of a new Prusso-Teutonic religion; and like Goebbels, whowould have sold his soul to anyone, but who concluded thatselling it to the Prussians would be most profitable.Despite his numerous tiewith Prussian interests, for
longtime Hitler would eat at anyone's table. His definite alliancewith the Prusso-Teutonic forces was not consummated untilearly in
Without it he would never have been able toaccede to power, nor could he have risen to international im-portance. He would never have been more than a picturesquedemagogue in the arena of internal German politics. Hitlerwas never a world threat until the support of Prusso-Teutonicforces gave him the key to power.The left wing of his parry, Roehm and his three million
had taken his earlier promises seriously. These folk nolonger understood what was happening. They had believedthat the hour of revolution had struck, and demanded changeswhich might be extremely annoying to the Prussian cliqueHitler was now planning to serve. Roehm went so far as todemand control of the Reichswehr by the SA and for himselfpowers superior to the generals. Decidedly, he did not yetunderstand what was going on.The man in Hitler's entourage who* ad "understoodn fromthe very beginning was Goering. He had always had personalties with the Prussian powers. He now put himself more fullyat their service. Consequently there was to be no change inhis relationships with them and he was to be rewarded for hisattitude: he would be permitted to set up his "HermannGoeringwerke,
G." within the empire of German heavyindustry.Hitler's accession to power became possible because of theconfidence of the Prusso-Teutonics. He was well aware thathe would be unable to maintain that power unless he managedto preserve this confidence. But the embarrassing activity ofRoehm and his troops was imperiling it. Gregor Strasser wasstill estranged from the throne and his silence signified a con-PRUSSO-TEUTONIA-ALIAS
stant reproach to Hitler, reminding him that he had been falseto his past. Kahr, leader of the Bavarian Separatists, formerlyallied with Hitler, failed also to understand the Chancellor'salliance with the Prussian forces against whom they hadstriven together. This whole set was sowing unrest amongmilitant Nazis
creating difficulties for the new Chancellor.
Killing the Past
In the spring of 1934 the Prusso-Teutonics became increas-ingly worried over the restlessness in the left wing of theNazi party. Their cabinet "liaison officer," von Papen, decidedto post a warning. On June
1934, he delivered a speechseverely criticizing the revolutionary phases of the Naziregime. This meant obviously that the Prusso-Teutonics werewondering whether after all they had made a good choice inthe person of Hitler, and whether they should not replacehim. Von Papen doubtless hoped that as a result of this speechHitler might be forced out and he himself might again suc-ceed to the office. He was adaptable and managed to fit him-self into a subordinate office, but if the necessity for changearose von Papen was not averse to playing first fiddle him-self, under the baton, of course, of the same band-leaders asbefore.But Hitler clung desperately to his office and was preparedfor any sacrifice to keep it. To meet the situation he impro-vised, as so often in his career, and his improvisation bore theusual stamp of his intuitive brutality. Goering had the sameunderstanding of affairs as he, and followed him wholeheart-edly, while Goebbels and Hess trailed along in more retiringfashion.The bloody purge of June 30, 1934, born of this inspiration,was
master stroke. Hitler organized
regain theconfidence of the Prussian clique.
Gregor Strasser and Roehmwere executed. They were the ones who had wished to