anticipate the possible consequences of his actions, but sometimes
he can “not-use” this essential openness to comportment. In other words: we can thematically look for the
best solution making hypothesis and anticipating the consequences but we can give up all these elements
and let ourselves go also to the openness of instinctual (disinhibiting ring). Resuming: if the animal is obliged
to follow its disinhibiting ring so it cannot value the scenery, the man can stop and value the different
solutions or he can behave instinctually without using his structurally accessibility to the beings as such. A
gloss to this thesis: it is very doubtful that I can pensively decide to behave instinctually, namely thoughtfully
choose to not reflect and act. Sometimes I behave instinctually, cʼest tout. Nevertheless the possibility to be
open to the scenery subsists in man, vice versa in the animal this chance is structurally forbidden.

3) A synergetic attempt to propose a genuinely phenomenology of action: a comparison between Heideggerʼs

thought and the Gallagher&Zahaviʼs perspective.

Considering the analysis suggested in this paper, it appears lawful to propose a comparison between
Heideggerʼs perspective and Gallagher&Zahaviʼs position that we can find in “The Phenomenological Mind”.
This attempt conducts us to outline a genuine phenomenology of action that tries to distinguish three
different degrees of experience. So I can synthesize the issue proposing three parallelisms: the
worldlessness of the stone in Heideggerʼs perspective could be connected with the oriented-towards-
something character of experience which Gallagher&Zahavi speak of; the poverty in world of animal
(behaviour) with the notion of action; lastly, the world-formation of the man (comportment) with the action
with sense of agency. Schematically we can outline this plan:

GALLAGHER&ZAHAVI HEIDEGGER

A) “Oriented-towards-something character” Worldlessness of the stone

B) Action Poverty in world of animal

(Behaviour)

C) Action with Sense of Agency World-formation of the man

(Comportment)

13
Luca Casartelli Université de Genève

We can suggest some considerations about these three attempts of comparison:

A) In Gallagher&Zahaviʼs perspective we can distinguish different kinds of “movement” that properly

we cannot name “action” even if they are directed to something (so in a certain sense we could speak
about “intentional reference”) and even if they produce some consequences. The philosophers speak
about a hurricane: it surely causes some modifications on the earth. It operates on the trees and on
the plants (“intentional” character) but it does not act in respect to trees and plants. In this sense, with
movement and “intentionality” I mean the “oriented-towards-something” character of experience.
In Heideggerʼs 1929-30 course we find the treatment of the worldlessness of the stone: it permits to
explain how a stone, a tree or a leaf lies on the path. They are directed-towards-something (the path)
but they cannot be aware of it and they cannot try to reach it: the stone cannot strive to lie in the river,
it falls into the river. For this reason its “touching” the path is essentially different from the animal or
human experience of “touching”.
Obviously, in a strictly phenomenological way, it is very hard to speak about the intentionality of a thing
(the stone, the hurricane, etc). Phenomenologically, the intentionality is a feature of consciousness
(the most important feature); so -considering that the material things have not any consciousness- it is
impossible to speak about it. For this reason I have always tried to underline the difficult statute of the
“intentional character” for the things; my purpose is simply to show the “oriented-towards-something”
character (in a broad sense an “intentional” reference) of displacement movements33 .

B) In “The Phenomenological Mind” the philosophers speak about a particular kind of action completed
by an agent even if he is not aware to be the agent of that action. They call it an action without sense
of agency for the agent. In this sense there is a real intentional reference inserted in a finalistic
purpose, even if there is not explicit awareness of these elements. When I get up to open the door
because my friend is arriving, I flex my legs and I grasp the arms of the chair (to get up) without
awareness of this specific act (even though I know the final goal: to go to the door and open it); so this
is an action (because it is goal-directed and intentional) but I do not have consciousness to be the
agent of this action. In my opinion, in “The Phenomenological Mind”, it is not clear enough how it is
possible to explain an action without sense of agency; someone could suggest some hypothetical
solutions: a “prereflexive sense of agency” that then will become reflexive, or an “unconscious sense
of agency”, or an “instinctual sense of agency”. Nonetheless these solutions appear to me very
complicated and not exhaustive.
The Heidegger positions seem more structured: the animal is the living being properly characterized
by an have and does not have world (the animal is poor in world): an animal has the accessibility to
the beings in an intentional manner (the dog making for the steak) and he is guided by aims (to eat the
steak), but at the same time it does not know the steak as such, he sees and he wants the steak as
dog-nourishment. Briefly: while it is certain that all instinctual behaviour is a relating to..., it is just as
surely the case that in all its behaviour the animal is incapable of ever properly attending to something
as such. The dog makes some actions but it is not aware of being the agent of these actions, so it
does not have the sense of agency. Developing Heideggerʼs perspective, it seems that also man
sometimes acts in the same way as an animal: sometimes man acts without sense of agency, that is
he acts without considering the typically human openness to beings as beings. This explication allows

33 Thisis a very important passage: I want to refer to the “directed-towards-something” character that we can observe in the
displacement of things. How can I name this “oriented-towards-something” character? I can speak about pseudo-intentional character or
about “intentional” character or about character in a certain sense intentional. The idea is always the same: there is an “oriented-
towards-something” character that we can observe in the natural displacements of natural things.
14
Luca Casartelli Université de Genève

us to give light to some controversial human experiences and it gives a plausible explanation to the
question about the action without sense of agency, which Gallagher&Zahavi write about.

C) In Gallagher&Zahavi perspective, the high-order phenomenal experience appears limited to human

activity: differently from the first-order experience that can involve non-conscious and sub-personal
processes, the human high-order experience presents to us an intentional horizon structure in the
sense that it “aims at” or “intends” something beyond itself; furthermore it is goal-directed and the
awareness about these elements is called agency. Stricto sensu, we can speak about action only for
the human experience, that is an intentional and goal-directed experience acted by an agent aware of
being the agent of this action.
In Heideggerʼs perspective - coherently with a typical metaphysic theoretical prejudice - only the
Dasein is world-forming, and he is separated from the other beings from an “absolute oppositional
limit”(Derrida). We can find some interesting critical analysis about Heideggerʼs position in the Jacques
Derridaʼs book “Lʼanimal que donc je suis” 34. The French philosopher tries to show how animals, like
men, can suffer; this element would cancel the supposed structural difference between humans and
what-the-humans-call-animals. Moreover Heidegger does not distinguish the internal cases inside the
animal reign (creating what Derrida explained with a jeu de mot: “Animaux” versus “Ani-mot” ). It is
very clear in Heideggerʼs perspective the purpose to manifest the human superiority, coherently with
his metaphysic commitment: we can say that the “animalist care” does not worry Heidegger simply
because it was not an element of his discussion. Nevertheless, the Derridaʼs position is more complex
but -I think- not resolutive 35.

I think that the comparison between these three levels of experience in Heideggerʼs perspective and in
Gallagher&Zahaviʼs position is definitely convincing. We have to clarify how some apparently equivalent
movements (at the level of sensory-motor processes and body schematic processes) are
phenomenologically different. Proposing an attitudinal change we have to diverge from a reductive
materialism and we have to return to the things themselves to attend to the world strictly as it appears. If we
want to clarify our experiences we have to reflectively dwell and refrain from naturalistic approaches;
following this way, I want to propose some conclusive considerations. In the analysis suggested, it clearly
appears the attempt to explain and to discern the difficulties connected to the role of action and the agentʼs
awareness to be an agent. So in this perspective I have tried to present an attempt of phenomenological
reflection about acting forward an outline of a phenomenology of action. What I have sought to do, it is not a
rereading of “The Phenomenological Mind” through the Heideggerʼs thought or vice versa. Rather, I have
researched for a phenomenology of action as the attempt to return retrospectively to the phenomena of our
experiences as they appear, showing the genesis of our beliefs and ingenuities. Historiographically it is
possible to ask whether a synergetic approach to phenomenology of action from Heideggerʼs and
Gallagher&Zahaviʼs perspective is plausible. I think so, and I can support my thesis quoting
Gallagher&Zahavi:

Perhaps the best answer is to say that in our book have been keen to advocate an open-ended pluralistic methodology
rather than a very orthodox and rigorous phenomenological methodology.36

34 J.Derrida,Lʼanimal que donc je suis, Ed.Galilée, Paris 2006; English translation by D.Wills: “The Animal That Therefore I Am”,
Fordham University Press, New York 2008.
35 We can find some interesting analysis about Derridaʼs position in C. Di Martino, Lʼuomo e lʼanimale, la morte e la parola, in AA.VV, Ai

limiti del mondo, Dedalo, Bari 2002. Comparing the Heideggerʼs and the Derridaʼs position, reflecting about Derridaʼs lecture of The
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysic, Di Martino underlines some undesirable outcomes of the Lʼanimal que donc je suis.
36 D.Zahavi and S.Gallagher, Reply: a phenomenology with legs and brains, Special Issue II,, 2008, p. 90

15
Luca Casartelli Université de Genève

On the other hand, I want to remember the importance of empirical findings of positive sciences and the role
that they have assumed in our attempt to present a phenomenology of action; quoting Gallagher&Zahavi
again:

Finally, one can also point out that the phenomenological approach that we promote in our book is anything but “arm-
chair”, since what we are concerned to show is that phenomenology can get up and walk into the lab, and can even
work even work the scanning machine. Weʼve tried to show that phenomenology has both legs and brains.37

I would like to conclude underlining the significance of action in the phenomenological topic in general:

Now, letʼs dig a little deeper, philosophically. And letʼs note that a consideration of human action will illustrate how the
different themes we are considering in this book are interconnected, since to understand the phenomenology of action,
it will be necessary to draw on our previous discussions of the phenomenology of pre-reflective consciousness,
temporality, embodiment, perception, and intentionality (just as we will also have to return to and amplify our treatment
of action in our subsequent chapters on sociality and selfhood).38

Concluding my paper about the phenomenology of action, I would like to stress that further research would
obviously be needed; my purpose was very simple: proposing two genuine phenomenological approaches to
action and compare the different positions about this topic, trying to connect the elements and suggesting
some conclusions. I think that Heideggerʼs elaboration about the worldlessness of world, about poverty in
world of animal (behaviour) and about the world-formation of Dasein (comportment) can bring to mind
Gallagher&Zahaviʼs distinction about oriented-towards-something movements, action, and action with sense
of agency. In this sense I have tried to reflect about act, action, agent and about the agentʼs awareness to be
an agent towards a phenomenology of action, towards a phenomenological clarification of our experience.

37 D.Zahavi and S.Gallagher, The Phenomenological Mind, p. 87.

38 S.Gallagher and D.Zahavi, Ivi, p.157.
16