by the state where the primary effect is felt, 'Jurisdiction', p. 154.
See e.g. La Forest
(1985) 21 CCC (3d) 206 and Lord Griffiths in
The LTnited States
[I9911 1 AC 225.'"CIJ, Series A, No. 10, 1927; 4 AD,
153. See e.g. Mann, 'Doctrine of Jurisdiction:
33-6, 39, 92-3; J.
The Jtrrisprude~zceo f the World
Leiden, vol. I, 1965, pp.73-98, and Schachter, 'International Law',
250. See also
Opperiheirn's Iriternational Law,
PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, 1927,
No. 10, 1927, p. 19; 4 AD, p. 156.
this, countries had adopted a number of different rules extending their jurisdiction beyond the territorial limits so that 'the territoriality of criminallaw, therefore, is not an absolute principle of international law andby
means coincides with territorial sovereignty'.42 The Court rejectedthe French claim that the flag state had exclusive jurisdiction over theship on the high seas, saying that no rule to that effect had emerged ininternational law, and stated that the damage to the Turkish vessel wasequivalent to affecting Turkish territory so as to enable that country toexercise jurisdiction on the objective territorial principle, unrestricted byany rule of international law prohibiting this.43The general pronouncements by the Court leading to the dismissal of the French contentions have been criticised by writers for a number of years, particularly with respect to its philosophical approach in treatingstates as possessing very wide powers of jurisdiction which could only berestricted by proof of a rule of international law prohibiting the actionconcerned.44 It is widely accepted today that the emphasis lies the otherway around.45 It should also be noted that the Lotus principle as regardscollisions at sea has been overturned by article ll(1) of the High SeasConvention, 1958, which emphasised that only the flag state or the stateof which the alleged offender was a national has jurisdiction over sailorsregarding incidents occurring on the high seas. The territorial principlecovers crimes committed not only upon the land territory of the state butalso upon the territorial sea and in certain cases upon the contiguous andother zones and on the high seas where the state is the flag state of thevessel.46As modern communications develop, so states evolve new methods of dealing with new problems. In the case of the Channel Tunnel, for example,providing a land link between the UK and France, these countriesentered into an agreement whereby each state was permitted to exercise jurisdiction within the territory of the other. The Protocol concerningFrontier Controls and Policing, Co-operation in Criminal Justice, PublicSafety and Mutual Assistance relating to the Channel Fixed Link was
PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, 1927, p. 20.
p. 24; 4 AD,
See e.g. G. Fitzmaurice, 'The General Principles of International Law Considered from theStandpoint ofthe Rule of La~7: 92 HR, 1957, pp. 1,56-7, and
Cambridge, 1970, vol. I, pp. 488-9.
See e.g. the
case, ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 116; 18 ILR, p. 86 andthe
case, ICJ Reports, 1955, p. 4; 22 ILR, p. 349.
See above, chapter 11, p. 552.
signed on 25 November 1991.~' Under this Protocol, French and UKfrontier control officers are empowered to work in specified parts of oneanother's territory. These areas are termed 'control zones' and are locatedat Cheriton, Coquelles, on board through trains and at international railway