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Meaning, Indian theories of

The term artha in Sanskrit is used for the notion of meaning, in the widest sense of the word 'meaning'; it can be the
meaning of words, sentences and scriptures, as well as of nonlinguistic gestures and signs. Its meaning ranges from a
real object in the external world referred to by a word to a mere concept of an object which may or may not correspond
to anything in the external world. The differences regarding what 'meaning' is are argued out by the philosophical
schools of Nyāya, Vaiśe ika, Mīmāʒsā, Buddhism, Sanskrit grammar and Sanskrit poetics. Among these, Nyāya,
Vaiśe ika and Mīmāʒsā have realistic ontologies. Mīmāʒsā focuses mainly on interpreting the Vedic scriptures.
Buddhist thinkers generally depict language as giving a false picture of reality. Sanskrit grammar is more interested in
language than in ontology, while Sanskrit poetics focuses on the poetic dimensions of meaning.

Generally, the notion of meaning is stratified into three or four types. First there is the primary meaning. If this is
inappropriate in a given context, then one moves to a secondary meaning, an extension of the primary meaning. Beyond
this is the suggested meaning, which may or may not be the same as the meaning intended by the speaker. Specific
conditions under which these different varieties are understood are discussed by the schools.

The various Indian theories of meaning are closely related to the overall stances taken by the different schools. Among
the factors which influence the notion of meaning are the ontological and epistemological views of a school, its views
regarding the role of God and scripture, its focus on a certain type of discourse, and its ultimate purpose in theorizing.

1 Artha in different Indian traditions

The most common Sanskrit term for meaning is artha. In the Western literature on the notion of meaning in the Indian
tradition, various terms, such as 'sense', 'reference', 'denotation', 'connotation', 'designatum' and 'intension', have been
used to render the Sanskrit. However, these terms carry specific nuances of their own, and no single term adequately
conveys the idea of artha. Artha basically refers to the object signified by a word. In numerous contexts, it stands for an
object in the sense of an element of external reality. For instance, Pata&ntildejali (second century BC) says that when a
word is pronounced, an artha, 'object', is understood. So in the case of 'Bring a bull' and 'Eat yoghurt', it is the artha that
is brought in and the artha that is eaten.

The logicians and ontologists belonging to the schools of Nyāya and Vaiśe˷ika, and the later combined school of Nyāya-
Vaiśe˷ika, set up an ontology containing substances, qualities, actions, relations, generic and particular properties, and
absences (see Nyāya-Vaiśe˷ika §§4-5). With this realistic ontology in mind, they argue that if the relation between a
word and its artha were a natural ontological relation, there should be real experiences of burning and cutting in one's
mouth after hearing words like agni ('fire') and asi ('sword'). Therefore this relation must be a conventional one
(saʒketa), the convention being established by God as part of his initial acts of creation. The relationship between a
word and the object it refers to is thought to be the desire of God that such-and-such a word should refer to such-and-
such an object. It is through this established conventional relationship that a word reminds the listener of its meaning.

The school of Mīmā˱sā represents the tradition of the exegesis of the scriptural Vedic texts (see Mīmā˱sā). However, in
the course of discussing and perfecting principles of interpretation, this school developed a full-scale theory of ontology
and an important theory of meaning. For the Mīmā˱sakas, the primary tenets are that the Vedic scriptural texts are eternal
and uncreated, and that they are meaningful. In this orthodox system, which remarkably defends the scriptures but
dispenses with the notion of God, the relationship between a word and its meaning is innate and eternal. Both Nyāya-
Vaiśe˷ikas and Mīmā˱sakas regard language as referring to external states of the world and not just to conceptual
constructions.

While the various schools of Buddhism differ among themselves concerning the nature of the external world, they all
seem to agree that language relates only to a level of conceptual constructions which have no direct relationship to the
actual state of the world. The tradition represented by Theravāda and the Vaibhā˷ikas argued that a word refers to a thing
which, in reality, is nothing but a composite entity made up of components which are momentary and in a continual flux
(see Momentariness, Buddhist doctrine of). The components, the momentary atomic

elements (dharma), are presumed to be more real, but words do not refer to this level of reality. Thus language gives us a
less than true picture of what is out there. Other schools of Buddhism, such as Vijñānavāda, reduced everything to
fleeting states of consciousness (vijñāna). From this point of view, the objects referred to by words are not even

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fleeting states of consciousness (vijñāna). From this point of view, the objects referred to by words are not even
composites. They are more like fictions (vikalpa) or illusions (māyā) created by a magician. The Mādhyamika school of
Buddhism focused on the essential emptiness (śūnyatā) of all objects which are subject to dependent origination
(pratītyasamutpāda). This also leaves language far away from the level of reality, which in this case is the level of
emptiness (see Buddhist concept of Emptiness). Later Buddhist logicians, such as Dignāga, developed a theory of word-
meaning which we can call the 'exclusionary' theory of meaning (apoha). Briefly stated, if a word refers only to a
conceptual construction, and not to a state of reality, then how are we to construe the conceptual construction? The
apoha theory proposed by the Buddhist logicians says that external reality ultimately consists of momentary atomic
elements which are so individualized and unique (svalak a a) that they are beyond perception and characterization.
Our perceptions and conceptions involve generalization
(sāmānyalak a a), and hence do not correspond to reality. A concept which corresponds to a given word must be
finally construed as being nothing more than the exclusion of all other concepts. This theory ultimately says that all
concepts are different from each other, and yet they cannot be defined by making a reference to any level of reality (see
Nominalism, Buddhist doctrine of).

The tradition of the grammarians, beginning with Bhart˵hari (fifth century), seems to have followed a middle path
between the realistic theories of reference (bāhyārthavāda) developed by Nyāya-Vaiśe˷ika and Mīmā˱sā on the one
hand, and the notional/conceptual theories (vikalpa) of the Buddhists on the other. For them, the meaning of a word is
closely related to the level of understanding. Whether or not things are real, we do have concepts. These concepts form
the content of a person's cognitions derived from language. Without necessarily denying the external reality of objects in
the world, the grammarians claimed that the meaning of a word is only a projection of intellect (bauddhārtha,
buddhipratibhāsa). The examples they offer, such as śaśasʖōga ('horn of a rabbit') and vandhyāsuta ('son of a barren
woman'), remain meaningful within this theory. The Sanskrit grammarians are thus not concerned with the truth-
functional value of linguistic expressions. For them, the truth of an expression and its meaningfulness are not to be
equated.

2 Varieties of meaning
By the middle of the second millennium AD, a certain uniformity came about in the technical terminology used by
different schools. The prominent schools in this period were the new school of Nyāya - Navya-Nyāya - initiated by
Gaōgeśa, and the schools of Mīmā˱sā, Vedānta, and Sanskrit grammar. While all these schools engaged in pitched battles
against each other, they seem to have accepted the terminological lead of the neo-logicians, the
Navya-Naiyāyikas. Following the discussion of artha by the neo-logician Gadādhara, we can state the general
framework of a semantic theory. Other schools accepted this general terminology, with some variations.
It may be said that the term artha stands for the object or content of a verbal cognition or a cognition which results from
hearing a word (śābdabodhavi aya). Such a verbal cognition results from the cognition of a word
(śābdajñāna) on the basis of an awareness of the signification function pertaining to that word
(padani ʚhavʖttijñāna). Depending upon the kind of signification function (vʖtti) involved in the emergence of the
verbal cognition, the meaning belongs to a distinct type. In general terms:

1 When a verbal cognition results from the primary signification function (śakti/abhidhāvʖtti/mukhyavʖtti) of a word,
the object or content of that cognition is called primary meaning (śakyārtha/vācyārtha/abhidheya). 2 When a verbal
cognition results from the secondary signification function (lak a āvʖtti/gu avʖtti) of a word, the object or content of
that cognition is called secondary meaning (lak yārtha). 3 When a verbal cognition results from the suggestive
signification function (vya&ntildejanāvʖtti) of a word, the object or content of that cognition is called suggested meaning
(vyaōgyārtha/dhvanitārtha). 4 When a verbal cognition results from the intentional signification function (tātparyavʖtti)
of a word, the object or content of that cognition is called intended meaning (tātparyārtha).
Not all schools of Indian philosophy accept all of these different kinds of signification functions for words, and they hold
substantially different views on the nature of words, meanings, and the relations between words and meanings. However,
the above terminology holds true, in general, for most of the schools. Let us note some of the

important differences. Mīmā˱sā claims that the sole primary meaning of the word 'bull' is the generic or class property
(jāti) - 'bullness', say - and the individual object which possesses this generic property, namely a particular bull, is only
secondarily and subsequently understood from the word 'bull'. The school called Kevalavyaktivāda, a segment of the

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Nyāya school, argues that a particular individual bull is the sole primary meaning of the word 'bull', while the generic
property bullness is merely a secondary meaning. Nyāya generally argues that the primary meaning of a word is an
individual object qualified by a generic property
(jātiviśi ʚavyakti), both being perceived simultaneously.

Sanskrit grammarians distinguish between various different kinds of meanings (artha). The term artha stands for an
external object (vastumātra), as well as for the object that is intended to be signified by a word (abhidheya). The latter -
that is, meaning in a linguistic sense - can be meaning in a technical context (śāstrīya), such as the meaning of an affix or
a stem, or it can be meaning as understood by people in actual communication (laukika). Then there is a further
distinction. Meaning may be something directly intended to be signified by an expression (abhidheya), or it can be
something which is inevitably signified (nāntarīyaka) when something else is really the intended meaning. Everything
that is understood from a word on the basis of some kind of signification function (vʖtti) is covered by the term artha.
Different systems of Indian philosophy differ from each other over whether a given cognition is derived from a word on
the basis of a signification function, through inference (anumāna), or through presumption (arthāpatti). If a particular
item of information is deemed to have been derived through inference or presumption, it is not included in the notion of
word-meaning.

3 Other dimensions of artha

The scope of artha is actually not limited in Sanskrit texts to what is usually understood as the domain of semantics in
the Western literature. It covers elements such as gender (liōga) and number (saʒkhyā), as well as such semantic/
syntactic roles (kāraka) as 'agentness' (kartʖtva) and 'objectness' (karmatva). Tenses such as the present, past and future,
and moods such as the imperative and optative are also traditionally included in the arthas signified by a verb root or an
affix.
Another aspect of the concept of artha is revealed in the theory of dyotyārtha, 'co-signified' meaning. According to this
theory, to put it in simple terms, particles such as ca ('and') do not have any lexical or primary meaning. They are said to
help other words used in constructions with them to signify special aspects of their meaning. For instance, in the phrase
'John and Tom', the meaning of grouping is said to be not directly signified by the word 'and'. The theory of dyotyārtha
argues that grouping is a specific meaning of the two words 'John' and 'Tom', but that these two words are unable to
signify it if used by themselves. The word 'and' used along with them is said to work as a catalyst that enables them to
signify this special meaning.
The problem of use and mention of words is also handled by Sanskrit grammarians by treating the word itself as a part of
the meaning it signifies. This is a unique way of handling this problem.

4 Different views regarding sentence-meaning

Most schools of Indian philosophy have an atomistic view of meaning and the meaning-bearing linguistic unit. This
means that a sentence is put together by combining words and words are put together by combining morphemic elements
such as stems, roots and affixes. The same applies to meaning. The word-meaning may be viewed as a fusion of the
meanings of stems, roots and affixes, and the meaning of a sentence may be viewed as a fusion of the meanings of its
constituent words. Beyond this generality, different schools have specific proposals. The tradition of Prābhākara
Mīmā˱sā proposes that the words of a sentence already convey contextualized/connected meanings (anvitābhidhāna) and
that the sentence-meaning is not different from a simple addition of these inherently connected word-meanings. On the
other hand, the Naiyāyikas and the Bhā˹˹a Mīmā˱sakas propose that the words of a sentence taken by themselves convey
uncontextualized/unconnected meanings, and that these uncontextualized word-meanings are subsequently brought into
a contextualized association with each other (abhihitānvaya). Therefore, sentence-meaning is different from word-
meanings, and is communicated through the concatenation (saʒsarga) of words rather than by the words themselves.
This is also the view of the early grammarians such as Pata&ntildejali and Kātyāyana.

For the later grammarian-philosopher Bhart˵hari, however, there are no divisions in speech acts and in

communicated meanings. He says that only a person ignorant of the real nature of language believes the divisions of
sentences into words, stems, roots and affixes to be real. Such divisions are useful fictions and have an explanatory value

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in grammatical theory, but have no reality in communication. In reality, there is no sequence in the cognitions of these
different components. The sentence-meaning becomes an object or content of a single flash of cognition (pratibhā).

5 Some important conceptions

The terms śakyatāvacchedaka and pravʖttinimitta signify a property which determines the inclusion of a particular
instance within the class of possible entities referred to by a word. It is a property whose possession by an entity is the
necessary and sufficient condition for a given word to be used to refer to that entity. Thus the property of potness may be
viewed as the śakyatāvacchedaka controlling the use of the word 'pot'.

Lak a āvʖtti (the 'secondary signification function') is invoked in situations where the primary meaning of an utterance
does not appear to make sense in view of the intention behind the utterance, causing one to look for a secondary
meaning. However, the secondary meaning is always something that is related to the primary meaning in some way. For
example, the expression gaōgāyāʒ gho a literally refers to a colony of cowherds on the river Ganges. Here it is argued
that one obviously cannot have a colony of cowherds sitting on top of the Ganges. This would clearly go against the
intention of the speaker. Thus there is both a difficulty in justifying the linkage of word-meanings (anvayānupapatti) and
a difficulty in justifying the literal or primary meaning in relation to the intention of the speaker (tātparyānupapatti).
These interpretive difficulties nudge one away from the primary meaning of the expression to a secondary meaning
which is related to that primary meaning. Thus we understand the expression as referring to a colony of cowherds on the
bank of the Ganges.

It is the third level of meaning, or vya&ntildejanāvʖtti ('suggestive signification function'), which is analysed and
elaborated by authors such as Ānandavardhana (ninth century) in the tradition of Sanskrit poetics. Consider the following
instance of poetic suggestion. Her husband away on a long journey, a lovelorn young wife instructs a visiting young
man: 'My dear guest, I sleep here and my nightblind mother-in-law sleeps over there. Please make sure you do not
stumble at night.' The suggested meaning is an invitation to the young man to come and share her bed. Thus the poetic
aspect of language goes well beyond the levels of lexical and metaphorical meanings, and heightens aesthetic pleasure
through such suggestions.

6 Why the differences?

The nuances of these different theories are closely related to the markedly different interests of the schools within which
they developed. Scholars of Sanskrit poetics were interested in the poetic dimensions of meaning. Grammarians were
interested in language and cognition, but had little interest in ontology. For them, words and meanings had to be
explained irrespective of one's metaphysical views. Nyāya-Vaiśe˷ikas were primarily interested in logic, epistemology
and ontology, and argued that a valid sentence was a true picture of a state of reality. The foremost goal of Mīmā˱sā was
to interpret and defend the Vedic scriptures. Thus, for Mīmā˱sā, meaning had to be eternal, uncreated and unrelated to a
person's intention, because its word par excellence, the Vedic scriptures, was eternal, uncreated and beyond any
authorship, divine or human. The scriptural word was there to instruct people on how to perform proper ritual and moral
duties. The Buddhists, on the other hand, aimed at weaning people away from all attachment to the world, and hence at
showing the emptiness of everything, including language. They were more interested in demonstrating how language
fails to portray reality, than in explaining how it works. The theories of meaning were thus a significant part of the total
agenda of each school and need to be understood in their specific contexts.
See also: Interpretation, Indian theories of; Language, Indian theories of; Language, philosophy of; Meaning in Islamic
philosophy
MADHAVM. DESHPANDE

References and further reading

Biardeau, M. (1967) Th&eacuteorie de la connaissance et philosophie de la parole dans le brahmanisme classique

(Theory of the Understanding and Philosophy of the Word in Classical Brahmanism), Paris: Mouton.(A comprehensive
discussion of theories of meaning and their evolution and interaction in the traditions of

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Sanskrit grammar, Mīmā˱sāand Nyāya-Vaiśe˷ika; no English translation is available as yet.) Deshpande, M.M. (1992)
The Meaning of Nouns: Semantic Theory in Classical and Medieval India, Dordrecht:

Kluwer Academic Publishers.(The bulk of the book is an annotated translation of a seventeenth-century Sanskrit text on
the meaning of nouns. The introduction covers the history of a number of semantic theories in Sanskrit grammar and
philosophy.)
Matilal, B.K. (1971) Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis, The Hague/Paris:

Mouton.(Very readable general introduction to Indian approaches to meaning, logic and language.) Matilal, B.K. (1985)
Logic, Language and Reality: An Introduction to Indian Philosophical Studies, Delhi:

Motilal Banarsidass.(More extensive, but still very accessible, discussion of a wide range of issues in Indian philosophy
of language.)

Raja, K. (1963) Indian Theories of Meaning, Adyar Library Series 91, Madras: Adyar Library and Research
Centre.(A somewhat dated, but still very useful, account.)

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