ANG TIBAY VS.

COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR) [69 PHIL 635;

G.R. NO. 46496; 27 FEB 1940]

Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor
Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that the supposed lack of leather material
claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically
discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired
to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs and
Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. That National Worker's
Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by
Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR,
decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new
trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the
said motion.

Issue: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted.

Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR.
The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its
creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative
board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not
intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of
justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked
and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the
function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions
in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its
functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the
entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question,
matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers
and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and
regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the
provisions of CA 103.

As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out
that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and
equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or
legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but
may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming
before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative
character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and
submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision
in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue
involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable
to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a
new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of
this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case
receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth. So ordered.

G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively
fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the
constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said
law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable
doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea
in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates
the fundamental rights of the accused. The focal point of the case is the alleged
“vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are:
combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial
challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the
law using the facial challenge.

Ruling:
On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute
vagueness. The petitioner’s contention that it would not give a fair warning and
sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued.
Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioner’s reliance
since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the
statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague
on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be
invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and
free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical
exactitude.

On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may
not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade
the area of protected freedoms.

Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to

vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect
upon protected speech.
Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area
of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge
to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial
challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the
established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not
be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it
might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in
striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not
before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that
the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real.
The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the
Congress’ decision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition
is dismissed for lacking merit.
GR NO. 89317 May 20 1990
Ariel Non., petitioner
Vs.
Hon. Sancho Danes in his capacity as the presiding judge of 5th RTC Br. 38 Daet,
Camarines Norte., respondent

Facts: Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in

Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the
academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions
against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of the protests is not,
however, made clear in the pleadings.

Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their readmission or re-

enrollment to the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition. They now
petition the court to reverse its ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA1, which was also
applied in the case. The court said that petitioners waived their privilege to be
admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed,
and used its enrollment form for the first semester of school year 1988-89,
which states that: The Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of
students whose scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory and to require
withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the institution and/or whose
activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college.
Students, therefore, are required to behave in accord with the Mabini College
code of conduct and discipline.

Issue: Whether or Not the students’ right to freedom of speech and

assembly infringed.

Held: Yes. The protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly
guaranteed by the Constitution is similarly available to students is well-settled
in our jurisdiction. However there are limitations. The permissible limitation on
Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights within the school presupposes that
conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason whether it
stems from time, place, or type of behavior should not materially disrupt
classwork or must not involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,pla intiff- a ppellee
vs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA,a ccus ed- appella nt
G.R. No. 121777 (350 SCRA 163) January 24, 2001
KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS: On the afternoon of January 30, 1994, Maria Lourdes Modesto and

Nancy Araneta together with her friends Jennelyn Baez, and Sandra Aquino went to the house of

Jasmine Alejandro, after having learned that a woman is there to recruit job applicants for Singapore.

Carol dela Piedra was already briefing some people when they arrived. Jasmine, on the other hand,

welcomed and asked them to sit down.

They listened to the “recruiter” who was then talking about the breakdown of the fees involved:

P30,000 for the visa and the round trip ticket, and P5,000 as placement fee and for the processing of the

papers. The initial payment was P2,000, while P30,000 will be by salary deduction. The recruiter said that

she was “recruiting” nurses for Singapore.

Araneta, her friends and Lourdes then filled up bio-data forms and were required to submit

pictures and a transcript of records. After the interview, Lourdes gave the initial payment of P2,000 to

Jasmine, who assured her that she was authorized to receive the money.

Meanwhile, in the morning of the said date, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas

Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an unidentified woman inquiring about the

legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos, whose duties include

the surveillance of suspected illegal recruiters, immediately contacted a friend, a certain Mayeth

Bellotindos, so they could both go the place where the recruitment was reportedly being undertaken.

Upon arriving at the reported area at around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the house and pretended to

be an applicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on the pavement, from where he was able to see

around six (6) persons in the sala.

Ramos even heard a

woman, identified as Carol Figueroa, talk about the possible employment she has to provide in Singapore

and the documents that the applicants have to comply with. Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos came

out with a bio-data form in hand.

 Thereafter, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal Investigation Service

(CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged illegal recruiter. A surveillance team was then organized to

confirm the report. After which, a raid was executed.

Consequently, Carol was charged and convicted by the trial court of
illegal recruitment.

Upon appeal, accused questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and assails,

as well, the constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crime.Fi rst, accused submits that

Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining “recruitment and placement” is void for vagueness and, thus,

violates the due process clause.

The provision in question reads:
ART. 13. Definitions.—(a) x x x.
(b)

“Recruitment and placement” refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,

transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment,

locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall
be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not sec. 13 (b) of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise

known as the illegal recruitment law is unconstitutional as it violates the due process clause.(2) Whether

or not accused was denied equal protection and therefore should be exculpated
HELD:
(1)For the First issue, dela Piedra submits that Article 13 (b) of the
Labor Code defining “recruitment and placement” is void for
vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause.

Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those

who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.

In support of her submission, dela Piedra invokes People vs. Panis, where the Supreme Court

“criticized” the definition of “recruitment and placement.”

The Court ruled, however, that her reliance on the said case was
misplaced.

The issue in Panis was whether, under the proviso of Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal recruitment

could be committed only “whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any

employment for a fee.” In this case, the Court merely bemoaned the lack of records that would help shed

light on the meaning of the proviso. The absence of such records notwithstanding, the Court was able to

arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in criminal law and drawing from
the language and intent of the law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a “perfectly vague act” whose

obscurity is evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise

language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for

vagueness.

Dela Piedra further argues that the acts that constitute “recruitment and placement” suffer from

overbreadth since by merely “referring” a person for employment, a person may be convicted of illegal

recruitment.

That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and harmless

acts such as “labor or employment referral” (“referring” an applicant, according to appellant, for

employment to a prospective employer) does not render the law overbroad.

Evidently,
Dela Piedra misapprehends concept of overbreadth.

A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms

affirmatively guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion. A generally

worded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot be constitutionally punished is

unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give adequate warning of the boundary between the

constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible applications of the statute.

(2)
Anent the second issue, Dela Piedra invokes the equal
protection clause in her defense.She points out that although the

evidence purportedly shows that Jasmine Alejandro handed out application forms and even received

Lourdes Modesto’s payment, appellant was the only one criminally charged. Alejandro, on the other hand,

remained scot-free. From this, she concludes that the prosecution discriminated against her on grounds

of regional origins. Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro is a Zamboangueña, and the alleged crime

took place in Zamboanga City.

The Supreme Court held that the argument has no merit.

The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, is not, by

itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair

on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial

of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful

discrimination. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of “clear and

intentional discrimination.”
 In the case at bar, Dela Piedra has failed to show that, in charging her, there was a “clear and

intentional discrimination” on the part of the prosecuting officials.

Furthermore, the presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly performed their duties,

and this presumption can be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation. As said

earlier, accused has not presented any evidence to overcome this presumption. The mere allegation that

dela Piedra, a Cebuana, was charged with the commission of a crime, while a Zamboangueña, the guilty

party in appellant’s eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers

denied appellant equal protection of the laws.

Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987)

Facts:
Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from
one province to another. The carabaos of petitioner were confiscated for violation of
Executive Order No 626-A while he was transporting them from Masbate to Iloilo.
Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. The
government argued that Executive Order No. 626-A was issued in the exercise of police
power to conserve the carabaos that were still fit for farm work or breeding.

Issue:
Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a violation of Substantive Due Process.

Held:
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power, because it is not
reasonably necessary for the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. It is difficult
to see how prohibiting the transfer of carabaos from one province to another can
prevent their indiscriminate killing. Retaining the carabaos in one province will not
prevent their slaughter there. Prohibiting the transfer of carabeef, after the slaughter of
the carabaos, will not prevent the slaughter either.