Welcome to Scribd. Sign in or start your free trial to enjoy unlimited e-books, audiobooks & documents.Find out more
Standard view
Full view
of .
Look up keyword
Like this
0 of .
Results for:
No results containing your search query
P. 1
Congress - Limitations,Question Hour,Investigations

Congress - Limitations,Question Hour,Investigations



|Views: 1,498|Likes:
Published by Sui

More info:

Published by: Sui on Aug 10, 2008
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial


Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as DOC, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
See more
See less





US vs. ANG TANG HO (February 17, 1922)Ponente: Johns, J.Facts:
Philippine Legislature passed
Act No. 2686
penalized the monopoly and hoarding of, as well as speculation in, palay,rice and corn under extraordinary circumstances
regulated the distribution and sale thereof 
authorized the Governor-General to issue necessary rules and regulationspursuant therefor
see p. 3-4 with regard to pertinent sections being assailed
August 1, 1919:
Gov-Gen issued proclamation fixing price at which rice shouldbe sold (EO #53)
August 8:
complaint was filed against defendant Ang Tang Ho, charging himwith the sale of rice at an excessive price – he was subsequently tried, foundguilty, and sentenced to 5 months’ imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500
Present case is an appeal, with petitioner alleging that the lower court erred in:
Finding EO #53 to of any force and effect
Finding him guilty of the offense charged
Imposing the sentence
WON Act No. 2868 delegates legislative power to the Governor-General(such delegation being violative of the Constitution)
YES, therefore, it isunconstitutional and void; lower court’s decision was reversed and petitioner wasdischarged
In the analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, insofar as it authorizes theGov-Gen to fix the price at which rice should be sold, it can be gathered thatlegislative power to enact law, which is constitutionally granted to theLegislature, is lodged in the Executive.
The promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures was left tothe discretion of the Gov-Gen
The Legislature did not specify or define what conditions or for whatreasons the Gov-Gen shall issue the proclamation – the Act states that itcan be issued “for any cause” 
The Legislature did not specify or define what is an “extraordinary rise” inthe price of rice (wow, nag-rhyme), the causes of which shall supposedlybe prevented by such proclamation
The Act did not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergencymeasure, or how long such temporary rules or measures shall remain inforce and effect, or when they shall take effect
In the absence of the proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at anyprice. It follows that if the defendant committed a crime, it was becausethe Gov-Gen issued the proclamation.
No act of the Legislature made ita crime to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, thesale of it at any price was not a crime. It is the violation of theproclamation, not of Act 2868, which constitutes the crime.
The power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated tothe Gov-Gen or anyone else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislativepower to enact any law; it can only pass a law that does nothing more than toauthorize the Gov-Gen to make rules and regulations to carry the law intoeffect.
Ponente states several US cases… ie.
State v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St.Paul Ry. Co:
“The true distinction is between the delegation of power to makethe law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be, and theconferring an authority or discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.” 
Act No. 2868, insofar as it undertakes to authorize the Gov-Gen in hisdiscretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void
(1991)Petition to review the resolution of the Metropolitan Manila Authority.FACTS:The ff cases were consolidated inasmuch as all of them present the samefundamental question w/c can be disposed of jointly:1.Oct 1990: Rodolfo Malapira’s complaint when he was stopped for an allegedtraffic violation and his driver’s license was confiscated by a traffic enforcer inQC2.Dec 1990: the Caloocan-Mla Drivers & Operators Assoc sent a letter to theCourt asking whether they could seek damages for confiscation of their driver’slicenses3.Feb 1991: Stephen Monsanto complained against the confiscation of his driver’slicense also for a traffic violation in Mandaluyong4.March 1991: Atty Calderon, also for the confiscation of his driver’s license inMakati
April 1991: Atty Trieste protested the removal of his front license plate by E.Ramos of MMA-Traffic Operations Ctr & subsequent confiscation of his driver’slicense by one Emmanuel of the Metropolitan Police Command
.This consolidated case revolves around a discrepancy between two opposingsanctions between PD 1605, the principal law, and Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, issued by the MMA, a local govt agency.Under PD 1605, the
confiscation of driver’s licenses
for traffic violations is notdirectly prescribed nor allowed. It does not allow either the
removal of license plates
in Metropolitan Manila. It transfers only the powers of the LandTransportation Commission and the Bd of Transportation to the Metropolitan MlaCommission inasmuch as the latter is allowed to impose fines and discipline trafficviolators in amounts and penalties prescribed.Under Ordinance No. 7 and 11, specifically Sec 2 of the latter, MMA is authorized todetach the license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motorvehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in MMla. The MMA, in itsdefense, alleges that its powers were conferred upon it by virtue of EO 392.ISSUE: WON Ord No 7 and 11 are legal and validHELD: The present issue of the validity of Ordinance No 7 and 11 can, in principle,be challenged only in a direct action and not collaterally as in this case. However,that rule is not inflexible and may be relaxed by the Court under exceptionalcircumstances such as in the present controversy. It has created a great deal of confusion among motorists about the state of the law on the questioned sanctions.Even though the complainants, especially the lawyers Monsanto and Trieste, failedto formally challenge its validity, the Court will suspend the procedural rules in theinterest of substantial justice.
Emmanuel averred that he confiscated Atty Trieste’s license pursuant to a memorandum authorizingsuch sanction. However, Dir Gen Cesar Nazareno of the PNP in his Comment assured the Court that hisOffice has never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles and he orderedfull compliance of the memorandum.
Ordinance No 11 was enacted to promote the comfort and convenience of the publicand to alleviate the worsening traffic problems in Metropolitan Mla due in large partto violation of traffic rules. The Court holds that indeed there is a valid delegationof legislative power to promulgate such measures, it satisfying the requisites of delegation: (1) completeness of the statute making the delegation; and (2) thepresence of a sufficient standard (i.e. the convenience and welfare of the public espmotorists and passengers).However, what is questioned is the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.Ordinance No 11 is merely an enactment of local govt acting only as agents of thenational legislature. Necessarily, its acts must reflect and conform to the will of theprincipal. Therefore, a municipal ordinance to be valid:
1) must not contravenethe Consti or any statute
; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not bepartial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must notbe unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent w/ public policy.It is clear that Ordinance No 7 and 11 do not pass the first criterion because they donot conform to the existing law, PD 1605, and in effect partially repeals the law.The latter prohibits and does not allow either the removal of license plates or theconfiscation of driver'’ licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Mla.Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. They are mere agents vested w/what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress,the LGU cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. Tosustain the local ordinances would open the floodgates to other ordinancesamending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing them.The enactment in question, therefore, being merely local in origin, cannot prevailagainst the decree, w/c has the force and effect of a statute. They are declaredNULL and VOID. All law enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Mla are enjoinedfrom removing license plates of motor vehicles
and confiscating driver’s licenses fortraffic violation w/in the area.
EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent
Original Action in the SC. Prohibition w/Preliminary Injunction [Dec. 24, 1965]
Sept. 4 – Oct. 29, 1964: Phil Pres purporting to act pursuant to Sec. 68 of Revised Administrative Code (RAC), issued Exec Orders (EO) Nos. 93-121, 124,126-129, creating 33 municipalities (see footnote #1 in p.573 for completelist).
Sec. 68 of RAC:
Gov Gen/Pres of Phil may by EO define boundary or boundaries of prov,subprov, municipality, municipal district or other pol subd & increase,divide, separate & merge territories, name new subd created & changeseat of gov’t w/in subd
as pub welfare may require
.2.Provided that Phil Legislature/Congress of RP’s authorization shall first beobtained when boundary of prov/subprov is to be defined or prov is to bedivided into 1/more subprov.
Except when authorized under LOI 43, in cases when stalled vehicles obstruct public streets.
3.Change of territory under jurisdiction of an administrative/judicial officer,recommendation & advice of head of dept having exec control over suchofficer shall be obtained.4.Equitable distribution of funds & oblig of divisions affected shall be made asrecommended by Auditor Gen & approved by Gov Gen/Pres.
Nov. 10, 1964: Emmanuel Pelaez, as VP of the Phil & a taxpayer, institutedaction to restrain Auditor Gen & his reps & agents from passing in audit anyexpenditure of public funds in implementation of EOs and/or any disbursementby said municipalities. He claims that law invoked by Pres has been impliedlyrepealed by RA No. 2370 & constitutes undue delegation of legislative pow.
Pertinent provisions of RA No. 23701.Sec. 3, Par. 1: All barrios at time of passage of this Act shall come underprovisions hereof.2.Sec. 3, Par. 2: New barrio may be created or name of existing one may bechanged by prov’l board of province upon petition of maj of voters in thoseareas & upon recommendation of council of municipality/municipalities inw/c proposed barrio is stipulated. Recommendation must be in a form of resolution approved by at least 2/3 of council’s mems. To create a newbarrio, pop must be at least 500 persons.3.Sec. 3, Par. 3: Barrios shall not be created/their boundaries altered northeir names changed except under provisions of this Act/by Act of Congress.
Respondent: action is premature & not all proper parties (officials of newly-created pol subd) have been impleaded.
Mayors of municipalities from which the barrios w/c formed the newmunicipalities were taken intervened.
Attys. Enrique Fernando & Emma Quisumbing-Fernando appeared as amicicuriae.
Issues & Ratio:1. WON the President’s act constituted an undue delegation of legislativepow. – YES.
Since Jan. 1, 1960, when RA 2370 took effect, barrios can only be created ortheir boundaries be altered or their names changed by Act of Congress or of provincial board (Par. 2 & 3 respectively).a.Petitioner claims if Pres is enjoined fr creating a barrio, all the more that heshould be prohibited fr creating a municipality w/c is composed of severalbarrios.b.Respondent: New municipality can be created w/o creating new barrios.You simply place old barrios under new municipality. (Tsktsk, logical!)But using logic & experience, we can deduce that the statutory denial of pres’lauthority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power tocreate new municipalities.
Respondent cites Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binangonan inclaiming that Pres’ act is not an undue delegation of pow. But this is notapplicable because it did not involve the creation of a new municipality but amere transfer of territory (fr Cardona to Binangona). Both territories alreadyexisted prior to & during time of transfer.
Remember that power to
common boundaries as in the cited case areadministrative in nature whereas authority to
municipal corp. islegislative in nature. Strictly a legislative function (State ex rel. Higgins vs.Aicklen), solely & exclusively the exercise of legislative power (Udall vs.Severn). It has been held that municipal corp are purely the creatures of statutes (Territory ex rel. Kelly vs. Stewart).
Congress can delegate such pow but it should provide the policy to beexecuted, carried out or implemented & fix the standard, w/ sufficientlydeterminate or determinable standards. Leaving the delegate (to whom pow isdelegated) only to fill in details in execution, enforcement or admin of law.Without the policy, delegate would be left to make/formulate the policy w/c isthe essence of every law & w/o the standard, we cannot determinew/reasonable certainty whether delegate acted w/in or beyond scope of hisauthority. Delegate might make or even unmake the law by adopting measuresinconsistent w/end sought to be attained by Act of Congress. This would nullifyprinciple of sep of pow & sys of checks & balances, & undermine foundation of our Republican sys. Sec. 68 of RAC doesn’t meet aforementioned standards indelegating pow since it does not provide w/ a policy & standard.
Last clause of #1 Sec. 68, RAC using the term “public welfare” pertains only tochanging the seat of gov’t & not to all items in that sentence. This is inaccordance w/ orig provision, Sec. 1, Act No. 1748. Although SC ruled inCalalang vs. Wiliams and People vs. Rosenthal that pub welfare & pub interestare valid standards for valid delegation of authority to execute the law, thesedoctrines are only applicable to specific facts & issues involved in said cases.They don’t constitute precedents & are not binding. Besides, both casesinvolved grants to administrative officers of pows related to exercise of administrative functions, calling for determination of ques of fact whereas Sec.68 deals w/legislative functions. Ques of WON pub interest demands ex of suchpow is not one of fact, it’s purely a legislative ques (Carolina-Virginia CoastalHighway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority), political ques (Udall vs. Severn) orques of public policy & statecraft (In Re Village of North Milwaukee).
Examples of laws annulled by judiciary due to undue delegation of legislativepow:1.law granting judicial dept pow to determine annexing of territories (Udallvs. Severn)2.law vesting in a Commission rt to determine plan & frame of gov’t of proposed villages & functions to be exercised (In re Municipal Charters)3.law allowing courts to incorporate towns/villages & determine metes & bounds upon petition of maj of taxable inhabitants setting forth areadesired to be included in the village (Territory ex rel Kelly vs. Stewart)4.law w/c allowed courts & inhabitants of a town to incorporate a town (In reVillages of North Milwaukee)5.creating Municipal Board of Control w/c determines if it’s w/in pub interestto construct/operate a toll road & allowing such board to create & namemunicipal corporations (Carolina-Virginia Coastal Hwy vs. Coastal TurnpikeAuthority)
Schechter Poultry Corp vs US: involved constitutionality of a law w/c authorizedUS Pres to approve codes of fair competition submitted by trade/industrialcopr/assoc w/co inequitable restrictions on admission to membership as long ascodes are not designed to promote monopolies or eliminate/oppress smallenterprises & will not operate to discriminate against them. Court ruled thataside from providing w/gen aims of rehab, correction & expansion, the law doesnot provide any standards. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, lawauthorizes making of codes to prescribe the rules. Pres’ discretion in approvingcodes is unregulated/unfettered. Thus, it is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative pow. If Schechter case found term “unfair competition” broad

Activity (59)

You've already reviewed this. Edit your review.
1 hundred reads
1 thousand reads
Aldie Martinez liked this
Joel Longos liked this
markuslagan06 liked this
ivan mark liked this
PuccaAndpig Shiawase liked this
PuccaAndpig Shiawase liked this
Franj Laserna Sarabia liked this
anna bee liked this

You're Reading a Free Preview

/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->