serious condition Japan's leaders soughtwas an assurance that the Emperorwould not be eliminated" (34; 33-35). The Japanese belief in the emperor'sdivine nature was understood byAmerican officials (35-36). The demandfor "unconditional surrender" wasadopted "almost accidentally byRoosevelt at the January 1943Casablanca conference," and there waswidespread support for its modification(36; 36-45). Truman appears to havecontinued to be willing to confine thedemand for "unconditional surrender" tothe military as opposed to the Emperor,as his May 8 statement indicated (45-46).
Ch. 4: To June 18, 1945.
The reasonsfor Truman's decision on Jun. 18 topostpone clarification of the meaning of the U.S. demand for "unconditionalsurrender," when he appeared to beleaning toward making such a statementbefore leaving for the Potsdamconference, remain uncertain; not alldocuments have been declassified (47-61).
Ch. 5: June 18, 1945.
Given all theevidence, it "seems reasonable tosurmise that it was [James F.] Byrnes[,then Truman's adviser, on July 3 to be hissecretary of state] who influenced Truman to reverse the thrust of his May 8softening of the surrender formula" (70-71; 62-72).
Ch. 6: From June 18 to July 2, 1945.
In this period it appears that "onlyByrnes, who formally took office on July3, was opposed to modifying thesurrender formula" (79; 73-79).
PART II: THE RUSSIAN OPTIONCh. 7: Phase I: From Pearl Harbor tothe Death of Roosevelt.
"Bymidsummer of 1945 intelligence experts,military and other officials, and thepresident himself, seem clearly to haverecognized that the impact of a RedArmy attack on the isolated and rapidlydeteriorating Japanese would almostcertainly precipitate a surrender eitheron its own or when combined withassurances for the Emperor" (84; 83-85). Throughout the war, U.S. leaders wanteda Soviet entry into the war "the sooner,the better" (85; 85-95).
Ch. 8: Phase II: April 1945.
But afterFDR's death on Apr. 12, in anundetermined and "odd" way the U.S."appeared to lose interest in a Sovietdeclaration of war"; Averill Harriman'sdisenchantment with the Soviets playedan important role (99; 96-110).
Ch. 9: Phase III: The New Reality.
Inthis period, which has been assessedonly superficially by historians, Trumanunderwent a "double shift in his attitudeduring a period of less than four weeks"(111; 111-24).
PART III: ATOMIC DIPLOMACY Ch. 10: Preliminaries: April and May1945.
That strategy vis-à-vis Russia wasat the heart of U.S. actions toward Japanat the end of the war is not known to thegeneral public (127-29). Truman firstheard about the bomb from Byrnes, whoexpressed then (acc. to Truman) hisbelief that it "might well put us in aposition to dictate our own terms at theend of the war" ) and then in detailfrom Stimson and Groves on Apr. 25(130-34). In April, the U.S. tried andfailed to dictate to Stalin about the Polishgovernment (135-37).
Ch. 11: Postponing a Confrontationwith Stalin.
There is abundantevidence the U.S. wanted to wait untilthe bomb had been proven to meet withStalin, though the evolution of Truman'sthinking is hard to trace in detail; theHopkins mission was probably alsorelated to bomb development (138-54).