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P. 1
The Thousand-Year Conspiracy – Secret Germany Behind the Mask by Paul Wrinkler P2

The Thousand-Year Conspiracy – Secret Germany Behind the Mask by Paul Wrinkler P2

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Published by: skalpsolo on Jan 24, 2011
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AFTER JANUARY0, 1933, every one of Hitler's decisions,without exception, accorded with Junker interests. No act ofhis can be found which in the slightest degree harmed theseinterests. From the moment he took the reins of power no oneever spoke of the Osthilfe scandal again (although previouslyit had often been stirred up by Nazi Deputies in the Reichs-tag) or of "colonization" on Junker land. The different anti-Junker slogans of early Nazism were definitely buried byHitler. The Junkers and Hindenburg breathed a sigh of relief.This business disposed of, work began in earnest on thePrusso-Teutonic scheme.The entire plan carried out by Hitler corresponded pointby point with Prusso-Teutonic intentions. The details arewell known. Decree-laws gave Hitler dictatorial powers allalong the line. This meant the end of what still survived ofthe representative system and individual liberties in Germany.These transformations had been planned for. It was only themethods of accomplishing them that were original and borethe Hitlerian stamp. The burning of the Reichstag on Febru-ary 27, 1933, was arranged to make people believe that theCommunists were responsible for it and make them admit thatit was necessary to vest unlimited power in Hitler to save thecountry from Communism. In contrast to the previous region-alistic character of Nazism, Hitler abolished every trace ofautonomy in the various States, and subordinated all Germanyto the domination of Berlin. The masses, deprived of theirleaders by the Fehme, did not protest.Making use of his dictatorial powers Hitler took the neces-
sary steps to stand in well with every part of the Prusso-Teutonic group. He introduced measure after measure tosatisfy the Junkers and the big industrialists. He flattered theReichswehr too and tried to make it forget that Schleicher,the man of the Reichswehr, had been replaced by himself asthe head of the government. As for Schleicher, the latter'sgrudge was against von Papen rather than Hitler-because hebelieved it was the former who had been principally respon-sible for his downfall. He never realized that, in the last anal-ysis, everything had been organized by Hitler.
But Hitler had
revolutionary past which might be embar-rassing to the interests he was now serving. He had hoistedhimself to power by fulminating for years against existingpower, including the Prusso-Teutonic forces.Originally Hitler was simply an agitator without a definitepurpose, ready to ally himself with any group of interests, ifhe saw some advantage to himself from such an alliance.Among his faithful followers were sincere men like GregorStrasser, who had strong German nationalist feelings butmoved in a direction opposed to Prussianism. They ardentlydesired a German Federation, free of any Prussian tinge.While the National Socialist party had had its headquarters inMunich, it had often displayed a Bavarian-inspired regionalresistance to the centralizing pressure of Prussia. From timeto time also, the Nazi party had appeared to be a movementwith socialistic tendencies, opposed to Junker feudalism.Rbehm's views were of this character, though clearly he wasStrasser's moral inferior. But Hitler, who did not feel con-strained by any basic principles and who made allies wherehe could (or rather, wherever his alert opportunism mightlead him), surrounded himself also with men like Goerinz,the Prussian officer type; like Alfred Rosenberg, who dreamed
of a new Prusso-Teutonic religion; and like Goebbels, whowould have sold his soul to anyone, but who concluded thatselling it to the Prussians would be most profitable.Despite his numerous tiewith Prussian interests, for
longtime Hitler would eat at anyone's table. His definite alliancewith the Prusso-Teutonic forces was not consummated untilearly in
Without it he would never have been able toaccede to power, nor could he have risen to international im-portance. He would never have been more than a picturesquedemagogue in the arena of internal German politics. Hitlerwas never a world threat until the support of Prusso-Teutonicforces gave him the key to power.The left wing of his parry, Roehm and his three million
had taken his earlier promises seriously. These folk nolonger understood what was happening. They had believedthat the hour of revolution had struck, and demanded changeswhich might be extremely annoying to the Prussian cliqueHitler was now planning to serve. Roehm went so far as todemand control of the Reichswehr by the SA and for himselfpowers superior to the generals. Decidedly, he did not yetunderstand what was going on.The man in Hitler's entourage who* ad "understoodn fromthe very beginning was Goering. He had always had personalties with the Prussian powers. He now put himself more fullyat their service. Consequently there was to be no change inhis relationships with them and he was to be rewarded for hisattitude: he would be permitted to set up his "HermannGoeringwerke,
G." within the empire of German heavyindustry.Hitler's accession to power became possible because of theconfidence of the Prusso-Teutonics. He was well aware thathe would be unable to maintain that power unless he managedto preserve this confidence. But the embarrassing activity ofRoehm and his troops was imperiling it. Gregor Strasser wasstill estranged from the throne and his silence signified a con-PRUSSO-TEUTONIA-ALIAS
stant reproach to Hitler, reminding him that he had been falseto his past. Kahr, leader of the Bavarian Separatists, formerlyallied with Hitler, failed also to understand the Chancellor'salliance with the Prussian forces against whom they hadstriven together. This whole set was sowing unrest amongmilitant Nazis
creating difficulties for the new Chancellor.
Killing the Past
In the spring of 1934 the Prusso-Teutonics became increas-ingly worried over the restlessness in the left wing of theNazi party. Their cabinet "liaison officer," von Papen, decidedto post a warning. On June
1934, he delivered a speechseverely criticizing the revolutionary phases of the Naziregime. This meant obviously that the Prusso-Teutonics werewondering whether after all they had made a good choice inthe person of Hitler, and whether they should not replacehim. Von Papen doubtless hoped that as a result of this speechHitler might be forced out and he himself might again suc-ceed to the office. He was adaptable and managed to fit him-self into a subordinate office, but if the necessity for changearose von Papen was not averse to playing first fiddle him-self, under the baton, of course, of the same band-leaders asbefore.But Hitler clung desperately to his office and was preparedfor any sacrifice to keep it. To meet the situation he impro-vised, as so often in his career, and his improvisation bore theusual stamp of his intuitive brutality. Goering had the sameunderstanding of affairs as he, and followed him wholeheart-edly, while Goebbels and Hess trailed along in more retiringfashion.The bloody purge of June 30, 1934, born of this inspiration,was
master stroke. Hitler organized
regain theconfidence of the Prussian clique.
Gregor Strasser and Roehmwere executed. They were the ones who had wished to
proceed with the National Socialist revolution and had beenreproaching Hitler for his alliance with Junkers and bigindustry. Schleicher was also killed. Despite his origin he haddared while
power to further a policy opposing Junkerinterests. Moreover, he remembered his negotiations withStrasser and Roehm and might possibly reveal at some futuredate the promises both had made in Hitler's name (and surelywith his consent) for the purpose of arousing him to actionagainst the Junkers. If Schleicher had survived the executionof Strasser and Roehm, he might at any moment have becomean extremely embarrassing witness. Kahr naively had signedhis own death warrant by reminding Hitler that he had oncebeen on the other side of the fence, with the Bavarian Separa-tists against the Prussian powers.Von Papen's arrest on the same date was necessary to makehim clearly understand that Hitler had no intention of aban-doning the position of "first fiddle." He had to accept with
smile the execution of his assistants. They had been unwiseenough to draw up the speech delivered by von Papen andhad dared to recommend that the powers behind the scenesaccord their confidence to someone other than Hitler. Sincethey were persons of no importance, no one would protesttheir deaths.Eventually von Papen was freed and was permitted to con-tinue "to serve." The bonds between him. and the Prusso-Teutonic forces were too close to allow Hitler to sacrificehim entirely. He deserved a warning and Hitler was satisfiedwith that much.By executing Schleicher, Kahr, Strasser, Roehrn, and nu-merous other militant members of his own party having similartendencies, Hitler had silenced embarrassing witnesses of hispast. He had equally in this way arrested any future desire,within the Nazi party, to proceed in a direction opposing theinterests of the Prussian forces. Besides he could now say tohis Prusso-Teutonic masters: "For you have
sacrificed my
best friends.
have eliminated Schleicher as well, who daredoppose you. What better proof could
furnish of my absolutedevotion to your interests?"True, the Reichswehr, which was part
the Prusso-Teu-tonic clan, was angry at him for Schleicher's death. But Hitlerknew that Junkers and industrialists were more powerfulwithin the group than the Reichswehr, and in the course ofhis career he had never hesitated to betray weaker interestsfor the advantage of stronger ones. Possessing the confidenceof Junkers and industrialists, he was certain that nothing couldhappen to him, and now that the general who had beenbothering him was no longer present, he applied himselfthenceforward to appeasing the Reichswehr too. Like a real"confidence man" he knew the best methods to regain the con-fidence of those whom he had tricked. Early in January,
he read a declaration before an officers' society restoringSchleicher's "honor," the officers were pleased, and tranquilityreturned.The contempt which the Prussian General Staff felt for tneAustrian Corporal did not disappear overnight, but they nolonger disputed his orders. Despite appearances to the con-trary, orders were no longer given in his name, nor in thename of Nazism (which had changed completely from itsearlier form). Hitler was now speaking in the very name ofthe ancient Prusso-Teutonic caste of which the army officerswere members, and whose supreme servant Hitler had be-come.The Anti-Semitic CamouflageSince then, what is now known as Nazi Germany has beenthe very prototype of what the Prusso-Teutonics might havedreamed in their most optimistic moments. Hitler had sup-plied the methods but it was the Prusso-Teutonic schemewhich had taken shape: Hitler had merely contributed the

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