/var/www/apps/collegelist/repos/collegelist/trunk/collegelist/tmp/scratch9/4689873.doc \ 1
LAW 109 : CRIMINAL LAW 1 DIGESTSLAW 109 : CRIMINAL LAW 1 DIGESTSPEOPLE v. RABANILLO
307 SCRA 613 (1999)
Rabanillo and the deceased Morales were drinking withtheir friends. One friend started a water fight game andRabanillo joined the fun, accidentally dousing Morales withwater. Morales reprimanded him because water got into his ear and they argued which led into a fistfight. They were pacifiedand ushered to their respective houses. The prosecution’sversion of the events was given credit by the court whichclaimed that after 30 minutes after, while Morales and somefriends were having a conversation in the terrace of the house of Morales, Rabanillo went out his house with a one-meter samuraiand hacked Morales who died that same day. Rabanillo offeredhis testimony to prove the mitigating circumstances of passionand obfuscation, drunkenness, and voluntary surrender therebyadmitting having killed Morales.
For passion and obfuscation to be mitigating, the samemust originate from lawful feelings. From the version of the factsby the prosecution, clearly the assault was made in a fit of anger. The turmoil and unreason that would naturally result froma quarrel or fight should not be confused with the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person injured or offended to such adegree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control. Theexcitement which is inherent in all persons who quarrel andcome to blows does not constitute obfuscation.Moreover, the act producing obfuscation must not be far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerablelength of time, during which the accused might have regainedhis normal equanimity. In this case, 30 minutes intervenedbetween the fight and the killing. Having been actuated more bythe spirit of revenge or anger than of a sudden impulse of natural or uncontrollable fury, passion and obfuscation cannotbe appreciated.To be mitigating, the accused’s state of intoxication should beproved or established by sufficient evidence. It should be suchan intoxication that would diminish or impair the exercise of hiswillpower or the capacity to know the injustice of his act. Theaccused must then show that (1) at the time of the commissionof the criminal act, he has taken such quantity of alcoholicdrinks as to blur his reason and deprive him of a certain degreeof self-control; and (2) such intoxication is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the felony. The accusedmerely testified that he joined his friends de Guzman andSoriano in a drinking session, but only for a short time. The factthat he was able to resume his routine work thereafter, belie hisclaim that he was heavily drunk at the time he attacked thevictim. The regularity of Rabanillo’s alcohol intake could evenhave increased his tolerance for alcohol to such an extent thathe could not easily get drunk.For voluntary surrender to be considered, the followingrequisites must concur:1.the offender was not actually arrested;2.he surrendered to a person in authority or to an agent of a person in authority; and3.his surrender was voluntaryA surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showingthe intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to theauthorities either because (a) he acknowledges his guilt or (b)he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarilyincurred in his search and capture.In the case, the baranggay captain had to go to the house of Rabanillo to take the latter to the police station. The latter didnot present himself voluntarily to the former, who is a person inauthority pursuant to Art. 152 of the RPC, as amended; neither did he ask the former to fetch him at his house so he couldsurrender. The fact alone that he did not resist but wentpeacefully with the baranggay captain does not mean that hevoluntarily surrendered. Besides, voluntary surrender presupposes repentance.
There being no mitigating nor aggravatingcircumstance the penalty is the medium period of thatprescribed by law for that offense. Accused is found guilty of homicide, and not murder, and applying the IndeterminateSentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate penalty rangin from 10 yrs of prision mayor asminimum to 17 yrs and 4 mos of reclusion temporal asmaximum with all accessories thereof, and to indemnify theheirs.-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PEOPLE v. MUIT
117 SCRA 696 (1982)
The deceased, Torrero and the Muit’s wife was rumoredto be having an affair. One day, Torrero and his family wereamicably invited by Muit to his house to rest. But later, anargument broke between the two when Muit asked Torreroabout his frequent meetings with his wife. When Torrero walkedaway to avoid more arguments, Muit drew his gun and shot him.He was held back by Gubatan but was still able to fire a secondshot which proved to be fatal. He fired a third shot but becauseGubatan had held him tighter this time, the shot was fired to thesky. Accused claims that the second fatal shot was unintentionaland was the direct consequence of the act of Gubatan inembracing him from behind and was thus an accident.
It was not an accident. Gubatan testified that heembraced appellant around the chest in such a way thatappellant he was still free to use his right hand which washolding the gun. However, the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, and passion and obfuscation can beappreciated. There can be no question that the accused wasdriven strongly by jealousy because of the rumors regarding theamorous relationship between his wife and the victim. Thefeeling of resentment resulting from rivalry in amorous relationswith a woman is a powerful stimulant to jealousy and issufficient to produce loss of reason and self-control. In other words, it is a powerful instigator of jealousy and prone toproduce anger and obfuscation.
Murder is punishable bby reclusion temporal in itsmaximum period to death. Considering the two mitigatingcircumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the penaltynext lower to that prescribed is imposable. Thus, he is given theindeterminate penalty of eight years of prision mayor, minimumto 14 yrs and 8 mos of reclusion temporal, as max.-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. v. HICKS
14 Phil. 217 (1909)
For about 5 years, the accused and the deceased livedillicitly in the manner of husband and wife. Afterwards, thedeceased separated from the accused and lived with another man. The accused enraged by such conduct, killed thedeceased.
Even if it is true that the accused acted with obfuscationbecause of jealousy, the mitigating circumstance cannot beconsidered in his favor because the causes which mitigatecriminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such whichoriginate from legitimate feelings, and not those which arisefrom vicious, unworthy and immoral passions.-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. v. DELA CRUZ
22 Phil. 429 (1912)
The accused, in the heat of passion, killed his common-law wife upon discovering her in flagrante in carnalcommunication with a common acquaintance.
In this a case, the accused was entitled to the mitigatingcircumstance of passion or obfuscation. The facts in this casemust be distinguished from the case of U.S. vs. Hicks where itwas found that the accused, deliberately and after due reflectionresolved to kill the woman who had left him for another man.With a clean and well-prepared weapon, he enetered the house,disguising his intention and calming her by his apparent reposeand tranquility, doubtless in order to successfully accomplish hiscriminal design. In this case, the cause of the alleged passionand obfuscation of the accused was his vexation, disap-pointment and anger engendered by the refusal of the woman tocontinue to live in illicit relations with him, which she had aperfect right to do. In the present case, however, the impulsewas caused by the sudden revelation that she was untrue tohim, and his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of another.
Modified by a finding that the commission of thecrime was marked with the extenuating circumstance of passionand obfuscation, penalty is reduced from 14 yrs 8 mos and 1day of reclusion temporal to 12 yrs and 1 day of reclusiontemporal.