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UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The European Theater of Operations

RIVIERA TO T H E RHINE

by
Jeffrey J. Clarke
Robert Ross Smith

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY


UNITEDSTATES ARMY
WASHINGTON,D. C., 1993
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Clarke, Jeffrey J.
Riviera to the Rhine /Jeffrey Johnstone Clarke, Robert Ross Smith.
p. cm.—(UnitedStates Army in World War II)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. World War, 1939-1945—Campaigns—Western. 2. United States.
Army—History—World War, 1939–1945. I. Smith, Robert Ross.
II. Title. III. Series.
D756.C53 1991
940.54’2 1—dc20 91–3180
CIP

First Printing—CMH Pub 7–10

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office


Washington, D.C. 20402
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
Advisory Committee
(As of 6 August 1990)

Edward M. Coffman David B. Miller, Esq.


University of Wisconsin Scranton, Pa.
Martin Blumenson Brig. Gen. John E. Miller
Washington, D.C. U.S. Army Command and General
Brig. Gen. William M. Boice Staff College
U.S. Army War College
Maj. Gen. James W. van Loben Sels
Brig. Gen. Gerald E. Galloway, Jr U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
U.S. Military Academy Command

Herman M. Hattaway William A. Walker


U.S. Military Academy Archivist of the Army
James M. McPherson Russell F. Weigley
Princeton University
Temple University
Ernest R. May
Harvard University

U.S. Army Center of Military History


Brig. Gen. Harold W. Nelson, Chief of Military History

Chief Historian Jeffrey J. Clarke


Chief, Histories Division Col. Robert H. Sholly
Editor in Chief John W. Elsberg

iii
. . . to Those Who Served
Foreword
With the publication of Riviera to the Rhine, the Center of Military
History completes its series of operational histories treating the activi-
ties of the U.S. Army’s combat forces during World War II. This
volume examines the least known of the major units in the European
theater, General Jacob L. Devers’ 6th Army Group. Under General
Devers’ leadership, two armies, the U.S. Seventh Army under General
Alexander M. Patch and the First French Army led by General Jean de
Lattre de Tassigny, landing on the Mediterranean coast near Marseille
in August 1944, cleared the enemy out of southern France and then
turned east and joined with army groups under Field Marshal Sir Ber-
nard L. Montgomery and General Omar N. Bradley in the final assault
on Germany.
In detailing the campaign of these Riviera-based armies, the authors
have concentrated on the operational level of war, paying special atten-
tion to the problems of joint, combined, and special operations and to
the significant roles of logistics, intelligence, and personnel policies in
these endeavors. They have also examined in detail deception efforts at
the tactical and operational levels, deep battle penetrations, river-cross-
ing efforts, combat in built-up areas, and tactical innovations at the
combined arms level.
Such concepts are of course very familiar to today’s military stu-
dents, and the fact that this volume examines them in such detail
makes this study especially valuable to younger officers and noncom-
missioned officers. In truth, the challenges faced by military command-
ers half a century ago were hardly unique. That is why I particularly
urge today’s military students, who might well face some of these same
problems in future combat, to study this campaign so that they might
learn from their illustrious predecessors in the profession of arms.

Washington, D.C. HAROLD W. NELSON


Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Military History

vii
The Authors
Dr. Jeffrey J. Clarke has been a historian at the U.S. Army Center of
Military History since 1971 and was named its Chief Historian in July
1990. H e has also taught history at Rutgers University and the Univer-
sity of Maryland-College Park and is currently adjunct associate profes-
sor of history at the University of Maryland-Baltimore County. Dr.
Clarke holds a Ph.D. in history from Duke University, is a lieutenant
colonel in the Army Reserve, and served with the 1st Infantry Division
and Advisory Team 95 during the Vietnam War. He is the author of
Advice and Support: The Final Years, a volume in the U.S. Army in Viet-
nam series, and has contributed many articles, papers, and essays on
military history to a wide variety of professional publications and orga-
nizations. Dr. Clarke is currently preparing a combat volume on the
Vietnam War.

Robert Ross Smith received his B.A. and M.A. from Duke University
and later served for two years as a member of General Douglas MacAr-
thur’s historical staff during World War II. In 1947 he joined the
Army’s historical office, then known as the Office of the Chief of Mili-
tary History, where he published The Approach to the Philippines (1953)
and Triumph in the Philippines (1963) in the U.S. Army in World War II
series as well as several other military studies. Later he served as histo-
rian for the United States Army, Pacific, during the Vietnam War. At
the time of his retirement from the Center of Military History in 1983,
Mr. Smith was chief of the General History Branch.

viii
Preface
Riviera to the Rhine examines a significant portion of the Allied drive
across northern Europe and focuses on the vital role played in that
drive by the U.S. 6th Army Group, commanded by General Jacob L.
Devers, and its two major components, the American Seventh Army,
under General Alexander M. Patch, and the French First Army, under
General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny. Had these forces not existed, Ei-
senhower’s two northern army groups, those commanded by Field Mar-
shal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery and General Omar N. Bradley, would
have been stretched much thinner, with their offensive and defensive
capabilities greatly reduced. In such a case the German offensive of De-
cember 1944 might have met with greater success, easily postponing
the final Allied drive into Germany with unforeseen military and politi-
cal consequences. Riviera thus should balance the greater public atten-
tion given to the commands of Montgomery and Bradley by concen-
trating on the accomplishments of those led by Devers, Patch, and de
Lattre and, in the process, by highlighting the crucial logistical contri-
butions of the southern French ports to the Allied war effort.
This work also constitutes the final volume in the U.S. Army’s series
of operational histories treating the activities of its combat forces
during the Second World War. It covers the period from August 1944
to early March 1945 and details the Allied landings in southern France,
the capture of Toulon and Marseille, the drive north through the
Rhone River valley, and, following the junction of the Riviera forces
with those moving east from the Normandy beachhead, the lengthy
push through the Vosges Mountains and the conquest and defense of
Alsace. As such, Riviera serves as a bridge between the already pub-
lished histories of the Allied campaigns in the Mediterranean and those
treating the campaigns waged in northeastern France. Within the U.S.
Army’s World War II historical series, this volume thus initially paral-
lels the early sections of Ernest F. Fisher’s From Casino to the Alps, and
to the north Gordon A. Harrison’s Cross-Channel Attack and Martin Blu-
menson’s Breakout and Pursuit. Starting in September 1944, those Riviera
chapters treating the campaign in the Vosges act as a southern compo-
nent to Charles B. MacDonald’s The Siegfried Line Campaign and Hugh
M. Cole’s The Lorraine Campaign, all supported by Forrest C. Pogue’s

ix
The Supreme Command, and Roland G. Ruppenthal’s theater logistical
volumes. Riviera’s final chapters, detailing the German offensive in
northern Alsace and the subsequent Allied elimination of the Colmar
Pocket, constitute a southern companion to Cole’s The Ardennes: Battle of
the Bulge, both of which lead into MacDonald’s The Last Offensive.
Finally Riviera is the study of a combined, Franco-American military
effort, one which frequently saw major combat units of each nation
commanded by generals of the other on the field of battle. Although
outwardly similar, each national component had its own unique style,
and a deep appreciation of one another’s strengths and weaknesses was
vital to the success of the combined force. National political consider-
ations also played a significant role in the operations of the combined
force as did personal conflicts within both chains of command, all of
which had to be resolved primarily by the principal commanders in the
field. Although Riviera often focuses more closely on the activities of
American combat units, the authors have no intention of slighting
those of the regular French Army or of the French Forces of the Interi-
or, both of whose operations were vital to the success of the entire
force.
The authors are indebted to a long line of officials at the Office of
the Chief of Military History and its successor, the Center of Military
History, who ensured the continuation of the project amid periods of
reduced writing resources and rising historical commitments. Center
historians who made significant contributions to the manuscript include
Maj. James T. D. Hamilton, Riley Sunderland, Charles F. Romanus,
and Martin Blumenson. Deserving substantial recognition is Charles V.
P. von Luttichau, whose original research in German records and the
resulting series of monographs on the German Nineteenth Army were
invaluable. Working under the supervision of the Center’s Editor in
Chief, John W. Elsberg, and the chief of the Editorial Branch, Cather-
ine A. Heerin, Christine Hardyman served admirably as both the sub-
stantive and copy editor, contributing greatly to the accuracy and read-
ability of the account. Barbara H. Gilbert and Diane Sedore Arms then
carried the manuscript through all the proofing stages. T h e excellent
maps are the work of Billy C. Mossman, a former office cartographer
and author of the Army’s recently published Ebb and Flow, a volume in
the Korean War series. Others who assisted include Gabrielle S. Pat-
rick, who typed much of the final version; Arthur s. Hardyman, the
Center’s Graphics Branch chief, who muted many (but not all) of the
final author’s unorthodox ideas on maps and photographs; Linda
Cajka, who designed the cover and mounted the photographs; Michael
J. Winey and Randy W. Hackenburg of the U.S. Army Military History
Institute (MHI) at Carlisle Barracks, Pa., and Ouida Brown of the Na-
tional Archives who assisted the author in selecting the photographs;
Dr. Richard J. Sommers and David A. Keough of MHI; Izlar Meyers of

X
the National Archives; John Jacob of the Marshall Library; Kathy Lloyd
of the Naval Historical Center; John Taylor of the National Security
Agency historical and records offices; the historians and archivists at
the Service Historique de l’Armee; and James B. Knight, Mary L.
Sawyer, and Hannah M. Zeidlik of the Center, all of whom provided
invaluable research assistance. T h e authors are also in debt to those
colleagues at the Center who read portions of the manuscript, includ-
ing Dr. Richard O. Perry, Dr. John M. Carland, Dr. David W. Hogan,
George L. MacGarrigle, Dr. Joel D. Meyerson, and Lt. Col. Adrian G.
Traas.
Outside readers of the entire manuscript included Professor Russell
Weigley of Temple University; Martin Blumenson; and General John S.
Guthrie, former operations officer (G–3) of the Seventh Army. In addi-
tion, portions of the manuscript were read by Col. Thomas Griess, the
former chairman of the West Point History Department; French histori-
ans Paul Rigoulot and Georges Coudry; Col. Helmut Ritgen, former
battle group commander of the Panzer Lehr Division; William K.
Wyant, who is currently preparing a biography of General Patch; and
Michael Hennessy, who is completing a dissertation on the ANVILland-
ings. Both Smith and Clarke also wish to acknowledge their debt to the
many veterans of the U.S. Seventh Army and the 6th Army Group who
freely discussed their experiences with the authors (and their interest in
seeing the work completed), and in particular Franklin L. Gurley, the
indefatigable veteran and historian of the 100th Infantry Division.
Following the completion of the volume, the final author discussed
the bibliographical note and citations with the archivists at the Military
Reference Branch and the Military Field Branch of the National Ar-
chives (Dr. Elaine C. Everly, Howard Whemann, Wilbert B. Mahoney,
Timothy P. Mulligan, and John L. Taylor) to ensure that those interest-
ed could easily locate the material used in preparing this study. Since
neither Smith nor the earlier contributing authors were able to partici-
pate in the final revision and drafting efforts, the final author is also
responsible for all interpretations and conclusions as well as for any
errors or omissions that may occur.
As one former infantryman remarked to the author at a veterans’
meeting several years ago, “We don’t expect you historians to tell us
what we did—only we know that. What we want is to know why we did
it—how we fit into the larger picture.” It is this task that Riviera to the
Rhine attempts to accomplish, providing a tactical, operational, and
strategic story that treats the roles and missions of the Riviera-based
armies, how they went about accomplishing those missions, and how
those accomplishments fit into the larger framework of what another

xi
Center historian, Charles MacDonald, once described as “the mighty
endeavor.”

Washington, D.C. JEFFREY J. CLARKE

xii
Contents
PART ONE
Strategy and Operations
Chapter Page

I . THE DEBATE OVER SOUTHERN FRANCE ............................... 3


The Protagonists ......................................................................... 3
Trident, May 1943 ..................................................................... 5
Another Look at Southern France ................................................. 7
The Quadrant Conference ............................................................. 9
The Cairo and Tehran Conferences ............................................... 11
Anvil Canceled ............................................................................ 13
Anvil Restored ............................................................................ 17
Churchill ’s Last Stand ................................................................. 21
II. COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION ............................................. 23
The High-Level Command Structure ............................................. 23
The 6th Army Group and the First French Army ............................ 26
Force 163 and the Seventh Army .................................................. 30
III. PLANNING FOR INVASION ......................................................... 35
The Main Assault Force .............................................................. 35
Supporting Assault Forces ............................................................ 38
French Guerrillas ........................................................................ 41
Organizationfor the Assault ......................................................... 42
Organizationfor Logistics ............................................................ 46
Supply and Shipping Problems ...................................................... 48
Logistics ..................................................................................... 50
IV. GERMAN PLANS AND ORGANIZATION .................................... 53
German Organization and Operational Concepts ............................. 53
German Organization and Strength ................................................ 56
The Effects of Overlord ................................................................ 62
OB Southwest ............................................................................. 63
The German Nineteenth Army ...................................................... 65
V . THE PLAN OF ASSAULT ............................................................. 71
Selecting the Landing Area ........................................................... 71
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Chapter Page

Operational Plans ....................................................................... 75


Air and Naval Support Plans ........................................................ 81
Beyond D-day ............................................................................. 83
Allied Intelligence ........................................................................ 85
The Role of U L T R A ................................................................... 87
Final Assault Preparations ........................................................... 89

PART TWO
The Campaign for Southern France
VI . ISOLATING THE TARGET AREA ............................................... 95
The French Forces of the Interior .................................................. 96
Air and Naval Operations ............................................................ 97
Rangers and Commandos ............................................................. 98
The 1st Airborne Task Force ........................................................ 101
The First German Reactions ......................................................... 105
VII. THE ANVIL BEACHHEAD ........................................................... 108
The 3d Division Lands ................................................................ 108
The Assault in the Center ............................................................. 112
The 36th Division on the Right .................................................... 113
Camel Red ................................................................................. 115
The 1st Airborne Task Force ........................................................ 118
The Advance to the Blue Line ....................................................... 120
A n Appraisal .............................................................................. 122
VIII . BREAKOUT: 17–19 AUGUST ....................................................... 126
German Plans ............................................................................. 128
Pressing Westward ...................................................................... 128
The German Defense .................................................................... 129
Task Force Butler ........................................................................ 132
Accelerating the Campaign ........................................................... 133
The German Withdrawal ............................................................. 134
Toulon and Marseille .................................................................. 137
West to the Rhone ....................................................................... 142
IX. THE BATTLE OF MONTELIMAR ................................................ 144
Task Force Butler ........................................................................ 144
The Battle Square ....................................................................... 147
Initial Skirmishes ........................................................................ 149
Reinforcing the Square ................................................................. 150
The German Reaction .................................................................. 153
I n the Square ............................................................................... 154
Both Sides Reinforce .................................................................... 156
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Chapter Page

The Battle of 25 August .............................................................. 158


More Reinforcements ................................................................... 160
Battles on the 26th ...................................................................... 162
The German Withdrawal ............................................................. 162
End of the Battle ........................................................................ 166
Mont elimar: Anatomy of a Battle ................................................... 167
X. PURSUIT TO THE NORTH .......................................................... 171
Alli ed Plans ................................................................................ 171
The German Situation ................................................................. 173
North to Lyon ............................................................................. 174
A Change in Plans ...................................................................... 181
Creation of the Dijon Salient ........................................................ 183
The Seventh Army Attacks ............................................................ 186
To the Belfort Gap ...................................................................... 190
A n E valuation ............................................................................ 194
XI . SUPPORTING THE CAMPAIGN .................................................. 199
Logi stical Problems ...................................................................... 200
Base Development ........................................................................ 203
Fuel and Transportation .............................................................. 205
Rati ons ...................................................................................... 208
Manpower .................................................................................. 209
Medical Support ......................................................................... 211
Signal Support ............................................................................ 212
Air Support ................................................................................ 213
Close Air Support ........................................................................ 215
Civil Affairs ............................................................................... 216
Civi l Affairs Operations ............................................................... 217
Conc lusions ................................................................................ 219

PART THREE
Ordeal in the Vosges
XII. STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS .................................................. 223
SHAE F’s Operational Concepts .................................................... 223
SHAE F’s Operational Strategy ...................................................... 225
Patc h and Truscott ...................................................................... 231
Tact ical Transition ...................................................................... 232
German Plans and Deployment ..................................................... 233
XIII. VI CORPS AT THE MOSELLE ..................................................... 238
Alli ed Plans and Alignment .......................................................... 238
The High Vosges ......................................................................... 240
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Chapter Page

The 45th Division at Epinal ........................................................ 242


The 36th Division in the Center ................................................... 245
The German Reaction .................................................................. 247
The 3d Division on the Moselle .................................................... 249
Results ....................................................................................... 250
XIV . APPROACHING THE GAPS: SAVERNE ...................................... 252
Allied Planning ........................................................................... 253
A Change in Command ................................................................ 254
VI Corps Attacks ......................................................................... 257
XV Corps Before the Saverne Gap ................................................. 259
The German Situation in the Luneville Sector ................................ 261
The Forest of Parroy .................................................................... 263
The Forest and the Fight ............................................................. 267
More Reorganizations .................................................................. 269
XV. THE ROAD TO ST. DIE................................................................ 272
The VI Corps .............................................................................. 272
The German Defenses .................................................................. 274
First Tryfor Bruyeres and Brouvelieures ........................................ 276
The 36th Division ....................................................................... 280
The 3 d Division ......................................... . ................................ 285
Relief and Redeployment .............................................................. 289
The Vosges Fighting: Problems and Solutions .................................. 291
XVI. APPROACHING THE GAPS: BELFORT ...................................... 297
The Initial French Attacks ........................................................... 297
Logistical Problems ...................................................................... 299
French Plans .............................................................................. 301
The German Defense .................................................................... 304
The II French Corps’ October Offensive ......................................... 305
XVII. INTO THE HIGH VOSGES ........................................................... 311
Planning the Attack .................................................................... 311
German Deployments ................................................................... 315
The Preliminary Attacks ............................................................... 318
The 3d Division Attacks .............................................................. 319
XVIII. THE FORESTS OF THE MEURTHE ............................................ 323
Dogface Resumed ........................................................................ 323
The German Response ................................................................. 325
The Attack Stalls ........................................................................ 328
The Lost Battalion ...................................................................... 329
XIX. THE GATES OF THE VOSGES .................................................... 334
Planning .................................................................................... 334
The Attack in the North ............................................................... 337
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Chapter Page
Germ an Reorganization ................................................................ 338
The Attack in the South ............................................................... 340
VI Corps Resumes the Attack ........................................................ 341
Operation Dogface Ends ............................................................... 342

PART FOUR
The November Offensive
XX. PLANNING THE NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE ................................ 349
Gene ral Planning ........................................................................ 351
The First French Army ................................................................ 355
Germ an Prospects ........................................................................ 360
The Final Allied Schedule ............................................................ 363
XXI. THROUGH THE SAVERNE GAP ................................................. 365
XV Corps Plans .......................................................................... 365
XV Corps Attacks ........................................................................ 368
The Exploitation Plan ................................................................. 371
Seizing the Gap ........................................................................... 373
The German Response ................................................................. 377
Planning the Final Stage ............................................................. 379
Stri king for Strasbourg ................................................................ 380
The Panzer Lehr Counterattack .................................................... 383
XXII. TO THE PLAINS OF ALSACE...................................................... 387
VI Corps Plans ........................................................................... 387
The German Defense .................................................................... 389
The Century (100th) Division ...................................................... 392
The Meurthe River Assault .......................................................... 396
The 100th and 3d Divisions ........................................................ 399
The 103d Division ...................................................................... 401
The 36th Division ....................................................................... 402
XXII I. THROUGH THE BELFORT GAP................................................. 406
The First French Army ’s Front ..................................................... 406
Defending the Gap ...................................................................... 409
French Plans .............................................................................. 412
The I Corps Assault .................................................................... 412
Breakthrough .............................................................................. 416
The Battle of the Gap .................................................................. 419
The German Counterattacks ......................................................... 423
The Belfort Gap Secured .............................................................. 428
XXIV . LOST OPPORTUNITIES ............................................................... 433
The Colmar Pocket ...................................................................... 434
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Chapter Page

A Dubious Decision ..................................................................... 437

PART FIVE
The Campaign for Alsace
XXV. A CHANGE IN DIRECTION ........................................................ 449
The X V Corps Sector ................................................................... 449
The VI Corps Sector .................................................................... 453
The VI Corps Advance ................................................................. 455
The XV Corps Moves North ......................................................... 459
A n Evaluation ............................................................................ 462
XXVI. ON THE SIEGFRIED LINE ........................................................... 464
The German Situation ................................................................. 466
The X V Corps Offensive North ..................................................... 468
The Fortresses of Bitche ............................................................... 471
The VI Corps Offensive North ...................................................... 475
VI Corps Attacks ......................................................................... 477
Drive to the West Wall ................................................................ 481
Into Germany ............................................................................. 482
Stalemate at Colmar .................................................................... 484
Epilogue ..................................................................................... 489
XXVII. NORTHWIND ................................................................................. 492
Planning Operation Northwind .................................................... 493
The Defense of Strasbourg ............................................................ 495
Preparations for the Attack ........................................................... 497
Preparations for the Defense ......................................................... 499
The New Year’s Eve Attacks ........................................................ 505
Command and Control ................................................................. 510
XXVIII. THE BATTLE OF ALSACE ......................................................... 513
The VI Corps .............................................................................. 514
The French II Corps .................................................................... 516
The XXXIX Panzer Corps Attacks ................................................ 518
The Panzer Assault ..................................................................... 521
The Final Attack ......................................................................... 523
A n Analysis ................................................................................ 527
XXIX. THE COLMAR POCKET ............................................................... 533
Planning the Colmar Offensive ..................................................... 533
The German Defense .................................................................... 537
The Initial Attacks ...................................................................... 539
The Bridge at Maison Rouge ........................................................ 542
Reorganization ............................................................................ 547
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Chapter Page

The February Offensive ..................................................................


550
Tactics and Techniques ............................................................
551
In Retrospect ............................................................................... 555
Toward the Fanal Offensive ........................................................... 558
XXX . RIVIERA TO THE RHINE: AN EVALUATION............................ 561
The Campaigns...........................................................................
56 1
The 565
Soldier.............................................................................
Allied Strategy and Operations ....................................................... 573

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE ........................................................................ 583


BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS ............................................................ 587
INDEX ........................................................................................................... 589

Table
No.
1. Tonnages Discharged at Continental Ports: June 1944-April 1945.... 576

Maps
1. Western and Central Europe. 1 September 1939................................. 6
2. German Dispositions. Southern France. 15 August 1944..................... 66
3. France 72
..........................................................................................................................
4. The Landing Area ...................................................................................
74
5. T h e ANVILLanding Plan....................................................................... 76
6. T h e Seventh Army Assault. 15-16 August 1944 ........................ 109
7. Breakout From the Blue Line. 17–19 August 1944.............................. 127
8. Capture of Toulon and Marseille. French II Corps. 20–28
August 1944 ................................................................................
139
9. Montelimar Battle Square ..................................................................... 148
10. Pursuit to Lyon. 29 August–3 September 1944 ......................... 176
11. Seventh Army Advance Toward Belfort. 4–14 September 1944.......... 187
12. T h e Allied Front. 15 September 1944 ..................................................... 227
13. Nineteenth Army Dispositions. 17 September 1944............................. 236
14. The High Vosges Area 241
................................................................................
15. The VI-Corps Crosses the Moselle River. 20-25
September 1944................................................................................. 243
16 . T h e VI Corps Advance. 26–30 September 1944.................................... 258
17 . The XV Corps Zone, 25 September 1944............................................. 260
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Page
18. 79th Infantry Division in the Parroy Forest. 25 September-9
October 1944 ..................................................................................... 264
19. 45th Infantry Division Operations. 1–7 October 1944 ........................ 277
20. 36th Infantry Division Operations. 1–14 October 1944 ...................... 281
21. 3d Infantry Division Operations. 30 September-14
October 1944 ..................................................................................... 285
22. The French II Corps Zone. 4 October 1944 ........................................ 303
23. The VI Corps Zone. 14 October 1944 ................................................. 312
24. 6th Army Group Plan of Attack. November 1944................................ 335
25. The Western Front. 8 November 1944 ................................................ 350
26. The XV Corps Capture of Strasbourg. 13–23 November 1944 .......... 369
27. Panzer Lehr Counterattack. 23–25 November 1944 ............................ 385
28. VI Corps Advance. 12–26 November 1944 .......................................... 390
29. First French Army Advance Through the Belfort Gap. 14–25
November 1944 ................................................................................. 407
30. The 6th Army Group Front. 26 November 1944................................. 441
31. Seventh Army Attack. 27 November–4 December 1944 ...................... 450
32. Seventh Army Advance to the German Border. 5–20 December
1944 ................................................................................................... 469
33. The Colmar Pocket. 5 December 1944 ................................................ 487
34. The Last German Offensive. 31 December 1944–25 January 1945 .... 506
5 ............................... January–5 540

Illustrations
Members of U.S. and British Staffs Conferring ........................................... 10
Lt. Gen.Jacob L . Devers .............................................................................. 25
Lt. Gen. Ira C . Eaker, Maj . Gen. John K . Cannon. General Devers. and
Maj. Gen. Thomas B. Larkin .................................................................... 26
Lt. Gen. Alexander M . Patch ........................................................................ 32
General Patch. Air Marshal Sir John C. Slessor. General Devers, General
Sir Henry Maitland Wilson. and Maj . Gen. Lowell W . Rooks .................. 33
Maj . Gen. Robert T . Frederick ..................................................................... 39
FFI Partisan Group. August 1944 ................................................................ 43
General Johannes Blaskowitz ....................................................................... 57
General Friedrich Wiese .............................................................................. 58
German Armor Passing Through Toulouse ................................................ 61
Maj . Gen. Wend von Wietersheim ............................................................... 67
Defensive Emplacement of a 65-mm. Italian Howitzer ............................... 69
45th Infantry Division Troops Load Up at Bagnoli. Italy. August 1944 ..... 90
ANVILConvoy En Route to Southern France. August 1944 ........................ 91
Cape Negre .................................................................................................. 100
American and British Paratroopers Take a Short Break. D-day 1944 ......... 103
Pillbox Guards Bridge to St. Raphael .......................................................... 116
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Page
Maj . Gen . Ludwig Bieringer, A Prisoner of War..................................... 119
Troops of 45th Division Wade Ashore Near St. Maxime ............................ 120
Troops and Tank Destroyers Move Through Salernes ............................... 130
French Troops in Marseille.August 1944 ................................................... 141
American Armor Moves Inland ................................................................... 146
157th Infantry. 45th Division. Passes Through Bourg, September 1944.... 181
30th Infantry. 3d Division. Crosses Doubs River at Besancon, September
1944.......................................................................................................... 189
Tanks of 45th Division Advance in Vicinity of Baume-les-Dames ............... 190
The Champagne Campaign Comes to a Close ............................................ 193
French Civilians Restoring Railway in Seventh Army Area ......................... 203
“The Long and the Short and the Tall” ...................................................... 210
Lt . Gen . Lucian K . Truscott. General Patch. and General Devers. Octo-
ber1944 ................................................................................................... 231
Troops of 36th Infantry Division Cross the Moselle ................................... 247
Maj. Gen. Wade H. Haislip .......................................................................... 255
General Leclerc and Staff at Rambouillet .................................................... 257
Parroy Forest ................................................................................................ 265
83d Chemical (Mortar) Battalion. 45th Division. Fires 4.2-Inch Mortars .... 279
4.2-Inch Mortars Hit Le Tholy .................................................................... 288
Artillery Munitions: Vital in the Vosges ....................................................... 293
Generals Marshall. de Lattre. and Devers Visit French First Army Head-
quarters.................................................................................................... 300
3d Algerian Division Moves Up to the Rupt Area ....................................... 304
Japanese-American Infantry (442d RCT) in Hills Around Bruyeres ........... 319
Dominiale de Champ Forest ........................................................................ 330
Men From the Lost Battalion ....................................................................... 332
General Patch and Maj . Gen . Edward H . Brooks ......................................... 337
Maj. Gen. Withers A. Burress ...................................................................... 342
Company L. 142d Regiment. 36th Division. Pulls Back to Rear in Snow-
fall............................................................................................................. 345
French North African Soldiers ..................................................................... 356
Generals Spragins, Haislip, and Wyche at XV Corps Command Post ........ 366
Saverne......................................................................................................... 367
French 2d Armored Division Moves Through Strasbourg .......................... 381
398th Infantry. 100th Division. in Raon-l’Etape Area ................................. 393
411th Infantry. 103d Division. in Vicinity of St. Michel .............................. 401
German Assault Gun Knocked Out by 76-mm. M4 Tank ............................ 404
French Light Tanks at Huningue ................................................................. 418
Infantry-Tank Team of French 5th Armored Division ................................ 424
French Troops Raise Tricolor Over Chateau de Belfort ............................. 431
Selestat......................................................................................................... 458
Soldier and Pack Mule Make Their Way in Heavy Snowfall ........................ 462
Brig. Gen . Albert C . Smith ........................................................................... 465
xxi
Page
Maj . Gen . Roderick R . Allen ........................................................................ 466
Commanding Generals Contemplate the Next Move .................................. 471
71st Regiment. 44th Division. Fort Simserhof. November 1944 ................. 473
313th Regiment. 79th Division. in the Vicinity of Bischwiller ..................... 479
Troops of the 45th Division Make House-to-House Search ........................ 485
Brig. Gen . Henry H . Linden ........................................................................ 500
Brig. Gen . Frederick M . Harris .................................................................... 501
Brig. Gen . Thomas W . Herren .................................................................... 502
Building Defensive Works in the Snow........................................................ 503
Generals Devers and Patch Confer at Luneville .......................................... 504
Men of the 100th Division Maintain Heavy Machine-Gun Position ............ 507
Gambsheim-Rhine River Area ..................................................................... 514
7 14th Tank Battalion. 12th Armored Division. Near Bischwiller. France ... 516
Rifleman of 70th Division Searching for Snipers......................................... 517
48th Tank Battalion. 14th Armored Division. Outside of Rittershoffen ..... 519
Herrlis heim .................................................................................................. 524
Railway Bridge at Neuf-Brisach Finally Destroyed ...................................... 550
Neuf-Brisach (Old Fortress Town) .............................................................. 552
French Infantry Advances Into Colmar ....................................................... 553
American Infantrymen ................................................................................. 566

All photographs are from the Department of Defense files except


those appearing on pages 57, 58, and 67, which are the courtesy of the
Militaergeschichtliches Forschungsamt.

xxii
PART ONE

STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS


CHAPTER I

The Debate Over Southern France


Although ultimately proving to be France and the invasion of Italy. Sup-
one of the most important Allied porters, mainly American, pointed out
operations of World War II, the inva- its vital assistance to the former, and
sion of southern France has also re- detractors, mostly British, emphasized
mained one of the most controver- its pernicious influence on the latter.
sial. 1 From start to finish and even Even many years after these events,
long afterwards, Allied leaders hotly surprisingly few have ever examined
debated its merits and its results. the campaign in southern France
Most judged the enterprise solely on itself or added anything to the origi-
the basis of its effect on the two nal arguments that surrounded the
major Allied campaigns in western project from its initial inception to its
Europe, the invasion of northern execution some fourteen months
later. Yet the debate over the invasion
1 This chapter is based on the following works in of southern France was central to the
the United States Army in World War II series of evolving Allied military strategy
the U.S. Army’s Office of the Chief of Military His-
tory (now the Center of Military History, or CMH): during that time and became almost a
Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, Global permanent fixture at Allied planning
Logistics and Strategy, 1943–1945 (Washington, 1968); conferences in 1943 and 1944.
Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition War-
fare, 1943–1944 (Washington, 1959); Forrest C.
Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washington, 1954); The Protagonists
Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack (Washing-
ton, 1951); Howard McGaw Smyth and Albert N.
Garland, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy (Washington, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
1965); and Martin Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino and Prime Minister Winston S.
(Washington, 1969). The principal British source Churchill together headed the Anglo-
was John Ehrman, “Grand Strategy,” vol. V, August
1943-September 1944 (London: HMSO, 1956), a
American coalition and made or ap-
volume in the series History of the Second World proved all political and strategic deci-
War, United Kingdom Military Series. Unpublished sions. They were assisted by their
sources were the following manuscripts (MS): CMH principal military advisers, the Ameri-
MS, James D. T. Hamilton, “Southern France”
(hereafter cited as Hamilton, “Southern France”); can Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the
MTO MS, Leo J. Meyer, “The Strategic and Logisti- British Chiefs of Staff (BCS).2 Each
cal History of MTO” (copy in CMH, and hereafter
cited as Meyer, “MTO History”); and CMH draft re- 2The JCS members were Admiral William D.
search papers by Walter G. Hermes and Darrie H. Leahy, Chief of Staff to President Roosevelt; Gener-
Richards, both in CMH, for the Matloff volume al George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army;
cited above. Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations
4 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE
national group met separately and velt, over the objections of the JCS,
formulated plans and programs, but had acquiesced. At the Casablanca
then came together in a single com- Conference in January 1943, the Brit-
mittee called the Combined Chiefs of ish had recommended and the Ameri-
Staff (CCS) to discuss matters further cans had reluctantly accepted the sei-
and arrive at joint decisions. The CCS zure of Sicily upon the conclusion of
spoke for the president and the prime the Tunisian campaign. What differ-
minister, allocated resources among entiated the outlooks of the two par-
the theaters of operation, and direct- ties was where and when to make the
ed Allied theater commanders. From Allied main effort in Europe.
time to time, when the two Allied po- The Americans wished to launch an
litical leaders came together to re- immediate cross-Channel attack from
solve key issues, the CCS accompa- England to the Continent, followed
nied them and sought to reconcile the by a massive and direct thrust into
often divergent views and interests of the heart of Germany. General
the United States and Great Britain. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of
Occasionally, Roosevelt and Churchill the U.S. Army, a member of the JCS,
conferred with other Allied leaders, and the dominant figure among
such as Joseph Stalin, and on those American planners for the war in
occasions the military chiefs were also Europe, was the primary spokesman
consulted. for this operational strategy, and Mar-
At first the British tended to domi- shall tended to judge other ventures
nate the Anglo-American strategic de- by evaluating their possible effect on
liberations. They had been in the what he thought should be the main
conflict from the beginning, had Allied effort. In contrast, the British
amassed more experience, and had preferred a peripheral, or “blue
more military forces engaged than the water,” strategy, undertaking lesser
poorly prepared Americans, who en- operations around the rim of Europe
tered the struggle more than two to wear down Germany and Italy
years later. As the Americans commit- before launching the climactic cross-
ted increasing manpower and materiel Channel strike. What the British
to the war, they gradually became the wanted in particular was to continue
more important partner and had cor- the offensive momentum in the Medi-
respondingly greater influence on the terranean area as opportunities un-
courses of action adopted by the alli- folded.
ance. British preference for operations in
In 1942 Churchill had proposed the the Mediterranean, especially along
North African invasion, and Roose- the eastern shores of the sea, was mo-
tivated in part by postwar political
and Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; and General considerations that were not shared
Henry H. Arnold, Chief of Staff of the Army Air
Forces. The BCS leaders were Field Marshal Sir by their American Allies. As such they
Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff were rigorously opposed by Marshall
(Army); Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief and his cohorts. But the United
of the Air Staff; and Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley
Pound (replaced in October 1943 by Admiral of the States, in turn, had similar political
Fleet Sir Andrew B. Cunningham). commitments in Southeast Asia and
THE DEBATE OVER SOUTHERN FRANCE 5

ment in the Mediterranean argued for


China that had little to do with British
further activity in the area, especially
interests overseas. Differences in mili-
tary strategy and postwar political if it could divert German resources
concerns thus colored all discussions from northern France without greatly
of future Allied operations and in the impeding the Allied buildup in Great
end forced the CCS to adopt a series Britain.
of compromises not entirely satisfac- The JCS considered a number of
tory to either side. Such, inevitably, is
potential target areas, including
the nature of coalition warfare, and southern France, southern Italy, Sar-
the southern France invasion repre- dinia and Corsica, the Genoa area of
sented one of the major compromises northwestern Italy, Crete and the Do-
of the Anglo-American partnership decanese Islands in the eastern Medi-
during World War II. terranean, the Balkans, and the Iberi-
an Peninsula (Map 1). The majority of
Trident, May 1943 American planners regarded an early
invasion of southern France as ex-
The proposal for an invasion of tremely risky: an exploitation north-
southern France formally arose in ward would require more strength
May 1943 at the TRIDENT Conference, than the Allies were likely to leave in
a series of meetings between the the Mediterranean, and the operation
American and British staffs held in would demand the prior occupation
Washington, D.C. At the time, the of Sardinia and Corsica, causing an-
Allies had cleared North Africa and other diversion of Allied resources.
were preparing to invade Sicily, but As for the Iberian Peninsula, earlier
had not yet decided on subsequent fears that the Germans might move
operational objectives. In their pre- against Gibraltar had disappeared,
liminary gatherings, the JCS had their and no one saw Spain as a potential
eyes firmly fixed on an assault across invasion route to anywhere. In the
the English Channel, eventually code- eastern Mediterranean, air support re-
named OVERLORD; following a suc- quirements for operations appeared
cessful Sicilian campaign, they wanted to depend on Turkish entry into the
to begin transferring all Allied mili- war on the Allied side, an unlikely
tary resources out of the Mediterrane- event. Many also believed that oper-
an theater to support an OVERLORDations in either the eastern Mediterra-
invasion sometime in the spring of nean or the Balkans would lead to a
1944. But this, they realized, was major Allied commitment in south-
hardly feasible. The campaign in eastern Europe, where logistical and
Sicily promised to be over by the end geographical problems could pre-
of summer, and the prospect of sus- clude the application of decisive
pending all ground operations against strength. Although the Italian penin-
the Axis until the following year, a sula appeared to be an immediately
gap of possibly eight or more months, feasible objective, the JCS feared that
was unacceptable. Some interim oper- the invasion would evolve into a
ations beyond Sicily were required, major campaign that would divert re-
and the considerable Allied establish- sources from OVERLORD.Instead,
THE DEBATE OVER SOUTHERN FRANCE 7
American planners concluded that the in 1943. Almost immediately they di-
seizure of Sardinia, and probably Cor- rected General Dwight D. Eisenhow-
sica as well, would prove the most de- er, commanding Allied forces in the
sirable action in the Mediterranean. Mediterranean,3 to draw up plans for
The operations would keep some invading Italy and tying down the
pressure on the Axis, while from maximum number of German divi-
bases on Sardinia and Corsica the sions in the Mediterranean area. In
Allies could pose strong threats late July, with Allied success on Sicily
against both Italy and southern assured and with the sudden collapse
France, thereby pinning Axis forces in of the Mussolini government in Italy,
place. the CCS, at Eisenhower’s behest,
British planners attending TRIDENT agreed that an invasion of southern
were better prepared. They quickly Italy would best achieve the ends set
agreed with their American opposites forth at TRIDENT;the Allied high
that an early invasion of southern command scheduled the invasion for
France would be difficult and, fur- early September 1943.
thermore, doubted the value of seiz-
ing Sardinia and Corsica. Instead, the Another Look at Southern France
BCS proposed that action in the Med-
iterranean be aimed at eliminating Throughout the summer of 1943
Italy from the war in 1943. The col- American planners continued to
lapse of Italian resistance would not regard the Mediterranean theater with
only provide the Allies with a great mixed feelings. The Joint War Plans
psychological victory but would also, Committee of the JCS emphasized the
the BCS argued, compel Germany to advantages of fighting the major west-
redeploy strong forces to Italy to hold ern European battles in Italy if the
the German southern flank, thereby Germans so elected, pointing out that
promoting the success of OVERLORDonce the Allies had cleared the Ital-
as well as relieving German pressure ian peninsula, the newly renovated
on the Russian front. As an alterna- French Army could invade southern
tive, the BCS were prepared to pro- France with relative ease. The Joint
pose a move into the Balkans, esti- Strategic Survey Committee, thinking
mating that Germany would divert along similar lines, suggested that
strong forces from both the east and after Italy had been eliminated from
west to hold southeastern Europe. In the war, the Allies might well launch
the end, however, they persuaded the a major invasion of southern France
Americans that an early invasion of in conjunction with a much smaller
Italy was the best solution.
Thus the idea of an invasion of
3 At this time Eisenhower’s command consisted of
southern France attracted some atten- Allied forces in North Africa and in the western and
tion at TRIDENT,but was dropped central Mediterranean. He was also commander of
from primary consideration. Instead, the U.S. Army’s administrative headquarters, the
with some reluctance on the part of North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army
(NATOUSA). The region east of Italy was under
the JCS, the CCS approved the con- General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, the commander
cept of knocking Italy out of the war of the British Middle East Theater.
8 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

OVERLORD effort undertaken with division landing in southern France


forces left over from the Mediterrane- would obviously complement OVER-
an. Navy planners favored a major LORD, representing a secondary,
effort in Italy, believing that a south- southern prong of the Allied attack
ern approach would allow more am- on German-occupied France. Current
phibious resources to be switched to OVERLORD plans in July 1943 even
the Pacific. called for such a diversionary effort
Although the JCS easily resisted against southern France at the time of
these internal arguments against the the cross-Channel assault. But Ameri-
basic OVERLORD concept, they were can planners now began to propose
still unable to decide how best to ex- that the southern landings be more
ploit the decline of Axis power in the than a diversion and be upgraded to a
Mediterranean with the resources left larger effort–one that would provide
in the theater after OVERLORD re- continued assistance to OVERLORD,
quirements had been met. The situa- would make immediate use of the
tion was further complicated by the French Army, and, incidentally, would
lack of sufficient shipping to move the preempt any British proposals to
bulk of Mediterranean resources to employ excess Allied strength in the
England for OVERLORD. In many cases eastern Mediterranean.
it was easier to ship OVERLORD forces For these reasons the JCS decided in
from America to England than from August 1943 formally to support an in-
the Mediterranean; for example, the vasion of southern France, code-
Allies would probably never have named ANVIL, which would be
enough shipping to move the French launched either before, during, or after
Army from North Africa to England OVERLORD as the situation permitted;
for participation in OVERLORD. they ultimately concluded that the op-
American planners thus believed eration would have to follow OVER-
that after all OVERLORD requirements LORD. American planners reasoned
had been met they would still have that a successful ANVILwould probably
enough strength left in the Mediterra- depend on OVERLORD to deplete
nean to maintain strong pressure German strength in southern France,
against German forces in Italy; to while the seizure of the southern ports
seize Sardinia and Corsica; to estab- and a subsequent drive to the north
lish air bases on the Dodecanese Is- would force the Germans to defend the
lands; and, in conjunction with OVER- approaches to their own country from
LORD,to launch some kind of assault two directions. Still giving overriding
against southern France. Even if the priority to OVERLORD, the JCS thus set-
Allies halted all offensive action in the tled on a three-phase plan for the Med-
Mediterranean, they would still have iterranean: (1) eliminating Italy from
to leave twelve to fourteen divisions the war and clearing the Italian penin-
in the theater to maintain security and sula as far north as Rome; (2) capturing
to pose threats. Better to have these
forces engage in at least limited
4Shortly before the invasion of southern France,
offensives than to have them waste the code name changed to DRAGOON,but to avoid
away from inaction. A small, multi- confusion ANVILis used throughout the text.
THE DEBATE OVER SOUTHERN FRANCE 9

Sardinia and Corsica to increase the forced division ashore. Eisenhower


width and depth of the Allied air pene- agreed with the BCS that anything
tration into Europe; and (3) creating a less than a three-division ANVILwould
situation in the Mediterranean favor- not be feasible unless Allied forces in
able to the launching of ANVILabout Italy had first reached the Franco-
the time of OVERLORD. Specifically, the Italian border.
JCS plan for southern France called for The JCS admitted the necessity for
the seizure of a beachhead in the increasing the OVERLORD assault ech-
Toulon-Marseille area, the develop- elon, but they convinced the BCS that
ment of Toulon and Marseille into the Allies should continue planning
major supply ports, and an exploitation for at least some kind of ANVILoper-
northward up the Rhone valley to sup- ation on the basis of the limited
port OVERLORD. This was the basic means expected to be available in the
ANVILconcept on which all planning Mediterranean at the time of OVER-
for the invasion of southern France LORD. Accordingly, a QUADRANT deci-
turned for nearly another year. sion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff
directed Eisenhower to prepare an
The Quadrant Conference ANVIL plan by November 1943. The
directive was somewhat vague and did
Soon after the end of the Sicilian not differentiate between the British
campaign in August 1943, Roosevelt, view that ANVILshould be reduced to
Churchill, and the CCS met in a threat at the time of OVERLORD and
Quebec at the QUADRANT Conference. the American desire to make ANVILa
There the British accepted the JCS major operation directly connected to
program for the Mediterranean in OVERLORD. But obviously the pres-
principle. However, the BCS also sures against ANVILwere growing. A
pointed out that the Allies would JCS insistence on a three-division
have to make OVERLORD a much ANVILwould create a natural competi-
stronger assault than current plans tion between OVERLORD and ANVIL
envisaged and that the forces already for amphibious resources. Meanwhile,
allocated to OVERLORD would require the demands of operations in Italy
more amphibious lift than had been would generate their own momentum
planned. If the United States was un- at the expense of both ANVIL and
willing to make the additional lift OVERLORD. Finally, the British, at
available from Pacific allocations, it QUADRANT, expressed continuing in-
would logically have to come from the terest in limited operations in the
Mediterranean, inevitably threatening eastern Mediterranean, operations
ANVIL.The BCS also believed that an that would also divert resources from
effective ANVILwould require a three- ANVIL.
division assault, but British projec- Eisenhower submitted his reduced
tions indicated that by late spring of ANVILplan in late October 1943. By
1944 the Allies would have only a then the heady optimism of the
mixed collection of ships and landing summer had faded. The Allies had
craft left in the Mediterranean, capa- successfully invaded southern Italy in
ble at best of putting a single rein- September, Italian resistance had col-
10 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

MEMBERSOF U.S. AND BRITISHSTAFFSCONFERRING, Quebec, 23 August 1943. Seated


around the tablefrom leftforeground: Vice Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten, Sir Dudley Pound,
Sir Alan Brooke, Sir Charles Portal, SirJohn Dill, Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay, Brigadier
Harold Redman, Comdr. R. D. Coleridge, Brig. Gen. John R. Deane, General Arnold,
General Marshall, Admiral William D. Leahy, Admiral King, and Capt. F. B. Royal.

lapsed, and the Germans had evacuat- LORD, then scheduled for about 1 May
ed both Sardinia and Corsica. But 1944. There was simply not enough
they had also quickly moved rein- amphibious shipping in the European
forcements into Italy, while the Allied theater for two major assaults. Eisen-
buildup was slow. By late October the hower himself felt that there was little
Germans had twenty-five divisions in chance for the Allies to be far enough
Italy as opposed to eighteen for the north in Italy by the spring of 1944 to
Allies, and the Allied commanders launch an overland invasion of south-
faced a stalemate if not a serious re- ern France from that quarter; the best
verse. Hopes that Allied forces might he could promise was the seizure of a
reach Rome before the end of 1943 small beachhead in southern France
had disappeared. in the unlikely event that the Ger-
Eisenhower's ANVIL plan made it mans withdrew the bulk of their
clear that the Allies would be able to forces from the south. He concluded
mount little more than a threat to that the Allies might do better at
southern France at the time of OVER- spreading out German defenses by
THE DEBATE OVER SOUTHERN FRANCE 11

continuing the Italian offensive with terranean. They proposed a schedule


all resources available in the Mediter- that called for an advance in Italy as
ranean. As for the eastern Mediterra- far as Rome by January 1944; the cap-
nean, Eisenhower, with the concur- ture of Rhodes during February; a
rence of the BCS, judged that no drive in Italy as far as the line Pisa-
operations could be undertaken in Rimini (about halfway from Rome to
that area until the Allied forces on the the Po River in northern Italy); and
Italian mainland were at least as far increased support to Yugoslav guer-
north as Rome. In the end, Eisenhow- rillas (including the establishment of
er recommended that ANVIL remain minor beachheads on the east coast
indefinite, as one of several alterna- of the Adriatic). T o provide the am-
tives the Allies should consider for phibious lift needed to support all
the future in the Mediterranean. these operations and to increase the
The British requested that the JCS amphibious allocations for OVERLORD,
accept Eisenhower’s concept as a the BCS recommended canceling am-
basis for future planning, a step the phibious undertakings in Southeast
JCS reluctantly took early in Novem- Asia and postponing OVERLORD until
ber. As a result, plans for an ANVIL July 1944. Eisenhower appeared to
operation in conjunction with OVER- support the British outlook. He ac-
LORD were dropped from consider- knowledged the value of harassment
ation before the next CCS meeting, operations across the Adriatic and
and ANVILwas absent from the SEX- suggested that after the Po valley had
TANT Conference agenda when the been reached, the French Army could
CCS convened at Cairo late in No- move westward into southern France
vember 1943. and the other Allied forces could ad-
vance northeast.
The Cairo and Tehran Conferences The reaction of the JCS was pre-
(November-December 1943) dictable. The British and Eisenhower
presentations threatened the place of
The meeting of the western Allied OVERLORD as the centerpiece of the
leaders with Generalissimo Chiang war in Europe. Although the May
Kai-shek at Cairo, code-named SEX- target date was hardly sacrosanct, a
TANT,on 22–26 November 1943, was delay until July was intolerable, and
followed by a second conference with waiting until the Allies had reached
Joseph Stalin in Tehran, 28 Novem- the Po River valley would probably
ber-1 December, and then a final ses- set the invasion back to August.
sion at Cairo, 3–7 December.5 At the Moreover, commitments to Chiang
initial SEXTANT meetings, the British Kai-shek at Cairo made it virtually im-
again pressed for increased Allied ef- possible for the JCS to cancel South-
forts in the central and eastern Medi- east Asia operations. T o General Mar-
shall all these proposals posed serious
5For a detailed treatment of the conferences, see threats to OVERLORD and represented
Keith Sainsbury, The Turning Point: Roosmelt, Stalin, a return to the British peripheral
Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek, 1943. The Moscow,
Cairo, and Tehran Conferences (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
strategy or, worse, one that would
sity Press, 1985). have had American troops fighting in
12 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

the Balkans and the Italian Alps. ANVILwould prove strategically indeci-
Settling nothing at Cairo, the CCS sive and could lead only to the disper-
moved on to Tehran for consultations sal of OVERLORD resources. He ap-
with Stalin and Russian military lead- peared intrigued with the pincers
ers. During preliminary conferences in aspect of a combined OVERLORD-ANVIL
Moscow among American, British, and campaign, but urged that not even
Russian officials in late October and ANVILshould be permitted to interfere
early November, the Americans had with OVERLORD.
gathered that the Russians favored in- The CCS promised Stalin that OVER-
creased efforts in the Mediterranean LORD would be launched toward the
and perhaps some operations in the end of May 1944, a compromise be-
Balkans to divert German strength tween the American date of l May and
from the eastern front. U.S. represent- the British proposal of 1 July. The CCS
atives had also received the impression also assured Stalin that they would exe-
that the Russians were no more than cute ANVILconcurrently with OVER-
lukewarm toward OVERLORD. 6 Howev- LORD on the largest scale possible with
er, at Tehran Russian representatives the amphibious lift left in the Mediter-
vehemently objected to further Anglo- ranean in May, and they agreed to
American operations in the Mediterra- carry the offensive in Italy no farther
nean-Balkan area that might detract than the Pisa-Rimini line, about 150
from OVERLORD, which, the Soviets in- miles north of Rome, but 100 miles
sisted, had to be launched in May 1944. short of the Po valley.
T o the surprise of both the Americans Returning to Cairo, the CCS took
and British, the Soviets also proposed another look at the amphibious lift
an invasion of southern France in sup- available for ANVIL.Even by scraping
port of OVERLORD. While not insistent the bottoms of all potential barrels,
about ANVIL,the Russians firmly op- they estimated that sufficient lift for a
posed other major offensives in the one-division assault with a quick
Mediterranean and took a stand follow-up of two-thirds of a division
against any advance in Italy beyond the was all that could be assembled by May
lines the Allies had already attained. 1944. As a remedy, the BCS again pro-
Stalin maintained that any major oper- posed canceling projected amphibious
ation in the Mediterranean other than operations in Southeast Asia or reduc-
ing Pacific allocations. With great re-
6 The principal American figures at the prelimi- luctance, Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief
nary Moscow talks were Secretary of State Cordell of Naval Operations and a member of
Hull, Ambassador to Russia W. Averell Harriman,
and Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, the U.S. military rep- the JCS, agreed to divert enough Pacif-
resentative in Moscow. The ranking British were ic lift resources to execute a two-divi-
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and General Sir sion ANVIL assault.7 However, King's
Hastings Ismay. A mystery still surrounds these pre-
liminary Moscow meetings. The Americans may
have misunderstood the Russians; Soviet thinking 7 King expressed concern that the reallocation
may have undergone a sweeping change between might delay the capture of Truk in the central Caro-
the Moscow and Tehran conferences; or the Rus- line Islands, then scheduled for July or August
sians may simply have been attempting to ascertain 1944. However, the JCS had already begun to ques-
the reactions of the western Allies to various pro- tion the necessity for seizing Truk and were also
posals. looking for other operations to cancel in order to
THE DEBATE OVER SOUTHERN FRANCE 13

offer helped little, permitting only a British agreement to halt in Italy at


minimum, risky ANVILassault; making the Pisa-Rimini line and by the fact
no allowance for unforeseen contin- that a British condition for the cap-
gencies in the Mediterranean; and still ture of Rhodes—Turkish entry into
leaving the amphibious resources for the war—could not be met. The only
OVERLORD at a level that many plan- other Mediterranean threat to ANVIL
ners considered inadequate. was the possibility that outflanking
The British were still dissatisfied amphibious maneuvers in Italy, such
and requested that even more am- as the one planned for Anzio in early
phibious shipping be allocated from 1944, might reduce ANVILallocations.
the Pacific theater. Reminding the But most American planners foresaw
JCS that Russia would ultimately that the real danger to ANVIL,if any,
enter the war against Japan, the BCS would come from pressures to
argued that major amphibious oper- strengthen the OVERLORD assault.
ations in Southeast Asia were thus
unnecessary, making it possible to Anvil Canceled
transfer more such resources to the
European theater. But the JCS at first The turn of the year saw a general
refused to accept the British rationale, reshuffling of command structures
and the matter reached a temporary and boundaries in the European and
impasse. However, on 5 December Mediterranean theaters. The CCS ap-
President Roosevelt, changing com- pointed Eisenhower as supreme
mitments to China, agreed to cancel Allied commander for OVERLORD, and
some of the planned operations in he left the Mediterranean in Decem-
Southeast Asia, and the CCS thereaf- ber. General Sir Bernard L. Mont-
ter began dividing the excess lift be- gomery, who was to be Allied ground
tween OVERLORD and ANVIL. commander for OVERLORD, and Lt.
Thus, at the beginning of Decem- Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, who was
ber 1943, ANVIL was again on the to be chief of staff at Eisenhower’s
agenda and, instead of a diversionary new command-Supreme Headquar-
threat, was to be an integral adjunct ters, Allied Expeditionary Force
to OVERLORD. Indeed, the CCS now (SHAEF)—followed. The Mediterra-
went so far as to agree that OVER- nean, previously divided between Ei-
LORD and ANVIL would be the “su- senhower and the commander of the
preme” operations in Europe during British Middle East Theater, General
1944 and that no other campaigns in Sir Henry Maitland “Jumbo” Wilson,
Europe should be allowed to prevent became unified under Wilson.
the success of those two. Prospects After reaching London Montgom-
that other operations in the Mediter- ery and Smith began reviewing the
ranean, at least, would not interfere draft OVERLORD plans and pressing
with ANVILwere also brightened by a for major increases in the size of the
OVERLORD assault, a step the prelimi-
nary planners had been urging on the
speed the war in the Pacific. See Robert Ross Smith,
The Approach to the Philippines, United States Army in CCS for months. Knowing that no
World War II (Washington, 1953), ch. 1 . other ready source but ANVILexisted
14 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

from which to draw the amphibious The JCS generally agreed.


lift needed to enlarge OVERLORD, they The next step in the debate was a
recommended that the lift be taken highly technical argument between
from ANVIL and that ANVIL be re- British and American logistical plan-
duced to a one-division threat. The ners over the capacity, serviceability,
BCS supported these recommenda- and availability of assault shipping
tions, reiterating their position that and landing craft already allocated to
ANVIL should not be permitted to ERLORD. Employing American fig-
interfere in any way with OVERLORD. ures, the JCS concluded that the
The renewed pressure against Allies could significantly increase the
ANVILput Eisenhower in an ambigu- size of the OVERLORD assault force
ous situation when he reached and still provide the lift necessary for
London in mid-January.8 One of his at least a two-division ANVIL.The JCS
last tasks as Allied commander in the carried this argument almost to the
Mediterranean had been to prepare a point of insisting on a two-division
new ANVILplan in accordance with a ANVIL,with OVERLORD being under-
CCS post-SEXTANT directive. Eisen- taken with the means left over after
hower’s plan had again been built the ANVILdemands were met. Per-
around a three-division ANVILassault haps happily for their peace of mind,
followed by exploitation northward. other problems arose before the JCS
Only the three-division ANVIL,Eisen- were forced to push their argument
hower believed, would provide strong to its logical conclusion-giving a
Support toOVERLORD-SUPPORT that a two-division ANVIL priority over
mere threat could not provide. He re- OVERLORD.
minded the BCS and his principal As had been the case earlier, the
subordinates that the CCS had prom- war in Italy now began to influence
ised ANVIL to the Russians, and re- the fate of ANVIL. On 22 January
peated his arguments about the most 1944, in an attempt to outflank
effective use of the French Army. If German defenses and speed the cap-
ANVIL were canceled, many French ture of Rome, the U.S. VI Corps
and even many American divisions surged ashore at Anzio, on Italy’s
might well be locked in the Mediter- west coast some thirty miles south of
ranean, wasted for lack of shipping to Rome. But the Germans reacted vig-
take them to northern France, for lack orously, and the Allied landing forces
of port capacity in the OVERLORD area soon found themselves confined to
to support them, and for lack of room the beachhead, unable to move
in Italy to deploy them. Eisenhower toward Rome or even to establish
made clear his reluctance to reduce contact with Wilson’s main armies to
ANVILto a threat and proposed that the south. The Italian campaign had
every other possible means of again bogged down, and the Anzio
strengthening OVERLORD be sought. venture began to consume resources
that planners had already earmarked
for ANVIL.
8 Before going to England, Eisenhower made a
trip to the United States, and thus reached London The situation in Italy prompted
after Montgomery and Smith. Churchill to recommend immediate
THE DEBATE OVER SOUTHERN FRANCE 15

reinforcement of the theater and the less concurrent with OVERLORD unless
abandonment of ANVIL. Italy was Wilson’s forces in Italy reached Rome
where the Allies had the best oppor- before April 1944. Marshall was will-
tunity to tie down German divisions ing to forego ANVILif Eisenhower in-
and thus contribute to the success of sisted, but suggested that the JCS
OVERLORD. It was unjustifiable, he could accept a stabilized front in Italy
held, to deny resources to the Italian south of Rome if such a step would
campaign for the sake of ANVIL.Far enhance the chances of executing
better to transfer the bulk of the ANVIL about the time of OVERLORD.
scarce amphibious lift earmarked for He still believed that canceling ANVIL
ANVIL to OVERLORD, retaining per- out of hand was unwise and still
haps enough shipping in the Mediter- hoped that improvements in the
ranean for a one-division threat and Allied situation at some future date
ultimately moving the French Army to might make the operation again feasi-
northern France when more shipping ble and perhaps even necessary.
became available. ANVIL,he contend- The CCS finally reached another
ed, was too far from Normandy to compromise. The JCS agreed to allo-
give direct support to OVERLORD. cate all Mediterranean resources to
The BCS agreed. The Allies were Italy temporarily for the purpose of
attempting to execute three major seizing Rome by May 1944, and the
campaigns, OVERLORD, ANVIL, and BCS instructed Wilson, the theater
Italy, and had given none of them commander, to continue planning for
sufficient resources for success. The ANVIL to be launched as circum-
British arguments boiled down to two stances in Italy permitted. The CCS
simple propositions: if the campaign deferred a final ANVILdecision until
in Italy went poorly, then it would be late March, but this delay left the pro-
necessary to commit the ANVILre- jected assault at the mercy of pres-
sources there; if the campaign in Italy sures from both Italy and OVERLORD.
went well, then ANVIL was unneces- In March Eisenhower, still attempt-
sary. ing to increase the size of the OVER-
By mid-February 1944 ANVIL had LORD assault force, recommended first
lost most of its prominent supporters postponing a decision on ANVIL and
among Allied planners in both Eng- then canceling the operation entirely.
land and the Mediterranean. Even Ei- Concerned over the ability of Wilson
senhower had begun to waver. He to transfer additional amphibious re-
still wanted ANVIL, but thought that sources from the Mediterranean in
the Allies would be unable to disen- time for OVERLORD, he wished to
gage sufficient strength from Italy to assume no unnecessary risks for the
execute a meaningful landing in the sake of ANVIL.At the time, launching
south at the time of OVERLORD. More- both OVERLORD and ANVIL concur-
over, he was still anxious to obtain rently seemed impossible. The earli-
additional resources for OVERLORD.est prospect of gaining Rome was
Within the JCS, General Marshall felt mid-June, which meant the earliest
that the Allies would probably have to possible date for ANVILwas mid-July.
cancel ANVILas an operation more or Thus he proposed immediately reduc-
16 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

ing Mediterranean resources for T o accomplish this, the JCS prom-


ANVIL to a one-division lift, transfer- ised the British that sufficient am-
ring the excess amphibious assets to phibious lift would be made available
OVERLORD, and reducing ANVIL to a from American resources to execute a
strategic threat that might possibly be two-division ANVILin July.9 However,
executed around the time of OVER- the Americans also specified that the
LORD if the circumstances permitted. additional lift could be used only for
With the British agreeing to Eisen- the purpose of executing ANVILon or
hower’s proposals, the JCS, on 24 about 10 July, and accompanied the
March, reluctantly concurred. offer with a proposal that Wilson halt
Late in March, however, the JCS his offensive in Italy south of Rome
appeared to be trying to reverse the so that the ANVILtarget date could be
decision and insisted on scheduling at met.
least a two-division ANVILfor 10 July. Allied strategic discussions over the
The American staff may have been matter now reached an impasse. Reit-
concerned at this point about a re- erating old arguments against ANVIL
newed British interest in the Balkans. and for Italy, the BCS submitted
Recently, for example, Wilson had counterproposals assigning priority to
proposed using the one-division lift Italy and allowing Wilson to use the
left in the Mediterranean for a variety additional amphibious lift as he saw
of operations, including the establish- fit. The JCS remained adamant, dis-
ment of a beachhead at the head of satisfied that the British were unwill-
the Adriatic. As might be expected, ing to accept an offer of additional
the JCS opposed this project as well resources without making any conces-
as another Wilson suggestion that the sions in return. The BCS, in turn, be-
offensive in Italy be pushed to the Po lieved that the JCS were attempting
River. Wilson had already estimated to force Wilson to adopt an American
that he would have difficulties deploy- “strategy” in a theater for which the
ing more than eight divisions north of British had had primary responsibility
Rome until he had seized major ports since January.
in northern Italy; the Americans thus Churchill, taking a hand in the dis-
believed that he would not be able to cussions, proposed that the Allies
employ usefully all of the Allied again defer a final decision about the
forces left in the theater. The JCS relative priority of Italy and ANVIL.
also estimated that the Germans He declared that unless the United
could hold a defensive line north of
Rome for six months or more, while 9In early March 1944 the JCS and the principal
at the same time retaining the ability American commanders in the Pacific had agreed on
to redeploy significant strength from an accelerated program of operations in that theater
a concomitant cancellation of previously sched-
Italy to the OVERLORD area. To the and
uled assaults against strongly held Japanese posi-
JCS, a reasonably early and strong tions, These changes led to a reexamination of Pa-
ANVIL still appeared to provide the cific requirements and enabled the JCS to release
best means of supporting OVERLORDfrom Pacific allocations amphibious resources that
and of effectively employing Allied re- could reach the Mediterranean late in June 1944.
See Robert Ross Smith, The Approach to the Philip-
sources in the Mediterranean. pines, ch. 1 .
THE DEBATE OVER SOUTHERN FRANCE 17

States made good its offer of addi- ranean, and submitted it for JCS con-
tional amphibious lift, there could be currence. Almost as a footnote, the
no choice in the Mediterranean—pri- proposed directive also instructed
ority would go to Italy by default. Wilson to prepare the most effective
Marshall, replying for the JCS, threat possible against southern
pointed out that unless the Allies France at the time of OVERLORD.
began immediate preparations for Unable to obtain any commitment
ANVIL,there would also be no options for ANVIL,the JCS approved Wilson’s
in the Mediterranean. Moreover, the new directive, but as their price they
United States could not make any withdrew the offer of additional am-
more resources available for a cam- phibious lift. Although Wilson was
paign—Italy—in which the Americans thus left with scarcely enough ship-
had no faith. If ANVIL was to assist ping for a one-division assault, the
OVERLORD, Marshall argued, it would JCS agreed that he could use it as he
have to take place before the end of saw fit. T o all intents and purposes,
July. T o meet such a target date, the latitude of Wilson’s directive and
Wilson would have to release ANVIL the withdrawal of the American offer
units from Italy by mid-May. Marshall of amphibious lift meant the end of
estimated that Wilson could continue ANVIL.
the offensive in Italy without the units For Wilson the ANVILdeferral was a
needed for ANVIL despite BCS con- welcome relief. Aside from the ques-
cern over a projected infantry short- tion of amphibious lift, the decision
age there. ostensibly removed the competition
On 8 April Wilson, completing between ANVILand Italy for cargo
plans for a spring offensive in Italy, shipping, combat aircraft, U.S. and
informed the CCS that he could no French Army divisions, and logistical
longer wait for an ANVIL decision. resources. The decision also settled
The renewed offensive in Italy would months of uncertainty regarding the
require his entire strength, including means Wilson would have for the Ital-
those divisions earmarked for ANVIL. ian campaign and enabled him to
The earliest he could execute ANVIL make final preparations for his spring
was probably late July, and late offensive, scheduled to begin about
August appeared more realistic. 10 May, almost a month before OVER-
Without consulting the JCS, the LORD. 11
BCS directed Wilson to carry out his
planned deployments. 10 At the same Anvil Restored
time, they prepared a directive for a
general offensive in Italy, employing For an operation that had so few
all resources available in the Mediter- consistent supporters, ANVIL proved
to have remarkable staying power.
10 Technically, the BCS did not have to consult
with the JCS concerning the deployment directive,
but, in light of the discussions under way, this uni- 11 For further details concerning the planning and
lateral action was unusual, especially since they fol- execution of Wilson’s spring offensive, see Ernest F.
lowed with the request that the JCS concur with the Fisher, Jr., Cassino to the Alps, United States Army in
new British directive to Wilson. World War II (Washington, 1977).
18 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

Wilson’s new directive was but a few units in whatever operation the CCS
days old when both the JCS and BCS, selected. On 9 May the JCS, although
perhaps motivated by a desire to heal still primarily interested in ANVIL,ac-
wounds left from the sometimes acri- cepted the British proposals as the
monious exchanges of early April, basis for further planning. Although
took still another look at the possibili- the CCS had still been unable to
ties in the Mediterranean. reach a decision on the future course
After reexamining his resources late of operations in the Mediterranean, at
in April, Wilson informed the CCS least they had reopened the door to
that when his main forces had linked the possibility of ANVIL sometime in
up with the Anzio beachhead, he July.
could begin releasing sufficient Early in June, after the Allies had
strength from Italy for a major am- seized Rome earlier than expected
phibious operation, but not with the and had come ashore on the Norman-
one-division assault lift left to him. dy beaches, the Anglo-American
Among other alternatives, Wilson debate on Mediterranean strategy re-
proposed an invasion of southern opened. Five alternative courses of
France or, with an ever-ominous action seemed feasible: (1) an ANVIL
sound to the JCS, a landing at the landing in the Marseille-Toulon area
head of the Adriatic. followed by an exploitation north up
The BCS, studying Wilson’s pro- the Rhone valley; (2) an ANVILland-
posals, hinted at the possibility of a ing in the Sete area, west of Marseille,
small-scale landing in southern and an exploitation northwest to Bor-
France by the end of June, and deaux; (3) an assault in the Bay of
Churchill suggested a descent on Biscay area, but only after OVERLORD
France’s Atlantic coastline along the forces had advanced as far south as
shores of the Bay of Biscay. Encour- the Loire River; (4) an advance in
aged, the JCS renewed their offer of Italy north to the Po, followed by a
amphibious lift from Pacific alloca- drive west into France or northeast
tions, but made it clear that they still into Hungary through the Ljubljana
favored a southern France invasion. Gap; and (5) a landing at the head of
In response the BCS suggested a the Adriatic with a subsequent exploi-
number of alternative landing sites, tation northeast through the Ljubl-
including southern France, the Bay of jana Gap. Both American and British
Biscay, the Gulf of Genoa in north- planners agreed that the first three al-
western Italy, or the west coast of ternatives required halting the ad-
Italy between Rome and Genoa. With vance in Italy at the Pisa-Rimini line.
obvious regard for American sensibili- Wilson regarded a drive to the Po
ties, the BCS omitted any mention of and then northeast through the Ljubl-
a landing at the head of the Adriatic, jana Gap as strategically more deci-
although such an operation had re- sive. His operational planners esti-
cently loomed large in BCS planning mated that an advance to the Po
discussions. Preparations, they recom- would force the Germans to deploy
mended, should start immediately for ten more divisions to Italy, thereby
participation by American and French relieving pressure against Eisenhower
THE DEBATE OVER SOUTHERN FRANCE 19

in Normandy. Yet reaching the Po verely upset OVERLORDunloading


would also probably necessitate re- schedules and that, coupled with the
taining most of the divisions marked tenacious German defense and even-
for ANVIL.Churchill and the BCS fur- tual destruction of Cherbourg, made
thermore approved continuing the of- the need for another major port to
fensive in Italy to the Po, but de- support the invading Allied armies
ferred a decision on whether to swing even more obvious.
west from there into France or north- By this time Eisenhower saw the
east toward Hungary. original three-division ANVIL concept
The JCS, while still firmly opposing as the best and most rapid method of
an entry into southeastern Europe, securing a supplementary port. While
had now become vitally interested in hoping for an early ANVIL operation,
securing another major port to sup- he believed that a landing in southern
port Eisenhower's OVERLORD forces. France would still be of considerable
Although strongly favoring a landing help to OVERLORDif undertaken
in southern France, the American before the end of August. If this
chiefs appeared willing to settle for target date proved impossible to
the Sete-Bordeaux or Bay of Biscay meet, Eisenhower continued, then all
alternatives. Whatever amphibious French divisions along with one or
operation the Allies selected, the JCS two veteran American divisions from
insisted that it should comprise a Italy should ultimately be shipped to
three-division assault and should take northern France through the Channel
place on or about 25 July. In addi- ports.
tion, they assured the British that the American planners quickly came to
United States would make available the conclusion that the second half of
most of the amphibious lift required August was the only practicable time
for a three-division landing. to initiate ANVIL.The Channel storm
The need to secure more ports to made it impossible for Eisenhower to
support OVERLORD lent a new note of release various types of landing craft
urgency to the debate over southern from OVERLORD supply and reinforce-
France. The JCS had been concerned ment runs before that time; further-
about the port situation since the in- more, because of meteorological con-
ception of OVERLORD planning, be- ditions, mid-August was about the
lieving that the southern French ports latest possible date for an ANVILas-
would prove vital for funneling more sault. Naval planners in the Mediter-
Allied divisions into France, especially ranean estimated that Allied forces in
the French forces in North Africa. southern France might have to be
While discussing the problem with supported over the beaches for at
Wilson earlier in June, Marshall had least thirty days, that is, until the sei-
pointed out that the Channel ports zure and rehabilitation of the port of
clearly lacked the capacity to support Toulon, if not Marseille as well. But
all the forces that the Allies planned they could not guarantee over-the-
to pour into France. His remarks were beach support after the mistral, the
underlined shortly thereafter by a strong, northerly winds along the
great storm in the Channel that se- coast of southern France that would
20 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

begin about 1 October. Therefore, 1 would suffer a net loss of only three
September was the latest safe date in divisions if Wilson executed ANVIL
1944 for executing ANVIL, and any and argued that Wilson still had
earlier date would ease potential ample strength to drive to the Po.
problems. 12 The JCS were convinced that Church-
Wilson, meanwhile, had concluded ill’s real aim was to commit major
that if the seizure of a major port was Allied strength to the Balkans—al-
the primary consideration, then ANVIL though the British expressly denied
was the best choice. The BCS, while such intentions-and did not even
reserving judgment about the need comment on the British contention
for another port, seemed to lean in that the capacity of the Channel ports
mid-June toward the idea that ANVIL could be easily expanded without re-
might prove desirable and necessary. course to the seizure of ports on the
By the third week of June, the JCS Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts.
had decided that any further delay in Replying to Churchill, Roosevelt
reaching a decision could only result brought up political considerations of
in another cancellation of ANVIL.Ac- his own. He reminded the prime min-
cordingly, on the 24th the JCS recom- ister that the United States would
mended to the BCS that the Allies hold national elections in November
halt in Italy at the Gothic Line (a and noted rather obliquely that even
German defensive network just north a minor setback in the OVERLORD
of the Pisa-Rimini trace) and that campaign would assure the presi-
Wilson launch ANVIL as close to 1 dent’s defeat. Diverting significant
August as possible. American strength into the Balkans or
Churchill, who still had his heart Hungary was dangerous. Roosevelt
set on continuing the Italian cam- also reminded Churchill that the
paign with a thrust northeast from the Allies had promised ANVIL to Stalin;
Po valley, now appealed directly to as for Churchill’s reiterated geo-
Roosevelt. Admitting that his propos- graphical objections to ANVIL,Roose-
als contained political overtones, he velt pointed out that the terrain in the
maintained that political objectives Ljubljana Gap region was even worse
must be taken into consideration. Al- than that along the Rhone valley.
though introducing little that was new On 30 June the BCS backed off.
into the debate, he forcefully repeat- They informed Churchill that, al-
ed all his old arguments against though they considered the Po valley-
ANVIL and for Italy, pleading with Hungary plan sounder, they were pre-
Roosevelt not to wreck one campaign pared for the sake of Anglo-American
for the sake of starting another. unity to approve ANVIL. Churchill,
Advising the president, the JCS fearing another impasse in the Medi-
pointed out that Allied forces in Italy terranean, gave way, but could not
resist the temptation to prophesy that
Stalin would be pleased, for the exe-
12For a discussion of the mistral factor, see H. cution of ANVIL would leave south-
Kent Hewitt, “Planning Operation Anvil-Dragoon,”
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXX, No. 7 (July eastern Europe open to Russian
1954),730-45. domination.
THE DEBATE OVER SOUTHERN FRANCE 21

ANVILwas at last back in the Allied across the Atlantic could be more
operational program. On 2 July the easily introduced to the northern Eu-
CCS directed Wilson to launch a ropean battlefields.
three-division ANVIL on 15 August, The JCS quickly scuttled these last-
reinforcing the amphibious assault minute proposals, noting that the
with airborne units and following up Allies had little information about the
with French Army divisions. The mis- conditions or defenses of the Breton
sions of the ANVILforces were to ports; that the Atlantic beaches were
seize the ports of Toulon and Mar- beyond effective air support range of
seille and exploit northward to Lyon Mediterranean bases; that ANVIL
to support future Allied operations in would have ample air support; that
Western Europe. Wilson was to build the Allies had no plans for Atlantic
up the ANVIL force to a total of at coast operations; and that the Breton
least ten divisions (most of them ports lay so much farther from Medi-
French) as soon as the tactical and lo- terranean staging and supply bases
gistical situations in southern France than southern France that insoluble
permitted. The Allies were to throw shipping problems would be created
into Italy all other resources left in for both assault and follow-up eche-
the Mediterranean, and Wilson was to lons. The JCS could see no merit in
push on up the Italian peninsula as abandoning a carefully planned and
best he could. prepared operation for the sake of se-
curing what they considered only a
Churchill’s Last Stand hypothetically better line of supply
and reinforcement for OVERLORD.
Churchill continued to view the de- Stubbornly Churchill turned to Ei-
cision with foreboding and some senhower, hoping to persuade him to
pique, feeling that the Americans had recommend cancellation of ANVIL in
forced ANVIL down his unwilling favor of the Italian campaign. Judging
throat. Even after temporarily drop- that Churchill was still primarily inter-
ping the issue, he continued to be- ested in pursuing his Hungarian and
lieve that if the Allies were to employ Balkan projects, Eisenhower evaded
major strength west of Italy, they his pleas, stating that he could speak
should seize a port on the Atlantic only from the basis of military consid-
coast of France. Until early August erations and suggesting that if the
the tactical situation in the OVERLORDprime minister wanted to ground his
lodgment area was such that Church- arguments on political premises then
ill could make no good case for an Roosevelt was the person to ap-
Atlantic coast venture. However, after proach. Even Wilson proved of no
the Normandy breakout he resumed real help to Churchill. Although sup-
his struggle against the ANVIL deci- porting the Atlantic coast switch in
sion, arguing that the landing should principle, the Mediterranean com-
be switched to Brittany where the mander-in-chief pointed out that the
American ANVILdivisions could play a change would require at least a two-
more direct role in OVERLORD and week delay in launching any assault
where American reinforcements from by the forces already loading for
22 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

ANVIL. Churchill unhappily gave up to send troops over the beach and
his fight, but it was not until 11 support them. The Germans in south-
August, only four days before the ern France clearly outnumbered the
scheduled date for ANVIL, that the initial attackers by a figure of three or
BCS issued Wilson a final directive to four to one; had strongly resisted
execute the operation. every other Allied attempt to land on
To the end, Churchill remained un- the Continent; and could easily send
reconciled to the endeavor, termed it reinforcements from Italy or other
a “major strategic and political fronts if they wished. In contrast,
error,” and predicted it would prove many of the French units scheduled
a “costly stalemate” and ultimately a to follow were untested and short of
“cul-de-sac,” or dead-end. 13 Perhaps trained personnel and equipment; no
the British prime minister had good further Allied reinforcements from
cause for concern. The American Italy or Great Britain could be expect-
forces leading the assault had been ed; and air support would have to be
fighting in Italy for over a year and staged out of Corsica, nearly one
had left the battle area only recently; hundred miles away. The Americans,
preparations and training for the am- Churchill feared, were taking on
phibious landing, one of the most much more than they could hope to
complex types of military operations, handle. On 15 August, as the ANVIL
had been hurried and incomplete; landings began, he arrived in a British
and there was barely enough shipping destroyer for a ringside seat at what
many believed was one of the gravest
13Ehrman, “Grand Strategy,” vol. V, 575–76 Allied strategic mistakes of the war.
CHAPTER II

Command and Organization


Many American leaders in the Med- and launching ANVILrested with Gen-
iterranean theater did not share eral Wilson as Supreme Allied Com-
Churchill’s doubts over the value of mander, Mediterranean Theater,
ANVILand its chances for success, and whose combined headquarters was
more than a few were convinced of its known as Allied Force Headquarters
absolute necessity. If any effort had (AFHQ).1 T h e land areas under Wil-
shown itself to be a dead end, it was son’s jurisdiction included northwest
clearly the Italian campaign where the Africa, Italy, the Balkans, Turkey,
difficult terrain had favored the de- most of the islands in the Mediterra-
fense and allowed a comparatively nean (except Cyprus and Malta), and
small number of German divisions to
throttle the Allied advance northward 1 Material on high-level organization for ANVILis
for over a year. The temporary stale- based mainly on the following: Hist of AFHQ Part
Three, Dec 43–Jul 44, Sec. 1, Record Group 331,
mate at Normandy in June and July Washington National Records Center (WNRC); U.S.
1944 only made the need for ANVIL Eighth Fleet and Western Naval Task Force, “Rpt
more pressing. Yet, considering the on Invasion of Southern France” (hereafter cited as
WNTF Rpt Southern France), pp. 1–8, and ibid.,
demands of the other Allied thea- Annex A, WNTF O p Plan 4–44, 24 Jul 44, corrected
ters—including those in the Pacific— to 14 Aug 44, both in the Operational Archives,
for ships and aircraft, for tanks and Naval Historical Center; and Albert F. Simpson,
“Invasion of Southern France,” ch. 12 of Wesley F.
artillery, and above all for trained Craven and James L. Cate, gen. eds., Europe: Argu-
manpower, the men who would put ment to V–E Day, January 1944 to May 1945 (Chicago:
together and lead the ANVIL assault University of Chicago Press, 1951), vol. III of the
series T h e Army Air Forces in World War II (here-
and the ensuing thrust north toward after cited as AAF III). Note: The official records of
the German heartland would have to AFHQ and SHAEF cited in the text are in the custo-
be both daring and innovative. With dy of the National Archives and Records Adminis-
tration (NARA) and are located in Record Group
the limited resources available for (RG) 331, and those of U.S. Army units and com-
ANVIL,there would be little room for mands in RG 338 and 407, all under the control of
error or second thoughts during this NARA and stored at either the National Archives in
Washington, D.C., or at the Washington National
most ambitious enterprise. Records Center in Suitland, Maryland. U.S. Navy
records cited can be found in the Operational Ar-
chives, Naval Historical Center, Department of the
The High-Leuel Command Structure U.S. Navy, at the Washington, D.C., Navy Yard. To
avoid needless duplication, references to KG 331,
338, and 407 and to the Navy Operational Archives
Ultimate responsibility for planning have been omitted in most citations.
24 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

southern France. 2 Wilson’s deputy Italy, supported British forces in Italy,


commander was Lt. Gen. Jacob L. while Headquarters, North Africa
Devers, an American officer who was District, handled British logistical
also the Commanding General, North functions in rear areas. Both logistical
African Theater of Operations, U.S. systems furnished support for other
Army (NATOUSA), the U.S. Army’s national forces-French, Polish,
senior administrative command in the Greek, Yugoslavian, and Italian-with
Mediterranean. 3 Devers’ NATOUSA French requirements being met
organization functioned simultaneous- mainly through the Services of
ly as a U.S. Army headquarters and as Supply, NATOUSA.
the American component of AFHQ. General Alexander also exercised
In his capacity as commanding gener- operational control over all Allied
al of NATOUSA, Devers supervised ground forces in Italy, but allocated
the Services of Supply (SOS NA- them to either Lt. Gen. Mark W.
TOUSA), commanded by Maj. Gen. Clark’s U.S. Fifth Army or Lt. Gen.
Thomas B. Larkin, which was respon- Sir Oliver W. H. Lease’s British
sible for the logistical support of U.S. Eighth Army for actual employment.
Army forces in the Mediterranean. Allied forces outside Italy fell under a
General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexan- variety of smaller national commands.
der’s 4 Headquarters, Allied Armies The U.S. Seventh Army headquarters,
which was temporarily in reserve, was
2General Sir Bernard C. T . Paget, who succeeded tentatively scheduled to command all
Wilson in command of a reduced British Middle ground forces participating in the
East Theater, was under Wilson’s control for certain
operational matters. Paget’s area included Egypt, ANVILassault.
Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. The Allied naval commander in the
3The boundaries of NATOUSA and the Allied Mediterranean was Admiral Sir John
Mediterranean Theater were not contiguous, for
NATOUSA also included all French Africa, Spain,
H. D. Cunningham, who bore the
Portugal, Austria, and Switzerland, On 1 November somewhat confusing title of Com-
1944, NATOUSA became MTOUSA, Mediterranean mander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. 5 For
Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, and no longer the execution of the naval and am-
had any responsibilities in southern France.
MTOUSA boundaries were considerably diminished phibious phases of ANVIL, Admiral
(on the north) from those of NATOUSA, and U.S. Cunningham created the Western
Army forces in southern France passed to the ad- Naval Task Force and placed this
ministrative control of Headquarters, European
Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA). command under Vice Adm. Henry K.
4Alexander had commanded the British 18th Hewitt (USN), who was also the com-
Army Group in North Africa from 18 February to mander of the U.S. Eighth Fleet.
15 May 1943. On Sicily and in Italy his headquar- Hewitt integrated British, French,
ters was known as 15th Army Group from 10 July
1943 to 15 May 1944; as Allied Forces in Italy from Greek, and Polish vessels into the var-
11 to 18 January 1944; as Allied Central Mediterra- ious subdivisions of the Western
nean Force from 18 January to 9 March 1944; and Naval Task Force, along with the
as Allied Armies in Italy (AAI) from 9 March to 12
December 1944. On 12 December 1944 Alexander
stepped up to Wilson’s position, and General Mark 5Wilson was actually the Allied commander in
W. Clark (USA), previously the commander of the chief in the Mediterranean, but bore the title Su-
U.S. Fifth Army in Italy, took over command of preme Allied Commander. Cunningham was no re-
Allied ground forces in Italy as Commanding Gen- lation to Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew B. Cun-
eral, 15th Army Group. ningham of the BCS.
COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION 25

U.S. Twelfth Air Force; the Mediter-


ranean Allied Coastal Air Force,
under Air Vice Marshal Sir Hugh P.
Lloyd; and the Mediterranean Allied
Strategic Air Force, under Maj. Gen.
Nathan F. Twining, also Commanding
General, U.S. Fifteenth Air Force.
Each command combined both Brit-
ish and American units; Cannon’s
MATAF, for example, consisted of
the Twelfth Air Force (less elements
assigned to Coastal Air Force) and
the British Desert Air Force. Eaker’s
control over the Strategic Air Force
was limited by the fact that Twining’s
primary operational direction came
from the U.S. Strategic Air Force,
based in England and commanded by
Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz.
While Eaker’s MAAF headquarters
had general control and coordination
of air support for ANVIL,he delegated
responsibility for direct air support of
LT. GEN.
JACOBL. DEVERS ANVIL to Cannon’s MATAF. Cannon,
in turn, appointed as tactical air task
ships and landing craft of his own force commander Brig. Gen. Gordon
Eighth Fleet. P. Saville, the commander of the XII
Wilson’s air commander was Lt. Tactical Air Command, Twelfth Air
Gen. Ira C. Eaker. Eaker served both Force. British and French air units re-
as Commander in Chief, Mediterrane- inforced the XII Tactical Air Com-
an Allied Air Forces (MAAF), and as mand during ANVIL, while the British
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Desert Air Force temporarily assumed
Forces, NATOUSA, and as such was most of the burden of air support for
administratively responsible to Gener- ground operations in Italy.
al Devers at NATOUSA headquarters. Although AFHQ was responsible
Eaker’s principal assistant for oper- for planning, mounting, and execut-
ations was Air Marshal Sir John C. ing ANVIL,Allied planners knew that
Slessor, who was also the administra- the ANVIL forces would ultimately
tive commander of all British air for- pass to Eisenhower’s control, thereby
mations in the theater. unifying the command of all forces in
Eaker’s MAAF consisted of three northwestern Europe. No specific
major commands: the Mediterranean date was set for the passage of com-
Allied Tactical Air Force (MATAF), mand, but Wilson intended to make
under Maj. Gen. John K. Cannon, the change when ANVIL troops had
who was also Commanding General, established physical contact with
26 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

tablishing an army group headquar-


ters. 6
Under the leadership of General
Charles d e Gaulle, President of the
French Committee of National Libera-
tion and Chief of French Armed
Forces, the French military leaders
pressed for a high command position
during ANVIL. 7 De Gaulle wanted to
regain for France the prestige lost
during the 1940 debacle and also de-
sired to enhance the importance of
the Committee of National Libera-
tion. This last aim complicated com-
mand discussions, for de Gaulle, seek-
ing recognition for the committee as
France’s lawful government, sought
to have agreements concerning the
command and employment of French
forces consummated between the
committee and the British and U.S.
governments. But President Roosevelt
refused to extend such recognition
LT. GEN. IRA C. EAKER,Maj. Gen. and persuaded the British to follow
John K. Cannon, General Devers, and his lead, making agreements with the
Maj. Gen. Thomas B. Larkin. French only on the military level, that
is, between de Gaulle and AFHQ.
OVERLORD forces or when Eisenhower With little leverage at the time, de
might otherwise be able to exercise Gaulle was forced to accept American
effective control over the units conditions, but the basic political con-
coming north from southern France. troversy involving the legitimacy of d e
Gaulle’s French government-in-exile
The 6th Army Group and the First French remained alive throughout the war.
Army When AFHQ brought the French
into the ANVILplanning process, the
Allied planners envisaged that French learned that virtually the
about the time the ANVIL forces entire Army of Free France would be
passed to SHAEF control, an army employed in southern France—seven
group headquarters would be created or eight divisions plus separate regi-
in southern France to coordinate the
activities of two army headquarters, 6 The story of the French role in the formation of
one American and one French, which the 6th Army Group is based largely o n Hamilton,
“Southern France,” ch. 6.
would be operational at the time of 7 De Gaulle’s official rank was General de Brigade
the transfer. At least indirectly, the (Brigadier General), which he retained throughout
French played a significant role in es- the war.
COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION 27

ments and battalions, support and reasonable, but at first feared that the
service units, and so forth.8 Because French would demand control of the
of the size of their commitment, the army group headquarters. However,
French thus proposed that a senior further talks revealed that de Gaulle
French general serve as the ground and his generals were willing to settle
commander under a higher American for an independent army command,
or British headquarters that also had even under an American army group
appropriate air and naval compo- commander. Although favorable to
nents. To further justify the request, such a command arrangement, Wil-
they pointed out that the initial Amer- son felt that a second army headquar-
ican contribution to ANVIL would be ters should not be inserted so early.
limited to less than four division Instead he supported an interim
equivalents and cited the excellent phase between the end of the assault
combat record of their forces and the establishment of an army
in Italy—the French Expeditionary group headquarters, during which an
Corps—which had operated as part of American army headquarters would
the U.S. Fifth Army. Finally, they control three corps-two French and
pointed out that many of their troops one American.
had intimate knowledge of the terrain De Gaulle was not satisfied with
of southern France and that French what he considered Wilson’s equivo-
guerrilla forces in the ANVIL area cal position, and about 20 April he
might rally more enthusiastically to unilaterally appointed General Jean
French leadership than to American. de Lattre de Tassigny as the com-
American military leaders, as might mander of all French ground forces
be expected, rejected the French pro- participating in ANVIL. This step
posals, and compromise came gradu- brought another army headquarters
ally. When Wilson pointed out that into the picture, for de Gaulle had
the French, with almost no experience previously made de Lattre the com-
in amphibious warfare, could play mander of Army B, a headquarters
little part in the initial assault, de that the French had organized espe-
Gaulle agreed that the landings cially for ANVIL.De Gaulle also ap-
should be under American command. pointed de Lattre as his personal rep-
However, after the amphibious assault resentative to AFHQ, for all matters
phase had ended, the French leader pertaining to French participation in
recommended that an army group ANVIL.
headquarters be established to con- Faced with this fait accompli, Wilson
trol the operations of two separate worked out a compromise. De Lattre,
armies, one French and the other he informed de Gaulle, would tempo-
American, both advancing northward rarily assume command of the first
side by side. Wilson felt that this was French corps ashore in southern
France, but would have to take orders
from the commander of the U.S. Sev-
8 In the end, the French 2d Armored Division was enth Army. When the second French
shipped to northern France and for a time became
part of Lt. Gen. George S. Patton’s U.S. Third corps reached France, de Lattre
Army. would then assume command of
28 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

Army B, later to be redesignated the problems expected in southern


First French Army, but would remain France indicated that the combined
under the direction of the American command of the Seventh Army and
army commander. The U.S. Seventh Army B, the First French Army,
Army would, in effect, assume a dual would eventually place intolerable
role as an army and an army group burdens on the American army com-
headquarters. mander and his staff. Another
The aim of this arrangement was to thought, shared by Wilson and
keep top control of civil affairs, troop Devers, was that Clark’s Fifth Army
and supply priorities, and major tacti- might ultimately drive up the west
cal decisions in American hands, and coast of Italy and swing west to join
to ease coordination with Eisenhow- the Seventh Army in France. It was il-
er’s SHAEF forces. The solution lim- logical to think that Patch’s army
ited French authority and placed a headquarters could coordinate the
French full general under an Ameri- operations of three separate armies.
can lieutenant general. Nevertheless, Finally, the establishment of an army
late in May de Gaulle declared him- group headquarters in southern
self satisfied with the command ar- France would parallel the command
rangements as long as de Lattre could system developed in northern France,
retain all other prerogatives of an where Eisenhower had two army
army-level commander. groups under his command. Thus,
During the following month British when ANVIL and OVERLORDforces
and American planners elaborated joined, Eisenhower would receive an-
further on the projected command ar- other army group with generally simi-
rangements. By this time they had lar command arrangements.
also concluded that an army group Early in July, Wilson took a prelimi-
headquarters separate from the Sev- nary step toward the formation of an
enth Army would ultimately be army group headquarters when he de-
needed in southern France.9 A reex- cided to set up the Advanced Detach-
amination of command and control ment AFHQ on Corsica during the
ANVILassault phase. Under the com-
9 Subsequent information on the organization of mand of Wilson’s chief deputy,
HQ 6th Army Group is from Radio Message (Rad), Devers, this detachment was to pro-
Devers to Marshall, B–13268, 2 Jul 44, CM-IN
2311; Rad, Marshall to Devers, WAR-59986, 3 Jul vide liaison between AFHQ and the
44, CM-OUT 59986; Rad, Devers to Marshall, B- Seventh Army headquarters; aid
13568, 13 Jul 44, CM-IN 10443; Rad, Marshall to coordination between the Fifth and
Eisenhower, WAR-64371, 13 Jul 44, CM-OUT Seventh Armies; and recommend pri-
64371; Rad, Eisenhower to Marshall, S–55590, 15
Jul 44, CM-IN 12455; Rad, Marshall to Devers, orities for air and naval support be-
WARX-66124, 16 Jul 44, CM-OUT 66124; and Ltr, tween Allied forces in Italy and those
Eisenhower to Marshall, no sub, 12 Jul 44. All in in southern France.
OPD file 381, RG 165, WNRC. Rad, Devers to Maj.
Gen. Lowell W. Rooks, D/Cofs AFHQ, B–13160, 28 Devers informed General Marshall
Jun 44, as quoted in Hamilton, “Southern France,” of the plans for the Advanced Detach-
ch. 9, p. 32; Hist Sec, 6th Army Group, “A History ment A F H Q suggested that the de-
of the Sixth Army Group,” ch. 1; and G–3 6th Army
Gp, Final Rpt G–3 Section H Q 6th Army Group tachment could readily be expanded
World War II (copy in CMH), ch. 1. into an army group headquarters, and
COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION 29

requested that he, Devers, be consid- had concentrated on the task of orga-
ered for the post of army group com- nizing, equipping, and training the
mander. Subsequently he added that vast armored force that Marshall
Wilson also favored the formation of wanted to put in the field. In May
an army group headquarters and 1943 Marshall had named Devers
would support his appointment to commander of the European Theater
command it. of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA),
Realizing that the proposed head- and Devers had been one of Mar-
quarters would ultimately come under shall’s leading candidates to head an
the authority of SHAEF, Marshall OVERLORDarmy group command at
sought Eisenhower’s views on the some future date. Eisenhower, howev-
matter. As the American chief of staff, er, following his appointment as Su-
Marshall thought highly of Devers, preme Commander, Allied Expedi-
but knew that Eisenhower might have tionary Corps, in December 1944,
certain misgivings over the selec- had successfully pushed Lt. Gen.
tion. 10Eisenhower and Devers had, in Omar Bradley for the post and had
fact, been rivals. Both had graduated subsequently persuaded Marshall to
from the U.S. Military Academy at move both Devers and Eaker, then
West Point, and, although Devers had the U.S. Eighth Air Force command-
entered active service several years er, to the Mediterranean Theater. Si-
earlier than Eisenhower, the latter multaneously he requested many
was now his superior in rank by one other officers who had served under
grade. Although neither had seen him in North Africa and Italy, such as
combat service in World War I, both Patton, for combat commands in
had risen to high positions by the OVERLORD. Marshall felt that Eisen-
time the United States entered the hower was trying to pack SHAEF with
current conflict: Devers as chief of the his own supporters, but also found it
Armored Force, Fort Knox, Kentucky, natural that Eisenhower would prefer
and Eisenhower as the Assistant Chief commanders he was already familiar
of Staff for operations on Marshall’s with and trusted thoroughly.
staff. Subsequently Eisenhower, as For the moment, Marshall’s con-
Commanding General, European cerns over the nomination of Devers
Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, appeared unjustified. O n 12 July Ei-
had commanded American and Allied senhower approved the idea of an
forces during the invasion of North army group headquarters for south-
Africa and the ensuing campaigns in ern France as well as Marshall’s ap-
Tunisia, Sicily, and Italy, while Devers pointment of Devers to head the new
command. Although admitting at the
time that he had entertained serious
10 For a discussion of the command proposals and doubts about Devers’ ability in the
appointments, see Forrest C. Pogue, George C. ,Mar-
shall: Organizer of the Victory 1943–1945 (New York: past, Eisenhower explained that they
Viking, 1973), pp. 370–78, and especially Cbl, Ei- had been “based completely upon im-
senhower to Marshall, 25 Dec 43, in The Papers of pressions and, to some extent, upon
Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years, III, ed.
Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins,
vague references in this theater . . .
1970), 161 1–15 (hereafter cited as Eisenhower Papers). [which] never had any basis in posi-
30 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

tive information,” and that, based on during the assault phase. Initially,
Devers’ record in the Mediterranean, ground command of the ANVILforces
he would accept the decision “cheer- remained the responsibility of the
fully and willingly.” 11But Eisenhower Seventh Army, while the 6th Army
must also have known that Devers Group headquarters went about the
was eager to have a combat command task of preparing itself for the day it
and that his appointment would fur- would become operational in France.
ther ensure that ANVIL took place as
scheduled, thus promising relief for Force 163 and the Seventh Army
the beleaguered forces under Eisen-
hower’s command in Normandy. This From the beginning of ANVILplan-
matter settled, on 16 July Marshall ning, responsibility for producing a
made the appointment official and di- theater-level program to coordinate
rected Devers to proceed with the the planning of subordinate head-
formation of the army group head- quarters rested with the AFHQ Joint
quarters. Planning Staff, which included repre-
In the end, Devers wore four hats sentatives of A F H Q Cunningham’s
at the time of the ANVILassault. He naval headquarters, and MAAF. 12But
was Deputy Supreme Allied Com- the Joint Planning Staff became so
mander, Mediterranean Theater; preoccupied with Italy that, after pro-
Commanding General, NATOUSA; ducing draft ANVILplans in late 1943,
Commander, Advanced Detachment it left the burden of ANVILplanning
A F H Q which was activated on Corsi- to the Seventh Army staff, temporari-
ca on 29 July; and Commanding Gen- ly based on Sicily. In December 1943,
eral, 6th Army Group, the headquar- at Eisenhower’s request, the War De-
ters of which Devers activated on 1 partment officially made the Seventh
August. But at first the 6th Army Army headquarters available to
Group headquarters consisted of only AFHQ for planning, preparing, and
the personnel of the Advanced De- executing ANVIL.
tachment A F H Q and, for reasons of By December 1943 the Seventh
security, retained the detachment Army, commanded by Lt. Gen.
title. George S. Patton, consisted of a skel-
The new arrangements made little eton headquarters and a few service
practical difference in the chain of units. Patton was scheduled to leave
command for ANVIL. Devers’ Ad- for England in January 1944, and
vanced Detachment headquarters on AFHQ had tentatively decided that
Corsica functioned primarily as a liai- General Clark, then commanding the
son and coordinating agency, and had
no command or operational duties
12This subsection is based primarily on the fol-
lowing: Hamilton, “Southern France,” chs. 1–4, 6 ,
11For quotes see Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 12 and 9; Historical Section, Headquarters, Seventh
Jul 44, and Cbl, S55590, Eisenhower to Marshall, 15 Army, Report on Operations: The Seventh United States
Jul 44, both in Eisenhower Papers, III, 2000 and 2009– Army in France and Germany, 1944–1945, 3 vols. (Hei-
10. The second communication was actually delberg: Aloys Graf, 1946) (hereafter cited as Seventh
prompted by information supplied by General Army Rpt), I, 1-49; and Official Diary, Headquarters,
Spaatz on the projected Devers appointment. Force 163, 10Jan-15 Aug 44, RG 338, WNRC.
COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION 31

U.S. Fifth Army in Italy, would be the merly the Engineer, Seventh Army,
Seventh Army’s commander for was commander of the U.S. Army
ANVIL. During ANVIL preparations, component; and Brig. Gen. Benjamin
Clark would remain in Italy and leave F. Caffey, Jr., Clark’s planning deputy
a deputy in charge of ANVILplanning. for ANVIL,presided over the whole
After the capture of Rome, or during assemblage. In March a small French
some suitable lull in the Italian cam- contingent under Col. Jean L. Petit
paign, he would leave Fifth Army and joined Force 163. Petit had virtually
devote his full attention to ANVIL. no powers of decision, but acted
The presence of Seventh Army more as a liaison officer between
headquarters on Sicily probably Force 163 and various French head-
served as a useful deception, but in quarters. It was not until early June,
view of the fact that the other major when representatives of the First
headquarters concerned with ANVIL French Army, the French Air Force,
were located in North Africa, Sicily and the French Navy joined Force
was not the place to undertake ANVIL 163, that planning for French partici-
planning. AFHQ therefore directed pation became thoroughly integrated.
Seventh Army to move a small plan- Col. Andre Demetz, the G–3 of the
ning staff to Algiers, where details First French Army, became the chief
could be worked out with air, naval, French planner, and his group ab-
and AFHQ planners. But a large part sorbed Colonel Petit’s staff.
of the Seventh Army staff remained Through January and February
on Sicily to continue deception oper- 1944, a confusion in command rela-
ations, and AFHQ took precautions tionships bedeviled the planning staff.
to prevent identification of the Al- General Caffey found himself in a
giers planning group with the staff on somewhat anomalous position—he
Sicily. Air and naval planners as- was Clark’s representative but was not
signed to help with the activities at a member of the Seventh Army staff.
Algiers were also separated from their I11 health further crippled his influ-
parent headquarters. Force 163, as ence. Moreover, Patton retained com-
the Algiers planning group became mand of the Seventh Army until his
known, opened on 12 January 1944; departure for England in January.
and Rear Force 163, a small group of Brig. Gen. Hobart R. Gay, Patton’s
logistical planners, set up on 27 Janu- chief of staff, replaced Patton but left
ary at Oran, the location of Head- for England himself in February, as
quarters, Services of Supply, NA- did a number of key staff officers
TOUSA, and also of the U.S. Eighth Patton had selected to take with him.
Fleet’s principal supply activity. Command of both Force 163 and the
Force 163 soon grew into a joint residual Seventh Army staff was then
and combined planning headquarters. assumed by General Davidson, and a
Capt. Robert A. J. English (USN), few days later General Caffey was
from Admiral Hewitt’s staff, was the transferred to AFHQ–NATOUSA,
chief naval planner; Group Capt. R. leaving Davidson as the senior officer
B. Lees (RAAF) represented MATAF; at Force 163.
Brig. Gen. Garrison H. Davidson, for- AFHQ had expected that Clark
32 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

Patton; served in Brig. Gen. John J.


Pershing’s expedition into Mexico;
and then commanded an infantry bat-
talion in the 1st Infantry Division
during World War I. During the in-
terwar years his career, like that of his
contemporaries, alternated between
military schools, teaching posts, and
other routine peacetime assignments.
But early in 1942 General Marshall
selected Patch to command a hastily
assembled Army task force headed for
the South Pacific. Quickly transform-
ing that force into the Americal Divi-
sion, Patch took it to the island of
Guadalcanal in December 1942 and,
as commander of the U.S. Army XIV
Corps, led a force of one Marine
Corps and two Army divisions that fi-
nally rooted out the island’s stubborn
Japanese defenders by the following
February. At Marshall’s request Patch
then returned to the United States to
LT. GEN.ALEXANDER
M. PATCH train American troops in desert war-
fare as head of the newly organized
would be able to take over Seventh IV Corps. By the time Patch brought
Army and Force 163 sometime in his new IV Corps staff to the Mediter-
mid-March 1944, but the difficulties ranean in early 1944, the desert cam-
in Italy following the landings at paign had long since ended. Marshall,
Anzio made this impossible. On 15 however, had a new post in mind for
February, accordingly, Wilson re- Patch and, with the approval of
lieved Clark of further responsibility Devers, appointed him commander of
for ANVIL.A new ground force com- the Seventh Army (and automatically
mander was needed, and Maj. Gen. of Force 163) on 2 March.13
Alexander M. Patch, slated to be pro- Patch immediately began rebuilding
moted in August, had just reached the depleted army staff with officers
the Mediterranean theater. and men from the IV Corps head-
By the time of General Patch’s ar- quarters, and gradually enlarged the
rival, he had already compiled an im- planning groups at Algiers and Oran
pressive military career that stretched
back to the American frontier wars. 13For background, see Truman R. Strobridge and
Born at Fort Huachuca, Arizona Ter- Bernard C. Nalty, “From the ‘South Pacific to the
ritory, in 1889, the son of an officer Brenner Pass: General Alexander M. Patch,” Military
Review, LXI (June 1981), 41–47, and John Miller,jr.,
in the 4th Cavalry, he graduated from Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, United States Army in
West Point in 1913, a classmate of World War II (Washington, 1949).
COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION 33

From left to right: GENERAL PATCH,AIR MARSHALSIRJOHN C. SLESSOR,General


Devers, General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, with map, and Maj. Gen. Lowell W. Rooks.

with more personnel from the Sev- vided in two, one part remaining in
enth Army staff.14In May he terminat- Italy and the other moving to Corsica,
ed the Seventh Army establishment where the bulk of the XII Tactical Air
on Sicily and in early July moved the Command had been concentrated
Oran and Algiers planners to Naples, during July. Meanwhile, from March
where Force 163 dropped its nom de to July 1944, the concerned staffs
guerre and the Seventh Army head- completed most of the ANVILplan-
quarters made its final ANVILprepara- ning under Patch’s leadership. By the
tions as a united staff. At approxi- end, Patch had earned the respect of
mately the same time, the Western his fellow commanders as a steady if
Naval Task Force headquarters also quiet leader and a professional sol-
moved to Naples, as did some of the dier’s general, who was more at home
air planners. The MATAF air staff di- with his own staff and troops than
with outsiders and less concerned
with the prerogatives of command
14The IV Corps remained in existence and fought than with getting the job done.
in Italy with Maj. Gen. Willis D. Crittenberger as its Between March and July 1944
commander. After Patch took over the Seventh
Army and Force 163, General Davidson became the Devers and Patch had thus become
Engineer, Task Force 163-Seventh Army. the primary movers within the theater
34 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

behind the continued Franco-Ameri- see that the supply buildup for ANVIL
can planning for the ANVILassault did not dissipate between April and
and the ensuing drive north, even June, when ANVILwas in all respects
after the CCS had canceled the entire officially dead. As a . result, its resur-
project. While Patch and his army rection in July for implementation in
staff devoted themselves to the more August—barely one month later—was
detailed planning, Devers, in his ca- a practicable if hurried affair. Without
pacity as deputy theater commander the strong support of Devers and
and commanding general of NA- Patch, it is doubtful that ANVILcould
TOUSA, labored behind the scene to ever have taken place.
CHAPTER III

Planning for Invasion


Despite the constantly changing to base detailed tactical and oper-
fortunes of ANVILin the higher Allied ational plans. Despite these difficul-
councils, planning for the operation ties the staffs associated with the
continued at lower echelons almost ANVILeffort had done their home-
without interruption throughout work well enough by this time to
1944. The long strategic debate, of mesh their preliminary plans quickly
course, created major problems. For with the actual requirements and
example, in January 1944 when ANVIL assets available.
planning staffs first assembled, they
had no idea of the size and composi- The Main Assault Force
tion of the assault force; and the thea-
ter headquarters had allocated no Probably the most serious problem
troops for the endeavor, established that Force 163-Seventh Army faced
no command organization, assigned during the planning for ANVILwas as-
no shipping or amphibious lift, and certaining the size and composition of
designated no staging or training the assault force. Of the two, size
areas. No decision had even been proved the more challenging, and the
made concerning the specific assault inability of the Allied leaders to agree
area, and, without a definite oper- on this matter seriously inhibited de-
ational directive, no foundation exist- tailed tactical and logistical planning
ed on which to make logistical requi- and organization. For composition,
sitions. Moreover, as the fortunes of planners employed the “division
ANVIL waxed and waned, planners slice” concept—an infantry or ar-
found it necessary to draw up a varie- mored division with its normal sup-
ty of invasion scenarios, including a porting combat and service force at-
one-division “threat”; a one-, two-, or tachments. But until the number of
three-division amphibious assault; and divisions participating in both the as-
a semiadministrative landing—each sault and the operations that immedi-
under different estimates of German ately followed was determined, it was
resistance in southern France. In the impossible for tactical planners to es-
end, planners had to act on differing timate the number and type of sup-
assumptions and, until July 1944, had porting forces needed.
little concrete information on which The earliest planning assumptions,
36 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

dating from the CCS conferences of experience in Italy before ANVIL.


late 1943, called for a two-division as- Toward late February 1944 Wilson
sault with an ultimate buildup to ten announced that ANVIL could be
divisions. 1 T h e plan Eisenhower pre- launched in mid-June if the CCS ap-
pared in December 1943 called for a proved and confirmed the selection of
three-division assault and was also assault units. AFHQ began prepara-
used by Force 163 planners. In Feb- tions to relieve the U.S. VI Corps
ruary 1944 Wilson instructed Force headquarters and the U.S. 3d and
163 to assume that the main assault 45th Infantry Divisions from the lines
would consist of two divisions, with a in Italy between 1 and 15 April, and
third coming ashore in a quick follow- to replace them with fresh units from
up. This concept governed tactical the United States. However, in mid-
planning until July, when the CCS re- April, the combined pressures from
instated the three-division assault. OVERLORD and Italy forced another
In December 1943 General Clark, cancellation of ANVIL, and tactical
who was then still in the planning pic- planning slowed until its reinstate-
ture, had proposed to AFHQ that the ment in June.
assault force include Headquarters, By 15 June, Wilson was sure that
U.S. VI Corps, the 3d and 45th Infan- some major amphibious operation
try Divisions, and the 1st Armored would take place in the Mediterrane-
Division, all in Italy at the time. Clark an and accordingly directed the VI
had selected units experienced in am- Corps headquarters and the 45th Di-
phibious warfare, and he expected vision to pull out of the lines in Italy
that they would be replaced in Italy at once, followed by the 3d Division
by divisions scheduled to come from on the 17th. With indications growing
the United States in the spring of clearer that there would be a three-di-
1944. Headquarters, VI Corps, and vision assault, Wilson further ordered
the two infantry divisions remained that the 36th Infantry Division, which
constants in all subsequent planning also had amphibious experience, be
for ANVIL,but Wilson decided that he relieved in Italy by 27 June and re-
would have to keep the 1st Armored place the 85th Division as the third
Division in Italy, leaving the Seventh major element of the assault force.
Army to depend on French armored The three American infantry divi-
divisions during the early phases of sions were organized along standard
ANVIL. Force 163, which had been wartime lines. Each division had three
planning for a two-division assault infantry regiments, and each regiment
with an early one-division follow-up, had three infantry battalions of about
substituted the 85th Infantry Division 800 to 900 men apiece. Also organic
for the 1st Armored Division and as- to each division were three medium
signed the 85th the follow-up role. (105-mm.) and one heavy (155-mm.)
Training at the time in North Africa, howitzer battalion (of twelve tubes
the 85th Division would have combat each) and supporting. cavalry (one
company-sized troop), engineer,
1 This subsection is based primarily on Hamilton, signal, quartermaster, medical, and
“Southern France,” chs. 1–4, 6, and 9–11. other service elements. In addition,
PLANNING FOR INVASION 37

the infantry regiments had mortars, groups, these units had acquired a
one battery of lightweight howitzers, degree of battlefield expertise that
and an antitank battery. These forces made them potentially much more ef-
were also accompanied by the sup- fective than the American OVERLORD
porting combat, combat support, and forces, many of which were entering
service units that had for the most combat for the first time. Neverthe-
part long served with the divisions. less, all of the U.S. ANVILunits were
Normally attached to each division tired, fairly worn out by the continu-
were one tank battalion (of one light ous uphill fighting in Italy, and due
and three medium tank companies for a rest. But little time was available
with fifteen tanks each), one tank de- for such pursuits. The 45th Division
stroyer battalion (75-mm. or 3-inch reached its staging area in Naples on
guns, self-propelled or towed pieces, 17 June and was soon followed by the
with three twelve-gun companies), VI Corps headquarters and the other
one antiaircraft artillery battalion, and participants. Preparations for their
one or two corps artillery battalions. new mission began almost immediate-
The corps headquarters controlled ly.
additional supporting elements as For ANVIL,the VI Corps would be
well as its own independent mecha- commanded by Maj. Gen. Lucian
nized cavalry squadron. Aside from Truscott; the 3d Division, by Maj.
the infantry battalions, all units of the Gen. John E. “Iron Mike” O’Daniel;
corps and divisions were motorized in the 45th, by Maj. Gen. William W.
some fashion. Eagles; and the 36th, by Maj. Gen.
Almost all of these forces had John E. Dahlquist. Of Truscott and
served together for many months his three division commanders, only
during the Italian campaign, and thus Eagles was a graduate of West Point,
constituted an experienced team. The and only O’Daniel had served in
3d Division had entered combat in France during World War I. But more
North Africa in late 1942 and, along important, all were about the same
with both the VI Corps and the 45th age, forty-eight to fifty years old, and
Division, had fought in Sicily, Sa- all were long-term career officers. In
lerno, and Anzio in 1943, and partici- fact, three of the four had worked
pated in the drive on Rome during closely together for nearly a year and
the following year. The 36th, only a half: Truscott had commanded the
slightly younger, had begun its jour- 3d Division from March 1943 to Janu-
ney at Salerno in mid-1943 and ar- ary 1944, when he became the deputy
rived in Rome with the others after VI Corps commander at Anzio, taking
many grueling battles. In combat, the over the corps one month later;
infantry divisions had formed closely O’Daniel had served as Truscott’s
knit regimental combat teams, each deputy division commander and had
with an infantry regiment, a medium taken over the 3d after Truscott’s de-
artillery battalion, and attached parture; and Eagles had been Trus-
armor, engineer, and signal units. cott’s assistant division commander
Tailored by the division commanders before assuming command of the
to serve as semi-independent battle 45th Division in November 1943.
38 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE
Only Dahlquist was not a member of can parachute battalion, and two bat-
Truscott’s original team. Taking com- teries of American parachute field
mand of the 36th Division after its artillery. Language problems and in-
withdrawal from the Italian campaign, sufficient training ruled out the
he had no combat experience and had French unit, leaving Force 163 with
the difficult task of turning around only an unbalanced Anglo-American
the 36th’s reputation as a “hard luck” parachute regimental combat team.
division, one that had suffered heavy In May and June airborne rein-
casualties at San Pietro in December forcements reached Italy from the
1943 as well as during the Rapido United States-a parachute regimen-
River crossing one month later. 2 tal combat team, another parachute
battalion, and a glider infantry battal-
Supporting Assault Forces ion. AFHQ and Seventh Army also
put together a full battalion of para-
From the earliest discussions of chute field artillery; converted a 75-
ANVIL, Allied planners had wanted mm. pack howitzer battalion to a
airborne support for the amphibious glider unit; trained two 4.2-inch
assault but had no idea what airborne mortar companies for glider oper-
forces would be available.3 By May ations; and transformed the antitank
1944, A F H Q and Force 163 had de- company of the Japanese-American
cided that nothing less than a full air- 442d Infantry regiment into a glider
borne division was needed, but Allied unit. Devers’ NATOUSA staff also ar-
airborne strength in the Mediterrane- ranged training for various small en-
an was limited to a British parachute gineer, signal, and medical detach-
brigade group, an understrength ments participating in the airborne
French parachute regiment, an Ameri- operation. In the end, the total of
parachute and glider units approxi-
2Intervs, Col Robert F. Ensslin with Gen Theo- mated a full airborne division, and on
dore J. Conroy, 29 Sep 77, pp. 6–7 (hereafter cited 12 July the Seventh Army named the
as Conroy Interv), Senior Officer Debriefing Pro-
gram, Theodore J. Conroy Papers, MHI; Col Irving new organization the Seventh Army
Monclava and Lt Col Marlin Lang with Gen Paul Airborne Division (Provisional),
Dewitt Adams, 5–9 May 75, p. 54 (hereafter cited as changing its formal title a week later
Adams Interv), Senior Officer Debriefing Program,
Paul D. Adams Papers, MHI. Adams, a former regi-
to the 1st Airborne Task Force. Maj.
mental and assistant division commander in the Gen. Robert T. Frederick, formerly
36th Division, confirmed the problem and also the commander of the renowned 1st
noted that the 141st regiment had gone through a Special Service Force (an American-
series of commanders in Italy and appeared to be
the black sheep of the division. Canadian commando unit), became
3 Additional material o n the airborne force is from commander of the new airborne force
the following: G–3 AFHQ, Rpt on A/B Opns in and began assembling it near Rome
DRAGOON, pp. 1-9; 2d Ind, H Q 1st ABTF, 22 Oct in July. 4
44, to Ltr, CG NATOUSA to CG 1st ABTF, 8 Oct
44, sub: Rpt on A/B Opns in DRAGOON, attached to
G–3 AFHQ, Rpt in A/B Opns, in DRAGOON; and 1st 4 Major elements of the 1st Airborne Task Force
ABTF FO 1, 5 Aug 44. While the text employs only were the British 2d Independent Parachute Brigade;
the code name ANVIL,the second code name, DRA- the 517th Parachute Infantry (Regiment); the 1st
GOON, is used in the footnotes, depending on the Battalion, 551st Parachute Infantry; the 509th Para-
source cited. chute Infantry Battalion; and the 550th Airborne In-
PLANNING FOR INVASION 39

Troop Carrier Command, which had


gained ample experience during
OVERLORD.
The list of other assault units in-
cluded ranger and commando forces
assigned special missions. T h e largest
was the 1st Special Service Force, ap-
proximately 2,060 men under Col.
Edwin A. Walker (USA). This force,
which had been in combat under the
VI Corps in Italy, reached the Salerno
area for final training on 3 July.
There were also two French comman-
do units: the African Commando
Group of some 850 men under Lt.
Col. Georges Regis Bouvet, and the
67-man Naval Assault Group, com-
manded by Captaine de Fregate
(Commander) Seriot.
Force 163–Seventh Army also en-
countered problems with the major
follow-up forces for ANVIL—the
combat echelons of the First French
MAJ. GEN.ROBERTT. FREDERICK Army. 5 The demands of the Italian
campaign before the capture of Rome
The next problem was finding the in June made it virtually impossible for
airlift to employ Frederick's force. In AFHQ to set a date for the release of
early June 1944, AFHQ had under its the French Expeditionary Corps from
control only two troop carrier groups Italy. The debate over the question of
and 160 gliders. Eisenhower made command likewise helped postpone
available two troop carrier wings and assignment of French forces until late
approximately 375 glider pilots from May. In addition, a long-standing dis-
the IX Troop Carrier Command in agreement over the size and composi-
England; in addition, some 350 glid- tion of the rebuilding French Army,
ers arrived in the Mediterranean from
the United Statesin July. The whole 5Additional information on French units is from
assemblagewas organizedinto the Marcel Vigneras. Rearming the French. United States
Provisional Troop Carrier Air Divi- Army in World War II (Washington, 1958). chs. 7–
sion under Maj. Gen. Paul L. Wil- 10, and Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, The History of the
liams, the of the IX French First Army, trans. Malcolm Barnes (London:
commander
1–3 (hereafter cited as
Allen and Unwin, 1952). chs.
de Lattre, History). T h e original French language
fantry Battalion (Glider). All were supported by the version, published as Histoire de la Premiere Armee
460th and 463d Parachute Field Artillery Battalions; Francaise (Paris: Plon, 1949), has also been consult-
the 602d Field Artillery Battalion (75-mm. pack); ed, but cited only in reference to d e Lattre's key
the British 64th Light Artillery Battalion; as well as operational orders that are omitted in the English
other elements. translation.
40 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE
largely equipped by the United States, manpower went into service units, but
proved a delaying factor. Because of the French high command was never
their limited manpower resources, the able to organize enough to provide the
French wanted to form ground combat First French Army with all the support
units exclusively, while the Americans it required.
wanted them to establish a balanced Of the major French units assigned
force with the appropriate number of to ANVIL,the French 1st Infantry Divi-
supporting service units. Still feeling sion 7 and the 2d Moroccan, 3d Algeri-
the impact of the disastrous 1940 cam- an, and 4th Moroccan Mountain Divi-
paign, the French generals felt that sions were in Italy with the French Ex-
honor demanded that they put their peditionary Corps, as were the 1st, 3d,
manpower into fighting units; in addi- and 4th Moroccan Tabor (Infantry)
tion, they believed that their army did Regiments. The headquarters of the
not require what they considered the First French Army (Army B) and the
luxurious service support enjoyed by French II Corps, scheduled to be
American forces. More to the point, merged for the initial phases of ANVIL,
the French military manpower consist- were in North Africa, along with the
ed primarily of colonial levees drawn newly formed French 1st and 5th Ar-
from north and central Africa—person- mored Divisions. T h e French I
nel who lacked technical skills and were Corps headquarters, the 9th Colonial
often functionally illiterate. Thus until Infantry Division, the 2d Moroccan
the French military were able to tap the Tabor Regiment, and the African Com-
manpower resources of the metropole, mando Group were on Corsica. Al-
they found it extremely difficult to though French unit designations dif-
form the technical service organiza- fered somewhat from American no-
tions necessary to sustain their combat menclature, French military organiza-
forces. tions and their equipment—except in
Despite these difficulties, the Allies certain colonial formations like the
insisted that the French establish at Tabors—were nearly identical to that
least a minimal combat support base. of their American counterparts in
Since the entire French rearmament 1944. Specifically, like the American
process depended on Allied and espe- armored divisions employed in north-
cially American largess, the French had ern France, the French division blindee
little choice. In mid-February 1944, had three combat commands (instead
they accordingly agreed to limit their of regiments or brigades), each with
major combat units to eight divisions, one tank, one armored infantry (half-
includingthree armored, to which tracks), and one armored artillery (105-
were added separate combat organiza-
tions such as light infantry regiments,
eight-division program o n 23 January; Vigneras, Re-
commandos, tank destroyer battalions, arming the French, p. 158, notes that final French
reconnaissance formations, and field agreement did not come until 16 February and, on
artillery battalions. 6 Their remaining p. 155, that the CCS did not approve the program
until 2 March.
7 Also known as the Ire Division Francaise Libre
6 D e Lattre, History, p. 28, states that the French (1st Free French Division) and the Ire Division de
Committee of National Liberation agreed to the Marche (1st Provisional Division).
PLANNING FOR INVASION 41

mm. self-propelled) battalion; one took place, and the Allies also antici-
mechanized cavalry squadron; and pated that the FFI could supply rein-
mechanized or motorized supporting forcements and replacements for the
elements. The infantry divisions were First French Army.
also organized on a triangular basis Until the CCS issued the directive
and used American tables of organiza- for ANVIL in July, the operations of
tion and equipment as well. Thus, de- the FFI in southern France were de-
spite differences in language, culture, signed primarily to support OVER-
and history, the two principal national LORD. Thus, responsibility for the
components of ANVILhad an unusual control and support of the southern
degree of homogeneity. FFI was vested in SHAEF, operating
The French forces outside Italy through the Special Force Headquar-
passed to Seventh Army control on 7 ters (SFHQ), an Anglo-American
July, but Patch and de Lattre did not agency in London. The Special
gain control of the units in Italy until Projects Operations Center of G–3
23 July, when the Fifth Army released AFHQ only assisted SHAEF’s supervi-
them. Patch passed all of these units sion of FFI groups in southern
over to de Lattre’s command with the France.
exception of Brig. Gen. Aime M. Although the Free French govern-
Sudre’s Combat Command 1 (Combat ment had a voice in FFI operations,
Command Sudre or CC Sudre) of the that voice was only as loud as the
French 1st Armored Division. To give Americans and British, who con-
the assault force a mobile striking capa- trolled guerrilla supplies, allowed it to
bility, Patch had detached CC Sudre be. With their approval, de Gaulle
from the First French Army for the as- had appointed Lt. Gen. Pierre Koenig
sault and placed it under the oper- as commander of the FFI and had
ational control of the U.S. VI Corps. made Koenig directly responsible to
Eisenhower. As a practical matter,
French Guerrillas Koenig remained subordinate to
S F H Q even after SHAEF, at French
The Allies expected considerable insistence, approved the formation of
help from French partisans in southern a tripartite FFI general headquarters.
France, and the plans of AFHQ and Commanded by Koenig and estab-
Seventh Army took into consideration lished in London, this organization
the potential of the guerrillas for dis- included representatives of various
rupting German communications and British, American, and French agen-
harassing German rear areas. 8 The cies.
guerrillas—or, as they were better The Allies were unable to make
known, the French Forces of the Interi- similar command and control ar-
or (FFI)—had proved their value as in- rangements for the FFI in southern
telligence sources long before ANVIL France until the last moment. O n 8
July, with ANVIL scarcely a month
from the launching, SHAEF and
8 This subsection is based primarily on Vigneras,
Rearming the French, pp. 299-306, and Hamilton, Koenig transferred control of the FFI
“Southern France,” ch. 8. in southern France to AFHQ and Maj.
42 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

Gen. Gabriel Cochet, de Gaulle’s rep- quarters and to provide leadership for
resentative for guerrilla affairs at FFI organizations. Finally, for oper-
AFHQ. Nominally responsible only to ations in southern France, the Allies
Wilson, Cochet actually had to oper- trained a limited number of “counter-
ate through the Special Projects Op- scorching” groups, which contained
erations Center at G–3 AFHQ. men from the French Navy and the
The British had carefully nurtured OSS. The primary mission of these
the FFI ever since the fall of France, units was to thwart German efforts to
but by mid-1944 American support destroy the port facilities along the
directed by the Office of Strategic coast of southern France. The groups
Services (OSS) began to equal or out- also had secondary intelligence mis-
strip the British effort. Aircraft of sions.
both nations, supplemented by By 15 August 1944, the FFI in
French planes, delivered supplies and southern France could put about
arms of all types to the FFI, and took 75,000 men in the field, but only
an ever-increasing number of “regu- about one-third of them were armed.
lar” troops to France to coordinate These activists, locally known as the
FFI and Allied operations, to assist maquis, had the support of probably
the FFI in organizational and supply thousands of part-time agents in the
matters, and to increase the FFI’s cities, towns, and villages. Although
combat potential. Such support came the guerrillas were not strong enough
from OSS Operational Groups, each to engage the German Army in posi-
consisting of four officers and thirty tional warfare, they severely limited
enlisted men, and from the British its freedom of movement by constant-
Special Air Service Brigade, which in- ly harassing German support organi-
cluded two battalions of French para- zations and interfering with the dis-
troopers. 9 The principal mission of placements of tactical units behind
the commando units inserted into the battlefield. In addition, the sabo-
France was usually sabotage at a par- tage activities of the maquis contin-
ticular point, after which the comman- ually forced the Germans to employ
dos would become part of the FFI. large numbers of troops to protect
Other Allied units sent into France and repair rail, highway, telephone,
included the Jedburgh teams, each and telegraph communications. Per-
consisting of two officers (one of haps if ANVIL had been approved
them French) and an enlisted commu- sooner and responsibility for FFI op-
nications expert. 10 Their main mis- erations transferred to A F H Q at an
sions were to establish liaison among earlier date, more could have been
FFI units and various Allied head- done with the resistance forces, which
were much stronger and better orga-
9 The 2d and 3d Parachute Chasseur Regiments.
nized than in the north.
The French Army often employed the term regiment
for units that the U.S. Army would designate as bat- Organization for the Assault
talions.
10For a short but colorful account, see Aaron
Bank, From OSS to Green Beret: The Birth of the Special
The organization and responsibil-
Forces (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1986), pp. 14–62. ities of the air, ground, and naval
PLANNING FOR INVASION 43

FFI PARTISANGROUP,AUGUST 1944

components for ANVILfollowed estab- notational, or fictional, organization


lished practice in the Mediterranean with no separate headquarters. Over-
and northwest Europe. 11 The ANVIL all control of the ANVILassault was, in
assault organization centered around fact, vested in Wilson at AFHQ.
a joint combined command designat- During the assault phase, Patch and
ed Western Task Force, which includ- Hewitt theoretically would have equal
ed the Seventh Army, the XII Tactical joint command responsibilities; but
Air Command, and the Western Naval from the time Western Naval Task
Task Force. However, although this Force embarked Seventh Army until
so-called Western Task Force was os- the time Patch established his head-
tensibly under the joint command of quarters ashore, Hewitt was in actual
the leaders of the ground, air, and command of both the ground and
naval components, it was actually a naval echelons, responsible only to
Wilson.
11This subsection is based primarily on WNTF Air support responsibility during
Rpt Southern France; WNTF Opn Plan No. 4–44, ANVILpresented a rather complicated
24 Jul 44; Seventh Army Outline Plan ANVIL,13 Jul
44; and Annex 9, Beach Maintenance Plan, to Sev- picture. Eaker's MAAF had only gen-
enth Army FO 1, 29 Jul 44. For description of com- eral control and coordination respon-
mand arrangements during amphibious operations
in the Pacific, see volumes in the Pacific subseries of sibilities. Mediterranean Allied Strate-
the United States Army in World War II. gic Air Force operated the heavy
44 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

bombers and their escorts assigned to Theoretically, the Army beach group
the support of ANVIL, while Mediter- commander was responsible for all
ranean Allied Coastal Air Force pro- beach and unloading activities, but
tected the staging areas and covered the Navy beachmasters were responsi-
the assault convoys to a point forty ble only to Admiral Hewitt for naval
miles out from the assault beaches. matters. Since these matters included
T h e remainder of the air support re- routing and control of landing craft
sponsibility rested with Cannon’s (including Army DUKWs 12),beaching
MATAF, which undertook detailed air directions, and ship-to-shore commu-
planning, coordinated bomber oper- nications concerned with unloading
ations, supervised troop carrier air- operations, the Navy beachmasters
craft operations, and provided air had responsibilities that overlapped
cover for the convoys within forty those of the beach group command-
miles of the beaches in southern ers.
France. Under MATAF, Saville’s XII In the end, the beach control
Tactical Air Command was responsi- system for ANVIL produced few diffi-
ble for close air support and for air culties and little friction. The Navy
cover in the assault area. Saville had beach battalions trained for ANVIL
operational control over land-based with the Army engineer combat regi-
and carrier-based aircraft in the as- ments with which they were sched-
sault area that were directly engaged uled to operate during the assault.
in the close support of the invasion. Both Army and Navy echelons of the
T h e only exceptions were the aviation beach groups were well versed in the
units of Western Naval Task Force’s responsibilities and capabilities of the
nine escort-carriers (CVEs), which other well before the invasion.
Hewitt combined into Task Force 88 T o achieve surprise, Admiral Hewitt
under Rear Adm. T. H. Troubridge planned to dispense with a lengthy
(RN). Troubridge, in turn, formed preinvasion naval bombardment;
those CVE-based aircraft not needed moreover, since no interference was
for local air defense into a pool avail- expected from German surface forces,
able to Saville for whatever missions he believed that a separate naval cover
were within their capabilities. (or support) force was unnecessary.
Beach operations and ship unload- For the actual assault, Hewitt divided
ings were the responsibility of beach his fire support vessels among the
groups, one assigned to each of the attack forces responsible for landing
three assault divisions. One Army the assault divisions and the comman-
combat engineer regiment (about do units. For postassault operations,
1,900 troops) and one Navy beach he intended to form his bombardment
battalion (around 445 personnel) and fire support vessels into a single
formed the nucleus of each beach force that would continue to support
group. T h e engineer regimental com- operations ashore as necessary. This
mander became the beach group enabled him to allocate all his major
commander, while the Navy beach
battalion commander served as the 12“Ducks” are light, wheeled amphibious craft
beachmaster at each division beach. built on 2.5-ton truck chassis.
PLANNING FOR INVASION 45

combat vessels to various bombard- assault, then its commander ought to


ment, fire support, and convoy have commensurate authority.
duties. 13 Patch did not agree. Because Trus-
Two aspects of the command ar- cott’s corps headquarters had been
rangements for ANVILdeserve special released from Italy so late, the Sev-
notice.14 First, there were no naval or enth Army, the XII Tactical Air Com-
air echelons in the chain of command mand, and the Western Naval Task
that corresponded to the VI Corps Force had already undertaken much
headquarters. Second, VI Corps did of the detailed planning that would
not control all of the ground forces normally be accomplished by the
participating in the assault; for exam- corps staff. Creating corps-level air
ple, the French commandos, the 1st and naval planning staffs at this late
Airborne Task Force, and the 1st date would only result in confusion.
Special Service Force were to operate Patch also believed that the VI Corps
initially under direct control of the staff could not effectively control the
Seventh Army. operations of the airborne and com-
In late June, General Truscott, the mando forces during the assault as
VI Corps commander, reviewed Sev- well as those of the three assault divi-
enth Army’s ANVILplans and recom- sions. Instead, he directed that the
mended several changes. First, he airborne and commando units should
asked Patch to arrange for naval and pass to VI Corps control only when
air echelons on the same level as VI they physically joined Truscott’s
Corps for both the planning and as- forces on the mainland or as other-
sault phases of the operation. In addi- wise commanded by the Seventh
tion, Truscott objected to dividing Army. Truscott accepted these judg-
the command of ground elements ments; the final arrangements thus
during the assault. He suggested that embodied the Seventh Army com-
since the main assault was a corps mander’s concepts, except that once
task, all units should be under his the assault force was embarked, Trus-
command as the ground assault force cott would report to Admiral Hewitt
commander, operating on the same until Patch opened his Seventh Army
level as a corresponding naval com- post ashore.
mander. If the VI Corps was to be re- The arrangement left one gap in
sponsible for the success of the entire the Army-Navy chain of command,
namely, the lack of any corps-level
13 For a more detailed treatment of the naval echelon in Hewitt’s organization, as
effort, see Samuel Eliot Morison, The Invasion of noted earlier by Truscott. Hewitt had
France and Germany, 1944–1945, vol. XI, History of
United States Naval Operations in World War II arranged for his landing force com-
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1959), pp. 233–92. manders to deal directly with the
14 Additional sources for the remainder of this Army divisions, dividing his amphibi-
subsection are the following: Seventh Army Rpt, I, 46–
51; VI Corps After Action Rpt (AAR) Jul-Aug 44, ous assault units into four task forces,
Annex I, Notes on Opnl Planning for Opn ANVIL; one for each assault division with the
Hamilton, “Southern France,” ch. 9; and Lucian K. fourth to land the commandos. There
Truscott, Jr., Command Missions, A Personal Story (New
York: E. P. Dutton, 1954), pp. 388–91 (hereafter
was no provision for consultations at
cited as Truscott, Command Missions). these levels with the army corps com-
46 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

mander. During the actual landings, ceived their initial supplies and equip-
the commander of each Army division ment from the Franco-American Joint
would be responsible to his corre- Rearmament Committee, an agency
sponding attack force (task force) under the control of Headquarters,
commander. When Truscott estab- NATOUSA, which procured supplies
lished his command post ashore, the and equipment from the United
division commanders would theoreti- States for the rebuilding French
cally pass to his control; but in reality Army. As a practical matter, Services
the individual naval task force com- of Supply had to make up many
manders, acting for Admiral Hewitt, French shortages from American
could maintain discretionary control stocks in the Mediterranean.
over landing operations at the divi- Logistical support of American
sion beaches without reference to land-based air units assigned to back
Truscott. Most of the participants up ANVILwas the responsibility of the
were experienced and knew that the Army Air Forces Service Command,
transition between naval and ground NATOUSA, a subordinate echelon of
command during the assault phase of Eaker’s U.S. Army Air Forces, NA-
an amphibious landing was always a TOUSA. Most land-based aircraft di-
delicate matter, one that depended rectly supporting ANVILwere located
more on the close relationships be- on Corsican airfields and supplied by
tween the principal ground and naval XII Air Service Command stocks pro-
commanders than on detailed but vided by the Army Air Forces Service
sometimes inflexible command ar- Command. Royal Air Force units at-
rangements. tached to the XII Tactical Air Com-
mand received most of their supplies
Organizationfor Logistics through British channels, but drew
some items from the XII Air Service
Logistical support responsibility for Command. French Air Force organi-
American ground forces engaged in zations supporting ANVILdrew initial
ANVIL rested with General Larkin’s supplies and equipment from stocks
Services of Supply (SOS), NATOUSA, made available by the tripartite Joint
which had worked closely with Rear Air Commission, which was responsi-
Force 163 during the planning ble for reequipping the French Air
phase.15 French ground forces re- Force, but the XII Air Service Com-
mand also provided some support for
15This section and its subsections are based gen- French air units on Corsica.
erally on the following: Coakley and Leighton, Service Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet,
Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943–1945, chs. 13-15;
Continental Advance Section, Communications was the channel through which sup-
Zone, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, plies flowed to U.S. Navy forces in
CONAD History (Heidelberg: Aloys Graf, 1945), pp. the Mediterranean, although Hewitt’s
1-47; HQ, NATOUSA/MTOUSA, Logistical History of
NATOUSA-MTOUSA 11 August 1943 to 30 November Eighth Fleet maintained its own logis-
1945 (Naples: G . Montanino, 1945), chs. 7-8; La
Base d’Operations 901, La Base d’Operations 901 dans
la Bataille pour la Liberation de la France, 1944–1945 416–18; Seventh Army Rpt, I , 65-70; Hamilton,
(Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1947), pp. 13-19; Vig- “Southern France,” chs. 3–5 and 12; and Meyer,
neras, Rearming the French, ch. 10; AAF III, 330–35, “MTO History,” chs. 24-25.
PLANNING FOR INVASION 47

tical base for storage and issue. Since burden of supplying, equipping, and
the bulk of the French Navy had ob- loading the ground forces for ANVIL. 16
tained its original supplies and equip- Once the Seventh Army was ashore in
ment through the Joint Rearmament southern France, supplies would con-
Commission, the U.S. Navy provided tinue to flow through established
support for most French naval units channels until a new organization,
participating in ANVIL. The Royal Coastal Base Section, could take over
Navy supplied its own vessels, some logistical support of the army, esti-
French ships, and almost all of the mated to occur on D plus 30. SOS
shipping that belonged to the minor NATOUSA organized Coastal Base
Allied navies (Greek and Polish, for Section at Naples on 7 July and
example). All naval echelons could placed it under the command of Maj.
also draw on SOS NATOUSA stocks Gen. Arthur R. Wilson, previously the
in an emergency. commander of Peninsular Base Sec-
Arrangements for supplying and tion. The staff of Coastal Base Sec-
distributing fuels and lubricants in the tion operated closely with Peninsular
Mediterranean provided an effective Base Section and with the Seventh
system of combined and joint respon- Army G–4 (assistant chief of staff for
sibilities and activities. All POL (pe- logistics) during final planning and
troleum, oil, and lubricants) products loading; Wilson made arrangements
available in the theater came into a for a large part of his staff to work in
general pool under the control of Pe- appropriate staff sections of the Sev-
troleum Section, A F H Q which allo- enth Army headquarters in southern
cated stocks on a percentage basis to France until Coastal Base Section
various national forces and civilian became operational ashore.
agencies. While each service of each Support of French forces in south-
nation administered and operated its ern France was ostensibly the respon-
own POL depots, the pool system sibility of Operations Base 901 which,
provided that any ship, plane, or commanded by Brig. Gen. Jean
truck of any service of any nation Gross, French Army, was theoretically
could obtain POL supplies at any air, a parallel organization to Coastal
ground, or naval depot of any other Base Section. But the French lacked
nation or service; the amount requisi- the technicians, equipment, and
tioned was subtracted from the draw- trained service troops to staff and op-
er’s allocation. erate Base 901 effectively; therefore,
In obtaining, storing, and issuing by default, Coastal Base Section
supplies for U.S. Army (and to a large became the agency actually responsi-
extent French Army) forces assigned ble for supplying Army B (the First
to ANVIL,SOS operated through sub- French Army). Base 901 essentially
ordinate base sections at various
ports in the Mediterranean. Of these, 16 Muchof Northern Base Section’s work on Cor-
the Peninsular Base Section at sica was involved in air force support in conjunction
Naples, the Mediterranean Base Sec- with the XII Air Service Command, but the base
section also helped supply and load some French
tion at Oran, and the Northern Base Army units and stored emergency supplies for
Section on Corsica bore the major ANVILground forces.
48 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

became a French component of time, SOS began earmarking ANVIL


Coastal Base Section and served as li- supplies in various theater depots,
aison between the First French Army hoping to keep such items inviolate
and the American base. T o make this from the demands of the Italian cam-
arrangement more effective, General paign.
Gross served simultaneously as the Loading began in New York in Feb-
commander of Base 901 and as ruary, employing a process called
Deputy Commanding General, Coast- “flatting,” in which cargo was careful-
al Base Section for French affairs; in ly packed into a ship’s hold up to a
addition, each of Coastal Base Sec- certain level and then boarded over
tion’s principal staff sections had to provide space in which to stow
French deputy chiefs. cargo not meant for ANVIL. The flat-
ted cargo space of these ships was
Supply and Shipping Problems filled with ANVIL materiel, while
above this level (and on the weather
Logistical support was critical for decks) the vessels carried general sup-
ANVIL and the ensuing operations of plies for the Mediterranean. SOS
the Seventh Army. When, in January planned to unload the general sup-
1944, Force 163 and SOS NATOUSA plies in the theater and to reload the
began to study ANVIL’S logistical empty space with supplies, equip-
problems, the indefinite nature, date, ment, and vehicles needed for ANVIL.
place, and size of the operation made In April, after sixty-four cargo ships
it impossible for planners to take carrying flatted ANVIL supplies had
more than preliminary steps toward left the United States for the Mediter-
obtaining supplies and equipment for ranean, the CCS canceled ANVIL.U.S.
the operation. Working from Eisen- agencies thereafter refused to honor
hower’s draft ANVIL plan of Decem- further requisitions from SOS for
ber, SOS developed a rough basic ANVIL and likewise refused to fulfill
plan for supporting a force of the incomplete portions of requisi-
450,000 troops for thirty days in tions already submitted. Army Service
southern France. Using this plan as a Forces halted further shipments of
tentative guideline, SOS began for- supplies to the Mediterranean over
warding supply requisitions to the and above those required for theater
New York port of embarkation (POE) maintenance and the Italian cam-
as early as 18 January, and later sent paign.
a liaison officer to the POE armed This turn of events still left large
with detailed requisitions and loading quantities of supplies and equipment
plans. With the cooperation of the earmarked for ANVILin the Mediter-
U.S. Army Service Forces, SOS also ranean. T h e sixty-four cargo ships
made arrangements to have convoys that had reached the theater with flat-
sailing to the Mediterranean during ted ANVIL supplies continued to sail
the period February through April— the Mediterranean with about half
at this time ANVIL was still projected their cargo capacity still taken up by
for May—partially loaded with sup- ANVILmateriel. Moreover, since Janu-
plies allocated to ANVIL. At the same ary, SOS had been building up local
PLANNING FOR INVASION 49

depot stocks of materiel also allocated looked promising in mid-June, and


to ANVIL. Generals Devers and prospects brightened further when,
Larkin, hoping that ANVIL would be on the 13th, Devers directed SOS to
revived, now acted to freeze all mate- switch the priority of supply oper-
riel, both afloat and ashore, that SOS ations from the Fifth Army in Italy to
had assembled for the operation. Al- preparations for ANVIL. T h e action
though General Devers was generally was not entirely effective until 2 July,
successful in resisting War Depart- when the CCS issued their ANVILdi-
ment pressure to have these ANVIL rective, which also permitted convoys
supplies reallocated to Italy, he also loaded with ANVIL supplies to start
found that emergency requisitions sailing from the United States. T h e
from the Fifth Army began to eat into first ANVILsupply convoy since April
ANVILsupplies at an alarming rate. left New York on 1 July—one day
Nevertheless, when prospects for before the CCS directive—and the
ANVILbrightened in June, SOS esti- first of the new convoys reached the
mated that it had on hand in the Mediterranean o n the 15th. By this
Mediterranean, either afloat or date SOS was able to report that vir-
ashore, about 75 percent of the sup- tually all the materiel needed for the
plies required for a two-division assault and for the support of Ameri-
ANVILassault, and could also see its can and French forces in southern
way clear to sustain ANVIL forces France through D plus 90 was on
ashore for some thirty days after the hand, on the way, or promised. There
first landings. The most serious short- is no doubt that this goal was attained
ages were in certain types of engi- on such short notice largely because
neer, transportation corps, and signal of Devers’ generally successful efforts
equipment. to freeze ANVIL supplies after the
In response to a War Department CCS had canceled the operation in
request, SOS submitted in June new April.
requisitions to the Army Service At least indirectly, Devers’ freeze
Forces for supplies and equipment also helped solve ANVIL’S shipping
needed to make up the most critical problems which, as the result of the
shortages for a three-division ANVIL on-again, off-again nature of the op-
assault. SOS also forwarded requisi- eration, threatened to be extremely
tions for maintenance materiel that troublesome. In general, ANVILplans
would be shipped directly to southern estimated that, in addition to naval
France after the assault. Since the assault shipping, 100 merchant-type
CCS had not yet reached a firm deci- cargo vessels were needed to carry
sion on ANVIL, the War Department ANVIL assault supplies and enough
could make no final arrangements for additional merchant shipping to pro-
loading and shipping the supplies that vide at least 200 individual sailings
SOS requisitioned, but did direct through D plus 90. These require-
Army Service Forces to start moving ments were over and above the ship-
the materiel to embarkation ports on ping needed for general Mediterrane-
the east coast. an maintenance and for the support
The ANVIL supply picture thus of the Italian campaign.
50 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

The first American contribution less the follow-up supplies and the
toward meeting the ANVIL require- French troops that were to reach
ments was the sixty-four merchant southern France during the first few
ships with flatted cargo that had days after the assault.
reached the theater between February To make up for the shortage of am-
and April. The United States also phibious assault vessels, various expe-
supplied sixty more large merchant dients were necessary. AFHQ and
ships that arrived in fast convoys Seventh Army had to plan for a much
during June and July, and seventy-five earlier employment of merchant-type
generally smaller vessels from slower shipping, a risk taken largely because
convoys. From June through August, intelligence estimates indicated that
the Americans also allocated addition- German air and naval forces could
al merchant ships to the theater for offer little effective resistance to the
general maintenance, while AFHQ ANVILassault. In the end, the sixty-
scraped up the rest of the required four merchant ships that had been
merchant shipping from commands carrying flatted ANVILcargo around
within the theater or borrowed it the theater since April were included
from British resources. in the D-day convoy. Likewise, the
The shortage of amphibious assault forces of First French Army that were
ships in the Mediterranean for ANVIL to start ashore on D plus 1 were
was more serious. In June Admiral largely loaded on merchant ships.17
Hewitt lacked 65 landing ships, tank
(LSTs); 160 landing ships, infantry Logistics
(LSIs), or attack troop transports
(APAs); 24 large landing craft, infan- T h e general supply plan for ANVIL
try (LCI[L]s); and 3 auxiliary troop called for VI Corps assault units to
transports (XAPs). T h e U.S. Navy dis- reach southern France with a seven-
patched 28 new LSTs to the Mediter- day supply of rations, unit equipment,
ranean, and Eisenhower supplied 24 clothing, and POL products.18 Of this
more from his resources. This left a total, a three-day supply was to be on
deficit of 13 out of the 96 LSTs the backs of the troops or aboard the
planned for the assault. In the end, vehicles of the assault units, and the
judicious juggling of shipping and remainder was to be unloaded and
units made it possible to launch the stockpiled on the beaches. If all went
assault with only 81 LSTs. Eisenhow- well, some 84,000 troops and 12,000
er also sent south the LSIs, APAs, vehicles would go ashore over the VI
and LCI(L)s that ANVIL required, Corps’ beaches on D-day. An addi-
while the U.S. Navy sent the XAPs tional 33,500 troops and another
from American ports. But the newly
arriving assault shipping, added to 17 Additional information on merchant shipping
the one-division amphibious lift that and early convoys comes from WNTF Rpt, p. 30,
AFHQ already had in the Mediterra- and Annex 4, Convoy Plan, to Seventh Army FO 1,
nean, was scarcely enough to carry 29 Jul 44.
18Additional information on the supply plan is
the three assault divisions and the from Annex 6, Admin Plan, to Seventh Army Out-
supporting commando units, much line Plan ANVIL,13 Jul 44.
PLANNING FOR INVASION 51

8,000 vehicles, including the leading the troops it carried, plus three and
elements of the French Army, would one-third units of fire for all elements
unload over the same beaches by D already ashore. The D plus 10 convoy
plus 4. These follow-up units, arriving would also carry five units of fire for
from D plus 1 through D plus 4, its troops, plus one and two-thirds
would carry the same amount of sup- units of fire for troops ashore, and so
plies as the initial assault units. From on to ensure a steady buildup.
D plus 5 to D plus 30 troop convoys SOS NATOUSA and Seventh Army
would reach southern France at five- intended that by D plus 30, when the
day intervals, each loaded with a Coastal Base Section was to assume
seven-day supply of rations, unit supply responsibility in southern
equipment, clothing, and POL prod- France, Seventh Army units would
ucts for the units carried. have ten days of supply for operations
Planners expected that ranger and in hand plus twenty days of supply in
commando units would start drawing reserve. T h e planners estimated that
supplies from the beach depots on D through D plus 30 some 277,700 tons
plus 1 . T h e 1st Airborne Task Force of cargo would have been unloaded
would drop with the minimum sup- over the beaches; roughly 188,350 of
plies necessary to accomplish its ini- these tons would have been forward-
tial missions, but would require aerial ed to units, and the remainder would
resupply for at least two days. As an be in depots.
added margin of safety, AFHQ put T w o closely related estimates con-
aside seven more days of supply at cerning the probable course of oper-
airfields in the Rome area, which the ations in southern France had a
Provisional Troop Carrier Air Divi- marked bearing on the supply plan.
sion could move to southern France First, intelligence information indicat-
for either the 1st Airborne Task ed to tactical planners that the ad-
Force or for any other Seventh Army vance inland would be fairly slow. As
unit that might become isolated. No a result they did not expect that
aerial resupply was planned for D- Toulon could be captured before D
day, but the Provisional Troop Carri- plus 20, or that Marseille could be se-
er Air Division was to have 112 cured until at least D plus 45. Logisti-
loaded aircraft on call and ready to fly cians estimated that the American and
to southern France at any time by D French ground forces would have to
plus 1. be supported over the beaches until
The ammunition supply plan called about D plus 30 and that beach
for all assault units to land on D-day supply operations could not support
with five units of fire for all weap- the tactical forces much farther than
ons. 19 The D plus 5 convoy was to twenty miles inland.
bring with it five units of fire for all Based on these extremely conserva-
tive logistical and operational projec-
19A “unit of fire” was the estimated average tions, Army and Navy planners saw an
amount of ammunition that a unit or weapon was opportunity to make better use of the
expected to use during one day of combat and
varied from theater to theater. See FM 9–6, Ammu- limited amount of assault shipping by
nition Supply (15 June 1944), p. 4 . reducing the amount of supplies
52 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE
needed for a fast-paced, mobile marked delaying effect on the course
battle. Expecting determined enemy of the campaign. O n the other hand,
resistance, they instructed the logisti- if the Germans offered determined
cians to emphasize ammunition and resistance as they had done at Sa-
to save shipping space by cutting lerno, Anzio, and Normandy, then the
deeply into early loadings of POL and fuel and vehicles would be a grave li-
rations for the period D-day through ability and ammunition much more
D plus 4. The planners subsequently vital to the troops ashore. With the
reduced POL loadings for these days limited number of amphibious ships
by 20 percent, lowered the amount of available, the Seventh Army planners
rations from a ten- to a seven-day had little flexibility in this regard, and
supply, and cut the number of vehi- the emphasis on munitions would
cles designated to haul supplies rapid- provide the best means of ensuring
ly and deeply inland from the beach- that the combat forces had the ability
es. The Seventh Army was taking a to secure the initial beachhead. 20
calculated risk. If its forces penetrated
German defenses faster and farther 20For further discussion of ANVILlogistics and its
than expected, the reductions of POL effects, see chapter 11, especially the sections treat-
supplies and vehicles could have a ing munitions, transportation, and POL products.
CHAPTER IV

German Plans and Organization


Until the waning months of 1943 the German Organization and Operational
Germans had focused their attention Concepts
on the Russian front. Only in Novem-
ber of that year did the German high Before November 1943 Oberbefehl-
command come to regard an Allied in- shaber West (OB West), the German the-
vasion of western Europe as an equal if ater command responsible for the
not greater threat than an invasion defense of France, had served as a
from the east. This realization slowly reservoir of reinforcements for the
brought about major changes in eastern front and to a lesser degree
German military deployments. Adolph for Italy and the Balkans. In Novem-
Hitler, the politico-military leader of ber, however, Hitler and his armed
the German state, fully understood the forces high command, Oberkommando
dangers of an invasion of northwestern der Wehrmacht (OKW), abandoned this
Europe. The area was not only close to practice and began strengthening OB
the heartland of Germany’s industrial West as quickly as possible to resist a
base, but also lay on the approaches to predicted Allied amphibious invasion
‘the north German plains, the tradition- expected to strike the northern coast
al invasion route to central Europe. He of France. Although unforeseen con-
thus vowed to turn the northeastern tingencies on the eastern front and in
portion of the Continent into a Festung Italy forced the German high com-
Europa and resist any invasion of the mand to slow down this buildup
northern coast as strongly as possible. during the opening months of 1944,
With this judgment German military OB West continued to prepare against
leaders could hardly disagree.1 the anticipated Allied cross-Channel
invasion with all the local resources it
1 German material in this volume is based mainly could muster, hoping that somehow
on a series of CMH manuscripts collectively entitled Germany would be able to raise the
“German Operations in Southern France and
Alsace, 1944,” prepared by Charles V. P. von Lutti- forces necessary to carry out the
chau and other historians of the former Foreign broad defensive policy on which
Military Studies Branch, CMH, and based on origi- Hitler and OKW had decided.
nal German sources (hereafter cited as von Lutti-
chau, “German Operations”). For more information
on German operational and tactical planning, espe- rison, Cross-Channel Attack; and Martin Blumenson,
cially in regard to northern France, see the appro- Breakout and Pursuit (Washington, 1961), all in the
priate sections of Pogue, The Supreme Command; Har- United States Army in World War II series.
54 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

Hitler’s defensive policy made the sive and that the Allies would launch
coast of France the German main line strong secondary attacks at the same
of resistance (MLR) in western time as the main effort. The German
Europe, and OKW planned to fortify high command at first interpreted the
the Normandy shoreline so thorough- Anzio landing of late January as the
ly that local reserves would be able to beginning of a series of peripheral
deal with most invasion attempts. But operations designed to pin down and
if the Allies succeeded in putting disperse German forces before the
strong forces ashore, OKW wanted a cross-Channel assault. The Germans
powerful, mobile central reserve com- changed this estimate when they dis-
posed primarily of armored units, covered that the Allies retained
which could drive the Allies back into strong, uncommitted forces in North
the sea. T o create such a force, OB Africa, and decided that the Allies
West was prepared to strip any sectors would launch another major attack in
not directly affected by the invasion, the Mediterranean more or less in
although the final decision to commit conjunction with an invasion of north-
the central reserve was to be made by ern France. In February, German in-
OKW and ultimately by Hitler himself. telligence even concluded that an as-
These plans, particularly making sault into southern France would
the French coast the MLR, required come before the cross-Channel oper-
manpower, materiel, and time the ation. By May, however, they had
Germans did not have. As a result, taken a harder look at Allied amphibi-
the so-called Atlantic Wall never ous capabilities and reduced the un-
became a true defensive line and con- dertaking in southern France to the
sisted mainly of a series of semi-iso- status of a threat-an estimate coin-
lated strongpoints. In fact, well before ciding remarkably well with contem-
OVERLORDbegan, OB West had porary Allied decisions concerning
reached the conclusion that it faced a ANVIL.
virtually impossible defensive task Mildly surprised when OVERLORD
with the means at hand and had started without a concurrent Allied
begun tentative plans to withdraw invasion of southern France (as they
strength from southern France to had been mildly surprised when the
defend the northern part of the coun- Russian spring offensive of 1944
try where, most German planners be- began without a concurrent OVER-
lieved, the main Allied invasion would LORD),the Germans kept a wary eye
come. on southern France after 6 June. For
As early as January 1944, the Ger- a while OKW estimates fluctuated be-
mans had developed reasonably accu- tween the Italian Ligurian coast and
rate estimates of Allied intentions in the French Riviera as the probable
regard to France. They certainly ex- sites for an Allied amphibious landing
pected a major invasion and thought in the Mediterranean. But by early
it would come in northern France August most German planners were
during the first third of the year; they convinced that southern France would
also believed that the invasion would be the Allied target. Only OB South-
coincide with a Russian spring offen- west, the German theater command in
GERMAN PLANS AND ORGANIZATION 55

Italy, still thought that landings some- only to an early and deep withdrawal
where in northern Italy were more from northern France, forcing the
likely. Three days before the ANVIL abandonment of southern France and
target date—15 August—German probably requiring redeployments
commanders in southern France were from Italy and the Balkans as well. In-
aware of Allied strength for the as- stead, OKW recommended an imme-
sault, of the Allies’ general intentions, diate counterattack with all available
and of the probable date of the oper- means against the flank of the Allied
ation, but had not yet reached a firm breakthrough in Normandy. Hitler
conclusion as to the exact location of agreed, and what was to become
the assault beachhead. known as the Mortain counterattack
Meanwhile, events in northern began on 7 August. 2
France had been moving toward a The decision to counterattack in
climax. Once the Allies succeeded in early August forced OB West to pull
establishing a bridgehead in Norman- even more forces out of southern
dy, Field Marshal Gerd von Rund- France. However, Hitler and OKW
stedt, commanding OB West, began to were not yet ready to openly modify
consider a general withdrawal from the missions assigned the German
France. By mid-June he had become armies in the south and, between 2 and
convinced that the situation in Nor- 15 August, issued instructions to the
mandy was irretrievable and that it German commanders in southern
was too late for OKW to do anything France confirming their mission of
except pull all OB West forces, includ- holding the coast at all costs. Neverthe-
ing those in southern France, back to less, OKW began drawing up contin-
the fixed fortifications along the gency plans for a general withdrawal of
German border. But Hitler and OKW all OB West forces to new defensive
vehemently disagreed, and Hitler, al- lines across northeastern France.
ready dissatisfied with the course of These plans included evacuating most
operations in Normandy, decided that German forces from both western and
a younger, less pessimistic command- southern France. Yet Hitler and other
er was needed in France. Accordingly, German leaders still hoped that the
on 3 July he dismissed von Rundstedt Allied breakthrough could be pinched
and placed Field Marshal Guenther off and contained, making such ex-
von Kluge in command of OB West. treme measures unnecessary.
The command change solved little. By 12 August OKW concluded that
Von Kluge was unable to halt the the Mortain counterattack had failed,
steady Allied buildup in Normandy and recommended a general with-
and the subsequent Allied breakout at drawal to the east before the remain-
St. Lo that began on 25 July. Faced ing German forces in France became
with a major reversal on the battle- isolated and trapped. Hitler at first
field, Hitler and OKW saw only two hesitated, feeling that his generals
alternatives: a general withdrawal, as were too quick to withdraw. However,
advocated by von Kluge, or a major
counterattack. Breaking off in Nor- 2 See Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, for a full ac-
mandy, OKW estimated, could lead count of this action.
56 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

by 15 August, the date scheduled for from the Atlantic to Tours and then
the Allied landings in southern ran southeast to the Swiss border.
France, the failure of the counterat- Von Rundstedt’s command problems
tack had become obvious to everyone, were complicated by the fact that
and large numbers of elite German Rommel also held semi-independent
troops were in danger of being authority as inspector of coastal de-
trapped within the rapidly closing Fa- fenses and held defensive concepts
laise Pocket. In the north, von Kluge’s not entirely in accord with those of
chief of staff was frantically seeking OB West. In addition, Rommel had
new decisions from OKW, averring been appointed by Hitler personally
that a complete collapse of OB West in and, as a field marshal, had direct
northern France was now imminent. access to the German leader, bypass-
Meanwhile, Hitler, once again dissat- ing von Rundstedt. The OB West com-
isfied with the performance of his mander also had to cope with many
generals, decided to replace von governmental and paramilitary agen-
Kluge with Field Marshal Walter cies that continually nibbled at his au-
Model. Thus, as the Allied invasion thority, preventing him from unifying
fleet approached France’s Mediterra- German efforts behind the battlefield.
nean shore in the south, the German Von Kluge, who relieved von Rund-
high command was in a state of gen- stedt on 3 July, was in a somewhat
eral disarray, making any immediate better position, having Hitler’s confi-
theater-level response to the landings dence at first and developing a close
extremely difficult. personal relationship with Rommel.
When Rommel was wounded in mid-
German Organization and Strength July, von Kluge assumed command of
Army Group B in addition to OB West,
At the beginning of June 1944, von thereby consolidating the army com-
Rundstedt’s OB West, theoretically a mand in northern France.
joint theater command, was little The three other major military
more than an army group headquar- commands in northern France were
ters with minimal direct authority the Third Air Force, under Field Mar-
over local air and naval commands or shal Hugo Sperrle; Navy Group West,
even over certain other army com- under Admiral Theodor Krancke; and
mands in the west.3 By that time von the office of Military Governor France,
Rundstedt had delegated responsibil- headed by Lt. Gen. Karl Heinrich von
ity for the ground defense of north- Stulpnagel. Field Marshal Sperrle re-
ern France to Field Marshal Erwin ported to Reichsmarschall Hermann
Rommel, commanding Army Group B, Goering’s Oberkommando der Luftwaffe
and of southern France to General Jo- (OKL), while Admiral Krancke was re-
hannes Blaskowitz, commanding Army sponsible to the Oberkommando der
Group G. The boundary line between Kriegsmarine (OKM), under Grand Ad-
the two units followed the Loire River miral Karl Doenitz.4 As a civil admin-

3 On the rolls of the German Army HQ OB West 4 Goering was the highest ranking officer of the
was actually listed as HQ Army Group D. German armed forces and as Reichsmarschall held
GERMAN PLANS AND ORGANIZATION 57

JOHANNES
GENERAL BLASKOWITZ
(center).

istrator of occupied territory, General Blaskowitz of Army Group G and Gen-


von Stulpnagel was responsible to the eral Friedrich Wiese, heading the
German government, but as military Nineteenth Army, were the principal
commander of security forces in German military commanders. While
France, he reported to OB West. In Blaskowitz had been an opponent of
addition, OB West attached most of its some of the Hitlerian regime’s harsh-
logistical and administrative staff sec- er policies, Wiese had been a member
tions to von Stulpnagel’s headquar- of the Freikorps in 1919 and was con-
ters, thereby making that headquar- sidered a fervent Nazi by American
ters the logistical command for authorities. 5 Both enjoyed good mili-
German ground forces in France, tary reputations, but, like OB West,
somewhat analogous to Services of had limited authority over some of
Supply in NATOUSA. the military and paramilitary forces in
In southern France General their areas of operation. Blaskowitz,

5 For contemporary Allied evaluations of German


what would correspond to a nonexistent “six star” leaders, see “G–2 History: Seventh Army Oper-
rank in the U.S. armed forces. Doenitz’s equivalent ations in Europe,” IV, Annex III, Box 2, William W.
rank in the U.S. Navy was Admiral of the Fleet, five Quinn Papers, MHI (copies also in Seventh Army
stars. retired records at WNRC).
58 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

army field units, and others were in-


dependent. As security forces they
were considered adequate, but their
conventional combat capabilities were
suspect. Headquarters, Ost Legion, was
an administrative and training com-
mand that controlled Ost units not
specifically assigned to Army Group G.
The Ost Legion headquarters was
under OB West for operations, but re-
ported to the German Army high
command, Oberkommando des Heeres
(OKH), for administrative matters
concerning the numerous Ost units
in Army Group G’s area. Upon an Al-
lied invasion of southern France,
Blaskowitz was to assume greater con-
trol over both Ost Legion units and any
tactical forces under Army Area South-
ern France, but even then his authority
was not total.
In southern France, Admiral Atlantic
Coast controlled naval units from Brit-
tany south to the Spanish border, and
Admiral French South Coast controlled
GENERALFRIEDRICHWIESE those on the Mediterranean littoral.
Both answered directly to Navy Group
for example, initially had direct con- West, and the Mediterranean com-
trol over only the coastal areas along mand was further subdivided into
the Atlantic and Mediterranean inland Naval Command Languedoc (west of
to a depth of about twenty miles. Toulon) and Naval Command French
Prior to ANVIL,the rest of the region Riviera (Toulon east to the Italian
was under the control of Lt. Gen. border). All forces under these two
Ernst Dehner’s Army Area Southern commands were land based and con-
France, a component of the Military sisted of coast defense artillery, anti-
Governor France, whose forces were en- aircraft units, service troops, and a va-
gaged primarily in antiguerrilla and riety of special staffs and offices. The
police activities. only surface unit in southern France
Blaskowitz’s control of local Ost Le- was the 6th Security Flotilla, which, with
gions was also limited. Ost units were a handful of patrol craft, reported
separate infantry forces made up of through Security Forces West to Navy
volunteer, drafted, or impressed sol- Group West.
diers from eastern Europe, mainly Blaskowitz’s control over naval ar-
Poles, Russians, and Czechs; some of tillery was restricted. Initially all naval
these organizations were attached to guns remained under naval control.
GERMAN PLANS AND ORGANIZATION 59

After an Allied landing had actually border area, the Carcassonne Gap
taken place, control was to be split, land bridge between the Atlantic and
with the navy directing fire on Allied Mediterranean coasts, and the Massif
aircraft and shipping, and the army Central, a broad plateau region west
directing fire against ground targets, of the Rhone valley. Behind these six
a division that was guaranteed to corps, Army Group G also had the
create problems. LVIII Panzer Corps, a reserve force
Third Air Force responsibilities in controlling three panzer divisions. Fi-
southern France were carried out by nally, the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Divi-
the 2d Air Division and Fighter Command sion, an OKW reserve unit, and the
Southern France. Neither had any 157th Reserve Mountain Division, oper-
ground support responsibilities. As of ating under Army Area Southern France,
15 August, the 2d Air Division could were to pass to Blaskowitz's control in
muster only about sixty-five torpedo the event of an Allied invasion. Thus,
bombers and fifteen bombers in June, Army Group G had under its
equipped to carry radio-controlled command two army headquarters,
missiles. Fighter Command Southern seven corps headquarters, three ar-
France, with the primary mission of air mored divisions, the equivalent of
defense, had virtually no aircraft and thirteen infantry divisions, and a host
would receive only minor reinforce- of smaller combat units, while two
ments from Italy after the invasion other divisions were to pass to its
had begun. 6 control following an Allied landing. 7
As opposed to the weak air and Serious manpower and equipment
naval commands, Army Group G was a shortages plagued all of these units.
reasonably strong and well-balanced The army group, army, and corps
force in early June. In the west the headquarters lacked many of the
German First Army, with the LXXX normal logistical and administrative
and LXXXVI Corps (each with two divi- support units and special staffs neces-
sions), defended the Atlantic coast sary for command and control, and
from the Loire River south to the the tactical staffs at division level and
Spanish border. In the south the Nine- below were all greatly understrength.
teenth Army guarded the Mediterrane- Despite frequent requests to higher
an coast with three corps: the IV headquarters, Blaskowitz was unable
Luftwaffe Field Corps, with three divi- to expand even his own staff to what
sions; Corps Kniess (soon to be redesig- he felt was an adequate size, a prob-
nated LXXXV Corps), with two divi- lem that undoubtedly hampered
sions; and the LXII Reserve Corps, also German planning activities.8
with two divisions. In addition
Blaskowitz had the LXVI Reserve Corps 7 Allied estimates often carried the Ost Legion as a
which, with part of one division and separate, ready division, but these units were gener-
ally attached to existing German infantry regiments
various lesser units, held the Pyrenees as a fourth battalion.
8Authorized only in late April 1944, Army Group G
headquarters had become operational on 12 May,
6 The number of planes redeployed from Italy but was initially designated an Armeegruppe with an
cannot be determined, but it appears to have been inferior status to that of Army Group B, which was
less than two squadrons. classified as a Heeresgruppe. Only on 1 1 September
60 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

The condition of the various infan- (authorized over 17,000 men), but
try divisions under Blaskowitz was were lighter and had greater firepow-
also spotty. The long drain on er. Each 1944 division was authorized
German resources had left many of three regimental headquarters con-
these units with a high proportion of trolling two infantry battalions, as
ethnic Germans from conquered east- well as a seventh infantry, or fusilier,
ern territories, while many of the battalion operating as a reserve di-
native Germans were overage or in rectly under divisional control. How-
limited service categories. Some divi- ever, they still lacked the motor trans-
sions also had large numbers of Ost port and logistical capabilities of the
troops, and others were markedly un- larger American infantry divisions
derstrength and underequipped, with and, by themselves, were much
little training or experience in large weaker than their Allied counterparts.
unit operations. The German armored formations
Blaskowitz classified four of his in- were a different story. Throughout
fantry divisions as static, or garrison, World War II the German Army con-
units with little mobility or logistical centrated its best weapons, equip-
resources. One of these divisions had ment, and manpower in its armored
only seven of its nine authorized in- units—the panzer and panzer grena-
fantry battalions, and another had dier divisions—and left its foot infan-
three Ost battalions attached to it. try divisions generally neglected. The
Five other divisions carried the desig- German high command regarded
nation reserve. Although supposedly in both types of divisions as “mobile
training, these divisions were engaged units” and often used them inter-
primarily in construction and security changeably on the battlefield to stif-
activities, and their conventional mili- fen the less well endowed infantry di-
tary capabilities had severely declined. visions and to counterattack enemy
Each had somewhere between four penetrations of the front lines. But as-
and nine infantry battalions, a mixed sessing the precise strength of these
collection of light and medium artil- armored formations at any given time
lery pieces, and a variety of Ost battal- is difficult. By 1944 the circumstances
ions. of war and Germany’s low production
Probably the best infantry divisions of armored vehicles had greatly
were four organized under the new blurred the organizational distinction
1944 tables of organization and between panzer (armored) and panzer
equipment (TOE).9 At 12,770 men, grenadier (armored, or mechanized,
these units were substantially smaller infantry) divisions. In mid- 1944 each
than the 1939–43 infantry divisions panzer division was generally author-
ized one two-battalion tank regiment
was Blaskowitz’s headquarters raised to the status of
(fifty to sixty tanks per battalion), two
Heeresgruppe. two-battalion mechanized infantry
9 TOEs were published military tables listing the regiments (four infantry battalions), a
authorized equipment by type and the personnel by mechanized reconnaissance battalion,
rank and specialty that a particular unit was sup-
posed to have. Normally units in combat did well to an armored artillery regiment,and
maintain 80–90 percent of their TOE strength. mechanized or motorized support
GERMAN PLANS AND ORGANIZATION 61

GERMANARMORPASSINGTHROUGH
TOULOUSE

units; the panzer grenadier division Thus, with a higher infantry-to-tank


was normally authorized two three- ratio than the standard American ar-
battalion motorized infantry regi- mored divisions (with three tank and
ments (six infantry battalions), one three armored infantry battalions)
tank or assault gun battalion, a and with equipment shortages further
mechanized reconnaissance battalion, reducing their armor strength, both
and motorized support units. Howev- formations bore striking similarities to
er, the attachment and detachment of the standard American infantry divi-
battalion-sized units to and from sion of World War II with its normal
these divisions was common, and the attachment of one tank battalion
armored formations rarely went into (sixty tanks), one self-propelled tank
combat with either their full author- destroyer battalion (thirty-six pieces),
ized or existing operational strength. and motorized support units.
In addition, the use of either armored Although the three armored divi-
half-tracks or light trucks to carry the sions of the LVII Panzer Reserve Corps
infantry of either type of division de- were in various stages of activation
pended on the availability of equip- and training, and their infantry regi-
ment; the substitution of turretless ments were generally truck-mounted
assault guns for turreted tanks some- with few armored half-tracks, each
times occurred for the same reason. could put at least one or two strong
62 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

combat commands in the field. More- tions, and the construction of large
over, their tank units were equipped submarine pens at Marseille had con-
with Mark IV medium and Mark V sumed a high percentage of the de-
(Panther) heavy tanks, both of which fensive materiel and labor that had
were better armored and armed than been made available. Civilian labor
their American counterparts, and was limited, while the requirements of
their commanders, staffs, and troops training, security, and antiguerrilla
were generally well experienced. operations made it impossible for
Other units in reserve were less im- Blaskowitz to use military manpower
pressive. T h e 17th SS Panzer Grenadier extensively to bring his defenses up
Division, for example, lacked many of to the standards necessary to face a
its components, while the 157th major Allied assault. Nevertheless, the
Mountain Reserve Division was hardly German commander realized that the
more than a reinforced regimental Allied air bases in Corsica could not
combat team. Yet these mobile re- begin to duplicate the air support
serves constituted a powerful weapon available for a cross-Channel assault
against any amphibious assault on in the north, and so his freedom of
either the Mediterranean or Atlantic maneuver in the south would be sig-
French coasts. nificantly greater. Thus, by concen-
To further beef up their combat trating his coastal defense prepara-
power, the German forces in southern tions in those areas most likely to be
France also employed large quantities targets of an amphibious assault and
of captured equipment of all types. by carefully positioning his sixteen di-
Their artillery, for example, included visions, Blaskowitz could bring con-
weapons of French, Italian, Russian, siderable pressure to bear against any
Czech, and other manufacture, all of one-, two-, or three-division ANVILas-
various calibers and sizes; the variety sault throughout the spring and early
among vehicles was even greater, summer of 1944. Any Allied amphibi-
ranging from models captured from ous invasion attempt there could
the British in North Africa, to French expect a heavy fight at the beachhead
armored machines of all kinds, to a and no assurance of ultimate success.
broad collection of commercial trucks,
vans, and autos drafted for military The Effects of Overlord
service. Although these improvisa-
tions aggravated Army Group G’s spare After the invasion of northern
parts and ammunition resupply prob- France, the strength of Army Group G
lems, they also enabled Blaskowitz to gradually deteriorated as unit after
strengthen significantly the units unit was ordered to the Normandy
under his command. area. T h e 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Di-
In comparison to the defenses of vision departed on 7 June, followed
the Channel coast and Normandy, the rapidly by the LXXXVI Corps head-
fixed defensive installations in south- quarters, an armored division, all four
ern France were weak. Blaskowitz had 1944-type infantry divisions, four ar-
been unable to obtain the materials tillery battalions, and an assault gun
required for strong coastal fortifica- battalion. T h e transfers were tempo-
GERMAN PLANS AND ORGANIZATION 63

rarily halted but resumed in late July sions. Obviously he could expect no
with the departure of the LVIII Panzer assistance from Army Group B, which
Corps headquarters, another armored was now in a state of near collapse,
division, one of the static infantry di- but reinforcement still might be pos-
visions, another assault gun battalion, sible from the Italian front under OB
four assault gun training battalions Southwest.
(which had personnel but few combat
vehicles), and five infantry training OB Southwest
battalions.
Transfers from southern to north- The relationship of OB Southwest in
ern France continued during the first Italy with OB West and Army Group G
half of August almost until the ships merits special attention. 10 German
of the Western Naval Task Force operational strategy in Italy was es-
were in sight of the Riviera. Major sentially defensive. The principal mis-
losses were the headquarters of the sion of the theater commander, Field
First Army, the LXVI and LXXX Corps, Marshal Albert Kesselring, was to
a regimental combat team of the hold the shortest possible east-west
338th Infantry Division, two more artil- line across the Italian peninsula and
lery battalions, another infantry re- keep the Allied ground forces in Italy
placement battalion, and one of the bottled up in the narrow peninsula as
11th Panzer Division’s two tank battal- far south as possible. Although Kes-
ions. A number of smaller units also selring had no responsibilities regard-
went north between June and August, ing the defense of southern France,
including the antiaircraft units that he was obviously interested in any
had protected the bridges over the threat to his rear that an amphibious
Rhone and the antitank companies of invasion might pose. But neither Kes-
four infantry divisions. selring nor his superiors believed that
These losses greatly reduced the the Allied amphibious assaults against
strength of Army Group G, and the re- either northern or southern France
inforcements reaching southern posed any direct threat to OB South-
France after 6 June provided little west, and even after ANVIL had oc-
relief. Moving in were the LXIV Corps curred, German leaders considered a
headquarters, which replaced the First strong Allied thrust into northern
Army on the Atlantic coast; two worn- Italy through the Alps highly unlikely.
out infantry divisions from Norman- Throughout the spring and summer
dy, one of which had to be consoli- of 1944, Hitler and OKW were more
dated with a remaining Army Group G concerned with an amphibious assault
division; a battered division from the against northern Italy along either the
Russian front that had been merged Ligurian or Adriatic coasts, behind
with the cadre of a new division from the German lines. Such a landing
Germany; two antitank battalions; and
one heavy artillery battalion. By 15
August Blaskowitz had thus lost two- 10For further information on German strategy for
Italy, see Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., Cassino to the Alps,
thirds of his armored reserve and United States Army in World War II (Washington,
about one-quarter of his infantry divi- 1977).
64 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

could cause a complete collapse of ther OKW or OB Southwest laid even


the theater and project Allied land tentative plans to use these forces for
and air power dangerously close to a flanking attack against Allied troops
the German heartland. Their fears landing in southern France. In fact, as
were undoubtedly strengthened by the southern France campaign devel-
Kesselring’s estimates that the next oped, Kesselring’s only mission would
major Allied offensive in the Mediter- be to hold the Alpine mountain
ranean would be an assault in the passes and block any possible Allied
Genoa area, outflanking German de- excursion into northern Italy. Al-
fenses north of Rome and forcing him though Allied intelligence sources
to evacuate the Italian peninsula. confirmed Kesselring’s passive stand
Moreover, in June and July, Kessel- toward the invasion of southern
ring was under renewed Allied mili- France, Generals Patch and Truscott,
tary pressure in Italy from Wilson’s the principal Allied ground com-
drives north of Rome. These multiple manders in the assault, continued to
threats to OB Southwest finally prompt- watch the Alpine passes on their right
ed Hitler to send Kesselring six more flank for any sign of unusual German
divisions, including one that had been activity.11 The plans of the German
promised earlier to Army Group G. military commanders in the past had
Furthermore, in early August OKW not always been discernible, and there
advised that, should a withdrawal was no reason to believe that their
from southern France become neces- operational ingenuity would disap-
sary, at least two of ArmyGroup G’s di- pear in the immediate future.
visions should be transferred to OB Perhaps a more significant factor
Southwest to protect Kesselring’s rear was the preoccupation of Hitler and
along the Franco-Italian border. In no OKW with the deteriorating situation
case was there any discussion of send- in northern France. By 15 August
ing reinforcements to Army Group G OKW was far more interested in with-
from OB Southwest. drawing the bulk of Army Group G
In August 1944 Kesselring’s contin- northward to help stem the threat of
ued concern about the Ligurian coast an Allied breakout from Normandy
had even led him to reinforce that than it was in forestalling an Allied
area. On 3 August he appointed the invasion of southern France. Al-
Italian Marshal Rodolfo Graziani to though Hitler himself might not have
command the newly formed Ligurian let the matter drop so easily, he prob-
Army, consisting of two understrength ably lacked the time to study the
German divisions and two Italian divi- German situation along the southern
sions of doubtful reliability. Southeast
along the coast from Genoa, but not
11 For discussion, see Arthur L. Funk, “General
part of Ligurian Army, were two more Patch and the Alpine Passes, 1944,” paper present-
German divisions, and by 10 August ed at the American Historical Association meeting
Kesselring had begun assembling in Chicago, 1987; and ibid., “Intelligence and Oper-
even more divisions in northern Italy ations: ANVIL/DRAGOON, the Landings in Southern
France,” paper presented at the XIIIth International
to act as a central reserve for the Colloquy on Military History, Helsinki, 1988 (copies
entire Italian theater. However, nei- at CMH).
GERMAN PLANS AND ORGANIZATION 65

French coast in any great detail. Thus test a major assault. Although greatly
neither Hitler, OKW, OB West, nor OB reduced, the forces that made up the
Southwest ever considered employing Nineteenth Army were still reasonably
German forces in Italy to mount a strong, their defensive missions un-
counterattack against an Allied inva- changed, and their commanders vet-
sion of southern France. This critical eran soldiers. As of mid-August
lack of interest had been carefully Wiese’s forces totaled seven infantry
noted in Allied intelligence estimates divisions controlled by three corps
prior to ANVIL,allowing Allied plan- headquarters. Although most of these
ners to minimize the danger of an OB formations were Still understrength
Southwest thrust into France through and short of equipment, many were
the Alpine passes after the invasion rested and experienced units that
had begun. could be expected to give a good ac-
count of themselves if well led and
The German Nineteenth Army well positioned. Wiese’s problem, like
Rommel’s in the north, was to decide
The steady transfer of Army Group where the Allies would land or, more
G’s best units out of the zone and the accurately, how he could best deploy
continued deterioration of the his forces to enable them to carry out
German position in northern France their defensive missions under a vari-
may have convinced Blaskowitz that ety of contingencies.
any attempt to resist a major Allied In early August, responsibility for
amphibious assault against the Atlan- the defense of the French Mediterra-
tic or Mediterranean coasts was futile. nean coast from Toulon to the Italian
In the west his coastal defenses had border rested with the Nineteenth
been so weakened that they were no Army’s LXII Corps under Lt. Gen. Fer-
more than an advanced outpost line. dinand Neuling (Map 2). Neuling’s
On 8 August OB West had even re- LXII Corps consisted of the 242d and
duced the missions of the Atlantic 148th Infantry Divisions and a host of
forces, requiring the LXIV Corps to smaller units of all types. The 242d
hold only three strongpoints in the Division, under Maj. Gen. Johannes
event of a major landing. The corps’ Baessler, was deployed from the
remaining forces—two understrength Toulon area east to Antheor Cove, a
divisions, some separate regiments, few miles north of the Argens River,
and a variety of paramilitary organiza- and was thus responsible for a sector
tions (police or security units)—were that would include almost all of the
only to maintain a screen along the ANVILassault beaches. Baessler was
coast and protect Army Group G’s also designated the Toulon garrison
northwest flank on the Loire River. commander, responsible for the de-
But, outside of holding local FFI fenses of the port. From Antheor
forces at bay, little more could be ex- Cove northeast to the Italian border,
pected from this command. the coast was defended by the 148th
Along the Mediterranean coast, Division of Maj. Gen. Otto Fretter-
the situation was different. There Pico. Fretter-Pico’s zone included the
Blaskowitz retained the ability to con- smaller ports of Nice and Cannes.
66 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

MAP 2

Guarding the German center, from units were the 198th and 716th Infan-
Toulon west to Marseille and across try Divisions and the weak 189th Reserve
the Rhone River delta, was Lt. Gen. Division. One of the 189th’s two infan-
Baptist Kniess’ LXXXV Corps, with the try regiments, the 28th Grenadiers, 12
338th and 244th Infantry Divisions. But constituted Army Group G’s reserve
by 15 August the 338th Division had and was located north of the coast in
already redeployed one of its regi- the Carcassonne Gap area; the rest of
ments north and had pulled its re- the division was in the process of
maining units back to the Arles area, moving into the Rhone delta posi-
preparing to follow. Kniess’ remain- tions vacated by the 338th. At the
ing unit, the 244th Division, was still time, Wiese had also ordered Peter-
relatively intact, but was repositioning sen to send the 198th Division east of
itself to take over the 338th’s area of the Rhone where it could serve as a
responsibility. The unit commander reserve unit behind Kniess’ coastal
was also charged with organizing the defenses. As a further precaution,
defense of Marseille and had no troop Blaskowitz was transferring Army
units to spare elsewhere. Group G’s principal reserve unit, Maj.
In the west the IV Luftwaffe Field Gen. Wend von Wietersheim’s 11th
Corps under Lt. Gen. Erich Petersen
held the area between the Rhone 12 The German term grenadier signified a normal
delta and Spanish border. His major infantry unit.
GERMAN PLANS AND ORGANIZATION 67

These movements were actually part


of a more ambitious internal reorgani-
zation conceived by Wiese. Since early
August the Nineteenth Army commander
had been expecting an Allied assault at
any time, but the continued redeploy-
ment of units northward forced him to
alter his defensive dispositions regular-
ly. The impending departure of the
338th Division made yet another reshuf-
fling necessary. But by 13 August
Wiese had also concluded that the
most likely area for an Allied assault lay
east of Toulon, a prediction that
agreed remarkably well with Allied
plans. T o meet this threat, he wanted
to have his weaker 189th and 198th Di-
visions assume responsibility for the
static defenses of Toulon and Mar-
seille, thereby freeing his two best
units, the 242d and 244th Divisions, to
act as mobile reserves. If these units
could be further reinforced by the 11th
Panzer Division, the Nineteenth A m y
might be able to give any invaders a
real fight at the beachhead and buy
MAJ. GEN.WENDVON WIETERSHEIM time for a more determined defense of
the larger ports and the Rhone valley.
Panzer Division, 13 from the Toulouse Although Hitler had ordered Wiese to
area to the vicinity of Avignon, also have strong garrisons defend Toulon
east of the Rhone. Both Blaskowitz and Marseille to the death, most of the
and Wiese considered the Marseille- German defenses there faced seaward,
Toulon region the most likely target and little had yet been done to fortify
of an Allied attack and were now hur- the land approaches to the two ports.
rying forces to the threatened sector. The movement of the 189th and 198th
Infantry and the 11th Panzers east of the
13At the time the 11th Panzer Division had one bat-
Rhone was thus the first step of this
talion of heavy Mark V (Panther) tanks, one compa- larger internal redeployment. But
ny of Mark IV mediums, one antitank battalion, four Wiese needed time to complete the
infantry battalions (motorized if not armored), an transfers, and the involved units would
antitank battalion, an engineer battalion, and an ar-
tillery regiment; it was slightly larger than an Ameri- need additional time to organize their
can armored division except in the number, but not new positions and deploy their compo-
the size, of its tanks. “Remarks Concerning the War nents in an orderly fashion. Yet, by the
History of the Seventh U.S. Army,” by the former
operations officer of the 11th Panzer Division (unpa- night of 14–15 August, the movement
ginated), John E. Dahlquist Papers, MHI. of the three divisions across the Rhone
68 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

had barely begun and was being se- Baessler for the 242d and Fretter-Pico
verely hampered by a lack of transpor- of the 148th, were also combat fatigue
tation, by FFI mines and ambushes, cases from the Russian campaign,
and by something the German staffs during which both had been relieved
had forgotten to consider, the com- of division commands. However,
plete destruction of the Rhone bridges Neuling’s service and his reputation
by Allied air attacks.14 How soon the as a training officer had brought him
units could. overcome these obstacles the corps command in southern
and reposition themselves was crucial France, and all three generals had a
to the German defense. wealth of military experience between
Whatever happened, the effective- them that could not be discounted.
ness of the initial German response to Of Neuling’s two divisions, Baes-
any Allied landings west of Toulon sler’s 242d was the stronger. Its 918th
would depend greatly on the actions and 9 1 7th Grenadier Regiments held the
of the LXII Corps already in place. At coast from the Toulon area east to
first glance the state of what was to Cape Cavalaire, which would consti-
be the principal German command tute the western edge of the ANVIL
and control organization in the landing area. The division’s third
beachhead area left much to be de- regiment, the 765th Grenadiers, de-
sired. The corps headquarters had fended the coastline northwest of
been sitting at Draguignan, about Cape Cavalaire, a stretch that includ-
midway between Toulon and the ed most of the future ANVIL assault
Cannes-Nice area, since late 1942, op- beaches. Each regiment had the sup-
erating generally as a training and oc- port of a battalion of the 242d Artillery
cupation command. Although the Regiment, as well as various naval artil-
headquarters had dropped its previ- lery batteries, and each had an Ost
ous “reserve” designation on 9 unit as a fourth infantry battalion. Of
August, the change in nomenclature the three grenadier regiments in the
was cosmetic, and the headquarters 242d Infantry Division, the 765th was
never acquired the staff sections and by far the weakest. Having just been
corps troops necessary for effective formed in the spring of 1944, it was
combat operations. OKH had almost only partially trained. Its fourth bat-
retired General Neuling, the corps talion (the 807th Azerbaijani Battalion)
commander, for physical disability was an Ost unit of doubtful reliability,
when his health broke down on the while its other three battalions had a
Russian front in the spring of 1942; high proportion of ethnic Germans
and his two division commanders, from the Sudetenland, Poland,
Russia, and the Baltic states. At the
time the only other unit in the future
14 Report of Maj. Gen. Wend von Wietersheim, 4
Jun 46, sub: 11th Panzer Division (unpaginated) beachhead area was the 148th Divi-
(hereafter cited as “11th Panzer Division Rpt of MG sion’s 661st Ost Battalion, located just
von Wietersheim, 4 June 46,”), John E. Dahlquist north of the 765th Grenadiers. How
Papers, MHI. Wietersheim commanded the panzer long these forces could effectively
division at the time and noted the failure of the
German command to anticipate the bridge problem oppose a major assault was a question
in any way. mark.
GERMAN PLANS AND ORGANIZATION 69

DEFENSIVE OF A 65-MM.ITALIAN
EMPLACEMENT HOWITZER,
Pointe de St. Pierre, Cape
St. Tropez.

Concerned with his weakness in the little assistance from the 148th Divi-
expected invasion area, Wiese direct- sion or anyone else.
ed Neuling to move the 148th Divi- Accurately estimating total German
sion’s reserves to the rear of the strength in southern France on the
threatened zone. This reserve consist- eve of the landings is difficult. The
ed of the division’s incomplete third two Nineteenth Army corps primarily
regiment—Regiment Kessler—an infan- concerned with the assault area, Neul-
try battalion from one of the divi- ing’s LXII and Kniess’ LXXXV, re-
sion’s full regiments, and a combat ported their corps and divisional
engineer battalion. But for unknown strength as approximately 53,670
reasons, LXII Corps was slow to carry troops, with an effective combat
out the order; and the 661st Ost Bat- strength of 15These totals do
41,175.
talion’s controlling headquarters, the not include Army Group G or Nineteenth
239th Grenadiers, together with the
148th Division’s other major units, the
8th Grenadiers and Regiment Kessler, re- 15In the German Army the term effective strength
and combat effectives referred to soldiers serving at
mained in the Cannes-Nice area far- the combat battalion level and below. See James
ther north. In the initial defense the Hodgson, “Counting Combat Noses,” Army Combat
765th Grenadiers could thus expect ForcesJournal, V, No. 2 (September 1954), 45–46.
70 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE
Army units not under the control of approximately one-third of these
the two corps headquarters, nor do forces at or near the expected inva-
they include naval and Luftwaffe orga- sion area west of Toulon.
nizations stationed in the assault area. German dispositions along the spe-
But even adding this non-corps ele- cific ANVIL beaches were extremely
ments, it is doubtful that the Germans weak on the eve of the assault. De-
had as many as 100,000 troops there, spite Wiese’s reasonably accurate esti-
and the total may well have been as mate of Allied intentions, the defend-
low as 85,000 on 15 August. In addi- ers were having severe difficulties
tion to the forces in the assault area, strengthening the expected assault
the German order of battle in the area and positioning their reserves for
south still included the IV Luftwaffe an effective counterattack. The com-
Field Corps and the LXIV Corps, both mand structure in the region still left
west of the Rhone; the 11th Panzer Di- much to be desired, and the defend-
vision under the direct control of Army ing troops were of a generally mixed
Group G; the 157th Reserve Mountain caliber and stretched over a wide area
Division and many police and security with little depth. Much depended on
units under Army Area Southern France; how quickly Wiese could complete his
Ost Legion organizations not attached current redeployment effort. Never-
to regular formations; a host of naval theless, the evening of 14 August
and air force units outside the assault found all elements of Army Group G on
area; and a large number of army ad- full defensive alert with Wiese desper-
ministrative and logistical units. ately trying to accelerate the move-
Adding all these troops to those in ment of his reinforcements from the
the assault area, German strength in west over the Rhone River. Aerial re-
southern France as of 15 August connaissance at dusk had reported
probably amounted to somewhere be- the approach of Allied convoys from
tween 285,000 and 300,000 troops of the direction of Corsica, and, ready or
all services and categories. By that not, everyone realized that an inva-
time Wiese had been able to position sion was imminent.
CHAPTER V

The Plan of Assault


The choice of assault sites along masses, separated by natural corri-
the Mediterranean coast of France dors, rise inland from the coast (Map
was in large measure dictated by the 3 ) . On the west, the Pyrenees moun-
ANVILoperational concept-to land in tains, stretching from the Atlantic to
southern France, seize and develop a the Mediterranean, form the tradi-
major port, and exploit northward up tional boundary between France and
the Rhone valley. Of these objectives, Spain; on the east, the Alps serve a
none imposed more tactical limita- similar purpose, separating France
tions on the selection of the assault and Italy and defining the Swiss
beaches than the requirement for the border farther north. Between these
early seizure of a major port. From two mountain ranges and about
the inception of ANVIL,Allied plan- twenty to thirty miles inland rises the
ners regarded the capture of Mar- Massif Central, a large mountainous
seille, one of France’s major port plateau region that dominates south-
cities, as vital to the success of the ern France. The Carcassonne Gap, a
operation. Sete, eighty-five miles west valley area formed by the tributaries
of Marseille, or Toulon, thirty miles of the Garonne and Aude rivers, sep-
east of Marseille, or the many smaller arates the Massif Central from the
harbors dotting the French Riviera Pyrenees in the west; and the Rhone
could serve as interim ports, but only River valley similarly divides the cen-
Marseille could handle the projected tral plateau area from the foothills of
volume of logistical operations envis- the Alps in the east. While the Car-
aged for southern France. cassonne Gap links the Riviera with
the French Atlantic coast, the Rhone
Selecting the Landing Area valley is the historic north-south cor-
ridor of France. From Lyon, 170
Washed by the waters of the Gulf miles north of the Mediterranean, the
of the Lion, the Mediterranean coast valley provides access to northern
of France slopes on the east, along France through the valley of the
the Riviera, down to the waters of the Saone River and to southwestern Ger-
Ligurian Sea. Three major mountain many through the Belfort Gap.
WNTF Rpt Southern France, pp. 14-15; and WNTF
1 This subsection is based on Seventh Army Rpt, I, Opn Plan 4–44, 24 Jul 44, Annex A, Characteristics
3–4, 27-30; Hamilton, “Southern France,” chs. 2-3; of Theater and Enemy Strength.
THE PLAN OF ASSAULT 73

South of Lyon the Rhone flows over-the-beach supply operations lay


through alternating steep-sided near Sete, far to the west of Marseille,
narrow valleys and more gently slop- and along the coasts west and east of
ing basins. Some of the basins give Toulon. But the beaches between
way on the east to corridors penetrat- Sete and Marseille were backed by
ing deeply into the Alps. At Avignon, marshes, streams and canals, and land
some forty miles north of the Medi- that the Germans could easily flood;
terranean, the Rhone enters a broad those between Marseille and Toulon
delta that, with lowlands along the were generally poor and known to be
eastern shore of the Gulf of the Lion, most heavily defended; and the
forms an arc of flat, often marshy, shores from Cannes to the Italian
stream-cut ground stretching from border led only into the rugged Prov-
the Pyrenees almost to Marseille. ence Alps. Further investigation
The mountains east of the Rhone proved that the Sete area beaches
and south of Lyon consist of west- would not fit all requirements. Off-
ward extensions of various Alpine shore conditions were poor and port
ranges. Those close to the coastal facilities limited, while the terrain
area are loosely known as the Prov- eastward would inhibit military move-
ence or Maritime Alps. In addition ment. In addition, all of the beaches
there are two non-Alpine coastal hill west of Toulon were either out of
masses northeast of Toulon, the range or at the extreme range of the
Massif des Maures on the west and XII Tactical Air Command’s bases on
the smaller Massif de 1’Esterel on the Corsica.
east (Map 4 ) . The Maures massif ex- Considering these factors, Allied
tends inland nearly twenty miles; the planners quickly narrowed down their
Esterel scarcely seven. The Argens choices of a landing area to the coast-
River valley separates the Massif des line between Toulon and Cannes.
Maures from the Provence Alps to the This selection presupposed that
north and forms an inland east-west Toulon would be the Seventh Army’s
corridor, about fifty miles long, be- first port objective, and that Toulon
tween Toulon and St. Raphael on the would have to meet Allied logistical
Frejus gulf. From the town of Le Luc, requirements until Marseille fell. But
in the center of the Toulon–St. Raph- the planners also made note of many
ael corridor, another corridor leads minor ports along the coastal stretch
west to Aix-en-Provence, twenty miles northeast of Toulon that might sup-
north of Marseille, and even farther plement over-the-beach supply oper-
to the Rhone delta in the region be- ations during the assault. The main
tween Marseille and Avignon. North- ones were St. Tropez, on the narrow
east of the Massif des Maures, the St. Tropez gulf about thirty-five miles
Massif d e 1’Esterel continues another northeast of Toulon; Ste. Maxime, on
ten miles to the vicinity of Cannes, the same gulf five miles beyond St.
east of which the rough Provence Tropez; and St. Raphael, ten miles
Alps drop sharply to the sea. northeast of Ste. Maxime.
Allied planners knew that the best The ANVILplan outlined by the
beaches for amphibious assaults and A F H Qo n December 1943 had origi-
74 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

MAP 4

nally designated the Hyeres Road- But further study convinced ground
stead, about twelve miles east of and naval planners that the Hyeres
Toulon, as the site for the main land- Roadstead was unsuitable. Both the
ings. At first glance, the AFHQ, selec- roadstead and its beaches lay within
tion seemed logical. An open bay easy range of German guns on the
some ten miles wide, the area pre- peninsulas flanking the bay or on the
sented flat, extensive beaches with defended Hyeres Islands, the closest
fine gradients and easy exits. It lay of which was only seven miles off-
close to Toulon, and its flat hinter- shore. The beaches were also within
land was suitable for the rapid con- range of German heavy artillery at
struction of airfields. One small oper- Toulon. Moreover, the restricted
ational field was already available only waters between the Hyeres Islands
ten miles north of the beaches. and the mainland severely narrowed
THE PLAN OF ASSAULT 75

sea approaches to the beaches, which moving up reinforcements that might


greatly complicated the projected endanger the success of the landing
naval bombardment and minesweep- or, at the very least, might occupy po-
ing operations, and in general caused sitions isolating the beaches from the
a dangerous concentration of ship- interior. No planner wanted a repeat
ping in a fairly small area. of the problems faced during the
With no choice but to look farther Anzio landings earlier in the year.
east and northeast, planners from Beyond the beachline, more poten-
Seventh Army and Western Naval tial hazards existed. Many prospective
Task Force settled on the shoreline beaches lacked good exits, and most
extending from Cape Cavalaire, thirty could be economically blocked by
miles east of Toulon, northeastward German defenders. T h e approaches to
almost another thirty miles to Anth- Toulon were also limited, threatening
eor Cove, about eight miles beyond to channel the advancing ground
St. Raphael. Closer than the Hyeres forces into two easily interdicted ave-
Roadstead to supporting Allied air- nues-one along the coast and the
fields on Corsica, the Cape Cavalaire- other in the Toulon-St. Raphael corri-
Antheor Cove coast provided favor- dor. The narrow coastal road could be
able approaches from the sea, con- blocked at many points, and the sec-
tained several strands well suited to ondary highway between St. Raphael
over-the-beach supply operations, in- and Toulon was only marginally wider.
cluded the principal minor ports, had Two railways-a narrow-gauge track
a tidal range of only six inches to one skirting the beaches along the coast
foot, and offered potential airfield and the main standard-gauge line in
sites. The coastal region and its im- the Toulon-St. Raphael corridor-
mediate hinterland also provided an added little; and the second- and third-
acceptable base area from which to class roads-many of which were in
launch attacks westward toward poor condition-that supplemented
Toulon and Marseille. the main highways were often no more
Despite these advantages, the Cape than a single lane wide and suitable for
Cavalaire-Antheor Cove coast had only light military traffic at best.
several notable drawbacks. Its thirty
miles of coastline, for example, trans- Operational Plans
lated into over fifty miles of irregular
shoreline. Moreover, the potential The need to seize quickly the high
landing sites were only moderately ground that dominated the assault
good to poor, and were separated by area, together with the requirement to
cliffs and rocky outcroppings. Almost develop supporting airfields rapidly,
all were backed by precipitous, domi- forced Seventh Army planners to map
nating high ground-the highest sec- out a large projected beachhead area
tions of the Maures massif along most to be occupied as early as possible. 2
of the stretch, and the Esterel on the
northeast. The Seventh Army would
2This subsection is based on the following: Sev-
have to secure the high ground quick- enth Army FO 1 , 29 Jul 44; French Army B, Person-
ly to prevent the German Army from al and Sec Memo on Opn DRAGOON, 6 Aug 44;
76 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

MAP 5

The planned beachhead was to have a arc, the beachline, was roughly forty-
radius of roughly twenty miles from its five miles. Within the beachhead area
center at Cape St. Tropez. On the lay three-quarters of the Massif des
southwest, the arc, or “blue line,” Maures, the entire Esterel, and the
began at the shores of the Hyeres northeastern part of the Toulon-St.
Roadstead at Cape de Leoube, about Raphael corridor. The blue line passed
eighteen miles southwest of Cape Ca- close to Le Luc, near the middle of the
valaire, curved in-land to a depth of corridor, and included important sec-
about twenty miles, and curved back to tions of the main highways and rail-
the beach at La Napoule, eight miles roads leading west and southwest
north of Antheor Cove (Map 5). The toward Toulon, Marseille, and the
straight-line distance at the base of the Rhone River, as well as northeast
toward Cannes and Nice..
VI Corps FO 1, 30 Jul 44; 3d Inf Div FO 12, 1 Aug Army planners believed that this
44; 36th Inf Div FO 53, 1 Aug 44; 45th Inf Div FO
1, 2 Aug 44; 1st ABTF FO 1 , 5 Aug 44; and Seventh projected beachhead had sufficient
Army Rpt, I, 57–60, 106–10, 118–19. depth to protect the landing sites
THE PLAN OF ASSAULT 77

from long-range German artillery; “division” and the troop carrier air-
provided space for support airfields craft, Patch agreed to concentrate the
and adequately dispersed supply drops in the vicinity of Le Muy, where
dumps; and gave the initial Allied the paratroopers were to begin their
ground combat units-the U.S. VI jumps well before first light on D-day.
Corps and the leading echelons of the The 1st Airborne Task Force’s main
First French Army-enough area in mission was to prevent German
which to maneuver. Seizing the ter- movements into the beach area from
rain within the blue line would also the direction of Le Muy and Le Luc
provide the Seventh Army with high- through the Argens River corridor.
ground anchors for its flanks as well The paratroopers were also to clear
as dominating heights along which the Le Muy area, securing it for sub-
Allied troops could prepare defenses sequent glider landings.
against German counterattack. Ens- Colonel Walker’s 1st Special Ser-
conced along this high ground, Sev- vice Force was to land about midnight
enth Army forces could deny German of 14–15 August on the two eastern-
access to the beachhead, while simul- most Hyeres Islands, Port Cros and
taneously preparing to break out in Levant. Lying just south of Cape Ca-
the direction of Toulon and Marseille. valaire, the two islands were believed
After securing the landing beaches, to shelter numerous German artillery
the VI Corps had three primary mis- batteries that controlled the ap-
sions: occupy all the terrain within the proaches to VI Corps’ westernmost
blue line as quickly as possible; pro- beaches. Their early capture was im-
tect the Seventh Army’s right flank; perative.
and prepare to launch attacks to the Shortly after the 1st Special Service
west and northwest on order. Specific Force started ashore, the French Afri-
D-day tasks included capturing Le can Commando Group was to make
Muy, some ten miles inland along the its assault on the mainland at Cape
Argens River valley west of St. Rapha- Negre, just north of the two islands
el; making contact with the 1st Air- and five miles west of Cape Cavalaire.
borne Task Force in the vicinity of Le After destroying any German coastal
Muy; and moving out from both defenses in the area, the commandos
flanks of the beachhead to link up were to establish roadblocks along the
with French commandos, who were to coastal highway, secure high ground
land beyond the limits of the main as- up to two miles inland from the cape,
sault beaches. and forestall any German efforts to
The 1st Airborne Task Force and move against VI Corps’ beaches from
French commando assaults, as well as the west. Meanwhile, at the opposite
landings by the 1st Special Service end of the beachline, the small
Force, were to precede the VI Corps French Naval Assault Group was to
landings. Seventh Army plans had land at Trayas Point, about four miles
originally called for scattered para- northeast of Antheor Cove, and block
troop drops; but, on the advice of the coastal highway on VI Corps’
Generals Frederick and Williams, re- right, or northeastern, flank.
spectively commanding the airborne H-hour for the main landings over
78 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

the Cape Cavalaire-Antheor Cove centrate it to form an offensive spear-


beaches was set for 0800, consider- head for a drive on Toulon. His least
ably later than had been the case experienced unit, the 36th, he felt,
during earlier amphibious operations should be put ashore on his right,
in the Mediterranean. The hour se- giving the division a primarily defen-
lected represented a compromise be- sive mission. Furthermore, he re-
tween two conflicting demands. On quested that his central division, now
the one hand, the preassault air and the 45th, be landed and concentrated
naval forces required sufficient day- in the vicinity of Ste. Maxime. Trus-
light to permit observed and accurate cott also asked that the amphibious
bombardment of German beach de- resources be more evenly distributed,
fenses. But the landings also had to allowing two regimental combat
begin early enough to move sufficient teams from each division to be landed
troops and supplies ashore, establish by small amphibious craft and LSTs.
a firm beachhead, and penetrate into Finally, he wanted the blue line
the high ground behind the beaches pulled in slightly on the west, fearing
to prevent a German counterattack. that the original beachhead area
The landing plan originally agreed would force him to overextend to the
to by the Seventh Army and the west and thus prevent him from mass-
Western Naval Task Force called for ing for an early drive on Toulon.
putting the 36th Infantry Division Both Patch and Admiral Hewitt read-
ashore on the left, the 45th in the ily agreed to these modifications.
center, and the 3d on the right.3 This Truscott was less successful in per-
plan also allocated all of the larger suading Hewitt to undertake oper-
amphibious assault vessels, such as ations against German underwater
LSTs, LCTs, and LCIs, to the 3d and obstacles believed to be in the land-
36th Divisions, leaving the 45th Divi- ing areas. The corps commander re-
sion to be loaded onto troop trans- quested that naval forces conduct a
ports and landed by small craft and thorough reconnaissance of all beach-
amphibious trucks (DUKWs) over a es before the assault, and destroy
number of small beaches along the whatever obstacles might be discov-
northern and southern shores of the ered. Hewitt disagreed, judging that
St. Tropez gulf. the great difficulties created by un-
After VI Corps entered into the derwater obstacles during the OVER-
planning process, Patch’s staff made LORD assault would not be a factor in
several changes in the plan at the in- ANVIL.The scant tidal range along
sistence of Truscott, the corps com- the Cape Cavalaire-Antheor Cove
mander. Truscott wanted to land his coast would not provide the Germans
most experienced division, the 3d, on with the opportunity to construct
the left so that he could quickly con- such formidable obstacles as had the
great tidal variations along the Nor-
3Subsequent information on the change of land- mandy beachheads. Hewitt also felt
ing plans comes from WNTF Rpt Southern France, that a detailed preassault reconnais-
p. 18; Seventh Army Rpt, I, 46–48, 56-57; Truscott,
Command Missions, pp. 388-91; and Hamilton,
sance would only risk revealing the
“Southern France,” ch. 9. projected landing sites. Thus he
THE PLAN OF ASSAULT 79

turned down the request. and northeast to clear the shoreline


Studying all available information, and hills for two miles inland, and
VI Corps, Seventh Army, and West- drive to the Argens River, about eight
ern Naval Task Force settled on nine miles north of Ste. Maxime.
separate assault beaches for VI Corps. O n the right, the 36th Division was
The nature of the terrain in the as- to land only one regiment at H-hour,
sault area, combined with known or putting it ashore on a broad beach-
suspected German defensive installa- line about four miles east of St. Raph-
tions and potential German routes of ael, with one infantry battalion to
counterattack, resulted in an undesir- make its assault at Antheor Cove,
able but necessary separation of the three miles farther away. A second
assault beaches. Some, for example, regiment was to follow the first
were as much as eight miles from ashore over the beaches east of St.
their nearest neighbor. Varying from Raphael, while plans called for the
80 to 4,500 yards in width, and from third to land at 1400 farther west be-
10 to 50 yards in depth, each beach tween the mouth of the Argens River
presented individual problems. Nev- and St. Raphael. Planners estimated
ertheless, Allied planners believed that elements of the 45th Division
that they had no choice but to accept would be in position south of the
the risks such separations presented. Argens to support the 36th Division’s
On the left, the 3d Infantry Divi- last regiment in the Frejus gulf
sion was to land across beaches in the region. If for some reason it proved
Cavalaire Bay-St. Tropez region. The impossible to make the afternoon as-
division’s first two regiments were to sault north of the Argens, the 36th
be put ashore in the Cavalaire Bay Division’s third regiment would also
and St. Tropez areas, with the third go ashore at the main landing beach-
regiment following in the Cavalaire es to the east.
Bay sector. Thereafter the division T h e 36th Division’s most pressing
was to clear the St. Tropez peninsula, mission was to protect Seventh
which separated Cavalaire Bay from Army’s right flank, a task that entailed
the St. Tropez gulf; seize St. Tropez a rapid drive to the northern end of
and the town of Cavalaire; secure the the blue line at La Napoule. The divi-
Cavalaire-St. Tropez road; and, upon sion’s other missions included seizing
corps orders, strike west toward the St. Raphael; capturing Frejus, two
blue line and Toulon. miles west of St. Raphael; advancing
The 45th Division in the center was inland along the Argens valley to join
also to send two regiments ashore in elements of the 1st Airborne Task
the assault, landing them abreast Force; and, if the airborne units were
about two miles northeast of Ste. unable to do so, clearing Le Muy and
Maxime. Its third regiment was to its environs.
follow the others ashore, but was to Combat Command Sudre (CC
be committed only with Truscott’s Sudre) of the French 1st Armored Di-
permission. On the morning of D-day vision was to land on D-day over 36th
the 45th was to capture Ste. Maxime Division beaches, assemble in the
and nearby high ground, move north Frejus area, and prepare to strike
80 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

westward through the Argens valley. Sudre, assigning it the relatively limit-
Initially, the French armor was to ed mission of assembling in the vicini-
serve as the VI Corps’ reserve and ex- ty of Le Muy and preparing to attack
ploitation force. But before the end either west or northwest on corps
of July, Truscott had become dissatis- orders. In addition, its late organiza-
fied with arrangements for his control tion precluded its loading as a sepa-
over CC Sudre, the only homogene- rate entity, and the task force was not
ous armored unit under his com- scheduled to be assembled at the
mand.4 The First French Army beach area until D plus 2.
expected the return of this brigade- If all went according to plan on D-
sized armored force as soon as signifi- day, the vanguard units of First
cant French forces were assembled French Army were to start landing
ashore, probably by D plus 3. De over U.S. 3d Infantry Division beach-
Lattre wanted Sudre’s armor to pro- es on the VI Corps’ left flank on D
tect the French right, or northern, plus 1. T h e early arrivals were to in-
flank during his subsequent attacks clude the French 1st Infantry Divi-
against Toulon and Marseille and to sion, the 3d Algerian Infantry Divi-
provide armored strength against any sion (less one regiment), and the
German panzer units that might French 1st Armored Division (less CC
counterattack the French. Since Sev- Sudre and another combat com-
enth Army could not promise that VI mand). Plans also called for the 9th
Corps would retain CC Sudre past D Colonial Infantry Division, with two
plus 3,5 Truscott decided on 1 August Moroccan Tabor Regiments (light in-
to organize a light mechanized fantry) attached, to arrive by D plus 9,
combat command from American but the rest of the French II Corps,
forces assigned to the VI Corps. T h e including the last elements of the 1st
unit, later designated Task Force Armored Division, were not to reach
Butler (TF Butler),6 included one cav- southern France until D plus 25.
alry squadron, two tank companies, After assembling on shore, the
one battalion of motorized infantry, leading French units, strengthened by
and supporting artillery, tank destroy- CC Sudre, were to pass through the
ers, and other ancillary forces. Trus- VI Corps left wing and strike for
cott placed the provisional unit under Toulon, which Seventh Army hoped
Brig. Gen. Frederick B. Butler, the VI would fall by D plus 20, 4 September.
Corps deputy commander, and initial- Following the seizure of Toulon, the
ly viewed it as a substitute for CC French were to move against Mar-
seille, simultaneously preparing to
4Additional information about CC Sudre and TF strike northwest toward the Rhone at
Butler in this subsection is from Truscott, Command Avignon. Marseille, Allied planners
Missions, pp. 403-07; and de Lattre, History, pp. 55,
74–75.
estimated, would probably not be in
5By the same token, Patch would not promise de French hands until D plus 40 to 45,
Lattre to return the CC Sudre to French control by or about 25 September.
D plus 3, as de Lattre had requested before the A final aspect of the ANVILground
landings.
6The official VI Corps designation for TF Butler plan concerned the French Forces of
was Provisional Armored Group, VI Corps. the Interior (FFI). Seventh Army,
THE PLAN OF ASSAULT 81

acting in concert with General French drives against Toulon and


Cochet, the FFI director for southern Marseille would likewise depend
France, and with Special Projects Op- heavily on air and naval support. T h e
erations Group at A F H Q assigned most dangerous threat, however, was
the FFI a series of missions designed the ability of the German defenders
to hamper German movement into to assemble enough forces for an ef-
the ANVIL assault area and to assist fective counterattack on the beach-
Allied advances throughout that area. head. T h e ultimate success of ANVIL
First, FFI forces were to destroy would thus hinge a great deal on the
bridges, cut railroad lines, and block efforts of the air arm, with assistance
highways. Next, they were to try to from the FFI, to isolate the landing
create major diversions inland in area.
order to disperse or pin down Air attacks at least indirectly related
German forces that might otherwise to ANVILhad been under way for
mass for counterattacks against the many months before 15 August as
beachhead. Third, the guerrillas were part of the Mediterranean Allied Air
to cut telephone and telegraphic Forces’ general program of oper-
communications systems throughout ations. Moreover, MAAF operations
southern France. Fourth, the FFI was in port of OVERLORD, although de-
to attack German fuel and ammuni- signed mainly to slow German rede-
tion dumps, sabotage German air- ployments to northern France, also
fields, and engage isolated German contributed to ANVIL. However, from
garrisons and small units. Finally, 2 July to 5 August MAAF was able to
they were to prepare to conduct tacti- devote relatively little effort to south-
cal combat operations on the flanks of ern France because of the demands of
whatever routes the Allied assault di- ground operations in Italy as well as
visions might use in breaking out of the priority given to strikes against
the beachhead. German oil and rail facilities in east-
ern and southeastern Europe. During
Air and Naval Support Plans July, air attacks over southern France
were directed primarily against
Although Allied planners were con- German naval installations at Toulon,
fident that German forces in southern various rail centers, and bridges over
France would be unable to prevent a the Rhone and Var rivers (the latter
successful lodgment along the Cape between Cannes and Nice). At the
Cavalaire-Antheor Cove coastline, the same time, air operations in support
planners also knew that the cost of of the FFI were stepped up.
the landing, as well as the speed of VI T h e first phase of an air campaign
Corps’ advance inland to the blue more directly associated with ANVIL
line, would depend largely upon the began on 5 August. From 5 to 9
efficacy of the preassault air and naval August, MAAF’s primary missions
bombardment.7 T h e success of the were to neutralize Luftwaffe units in

7This subsection is based on Seventh A m y Rpt, I, WNTF Rpt Southern France; and Hamilton,
45–56, 60–62, 101-05; AAF III, 416, 420-28; “Southern France,” ch. 9.
82 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE
southern France and northwestern strong naval shelling, could not effec-
Italy, interdict German communica- tively neutralize German coastal de-
tions between Sete and Genoa, and fenses in the area. Instead, the Navy
attack German submarine bases. From held that a more complete destruc-
10 August to approximately 0350 on tion of German coast defenses, in-
the 15th, MAAF was to pay special at- cluding radar installations, would at
tention to German coastal defenses, least partially compensate for the loss
radar stations, troop emplacements, of tactical surprise. They also pointed
and communications. This phase was out that concentrated air attacks on D
to culminate on the 14th with espe- minus 1 and D-day would probably
cially heavy attacks against overland alert the Germans to the location of
communications and selected bridges. the assault beaches in any case. More-
The final phase of the preassault over, a concentration of air effort in
aerial bombardment was to begin at the Cape Cavalaire-Antheor Cove
first light (approximately 0550) on D- area on D minus 1 might start forest
day and last until 0730. During this and supply dump fires, the smoke
last effort air attacks were to be con- from which could obscure targets
centrated against coastal guns, beach ashore for the crucial air and naval
defenses, underwater obstacles, and bombardments of D-day morning.
troop installations. Taking the Navy concerns into con-
MAAF had adopted the program of sideration, Seventh Army and MAAF
bombing German coastal defenses in agreed to stretch out the planned air
the Cape Cavalaire-Antheor Cove campaign, with one proviso. To avoid
area before D-day with some reluc- the risk of disclosing to the Germans
tance. Air planners felt that, to ensure the selected assault beaches early in
tactical surprise at the assault beach- the game, Eaker insisted that his com-
es, the coastal bombardments should mand would divide its efforts more or
extend from the Spanish border all less equally among four potential
the way around to the Italian coast landing areas between 5 and 13
southeast of Genoa. General Eaker, August: Sete and vicinity, the Toulon-
commanding MAAF, believed that, in Marseille region, the Cape Cavalaire-
conjunction with the naval bombard- Antheor Cove coastline, and the
ment on D-day, air attacks could de- Genoa area.
stroy all significant shore defenses in The D-day air and naval attacks
the assault area in less than two days, presented some equally complex
that is, D minus 1 and the morning of problems for the planners. To be ef-
D-day. fective, the bombardments would
Both Patch and Truscott, con- have to start just after first light, but
cerned that surprise not be lost, were air strikes would have to cease early
inclined to agree with Eaker’s esti- enough to allow smoke and dust to
mate. But Navy planners were not so settle, thus providing better visibility
optimistic. Admirals Cunningham and for the final naval bombardment. In
Hewitt, for example, felt that an air addition, the time allocated to naval
bombardment limited to D minus 1 gunfire could not be too long, for the
and D-day, even in conjunction with naval forces in the Mediterranean
THE PLAN OF ASSAULT 83

possessed but limited supplies of am- efforts. Starting from Corsica on D


munition for their larger guns. Bom- minus 1, on a course headed toward
bardment vessels would have to con- Genoa, one section of the group was
serve some ammunition to support to swing northwest about midnight to
operations ashore after the assault. create diversions in the Cannes-Nice
Planners ultimately decided that the area. MAAF planes, dropping various
last concentrated air strikes should types of artificial targets, were to help
start at 0610 and end at 0730, when the naval contingent to simulate a
the naval gunfire support ships were much larger force. A westerly naval
to begin a final, drenching shelling of unit, simulating a convoy twelve miles
the assault beaches. From 0650 to long and eight miles wide, was to op-
0730 naval bombardment was to be erate meanwhile along the coast be-
limited to carefully selected targets in tween Toulon and Marseille. MAAF
the assault area (and mainly to its was to add to the confusion by drop-
flanks), and this was to be lifted when ping dummy parachutists in the same
MAAF bombers were striking the region.
beaches. Such an arrangement de- The final arrangements for air and
manded especially tight coordination naval bombardment, the selection of
of air and naval operations. From H-hour, and the type of landings thus
0610 to 0730 fighters and bombers represented marked departures from
were to give first priority to German previous amphibious operations in
artillery positions, and second priority the Mediterranean. ANVIL'S H-hour
to German installations that might was considerably later than was usual
block the advance inland. The air in the Mediterranean, where previous
strikes were to give special attention landings had taken place under cover
to any German weapons that could of darkness. But earlier assaults in the
not be reached by the relatively flat Mediterranean had been directed
trajectory of naval gunfire. The half against unfortified and virtually unde-
hour (0730-0800) left for the final fended coasts. Accordingly, for the
naval bombardment was a consider- first time in Mediterranean experi-
ably shorter period than normally ence, planners had to arrange heavy,
needed for most amphibious assaults, concentrated air and naval bombard-
especially in the Pacific, but the cir- ment before H-hour on D-day. Final-
cumstances of the ANVILassault left ly, the air bombardment plan for D-
little choice. In effect, the concentrat- day demanded that heavy bombers
ed air bombardment early on D-day execute mass takeoffs during the
would have to substitute for more ex- hours of darkness, another first in the
tended naval gunfire. Mediterranean theater, in order to
In addition to its responsibilities for reach their objectives on schedule.
landing and supporting the assault
forces, Western Naval Task Force also
had the mission of conducting a Beyond D-day
series of diversionary operations.
Task Group 80.4, the Special Oper- Until early August, the Seventh
ations Group, was to make two such Army had no firm plans for the cam-
84 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

paign following the seizure of the of action. 8 First, he suggested that the
beachhead and the capture of Toulon Seventh Army could strike northwest
and Marseille. The ANVIL directive directly from the beachhead to the
from AFHQ directing Patch’s forces Rhone north of Avignon, leaving only
to exploit northward up the Rhone minimum forces in the Marseille area
toward Lyon was extremely vague. Es- to secure the left and to contain
timated German resistance, together German units in the Rhone delta. A
with the logistical problems involved second possibility was to strike gener-
in supporting large forces in southern ally north from the beachhead
France until the port of Toulon at through the Provence Alps toward the
least became operational, made it Grenoble area, over one hundred
appear that Seventh Army and First miles north of Toulon.
French Army forces would not be Wilson apparently regarded the
ready to strike north along the axis of proposed thrust to Grenoble primari-
the Rhone much before 15 October. ly as a means of protecting the Sev-
In early June, well before OVERLORD enth Army’s right flank and stimulat-
began, Mediterranean planners be- ing FFI activity east of the Rhone. But
lieved that it might even be mid-No- Patch and particularly Truscott saw in
vember before Patch and de Lattre Wilson’s suggestions an opportunity
had control over the Rhone valley to exploit whatever weaknesses might
from the Mediterranean north to be found in German defenses be-
Lyon. More detailed plans for future tween the Rhone and the Italian and
operations therefore were not an im- Swiss frontiers. For such purposes,
mediate concern. Truscott already had an exploitation
But as June and July passed and force available, T F Butler. Although
Allied intelligence officers tallied the he had originally planned to employ
German withdrawals from southern it only in a limited role, its missions
France, prospects for more rapid could be easily expanded if the situa-
progress grew accordingly. At AFHQ tion warranted.
Wilson foresaw a possibility that a The VI Corps commander subse-
weakened Army Group G, failing to quently drew up tentative plans to
contain Seventh Army’s beachhead or rush TF Butler to the Durance River
to hold Toulon, would concentrate as soon as the force could assemble
on the defense of Marseille and the ashore. His plans allowed for two
approaches to the Rhone. In such a possible thrusts: one to cross the Dur-
case, Army Group G might leave the ance River and strike west for the
area east of Marseille and the Rhone Rhone near Avignon; or, alternatively,
River valley nearly undefended. Avail- another to drive on north toward
able information indicated that the Grenoble. The latter maneuver, Trus-
Germans had only one understrength cott thought, could develop either
division scattered about this eastern
flank area, a region where, the Allies 8Material on final operational planning is from
knew, the FFI was strong and active. Memo, SACMED to CG Seventh Army, 11 Aug 44,
sub: Opn DRAGOON; Min, SACMED (and AFHQ
With this information, Wilson, on Joint Plng Staff) Mtg, 10 Aug 44 (both in AFHQ
1 1 August, proposed two new courses files); and Truscott, Command Missions. p. 407.
THE PLAN OF ASSAULT 85

into a swing west to cut the Rhone posts in the assault area; and informa-
valley between Avignon and Lyon, or tion on units at and near the assault
into a drive through Grenoble to beaches, while generally correct, was
Lyon. With quick success by T F sometimes erroneous in detail. De-
Butler, VI Corps would be in a posi- spite these shortcomings, however,
tion to outflank German defenses the information available was fairly
along the lower Rhone and to block complete and accurate.
an Army Group G withdrawal up the Seventh Army intelligence estimates
Rhone valley. But the feasibility of placed German strength in the coastal
such projects depended on the speed sector from the Rhone delta east to
with which the Seventh Army reached the Italian border at approximately
the blue line, the strength of opposi- 115,000 troops, a figure that was
tion in the beachhead area, and Army probably too high by at least 15,000.
Group G’s reaction to the ANVIL as- On paper, the Germans appeared to
sault. have sufficient force to put up a
strong defense, but the Seventh Army
Allied Intelligence knew that many German units were
not up to strength and that many
Because of the prodigious Allied in- others were second-rate formations.
formation collection effort, including German coastal defenses were known
the highly secret ULTRA intercept to be fairly strong in some locations
program, the Seventh Army had a but quite weak in others, and avail-
reasonably accurate picture both of able information indicated that the
the organization and strength of the defenses lacked depth. Once Allied
German forces in the ANVILassault forces pushed through the narrow
area and of German deployments all belt of German coastal defenses, Sev-
along the Mediterranean coasts of enth Army planners felt that they
France and Italy.9 The main problem would encounter few other prepared
facing intelligence personnel was to defensive installations except at
keep up to date with the constant Toulon and Marseille. Seventh Army
movement of German units in and intelligence estimated the German
out of southern France since OVER- Toulon garrison at 10,000 troops and
LORD began. Due to the frequency of the Marseille defenders at 15,000 (ac-
these movements, the Seventh Army tually, the Germans had 13,000 men
did not have completely accurate in- at Toulon and 18,000 at Marseille).
formation on the specific location of The garrisons were known to include
German corps and division command not only German Army infantry and
artillery, but also engineer, antiair-
craft, and fortress troops, communica-
9This subsection is based mainly on Seventh tions and supply units, and various
Army G–2 records, Jul-Aug 44; Annex 1, Intel, to
VI Corps FO 1, 30 Jul 44, and Amend 1, 7 Aug 44; navaI personnel.
Annex A, Characteristics of Theater and Enemy The Allies also knew that there
Strength, to WNTF Opn Plan 4–44, 24 Jul 44; and would be little danger from German
French Army B, Personal and Secret Directive No. 1
on Operation DRAGOON,6 Aug 44, in Annex II of
air and naval forces. ANVILplanners
de Lattre, Histoire (French language edition). put Luftwaffe strength in southern
86 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE
France around 250 aircraft, of which But with the many deception efforts
less than two-thirds would be oper- undertaken, the Allied planners felt
ational on 15 August. Considering the reasonably confident that the Ger-
demands of the current battles in mans would be unsure of the precise
northern France and Italy, they ex- date and location of ANVILuntil 14
pected that the Luftwaffe would not be August, and even then the defenders
able to send any significant reinforce- would not be completely certain until
ments to southern France and that its the Allied landing craft were actually
operations during the landings would sighted heading toward the shore. In
be limited to scattered torpedo- addition, Seventh Army planners be-
bomber attacks and some night mine- lieved that A m y Group G would not be
laying sorties, with fighters probably able to oppose the initial landings ef-
used for air defense only. fectively nor those of the French
Admiral Hewitt’s staff considered follow-up divisions.
German naval strength in southern The main problem facing Allied in-
France insignificant. With approxi- telligence officers was ascertaining the
mately one destroyer, seven corvettes, German response once the Seventh
five torpedo boats, five or six subma- Army was ashore. They estimated that
rines, and miscellaneous small auxilia- neither OB West nor OB Southwest
ries-and it was doubtful that the would be able to reinforce A m y Group
destroyer or the submarines were G after the ANVIL assault. Neverthe-
operational–they deemed the Ger- less, they believed that A m y Group G’s
mans incapable of significant offen- most probable course of action would
sive action at sea. be to try to contain the Allied beach-
The Allies had no expectation of head by attempting to hold the Massif
achieving strategic surprise. Believing des Maures. But given the current
that German aerial reconnaissance disposition of German forces, Seventh
would have discovered the obvious Army also believed that the defenders
preparations for a major amphibious would be unable to redeploy enough
assault, they correctly estimated that strength into the Maures to secure
the Germans would expect the attack the range before French and Ameri-
to come along the French Riviera as can forces could move inland and
opposed to the Atlantic or Ligurian occupy the terrain. Faced with strong
coasts. On the other hand, Seventh Allied forces in the hills above the
Army hoped to achieve some degree beachline, the Germans would prob-
of operational and tactical surprise ably fall back on the defenses of
concerning the exact time and place Toulon and Marseille. From Toulon
of the landings. But keeping the 15 the Germans could pose a serious
August target date a secret was difi- threat to Allied lines of communica-
cult. The need to coordinate FFI op- tion, inhibiting all westward advances
erations with the assault considerably toward the Rhone valley. Moreover,
increased the potential for compro- the Germans undoubtedly recognized
mising security, while the final air the logistical importance of the port
bombardment would also give away cities to the Allies. The longer the
the time and place of the landings. Germans held on to Toulon and Mar-
THE PLAN OF ASSAULT 87

seille, the more difficult it would be strength and location of the major
for the Seventh Army to project its German units opposing them. This
combat power far from the landing picture, in turn, enabled them to have
beaches. a better understanding of German
Should the Germans fail to hold the military capabilities and intentions. In
two major ports for an extended a few cases, ULTRA intercepts even
period, Seventh Army planners esti- provided Allied commanders with
mated that Army Group G would with- critical German orders almost before
draw up the Rhone valley, making the designated recipients had received
temporary stands at successive delay- them in the field.
ing positions. However, they consid- ULTRA, however, also had its
ered it unlikely that the Germans drawbacks and limitations. First, raw
would start withdrawing up the intelligence was often of limited value
Rhone valley until Army Group G had until it could be correlated with other
begun to exhaust its defensive poten- information sources-prisoner of war
tial in the coastal sector. This deple- reports, air reconnaissance, captured
tion, Seventh Army estimated, would documents, and observations of tacti-
probably not occur until the fall of cal ground units on the battlefield.
Toulon, expected about 5 September. Second, many key military decisions
were made by the Germans during
The Role of ULTRA command conferences, and detailed
plans were normally hand-carried by
During these discussions the Sev- staff liaison officers, with little of this
enth Army intelligence staff undoubt- information ever being transmitted
edly benefited greatly from the infor- directly through wireless communica-
mation derived from ULTRA, code tions. As a result, ULTRA was often
name of the now Anglo-American op- mute regarding specific German in-
eration for intercepting, decoding, tentions. In addition, both OKW and
and disseminating the radio commu- OB West, and even Hitler, sometimes
nications of the German high com- gave field commanders a wide degree
mand. Raw ULTRA information of latitude in carrying out their mis-
would in fact be available to the prin- sions (or sometimes orders were ig-
cipal American commanders in south- nored), further reducing the value of
ern France-Generals Devers, Patch, ULTRA in revealing specific German
anduscott 10 —and to their main operational and tactical intentions. Fi-
staff officers throughout the entire nally, the time between the intercep-
campaign. When correlated with tion of a radio transmission and its
other intelligence, this data usually arrival in a decoded, translated
gave them a fairly good idea of the format at the field commands was
opposing order of battle, that is, the normally about twelve to twenty-four
hours, or longer depending on the
10Although corps commanders were normally not significance of the message. For this
privy to ULTRA information, Truscott had been a reason ULTRA information was less
recipient during the Anzio campaign, and various
references in his Command Missions indicate that he useful during fluid combat situations;
still received information via Patch. moreover, it was often only of limited
88 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE
value at division and lower echelons Finally, to put ULTRA in perspec-
where highly perishable tactical intel- tive, the contribution of the O E c e of
ligence often arrived too late to be Strategic Services (OSS) intelligence
significant. Thus, although ULTRA networks established in southern
was of undisputed value in outlining France under Henry Hyde should also
the general German military situation be noted. Based in French North
on the battlefield, it in no way obviat- Africa, Hyde’s organizing effort began
ed the need for Allied intelligence approximately one year before the in-
staffs to rely on a wide variety of in- vasion; the final OSS network includ-
formation sources concerning their ed about 2,500 intelligence agents
opponents and to continue their tra- throughout the area held by Army
ditional but time-consuming analysis Group G. These agents usually com-
efforts to turn that information into municated information on German
intelligence useful to the operational military forces to the central OSS
and tactical commanders on the bat- headquarters in North Africa through
tlefield. 11 an extensive and elaborate secret
radio system, and smuggled maps,
11For background documents on ULTRA, see the overlays, sketches, drawings, photo-
NSA/CSS Cryptologic Documents collection in graphs, and similar material through
Record Group (RG) 457, NARA, especially SRH-
023, “Reports by U.S. Army ULTRA Representa- Spain. Hyde himself worked closely
tives with Army Field Commands in the European with the Seventh Army G–2 (assistant
Theatre (szc) of Operations, 1945,” Part II, Tab F, chief of staff for intelligence), Col.
Memo, Maj Warner W. Gardner to Col Taylor,
Office of the Military Attache, England, 19 May 45, William W. Quinn, and Quinn even
sub: Ultra Intelligence at Sixth U.S. Army Group made special arrangements so that he
(hereafter cited as Gardner ULTRA Report); and could receive OSS reports at sea
Tab G, Memo, Maj Donald S. Bussey to Col Taylor,
Office of the Military Attache, England, 12 May 45, during the voyage to the assault area.
sub: Ultra and the U.S. Seventh Army (hereafter From these agent reports, the Sev-
cited as the Bussey ULTRA Report). A large though enth Army was able to piece together
incomplete collection of the messages that had first
been encoded by the German ENIGMA enciphering an even more detailed picture of
machine and then intercepted, decoded, and trans- German dispositions and strength. In
lated by the Allied ULTRA intelligence-gathering fact, on 13 August, just before the
program has been published by the British Public
Records Office and is available at the U.S. Army actual landings, a French OSS agent,
Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, on bicycling from Cannes to Hyeres,
microfilm, but without any finding aids. The data made a final survey of the landing
does not show interception date-time groups for the
original ENIGMA intercepts, and thus messages
cited from this collection note only the sequential Seventh Army SLU chief), 19 Aug 87; interv, Alex-
decoding number and date-time group of the trans- ander S. Cochran, Jr., with Bussey, “Protecting the
mission of the decoded, translated message to the Ultimate Advantage,” Military History Magazine (June
field. However, since decoded intercepts were sent 1985), 42–47 (original draft of interview at CMH);
directly from England to special communications d Funk, “Intelligence and Operation ANVIL/DRA-
units (SCUs) in the field and passed ’directly to spe- GOON.”A good secondary treatment of ULTRA is
cial liaison units (SLUs) on the staffs of the major Ralph Bennett, Ultra in the West (New York:
commands for limited dissemination, and since the Scribners, 1980), which supplements the official
SCUs and SLUs destroyed all copies of these British Intelligence in the Second World War, III, Part 2,
records almost immediately, it is virtually impossible by F. H. Hinsley et al. (London: HMSO, 1988).
for the historian to document the arrival of specific Both cite ENIGMA date-time groups for the inter-
messages and ascertain their disposition. Interv, ception of key ULTRA messages, information that is
Clarke with Col Donald S. Bussey (Ret) (the former currently still unavailable to the general public.
THE PLAN OF ASSAULT 89

areas; the report was quickly cabled combat experience in Italy, all of
to Quinn aboard the Seventh Army’s which eased the compressed tactical
command ship, making any last- planning, training, and loading re-
minute surprises on the assault beach- quirements.
es extremely unlikely. Later, at the re- ANVILtraining emphasized amphib-
quest of Patch and Quinn, the OSS ious loading and unloading proce-
assigned intelligence teams (from the dures including small craft embarka-
Strategic Services Section, or SSS) to tion and debarkation, ship and vehicle
each of the American combat divi- loading, the operations of joint Army-
sions, and the organization continued Navy fire control parties, the tactical
to provide order-of-battle information command and control problems pecu-
to the Seventh Army staffs through- liar to assault landings, and other re-
out the ensuing campaign.12 ULTRA lated matters. Special attention was
was thus only one of many Allied in- also given to the destruction of un-
telligence sources used by the Sev- derwater and beach obstacles. In ad-
enth Army, and only in extremely dition, the estimated strength of
rare instances would it provide infor- German beach defenses demanded
mation that could not have been ob- that some sort of armored support
tained elsewhere. move ashore with the assault waves.
Lacking “amtracks”-the armored,
Final Assault Preparations tracked landing vehicles that played a
critical role in most Pacific amphibi-
Because the Seventh Army did not ous assaults during World War II-
gain control over most ANVILground the Seventh Army had to train select-
assault units until late June-and ed elements of medium tank battal-
some French units not until late ions in the operation of the floatable
July-the time available for final but less stable duplex-drive (DD)
training, rehearsals, loading, and lo- tanks available in the European thea-
gistical preparations was limited. 13 On ter.14 The assault plan called for each
the other hand, many of the assault
units already possessed ample am- 14Amtracks included landing vehicles, tracked
phibious experience, and most of the (LVTs), and landing vehicles tracked, armored
(LVT[A]s); with their high freeboard, they were cru-
remainder had acquired extensive cial for the Pacific Ocean assault beaches, which
normally exhibited much greater wave turbulence
120 n supporting OSS operations, see U.S. War than those located on the European coasts. Not as
Department, The Overseas Targets: War Report of the satisfactory at sea but better once ashore, the DDs
OSS (Officeof Strategic Services),II (New York: Walker, were Sherman medium tanks that achieved flotation
1976), 166–77 183, 187–90, 200, 204–05, 223-48; by means of heavy canvas coverings attached to the
MS, William J. Casey, “Up the Route Napoleon,” lower hull. Raised mechanically, the coverings per-
pp. 3–10 (copy at CMH; hereafter cited as Casey mitted the DD tanks to disgorge from LCTs and
MS); Casey, The Secret War Against Hitler (Washing- make their way shoreward, using propellers attached
ton, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1988), pp. 133–37. Bi- to standard truck differentials (and mounted on the
cyclers with similar tasks were undoubtedly touring tanks sprocket hubs) to move the cumbersome ve-
all possible Mediterranean landing sites to provide a hicles through the water. Since these machines were
cover for the actual reconnaissance. especially vulnerable to underwater mines or obsta-
13This section is based primarily on Seventh Army cles that could put holes in the canvas coverings,
Rpt, I , 71-89; WNTF Rpt Southern France, pp. their crews were trained in the use of the Monsen
166-73; and TF 87 Rpt Southern France, p. 1. Lung, a submarine escape device.
90 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

45TH INFANTRY DIVISION TROOPS LOAD UP AT BAGNOLI, ITALY, August 1944.

division to set eight DDs ashore at ings of vehicles and cargo, while
the time of or immediately after the some landing ships and other vessels
first landing waves. reached the Mediterranean so late
Much of the training for the assault that they could not participate in the
units took place at Seventh Army’s In- final rehearsals. In addition, although
vasion Training Center near Salerno, MAAF aircraft undertook limited air
Italy, although the 3d Division ran its support operations, training staffs
own school at Pozzouli. Participating were unable to incorporate naval gun-
in the training and directing most of fire into the rehearsals, and the nine
the final phases were elements of days remaining between the comple-
Western Naval Task Force. The three tion of the rehearsals and the assault
VI Corps divisions undertook final re- were not enough for extended cri-
hearsals along the Italian coast be- tiques and remedial instruction. How-
tween 31 July and 6 August. Although ever, the previous experience of most
the training of the tactical ground VI Corps units in amphibious oper-
units was fairly complete and realistic, ations had to substitute for more ex-
the lack of time made it impossible to tended training.
undertake more than token unload- The 1st Special Service Force start-
THE PLAN OF ASSAULT 91

ANVIL CONVOY ENROUTE TO SOUTHERN FRANCE, AUGUST 1944

ed its training in early July south of but all glider units undertook at least
Salerno, emphasizing the use of one flight and landing. The entire
rubber assault boats, scaling of cliffs, task force limited its final rehearsal to
and attacks on fixed defenses. The a ground exercise near Rome, and
force undertook final rehearsals on is- completed its preparations for ANVIL
lands off the Italian coast during the by 12 August.
night of 7–8 August–rehearsals that, Final loading and staging for all
Colonel Walker later reported, were seaborne elements began on 8
far more rugged than the actual as- August. Most VI Corps assault units
saults on the Hyeres Islands. The loaded at Naples and Salerno, but CC
French commandos received similar Sudre of the French 1st Armored Di-
training elsewhere. vision came from Oran in North
Many paratroop elements of the 1st Africa. The French 1st Infantry Divi-
Airborne Task Force had received re- sion and the 3d Algerian Infantry Di-
fresher training on Sicily during May, vision staged at Brindisi and Taranto,
and thus preassault preparations fo- ports on Italy’s heel, as did a few
cused on unit training, with special at- smaller French units. The 9th Coloni-
tention to ground tactical operations. al Infantry Division and a Moroccan
A shortage of parachutes in the thea- Tabor regiment boarded ship from
ter precluded final rehearsal jumps, Corsica, and most MAAF units staged
92 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

on Corsica. The rest of First French staging on Corsica.


Army, scheduled to arrive much later, The final D-day convoys comprised
was to be shipped from Italy and approximately 885 ships and landing
North Africa. craft sailing under their own power.
The loading from scattered ports, On the decks of this armada were
the need to keep shipping within loaded nearly 1,375 smaller landing
range of land-based air cover, the craft. Exclusive of naval crews, the con-
varying speeds of the vessels of the voys carried roughly 151,000 troops
assault convoys, naval diversionary and some 2 1,400 trucks, tanks, tank de-
operations, and the pre-H-hour as- stroyers, prime-movers, bulldozers,
saults by the 1st Special Service Force tractors, and other vehicles. Included
and French commandos combined to in these totals were about 40,850 men
force Western Naval Task Force to and 2,610 vehicles of the First French
set up a complex convoy schedule. Army that were to start unloading on D
Each separate group of ships and plus 1. After a few minor problems in
landing craft had to move along care- the final loading and departures, Ad-
fully prescribed routes to make the miral Hewitt was able to report that
rendezvous with other groups at se- “all convoys sailed as planned without
lected times and points. All VI Corps incident and rendezvous were effected
assault units aboard LCTs and LCIs, as scheduled.” 15
together with the 1st Special Service
Force on American APDs and British
LSIs, also had to complete their final 15WNTF Rpt Southern France, p. 173.
PART TWO

T H E CAMPAIGN FOR
SOUTHERN FRANCE
CHAPTER VI

Isolating the Target Area


The first task of the ANVILinvaders critical last-minute German troop de-
was in some ways the most difficult. ployment and that the assaulting
Transporting over 100,000 men force might be in for a surprise. How
across hundreds of miles of ocean fast, for example, could Blaskowitz
and depositing them on a small move the vaunted 11th Panzer Division
number of beaches in a specific order to the beachhead area? The Germans
in the space of about a dozen hours had defended all previous Allied land-
was no small accomplishment, even if ings on the Continent with great
there had been no hostile resistance. vigor, and there was no indication
Yet it was during this period that the that they were about to change their
invading force was the most vulnera- policy in this regard. For this reason,
ble. Although German weakness at the ANVIL commanders knew it was
sea and in the air made the sea jour- crucial to interdict German movement
ney a fairly administrative affair, the into the planned beachhead area with
diverse capabilities of the German any and all means available. Without
forces in southern France guaranteed a successful lodgment, the Seventh
that the reception of the Seventh Army would be unable to make ad-
Army divisions would not be so pas- vances toward Toulon, Marseille,
sive. Mines, coastal artillery, and Lyon, or anywhere else.
radio-controlled air-to-surface missiles Prior to the actual landings, the pri-
were only the initial concerns. A de- mary Allied objective was therefore to
termined German counterattack at the neutralize the projected landing areas
beachline could prove disastrous, by making it as difficult as possible
while the interdiction of the beach for Army Group G to reinforce their
exits and the arrival of strong beach defenses or interfere with the
German forces, including artillery, on Allied advance to the blue line. T o
the surrounding hills could be equally this end the Allies sought to immobi-
fatal. lize the German defenders through-
Although Allied intelligence had out southern France in every way pos-
pointed out the disabilities of the sible. This task was the common
German defenders, there was always objective of the Allied air and naval
the chance that ULTRA or the other campaigns in southern France, the
intelligence sources had missed some FFI ground operations there, and,
96 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

closer to the beachhead, the activities west of the Rhone, threatened to


of the airborne, ranger, and naval as- block the river valley. Alarmed by this
sault forces. threat, the Germans moved against
the FFI concentration in late July with
The French Forces of the Interior (FFZ) a force that included approximately
thirteen battalions of infantry, a para-
ORLORD had provided a great chute battalion, a tank battalion, and
stimulus to the FFI in southern supporting artillery. In the ensuing
France, and during June and July the action, and in related expeditions
southern FFI grew stronger and north of Lyon and into the Massif
bolder as German fortunes waned. Central, the Germans secured the
With Army Group G dispatching unit Rhone valley, although they were
after unit northward to Normandy unable to destroy the highly mobile
and concentrating much of its remain- French guerrillas. On the contrary,
ing strength along the coasts, the FFI Army Group G soon found that its
took control over large areas of focus on the Rhone valley area only
southern France, posing serious made it possible for the FFI to ignite
threats to Army Group G’s two most countless brush fires throughout the
important overland lines of communi- rest of the region.
cation, the Carcassonne Gap and the Sabotage rapidly increased far
Rhone valley. As a result Army Group beyond the capacity of Army Group G
G had to assign an increasingly large to halt or control it, or even to keep
number of tactical units to keep the up with the growing repair and recon-
gap open, and had to take even more struction tasks. For example, between
drastic steps against FFI units threat- 1 and 15 August, the FFI cut rail lines
ening the upper Rhone valley. in the Carcassonne Gap and Rhone
One FFI force even established an valley over forty times and, during the
open resistance government in the same period, destroyed or severely
rugged uplands known as the Ver- damaged thirty-two railroad and high-
cors, southwest of Grenoble, and way bridges in southern France, most
marshaled a standing army of some of them east of the Rhone. The FFI
6,000 armed men to defend it. also established an almost daily
Coming out of the mountains to schedule for cutting both under-
harass German traffic along the ground and overhead telephone and
Rhone valley, these FFI forces, acting telegraph lines; after 6 August Army
in concert with other guerrillas north Group G’s telephone, telegraph, and
of Lyon and in the Massif Central teletype communications with its
forces on the Atlantic coast and with
1 This section is based on Hamilton, “Southern OB West were, at best, sporadic. Be-
France,” ch. 8; and von Luttichau, “German Oper- cause of interference from the moun-
ations,” ch. 6, “The French Resistance Movement.”
For detailed coverage of FFI activities throughout tains of southern France, radio
the southern France campaign, see Arthur L. Funk’s proved an ineffective substitute, and
forthcoming Special Operations and the Invasion of Army Group G often found it easier to
Southern France: SOE, OSS, and French Resistance Coop-
eration with the U.S. Seventh Army, January-September
maintain wireless communication with
1944. Berlin than with OB West near Paris.
ISOLATING THE TARGET AREA 97

Meanwhile, the FFI had become so 5,400 sorties and dropped over 6,400
aggressive that Army Group G was able tons of bombs on German coastal de-
to move only large, well-protected fenses from Sete to Genoa. Beginning
convoys along the highways and rail- at 0550 on D-day, MAAF planes flew
roads of southern France, and had to 900 fighter-bomber and 385 medium-
increase the number of guards at and heavy-bomber strikes against
supply dumps, bridges, and head- German positions in Seventh Army’s
quarters installations. By 7 August the assault area. Danger to Western Naval
situation had reached the point where Task Force (WNTF) vessels close to
General Blaskowitz, commanding shore somewhat curtailed the pre-H-
Army Group G, reported that the FFI hour air strikes in the area of the 36th
no longer constituted a mere terrorist and 45th Infantry Divisions’ assault
movement in southern France, but beaches, for low overcasts that ex-
had evolved into an organized army tended out to sea obscured both the
at his rear. By 15 August the FFI had beaches and the offshore shipping.
virtual control over southern France Therefore, although the air interdic-
except for the Carcassonne Gap, the tion effort proved highly successful,
Rhone valley, and narrow strips along the air attacks against German coastal
the Atlantic and Mediterranean artillery emplacements were less ef-
coasts. Although lacking the strength fective.
to stand up to the larger conventional The results of the naval bombard-
German forces, the FFI severely limit- ment were also mixed. Before 0730,
ed the mobility of Army Group G. spots of low overcast, combined with
smoke and dust raised by the air
Air and Naval Operations bombardment, forced naval gunships
to resort to unobserved fire at many
While the FFI accelerated its activi- points. After 0730 visual conditions
ties, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces improved, and the support ships were
(MAAF) began a widespread air inter- able to move shoreward, concentrat-
diction campaign against the German ing observed fire against the landing
land communications networks, fol- beaches. At 0750 naval fire shifted to
lowed by concentrated attacks against the flanks of the beaches, thereby
specific targets in the coastal areas.2 helping to isolate the individual land-
By 15 August the MAAF had de- ing areas. Combined with air bom-
stroyed almost all important rail and bardment, the final naval shelling was
highway bridges over the Rhone, Dur- generally effective in neutralizing the
ance, and Var rivers, leaving intact major beach defenses and in destroy-
only two or three highway bridges ing underwater and beach obstacles
that were incapable of bearing heavy or cutting paths through these obsta-
military traffic. From 10 August to cles. On the other hand, neither air
0550 on D-day, MAAF flew some nor naval bombardments detonated
most beach-laid mines or mines laid
in. shallow water just offshore. WNTF
2This section is based on Hamilton, “Southern
France,” ch. 11; Seventh Army Rpt, I, 101-05; AAF ocean minesweepers began oper-
III, pp. 420-26:and WF Rpt Southern France ations about 0300 on D-day, but
98 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

found no mines in the deep waters off shore, these detachments landed on
the assault beaches or off the Hyeres Levant and Port Cros just after 0030,
Islands. Shallow-water minesweepers, and the main assault waves arrived
operating closer to the beaches, one hour later.
cleared only a few mines and were The 1st Regiment, 1st Special Ser-
unable to sweep the last 100 yards to vice Force, went ashore near the
the shoreline. northeast corner of Port Cros, while
Guide boats that marked the trans- the 2d and 3d Regiments made their
port assembly and unloading areas assault along the eastern shore of
began taking station offshore about Levant. Despite the fact that the small
0300, followed shortly by ships and garrisons on both islands expected an
landing craft bearing VI Corps assault attack, the Germans offered no oppo-
units. Meanwhile, transport planes sition to the landings, and tactical
carrying the 1st Airborne Task Force surprise was complete. In both cases
had long since taken off from airfields the American rangers had deliberately
near Rome and were winging their landed under broken, rocky cliffs
way toward the Le Muy drop zones; rising vertically forty to fifty feet
subsidiary operations of the 1st Spe- above the water, which apparently the
cial Service Force and French com- German defenders had seen no
mandos had been under way for reason to secure.
nearly three hours. Landing on Levant to the 2d Regi-
ment’s right, the 3d Regiment imme-
Rangers and Commandos diately swung northeast to take out a
battery of German artillery emplaced
Task Force 86, with troops of the at the island’s northeast corner.
1st Special Service Force and the Clearing its area of responsibility
French African Commando Group before 0630, the 3d Regiment found
aboard, left Corsica on the morning only cleverly camouflaged dummy ar-
of 14 August and hove to about five tillery pieces. Meanwhile, the 2d Regi-
miles southeast of Levant island ment had struck southwest, discover-
shortly after 2200.3 At 2300 1st Spe- ing German resistance centered in
cial Service Force troops began dis- ruined fortifications and monastery
embarking from APDs and LSIs into buildings in the west-central section
rubber assault boats, which LCAs and of the island. Most of the Germans
LCPRs then towed shoreward. Shortly surrendered during 15 August, and
after midnight the leading waves, car- all fighting was over on Levant by
rying scouts and security detachments 2030 that evening. The task had cost
to serve as guides for the main eche- the 1st Special Service Force about 10
lons, started toward the islands. Cut- men killed and 65 wounded, for ap-
ting their tows 750 to 1,000 yards off- proximately 25 German soldiers killed
and 110 captured.
On Port Cros, also scheduled to fall
3Material on the seizure of Levant and Port Cros on D-day, operations did not go ac-
is from TF 86 Action Rpt Southern France; 1st Sp
Serv Force Unit Jnl, 14–17 Aug 44; and 1st Sp Serv cording to plan. Initially the 1st Regi-
Force After Action Rpt (AAR), Aug 44. ment encountered little opposition
ISOLATING THE TARGET AREA 99

and by 0630 had secured the eastern 0045. Meanwhile, a lone scout was to
quarter of the island. But the German go ashore to mark landing sites for
garrison withdrew to prepared posi- the main body at Rayol Beach, two
tions in thick-walled old forts and in miles east of Cape Negre; at 0050 two
an old chateau at the island’s north- ten-man parties would follow to
west corner. Infantry assaults against secure the rocky points off both
the structures proved useless and air flanks of Rayol Beach, and at 0100
and naval fire support ineffective–the the main force would land.
8-inch shells fired by the heavy cruis- Chance and human error quickly
er USS Augusta during the afternoon upset these elaborate plans. A light
simply bounced off the walls, and the westerly current pushed the leading
rockets and light bombs that MAAF Cape Negre craft off course, while a
planes directed against the forts early low haze made it impossible for cox-
on the 17th proved equally innocu- swains to identify landmarks. The
ous. Finally, late on the morning of LCAs that followed also drifted to the
the 17th, twelve rounds from the 15- west, with the result that all of the
inch guns of the British battleship groups ended up landing a mile or so
HMS Ramillies convinced the Germans west of their objectives. But despite-
that further resistance was futile. The or perhaps because of—the mixups,
capture of Port Cros cost the 1st Spe- the commandos had a surprisingly
cial Service Force 5 men killed and 10 easy time once ashore; several of the
wounded, while the Germans lost 10 scattered teams caught the Germans
killed and 105 captured. completely unawares. The comman-
At Cape Negre the French African dos on Cape Negre quickly overran
Commando Group encountered con- some artillery emplacements, cleared
siderably more difficulty gaining the five or six pillboxes or bunkers, and
shore than the American rangers. 4 by daylight had established a strong
The vessels carrying the French force roadblock on the coastal highway at
broke off from the rest of Task Force the inland base of the cape, turning
86 at 2155 on the 14th and started back a German counterattack at 1100.
the commandos shoreward about Meanwhile, those landing to the east
2230. Plans called for two LCAs to of Cape Negre cleared the Rayol
land some sixty commandos on a Beach area and established a second
rocky, cliff-faced beach at the south- block on the coastal road. About
eastern corner of Cape Negre at
5T h e commandos had landed expecting to find
4Material on the African Commando Group’s op- two to four coast defense guns in the 150-mm. to
erations is mainly from the following: Groupe de 167-mm. caliber range. But, as far as can be ascer-
Commandos d’Afrique, Compte-Rendu d’Opns, 15- tained from official records and Bouvet’s account,
24 Aug 44; Georges R. Bouvet, “Un Debarquement they actually found two empty emplacements that
de Commandos (Nuit du 14 au 21 Aout 1944): I’O- were probably alternate positions for 105-mm. artil-
peration du Cap Negre,” in Revue Milztaire d’lnforma- lery of the 242d Division. Jacques Robichon’s The
tion, No. 152 (April 1950), 15–20, and No. 153 (May Second D-Day (New York: .Walker, 1969) claims that
1950), 13-20: TF 86 Action Rpt Southern France; three guns were destroyed at Cape Negre, one
TG 86.3 Action Rpt Southern France: 7th Inf Jnl, three-inch and two six-inch (pp. 112-13); but this is
15 Aug 44; 7th Inf S–3 Rpt 1, 16 Aug 44; and Sev- based primarily on interviews and differs from offi-
enth Army Rpt, I, 108. cia1 records in many details.
100 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

CAPENEGRE

1300, troops of the 7th Infantry, 3d tion of the main beaches encountered
Division, reinforced the commandos severe difficulties. 6 Carried forward
at the roadblock. from Corsica aboard PT boats, the
In the meantime a third group of sixty-seven men of the French Naval
commandos had struck out north of Assault Group started ashore from
the beach toward the town of La rubber assault boats about 0140, dis-
Mole, over three miles inland. Scat- embarking on a rocky shore at Deux
tered German troops offered some Freres Point, a mile south of
resistance along the way, but by 1215 Theoule-sur-Mer. But as the naval
the commandos had cleared the town troops started inland toward the
and had captured a battery of artillery coastal road, a quarter-mile away,
emplaced on high ground nearby. they walked into an extensive mine-
Elements of the 7th Infantry reached field only recently emplaced. The first
La Mole shortly after 1630. detonation caused several casualties
On the far right (northeastern)
flank of the Seventh Army’s assault 6Information on the French Naval Assault Group
operations is from Groupe Naval d’Assault de
area, the attempt by the French Naval Corse, Compte-Rendu d’Opns; TG 80.4 Opns Rpt
Assault Group to complete the isola- Southern France; and 141st Inf Jnl, 16 Aug 44.
ISOLATING THE TARGET AREA 101

and alerted the Germans; at daylight, ing to find breaks in the inland fog.
still trapped in the minefield, the In the end, of the nine pathfinder
French group was forced to surren- teams that started dropping about
der.7 Nevertheless, although the naval 0330 on 15 August, only three, all
soldiers had failed to establish a from the British 2d Independent
blocking position along the coastal Parachute Brigade, landed in their
road, their activities, along with those proper drop zones. Two American
at Cape Negre, diverted German at- teams landed on the northern slopes
tention away from the main landing of the Esterel, thirteen miles east of
area. Le Muy; another dropped into hill
country eight miles east of the town;
The 1st Airborne Task Force and three more, which landed closer
to Le Muy, were unable to orient
The paratroopers of the 1st Air- themselves on the ground until dawn.
borne Task Force had mixed success, The lack of pathfinders and the
and their assault was accompanied by continued poor visibility over the
the initial confusion that characterized drop zone severely hampered the
most Allied airborne efforts during main airborne assault. The pilots fer-
the war.8 Trouble began as the lead- rying the 509th Parachute Infantry
ing troop carrier aircraft came in over Battalion and the 463d Parachute
the coast of southern France and pre- Field Artillery Battalion, the first siza-
pared to drop pathfinder teams that ble American units to drop, found no
would mark the drop zones for the signals from the ground to guide
main force of paratroopers. The them to the proper zone, which was
pilots found the area around Le Muy centered in broken, partially wooded
completely obscured by ground fog terrain about two miles southeast of
up to 800 feet thick, forcing them to Le Muy. Again using blind navigation,
drop the teams using only rough one group of aircraft of the 509th’s
navigational estimates. Such dead serials sent two companies of para-
reckoning inevitably led to error and chute infantry and two batteries of ar-
was compounded when some planes tillery groundward over the correct
went farther off course while attempt- drop zone at 0430. A second group of
planes, however, strayed off course
7On 16 August, after elements of the 36th Infan- and dropped one infantry company
try Division located some survivors, the roster of the
French Naval Assault Group stood at 10 men killed,
and two artillery batteries into the
17 wounded (and recovered), 28 missing (and pre- hills south of St. Tropez, nearly fif-
sumed taken prisoner), and 12 unscathed (and re- teen miles southeast of Le Muy. In
covered); two days later 6 of the missing turned up,
leaving the total casualty list at 49 of the 67 who
toto, only about half the 509th’s bat-
had landed. talion combat team landed in or close
8This section is based on AAF III, pp. 427-31; to its proper drop zone.
G–3 HQ Rpt on A/B Opns in DRAGOON; and the
official records of the 1st ABTF, the 517th Prcht As the night wore on, the confusion
RCT, the 509th Prcht Inf Bn, the 550th Gli Inf Bn, grew worse. None of the troopers of
and the 1st Bn, 551st Prcht Inf. For a popular treat- the 517th Parachute regimental
ment, see William B. Breuer, Operation Dragoon: The
Allied Invasion of the South of France (Novato, Calif.:
combat team landed on their assigned
Presidio, 1987). drop zones, which were centered on a
102 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

flat, cultivated area over two miles possible. Most of the 1st and 2d Bat-
west of Le Muy. Exiting from their talions, 5 17th Parachute Infantry,
planes about 0435, most of the sol- managed to reach their assigned as-
diers from the 1st Battalion, 517th In- sembly areas shortly after dawn on 15
fantry, were scattered from Trans-en- August, and the British troops who
Provence, four miles northwest of Le had landed near Callas marched to
Muy, to Lorgues, six miles farther their proper area later in the morn-
west. Much of the regiment’s 2d Bat- ing. But the bulk of the American and
talion landed one or two miles north- British troopers who had landed out-
west of Le Muy in the vicinity of La side of the immediate Le Muy area
Motte, but about a third of the battal- were unable to join their parent units
ion’s paratroopers found themselves until D plus 1, and the 1st Airborne
on rising ground east and northeast Task Force did not collect the last
of the town. The 3d Battalion of the scattered elements of the parachute
5 17th dropped along an east-west line drop until D plus 5. A later count re-
almost six miles long and about vealed that less than 40 percent of the
twelve to fourteen miles northeast of paratroopers of the predawn lifts
Le Muy, while approximately a bat- landed in the assigned drop zones,
tery of the regiment’s 460th Para- and by 0600, as dawn arrived, only
chute Field Artillery Battalion landed about 60 percent of the men of the
in rising ground just northwest of first parachute lifts had been assem-
Frejus, some twelve miles southeast bled in the Le Muy area.9
of its assigned drop zone. Still others Follow-up parachute and glider
were blown far and wide in ones and landings were scheduled to start at
twos and, outside of a few that landed 0815 on 15 August, when gliders were
in the ocean, many had difficulty later to bring in artillery and antitank units
reconstructing exactly where they had of the 2d Independent Parachute Bri-
first touched down. gade. But fog still blanketed the land-
With two of its three pathfinder ing areas north of Le Muy when the
teams operating their ground radar planes towing the brigade’s gliders ar-
sets to mark the drop zones, the Brit- rived. The aircraft, without cutting
ish 2d Independent Parachute Bri- their tows, thereupon turned back to
gade did a little better. Starting the their Rome area airfields; ultimately
assault about 0450, half of the 4th they returned to release the gliders in
Parachute Battalion, one company of the Le Muy area about 1800. The land-
the 5th Parachute Battalion, and the ings of other gliders carrying elements
bulk of the 6th Parachute Battalion, of the 1st Airborne Task Force head-
totaling something less than two- quarters and support troops were de-
thirds of the brigade, landed in cor- layed about an hour, and did not start
rect drop zones. Most of the remain- until about 0930. The 1st Battalion,
ing paratroopers were scattered over
a wide area roughly nine miles north- 9The situation described here contrasts with the
east and northwest of Le Muy. statement in AAF III, p. 428, that only 20 of the
nearly 400 aircraft assigned to the parachute oper-
Once on the ground the paratroop- ation missed the proper drop zones by “an appre-
ers tried to regroup as quickly as ciable distance.”
ISOLATING THE TARGET AREA 103

AMERICAN AND BRITISH PARATROOPERS TAKE A SHORT BREAK, D-day 1944.

551st Parachute Infantry, jumped with- the gliders’ wings, caused ground
out incident into the 517th regiment’s loops, and otherwise made a sham
drop zone beginning at 1810, as bles of the glider landing zones. More
planned, while the 550th Infantry Air- trouble stemmed from the fact that
borne Battalion came in via gliders at the first gliders to arrive set down in
1830, also on schedule. Other units the best and clearest areas instead of
that came in by glider late in the day- in their assigned zones; as later
such as the 602d Glider Field Artillery groups arrived, they found the best
Battalion-likewise landed on or near spots already packed with grounded
schedule. gliders, thus forcing the pilots to
The Germans had planted anti- select less desirable, rougher areas. In
glider obstacles throughout much of the end, only 50 of some 400 gliders
the Le Muy area, mostly using stakes used in the airborne operation were
about twelve feet tall and six inches salvageable. Fortunately, damage to
thick, dug at least two feet into the cargo and passengers was minimal-
ground. In some cases these sticks, only about 80 incapacitating casual-
deliberately sunk shallow and loose ties among the paratroopers and
by French workers, served mainly as about 150 among the troops who
breaking power for the gliders, but in came in by glider, not counting 16
most instances the stakes snapped off glider pilots killed and 37 injured.
104 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

The total of about 230 jump and had not appreciably affected the 1st
glider casualties represented only 2.5 Airborne Task Force’s operations and
percent of the nearly 9,000 airborne may, on the contrary, have created di-
troops who arrived in southern versions that helped confuse the
France on D-day. Thus by 1900 on German reaction to both the airborne
the 15th, D-day evening, about 90 and amphibious assaults.
percent of the troops and equipment Complementing the air, naval,
borne by gliders were ready for guerrilla, commando, and parachute
action. operations was a series of widespread
Fortunately for the paratroopers deception efforts associated with
who landed early, German resistance almost every aspect of ANVIL.For ex-
was light, and, except in Le Muy ample, in the weeks immediately pre-
proper, the troopers experienced only ceding the invasion, the OSS and FFI
a few minor skirmishes as they moved had established dummy broadcast cir-
to assembly areas and objectives. By cuits and inserted an ever-increasing
the time German reinforcements stream of false messages into their
began to trickle in late in the day, the radio nets to mislead any German lis-
paratroopers had secured high ground teners regarding the focus of the
along both sides of the Argens River Allied intelligence-gathering effort,
east of Le Muy, had occupied hills thereby concealing the general land-
overlooking the Toulon-St. Raphael ing area. The air attacks that were
corridor in the vicinity of Les Arcs, five spread out along the coasts of south-
miles west of Le Muy, and had cleared ern France and northwestern Italy
several small towns of German troops. served the same purpose. On the eve
A formal juncture with the main of D-day, the Allies also arranged for
ground forces began that night about the appearance of dummy, booby-
2030 when troops of the 509th Para- trapped paratroopers, air-released
chute Battalion met a patrol from the strips of tin foil, and paraded a small
45th Division’s reconnaissance troop. boat flotilla past Marseille to simulate
Le Muy itself remained in German an invasion. To the east, another
hands for the time being. The com- mock invasion fleet by U.S. Navy PT
mander of the 2d Independent Para- boats and other small craft led by Lt.
chute Brigade judged that the scat- Cmdr. Douglas E. Fairbanks (USNR),
tered drop, together with the initial a well-known American cinema star,
failure of the gliders to land his artil- steered past Genoa and caused a
lery and antitank weapons, left him ruckus near Cannes. However, al-
insufficient strength to launch an though Radio Berlin later announced
attack against what appeared to be a that the German garrison at Marseille
strongly defended town. However, had repulsed a major Allied invasion,
except for the seizure of Le Muy, the neither the German radar operators
1st Airborne Task Force had executed nor the German commanders were
its D-day missions, establishing strong taken in by these last-minute ruses. 10
blocking positions along the Argens
valley and further isolating the beach 10 See Morison, The Invasion of France and Germany,
area. The scattered parachute drop pp. 249-50; Casey MS, pp. 2-3.
ISOLATING THE TARGET AREA 105

The First German Reactions drops near Le Muy began arriving at


Avignon around 0600. Meanwhile,
For the Germans, the first confir- both wire and radio communications
mation that a major Allied assault was began breaking down throughout the
imminent came about 2330 on 14 Nineteenth Army’s area, and General
August, when ships of the Western Wiese, the army commander, contin-
Naval Task Force bombarded shore ued to receive most of his informa-
installations in the Marseille area, and tion about the airborne operation
MAAF planes began dropping dummy through OB Southwest channels. Not
parachutists in the same region. 11 until nearly 1030 on D-day did Wiese
Nineteenth Army staff officers first obtain local confirmation of the air
thought that the main Allied assault drop.
might come over beaches in the vicin- One major reason for the delay was
ity of Marseille, but the diversionary that the 1st Airborne Task Force had,
operations deceived the Germans for as an unexpected consequence of its
less than an hour. Next, reports fil- scattered drop, isolated General Neul-
tered into the Nineteenth Army head- ing’s LXII Corps headquarters at Dra-
quarters that attempted Allied land- guignan, seven miles northwest of Le
ings at Cape Negre and on the Muy, and the paratroopers had cut all
Hyeres Islands had been repulsed. wire communications within sight. As
However, not until 0600 on the 15th a result, Neuling soon lost contact
did coastal defense units report that with both Nineteenth Army and his two
Allied troops were actually ashore on infantry divisions, although apparent-
the mainland, and even these mes- ly he was able to direct the 148th In-
sages noted only that German forces fantry Division to start its reserves
were containing assault forces at Cape toward Le Muy before his headquar-
Negre. 12 ters was completely cut off. Had
German intelligence regarding the Neuling carried out the Nineteenth
airborne assault was not much better. Army’s orders of 13 August to move
News of the approach of troop carrier the division’s reserves into the Argens
aircraft reached Nineteenth Army head- valley between Le Muy and St. Raph-
quarters at Avignon and Army Group G ael, the task of the airborne force
at Toulouse about 0430 on the 15th might have been much tougher.
from OB Southwest in Italy, and pre- Communications were much the
liminary reports concerning parachute same at Army Group G headquarters.
Shortly after 0800 on the 15th the
11This section is based primarily on von Lutti- telephone lines between Army Group G
chau, “German Operations,” chs. 9 and 10. at Toulouse and Nineteenth Army at
12Times given in German sources are an hour Avignon went Out, probably as the
later than those used in this text. In August the
Germans operated on Zone A time, Central Europe-
result of FFI sabotage. Radio commu-
an Standard Time or British single daylight saving nications between the two headquar-
time, while the Allies operated on Zone B time, ters were also unsatisfactory during
British double daylight saving time. The time differ- the day, and most of the information
ence sometimes causes confusion, but insofar as
possible the text transliterates German times into that General Blaskowitz, commanding
the Allied clock. Army Group G, obtained on the 15th
106 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

actually came from OB West headquar- manding the Nineteenth Army’s coun-
ters near Paris, relayed there from the terattack forces. About 0900 von
coastal area through German naval Schwerin moved to the LXXXV Corps
communications. command post about fifteen miles
Out of touch with both Army Group east of Avignon (and about seventy-
G and the LXII Corps, General Wiese five miles west of Le Muy), with
of Nineteenth Army had to act quickly orders to take command of a provi-
and independently. Before the sun sional division that Wiese was trying
was well up, he had decided that the to assemble for the effort.
main threat lay in the Le Muy-St. The provisional organization was to
Raphael region. The Allied airhead at consist of the 189th Division headquar-
Le Muy would make it relatively easy ters (von Schwerin’s original com-
for Allied ground units to push inland mand); an understrength regimental
from likely assault beaches in the combat team built around the 932d
Frejus-St. Raphael area, and would Grenadiers of the 244th Division; the
severely hamper his ability to assem- headquarters of the 189th Division’s
ble blocking or counterattacking 15th Grenadiers, controlling a total of
forces in the Toulon-St. Raphael three infantry battalions from the 189th
(Argens River) corridor just north of and 338th Divisions; the 198th Division’s
the Maures massif. Accordingly, 305th Grenadiers, which was still west of
Wiese’s first priority was to find and the Rhone; and, for artillery, the
assemble enough forces to clear the Luftwaffe’s 18th Flak Regiment. Wiese di-
paratroopers from Le Muy as rapidly rected von Schwerin to assemble and
as possible. take charge of all or any of these units
Early on the morning of the 15th, that were immediately available and
Maj. Gen. Richard von Schwerin, mount a counterattack toward Le Muy
commanding the 189th Infantry Divi- from the vicinity of Vidauban, in the
sion, had arrived at the 338th Infantry Toulon-St. Raphael corridor about
Division headquarters in Arles, on the eight miles southwest of Le Muy, in
Rhone River some twenty miles south order to destroy the Allied airhead and
of Avignon. A few days earlier, when to assist the presumably trapped LXII
the 338th Division was still scheduled Corps forces at Draguignan.
to redeploy to Normandy, Nineteenth The first unit von Schwerin could
Army had directed the 189th Division find was the regimental headquarters
to take over the 338th’s sector astride of the 15th Grenadiers, which had ar-
the Rhone delta and to assume con- rived from west of the Rhone during
trol of the 933d Grenadiers, 244th In- the morning. He quickly dispatched
fantry Division, which was moving into the unit sixty-five miles farther west
that portion of the 338th’s sector ex- to Le Luc, some six miles west of Vi-
tending from the Rhone east to the dauban, to act as an assembly control
vicinity of Marseille. News of the inva- command. He then drove on to Vi-
sion prompted OB West to cancel the dauban himself, where he found a few
338th Division’s redeployment north- service troops of the 242d Division as
ward, an action that enabled Wiese to well as headquarters personnel of the
hand von Schwerin the task of com- 18th Flak Regiment, but no firing bat-
ISOLATING THE TARGET AREA 107

teries. Moving on to Le Luc, he found About the same time that von
that the command elements of the Schwerin started to go off on his own,
932d Grenadiers had arrived, but the the 148th Division, evidently having
unit’s infantry battalions were still received new orders from either the
straggling eastward. It was now mid- LXII Corps or the Nineteenth Army, fi-
afternoon and the only effective nally began moving a force equivalent
combat unit von Schwerin had under to an infantry battalion (probably part
his command in the forward area was of Regiment Kessler) toward Draguig-
the assault company from his own di- nan. Near Fayence, twelve miles
vision headquarters. northeast of Le Muy, the 148th Divi-
Meanwhile, events had moved so sion’s unit ran into trouble when it
rapidly that the Nineteenth Army was was halted by strong elements of the
about to change von Schwerin’s FFI, reinforced by British paratroop-
orders. Wiese had learned that for the ers who had landed in the Fayence
time being the LXII Corps headquar- area by mistake.
ters was safe at Draguignan. However, In the end, all German attempts on
his fear of a quick thrust up the 15 August to mount a counterattack
Argens valley toward Le Muy by against the landing area failed and,
Allied troops now known to have for at least the first day, the Allied
landed near St. Raphael was becom- beaches appeared safe from outside
ing more pressing. Wiese thus direct- interference. In the interior, the
ed von Schwerin to ignore Draguig- Allied deception operations, the air
nan, and instead to push through the attacks against the Rhone bridges,
Allied paratroopers around Le Muy and continued FFI operations against
and then sweep down the Argens German communications made a
valley to turn back into the sea what- quick response to the initial Allied air
ever Allied forces might have landed and sea assault difficult. Closer to the
in the Frejus-St. Raphael region. beachhead area, the French comman-
By the time von Schwerin had re- dos and the American and British
ceived and digested these orders, paratroopers had positioned them-
dusk was upon him, and the only ad- selves astride the main avenues of ap-
ditional combat strength that he had proach leading to the landing beaches
been able to assemble near Vidauban from the west, effectively isolating the
were parts of two battalions of the beachline. Meanwhile the main assault
932d Grenadiers. With little more than force, which had started ashore over
the equivalent of a disorganized regi- the Cape Cavalaire-Antheor Cove
ment at his disposal, von Schwerin beaches about 0800 on 15 August,
decided to ignore Wiese’s new direc- was encountering unexpectedly weak
tive and continue preparing for an opposition and had begun to pene-
attack toward Le Muy and ultimately trate inland faster and with greater
Draguignan to relieve the LXII Corps strength than most planners had ever
headquarters. dared to hope.
CHAPTER VII

ANVIL
The
B eachhead

On the transport and fire support The 3d Division Lands


ships offshore, first light on 15
August revealed a clear, calm Medi- The first objective of the 3d Infan-
terranean day. Although cool at first, try Division was to secure the squat
variable light surface breezes prom- St. Tropez peninsula on the left, or
ised that temperatures ashore would southwestern, section of the ANVIL
rise sharply during the morning. beachline (Map 6). The area was de-
Coastward, a bank of mist, thickening fended by the fourth, or Ost, battalion
inland into the fog that had helped of the 765th Grenadier Regiment (242d
scatter the paratroopers, partially ob- Division), supported by two field artil-
scured the beaches, leaving only the lery battalions and one coast artillery
forbidding peaks of the Maures and battery. Seventh Army planners had
the Esterel clearly visible. As the fog chosen two beaches for the 3d Divi-
began to dissipate after sunrise at sion’s assault: one on the southern
0638, smoke and dust from air and base of the peninsula off Cavalaire
naval bombardment continued to Bay, and a second at the head of the
keep the coastline hazy, and visibility peninsula just south of St. Tropez.
dropped to as little as fifty yards off Temporarily, the northern side of the
several assault beaches for a while. peninsula, including the narrow St.
Despite all the information supplied Tropez gulf, would be avoided.
by the vast Allied intelligence effort, The 3d Division’s southernmost
no one could be certain of what beach was Alpha Red, located on the
German defenses were hidden by that shores of Cavalaire Bay. The landing
late summer veil.’ area consisted of low, mostly bare
sand dunes backed by a narrow band
1 The principal sources for coverage of U.S. Army of pines twenty to thirty yards deep.
operations in this chapter are the official records of The coastal road, N-559, 2 lay beyond
HQ VI Corps and the 3d, 36th, and 45th Infantry
Divisions and their component or attached units.
Naval source materials include the WNTF Rpt 2During the period covered by this volume, main
Southern France; N-2 Section, Eighth Fleet, Survey French highways and roads had two designations, N
of Assault Beaches, Invasion of Southern France; for National and D for Departmental. The N high-
and the AARs of TF 84, TG 84.1, TF 85, TU 85.15, ways correspond roughly to U.S. interstate highways
TG 85.6, TG 85.7, and TF 87. Information on and the D roads to state routes. Other classifications
German activities derives mainly from von Lutti- for lesser roads existed, but are rarely used in this
chau, “German Operations,” ch. 9. work.
110 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

the pines, while the narrow-gauge the 7th Infantry ashore at 0900 and
railroad that skirted the coast ran par- advance north across the base of the
allel to N-559, swinging inland near peninsula to secure Cogolin, a road
the center of Alpha Red. Cultivated junction town on N-98, about three
fields lay beyond the eastern half of miles inland from the head of St.
the beach; and on the west, rocky, Tropez gulf. Subsequently the 30th
pine-clad foothills rose just inland. Infantry was to push westward along
On the left, Route N-559 passed by a third-class road toward Collo-
the resort town of Cavalaire-sur-Mer brieres, about fifteen miles northwest
and wound south and southwest of Alpha Red and in the heart of the
along the coastal hills to Cape Negre, Maures massif. T o the 15th Infantry,
six miles away; on the right, the coast- landing at Alpha Yellow, fell the tasks
al route turned north at the eastern of clearing the peninsula and seizing
edge of the beach, cutting through St. Tropez. These missions complet-
the lightly wooded, low hills along the ed, the 15th was to assemble in re-
inland base of the St. Tropez penin- serve near Cogolin.
sula for about six miles to the oppo- Air and naval bombardment took
site side of the cape. place generally as planned at both
About six miles northeast of Alpha Alpha Red and Yellow, while mine-
Red, at the end of the peninsula, lay sweepers efficiently accomplished
the 3d Division’s other assault beach, their tasks. About 0715 Apex craft-
Alpha Yellow. The landing area of- radio-controlled LCVPs loaded with
fered over two good miles of excel- high explosives-started shoreward at
lent beach on which the entire 3d Di- Alpha Red. Some hit concrete tetra-
vision could easily have landed. But hedrons armed with mines, thereby
exits were poor. A narrow, one-lane opening channels through these off-
road that might not hold up under shore obstacles; others went on to
heavy military traffic led north to St. detonate on the beach, exploding
Tropez, and there was no direct route mines. Preceded by twenty-one
west across the peninsula to Route rocket-equipped landing craft, the
N-559. leading assault wave at Alpha Red
Alpha Red was the assault beach started shoreward about 0630. The
for the 3d Division’s 7th Infantry regi- rockets blasted the shoreline between
ment. The regimental left was to 0750 and 0756, and were quickly fol-
drive inland about two miles to secure lowed by the first troops and several
dominant high ground and then push DD tanks. One tank hit a mine and
southwestward along the coast via sank, as did two LCVPs carrying men
N-559 toward Cape Negre. The of the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, re-
center was to advance north along N- sulting in sixty casualties. Later waves
599 to the junction with Route N-98 landed generally according to sched-
and be prepared to move southwest ule, although mines, both offshore
into the interior along N-98 about and on the beach, damaged a few ad-
eight miles to La Mole. The right was ditional craft and forced landing con-
to probe into the St. Tropez penin- trol officers to close the right flank of
sula. The 30th Infantry was to follow the beach for some time. The 30th
THE ANVIL BEACHHEAD 111

Infantry started ashore at 0920, sula to the head of the St. Tropez
twenty minutes late, but by 1015 the gulf, where it joined elements of both
regiment and most of the artillery the 3d Division’s 15th regiment and
scheduled for Alpha Red were ashore. units of the 45th Division. The 3d
General O’Daniel, commanding the Battalion, 30th Infantry, passed
3d Division, came ashore at Alpha through Cogolin about 1400 and then
Red about 1045. struck west for Collobrieres, which
Opposition at the beach was negli- fell at 2000, fully twenty-four hours
gible, but inland the 7th Infantry earlier than had been expected. The
came under small-arms, machine-gun, rest of the 30th Infantry started
and mortar fire from elements of the northwest across the Maures from
242d Division. During the morning the Cogolin about 1700; by nightfall lead-
most stubborn opposition centered at ing elements were scarcely five miles
Cavalaire-sur-Mer and nearby Cape short of Le Luc, at the center of the
Cavalaire, but the 3d Battalion, 7th Toulon-St. Raphael corridor.
Infantry, cleared the area by 1030. The 15th Infantry’s assault at Alpha
Accompanied by tanks and tank de- Yellow, executed on schedule, fol-
stroyers, the battalion continued west lowed the pattern at Alpha Red.
astride Route N-599 toward the area Again mines rather than German fire
held by the French African Comman- caused the few casualties suffered. Ost
do Group. Picking up part of the troops of the 242d Division, stunned
French unit, the 3d Battalion probed by the air and naval bombardment,
onward until dusk, halting before a surrendered at the earliest opportuni-
German strongpoint at Layet Point, a ty. The 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry,
mile southwest of Cape Negre and struck directly inland and by 1400 se-
over seven miles southwest of Alpha cured the high ground in the center
Red. of the St. Tropez peninsula, overrun-
In the center the 1st Battalion, 7th ning a German strongpoint in the
Infantry, struck out from Alpha Red process and suffering eight casualties
sometime around noon, pushing while capturing forty prisoners. 3
northwest over rugged coastal foot- On the right, the 3d Battalion, de-
hills of the Maures to reach Route layed by skirmishes with withdrawing
N-98, a mile east of La Mole, at 1630. troops of the 242d Division, reached
On the right the 2d Battalion, en- St. Tropez about 1500 to find that
countering scattered resistance, misdropped troopers of the 509th
moved north along N-559, marched Parachute Infantry Battalion, aided by
into Cogolin during the afternoon, the FFI, had already cleared most of
and then advanced southwest along the town. Remaining resistance was
Route N-98. Both 7th Infantry battal- centered at the Citadel, a medieval
ions joined the French commandos, fortress on the eastern outskirts of St.
who had already cleared La Mole, and Tropez. But before the 15th Infantry
moved into the town at dark.
The 30th Infantry, driving rapidly
3 For action at this strongpoint, the much-decorat-
north from Alpha Red behind the ed Audie L. Murphy, then a staff sergeant, received
7th, cut across the base of the penin- the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC).
112 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

could organize a concerted attack, the destroyed much of the artillery the
paratroopers induced the small Germans had emplaced to defend the
German garrison of sixty-seven men area. O n the morning of D-day, only
to surrender. one 75-mm. gun fired a few ineffec-
The 2d Battalion followed the rest tive rounds at landing craft before an
of the 15th Infantry ashore, marched American destroyer silenced the
overland to the St. Tropez area, and piece. Three 81-mm. mortars on
joined elements of the 30th Infantry Cape Sardineaux let go about sixty
and the 45th Division. Meanwhile, pa- rounds before they too were de-
trols of the 15th Infantry, aided by stroyed, while a 20-mm. automatic
the 3d Cavalry Reconnaissance cannon at the northeastern limit of
Troop, cleaned out bypassed portions Bougnon Bay fired ineffectively for
of the St. Tropez peninsula. By dark some time. Other German weapons in
the 15th Infantry was assembling at the area were in firing condition on
Cogolin in division reserve. D-day, but the weight of the air and
naval bombardment, together with
The Assault in the Center last-minute rocket barrages, discour-
aged the crews. In the end, most of
The 45th Division’s Delta beaches the defenders at gun emplacements
lay along the shores of Bougnon Bay, and other strongpoints in the Delta
about eight miles north of Alpha beach region readily surrendered to
Yellow and across the mouth of the 45th Division troops.
St. Tropez gulf. The division’s land- At Delta Red and Delta Green a
ing areas were again defended by few rounds of mortar fire and some
only a single battalion, the 1st Battal- small-arms fire harassed the 157th In-
ion of the 765th Grenadiers, backed by fantry’s leading wave, which went
one field artillery battalion and one ashore at 0802. The 3d Battalion
naval battery. Delta Red, southern- swung southwest from Delta Red
most of the Delta beaches, was locat- along Route N-98 toward Ste.
ed about a mile and a half north of Maxime, encountering only weak,
Ste. Maxime, and the others, Green, scattered opposition in the area. At
Yellow, and Blue, were a few miles Ste. Maxime resistance was more de-
farther up the coast, separated by termined, and the battalion had to
500- to 1,000-yard stretches of less call on naval gunfire support before
hospitable shoreline. Behind the securing the town about 1530. Then,
beaches, Route N-98, hugging the led by a platoon of light tanks from
coastal contours, pointed the way the 117th Cavalry Squadron, the bat-
southwest to Ste. Maxime and north- talion moved on to the southwest,
ward to St. Raphael. Rising, cultivated halting at dusk along the western
slopes led inland for about half a mile shore of the St. Tropez gulf after
before giving way to the steeper, meeting troops from the 3d Division.
wooded hills of the Maures. The 1st Battalion, 157th Infantry,
No offshore obstacles existed at the landed unopposed at Delta Green and
Delta beaches, and the preassault air advanced generally through the
and naval bombardment had already Maures along a stream valley to Plan
THE ANVIL BEACHHEAD 113

de la Tour, about five miles inland that, about 2030, met elements of the
from Ste. Maxime. T h e 2d Battalion 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion
followed the 3d ashore over Delta south of Le Muy. The 45th Division
Red and moved without opposition had not required the services of its
onto high ground some three or four third regiment, the 179th Infantry, on
miles west and southwest of Ste. D-day, and the unit landed without
Maxime. incident to assemble in reserve near
In the 45th Division’s center, the Ste. Maxime.
2d Battalion, 180th Infantry, started
ashore at Delta Yellow about 0758, The 36th Division on the Right
encountered negligible resistance,
and at dusk was in control of high As fortune would have it, the Ger-
ground four miles northwest of its mans had concentrated most of their
beach, pushing deeper into the defenses in the area to be assaulted
Maures. At Delta Blue on the right by the “hard luck” 36th Division. T h e
the 1st Battalion encountered little short stretch of coastline between the
opposition (although land mines dis- mouth of the Argens River north to
abled four DD tanks), but ran into in- Antheor Cove was defended by the
creasingly stubborn resistance as it 765th Grenadier Regiment’s 2d Battalion,
swung north along Route N-98. By backed by a field artillery battalion, a
dusk the main body was scarcely a naval battery, and the 1038th Antitank
mile and a half beyond Delta Blue, al- Battalion. The area included the small
though other elements, having port of St. Raphael and, slightly
marched over hills just inland, had inland, the town of Frejus. In addi-
reached N-98 a mile and a half far- tion, the 3d Battalion, 765th Grenadiers,
ther north. During the evening, pa- was in reserve in the Frejus region,
trols probed northward to St. Aygulf, and the fourth, or Ost, battalion of the
four miles north along Route N-98 239th Grenadiers (148th Division) held
from Delta Blue, and found well-de- the area north of Antheor Cove for
fended German strongpoints at the six miles to Theoule-sur-Mer.
southern edge of town. The primary beach of the 36th Di-
The 3d Battalion, 180th Infantry, vision was Camel Green, where the
drove due north and inland from 2d and 3d Battalions of the 141st In-
Delta Blue, following a poor road fantry, 36th Division, were scheduled
over rough, semiforested hills. The to land. Situated a little over three
battalion ran into strong resistance miles east of St. Raphael, the landing
from elements of the 242d Division area was backed by a steep embank-
and at dark was still maneuvering to ment on top of which ran Route N-98
clear high ground about two miles and the main-line, standard-gauge
north of Delta Blue. Late in the after- railroad, which emerged from the
noon a platoon of the 45th Recon- Toulon-St. Raphael corridor at St.
naissance Troop struck northward Raphael to continue along the coast
from Ste. Maxime along a third-class toward Cannes and Nice. Beyond the
road (D-25) that led to Le Muy, embankment were stone quarries cut
twelve miles away. It was this platoon deep into the sharply rising, scrub-
114 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE
covered hills of the Esterel. Three the discharge of both troops and
miles northeast of Camel Green lay cargo. The Camel Red region was
tiny Camel Blue, the assault beach for also the logical area in which to estab-
the 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry. Situ- lish a base for a major thrust toward
ated at the head of Antheor Cove, the Le Muy and objectives farther west.
beach gave way a scant ten yards Once ashore at Camel Red, the
inland to the Route N-98 embank- 142d Infantry was to strike inland for
ment, beyond which the main railroad about a mile to clear Frejus and then
crossed a narrow gorge via an eight- push westward along Route N-7
span bridge. toward the 1st Airborne Task Force.
T o the 141st Infantry fell the task If necessary, the regiment was to help
of carrying out the main part of the the airborne troops seize Le Muy, ten
36th Division’s initial mission, that is, miles up the Argens valley from
securing the right flank of the VI Frejus. However, because of expected
Corps. Once it landed, the regiment German opposition at Camel Red, the
was to concentrate its efforts on clear- 142d’s assault was not scheduled until
ing the shores of Agay Roadstead, be- 1400 in the afternoon. In the event
tween Camel Green and Camel Blue, that the 142d could not land at Camel
so that the division could use an ex- Red, the regiment was to come
cellent strand at the top of the road- ashore over Camel Green, swing
stead for general unloading. Next, the inland past the 143d Infantry, and de-
1st Battalion was to swing northeast scend upon Frejus and Camel Red
along the coast toward Theoule-sur- from behind.
Mer and La Napoule, at the eastern The landings of the 36th Division
end of the Army beachhead line, a also began on schedule. At Camel
little over six miles beyond Camel Green, the initial assault waves found
Blue. The rest of the regiment was to no underwater obstacles and at first
strike north across the Esterel to the encountered little opposition. From
Army beachhead line and Route N-7, 0900 to 1300 sporadic fire from
which ran along the inland slopes of German artillery on high ground to
the Esterel from Frejus to Cannes. the west and northwest harassed un-
The 143d Infantry, following the loading operations, but caused little
141st ashore at Camel Green, was to damage and few casualties; it was fi-
drive rapidly westward in the opposite nally halted by naval gunfire. At
direction to seize St. Raphael and Camel Blue farther east some ma-
support the landing of the 142d In- chine-gun fire had greeted the first
fantry over Camel Red, the 36th Divi- waves, but all firing ceased by 0900.
sion’s third beach located at the head As at the St. Tropez beaches, many of
of the Frejus gulf. Camel Red gave the Ost troops began surrendering as
direct access to Frejus, to a small air- soon as the American troops ad-
field, and to the road net of the vanced beyond the shoreline.
Argens valley sector of the Toulon-St. By 1000 the 141st had secured
Raphael corridor and, in general, both Camel Green and Camel Blue,
promised to provide the best beaches but at Agay Roadstead the 1st and 2d
in the entire VI Corps assault area for Battalions met stubborn opposition
THE ANVIL BEACHHEAD 115

from elements of the 242d Division, the 142d Infantry was scheduled to
and it was 1700 before the road- make its afternoon assault over Camel
stead’s shoreline was secure. The 2d Red, forward elements of the 2d Bat-
Battalion then headed up a twisting talion, 143d Infantry, had not yet
road across the Esterel; by sunset, reached St. Raphael and could not
about 2030, it was less than a mile assist; and the closest troops of the
from Route N-7 and over two miles 180th Infantry, 45th Division (which
inland from La Napoule.4 The 1st VI Corps had hoped would also be
Battalion, which had to backtrack to able to support the 142d Infantry),
Camel Blue after helping out at the were still a good four miles south of
Agay Roadstead, was two miles north Camel Red at 1400. The 142d regi-
of Blue by dark, having encountered ment would have to make what was
only scattered opposition from 148th expected to be one of the most criti-
Division troops along winding Route cal landings alone.
N-98. The 3d Battalion, relieved at
Green in midafternoon by other divi- Camel Red
sion units, began moving north over
the Esterel along back roads in be- During the morning of 15 August,
tween the 1st and 2d Battalions. The after the success of the main landings
141st Infantry’s casualties for the day was assured, naval and air echelons
were approximately five men killed went forward with preparations for
and twenty-five wounded, almost all the Camel Red assault. Here, for the
incurred during the action at Agay first time, the attackers met consider-
Roadstead. able opposition. The Germans, recog-
The 143d Infantry ran into more nizing the importance of the Camel
opposition to the west. After assem- Red area, had developed a much
bling at Camel Green, its 1st and 3d stronger network of coastal defenses
Battalions advanced west and north- there. Static installations included a
west to secure high ground along the minefield across the Frejus gulf,
slopes of the Esterel and a mile or single and double rows of mined con-
two inland. Closer to the coast, the crete tetrahedrons at the shoreline,
2d also moved west, heading directly and, on the beach, two rows of
toward St. Raphael, but encountered double-apron barbed wire, a concrete
stubborn resistance from a series of antitank wall seven feet high and over
strongpoints controlling N-98, the three feet thick, a twelve-foot-deep
shore road. Mortar and artillery fire antitank ditch on the seaward side of
from the right also harassed the bat- the wall, and extensive fields of land
talion, while scattered groups of mines on the beach, on the nearby
German infantry on hills just inland airfield, and on the roads and paths
helped slow progress. By 1400, when leading inland. There were machine-
gun positions in the antitank wall, and
pillboxes and other strongpoints just
4Under the double daylight saving time the Allies behind it. Larger emplacements, a few
were using, sunset on 15 August 1944 was at 2035;
it did not become completely dark for nearly an-
holding 88-mm. guns, enfiladed the
other two hours. beach from the harbor front at St.
116 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

GUARDS
PILLBOX Supporting installations are behind it.
BRIDGETO ST. RAPHAEL.

Raphael. Inside the town the defend- unscathed by the preassault bombard-
ers had turned many buildings into ment. Infantry in the area included at
lesser defensive works, and booby least two reinforced companies of the
traps and mines were plentiful. Artil- 2d Battalion, 765th Grenadiers (242d Di-
lery dominating the beach included a vision).
battery of 75-mm. guns and another The strength of the defenses was
of 105-mm. in hills south of the soon apparent. About 1100, mine-
Argens River; another 105-mm. bat- sweepers clearing the deep-water ap-
tery emplaced in rising ground a mile proaches came under fire from
north of St. Raphael; two batteries of German artillery that covering de-
100-mm. howitzers on high ground stroyers were unable to neutralize,
northwest of the port; and various and had to retire. From approximate-
light antiaircraft batteries sprinkled ly 1205 to 1220 over ninety B-24
throughout the region. Finally, the medium bombers dropped nearly 200
1038th Antitank Gun Battalion had tons of high explosives in the Camel
zeroed in on Camel Red and its ap- Red area. But when the shallow-water
proaches with eight or ten of the minesweepers darted shoreward again
newest model 88-mm. guns. Towed about 1235, they found that the aerial
from place to place as the occasion bombardment had likewise failed to
demanded, these weapons had been reduce the volume of German fire,
THE ANVIL BEACHHEAD 117

and the minesweepers again retired and naval forces involved.


under heavy shelling. Apex drone Lewis first attempted to consult
boats went in about 1300 and also re- with the 36th Division commander,
ceived fire; all but three of the drones General Dahlquist. Since he and
malfunctioned, and some had to be Dahlquist had prepared alternate
destroyed by Navy ships. plans for landing the 142d Infantry at
Meanwhile, four destroyers, two Camel Green, the admiral knew he
cruisers, and a battleship began a could make the switch with a mini-
final 45-minute bombardment. The mum of confusion. Moreover, reports
assault waves of LCVPs had already from shore indicated that the 36th Di-
formed and, led by rocket craft, start- vision could probably secure Camel
ed shoreward shortly thereafter. At Red by an overland attack, while
1400 the leading wave was about Camel Green was proving to be a far
3,000 yards offshore and under fire better unloading beach than expect-
from German artillery, when Capt. ed. On the other hand, Dahlquist,
Leo B. Schulten, USN, commanding who had been ashore since 1000,
the Camel Red assault group of Task might need the 142d Infantry to land
Force 87 under Rear Adm. Spencer S. at Camel Red for tactical reasons. Ac-
Lewis, temporarily halted the landing. cordingly, between 1400 and 1415,
Initially he decided to postpone the Lewis tried to reach the division com-
assault on Camel Red until 1430. At mander by radio, but, since adequate
the same time, he informed Admiral ship-to-shore communications had
Lewis of the situation and requested not yet been established, the effort
instructions. was unsuccessful. Reluctant to delay
Schulten’s message placed Lewis in his decision any longer, at 1415 Lewis
a dilemma. The T F 87 commander directed Schulten to cancel the Camel
had no desire to cancel the landing, Red assault and land the 142d over
but sending the 142d Infantry ashore Camel Green, which had long since
as planned over Camel Red seemed a been secured by the 141st Infantry.
serious error. Obviously the preas- The 142d Infantry started ashore at
sault bombardment had failed to neu- Camel Green about 1515, and before
tralize the German artillery; the mine- 1600 its leading units had started
sweeping had been incomplete; and north through rear elements of the
the drones had accomplished little. 143d Infantry, which continued its
Admiral Lewis also believed that push southwest along the coast, still
Schulten’s postponement had already encountering determined resistance.
cost them whatever shock effect the Two miles inland from Camel Green
air and naval bombardments might the 142d Infantry wheeled westward,
have had, thus allowing German de- under orders to reach positions from
fenders time to recover and reoccupy which it could launch an attack into
any vacated positions. Chances for Frejus by 2000. However, the dis-
tactical surprise had certainly been tance involved, the slow movement
lost, and sending the assault forces in through the steep, wooded hills, and
now would undoubtedly result in some skirmishing with German
heavy casualties for both the ground units-probably the 765th’s reserve
118 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

battalion-combined to delay prog- across the Maures from Ste. Maxime


ress, and darkness found the 142d’s to lend a hand; and the last defenders
forward elements still three miles of Le Muy surrendered shortly there-
from the town. Yet the prognosis was after.
good. The regiment’s casualties for Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 551st
the day were only five men wound- Parachute Infantry, had set out west
ed-certainly far fewer than there for Draguignan, where elements of
would have been if the unit had made the LXII Corps headquarters still held
an assault at Camel Red-and the out. By 2300 on the 16th, the battal-
progress of both the 142d and the ion had cleared most of the town and
143d together with the airborne captured part of the corps staff as
blocking force had just about sealed well as Brig. Gen. Ludwig Bieringer,
off the entire Frejus area. The only the German military governor of the
serious loss occurred that night when Var department.
the Luftwaffe launched its only effec- West of Le Muy, at Les Arcs, the
tive air sortie against the beachhead; 517th Parachute Infantry had begun
JU-88 twin-engined light bombers to run into the first signs of an orga-
managed to hit and sink LST-282 off nized German response. True to his
Agay Roadstead with radio-controlled decision at dusk on the 15th, General
bombs, resulting in forty casualties von Schwerin had continued prepara-
and the loss of several 36th Division tions at Vidauban to attack toward Le
artillery pieces. Muy and relieve the LXII Corps head-
quarters at Draguignan. By 0700 on
The 1st Airborne Task Force the 16th, he had finally managed to
assemble about four infantry battal-
Since the British 2d Independent ions from the 244th Division, two 105-
Parachute Brigade had failed to take mm. howitzers from the same divi-
Le Muy on D-day, the 550th Glider sion, and a couple of heavy weapons
Infantry Battalion, supported by part platoons and the assault company
of the 509th Parachute Battalion, un- from his former division headquar-
dertook the task shortly after mid- ters. Moving several miles northeast
night on 16 August.5 The two units from Vidauban, the German force
launched their first attack at 0200, split at a road junction just south of
but, making little progress against Les Arcs-one group heading north
stubborn resistance, they withdrew at for Les Arcs, and the other, intending
daylight and returned at 0900 with ar- to strike for Le Muy, temporarily
tillery support. The two battalions holding at the junction.
then pushed slowly into the town. The first German group entered
Toward midafternoon, tanks of the Les Arcs about 0730, threw out a
191st Tank Battalion, attached to the small American outpost, and gained a
45th Division, rumbled up the road foothold on rising terrain north of
town, while the 517th Parachute In-
fantry held along the hills to the
5This subsection is based on the official records
of the 1st ABTF and its components, and on von northeast and east. About 0930 the
Luttichau, “German Operations,” chs. 9 and 10. 517th’s paratroopers were joined by
THE ANVIL BEACHHEAD 119

MAJEN. LUDWIGBIERINGER,A PRISONER OF WAR. General Frederick is on the


passenger side of the jeep.

the 2d Battalion of the 180th Infan- Doomed to failure before it started,


try, 45th Division, which had made its General von Schwerin’s counterattack
way over the Maures massif via back now collapsed, and the remaining
roads and trails. It had passed Germans in the vicinity of Vidauban
through Vidauban–then inexplicably and Les Arcs withdrew to the west
empty of Germans–and, aided by a and northwest under cover of dark-
platoon from the 645th Tank De- ness. During the day’s fighting, the
stroyer Battalion, began clearing Germans had lost not only many
Route N-7, which threatened the heavy weapons and vehicles, but also
German rear. A few hours later, ele- the equivalent of two infantry battal-
ments of the 157th Infantry, 45th Di- ions of the 244th Division against
vision, approached Vidauban from forces of the 1st Airborne Task Force
the south and found the town again and the 45th Infantry Division. The
occupied by Germans, but they man- action at Les Arcs was also the last
aged to clear the area of hostile significant engagement of the 1st Air-
troops by 1530. Late in the day, rein- borne Task Force in the Toulon-St.
forced by its 3d Battalion, the 517th Raphael corridor. By the morning of
Parachute Infantry launched an attack 17 August the airborne forces were in
of its own, and by dusk had virtually firm control of their objective area,
surrounded Les Arcs. including the railroad-highway junc-
120 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

TOPS OF 45TH DIVISIONWADEASHORENEARST. MAXIME

tion towns of Le Muy, La Motte, the southwest, the 7th Infantry, 3d


Trans-en-Provence, and Les Arcs, Division, drove toward Toulon in two
which both blocked the main en- columns-the 3d Battalion and the
trances to the beachhead and secured French commandos along the coastal
the inland approaches to Toulon. road (Route N-559) and the rest of
Shortly before noon on the 17th, the regiment about three miles
major elements of the 36th Division inland along Route N-98. 6 The
began to arrive at Le Muy from the German strongpoint at Layet Point,
Frejus area, and the initial mission of where the Allied coastal force had
the airborne force ended. been halted late on the 15th, fell early
on the morning of the 16th, but the
The Advance to the Blue Line area was not entirely cleared until
almost 1500. Against scattered oppo-
sition, the coastal force pushed on
German opposition during the
night of 15–16 August and through- 6Additional information on 3d Division and com-
out the 16th. was strongest on VI mando operations comes from Bouvet, “Un Debar-
Corps’ far left, beyond Cape Negre, quement de Commandos . . . l’Operation du Cap
Negre,” Revue Militaire d’Infomation, No. 153; and
and on the right, along the Argens Groupe de Commandos d’Afrique, Compte-Rendu
valley for about five miles inland. In d‘Opns, 15-25 Aug 44.
THE ANVIL BEACHHEAD 121

and by nightfall had patrols in Le La- wide area south of the Argens River
vandou, about three miles beyond from Frejus to Le Luc and stood
Layet Point. astride the central portion of the
Starting out from La Mole about Toulon-St. Raphael corridor. Above
0330 on the 16th, the 7th Infantry’s the 45th, units of the 36th Division
inland column halted at 0730 in front had secured the coast on the 16th
of a strong 242d Division roadblock and then pushed scattered German
about seven miles beyond La Mole. elements off the Esterel massif before
Defensive fire and rugged terrain de- swinging west to join the airborne
layed progress for the rest of the day, units at Le Muy. By the 17th they oc-
but during the night the American cupied a broad area on the VI Corps’
units, guided by the FFI, began flank- right flank, from Theoule-sur-Mer, at
ing marches that were to carry them the northern end of the blue line, to
past the obstacle early on the 17th. the region around Draguignan a few
North of the 7th Infantry, the 30th miles northwest of Le Muy.
Infantry regiment also swept west- The 36th Division seemed to work
ward in two columns. About 1000 a harder for its gains. Shortly before
small group started out from Collo- dawn on the 16th, units of the 142d
brieres opposed mainly by 242d Divi- Infantry had entered Frejus unop-
sion artillery, antitank, and mortar fire; posed, but soon became involved in a
it emerged from the mountains about series of minor skirmishes after day-
1600 at Pierrefeu in the Toulon-St. break. They were unable to secure
Raphael corridor. The unit had the town until 1330, and then met
broken through a heavily wooded, further resistance while pushing up
easily defensible section of the the Argens valley that afternoon.
Maures and was a good eight miles Along the coast, the 143d had cleared
west of the Army beachhead line. St. Raphael by 0930, but, as expected,
Meanwhile, other elements of the encountered stubborn resistance from
30th Infantry regiment had reached 242d Division elements in the Camel
Gonfaron, ten miles northeast of Col- Red area. Meanwhile, north of Frejus
lobrieres on Route N-97, the main and St. Raphael, 141st Infantry units
highway through the southwestern ran into a second counterattacking
section of the Toulon-St. Raphael force along Route N-7 in the north-
corridor. By dusk on the 16th the eastern corner of the Esterel. A
main body of the 30th Infantry was German motorized column, probably
assembled at Gonfaron, with patrols consisting of part of the reserve bat-
active to the west and southwest. talion of the 239th Grenadiers, 148th
North of the 3d Division, units of Division, came rolling south along the
the 45th Division that had completed highway early in the morning from
their missions along the coast the direction of Cannes. The infantry-
marched across the northeastern por- men of the regiment’s 2d Battalion
tion of the Maures on the 16th, push- easily dispersed these Riviera rangers,
ing west and assisting the paratroop- who apparently had little knowledge
ers at Vidauban. By the following day, of the rapid American advance. How-
17 August, the division had cleared a ever, to prevent further excursion
122 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE
from this quarter, the 141st regi- they had confirmed the low caliber of
ment’s 1st Battalion and some divi- the German units that were facing
sional engineers moved up to La Na- their forces. Captured documents and
poule, destroying a local highway and interrogation reports showed that the
railroad bridge just south of the town. vast majority of the 2,300 prisoners
taken by Seventh Army units were
A n Appraisal either overage Germans or members
of Ost units. In addition, Allied losses
On both 15 and 16 August the VI had been much lower than expected
Corps had penetrated farther and on D-day, with only about 95 killed
more easily than planners had and 385 soldiers wounded. Further-
thought possible. Except on the far more, instead of rising sharply on the
west, in the sector of the 7th Infantry, 16th as many planners had expected,
VI Corps and the 1st Airborne Task VI Corps casualties were somewhat
,Force had reached and crossed the lower than they had been on the
Army beachhead, or blue, line. By the 15th. Losses of equipment and mate-
end of D plus 1 Truscott’s forces thus riel had also been relatively insignifi-
had a firm hold on the vital Toulon- cant. Despite the misgivings of
St. Raphael corridor, making it nearly Churchill, the ANVILlandings, accord-
impossible for German ground forces ing to the U.S. Navy historian Samuel
to launch a significant attack on the Eliot Morison, had been “an example
Allied beachline. Although German of an almost perfect amphibious oper-
resistance had stiffened somewhat on ation from the point of view of train-
the 16th, it was still spotty and much ing, timing, Army-Navy-Air Force
weaker than expected. In fact, the cooperation, performance, and re-
Germans had failed to make any sults.” 8
strong or coordinated attempt to con- Just about the only major contro-
tain the beachhead, and the VI Corps versy regarding this initial phase
found no indication that the Germans stemmed from Admiral Lewis’ deci-
had any firm front line. Resistance sion to back away from the Camel
had been disorganized and confined Red beach and put the 36th Division’s
to widely separated strongpoints; 142d Infantry regiment ashore on
counterattacks had been highly local- Camel Green. The division command-
ized and uncoordinated with units de- er, General Dahlquist, later approved
fending the beachline. In addition, in- the decision and regretted only that
telligence officers at VI Corps and
Seventh Army could find no indica- 7The figures on the wounded include those car-
tions that the Nineteenth A m y was ried as injured in action; the killed include those
massing forces for a major counterof- who died-of wounds. The figures are approxima-
fensive, and could only assume that tions from incomplete and contradictory informa-
tion in the official Army records. For the first three
the Germans would attempt to delay or four days of the campaign, casualty figures were
further penetrations while preparing not adequately recorded, but as command, control,
stronger defenses at Toulon. and administration procedures formalized ashore,
casualty reporting became more accurate.
The ANVIL commandershad Other 8Morison, The Invasion of France and Germany, p.
reasons to be optimistic. By the 16th 291.
THE ANVIL BEACHHEAD 123

the concerned regiment could not gardless of casualties, had secured


have been scheduled for Camel Green Camel Red during the afternoon of
from the beginning. The delay at 15 August, the beach would not have
Camel Red had wasted six or seven been ready to receive CC Sudre or
hours. On the other hand, he be- any other unit until late on the 16th
lieved that to have planned to land at the earliest.
almost his entire division over Camel Truscott’s own plans had called for
Green would have been unsound. the French armored command to land
Truscott, however, was later extreme- sometime on the 16th, with “first pri-
ly critical of the decision, holding that ority” to Camel Red.10 But Sudre’s
the failure to carry out the assault on force actually landed over the 45th
Camel Red forced his units to spend Division beaches during the night of
an extra day securing the beach from 15-16 August, and was assembled
the land approaches, directly causing ashore earlier than would have been
delays in the landing of Combat Com- the case if it had landed over Camel
mand Sudre and ground echelons of Red on the 16th in accordance with
the tactical air force, which in turn Truscott’s original plans. From its as-
delayed the seizure and occupation of sembly point near Ste. Maxime, CC
airfields near Frejus and in the Sudre could have started north along
Argens valley. According to Truscott, Route N-98 on the morning of the
the net result was the lack of close air 16th and would have reached the
support for the VI Corps in the criti- Argens valley no later than it would
cal days that followed and his own in- have if the unit had landed over
ability to send Sudre’s armored unit Camel Red on the 16th. Truscott
“northwest or north as . . . planned.” could also have sent the unit north
Thus he termed the decision “a grave into the Argens valley over the Ste.
error which merited reprimand at Maxime-Le Muy road on the 16th.
least, and most certainly no congratu- The 45th Division had already estab-
lation,” adding that, “except for the lished liaison with the 1st Airborne
otherwise astounding success of the Task Force along this road, and
assault, it might have had even graver during the afternoon of the 16th a
consequences.” 9 platoon of the 191st Tank Battalion,
Truscott’s criticism appears unjusti- attached to the 45th Division, reached
fied. The 36th Division did not secure Le Muy over the same road. Had
the St. Raphael-Frejus area until mid- Sudre’s armor followed that route on
afternoon on 16 August, and even the 16th, it might well have reached
then the task of clearing offshore and Le Muy considerably sooner than if it
beach obstacles proved to be so great had landed at Camel Red during the
that Army engineers and Navy demo- afternoon of that day.
lition experts were unable to open But the entire matter is academic.
Camel Red for discharge operations Well before 15 August, Patch had de-
until 1900 on 17 August, D plus 2. cided that CC Sudre would have to be
Thus, even if the 142d Infantry, re- returned to de Lattre’s control soon

9Truscott, Command Missions, pp. 414, 418. 10Ibid., p. 397; see also VI Corps FO 1, 30 Jul 44.
124 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

after the landings. Truscott could not opened two days late, three of the
have sent it “northwest or north.” four planned dry-weather fields were
Realizing this, Truscott had made four days behind schedule, and the
plans to put together Task Force rapid advance inland prompted engi-
Butler for a possible drive north and neers to cancel the fourth. On the
northwest of the beachhead area, and other hand, a field at Sisteron, sixty
had expected CC Sudre to attack gen- miles northwest of Camel Red and
erally westward in the region south of not planned before the assault, was
the Durance River. In the end, open on 23 August; a field at Le Luc
Sudre’s armor began to reach the was ready on the 25th, a week ahead
middle of the Toulon-St. Raphael of schedule; and one at Cuers, also in
corridor during the night of 16-17 the Toulon-St. Raphael corridor, was
August, certainly no later than it operational on D plus 12, ten days
could have if put ashore over Camel ahead of schedule. Thus it is unlikely
Red on the afternoon of the 16th in that the failure of the 142d Infantry
accordance with preassault plans. to land at Camel Red on the after-
Truscott’s remarks about delays in noon of D-day had any bearing on
airfield construction and lack of air close air support for the VI Corps
support east of the Rhone are also east of the Rhone.12 Truscott’s post-
difficult to support. Even if the 142d war contentions may signify little
Infantry had landed on Camel Red as more than his frustrations with some
scheduled, it is doubtful that engi- aspects of the campaign that followed.
neers could have begun work on the Certainly for Truscott, the evening
airfields near Frejus before the 17th, of 16 August was filled with both ela-
when surveys actually began. More- tion and expectation. For all practical
over, existing and potential airfield purposes, his forces had gained the
sites in the Argens valley and in the initial objectives that the Seventh
Toulon-St. Raphael corridor were all Army had assigned to them, and had
in VI Corps’ hands as soon as o r ear- done so twenty-four to forty-eight
lier than anyone had expected. 11 But hours before most planners had
the rapid Allied penetration, com- thought possible. The next stage, ac-
bined with adverse soil conditions in cording to the Seventh Army’s inva-
the beachhead area, forced aviation sion directive, was to reorganize the
engineers to make drastic revisions in assault force and mount an aggressive
construction plans; unloading delays drive to the west and northwest. Con-
at both Alpha and Camel beaches also
slowed airfield progress. In the
beachhead area engineers could not 12Air Force reports emphasized inadequate ship-
meet construction schedules: the ping for the air buildup in southern France, unload-
ing problems that resulted primarily from using
crash (emergency) airstrip was merchant ships instead of LSTs for some supplies
and equipment, and transportation problems
ashore. Finally, the very success of VI Corps created
11Additional information on air force planning a major problem for the air forces because, accord-
and construction derives from MATAF Rpt on Opn ing to the official Air Force account, “the battle line
DRAGOON and XII Tactical Air Command Rpt on was so completely fluid that MATAF’s planes could
Opn DRAGOON. not be used for close support.” AAF III, p. 433.
THE ANVIL BEACHHEAD 125

sidering the apparent German weak- mans off balance, making it increas-
ness all along his front, .Truscott was ingly difficult for them to concentrate
eager to begin executing this second enough forces to contain the Allied
phase as soon as possible. A strong beachhead area. With Patch’s approv-
advance inland toward Toulon and al, Truscott issued the new attack
the Rhone would also keep the Ger- orders before dark on the 16th.
CHAPTER VIII

Break out: 17–19August

Eager to take advantage of the Armored Division was also to head


weakness of the German defenders westward to the St. Maximin-Barjols
and their slow response to ANVIL, line, using both N-7 and secondary
Truscott sent his three divisions roads between the 3d and 45th Divi-
inland. He wanted the bulk of the 3d sions.
Infantry Division to continue its ad- On the VI Corps’ eastern flank,
vance on 17 August, first pushing its scattered forces of Task Force Butler
left flank westward to the line of the were to assemble at Le Muy on the
Real Martin and Gapeau rivers, both 17th, reorganize in accordance with
running generally north to south preassault plans, and start probing
under the western slopes of the northwest on the 18th. The 36th Divi-
Maures. 1 Once there, the division’s sion was to relieve the 1st Airborne
left was to hold until the French II Task Force in the Le Muy-Les Arcs
Corps, on or about 20 August, could region and then, leaving one regi-
move up to continue the drive toward ment along the coast to protect VI
Toulon. The rest of the 3d Division Corps’ right flank, be prepared to
was to assemble in the Le Luc-Gon- follow TF Butler. After assembling in
faron area and strike westward along reserve at Le Muy, the airborne force
the axis of Route N-7 to Brignoles, was to move eastward to relieve the
thirteen miles beyond Le Luc, and to regiment that the 36th Division had
St. Maximin, eleven miles farther and left behind.
twenty-five miles directly north of In brief, Truscott’s plans provided
Toulon (Map 7). Meanwhile, the 45th f o r three mutually supporting maneu-
Division was to dispatch one regimen- vers: first, a general pressure west-
tal combat team northwest from Vi- ward along the coast toward Toulon;
dauban to the Barjols area, about second, an outflanking of Toulon to
eleven miles north of St. Maximin. the north (possibly followed by an ad-
CC Sudre (CC1) 2 of the 1st French vance westward toward the Rhone);
and third, a drive northwest by T F
1 Additional planning material for American units Butler and the 36th Division. On the
in this section is from Truscott, Command Missions,
pp. 416–19.
2The French 1st and 5th Armored Divisions nor- 4, 5 , and 6 in the 5th Armored Division. The
mally used numerals to designate their combat com- French 2d Armored Division, in contrast, used let-
mands-1, 2, and 3 in the 1st Armored Division and ters taken from the last names of the commanders.
128 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

left, the advance westward to the Real mated that the Seventh Army posed
Martin and Gapeau rivers would no immediate threat to the region
secure a base area for the attack on west of Toulon, allowing him to move
Toulon and Marseille by the French units east from the Marseille area for
II Corps. T h e push in the center to defensive purposes and replace them
the St. Maximin-Barjols line would with forces from west of the Rhone.
protect the French northern flank and Late on the afternoon of 16 August
threaten the Rhone valley. Finally, the Wiese directed General Baessler,
advance northwest by T F Butler and commanding the battered 242d Divi-
the 36th Division would greatly com- sion, to build up delaying positions
plicate German efforts to hold the along the line of the Real Martin and
lower Rhone and would pose a seri- Gapeau rivers from the coast inland
ous threat to a subsequent German for thirty miles northeast to Vidau-
withdrawal from the area. ban. (Wiese did not yet know that Vi-
dauban was already lost.) To help
German Plans hold this sector, he pulled three bat-
talions of the 244th Division from po-
T h e German commanders spent sitions west of Toulon and assigned
the night of 16–17 August assessing the units to Baessler. About the same
their options.3 With the failure of the time, Wiese directed the 148th Divi-
LXII Corps’ 248th and 242d Divisions to sion, now cut off on the eastern side
halt or even slow down the invasion of the Allied landing area, to employ
and with the collapse of the German whatever units it could find to halt
counterattack in the Les Arcs area on what he believed to be an Allied drive
the 16th, General Wiese, the Nine- along the coast toward Cannes. At
teenth Army commander, concluded this point, he thus had no clear idea
that his major problem was no longer of specific Allied objectives inland.
mounting an immediate, ad hoc as-
sault but rather establishing a defen- Pressing Westward
sive line that would give his combat
forces still west of the Rhone time to T h e rapid Allied advance westward
transfer to the east side of the river, soon made Wiese’s defensive plans
either for defensive purposes or to obsolete. 4 O n the left of the 3d Divi-
build up the strength needed to sion, the 7th Infantry and the French
launch a substantive counteroffensive. African Commando Group moved up
Furthermore, he decided that any new to the Real Martin and Gapeau rivers
attempts to rescue the LXII Corps on the 17th and 18th, encountering
headquarters would be fruitless and
could only disrupt orderly redeploy- 4The general sources of information for Allied
ments. However, on the basis of inad- ground operations in this and subsequent chapters
are the official records of the units mentioned in the
equate intelligence, Wiese also esti- text. Continued repetition of citations to these
sources becomes redundant, but planning material,
controversial matters, and complex situations are
3German information in this chapter is based on fully documented, while citations are made, as ap-
von Luttichau, “German Operations,” chs. 8–11 and propriate, to published material, both official and
15. unofficial.
BREAKOUT: 17–19 AUGUST 129

some stubborn but scattered resist- during the 18th. The 143d Infantry
ance from units of the. 242d Division. reassembled in the vicinity of Le Muy
On the 18th and 19th the French on the 17th and 18th, while the 141st
commandos and elements of the Infantry and the 636th Tank Destroy-
French 1st Infantry Division relieved er Battalion spread out to secure the
the 7th Infantry in the coastal sector region extending east from Le Muy to
and continued the drive west. the coast as well as the slopes of the
In the 3d Division’s center the 15th Esterel. During the 18th the 636th
Infantry, following the 3d Provisional Tank Destroyer Battalion sent recon-
Reconnaissance Squadron,5 reached naissance troops north about fifteen
the town of La Roquebrussanne on miles from Frejus in an effort to
18 August, ten miles south of Brig- rescue a group of misdropped para-
noles. The 30th Infantry, charged troopers that the Germans had cut
with seizing Brignoles, started out on off. The first attempt failed, but after
17 August with a firefight at Le Luc, hard fighting on the 19th, elements of
but part of the regiment and elements the 141st Infantry and the tank de-
of CC Sudre cleared the town after a stroyer battalion extricated many in-
four-hour action. Meanwhile, the jured paratroopers.
main bodies of the two Allied units Meanwhile, the 36th Division’s Cav-
continued westward along Route N-7 alry Reconnaissance Troop had been
and lesser roads, nearing Brignoles indulging itself in a series of long-
late on the 18th. After a battle that distance scouting patrols to the north.
lasted until the next morning, the Rapidly moving twenty-five to thirty
area fell to the French and American miles north and northeast of Le Muy
attackers. Farther north, the 157th as far as Route N-85, which is the
and 179th Infantry, 45th Division, main highway from the Riviera to
headed out of the Le Luc-Vidauban Grenoble, the light cavalry units en-
area late on the 17th, encountered countered no significant resistance on
little resistance, and halted at dark on 17 and 18 August. The patrolling, to-
the 18th within striking distance of gether with information received from
Barjols. The entire advance complete- ULTRA sources,6 reflected the gener-
ly dislocated the center of the line al weakness of the German forces
that Wiese had hoped to establish. along the Seventh Army’s eastern
Well to the east the 142d Infantry, flank. Once TF Butler and the 36th
36th Division, cleaned out the north Division started north and northwest,
side of the Argens valley with little they apparently would face no signifi-
trouble and, passing through units of cant threat on their right, or north-
the 1st Airborne Task Force at Le eastern, flank.
Muy, mopped up the Draguignan area
The German Defense
5T h e squadron consisted of the 3d Cavalry Re-
connaissance Troop, the 3d Division Battle Patrol In the early afternoon of 17
(itself a provisional unit), the Reconnaissance Com- August, Nineteenth Army officers
pany of the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and
Company D (light tanks) of the 756th Tank Battal-
ion. 6 Bussey ULTRA Report.
130 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

TROOPS AND TANK DESTOYERS MOVE THROUGH SALERNES

learned that VI Corps’ center and These two lines represented Wiese’s
right wing had passed through the last effort to tie the defense of
defensive line they had planned to es- Toulon and Marseille to that of the
tablish from the coast to Vidauban. Rhone River valley, which was still
Seeking some way to hold back Allied fifty miles farther west.
forces until more German units, espe- Wiese assigned responsibility for
cially the 11th Panzer Division, could holding the two new lines to Lt. Gen.
move to the east side of the Rhone, Baptist Kniess, commanding the
General Wiese decided to establish LXXXV Corps. Kniess would have what
two new defensive lines. The first was left of the 244th Division (guard-
would extend northward from the ing Marseille), the 338th Division (less
eastern defenses of Toulon through one regimental combat team), the
Brignoles to Barjols. The second line, remnants of the 242d Division, and
about fifteen miles farther west, part of the 198th Division, which was
would anchor on the south at Mar- still trying to cross the Rhone. Wiese
seille, stretch eastward about twenty also gave Kniess General von
miles along Route N-8 (the Toulon- Schwerin and his 189th Division head-
Marseille highway), and then swing quarters, along with the miscellane-
north to the Durance River about ous units that von Schwerin had
fourteen miles northwest of Barjols. already assembled. Kniess, in turn, di-
BREAKOUT: 17- 19 AUGUST 131

rected Baessler of the 242d Division to morning of 19 August, the 30th In-
hold Toulon and the southern part of fantry, 3d Division, had cleared Brig-
the first line with whatever units the noles, and Sudre’s CC1 had pushed
division commander could round up; to St. Maximin, eleven miles farther
he ordered von Schwerin to hold the west. The 15th Infantry joined the
center at Brignoles and Barjols with French armor at St. Maximin later in
the 15th Grenadiers of his former divi- the day and by the evening had trav-
sion and the battered 932d and 933d eled another nine miles west to the
Grenadier Regiments of the 244th Divi- town of Trets. The general advance
sion. The 198th Division, reinforced by met only minor German resistance,
elements of the 338th Division, would but had breached the center of
man the second line as quickly as pos- Kniess’ second line of defense before
sible, for Kniess had little confidence it could be established.
that he could hold the first line past Meanwhile, north of Brignoles, the
nightfall on 18 August. If all went 179th Infantry of the 45th Division
well, the delay along the first line had cleaned out Barjols on the 19th,
would provide enough time for the while still farther north the 157th In-
11th Panzer Division and the remaining fantry had pushed west and by dusk
elements of the 198th and 338th Divi- was nearing the Durance River. It
sions to cross the Rhone. began to appear to jubilant oper-
The German plans were again over- ations officers at all echelons of com-
taken by events. Except on the imme- mand that the east-west highways and
diate Toulon front, General Kniess byways between the coastal ports and
was unable to establish the first line, the Durance River might be unde-
and the Brignoles-Barjols area fell fended all the way to the Rhone. If
before any L X X X V Corps units could so, the Nineteenth Army might be in for
establish a coherent defense. Accord- a major disaster if the American drive
ingly, during the afternoon of 18 west continued at its current pace.
August, Wiese directed a general re- For General Patch, the Seventh
tirement to the second line. Here Army commander, the capture of
Kniess planned to have the 198th Di- Toulon and Marseille was more
vision, which so far had been able to pressing. Until the ports were in
deploy only two infantry battalions, Allied hands, the success of the inva-
hold the northern section of the sion could not be confirmed. Thus, as
second line near the Durance River; Sudre’s armored force was preparing
the 242d Division-now so reduced in to continue its drive west, Patch or-
strength as to be redesignated Battle dered Truscott to return the unit to
Group Baessbr–defend the center with French control for the assault on
the equivalent of a regimental task Toulon. Reluctant to lose the force
force; and two battalions of the 244th and arguing that its return east would
Division anchor the line in the south at create traffic jams, which would seri-
Marseille. The garrison at Toulon ously inhibit the westward progress of
would have to fend for itself. the 3d Division, Truscott rushed to
The Allied push westward was, the Seventh Army’s command post at
however, again relentless. By the St. Tropez to dispute the decision.
132 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

Patch was unmoved and refused to ion. 9 Support forces included Compa-
reverse the long-standing arrange- ny F of the 344th Engineer General
ment. Although sympathetic, he re- Service Regiment; a reinforced com-
minded Truscott that the Seventh pany from the 111th Medical Battal-
Army had promised General de Lattre ion, 36th Division; the 3426th Quar-
to return CC1 by dark on the 19th to termaster Truck Company; and a
a position from which it could move detachment of the 87th Ordnance
forward on the 20th with the rest of Company (Heavy Maintenance).
the French forces heading toward Butler’s mechanized task force
Toulon. General Sudre of CCl, who started out early on 18 August, first
disliked the redeployment order as following the 45th Division’s trail
much as Truscott, had no choice but west to the Barjols area, and then
to move his command back east along striking north on its own. By noon
Route N-7, thus creating the traffic the force had reached the Verdon
jams Truscott had feared and, more River, ten miles above Barjols, but
important, depriving the VI Corps of found the highway bridge destroyed
its most powerful mobile striking and was unable to cross until about
force. In its place, Task Force Butler 1600, despite assistance from the FFI
would have to suffice. 7 and local French civilians. Then, with
only about four hours of daylight left
Tusk Force Butler and five hours of fuel, Butler decided
to wait for his resupply column, due
By evening on 17 August, almost to arrive that night. Meanwhile, one
all of TF Butler had assembled just element of the force, Troop C, which
north of Le Muy.8 A brigade-sized had taken a slightly different route
unit, the force included the 117th north, bumped into a portion of the
Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron; LXII Corps staff that had eluded the
the 753d Tank Battalion (with two airborne units, and captured the un-
medium tank companies); the motor- fortunate General Neuling.
ized 2d Battalion of the 143d Infan- The next day, 19 August, the main
try, 36th Division; Company C, 636th body of the task force struck out
Tank Destroyer Battalion; and the northwest, crossing to the west bank
59th Armored Field Artillery Battal- of the Durance River to take advan-
tage of better roads there, and contin-
ued north to Sisteron. Troops A and
7 See also Truscott, Command Missions, pp. 422-23.
B of the 117th Cavalry remained on
8 In addition to official records, material in this the eastern side of the river and, after
chapter on the operations of TF Butler derives from a few minor skirmishes with isolated
Frederick B. Butler, “Task Force Butler,” Armored German units, entered Sisteron unop-
Cavalry Journal, LVII, No. 1 (Jan-Feb 48), 12-18,
and No. 2 (Mar-Apr 48), 30-38 (hereafter cited as
Butler, “Task Force Butler”); and John A. Hixon, 9 The 117th Cavalry Squadron consisted of three
“Analysis of Deep Attack Operations–U.S. VI reconnaissance troops (A, B; and C), a self-pro-
Corps: Task Force Butler, August 1944,” MS, U.S. pelled assault gun troop (E), and a company of light
Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, tanks (F) (there was no Company or Troop D). The
Kansas, 1987 (hereafter cited as Hixon, “TF 753d Tank Battalion left behind Company A,
Butler”). medium tanks, and Company D, light tanks.
BREAKOUT: 17-19 AUGUST 133

posed about 1800 hours. The main exploitation order of late 16 August,
column, its march. north disturbed which had started the 3d and 45th Di-
only by a mistaken strafing attack visions westward and T F Butler
from friendly aircraft, reached the northward. The second, made by
town shortly thereafter. The only siza- Patch, was to accelerate the unloading
ble action took place at Digne, fifteen of the French II Corps.
miles southeast of Sisteron, where ar- Original plans had called for the
mored elements of Butler’s force first echelon of the French II Corps
helped an FFI battalion convince to land between 16 and 18 August,
about 500 to 600 German defend- and the second between the 21st and
ers-mostly administrative and logisti- the 25th. Seeking to exploit German
cal troops-to surrender after several weakness and speed up the move to
hours of fighting.10 Toulon and Marseille, Patch, in con-
That evening Butler refueled his junction with Admiral Hewitt and
vehicles, established outposts north of General de Lattre, pushed up the
Sisteron, and sent out several mobile schedule. The bulk of the first French
patrols to the west, which scouted to echelon came ashore on 16 August,
within thirty miles of Avignon and the and elements of various French ar-
Rhone. With good radio communica- mored units arrived the next day.
tions established with VI Corps head- This allowed the troop transports to
quarters and several intact bridges make a rapid trip back to Corsica, and
over the Durance River in his hands, return with troops of the second ech-
he was ready to move his task force elon on the 18th. By nightfall that day
either north toward Grenoble or almost all troops of the II Corps (ex-
west-northwest toward the Rhone cepting those of one armored combat
River in the vicinity of Montelimar. command and one regiment) were
Impatiently he awaited Truscott’s ashore, but scarcely half the trucks,
orders. tanks, tank destroyers, artillery, and
other heavy equipment were on hand.
Accelerating the Campaign Meanwhile, on 17 August, Patch
and de Lattre decided to move the
The campaign in southern France French troops up to the line of the
was quickly reaching a crisis point. Real Martin and Gapeau rivers on the
Well before 19 August the unexpect- 19th instead of assembling all of
ed weakness of German resistance in French II Corps, including its missing
the assault area had brought about equipment, near the beaches. This
two significant changes in Seventh decision alone had the French forces
Army plans.11 The first was Truscott’s

10For the interaction of Task Force Butler and three volumes), entries for 17-21 Aug 44 (copy in
local FFI, see unpublished paper, Arthur L. Funk, CMH, hereafter cited as Seventh Army Diary); Sev-
“Allies and Maquis: Liberation of Basses Alpes enth Army G–2 Rpts 1–8 and 16–23 Aug 44; VI
(Alpes de Haute-Provence) and Hautes Alpes- Corps G–2 Rpts 1–7 and 15–21 Aug 44; VI Corps
August 1944,” 16 pp. (copy CMH). War Rm Jnl 19–21 Aug 44; Seventh Army FO 2,
11 This section is based largely on Seventh Am) 1200 19 Aug 44; Truscott, Command Missions, pp.
Rpt, I, 152; Headquarters, Seventh Army, “Diary for 421-23; de Lattre, History, pp. 71-75; von Luttichau,
Commanding General, Seventh Army,” vol. II (of “German Operations,” ch. 10.
134 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

moving westward at least six days ear- August Seventh Army planners re-
lier than originally planned. Finally, ceived information through ULTRA
rather than waiting until 25 August, channels that forced them to revise
when all the French vehicles and this estimate. According to an
equipment would be ashore, de Lattre ULTRA intercept, Army Group G was
wanted to attack Toulon as soon as about to initiate a general withdrawal
possible, asking only for the return of of its forces from southwestern
Sudre’s armor on the 19th and the France and the Atlantic coast south of
loan of artillery ammunition from Brest; if accurate, the withdrawal of
Seventh Army stocks. With this help, the Nineteenth Army could not be far
he felt he could launch an effective behind, and the success of the land-
assault on 20 August before the Ger- ing was assured.
mans had time to organize their de-
fenses. Patch agreed to the accelera- The German Withdrawal
tion, supplied the ammunition de
Lattre needed, released CC1 to In Germany, OKW was more con-
French control, and at noon on the cerned about Army Group B in north-
19th directed de Lattre to move im- ern France than about Army Group G
mediately toward Toulon and Mar- in the south. The Allied breakout
seille. from the Normandy beachheads at St.
Simultaneously, Patch ordered VI Lo, the failure of the German coun-
Corps to push westward to Aix-en- terattack at Mortain, and the threat-
Provence, fifteen miles north of Mar- ened Allied envelopment of the
seille, in order to protect the north- German forces in the Falaise Pocket,
ern flank of the attacking French. T h e all pointed to a major German disas-
American corps was also to secure ter in the north. At the same time, the
crossings over the Durance River; ANVILlandings made it impossible for
seize Sisteron (which T F Butler Army Group G to withdraw from south-
reached about four hours later); con- ern France to northern Italy if
tinue strong reconnaissance north- German defenses in the Normandy
ward; and prepare to start the 36th area finally collapsed. Accordingly, on
Division north toward Grenoble. 16 August OKW put the issue before
Seventh Army’s new orders also re- Hitler: either authorize the immediate
flected changes in Allied estimates of withdrawal of Army Groups B and G or
German capabilities and intentions in preside over the destruction of both.
southern France. Patch’s intelligence Having no real choice, Hitler reluc-
staff had originally expected that Army tantly assented, and OKW quickly
Group G, after making every effort to issued the necessary orders.
contain the Allied beachhead, would From the start, German execution
conduct an all-out defense of Toulon of the orders was hampered by poor
and Marseille, and, after it had ex- communications. The withdrawal
hausted its defensive potential east of orders for Army Group G were in two
the lower Rhone, would ultimately parts. About 1115 on 17 August
undertake a fighting withdrawal up Blaskowitz’s headquarters received
the Rhone valley. But late on 17 the first part, pertaining mainly to
BREAKOUT: 17- 19 AUGUST 135

forces on the Atlantic coast and in LXIV Corps on the Atlantic front, to
southwestern France. This order begin moving eastward immediately.
came directly to Army Group G from The LXIV Corps was to assemble most
OKW, and it was not until 1430 on of its assigned forces-the 16th and
the same day that Blaskowitz received 159th Infantry Divisions, miscellaneous
an identical directive relayed through army combat and service units, and a
OB West channels. Presumably OKW conglomeration of small air force and
dispatched the second part of the naval organizations-in the northern
order, pertaining largely to the Nine- part of Army Group G’s Atlantic sector.
teenth Army, at 1730 on 17 August, but These units, representing three-quar-
neither OB West nor Army Group G re- ters of LXIV Corps’ strength and virtu-
ceived the second order that day. ally its entire combat complement,
Such was the state of German com- were to move generally eastward
munications that it was 1100 on the south of the Loire River to a rendez-
18th before Blaskowitz, via OKW vous with the main body of Army
radio channels, received the second Group G north of Lyon. Left behind
part of the order, which directed the on the Atlantic coast were the garri-
Nineteenth Army to withdraw northward sons of three coastal strongpoints that
from southern France. Meanwhile, by Hitler directed be held to the end: De-
early afternoon of the 18th, ULTRA fense Area La Rochelle, Fortress Gironde
sources had supplied the Seventh North, and Fortress Gironde South. LXIV
Army with the second part; thus Patch Corps was also to leave a small force at
and Wiese were probably evaluating Bordeaux until the German Navy
the new information at about the could put to sea a few submarines un-
same time.” Both armies now had to dergoing repairs there.
consider how best to react to the In the extreme southwest,
sudden change in plans. Blaskowitz wanted Maj. Gen. Otto
Upon receiving the Atlantic coast- Schmidt-Hartung of the 564th Liaison
southwestern France directive on the Staff; a military government organiza-
17th, Blaskowitz had ordered Lt. Gen. tion, to lead a motley collection of
Karl Sachs, who commanded the army service units and air force
————
troops out of the Pyrenees-Carcas-
12The first part of the withdrawal orders is sonne Gap-Toulouse area to join
ULTRA Msg XL 6753, 171408 Aug 44, and the other Army Group G units along the
second is XL 6919, 181356 Aug 44, ULTRA Collec-
tion, MHI. According to data presented in Bennett, west bank of the Rhone near Avi-
Ultra in the West, p. 159, and Hinsley et al., British In- gnon.
telligence in the Second World War, III, 2, pp. 274-75, The second OKW message-a
the ULTRA decrypt of the first part of the with-
drawal order was based on an ENIGMA intercept
“Hitler Sends” directive-ordering
from Naval Group West to Admiral Atlantic at 0940, 17 the northward deployment of the
August, and was dispatched to the field at 1408 that Nineteenth Army, called for a more
day. The second part was based on an intercept at
1730, 17 August (source not noted), and dispatched
carefully thought out withdrawal con-
to the field at 1356, 18 August. Although both mes- cept. On the western Mediterranean
sages dealt with the withdrawal of Army Group G coast, the IV Luftwaffle Field Corps, with
forces, each is distinct from the other and not
“part” of a larger order. See also von Luttichau,
the 716th Infant? Division as its princi-
“German Operations,” ch. 10, pp. 1-7. pal combat component, was to retire
136 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

up the west bank of the Rhone, pick- north-south delaying positions, la-
ing up Schmidt-Hartung’s group, beled A, B, and c. The first, line A,
some local naval units, three infantry began above Marseille and centered
battalions of the 189th Division, one or on Aix-en-Provence; the second, line
two Luftwaffe infantry training regi- B, was located between Lake Berre
ments, and other miscellaneous units. and the Durance River; and a third,
On Army Group G ' s far eastern flank, line C, was just west of the Rhone.
the 248th Division and the 257th Re- Kniess wanted his LXXXV Corps units
serve Mountain Division no longer con- to reach line A during the night of
cerned Blaskowitz because the OKW 19-20 August; line B during the night
withdrawal orders had transferred the of 20-21 August; and line C before
two divisions to OB Southwest in Italy, daylight on the 22d. The Nineteenth
and their retirement to the Alps Army expected him to hold along line
seemed a relatively simple affair. 13 C until evening on the 23d, by which
Extracting that portion of the Nine- time, Wiese hoped, all preparations
teenth Army engaged in combat was by would be complete for a rapid, well-
far the most difficult undertaking. organized withdrawal up the Rhone
Blaskowitz’s concept called for these valley, with the IV Luftwaffe Field Corps
forces to retire through successive de- on the west bank and the LXXXV
fense lines, holding the U.S. Seventh Corps on the east.
Army east of the Rhone and south of For the Germans, the appearance
the Durance until the 11th Panzer Divi- of American mechanized forces north
sion, the bulk of the 198th Division, of the Durance River on the 19th was
and the two remaining regimental an unwelcome surprise. As yet, Army
combat teams of the 338th Division Group G had little solid information
could cross the Rhone to participate concerning Task Force Butler, but
in a general withdrawal up the east Blaskowitz had learned enough by
bank. The garrisons at Toulon and nightfall on the 19th to realize that he
Marseille, ordered by Hitler to fight might have a problem securing the
to the death, were to tie down as eastern flank of his forces withdraw-
many Allied troops as possible and ing up the Rhone valley. With the
ensure that the harbor facilities did Nineteenth Army already having trouble
not fall into Allied hands intact. holding back VI Corps in the area
On 18 and 19 August the staffs of south of the Durance River, a strong
the Nineteenth Army and LXXXV Corps threat north of the Durance might
drew up detailed plans for the with- turn a carefully phased withdrawal
drawal, specifying three successive into a rout. On the other hand,
Blaskowitz felt h e had sufficient
strength to deal with any immediate
13Seventh Army intelligence during late August
placed these two weak units, along with the 5th
threat north of the Durance, and also
Mountuzn Division and elements of the 90th Panzer estimated that for the time being a
Grenadzer Division, under the LXXV Corps, with a de- major thrust northward toward Gre-
fensive mission along the Franco-Italian Alpine noble and Lyon was of secondary im-
border, protecting OB Southwest’s rear. “G–2 Histo-
ry: Seventh Army Operations in Europe,” I, 15-31 portance in Allied planning.
August 44, Box 2, William W. Quinn Papers, MHI. On the evening of 19 August,
BREAKOUT: 17-19 AUGUST 137

German attention thus remained fo- that the Allied logistical system could
cused on the critical Avignon area, not immediately support a major
the focal point for German forces effort to cut off the Nineteenth Army at
withdrawing both east across the Avignon or farther north up the
Rhone and north across the Durance. Rhone valley. For deeper operations
By that time substantial components inland, Toulon and Marseille would
of the 11th Panzer Division and the have to be taken and rehabilitated, a
198th and 338th Infantry Divisions still task that a strong German defense
had to cross to the east bank of the might make exceedingly difficult. In
Rhone on a single ferry near Avignon northern France, Eisenhower’s forces
and on two more farther south. In ad- were already suffering from a lack of
dition, the Germans had to hold operational ports, and Patch, with
crossings over the Durance east of comparatively little over-the-beach
Avignon until the LXXXV Corps as supply capability, could not afford
well as units coming over the Rhone similar difficulties. Thus, on the 19th,
south of Avignon could move north he made Aix-en-Provence the western
across the Durance. A strong Allied limit of Truscott’s VI Corps advance,
drive toward Avignon could cut off primarily to protect the Seventh
much of the LXXXV Corps. An addi- Army’s main effort, which was seizing
tional concern was an Allied drive to Toulon and Marseille.
and across the Rhone south of Avi-
gnon before the IV Luftwaffe Field Toulon and Marseille
Corps, withdrawing up the Rhone’s
west bank, could escape. If that hap- Before the invasion, de Lattre had
pened, the bulk of the IV Luftwaffe planned to capture Toulon and Mar-
Field Corps would probably be lost. seille in succession, but the acceler-
Under these circumstances, Generals ated French landings allowed him to
Blaskowitz and Wiese could hardly envision almost concurrent actions
avoid the conclusion that a strong against both ports.14 He divided his
Seventh Army drive to the Rhone in forces into two groups: one under Lt.
the Avignon area would be the Allies’ Gen. Edgar de Larminat consisting of
most logical, timely, and likely course two infantry divisions, some tanks,
of action. and the African Commando Group;
In the Allied camp, however, the the other under Maj. Gen. Aime de
proper course of action was not so Goislard de Monsabert consisting of
evident. Based on the ULTRA infor- an infantry division, some tanks, and
mation that Patch had received on 17 a ranger-type unit. De Larminat was
and 18 August, the Seventh Army’s to attack Toulon westward along the
best move appeared to be an immedi- coast; de Monsabert was to maintain
ate push toward the Rhone in an at- flank contact with the VI Corps on
tempt to cut off the Nineteenth Army. the right, strike into Toulon from the
But a number of factors stayed
Patch’s hand. Logistics had now
14De Lattre, History, pp. 72-75, 95-97; Army B,
become a major problem. A general Genl Opns Order 5, 19 Aug 44; Army B, Particular
shortage of trucks and gasoline meant Order 8, 20 Aug 44.
138 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

north, drive to the coast to encircle mans would have difficulty putting up
the city, and, if possible, probe west any effective resistance.
toward Marseille. From the afternoon The French attacked on the morn-
of 19 August through the night, ing of 20 August, and the first results
French troops poured westward from were less than promising. 15 Heavy ar-
the landing beaches to take positions tillery, antitank, and machine-gun fire
for the assault against Toulon on the was initially severe along the coastal
following day. road, and de Larminat’s forces had to
If the Germans had had more time reduce, one by one, a series of major
and materiel, they might have turned and minor strongpoints. Infantrymen
Toulon into a formidable fortress. clawed their way to the outskirts of
The local garrison consisted of about Hyeres, nine miles east of Toulon,
18,000 troops, including 5,500 naval late in the day; but determined
personnel and 2,800 air force men, German resistance stopped the
plus naval and army artillery and anti- French drive from the northeast (Map
aircraft guns. Equally important, the 8). In the west, however, de Monsa-
port was virtually surrounded by bert’s units achieved spectacular suc-
rugged hills and mountains-those to cess. Swinging across high rough
the north rising to nearly 2,500 feet. mountains, they outflanked the
If Toulon was strongly defended, the German defenders and pushed
Allied timetable could be severely dis- through the western approaches to
rupted. However, from the start the city, some leading elements pene-
German command difficulties ham- trating to within less than two miles
pered the organization of a coherent of the Toulon waterfront. Another
defense. The senior admiral of the group, operating approximately six
port had died of a heart attack several miles west of Toulon, cut the main
days before ANVIL, and General highway between Toulon and Mar-
Baessler, the senior army officer, had
been cut off from the city several days 15The following account is based on de Lattre,
afterward. Rear Adm. Heinrich History, ch. 5; La Premzere Division Blindee au Combat
(Malakoff-Seine, 1947), pp. 32-52; de Monsabert, La
Ruhfus, who subsequently took com- 3eme Division d’lnfanterie Algerienne dans la Bataille de
mand of the German defense, did the Provence, Toulon-Marseilles, Aout I944 (Offenburg,
best he could and evacuated the in- n.d.), pp. 21-65; Histoire de la Neuvieme Division
d‘lnfanterie Coloniale (Lyon, n.d.), pp. 30-38; La Ire D.
creasingly restive civilian population, F. L.: Epopee d’une Recongueie, Juin 1940-Mai I945
probably about 100,000 men, women, (Paris, 1946), pp. 124-27; 3d Algerian Inf Div, Jour-
and children, prior to the battle. But nale de Marche, 19-31 Aug 44; and French Army B,
Comptes Rendus de 3eme Bureau, 18-31 Aug 44.
Ruhfus needed time to reorganize his For additional information on French units through-
forces. The existing defenses were out the course of the later campaigns, see the Ser-
strongest in the wrong places. On the vice Historique de l’Armee, Guerre 1939-1945: Les
landward approaches, they were Grandes Unites Francaises, Historique Succinct, 6 vols.
(Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1972-76), especially
spotty and incomplete-in some cases the daily corps situation reports in vol. V, “Cam-
no more than roadblocks-and little pagnes de France et d’Allemagne;” pt. III of three
attention had been paid to the north- parts, or subvolumes) (hereafter cited as Historigue
Succinct); and interviews of Marcel Vigneras, a CMH
ern and western sectors of the city. If historian, with various French commanders in 1945
the Allies moved quickly, the Ger- (hereafter cited as Vigneras Intervs).
BREAKOUT: 17-19 AUGUST 139

MAP 8

seille, with elements of de Monsa- away toward the city along the coast,
bert’s armor approaching the strongly others continued to encircle the port
defended village of Aubagne, which on the north and west. Progress in
was eight miles from Marseille and the north was disappointing as
the key to the eastern approaches to German resistance stiffened. One
that city. In addition, troops of the French tank company managed to
U.S. 3d Division, preparing to attack penetrate to about three and a half
Aix-en-Provence, spilled into the miles from the principal square in
French zone and came within six Toulon, but was cut off, taking heavy
miles of Aubagne. casualties while holding out for
On the morning of the 21st the almost thirty-six hours.
French attacked Toulon with renewed Toward the end of the day, de Lar-
vigor. While some units hammered minat, believing that the operations
140 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

against the two ports demanded a Marseille. From the beginning of the
unified command, requested permis- attacks, de Lattre had decided that
sion to take charge of the entire oper- the conquest of Toulon would not
ation. De Lattre turned the corps absorb his entire force and directed
commander down and, after a lengthy de Monsabert to probe aggressively
argument between the two quick-tem- to the west. Although reminding his
pered generals, dismissed de Lar- subordinate of Toulon’s priority, de
minat and took direct control of the Lattre probably expected him to in-
operation.16 The command change terpret his instructions as broadly as
had little, if any, effect on French op- possible and to exploit favorable op-
erations. portunities to speed the seizure of
On the 23d, the French continued Marseille. But de Monsabert’s first
to exert pressure on Toulon, forcing objective was Aubagne.
the Germans back into their inner The German force at Aubagne was
fortifications, overrunning German part of the 13,000-man garrison of
strongpoints west of the city, and Marseille, which included several key
opening rail and highway connections units of the 244th Infantry Division and
toward Marseille. As the fighting con- 2,500 naval and 3,900 Luftwaffle per-
tinued, the German defense lost co- sonnel, all under the control of Maj.
hesion, and negotiations opened for Gen. Hans Schaeffer, the 244th Divi-
the surrender of isolated German sion commander. The landward ap-
groups. The last organized German proaches to Marseille gave the Ger-
resistance ended on 26 August, and a mans significant defensive advantages,
small command garrison under Admi- but again time and lack of materiel
ral Ruhfus surrendered on the 28th worked against them. Their fortifica-
after two days of intense Allied air tions were less extensive than at
and naval bombardment. The battle Toulon, and the half a million civilian
cost the French about 2,700 men inhabitants of the second largest city
killed and wounded, while the Ger- in France were becoming increasingly
mans lost their entire garrison of hostile. Schaeffer had chosen not to
18,000. However, the French claimed evacuate the city, and as the attacking
to have taken almost 17,000 prison- French military forces drew near, the
ers, indicating that only about 1,000 FFI became bolder, encouraged by a
Germans lost their lives defending the major civil uprising on the morning
city-hardly a serious attempt to of 22 August.
follow Hitler’s order to fight to the Without waiting to reduce Au-
last man. Toulon had been secured a bagne, de Monsabert positioned his
full week ahead of Allied expecta- units, consisting of less than a divi-
tions. sion in strength, around the eastern
Even as the French invested and northern outskirts of the city to
Toulon, part of their forces were harass the confused defenders. Gains
moving on their second objective, on the 22d put French troops within
five to eight miles of the heart of the
16General de Larminat later received a command city, and they prepared to strike well
on the Atlantic coast. Vigneras Intervs, p. 14. into the port on the following day.
BREAKOUT: 17-19 AUGUST 141

FRENCHTR S IN MARSEILLE,AUGUST1944

While approving de Monsabert’s initi- lieved that more could be lost than
ative, de Lattre was concerned by the gained by holding back. He relayed
dispersal of the attacking forces. de Lattre’s orders to his own subordi-
Patch had informed him of the ap- nates, but his instructions to Col.
pearance of the 11th Panzer Division in Abel Felix Andre Chappuis, who com-
the Aix-en-Provence area, and de manded the 7th Algerian Tirailleurs,
Monsabert’s trucks and combat vehi- were flexible. Spurred by calls for as-
cles were running low on fuel.” Be- sistance from resistance groups inside
lieving that the French lacked s u s - Marseille, Chappuis’ infantry prowled
cient strength for a full-fledged battle the eastern suburbs; in the early
in Marseille, should it come to that, hours of 23 August, one battalion, en-
de Lattre instructed de Monsabert to couraged by large crowds of exuber-
back off a bit and ring the city with ant French civilians, plunged into the
his troops, but to limit his offensive city itself. By 0800, the tirailleurs had
operations to clearing the suburbs begun pushing through the city
until more units arrived. streets, and two hours later, after cut-
On the ground, de Monsabert be- ting through the center of Marseille,
they reached the waterfront. Later
that day the rest of the regiment en-
17De Lattre, History, p. 100. See p. 142 of this
volume. tered the city from the north and
142 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

northeast. This unplanned drive de- Unknown to the Allied command-


cided the issue, and the fighting, like ers, the Germans had no intention of
the final days in Toulon, became a mounting a counterattack. Wiese's de-
matter of battling from street to cision to send a tank-infantry task
street, from house to house, and from force with about ten tanks toward
strongpoint to strongpoint, with Aix-en-Provence was a reaction to
ardent FFI support. what had been, until the 21st, a
On the evening of 27 August, steady Allied push to the Rhone. The
Schaeffer parlayed with de Monsabert task force was merely to give the
to arrange terms, and a formal sur- Americans pause, something to think
render became effective at 1300, 28 about. Wiese hoped to slow American
August, the same day as the capitula- progress and buy time for Kniess'
tion at Toulon. The French had lost LXXXV Corps withdrawal. Truscott, in
1,825 men killed and wounded in the any case, had been ordered to hold
battle for Marseille, had taken rough- up until Toulon and Marseille were
ly 11,000 prisoners, and had again ac- secure. As a result, Kniess was able to
complished their mission well ahead withdraw the remainder of his forces
of the Allied planning schedule. 18 without interference. His corps as-
sembled along the second defensive
West to the Rhone line on the morning of 21 August and
pulled back easily to the final line
Meanwhile, the general picture of during the following night. By the
German weakness along the ap- morning of the 22d, almost all units
proaches to the Rhone changed on scheduled to cross over the Rhone
the afternoon of 21 August when ele- from the west were on the eastern
ments of the 11th Panzer Division were bank, and the bulk of Petersen's IV
reported west of the river. Patch and Luftwaffe Field Corps, still west of the
Truscott wondered whether the Rhone, was moving north and coming
German armored movements, about abreast of Kniess on the other side.
which they could learn little, might in- Deployed along the final defensive
dicate a counterattack. Truscott's only line early on the 22d, Kniess planned
reserve, the 36th Division, was al- to hold until dark on the 23d. His de-
ready on its way north on the route fenses extended from the Rhone
followed by Task Force Butler, as was River at Arles, northeast to the Dur-
a regiment of the 45th Division. Trus- ance River at Orgon, and then north
cott had been considering sending the thirty miles to Avignon and the main
entire 45th Division to the north, but Rhone valley. The focal point was
now tabled this idea and ordered the Orgon, where the Durance River
3d and 45th Divisions to halt along a passed through a defile two miles
north-south line above Marseille. 19 wide. The Germans had to hold the
gap until all of Kniess' units could
cross the river to the north bank.
18 See La 3eme Division d'lnfantrie Algerienne dam la Concerned about his eastern flank,
Bataille de Provence, p. 6; de Lattre, History, pp. 114-
15; and Seventh Army G–3 Rpts. Wiese sent reconnaissance units of
19See pp. 150–151 of this volume. the 11th Panzer Division to probe north
BREAKOUT: 17-19 AUGUST 143

of the Durance and ascertain the in- attached units to hold the Durance
tentions of the American armored crossings at Orgon, to protect his
forces that Wiese knew were active southern flank, and to defend Avi-
there; but the unit found little except gnon against an American sweep.
assorted FFI resistance units. Wiese now wanted all his units to be
Not until late in the morning of the north of the Durance well before dark
22d was Truscott sufficiently satisfied on 23 August, the time previously set
about German intentions in the lower for abandoning the final line below
Rhone. With the attacks against the the Durance.
ports proceeding as planned, he re- On the 23d, with the ports not yet
leased another regiment of the 45th secure, Patch and Truscott cautiously
Division for redeployment northward, limited the 3d Division’s movement
but decided to keep the 3d Division west and thereby may have sacrificed
south of the Durance until French an opportunity to cut off major por-
forces could relieve it. Both the 3d tions of Kniess’ corps south of the
Division and the remainder of the Durance or to block the withdrawal of
45th advanced westward during the Petersen’s corps. Virtually undis-
day, and both units reached Kniess’ turbed during the daylight hours, the
abandoned second line that after- remainder of Kniess’ forces crossed
noon. the Durance during the night of 23-
Wiese now began to worry less 24 August. On 24 August, as French
about his southern front. Increasingly units began to relieve elements of the
disturbed by threats developing on 3d Division, and Allied troops occu-
the eastern flank of his withdrawal pied Avignon unopposed, Kniess’
route, he ordered all elements of the L X X X V Corps escaped. His forces, to-
11th Panzer Division to move immedi- gether with those of Petersen, now
ately north; he alerted Kniess to start marched rapidly up the Rhone valley
the 198th Division moving up the toward Montelimar, thirty miles away,
Rhone as well, leaving him only the and the focus of operations quickly
weak 338th Division and miscellaneous began to shift to the north.
CHAPTER IX

The Battle of Montelimar


As de Lattre’s French forces pre- Task Force Butler ( 19-21 August)
pared to move against the port cities
with the bulk of Truscott’s VI Corps on On 19 August, Butler’s vehicles
their northern flank, Patch began to were already well on their way north.
consider his future course of action if At noon, shortly before Butler
all went well along the coast. His first reached Sisteron, Patch directed
task, to secure the landing area, had Truscott to alert one infantry division
been accomplished; seizing Toulon for a drive northward on Grenoble.
and Marseille was his next major objec- Truscott, in turn, instructed General
tive. The ports would give him the lo- Dahlquist, the 36th Division com-
gistical base he needed for a sustained mander, to be prepared to have his
drive north to join Eisenhower’s armies unit execute the order early the fol-
in northern France, his third major lowing day.1 The VI Corps command-
task. But until the ports were secure, er expected at least one regiment of
supplying his American divisions with the 36th Division to be at Sisteron on
fuel, vehicles, and ammunition for any- the afternoon of the 20th. Convinced
thing so ambitious would be extremely of German intentions to withdraw up
difficult. Nevertheless, both he and the Rhone valley, Truscott also ra-
Truscott were eager to exploit the dioed Butler to hold at Sisteron and
rapid German withdrawal and unwill- await the arrival of Dahlquist’s units,
ing to allow the remainder of the NIne- adding that he should continue his
teenth Army to escape intact, especially if patrols westward to “determine the
the Germans intended to make a stand practicability of seizing the high
farther up the narrow Rhone valley.
Truscott had created Task Force 1 In addition to unit records, the following ac-
count is based on the following: Truscott, Command
Butler for this purpose. With its motor- Missions, pp. 423-34; Seventh Army FO 2, 1200, 19
ized infantry battalion, its approxi- Aug 44; 36th Div 01 200200B Aug 44 (note: early
mately thirty medium tanks, twelve 01s identified only by date-time group); Msg, CofS
36th Div to CO 143d Inf, 2208 19 Aug, 143d Inf
tank destroyers, and twelve self-pro- Jnl, 19 Aug 44; Butler, “Task Force Butler”; Seventh
pelled artillery pieces, and the armored Army Rpt, I, 188-228; and Hixon, “TF Butler.” For
cars, light tanks, and trucks of the cav- another participant’s account of the battle, see
Adams Interv (Adams commanded the 143d regi-
alry squadron, TF Butler represented a ment at Montelimar), pp. 61-65, Paul D. Adams
balanced, mobile offensive force. Papers, MHI.
THE BATTLE OF MONTELIMAR 145

ground north of Montelimar.”2 Mon- main highway to Grenoble, and to


telimar, a small city on .the east bank dispatch a force to Gap. Meanwhile,
of the Rhone River about fifty miles he sent his operations officer in a liai-
north of Avignon and sixty miles west son plane to corps headquarters for
of Sisteron, lay astride the most prob- more specific guidance.
able German route of withdrawal. (See On the following morning, 20
Map 7.) August, Butler grouped the main
Butler, whose radio communica- body of his task force at Sisteron and
tions with VI Corps headquarters had Aspres, thirty miles to the northeast,
become intermittent, never received and sent reinforced cavalry troops to
the message. 3 T h e only instructions the pass at Croix Haute and to Gap.
arriving during the night of 19-20 Both forces reached their objectives
August stated that the mission of his during the afternoon, the Gap patrol
task force was unchanged. Shortly capturing over 900 German prisoners
before midnight, Butler thus reported after a short skirmish aided by local
his intention to continue his recon- FFI elements. By dusk Task Force
naissance activities the following Butler was thus spread over a wide
morning, but warned that shortages area, but oriented more for an ad-
of fuel and supplies would limit his vance on Grenoble than one on Mon-
advance to forty miles in any direc- telimar. Supply convoys brought
tion. He emphasized his need for fur- Butler news on the approach of 36th
ther instructions that would enable Division elements, but his operations
him to direct his main effort either officer returned with no information
north to Grenoble or west to Monteli- other than that new orders would be
mar and the Rhone. The general also forthcoming sometime that night.
felt uneasy remaining stationary at On the evening of the 20th, Butler
Sisteron, deep in enemy territory, met with Brig. Gen. Robert I. Stack,
with limited logistical support. The the assistant division commander of
FFI and his own artillery liaison the 36th. Stack, arriving with an ad-
planes had reported a strong, mobile vance echelon of the division head-
German force at Grenoble and a large quarters and a regimental task force
garrison at Gap, about thirty miles built around two battalions of the
above Sisteron. Both could block But- 143d Infantry (its third battalion was
ler’s advance northward. Expecting with Butler), passed on to Butler what
Grenoble to be his immediate objec- information he could: that the 36th
tive, Butler decided to establish a Division was now displacing north;
strong outpost at the Croix Haute that Truscott had released the divi-
Pass, about forty miles north on the sion’s 142d Infantry from corps re-
serve at noon that day, and this regi-
2Truscott, Command Missions, p. 424.
ment was now arriving at Castellane,
3On Butler’s radio and air liaison difficulties, see thirty-five miles away; and that the
Hixon, “TF Butler,” pp. 21-23 and Enclosure 5. 141st Infantry had finally been re-
Butler received an excellent SCR-299 mobile radio lieved by airborne troops on the Sev-
on the 19th, but it did not end his communications
problems, possibly because of the increasingly diff-
enth Army’s right flank and would
cult local topography. follow north the next morning. How-
146 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

AMERICANARMORMOVESINLAND

ever, he warned Butler that all divi- Butler was to remain in the Sisteron
sional movements had been slowed area until most of the 36th Division
by a serious shortage of fuel and had arrived and promised to seek
trucks, and that most units were clarification on the matter from Trus-
moving north in time-consuming cott. Communicating with Stack sev-
company-sized shuttles. Precisely eral hours later, Dahlquist instructed
when they would reach Sisteron was him to hold all arriving division ele-
unknown. The assistant division com- ments in the Sisteron region and to
mander further explained that he in- cancel the move to Grenoble, explain-
tended to have the 143d Infantry ing that the division’s objective might
strike out for Grenoble on the follow- be changed to the Rhone valley. Fur-
ing morning, 21 August, and that it ther orders, Dahlquist continued,
was his opinion also that Grenoble would come early the following morn-
was Butler’s most logical objective. ing. Stack relayed this information to
Radioing Dahlquist, Stack asked Butler about 2300, 20 August,
whether the 143d Infantry was to use Unknown to Stack and Dahlquist,
the same roads to Grenoble as Butler. Truscott had met again with Patch
Dahlquist, having talked with Truscott around noon of the 20th, had in-
on the 19th but knowing little of But- formed him of the decision to send
ler’s movements, responded that the 143d Infantry northward, and had
THE BATTLE OF MONTELIMAR 147

requested his approval to follow the Dahlquist would take control of But-
regiment with the rest of the 36th Di- ler’s task force when he arrived in the
vision and to send Task Force Butler forward area.
west to the Rhone. Patch quickly The new orders presented several
agreed with these plans, which were problems. First, neither Stack nor
bold undertakings considering the un- Dahlquist had been informed of the
certain situation in the south and the switch in the main effort from Greno-
lack of vehicles and fuel. Perhaps ble to Montelimar. Second, Butler’s
mindful of these constraints, Truscott movements on the previous day had
did not immediately relay these oriented his advance north toward
orders to Butler, thereby failing to Grenoble, and he needed consider-
forestall the temporary dispersion of able time to reassemble his scattered
his task force. By the end of the day, forces. At the same time, he felt com-
however, the corps commander had pelled to leave a small blocking force
become more certain of German in- at Gap to secure his rear and, as di-
tentions south of the Durance River rected by supplemental orders from
and of his ability to reinforce Butler if Truscott, to retain the block at the
necessary. Thus at 2045, 20 August, Croix Haute Pass until 36th Division
Truscott finally radioed specific in- units could take over.
structions to Butler, directing him to By daybreak of 21 August, Butler
move to Montelimar at dawn with all had regrouped the bulk of his task
possible speed. There Butler was to force at Aspres. Leaving a small de-
seize the town and block the German tachment at the pass and a larger one
routes of withdrawal. The 36th Divi- at Gap, he started the rest of his com-
sion would follow the task force as mand rolling westward. Moving with-
quickly as possible. out interference a good twenty-five
Butler received the message that miles, the task force reached Crest on
night and acknowledged receipt early the Drome River in the late after-
the next morning. Nevertheless, Trus- noon, about thirteen miles east of the
cott also sent Lt. Col. Theodore J. Rhone. Before it lay the Rhone valley
Conway of his G-3 section to Butler’s and the setting for the eight-day
headquarters with more specific writ- battle of Montelimar.
ten instructions. Reaching Butler’s
command post at Aspres in the early The Battle Square
hours of 21 August, Conway deliv-
ered the letter from Truscott instruct- Almost twenty miles northeast of
ing Butler to seize the high ground Montelimar, the town of Crest was at
immediately north of Montelimar, but one corner of what became known as
not the city itself, before dark that the Montelimar Battle Square, bound-
day. T w o battalions of corps artillery ed by the Drome River on the north,
were on their way to reinforce the the Rhone River on the west, and the
task force, but initially only a single Roubion River o n the south (Map 9 ) .
regimental combat team from the With sides varying from nine to sev-
36th would support the effort; the enteen miles, the square, or rectan-
rest of the division would follow later. gle, encompassed an area of about
148 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

MAP 9
250 square miles on ground that al- miles east of the Rhone. Route N-7,
ternated between flat, open farmland the main north-south artery along the
and rugged, wooded hills, which rose, Rhone, passes through the city and
often steeply, to more than 1,900 then runs almost due north to the
feet. Drome. A secondary road, D-6, runs
Montelimar itself is on a small, flat northeast from Montelimar about two
plain extending along the north bank miles to the small village of Sauzet
of the Roubion River, a little over two and then turns east, skirting the
THE BATTLE OF MONTELIMAR 149

northern bank of the Roubion. On German forces were already travel-


Route N-7, about six miles above ing north along the main highway, and,
Montelimar, is the small town of La as soon as an artillery battery could un-
Coucourde. Between Montelimar and limber its pieces, Felber had it open
La Coucourde the eastern side of the fire on the German traffic. A second
Rhone valley narrows considerably, battery and several tanks and tank de-
squeezing both N-7 and a parallel stroyers soon added their fire, while a
railway line between the Rhone and a cavalry troop and some infantry placed
high ridgeline, which the American a roadblock across the main highway,
troops labeled Hill 300. The ridgeline until a German attack at dusk drove the
easily dominated Route N-7, as well small force back into the hills. On the
as a parallel road on the west bank of north bank of the Drome River, an-
the Rhone and the railways on both other cavalry troop, after moving west
sides. T w o other hills to the east, Hill from Crest, fired on a German truck
294 and Hill 430, provided additional column fording a stream, and then ad-
observation of both banks of the vanced and destroyed about fifty
Rhone and, to the south, overlooked German vehicles.
the approaches to Sauzet and D-6. In Upon reaching the forward area,
all, this high ground dominated the Butler ordered the troop operating
Rhone valley for a distance of roughly on the Drome back to Crest to pro-
fifteen miles. All retreating German tect the roads to Puy St. Martin, but
forces would have to pass through the left a platoon on the north bank of
bottleneck that Task Force Butler was the Drome as flank protection. After
about to squeeze. establishing his command post at
Marsanne, he sent a message to Trus-
Initial Skirmishes (21-22 August) cott’s corps headquarters at 2330
confirming his unit’s arrival at the ob-
Late in the afternoon of 21 August, jective area. His forces, Butler report-
Butler’s men moved south from Crest ed, were thinly spread, but with the
to Puy St. Martin, and then west to expected reinforcements–a regiment
Marsanne in the center of the square, of the 36th Division and more artil-
probing farther west through the lery-he was confident he could deal
Condillac Pass toward La Coucourde with a determined German reaction
and south down Route D-6 toward and launch a successful attack against
Sauzet and Montelimar. Lt. Col. Montelimar the following afternoon.
Joseph G. Felber, commanding the However, until he was resupplied with
advance party, immediately recog- ammunition, his artillery and tank de-
nized Hill 300 as the key terrain fea- stroyers would be unable to halt all
ture and established his command the German traffic along the highway.
post nearby at the Chateau Condillac. The morning of 22 August found
Unable to secure the entire ridgeline Butler still waiting for supplies and
of Hill 300, Felber set up outposts, reinforcement. Meanwhile the Ger-
roadblocks, and guard points and mans moved first, mounting what was
posted accompanying FFI soldiers in to be the first of many efforts to dis-
Sauzet. lodge the Americans. Grouped
150 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE
around the reconnaissance battalion Butler believed that the German
of the 11th Panzer Division and ele- attack was only a probe to determine
ments of the 71st Luftwaffe Infantry his strength, and he expected a much
Training Regiment,4 an ad hoc force at- stronger assault on the following day,
tacked north from Montelimar about 23 August. Still no units of the 36th
noon, took Sauzet, and forced an Division had arrived during the day.
American outpost and the FFI back The only forces joining him on the
into the hills. The action, however, 22d were his own detachments from
proved to be a feint. The main Gap and the pass and two 155-mm.
German force reassembled south of battalions of VI Corps artillery.
the Roubion River, advanced nine Equally important, his own artillery
miles east, and then swung north, and armor were dangerously low on
crossing the river and advancing on ammunition, with about twenty-five
Puy St. Martin and Marsanne, behind rounds per gun. T o preserve his posi-
Butler’s defenses. Almost unopposed, tion, he needed both reinforcements
the Germans occupied Puy that after- and resupply.
noon, cutting the American supply
line to Crest and Sisteron. Reinforcing the Square
The German success was short-
lived. By chance, Butler’s detach- Around 2200 on the evening of the
ments at Gap and the Croix Haute 22d, as Butler was beginning to de-
Pass had been relieved by some of spair, a single battalion of the 14 1st In-
Stack’s forces on the 21st, and both fantry arrived along with the regimen-
had been traveling to rejoin Butler. tal commander, Col. John W. Harmo-
The Gap group had just turned south ny. Harmony quickly brought Butler
from Crest on the afternoon of the up to date on the situation in the rear.
22d, and its commander, realizing the Throughout the previous day, 21
implications of the German advance, August, he explained, General Stack
quickly organized a tank-infantry had been waiting at Sisteron to learn
counterattack into Puy. While Sher- whether to move the 143d Infantry to
man tank fire blocked the roads lead- Grenoble or Montelimar. Dahlquist,
ing from Puy to Marsanne, the unit the 36th Division commander, had not
from Gap cleared Puy that evening, yet been able to determine where Trus-
destroying ten German vehicles but cott wanted the Rhone blocked. Al-
suffering no casualties. though ready to push the 143d north to
Grenoble or west to Montelimar, he
4The Luftwaffe unit, which had been leading Pe- had also ordered the 142d Infantry to
tersen’s withdrawing columns on the west bank of Gap to protect his eastern flank and
the Rhone, outdistanced the rest of the retreating had sent Harmony’s 141st regiment
German forces before losing most of its transporta-
tion to Allied air attacks and FFI ambushes. Some of
initially to Sisteron to serve as his re-
the regiment’s troops then crossed the river near serve. Unconfirmed intelligence re-
Montelimar and, in disarray, hitched rides on vehi- ports still placed the 157th Reserve
cles of the 11th Panzer Division The Luftwaffe unit Mountain Division in the Grenoble-Gap
commander was later court-martialed for his role in
the regiment’s flight northward and for deserting region, and an attack on the 36th Divi-
his troops. sion’s northeastern flank thus re-
THE BATTLE OF MONTELIMAR 151

mained a possibility. Dahlquist had intercept was accurate, the armored


then altered these plans on the evening threat was just a ruse, for the 11th Pan-
of the 21st, judging that the 143d was zers had been able to ferry only a few of
too oriented on Grenoble to assist their imposing machines across the
Butler and giving the mission to the Rhone. 6 Nevertheless, themove appar-
141st. Harmony related that his regi- ently succeeded, for Truscott stayed
ment, the last major unit of the 36th his hand; it was not until 2300 that
Division to displace north, had arrived evening that he finally ordered Dahl-
in the Sisteron-Aspres area only on the quist to move on to Montelimar, and
morning of the 22d and, due to the the next day before the 179th regiment
general shortage of vehicles, had not resumed its movement north.
been able to advance much farther. When Truscott’s orders arrived,
Using captured German fuel stores, he late on the 21st, Dahlquist sent the
had finally managed to bring the one rest of Harmony’s 141st regiment on
battalion with him to Marsanne, but its way west and, through the 22d,
did not expect the rest of his units to tried to reorient the rest of his scat-
reach the Montelimar area until the fol- tered division on Montelimar. T o
lowing day. In the meantime, Butler secure his northern flank, he decided
would have to make do with this limit- to allow the 143d Infantry to resume
ed reinforcement. its advance on Grenoble, which
The lack of reinforcements reflected Americans entered that afternoon,
American indecision. Throughout the and then have it swing west and
day and evening of 21 August neither south, through the city of Valence,
Patch nor Truscott had been willing to into the battle square. 7 Transporta-
make Montelimar the major effort. tion problems, however, hindered his
They were still unable to predict when efforts to accelerate the movement of
Toulon and Marseille would fall or the 141st to Montelimar, and to
confirm the beginning of a complete follow it with the 142d regiment from
German withdrawal up the Rhone Gap and the rest of the division. Im-
valley. On the morning of the 21st, patient with these delays, Truscott ar-
Truscott had ordered one regiment of rived at the 36th Division command
the 45th Division-the 179th Infan- post near Aspres shortly before noon
try-to Sisteron, but had canceled the
movement abruptly at 1330 when an Army G–2, to allow Patch to pass the information
ULTRA intercept informed him that on to Truscott’s subordinates and to the French
without revealing the true source (see p. 124 of this
units of the 11th Panzer Division had volume).
crossed the Rhone and were south of 6See “11th Panzer Division Rpt of MG von Wie-
the Durance River. 5 Although the radio tersheim, 4 June 46,” and (G–3, 11th Panzer Division,
“Remarks Regarding the War History of the Sev-
enth US Army,” 20 Jun 46 (both unpaginated), in
5ULTRA Msg XL 7178 201029 Aug 44, ULTRA John E. Dahlquist Papers, MHI.
Collection, MHI; Truscott, Command Missions, p. 426. 7 For a treatment of the FFI and American actions
The message was also supposedly confirmed by in the Grenoble area, and the withdrawal of the
POW reports according to “G–2 History: Seventh weak 157th Reserve Mountain Division east to the
Army Operations in Europe,” I, 15-31 Aug 44, 5, Franco-Italian border region, see unpublished
Box 2, Quinn Papers, MHI, but the POW item may paper, “United States and Resistance Cooperation
have been only a cover story by Quinn, the Seventh in the Liberation of Grenoble” (copy CMH).
152 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

and, finding Dahlquist absent, made Late on the evening of the 22d,
his dissatisfaction clear to the division about 2100, Truscott and Dahlquist
chief of staff, Col. Stewart T. Vincent. hashed out their differences over a re-
Noting the 143d advancing on Greno- cently opened telephone line. Dahl-
ble, the 142d at Gap and points east, quist recommended moving the
and elements of the 141st just pulling 179th, rather than the 143d, to Mon-
into Aspres, he demanded that the telimar and even suggested sending
entire division move to the Rhone the entire 45th Division there while
“forthwith,” and attached the 179th the 36th dashed up to Dijon, 150
regiment (45th Division) to the divi- miles farther north. Truscott brushed
sion for employment at Grenoble. aside these proposals, showed in-
Upon returning to his own com- creasingly less sympathy for Dahl-
mand post, Truscott composed a quist’s transportation problems, and
letter to Dahlquist with detailed in- again emphasized the need to block
structions. Indicating his displeasure the Rhone valley near Montelimar,
with the division’s deployments, he telling him to get his men there even
emphasized that “the primary mission if they had to walk. His one conces-
of the 36th Division is to block the sion was to allow Dahlquist to move
Rhone Valley in the gap immediately the 179th Infantry to the west in lieu
north of Montelimar.” 8 Dahlquist was of the 143d.
to push the entire 141st regiment to Throughout the rest of the night
Montelimar as soon as possible; move and into the early morning hours of
the 179th to Grenoble and shift the 23 August, Dahlquist continued to
143d from Grenoble to Montelimar; shuffle the growing number of units
and march the rest of the 142d west under his command into some kind of
to the Montelimar-Nyons area to pro- order. Lack of fuel and transportation
tect Butler’s southern flank. He also rather than lack of manpower re-
suggested that Dahlquist screen But- mained his key problem. Soon after
ler’s northern flank by reconnoitering conversing with Truscott, he directed
toward Valence above Montelimar. the 142d Infantry to start westward at
The 45th Division, he explained, once, traveling at night, not to the
would ultimately assume responsibil- Nyons region southeast of Monteli-
ity for the entire Grenoble-Gap-Sis- mar as Truscott had recommended,
teron region. Truscott appreciated but rather to Crest and Butler’s area.
Dahlquist’s logistical difficulties, how- Several hours later, however, Dahl-
ever, and arranged to have the Sev- quist countermanded the order and
enth Army headquarters rush a spe- sent the 142d to Nyons, where the
cial truck convoy of fuel to the north leading elements arrived about 0730
during the afternoon. This resupply, on the morning of the 23d.
together with captured gasoline, al- Meanwhile, as the 179th Infantry
lowed the bulk of the 141st, following was leaving Sisteron at 2230, 22
Harmony, to resume its march west at August, Dahlquist changed its objec-
0330 early on the 23d. tive from Grenoble to Montelimar,
but, as the unit rolled into Aspres
8Truscott, Command Missions, p. 427 around midnight, he changed its des-
THE BATTLE OF MONTELIMAR 153

tination back to Grenoble. Once telligence reports had convinced


there, the unit was toxelieve the 143d Wiese, the Nineteenth Army command-
Infantry, which would then move west er, that the Allied forces that had sud-
to Valence and south to Montelimar. denly appeared above Montelimar
Again, the availability of fuel and ve- posed a serious threat to his north-
hicles dictated these troublesome ward withdrawal.9 He responded by
changes, and Dahlquist and his staff sending his most powerful and most
labored to keep them to a minimum. mobile force, the 11th Panzer Division
Dahlquist’s final orders for 23 under Maj. Gen. Wend von Wieter-
August appeared to put his house in sheim, toward the troubled area. It
order at last. Pushing the 143d to was the division’s reconnaissance bat-
Montelimar through Valence would talion that had probed Butler’s posi-
safeguard Butler’s northern flank, and tions on the 22d, while the rest of the
deploying the 142d into the Nyons 11th, less the force feinting toward
area would cover Butler in the south; Aix-en-Provence, began blocking the
meanwhile, the movement of the major roads to the Rhone coming
141st directly to Montelimar would from the east. But the action around
receive priority, and the divisional Puy that afternoon, when Butler’s
units could follow as transportation armor pushed light elements of the
became available. Truscott approved 11th Panzers back across the Roubion,
these final dispositions and also or- further alarmed Wiese, who then
dered the 180th Infantry, another order von Wietersheim to speed his
45th Division regiment, to the Gap entire division northward. The panzer
area from where it and the rest of the division was to clear the high ground
division could follow the 179th to northeast of Montelimar and secure
Grenoble and points north at some the main highway from Montelimar
future date. As a result, the 45th Divi- north to the Drome. Wiese also di-
sion was soon able to relieve the last rected General Kniess, the L X X X V
36th Division units in these areas, Corps commander still at Avignon, to
leaving Dahlquist free to devote his reinforce Wietersheim’s unit with the
attention to the Rhone. But Truscott 198th Infant? Division within twenty-
was still uneasy. To make sure that four to forty-eight hours.
his operational concept was clearly Fortunately for Butler, von Wieter-
understood by Dahlquist, he tele- sheim found Wiese’s orders hard to
phoned him once again at 0200 execute. Fuel shortages, the presence
hours, 23 August, and reminded him of service and administrative traffic
that his task was to halt the German on the roads, and the difficulties of
withdrawal. Not a single German ve- marching at night under blackout
hicle was to pass Montelimar.
9For the account that follows, von Luttichau,
The German Reaction “German Operations,” chs. 13–14, has been supple-
mented by materials in the 36th Division and VI
The German commanders were Corps G–2 Journals and the daily G–2 Periodic Re-
ports of Task Force Butler, the 36th Division, and
quick to appreciate the dangerous sit- VI Corps, as well as prisoner-of-war interrogations
uation. Late on 21 August German in- and translations of captured documents.
154 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

conditions all delayed the movement and Nyons. However, German activi-
of his division north. Groupe Thieme, ties and the late arrival of the 141st
the first major element of the divi- Infantry put most of these plans in
sion, reached Montelimar only at abeyance.
noon, 23 August, with a battalion of Shortly after dawn o n the 23d, the
infantry, ten medium tanks, and a Germans again attempted to take the
self-propelled artillery battery; the initiative. Above Montelimar elements
rest of the division was not expected of the panzer division’s reconnaissance
to arrive before the 24th. Yet the battalion, supported by a few tanks and
Germans were determined to take the self-propelled guns, infiltrated into
initiative. Although they were unsure Sauzet only to be thrown out by an
of the exact strength of the American American counterattack several hours
forces, they realized that every delay later. About noontime, another small
gave their enemy more time to build German armored column, repeating
u p his strength along their unprotect- the maneuver of the previous day,
ed line of withdrawal. struck across the Roubion River
toward Puy St. Martin, but was also
In the Square (23-24 August) pushed back, this time by concentrated
American artillery fire, Finally, Groupe
On the morning of 23 August, Thieme entered the fray, moving from
Dahlquist dissolved Task Force Butler the Sauzet area toward the Hill 300
as a separate entity, but allowed ridge, but again American forces resist-
Butler to remain in command of ed the pressure and held.
those forces in the battle square area. Uncertain of German strength and
Butler planned to have the 141st In- dispositions, the American counterat-
fantry, with the motorized battalion of tacks fared little better. About 1630
the 143d attached (one of the original that afternoon Butler sent an infantry
components of Task Force Butler), battalion, some service troops, and a
take control of the Rhone front from few tanks southward through Sauzet
the Drome River south to the Rou- to seize Montelimar. But the German
bion. Initially he tasked one battalion defense was far too strong, and a
to secure Hill 300; another, with counterattack halted the American
tanks and tank destroyers, to strike drive at 1800 scarcely a mile short of
southwest from Sauzet to seize Mon- the city. Thus neither side had accom-
telimar; and the two remaining battal- plished a great deal during the 23d.
ions to serve as a reserve near Mar- Since the German withdrawal
sanne, helping to secure Hill 300 as through the Montelimar area had not
necessary. Small forces were to patrol yet begun in earnest, Butler had not
the main supply route from Crest to made a strong effort to interdict
Puy, guard both banks of the Drome, Route N–7 physically. Some ammuni-
and secure Butler’s southern flank on tion had come up during the night,
the Roubion. Butler also dispatched and the artillery units had engaged
cavalry elements to the north and several German convoys on the high-
south in order to link up with 36th way, destroying nearly one hundred
Division units on their way to Valence vehicles. But the need to conserve
THE BATTLE OF MONTELIMAR 155

shells for defensive fire and the un- had been left at Gap to move to Crest
certainty of resupply limited the as soon as the 180th Infantry of the
effort. The Germans, for their part, 45th Division relieved it. In the Mon-
had begun to sort out a potentially telimar Battle Square, Dahlquist
monumental traffic jam at Montelimar wanted Butler to secure all the
and had started some administrative ground dominating the valley be-
and service organizations moving tween Montelimar and the Drome
northward again. However, they had River and, if possible, to capture the
made little progress clearing the city itself. But without the direct sup-
danger area, especially the all-impor- port of the 143d and 142d regiments,
tant Hill 300. Both sides required Butler’s ability to block the Rhone
more strength at Montelimar, and valley physically and to handle
both expected stronger actions by German counterattacks at the same
their opponents on the following day. time was becoming questionable.
Outside of the battle square, Dahl- Wiese was more realistic. Through-
quist inexplicably had shown little ur- out the 23d, he repeatedly urged von
gency in moving the rest of his divi- Wietersheim to rush his panzer divi-
sion to the Montelimar area on the sion up to Montelimar, and pressured
23d. In the north, the 143d Infantry Kniess to have the 298th Division
did not leave Grenoble until 1730 follow as soon as possible. He recom-
and, although encountering no oppo- mended that the 198th relieve 22th
sition, had stopped above Valence, Panzer Division outposts and road-
more than twenty miles north of the blocks at least as far north as Nyons,
Drome, that evening. In the south, and have a regiment at Montelimar by
the 142d Infantry had two infantry the morning of the 24th. Then Wiese
and one artillery battalions in the vi- wanted von Wietersheim to clear all
cinity of Nyons-twenty-five miles American forces from the area using
southwest of Montelimar–by midaf- the entire 22th Panzer Division, the
ternoon, but made no effort to move regiment of the 198th, and the 63d
up to the battle square. Perhaps Dahl- Luftwaffe Training Regiment, which was
quist felt that the coming battle would then assembling at Montelimar.
not be limited to the square, and was Wiese’s subordinates had their own
thus wary of pushing his entire divi- problems. At the time, Kniess was
sion into an area that might become a more concerned with having his corps
German noose. The earlier German across the Durance River that night,
attacks on Butler’s flank at Puy St. and made no provisions to deploy a
Martin supported this concern. regiment of the 298th up to Monteli-
Dahlquist’s plans for 24 August mar; von Wietersheim had to contend
were conservative. He ordered the with crowded roads and shortages of
143d to seize Valence and the 142d fuel, and his armor arrived in the
to extend its covering line from battle square area in dribs and drabs.
Nyons to within ten miles southeast Nevertheless, German strength in the
of Montelimar. Only later, sometime Montelimar region on 24 August was
during the night, did h e order the re- enough to give Task Force Butler and
maining battalion of the 142d that the 36th Division considerable trou-
156 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

ble. Another American attack that units into the battle square, still with
morning by a battalion of the 141st less dispatch and more confusion
Infantry from Sauzet toward Monteli- than was called for. That morning, for
mar again ended in failure when example, he ordered the 2d Battalion,
German troops, striking from the 142d Infantry (relieved of its defen-
west, first drove a wedge into the sive assignment at Gap), first to
American flank, and then infiltrated a Crest, then to Nyons, and finally, as it
maze of small roads and tracks to entered Nyons at 1500, back to Crest.
threaten the unit’s rear. That evening,He then directed the rest of the 142d
as Harmony attempted to withdraw regiment, still in the Nyons area, to
the battalion, a second series of infan-
follow and take up positions in the
try-armor counterattacks struck the battle square along the Roubion River
unit’s front and flanks, cutting the guarding the American southern
battalion off from Sauzet and dispers- flank. Meanwhile, between 1300 and
ing many of the troops. American ar- 1830, Dahlquist dispatched no less
tillery broke up further German ef- than four contradictory directives-
forts, and the battalion managed to three by radio, one by liaison offi-
fight its way back to Sauzet, but, as c e r – t o the 143d Infantry still above
German pressure renewed, the Amer- Valence. The regiment started to re-
icans again pulled out of the village ceive them at 1600 in the wrong se-
and took positions on the southern quence. Not until 1900 did the regi-
slopes of Hill 430. The battalion lost ment, reinforced by FFI units, get
about 35 men wounded and 15 miss- under way toward Valence only to be
ing, captured 20 Germans, and esti- halted by German defenses on the
mated killing 20. outskirts of the town; and, as the
Meanwhile, a few miles farther American units reorganized for a
north, a second German attack had second effort, another order arrived
cleared several early morning Ameri- directing its immediate movement to
can patrols from Route N–7, and then Crest. Breaking contact, the 143d left
had slowly pushed scattered elements Valence to the FFI and the Germans,
of the 141st Infantry off most of the but were unable to reach Crest and
Hill 300 ridgeline. By dark the Ameri- the battle square until early the fol-
can position had received a serious lowing morning, 25 August.
setback. Pleased, Wiese ordered von By this time Dahlquist was becom-
Wietersheim to finish the j o b on the ing more concerned with defending
following day with the rest of his his own positions than in attacking
units plus several battalions of the Montelimar or blocking the Rhone
198th Division, which the army com- highways. Expecting larger German
mander had personally dispatched attacks on the 25th, he tried to orga-
north. nize his forces into a tight defensive
posture, with the 141st and 142d
Both Sides Reinforce regiments on line (the 141st on the
high ground and the 142d along the
Behind the battlefield on the 24th, Roubion) and the 143d and Task
Dahlquist now directed the rest of his Force Butler, now reconstituted, in
THE BATTLE OF MONTELIMAR 157

reserve. The only offensive action On the German side, the fog of war
planned for the next day was to have had begun to dissipate a little. O n the
elements of the 141st attempt to cut evening of the 24th a detailed copy of
Route N-7 at La Coucourde, several Dahlquist’s operational plans for 25
miles farther north of the previous August had fallen into their hands,
day’s battles. Truscott, who had vis- giving the German commanders their
ited Dahlquist’s forward command first clear picture of the forces oppos-
post near Marsanne that day, wanted ing them at Montelimar. 11As a result,
a more offensive role for Butler, but Wiese now decided to move the
had approved Dahlquist’s plans, al- entire 198th Infantry Division to the
lowing the division commander to north and form a provisional corps
deploy his forces as he thought best. under von Wietersheim, consisting of
The confusion in American com- the 11th Panzer and 198th Divisions,
mand channels was far from over. the 63d Luftwaffe Training Regiment, the
About 2330 that night, 24 August, Luftwaffe 18th Flak Regiment (with guns
Dahlquist, concerned about protecting ranging from 20-mm. to 88-mm. in
his flanks and rear, asked Truscott to caliber), a railroad artillery battalion
send a regiment of the 45th Division to (with five heavy pieces ranging from
Crest early the next day. Although he 270-mm. to 380-mm. in caliber), and
had already instructed the 45th Divi- several lesser units. With these forces
sion to move the 157th Infantry to Die, he expected von Wietersheim to
twenty miles east of Crest, Truscott re- launch a major attack before noon on
fused the request, feeling that Dahl- the 25th and sweep the American
quist’s strength in the battle area was units away. At the same time, Wiese
adequate. A few hours later, perhaps continued to urge Kniess to move his
feeling that the division commander’s corps north as fast as he could.
defensive concerns might lead him to Having withdrawn the last of the
abandon his main mission, Truscott re- LXXXV Corps across the Durance
minded him that he still expected his during the night of 23-24 August,
division to block the main highway as and having executed another with-
soon as possible. His troops, Dahlquist drawal the following night without
radioed in reply, had been there during pressure from the south, Kniess was
the day, and h e assured Truscott that about fifteen miles north of Avignon
they were “physically on the road.” 10 but still more than thirty-five miles
However, although small groups of south of Montelimar on the morning
American soldiers may have reached of the 25th. Success at Montelimar
the highway from time to time, the im- would be for naught if Kniess’ units
plication that they controlled any por- were destroyed in the south.
tion of N-7 was inaccurate; at best, While the rest of the 36th Division
Dahlquist’s knowledge of his own
troop dispositions may have been 11 Dahlquist later confirmed the loss, attributing it
faulty. to a “very stupid liaison officer” who fled from his
jeep when fired on by a small German roadblock,
leaving the operational plans behind. Dahlquist Ltr
10Rad, Dahlquist to Truscott, 0130 25 Aug 44, (to wife), 29 Aug 44 (hereafter cited as “Dahlquist
36th Div G–3 Jnl, 25 Aug 44. Ltr” and date), John E. Dahlquist Papers, MHI.
158 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

entered the battle square that night, hoped that the 305th Grenadiers would
von Wietersheim, with Dahlquist’s be able to isolate the American infan-
order in hand, issued detailed instruc- try and artillery in the Hill 300-Con-
tions for his attack. H e divided the dillac Pass area, while the 326th Gren-
units under this control into six sepa- adiers, coming up from the south,
rate task forces, four from the 11th swept behind them and linked u p
Panzer Division–Groupes Hax, Wilde, with Groupe Thieme in the north, thus
and Thieme and the 11th Panzer Recon- surrounding the entire 36th Division.
naissance Battalion-and two from the Groupe Wilde, at La Coucourde, would
198th Division built around the unit’s act as a reserve, able to reinforce any
305th and 326th Grenadiers. T h e 198th of the various efforts or strike into
Division, reinforced with armor, would the Condillac Pass on its own. Finally,
conduct the main effort. T h e 305th the 11th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion
Grenadiers, attacking northeast of Mon- was again to push into the Puy St.
telimar, were to seize the eastern sec- Martin area, further disrupting Ameri-
tion of Hill 430, seal the western end can lines of communication. Taking
of the Condillac Pass, and then move advantage of the dispersion of Dahl-
northwest to Route N-7. Slightly to quist’s units, his logistical difficulties,
the east, the 326th Grenadiers would and the temporary numerical superi-
support this effort by striking across ority of the German forces, the ar-
the Roubion near Bonlieu, marking mored division commander hoped to
the weakly held boundary between destroy completely both Task Force
the 141st and 142d Infantry, and then Butler and the 36th Division. With
driving north. In the west, Groupe Hax, this impediment out of the way, the
consisting of two panzer grenadier German withdrawal could be easily
battalions and two battalions of the accelerated and all delaying action
63d Luftwaffe Training Regiment, rein- could be focused on the U.S. 3d Divi-
forced by artillery and tanks, was to sion slowly moving up from the
support the 198th Division’s attacks by south.
clearing the area north and northeast
of Montelimar, the rest of Hill 300, The Battle of 25 August
and the western slopes of Hill 430.
Meanwhile, Groupe Thieme, with one The German plan of attack was am-
panzer grenadier battalion supported bitious but exceedingly complex and
by tanks and the 119th Replacement depended greatly on the ability of the
Battalion, was to assemble at Loriol in participating units to arrive at their
the north and strike eastward along assembly areas on time and ready for
the south bank of the Drome River to action. From the beginning, diffcul-
Grane, five miles short of Crest; at ties in communications and transpor-
the same time Groupe Wilde, consisting tation made a coordinated attack, as
of another panzer grenadier battalion, envisioned by von Wietersheim, im-
an artillery battalion, and a few tanks, possible. Groupe Thieme, setting out
would relieve elements of Groupe from Loriol around 1130, was the
Thieme outposting Route N-7 around first unit under way. Pushing back
La Coucourde. Von Wietersheim outposts of the 117th Cavalry Squad-
THE BATTLE OF MONTELIMAR 159

ron, the attackers reached Grane forced the Germans back across the
before 1400, while other German Roubion. T h e 1st Battalion, 143d In-
forces seized Allex, on the north side fantry, part of Dahlquist’s reserve, en-
of the Drome, at approximately the tered Bonlieu at 2100 hours that
same time. Alarmed, Dahlquist sent night without opposition.
Task Force Butler, now little more T h e American effort that day to cut
than a weak battalion combat team, Route N-7 turned out to be the most
north from Puy St. Martin about half- promising offensive action. Due to
way to Crest to protect his main the early departure of Groupe Thieme
supply route; Butler, in turn, dis- and the late arrival of Groupe Wilde,
patched a tank platoon northwest the Germans had left the Hill 300-La
over a mountain road toward Grane. Coucourde area nearly unprotected
Unable to retake Grane, the tank unit for much of the day. However, Har-
established a blocking position just mony’s 141st Infantry was stretched
south of the town, while a heteroge- thin along a six-mile front, and the
neous collection of infantry, recon- regimental commander was unable to
naissance, armor, and engineer units put together an attacking force until
hurriedly set u p roadblocks west of late afternoon. Finally, around 1600,
Crest on both sides of the Drome. Al- while units of the 2d Battalion, 143d
though this mixed force expected a Infantry, secured the northern slopes
major German effort against Crest to of Hill 300, the 1st Battalion, 141st
follow, no further German advances Infantry, moved west out of the Con-
along the Drome took place that day. dillac Pass supported by some tanks
Groupe Thieme had accomplished its and tank destroyers and struck out for
mission and was content to defend its La Coucourde. Despite the arrival of
gains. Groupe Wilde elements, the attack suc-
Elsewhere German attacks accom- ceeded, and by 1900 one and later
plished much less. Groupe Hax, for ex- two rifle companies, four tanks, and
ample, did not start out until 1400, seven tank destroyers were blocking
and then succeeded only in consoli- the highway.
dating earlier gains above Monteli- Whether the Americans could keep
mar. Groupe Wilde did not reach its as- the block in place was critical. Until
signed positions in the Hill 300-La darkness halted observed fire, Ameri-
Coucourde area until 1500, and the can artillery prevented the Germans
planned attacks of the 305th Grenadiers from assembling forces for a counterat-
and the 11th Panzer Reconnaissance Bat- tack, but Harmony doubted that he
talion never even began. The only se- could hold the roadblock through the
rious German threat in the south that night. Increased German pressure
day was the attack of the 326th Grena- across his entire front made it impossi-
diers in the Bonlieu area late in the ble to reinforce the blocking force, and
afternoon. Although the grenadiers he had considerable difficulty keeping
easily routed a company of the 111th it supplied. Accordingly, he suggested
Engineer Battalion which was holding that the force retire into the pass for
the area, American artillery quickly the night, blowing up several small
broke up their advance and again bridges in the area before leaving, and
160 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

return in the morning. But Dahlquist, ery of the battle square, nearly lead-
complying with Truscott’s orders, told ing to his defeat in the center where
him to maintain the block as long as it counted.
possible.
At this juncture, von Wietersheim More Reinforcements
took a personal hand in affairs. Dis-
gusted with the failure of his plans Additional American troops were
and especially with the inability of his on their way to the Montelimar
forces to keep at least the highway sector. When Truscott learned of the
open, he organized an armored-infan- German push toward Crest on the
try striking force from units scraped 25th, h e directed the 45th Division to
up in the Montelimar-Sauzet area and send the 157th Regimental Combat
led a midnight cavalry charge against Team and the 191st Tank Battalion
the American roadblock. By 0100 on north to the battle square area.
the 26th, German armor had dis- Taking a southerly route via Nyons,
persed the blocking force, knocking one battalion and most of the tanks
out three American tanks and six tank reached Marsanne about 2200 on the
destroyers and driving what was left 25th; the rest of the regiment along
back into the Condillac Pass. After re- with one tank company began closing
opening the highway, Wietersheim on Crest early the following morning.
swung some of his forces east to seize Truscott attached the units at Mar-
the high ground on the northern side sanne to the 36th Division, instructing
of the pass to prevent the Americans Dahlquist to use them as his reserve,
from resuming their ground attacks and ordered the rest of the force to
on the highway in the morning. At remain at Crest as the corps reserve.
the time, Harmony still had two rifle Meanwhile, late on the 25th, Dahl-
companies on the northern section of quist began planning for a limited of-
the Hill 300 ridgeline, but nothing fensive on the following day. He
strong enough to counter this new wanted Task Force Butler to attack
German force. first west from Crest along the south
Once again the action at Monteli- bank of the Drome and then south
mar ended in a stalemate. Dahlquist along Route N-7 to the Condillac
had still committed little of his Pass. At the time, Harmony’s 141st
strength in La Coucourde area, and Infantry was still maintaining its road-
most of his 142d and 143d Infantry block near La Coucourde, and it ap-
had seen no action. With so much peared that no more Germans would
American strength held in reserve or reach the Drome. Nevertheless, ex-
in supporting defensive positions, the pecting stronger German counterat-
inability of Dahlquist and Harmony to tacks on the 26th in the southern
interdict the highway-their main sector of the battle square, Dahlquist
mission-was not surprising. But Wie- continued to deploy his main
tersheim had done little better. His strength, the bulk. of the 142d and
grandiose attack plans had gone no- 143d regiments, and the recently ar-
where and, in the end, had only rived battalion of the 157th with its
spread his forces out over the periph- attached tanks in reserve or in defen-
THE BATTLE OF MONTELIMAR 161

sive positions along his northern and reserve near Montelimar. He also
southern flanks. wanted the withdrawal of the rest of
In the early morning hours of 26 his corps speeded up. Still well south
August, American tactical plans again of Montelimar were the 308th Grena-
underwent a major revision. The dis- diers plus other elements of the 198th
persion of the 141st regiment’s road- Division; the 338th Division, less one
block at La Coucourde prompted regiment traveling up the west bank
Dahlquist to change Butler’s mission, of the Rhone; several field artillery
and he subsequently directed the task and antiaircraft battalions; some
force to launch an attack at daylight combat engineer units; and a host of
from the western exit of the Condillac lesser combat and service units of
Pass to restore the roadblock. Butler’s both the army and air force. Kniess
attack was still the only offensive had good reason for concern. Late on
action that Dahlquist planned for the the 25th the U.S. 3d Infantry Division
26th. had caught up with several L X X X V
The Germans were also changing Corps elements north of Avignon, and
their plans. Late on the 25th von he had no way of predicting the
Wietersheim directed the 110th Panzer speed of the American advance north.
Grenadiers, previously split between Accordingly, he canceled existing
Groupes Hax and Thieme, to displace plans for a phased withdrawal and di-
north of the Drome and protect the rected the 338th Division to begin a
routes of withdrawal beyond the river. forced march that, he hoped, would
At the same time he notified Wiese bring it to Montelimar early on the
that he felt unable to retain command 26th. The 669th Engineer Battalion, re-
of the provisional corps and devote inforced, was to man rear-guard
sufficient attention to his own divi- blocking positions to cover the corps’
sion. Wiese, unhappy with the con- withdrawal and delay the 3d Division.
duct of operations that day, agreed In the south, the 3d Division had
and assigned most of the remaining started north on the 25th after receiv-
forces in the Montelimar sector to the ing orders from Truscott to push
L X X X V Corps, directing Kniess to con- reconnaissance patrols across the
tinue the attacks against the American Durance and prepare for a drive on
forces in the area on the 26th. For Montelimar. But the progress of the
this purpose, he allowed Kniess to division was continually delayed by
employ Groupes Hax and Wilde, both general transportation problems and
reduced to a single panzer grenadier the necessity of waiting for French
battalion but each reinforced with units to take over American positions
tanks. south of the Durance. Leading ele-
On 26 August Kniess planned to ments of the 3d Division reached Avi-
renew the attacks north and northeast gnon about 1400, 25 August, and,
of Montelimar between Hill 300 and finding the Germans gone, moved fif-
the Bonlieu area with the 198th Divi- teen miles farther north to Orange
sion’s 305th and 326th Grenadiers. He where, about 1730, they ran into the
expected Groupe Wilde to keep Route German rear guard. Under pressure
N-7 open and placed Groupe Hax in from Truscott to strike northward
162 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

with all possible speed, General other attempt to cut Route N–7 had
O’Daniel, the division commander, failed, and again the primary reason
planned to bring his main strength up for the failure was the inability of the
to the Orange-Nyons area on the 36th Division to commit sufficient
26th, and continue northward with strength at the crucial point.
two regiments abreast-the 15th In- The German attacks on the 26th
fantry along the Rhone and the 30th were even less successful. In the Mon-
Infantry to the east. But, like Dahl- telimar corner of the battle square,
quist, he lacked the fuel and transport Kniess’ offensive began at 1130 with a
to move quickly. lone battalion of the 305th Grenadiers
moving toward Hill 430 and was
Battles on the 26th quickly repelled by American artillery
and tank fire. A second German
Well before the 3d Division re- attack at 1530 in the Bonlieu area,
sumed its march north on 26 August, again hitting the crease between the
Task Force Butler, after a grueling 141st and 142d regiments, penetrated
night march, assembled in the Condil- a little over a mile north of the Rou-
lac Pass, ready to drive west toward bion, but was also stopped by Ameri-
the highway. The new American can artillery, and the position was re-
attack developed slowly against scat- stored by counterattacks of the 1st
tered but determined German resist- Battalions of the 142d and 143d regi-
ance. After a few initial patrols toward ments, both pulled out of reserve. In
La Coucourde failed to reach Route the northern sector of the square, the
N-7, Butler sent two rifle companies 11th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion
of the 3d Battalion, 143d Infantry, broke through American roadblocks
over the northern nose of the Hill to come within two miles of Crest,
300 ridgeline around 1330; and as but was too weak to press home the
they started down the northwest slope attack; during the afternoon, units of
toward the highway, he reinforced the 157th Infantry helped restore
them with a platoon of medium tanks American blocking positions near
and a few tank destroyers moving di- Grane and Allex.
rectly out of the pass. Skirmishing
with German infantry most of the way The German Withdrawal
and harassed by German artillery fire, ( 27-28 August)
these forces butted into Groupe Wilde,
which had moved up from the south During the 26th, American artillery
and swung east toward the pass. Si- managed to block the road and rail
multaneously, other German forces lines along the Rhone intermittently,
attacked from the north, and indeter- but, still short of ammunition, was
minate fighting continued throughout unable to halt the steady stream of
the entire area until dusk when the German foot and vehicle traffic that
American armor finally pulled back continued up the valley and across
into the pass for the night, leaving the Drome. Although much of the
the two infantry companies clinging movement consisted of artillery, anti-
to the northern slope of Hill 300. An- aircraft, and service units, it also in-
THE BATTLE OF MONTELIMAR 163

cluded major combat units. Dawn on Shortages of transportation, fuel, and


the 27th found all of the 110th Panzer ammunition were also constant prob-
Grenadiers, the 11th Reconnaissance Bat- lems, and the net result had been the
talion, the I 19th Replacement Battalion, impossibility of concentrating Suff-
most of the 119th Panzer Artillery Regi- cient combat power to hold the ridge-
ment, and part of the 15th Panzer Regi- line on Hill 300 or to establish a per-
ment (Groupe Thieme) safely north. manent block across the highway in
Guarding the Drome crossings were the face of several desperate German
Groupe Wilde and units of the 305th divisions. Somewhat mollified by a
Grenadiers, while south of the Hill 300 firsthand look at the terrain, Truscott
bottleneck were Groupe Hax, the bulk decided not to take any action against
of the 198th Division, the 338th Divi- Dahlquist for the moment, but re-
sion, and-mainly on Hill 300-the mained unhappy with the state of af-
63d Luftwaffe Training Regiment. The fairs.
338th had not moved north as rapidly At the conclusion of the conference
as Kniess and Wiese had hoped, and Truscott directed Dahlquist to employ
it had only begun to arrive at Monte- Task Force Butler once again to es-
limar after dark on the 26th. Howev- tablish a roadblock near La Cou-
er, the pursuing 3d Division proved courde and then, if possible, move
even slower and, beset by severe fuel the force north across the Drome and
shortages, was ten miles short of then east to Crest to close all of the
Truscott’s objective by dusk of the Drome crossing sites. He also sug-
26th and still fifteen miles south of gested that Butler could then head
Montelimar. north, bypass Valence, and take Lyon,
Although not surprised by Dahl- thereby preventing the IV Luftwaffe
quist’s failure to block N-7, Truscott Field Corps from crossing to the east
had about lost patience with the divi- side of the Rhone north of Monteli-
sion commander. Arriving at Dahl- mar. For this purpose, he gave Dahl-
quist’s headquarters on the morning quist permission to use the 3d Battal-
of the 26th, Truscott intended to re- ion, 157th Infantry, and its attached
lieve him, complaining that his situa- armor as he saw fit, but Truscott re-
tion reports had proved erroneous tained the main body of the 157th In-
and that he had failed to carry out his fantry under his own control, direct-
main objective, interdicting the ing it to move west on the north side
German withdrawal. 12 According to of the Drome to help Butler close the
Truscott, Dahlquist explained that in crossing sites. Truscott also hoped
the confusion of battle his subordi- that O’Daniel’s 3d Division could
nate units had sometimes misin- push substantial strength into the
formed him regarding their locations Montelimar area on the 27th to re-
and progress, and that continuous lieve some of Dahlquist’s units.
German attempts to strike at his Much to Truscott’s disappointment,
supply routes at Crest and Puy had the fighting on 27 August was incon-
occupied much of his reserve force. clusive. Butler, strengthened by the
3d Battalion, 157th Infantry, again
12Truscott, Command Missions, p. 430. pushed west from the Condillac Pass
164 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

toward Route N-7, starting a battle mounting at a rate that Wiese consid-
that seesawed back and forth all day ered alarming. Route N-7 was littered
and that ended in failure for the with destroyed vehicles, guns, and
Americans. During the afternoon, dead horses; the railroad was blocked
mixed elements of the 141st and with wrecked engines and cars, in-
143d Infantry managed to push the cluding those of the railway artillery
Germans off the eastern slopes of Hill battalion. Personnel losses had also
300, but German infantry held on to risen sharply on the 27th, not only
the remainder of the ridge for the from American bombardments but
rest of the day. T o the south, further also as a result of Kniess’ unprofitable
German attacks against 141st Infantry at tacks.
units on Hill 430 were repulsed but, At dusk on the 27th Wiese directed
worried about another German attack Kniess to pull the 338th Division and
on his southern flank, Dahlquist kept Groupes Hax and Wilde across the
most of the 142d Infantry idle in de- Drome at all costs on the 28th. The
fensive positions along the Roubion. 198th Division and the rear-guard en-
Meanwhile, in the north, American gineers were to continue to hold back
elements entered Crane late on the the 3d and 36th Divisions and, once
27th without opposition and the the other units were across the
157th Infantry cleared Allex; but nei- Drome, to escape as best they could.
ther force was able to move any If Wiese was pessimistic, Truscott
closer to the Livron-Loriol area that was still optimistic. On the basis of
day. South of the battle square, the overly enthusiastic messages from
3d Division’s northward advance was Dahlquist on the 27th and erroneous
still hampered by continued transpor- intelligence reports, Truscott believed
tation problems as well as by road- that major portions of the L X X X V
blocks of mines, booby traps, felled Corps had been destroyed south of the
trees, destroyed bridges, and other Drome and that only remnants of
obstacles, and by evening the unit was three German regiments remained in
still four miles short of Montelimar. the Montelimar area. Equally signifi-
On the German side Wiese had cant, he knew that the French had
become increasingly nervous at the now cleared nearly all of Toulon and
steady northern progress of the 3d Marseille without much of a fight, and
Division and the slow speed of the the remaining German forces in both
L X X X V Corps withdrawal. He had ex- ports were expected to surrender for-
pected to have all his units across the mally at any moment. It was time to
Drome by nightfall, except the 198th begin the drive to northern France in
Division. Instead Kniess had kept earnest. H e therefore gave orders for
Groupes Hax and Wilde south of the the 3d and 36th Divisions to mop up
Drome and had committed part of the the area between the Drome and
338th Division to what the Nineteenth Roubion rivers on 28 August, for
Army commander felt were fruitless at- Task Force Butler and the 157th In-
tacks against Hill 430 and the Condil- fantry to occupy Loriol and Livron,
lac Pass. Meanwhile, German materiel and for units of the 45th Division to
losses in the battle square were begin moving north from Grenoble
THE BATTLE OF MONTELIMAR 165

toward Lyon. He expected both banks Hills 300 and 430 and the Condillac
of the Drome to be in American Pass. Although American artillery
hands by noon, and hoped that the continued to shoot up German traffic
36th Division could start one regi- along the road, the effort to block the
mental combat team north before highway with ground troops in the
dark. area of La Coucourde was not re-
Truscott soon discovered that he sumed. T o the south, units of the 3d
had greatly overestimated the speed Division, which had conducted a day-
of the German withdrawal and under- long running engagement with the
estimated the strength of their forces German rear guard, entered the
still south of the Drome. When units southern outskirts of Montelimar that
of the 141st Infantry, now command- evening, but were unable to secure
ed by Lt. Col. James H. Critchfield,13 the city until the following morning,
tried to advance toward Montelimar 29 August.
on the morning of the 28th, they Although the Germans had again
were quickly repelled by the 298th Di- frustrated American attempts to cut
vision’s 308th Grenadiers supported by their route of withdrawal during the
heavy artillery and mortar fire; Critch- 28th, their losses in men and materiel
field spent the better part of the day continued to multiply. South of Mon-
trying to extricate two of his attacking telimar the 3d Division overran a
infantry companies that had been sur- column of some 340 German vehicles
rounded. Task Force Butler’s drive on and took almost 500 German prison-
Loriol was equally unsuccessful. Now ers. Moreover, although Groupe Hax,
built around the 3d Battalion, 157th part of the 933d Grenadiers, and ele-
Infantry, the task force ran into heavy ments of the 338th Division’s artillery
German tank and antitank fire at and special troops had arrived safely
Loriol, losing three medium tanks across the Drome, Kniess was unable
and two tank destroyers within a few to move either the 338th Division or
minutes, which forced Butler to pull Groupe Wilde northward. Instead he
back at once. North of the Drome the was forced to commit Groupe Wilde
157th Infantry did little better when and the 3 3 8 t h ' s 757th Grenadiers at
stubborn resistance from the 210th Loriol to hold back Task Force
Panzer Grenadiers reinforced with tanks Butler; to use a battalion of the 933d
stopped their attack just short of Grenadiers, 338th Division, and another
Livron. from the 305th Grenadiers, 298th Divi-
Meanwhile, in the center, the 2d sion, to secure the high ground be-
and 3d Battalions, 143d Infantry, tween the Condillac Pass and Loriol;
spent most of the day defending and to retain other elements of the
American positions in the area of 305th and the 63d Luftwaffe to hold at
least a portion of Hill 300. At dusk
these units were still in place, while
the main body of the 198th Division
13Colonel Harmony had been wounded on the was concentrated a few miles north of
27th, and Critchfield, commander of the unit’s 2d
Battalion, headed the regiment until Col. Clyde E. Montelimar, just above what was left
Steele took over on the 29th. of the rear-guard engineer battalion.
166 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

End of the Battle into the two columns of the 198th Di-
vision moving north. In the violent
With Groupe Wilde and elements of night melee that followed, some of
the 338th Division protecting the the German soldiers managed to
Drome crossings near Livron and break through the American lines
Loriol, Kniess ordered Brig. Gen. and, under constant fire, reach Route
Otto Richter, commanding the 198th N–7 by morning; most, however, were
Division, to break out of the battle either killed or captured during the
square during the night of 28–29 lengthy skirmish, just about ending
August and the morning of the 29th. the effectiveness of at least two of the
For the escape, Richter decided to three 198th Division regiments. Mean-
divide his forces into three tactical while the 305th’s column, which was
columns, each built around one of his supposed to wait until the other
grenadier regiments and each moving groups had cut back onto the high-
north during the early hours of the way, left early during the night and
29th by a separate route. On the west made good its escape directly up
a column led by the 305th Grenadiers Route N-7 without opposition.
was to move directly up Route N-7; As daylight broke on the morning
two other columns, one centered of the 29th, the 141st Infantry re-
around the 308th Grenadiers and the sumed its drive on Montelimar, polic-
other around the 326th Grenadiers, ing stragglers of the 198th; capturing
were to push up separately through General Richter, the division com-
the valley between Hills 300 and 430 mander; and joining forces with the
and try to swing back to the highway 3d Division’s 7th regiment coming up
near La Coucourde. from the south. During the final fight-
Meanwhile Dahlquist, intent on re- ing of 28–29 August, the three con-
suming his clearing operations that verging American regiments captured
night, ordered the 141st regiment to over 1,200 Germans (including about
again strike south against Montelimar, 700 by the 143d Infantry in the area
supported by the 143d Infantry, of the Hill 300–430 valley) while suf-
which was also to advance toward the fering 17 killed, 60 wounded, and 15
city through the valley between Hills missing. The 15th Infantry, 3d Divi-
300 and 430. In addition, he ordered sion, clearing Montelimar, captured
Task Force Butler to make another at- another 450 Germans; and the 3d Di-
tempt against Loriol at first light, and vision’s 30th Infantry, which contin-
directed the 142d Infantry, which had ued mopping up during the day, took
replaced the 157th north of the several hundred more. On the 30th,
Drome, to continue west through those 3d and 36th Division units re-
Livron to block the Drome fords. In- maining in the battle square swept
evitably the opposing forces would the entire area, taking nearly 2,000
clash head on. additional prisoners.
As units of the 143d Infantry To the north, along the Drome, the
moved south through the Hill 300- 142d Infantry cleared Livron by 0930
430 valley in the early hours of 29 on the 29th, and, despite stiff German
August, their leading elements ran opposition, Task Force Butler secured
THE BATTLE OF MONTELIMAR 167

Loriol during the afternoon. Howev- parts of units, and individual groups
er, neither force could- make a final of army, air force, navy, and civilian
push to the Rhone that day to stop personnel. West of the Rhone, the
Germans who were still crossing at a bulk of the IV Luftwaffe Field Corps, in-
few small fords. These eleventh-hour cluding the understrength 716th In
German escapees still had some InfantryDivision and an assortment of
punch left, and during the night they units under the 189th Division, had
swallowed up two American road- pulled abreast of Montelimar as early
blocks, capturing 35 American troops. as 26 August and had also continued
Total casualties during the 29th for north, led by the 7Ist Luftwaffe Infantry
the two attacking American forces on Regiment, which, fleeing in disarray,
the Drome were about 13 killed, 69 had already reached Lyon. At Vienne,
wounded, and 43 missing, but ap- fifty miles north of the Drome, the
proximately 550 more German sol- corps crossed the Rhone, joining the
diers were prisoners. LXXXV Corps’ flight northward with
For the Nineteenth Army, 29 August elements of the 11th Panzers constitut-
was the last day of cohesive action in ing a new rear guard. The battle of
the battle square. As long as they southern France was over, and the
could, German soldiers continued to race for the German border had
flee over the Drome River in ones begun.
and twos and disorganized groups.
Groupe Wilde pulled out during the Montelimar: Anatomy of a Battle
early afternoon, as did what was left
of the 338th Division, followed later in Was Montelimar an Allied victory, a
the day and into the evening by those German victory, or something in be-
elements of the 198th Division that tween? Casualty figures tell part, but
had managed to break through from by no means all, of the story. Ameri-
the south. This last-minute success, can units involved in the battle suf-
however, came at the expense of fered 1,575 casualties-187 killed,
other German units, such as the 757th 1,023 wounded, and 365 missing.
Grenadiers, that were virtually de- These losses, representing well under
stroyed during the day trying to pro- 5 percent of the American strength
tect the Loriol-Livron crossings. ultimately committed, hardly seem
The battle officially ended on the heavy considering the size of the
morning of 31 August when the 142d forces engaged, although the concen-
regiment finally reached the Rhone tration of casualties in a few infantry
River, clearing the north bank of the battalions of the 141st and 143d regi-
Drome and capturing 650 more Ger- ments attests to the bitterness of
mans in the process. Although ex- some of the fighting and the length of
hausted and thoroughly disorganized, the conflict.
the Nineteenth A m y had managed to German losses were considerably
save the bulk of the 11th Panzer Divi- higher. American forces engaged in
sion, Kniess’ LXXXV Corps with two the attempt to cut the Rhone valley
greatly weakened infantry divisions, escape route captured some 5,800
and a host of miscellaneous units, Germans from 21 through 31 August.
168 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

Of these, about 4,000 were from as only 20 percent effective but, over-
LXXXV Corps units and most of the generously, put the equally damaged
remainder from assorted Luftwaffe ele- 198th at 60 percent.
ments. In addition, the withdrawal In contrast, the 11th Panzer Division,
along the east bank of the Rhone cost the “Ghost Division,” survived the
the German Army about 600 men Montelimar withdrawal in relatively
killed, 1,500 wounded, and several good condition, suffering no more
thousand others missing during the than 750 casualties and arriving at
same time period. West of the river, Vienne with about 12,500 effectives.
the IV Luftwaffe Field Corps lost ap- The unit also brought out 39 of its 42
proximately 270 killed, 580 wounded, artillery pieces, over 30 of its 40-odd
and 2,160 missing, mostly due to air heavy tanks, and 75 percent of its
attacks, FFI operations, and the gen- other vehicles. With accuracy, the
eral disorganization that characterized Seventh Army G-2 rated the panzer
the movement north. division as 75 percent effective. How-
Taking into account all available in- ever, the 11th had not really done
formation, the German Army units much during the campaign. While
moving up the east bank of the serving as the Nineteenth Army’s re-
Rhone suffered about 20 percent cas- serve, it had only been committed to
ualties. More important, most of battle briefly and had led, rather than
these losses came from front-line followed, the main German withdraw-
combat units, greatly reducing their al, with disastrous consequences . for
effective combat strength, which was the less mobile infantry divisions.
defined by the German Army as fight- Despite the heavy German losses in
ing troops forward of the infantry bat- personnel and equipment, the escape
talion headquarters. For example, the of the Nineteenth Army was a disap-
338th Division (omitting the attached pointment for Truscott, Dahlquist,
933d Grenadiers) was down to 1,810 and Butler. Truscott, looking back on
combat effectives by the 31st, and the his experiences in the Italian cam-
198th Division was reduced to about paign, was acutely aware of the need
2,800. In addition, both units had lost to destroy or at least damage the re-
much of their artillery as well-as sub- treating German forces as severely as
stantial quantities of other equipment, possible. From the beginning, the ob-
such as vehicles, radios, crew-served lique advance to the Grenoble-Monte-
weapons, and small arms. Thus, al- limar area had been a gamble, one
though the total manpower, or that attempted to take advantage of
“ration,” strength of these units the hasty German withdrawal as well
might have been considerably more as the failure of Wiese to protect the
than their combat effective strength- flanks of his narrow route of retreat.
as determined by German account- The courageous assistance of the
ing-they could assemble little more FFI–harassing German detachments,
than a single, weak regimental combat providing valuable local intelligence
team apiece for action. At the end of to the advancing Americans, and aug-
the month, the U.S. Seventh Army in- menting their combat forces when-
telligence thus rated the 338th Division ever possible–was another advantage
THE BATTLE OF MONTELIMAR 169

enjoyed by the Allies that is often forcing them to run a gauntlet they
overlooked. But the- inability of the would not quickly forget.
Allied commanders to concentrate The Seventh Army’s logistical prob-
their limited forces early enough at a lems were not mysterious. Its rapid
single point–at Montelimar or, had progress inland had created a gaso-
circumstances dictated otherwise, per- line shortage as early as D plus 1; by
haps Loriol, Valence, or even farther 21 August the three American divi-
north–made it extremely difficult to sions alone required approximately
stop the withdrawal, especially consid- 100,000 gallons of fuel per day. At
ering the strong German response the time there was a surplus of am-
once the danger was perceived. Allied munition in the beachhead area, but
logistical problems in the north–par- the three beach fuel dumps had only
ticularly the shortage of transport- about 11,000 gallons of gasoline left
caused by the rapid success of the between them. Using captured fuel
landing itself, also reduced the flexi- stores at Draguignan, Le Muy, and
bility of the northward thrust and Digne (26,000 gallons) helped some-
made an earlier decision on a focal what, as did severe rationing, but
point necessary. Had this been done, there was no easy solution. Employ-
the Seventh Army might have been ing the 36th Division’s trucks to mo-
able to push more fuel and ammuni- torize Task Force Butler only com-
tion up to the battle square in sup- pounded both the fuel and vehicle
port, and Butler and Dahlquist might shortage within the Allied command.
have been able to throw much more As a result, the Seventh Army and the
of their strength in the Hill 300–La VI Corps lacked the wherewithal to
Coucourde area sooner. But until a assemble Task Force Butler and the
firm decision was made to focus on 36th Division quickly at Montelimar
Montelimar and was communicated to and support the force with adequate
all participants, the tactical command- rations, fuel, and munitions from the
ers could not begin to close the beach depots 200 miles to the rear.
Rhone valley escape route. As a new Although the ammunition expendi-
division commander and one who was tures of American artillery units in
unfamiliar with Truscott’s methods of the Montelimar area were approxi-
operation, Dahlquist was unsure of mately three times higher (about
himself and needed more guidance. ninety 105-mm. and thirty 155-mm.
At the time, he blamed himself for al- rounds per tube per day) than else-
lowing the Germans to escape, feeling where, there was never enough to
that he had had “a great opportunity” support these infantry and armored
and had “fumbled it badly.” 14 But, units adequately or to interdict the
operating on a logistical shoestring, highway by fire alone.15
the so-called hard-luck 36th Division From Patch’s broader perspective,
had at least given a beating to almost the results were more satisfying. His
every retreating German division,
15U.S. Seventh Army, Report of Operations, I, 316-
14Dahlquist Ltr, 25 Aug 44, John E. Dahlquist 18. For further discussion of logistical conditions at
Papers, MHI. the time, see ch. 1 1 .
170 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

army’s main objective-securing the flanks of the Nineteenth Army’s with-


ports of Toulon and Marseille-had drawal was the result of poor plan-
been accomplished in record time, ning and poor intelligence. Aside
but it was a task that had kept most of from the capture of the 36th Divi-
the Allied com bat power-including sion’s order of 24 August, similar dif-
vehicles, fuel, and munitions well ficulties beset the German command-
south of the Durance. Patch’s prior- ers throughout the battle. As a result,
ities forced first Butler and then Dahl- they rarely had a clear idea of the
quist to grapple with the more power- strength and dispositions of the
ful German units at Montelimar with forces opposing them at Montelimar
little direct support. Although they and were unable to take advantage of
subsequently failed to halt the weak points in the American lines.
German retreat, both Task Force Like the Americans, the Germans suf-
Butler and the 36th Division acquitted fered from an inability to concentrate
themselves well against often superior sufficient strength at the crucial time
German forces that continually at- and place, and were thus unable to
tempted to outflank their blocking exploit local tactical successes. Piece-
positions. The ensuing battle greatly meal commitment of battalions, small
sapped the strength of the remaining task groups, and hastily assembled
German units, while having little provisional units characterized Ger-
effect on the American forces in- man efforts throughout the battle.
volved. The action also forced Wiese Moreover, the German commanders
to use his most mobile force, the 11th often spread out these forces over a
Panzer Division, at Montelimar rather broad front on terrain that generally
than as a rear guard. As a result, the favored the defense. Had they con-
3d Division had a relatively easy time centrated on holding the Hill 300
following the Germans up the Rhone, ridgeline and directing the remainder
while the capture of Grenoble and its of their available strength at one of
subsequent occupation by 45th Divi- the American flanks-Crest or Puy,
sion units that were poised to strike for example-they might have been
even farther northward was an added able to extract much more from the
bonus. south and, at the same time, deal a
On the German side, General severe blow to their pursuers. Thus,
Wiese had managed to save much of while Montelimar was certainly not
his army, in part due to the early de- the victory that Truscott had hoped
cision of OKW to withdraw German for, it highlighted serious German
forces from southern France. Howev- military weaknesses as well as demon-
er, he could not have been too happy strated the willingness of Allied com-
over either the Montelimar episode or manders to undertake a certain
the rapid fall of the Mediterranean degree of risk and initiative at the
ports. His own failure to secure the operational level of war.
CHAPTER X

Pursuit to the North


With its rear area secure and the two opposing armies in southern
Germans in full retreat, the Seventh France raced up the Rhone valley and
Army’s next objective was to move proceeded northward, one after the
northward as rapidly as possible and other-each often more concerned
join Eisenhower’s SHAEF forces by with reaching its objective than in im-
linking up with General Patton’s peding the progress of the other.
Third Army, which was operating on Clashes between the two forces were,
Eisenhower’s right, or southern, wing. however, unavoidable.
While French units policed up the
port cities, Patch’s staff began push- Allied Plans
ing more supplies to Truscott’s VI On 25 August, as the battle of
Corps units to support the trek north. Montelimar was reaching its climax,
At the same time, the influx of Patch was already issuing orders that
troops, supplies, and equipment over outlined his plans for future Seventh
the original landing beaches contin- Army operations. 1 In accordance with
ued, with the remainder of the French preassault concepts, he intended to
combat units gradually coming ashore have Truscott’s VI Corps drive rapid-
along with the rest of the American ly northward, first to the city of Lyon,
logistical and administrative support 75 miles up the Rhone from Monteli-
units. As all these forces sorted them- mar, and then to Dijon, 110 miles far-
selves out, it was evident that the Sev- ther. Subject to later arrangements
enth Army had become almost inad- with Eisenhower, VI Corps would
vertently involved in a race to north- then strike northeast from Dijon 160
eastern France against what remained
of Wiese’s Nineteenth Army, as well as 1Information on Allied plans in this section is
the rest of Army Group G’s forces flee- based on the following: Seventh Army Rpt, I, 220-21;
ing from western France. The de Lattre, History, pp. 121-23; Truscott, Command
Missions, pp. 430-33; Seventh Army Diary, 25–28
German goal was to reach the area in Aug 44; Seventh Army FOs 3 and 4, 25 and 28 Aug
front of the Reich border before the 44; Seventh Army 0 1 8 , 30 Aug 44; First French
Allied advance, join with Army Group Army Genl Opns Orders 17 and 24, 26 and 29 Aug
B , and present a unified front to the 44; First French Army Preparatory Order, 28 Aug
44; Rad, de Lattre to GenAlphonse Juin (CofS,
invaders. As a result, from the last French Natl Def), 1 Sep 44; VI Corps Fld Msgs,
days of August to mid-September, the 241000 and 281200 Aug 44.
172 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

miles to Strasbourg on the Rhine. East of the Rhone, de Lattre’s forces,


The tasks assigned to de Lattre’s Army B, were to support the right
French forces were more complex. flank of the VI Corps by moving
The French would first complete the north through Grenoble and east of
seizure of Toulon and Marseille; Lyon, before turning their advance
second, screen the area west of the toward the Belfort Gap and the
Rhone, pushing reconnaissance ele- Rhine. In addition, Patch instructed
ments north along its west bank; and de Lattre to relieve the airborne units
third push north and northwest on and any other American forces in the
the right of the VI Corps, moving area of the Franco-Italian border.
into Alsace and the upper Rhine General de Lattre was understand-
valley through the Belfort Gap, about ably upset with these instructions. If
90 miles east of Dijon. Finally, the 1st followed, they would divide what was
Airborne Task Force would continue to become the First French Army into
to screen the Franco-Italian border several parts-two protecting the Sev-
area assisted by French forces when enth Army’s extreme eastern and
available. western flanks, and two others on
For the immediate future Patch’s either side of the VI Corps support-
orders of 25 August specified that the ing its drive to Lyon. With such dis-
airborne force, continuing to operate persion de Lattre doubted whether he
under the direct control of the Sev- could project much of a force into the
enth Army, would secure the army’s Belfort Gap area, especially with his
east flank from the mouth of the Var weaker logistical organization. He put
River near Nice, north into the Alps these arguments to Patch, and the
about 60 miles to the Larche Pass. two subsequently reached a compro-
The VI Corps, in addition to fighting mise. The 1st Airborne Task Force
it out at Montelimar, was to push would continue to hold the area from
east, northeast, and north to a line the Mediterranean to the Larche Pass,
extending about 130 miles northwest but de Lattre would accept responsi-
from the Larche Pass through Greno- bility for the border region north of
ble to Lyon. The French units would the pass. West of the Rhone, Patch
receive their own operational sectors conceded that the “reconnoitering”
as their forces became available for of southwestern France could be
the drive north. done by a small reconnaissance force
On 28 August, with the Montelimar assisted by FFI elements; de Lattre
episode nearing an end, Patch issued agreed to send both the French 1st
more specific guidance, repeating his Armored Division, now unified under
desire to have the VI Corps start its Maj. Gen. du Touzet du Vigier, and
drive north to Dijon as soon as possi- the 1st Infantry Division up the west
ble and confirming Lyon as Truscott’s bank of the Rhone as soon as they
immediate objective. West of the were available. East of the Rhone
Rhone the French were to reconnoi- other French units would secure the
ter 100 miles west and southwest of VI Corps’ right flank, pushing north
Avignon, while pushing forces north- from Grenoble. However, after the
ward in support of the Lyon attack. fall of Lyon, the two French divisions
PURSUIT T O THE NORTH 173

coming up the west bank of the telimar.


Rhone would redeploy east of VI The Seventh Army’s G–2 section
Corps and join the rest of the French believed that the Nineteenth Army’s
forces, thereby uniting de Lattre’s main body would follow the Lyon-
army for a stronger drive on the Bel- Bourg-Besancon route of withdrawal
fort Gap. because the Lyon-Dijon route would
During the planning process, Patch put the enemy forces in an area that
viewed the capture of Lyon primarily was becoming a major battlefield. In
as a stepping stone to the German contrast, Truscott’s corps staff esti-
border rather than as another chance mated that Wiese’s forces would take
to trap the retreating Nineteenth Army, the northern route to Dijon and then
and he paid relatively little attention simply swing east, heading for the
to the German forces retiring across natural defenses of the Vosges Moun-
the Alps into northern Italy. But the tains. From the Vosges the Nineteenth
Nineteenth Army’s line of withdrawal Army could anchor its left, or south-
and Truscott’s aggressive tempera- ern, flank on Belfort and the Swiss
ment made it inevitable that the pur- border, while stretching its right out
suing Americans would exploit every to Army Group B forces north of Dijon.
opportunity to destroy their retreat- French intelligence estimates general-
ing foe. Lyon represented the first ly agreed with this second assess-
focal point of such an effort. Situated ment.2
at the juncture of the Saone and
Rhone rivers, Lyon was the third larg- The German Situation
est city in France and an important
road and rail center, whose seizure The VI Corps’ projection proved
would have important logistical as accurate, for the bulk of the Nineteenth
well as propaganda value. The city Army was indeed to head north from
also controlled the two most logical Lyon to Dijon. OB West ordered Army
German routes of withdrawal. One Group G to extend what would
route led northeast through the towns become its right wing northeast of
of Bourg-en-Bresse and Besancon to Dijon toward the retreating Army
the Belfort Gap. Another went almost Group B forces and establish a strong
due north up the Saone valley to defensive line from Dijon through Be-
Dijon, from where Army Group G sancon to the Swiss border. Such a
forces could continue north to join line would not only secure the ap-
other German commands facing; Ei- proaches to the Belfort Gap, but
senhower’s armies or could swing would also create a German pocket,
back east, either through Besancon or or salient, west of the Vosges. At the
routes farther north, to the Belfort insistence of Hitler and OKW, OB West
Gap. The longer Lyon-Dijon route intended to launch an armored coun-
was much easier and faster, while the terattack from this salient against the
Lyon-Besancon route, although short-
er, offered many natural defiles that
2Seventh Army G–2 Rpt, 29 Aug 44; VI Corps G–
French and American forces could at- 2 Daily Rpts, 29–31 Aug 44; First French Army G–2
tempt to interdict as they had at Mon- Daily Rpt, 29 Aug 44.
174 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

southern flank of Patton’s eastward- Following the LXXXV Corps ’ escape


moving Third Army. Blaskowitz, the past Valence and Vienne during 29–
Army Group G commander, also 30 August, Wiese arranged for a
wanted to hold the salient until the phased withdrawal through Lyon, as-
LXIV Corps, withdrawing from the At- signing the IV Luftwaffe Field Corps the
lantic coast, could reach Dijon and task of holding the city and control-
strengthen the new line. 3 ling traffic through it. He intended to
With the Montelimar episode on withdraw all of the rear-guard forces
their minds, both Blaskowitz and into the city on the night of 31
Wiese were also concerned with the August, and have the bulk of the
possibility of the Seventh Army exe- army start north up the Saone valley
cuting a wide envelopment northeast toward Dijon the following evening;
of Lyon in another attempt to trap he then intended to pull his rear
their retreating forces. Erroneous re- guard out of Lyon on the night of 2–3
ports that strong Seventh Army for- September after it had destroyed all
mations had already pushed east of bridges across the Rhone and Saone
the city increased their alarm. Almost rivers in the area. During the exodus,
equally worrisome was the news that the 11th Panzer Division was to guard
the FFI had started a major uprising the army against any flanking attack
within the city, a development that from the east-a threat that Wiese
could further retard the German with- knew by the evening of 30 August
drawal. On 26 August Blaskowitz ac- had again become imminent.
cordingly had sped units north from
the Montelimar sector to put down North to Lyon
the Lyon uprising and suggested that
Wiese pull the 11th Panzer Division out The Allied drive on Lyon was not
of the Montelimar battle to protect as far advanced as the German com-
the Nineteenth Army’s flank east of manders at first feared. O n 25 August
Lyon. At the time the armored divi- both Truscott and de Lattre were
sion was still fully engaged, however, hard-pressed to round up any combat
and the best Wiese could do was units for the thrust north. The bulk of
direct the IV Luftwaffe Field Corps to the French forces were still clearing
accelerate its withdrawal all the way Toulon and Marseille, while most of
to Lyon and protect the LXXXV Corps’ Truscott’s VI Corps was deeply in-
route of withdrawal up the east bank volved in the Montelimar battle.
of the Rhone. Nevertheless, on 26 August Truscott
directed General Eagles, the com-
3Sources for German planning and operations in mander of the 45th Division, to initi-
this chapter include von Luttichau, “German Oper- ate reconnaissance toward Lyon from
ations,” chs. 10–11 and 14-15; Seventh Army G–2 Grenoble, and on the 27th the two
History, Opns in Europe, Part I and Annex V, Part
II and Annex III; Hugh M. Cole, The Lorraine Cam- commanders agreed to start the 45th
paign, United States Army in World War II (Wash- Division’s 179th regiment moving
ington, 1984), ch. 1 (hereafter cited as Cole, The north on the next morning. To
Lorraine Campaign); and official records of the G–2
sections of the Seventh Army, VI Corps, and the strengthenthe effort, Truscott also
36th and 45th Infantry Divisions. ordered the 157th regiment, then in
PURSUIT T O THE NORTH 175

the Crest-Livron area, to join the miles east of Lyon, and on the follow-
drive; for the same reason, he re- ing days, 30 and 31 August, advanced
lieved the 180th regiment from the 15 miles farther north to the town of
mission of securing the corps’ eastern Meximieux and then another 15 miles
flank. Now regarding any threat from to Pont d’Ain on the Ain River (Map
the Franco-Italian border area as 10). Thus far, there had been no sign
remote, he replaced the 180th Infan- of the 11th Panzer Division or any
try with a small provisional task force other German security forces.
made up of reconnaissance, mortar, As Eagles struggled to bring the
and antitank units. bulk of his division up to the Mexi-
Patch’s directive of 28 August con- mieux area, the rest of the VI Corps
firmed the VI Corps’ new objective, followed as rapidly as possible. By 31
Lyon. Since the first French units August the 36th Infantry Division,
were not due to arrive at Grenoble closely followed by two regiments of
, until the 30th, Truscott decided that O’Daniel’s 3d, had also avoided the
his American units would have to German rear-guard defenses by using
make the drive alone. Speed was es- roads east of the Rhone valley and
sential. Accordingly, he ordered was only about thirty miles from
Eagles’ 45th Division to seize Bourg- Lyon. In addition, the 3d Algerian Di-
en-Bresse, lying northeast of Lyon, as vision started north from Grenoble
soon as possible, while Dahlquist’s on the 31st, following in the wake of
36th Division, advancing directly the 45th Division and reporting that
north along the east bank of the there were no Germans on the VI
Rhone, moved against Valence, Corps’ eastern flank. On 1 September
Vienne, and finally Lyon. O’Daniel’s the Allied concentration against Lyon
3d Division would follow the 45th, continued, but early in the day the
ready to reinforce either leading divi- commanders of the leading American
sion if necessary. Truscott hoped that divisions began to sense the first
the dual drive would make the ad- German reactions to their rapid pur-
vance more flexible, would enable VI suit. At Dahlquist’s command post,
Corps units to sidestep German rear- FFI reports indicated that the Ger-
guard defenses along the Rhone, and mans were constructing heavy rear-
would ultimately offer him another guard defenses just south of Lyon;
opportunity to trap the retreating meanwhile at Eagles’ headquarters
enemy if the Bourg-en-Bresse area subordinate commands notified the
could be taken early enough. 45th Division staff that its outposts in
On 29 August, as the Nineteenth the Meximieux-Pont d’Ain area were
Army’s survivors trundled past Vienne, being probed by German armor. Ob-
15 miles south of Lyon, leading ele- viously the Germans were more sensi-
ments of the 45th Division bypassed tive to threats to their rear or flanks
the retreating Germans on the east than they had been before the battle
and came abreast of the city. Encoun- of Montelimar.
tering negligible resistance, the 45th Wiese had hoped that the 11th
Division forces captured two intact Panzer Division would have secured or
bridges over the Rhone 15 to 20 destroyed all the Rhone and Ain river
PURSUIT T O THE NORTH 177

bridges east of Lyon before the times, using bazooka, tank destroyer,
Americans could reach the area. This and artillery fire against the enemy
done, the task of covering the with- armor. Fighting continued in the
drawal of his two corps north to town until dusk, when units of the
Dijon would have been fairly easy, 179th and 157th Infantry began re-
with the panzer units slowly retiring turning to Meximieux from the north.
directly to the northeast toward the With their withdrawal routes threat-
Belfort Gap. But the early arrival of ened, the German attackers finally
the 45th Division (or the late arrival broke off the action, but 45th Divi-
of the 11th Panzers) complicated these sion troops were unable to clear the
designs. T o protect his eastern flank, area completely until 0350 on the fol-
Wiese now ordered General von Wie- lowing morning.
tersheim, the panzer division com- As counted by the 179th Infantry,
mander, to make a major effort to German casualties during the Mexi-
dislodge the American forces from mieux affair totaled 85 men killed and
the Meximieux area and to strengthen 41 captured. In addition, 45th Divi-
German outposts at Bourg, about fif- sion units destroyed 8 medium and 4
teen miles above Pont d’Ain. His ac- light tanks, 3 self-propelled guns, and
tions would have to be closely coordi- 7 other vehicles. The 11th Panzer Divi-
nated with Group von Schwerin, com- sion, with more enthusiasm than truth,
posed of remnants of the 189th Divi- reported to the Nineteenth Army that it
sion and the 71st Luftwaffe Training had destroyed an entire American
Regiment, which had been charged regiment. Actually, casualties of the
with defending the southern and east- 179th Infantry and supporting units
ern approaches to Lyon itself. numbered 3 men killed, 27 wounded,
Meanwhile, units of the 45th Divi- and 185 missing and probably cap-
sion began assembling north of Mexi- tured. Materiel losses included 2 tank
mieux on 1 September in preparation destroyers, 2 armored cars, 1 half-
for a major attack on the 2d, and the track, and 2 jeeps destroyed with
117th Cavalry Squadron moved out about 20 other vehicles damaged.
to secure their right flank. The result The most the German effort accom-
was a series of disorganized engage- plished was to disrupt preparations by
ments between elements of the 11th the 179th Infantry to participate in
Panzers and 45th Infantry Division that the 45th Division’s attack on 2 Sep-
lasted throughout the day. At Mexi- tember. This, however, was von Wie-
mieux, a strong German infantry-tank tersheim’s primary mission. Neverthe-
force bypassed the American troops less, by the end of the day the threat
advancing north-probably by acci- to Lyon had grown even greater as
dent-and penetrated to the center of both the 3d and 36th Divisions as
town. There, a desperate defense by well as the French forces moving up
two reserve companies of the 179th west of the Rhone all arrived within
Infantry and the regimental headquar- striking distance (some five to ten
ters, including clerks and kitchen per- miles) of Lyon.
sonnel, managed to repulse the per- Despite the growing Allied threat to
sistent German attackers several Lyon, Wiese felt more confident by
178 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

the evening of the 1st. On the follow- Marboz located on a secondary road,
ing day, 2 September, he expected ten miles north of Bourg. The cavalry
that the bulk of the Nineteenth Army force lost Marboz briefly to a small
would be well north of the city German counterattack, but reentered
screened in the south and east by the the town at dusk to stay the night.
11th Panzer Division, now reinforced by Truscott immediately saw the tiny
a regiment of the 338th Division. Yet troop, with only armored cars and
Truscott still had hopes of catching light trucks, as a lever that might un-
Wiese’s forces off-guard. With Patch’s hinge the entire German flank securi-
consent, he decided to allow the ty force. But speed was essential.
French the honor of formally occupy- Before the situation could be com-
ing Lyon, while he had the 36th Divi- pletely clarified, he directed the caval-
sion sidestep past the eastern edge of ry unit to push westward seven miles
the city. T o the northeast, he still ex- from Marboz and occupy Montrevel
pected the 45th Division to launch a on Route N-75, the main highway
major attack toward Bourg on 2 Sep- northwest from Bourg. Since the new
tember, while the 117th Cavalry objective lay squarely on the 11th
Squadron probed east and west of the Panzer Division ’s main supply route,
town. With luck, he still might be able the isolated cavalrymen expected
to penetrate the German flank de- trouble. One platoon of Troop B
fenses at some point and strike at even managed to work its way into
their northward withdrawal columns. the eastern edge of Montrevel that
This time the American units found night, but was abruptly thrown out by
the German security forces more solid the German garrison and forced to
and better organized. Between 2 and retire to Marboz.
3 September the 45th Division’s Meanwhile, the 117th Cavalry com-
157th and 180th regiments encoun- mander, Lt. Col. Charles J. Hodge,
tered strong German resistance south tried to concentrate the rest of his
and east of Bourg-en-Bresse, and widely scattered forces in the Marboz
were unable to pierce the German area as quickly as possible. Troop A
flank defenses there. Meanwhile, seek- reached the town during the night
ing less difficult routes through the along with a forward squadron com-
German lines, Truscott had the 117th mand group, which immediately
Cavalry Squadron send out a series of began planning for a second attempt
reconnaissance patrols from the Mexi- at Montrevel early on the 3d. Much,
mieux area toward Macon, about however, still depended on the arrival
thirty miles north of Lyon and fifteen of more reinforcements, especially the
miles west of Bourg. Although squadron’s Troop C, Troop E (as-
making little progress in the west, the sault guns), and Company F (light
squadron was able to slip one of its tanks).
4 Butwhen these forces, which
scout troops north through the
German defensive lines and past
Bourg without encountering any re- 4 Troops A, B, and C consisted mainly of six-
wheeled armored cars (twelve each) and quarter-ton
sistance. At 1730 that evening, B “jeeps” (forty-five each); Troop E of M8 self-pro-
Troop entered the small town of pelled guns (modified light tanks with 75-mm. how-
PURSUIT T O THE NORTH 179

had been scouting the area east of not intended for heavy combat, and
Bourg, failed to show,. the squadron the contest was uneven; by 1330 the
commander decided to attack anyway American force was surrounded and
with only his two reconnaissance in disarray. The self-propelled guns
troops. of Troop E, a mile or so to the west,
On 3 September Troop B started could provide little support because
into Montrevel shortly after dawn fol- of the confused nature of the fighting,
lowed quickly by Troop A. After scat- and the arrival of Troop C and Com-
tering about 300 German service pany F was delayed by traffic prob-
troops, the small force secured the lems as the units tried to backtrack
town by 0930, but lacked the strength through the 45th Division’s area of
to occupy the entire area. Looking operation.
over the objective in daylight for the At 1430, with the Germans com-
first time, the cavalrymen found that pletely encircling the town, Company
Montrevel stood on a low ridge sur- F attacked from the east and Troops
rounded by open farmland with few A and B tried to break out. The re-
defensive possibilities; the two troops sults were disappointing. German ar-
lacked the manpower even to occupy tillery and tank fire easily destroyed
the entire town. But expecting a vio- or drove off the American light tanks,
lent reaction from the German ar- and only a few troopers within Mon-
mored unit—the tiger on whose tail trevel managed to escape. By 1630
they now sat—the two troops tried to the American situation in the town
prepare a creditable defense of the had become hopeless. The number
eastern section of Montrevel as best of wounded made other breakout at-
they could. tempts impracticable, and the ammu-
Upon learning of the threat to his nition of the cavalry force had just
main route of supply and withdrawal, about run out. Shortly thereafter, all
von Wietersheim immediately pulled of the troopers who were left in the
his 11th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion town surrendered. Half an hour later
out of Bourg, reinforced it with a bat- Troop C and the 2d Battalion of the
tery of self-propelled artillery, six 179th Infantry began reaching the
medium tanks, and an engineer com- scene, but were too late to help. The
pany, and dispatched the task force remaining American forces in the area
northwest to clear Montrevel. The retired to Marboz for the night, leav-
German force reached Montrevel at ing the German panzer division with
1100 and began a fight that lasted its escape route intact.
well into the afternoon. The Ameri- When the cavalry squadron could
cans called for reinforcements, while take a count, it found that Troop A
holding on as best they could and
mounting counterattacks to keep the 5The Congressional Medal of Honor was awarded
Germans off balance. But the light ar- to 2d Lt. Daniel W. Lee, commanding Headquarters
mored vehicles of the cavalry were Platoon, Troop A, 117th Cavalry Squadron, for
heroic action, despite severe wounds, at Montrevel.
(The date of the action was mistakenly cited as 2
itzers); and Company F of light tanks with 37-mm. September since almost all of the fighting actually
cannons. took place on the 3d.)
180 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

had lost only 12 men, but only 8 sol- heavy losses from Allied air and artil-
diers from Troop B could be found. lery if the tactical units were caught
In addition, Troop B and one platoon out in the open. 7 This policy also
of Troop A had lost all their vehi- made it easier to reconstitute dam-
cles-20 jeeps and 15 armored cars- aged units fairly quickly, even after
while Company F had 2 light tanks they had been in heavy action as at
destroyed and 3 damaged. The Ger- Montelimar, and may explain the divi-
mans captured 126 men, including 31 sion’s seemingly great staying power
wounded, while 5 troopers had been on the battlefield. Nevertheless, at
killed during the fight. About 10 of both Montrevel and Meximieux as
those captured escaped during the elsewhere, von Wietersheim’s actions
next few days, and the Germans left were rarely decisive, even at the small
behind 12 of the most seriously unit level; and Truscott’s persistence
wounded when they evacuated Mon- in using every opportunity that pre-
trevel. German personnel losses are sented itself to turn his opponent’s
unknown, but the cavalry force ac- flank and strike at his rear was to
counted for at least 1 German tank, 2 slowly wear the 11th and its sister in-
armored cars, and 4 other vehicles. fantry divisions down to the bone.
Truscott later determined that the While his forces were reoccupying
117th Cavalry troopers at Montrevel Montrevel, von Wietersheim learned
had been careless and were caught that the bulk of the Nineteenth Army
napping by elements of the 11th had escaped north up the Saone
Panzer Division withdrawing from valley past Macon and that only the
Bourg. However, given German and IV Luftwaffe Field Corps rear guard re-
American strength and dispositions in mained in the area. His primary mis-
the area, it is hard to escape the con- sion, protecting the retreating army’s
clusion that Truscott simply assigned flank, had thus been accomplished,
missions to the 117th Cavalry Squad- and the panzer division commander
ron that were beyond its capabilities. 6 now began planning his own escape.
If Truscott expected more of the re- Faced with the certainty that the VI
connaissance unit, then he ought to Corps would renew its attacks on 4
have reinforced it with tanks and tank September, he ordered his armored
destroyers. But Truscott and his staff elements to vacate their delaying po-
may have underestimated the recu- sitions in the Meximieux-Bourg-Mon-
perative powers of the 11th Panzer Di- trevel area on the night of 3–4 Sep-
vision and its strength in the Bourg tember. But rather than heading
area. As later noted by von Wieter- north with the rest of Wiese’s forces,
sheim, the 11th often went into action von Wietersheim turned the 11th
with about 50 to 60 percent of its Panzer Division to the northeast, plan-
available strength, in order to avoid ning to pull it back along the ap-
proaches to the Belfort Gap.
On the morning of 4 September,
6 See Truscott, Command Missions, p. 439; and the
account in the squadron commander’s draft auto-
biography, pp. 133–35, Charles J. Hodge Papers, 7 “11th Panzer Division Rpt of MG von Wieter-
MHI. sheim, 4 June 46,” John E. Dahlquist Papers, MHI.
PURSUIT T O THE NORTH 181

of Lyon, taking nearly 2,000 prison-


ers. Meanwhile, on the other side of
Patch’s spearhead, the French 3d Al-
gerian Division, out of Grenoble and
now abreast of the leading VI Corps
units, probed the Jura Alps toward
the Swiss border, finding nothing but
assorted FFI units. Behind the Algeri-
ans, O’Daniel’s 3d Division finally
rumbled up to the front lines, eager
to get on with the drive north and
with what many American GIs in the
rear had begun to call “the cham-
pagne campaign.”

A Change in Plans

Patch’s original plans of 28 August


had called for VI Corps to continue
its drive directly north, moving up the
Saone valley to Dijon in order to join
Patton’s eastward-moving Third
Army. Simultaneously, de Lattre’s
1 5 7 T H INFANTRY, 45TH DIVISION, forces on Truscott’s right were to
passes through Bourg, September 1944. begin a concentrated thrust to the
northeast, aiming for the Belfort Gap
and the Rhine. 8 However, events had
Truscott’s forces found that their foes continued to move faster than many
had once again escaped. Units of the Allied planners predicted, and Trus-
45th Division occupied Bourg-en- cott now believed the earlier plans
Bresse, while those of the 36th Divi- were impractical. On 2 September, in
sion moved into Macon. There was view of the rapid German withdrawal
no opposition. In the west, French to Dijon and the still-scattered de-
units of the 1st Infantry Division, ployment of the French divisions, he
after overcoming scattered German proposed several major revisions to
roadblocks and their own logistical these instructions. Pointing out that
problems, had entered Lyon earlier,
on the 3d, and also found the Ger- 8This section is based on the following sources:
mans long gone. However, bypassing Seventh Army Rpt, I, 258-59; Truscott, Command Mis-
pp. 434-40; de Lattre, History, pp. ,133-36;
the city on the west, CC Kientz of du sions,
Seventh Army Diary, 3–5 Sep 44; Seventh Army Di-
Vigier’s 1st Armored Division, rein- rective (no number), 3 Sep 44; VI Corps Fld Msg,
forced with the 2d Algerian Spahis, 031000 Sep 44; G–3, Army B, Note Concernant le
achieved a signal success by trapping Developement des Operations apres la Prise de
Lyon, 2 Sep 44; G–3, Army B, SO 31-A, 2 Sep 44;
and destroying the IV Luftwaffe Field Army B, Genl Opnl Order 32, 3 Sep 44; Army B,
Corps’ rear guard twenty miles north SO 3 3 ,4 Sep 44.
182 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

de Lattre would need at least a week If the French forces remained split,
to concentrate his forces in the obviously this would be impossible.
Bourg-en-Bresse area for the drive on De Lattre admitted that it would
Belfort, he suggested that his VI take several days to transfer the two
Corps undertake the mission instead. French divisions, the 1st Armored
His three mobile infantry divisions and 1st Infantry, to the area east of
were already massed east of Lyon and Lyon, and probably a few more to
could begin to move northeast toward bring up one or two additional infan-
the Belfort Gap within a day or two. try divisions from southern France.
In front of them, he felt, were only But he also pointed out that the 3d
scattered elements of the 11th Panzer Algerian Division, on VI Corps’ right,
Division, also moving northeast, but had already sent strong armored re-
with very little armor left. More im- connaissance elements of its own fifty
portant, a rapid thrust to the north- miles east of Bourg to scout out the
east, taking the shortest route to the routes to Belfort; moreover, the divi-
Vosges-Belfort Gap area, would give sion planned to send an infantry regi-
the Seventh Army yet another chance ment reinforced with a tank destroyer
to trap the Nineteenth Army, catching battalion toward the Belfort Gap on
the Germans between Dijon and the the following day. Starting even more
Vosges as they ultimately tried to forces east at this point was danger-
withdraw eastward. The French, Trus- ous, he felt; and de Lattre questioned
cott added, were already well north of Truscott’s ability to support a corps-
Lyon and were therefore in a better sized drive logistically.
position to pursue the bulk of the re- In the end de Lattre compromised.
treating German forces and then On the afternoon of 3 September the
swing east through the Vosges passes French commander unilaterally an-
to Strasbourg. nounced the formation of two French
Patch formally agreed to Truscott’s corps-level commands-the I Corps
proposals early on the morning of 3 under Lt. Gen. Emile Bethouart and
September, but de Lattre was angry the II Corps under General de Mon-
and objected strenuously to the sabert.9 De Monsabert’s II Corps was
changes. In part, his irritation to control the French 1st Armored
stemmed from his belief that the two and 1st Infantry Divisions west of the
principal American commanders, Rhone and Saone, pushing north
Patch and Truscott, were making toward Dijon; Bethouart’s I Corps
major decisions without consulting was to operate to the right of VI
him or his staff. The fact that the Corps with the 3d Algerian and 9th
French army would soon deploy more
than twice as many divisions as the
Americans on the battlefieldlent 9 Headquarters, French II Corps, actually became
operational on 1 September, with de Monsabert,
weight to his position that the French then commander of the 3d Algerian Division, taking
divisions, as agreed upon, should be over on the 2d. Before 1 September French forces
united on the Seventh Army’s right west of the Rhone had operated as a provisional
groupemat under General du Vigier, commander of
and, after joining with Eisenhower’s the 1st Armored Division. For the present, de
forces, become an independent army. Lattre’s staff continued to call itself simply Army B.
PURSUIT TO THE NORTH 183

Colonial Divisions and later the 2d Hitler personally reminded Blaskowitz


Moroccan Division. . In compliance of Army Croup C’s primary responsibil-
with the revised Truscott-inspired ities: establishing a common front
plans, the French II Corps was to with Army Croup B; defending the ap-
push north toward Dijon and then proaches to the Belfort Gap; and
swing east toward Strasbourg; the holding the salient around Dijon.
French I Corps was to push east and This last was obviously the most diffi-
northeast toward Belfort, presumably cult task, but the German political
supporting Truscott’s drive northeast. leader still had visions of launching
The 2d Moroccan Division would take an armored counterattack from an as-
over the northern sector of the sembly area west of the Vosges.
Franco-Italian Alpine front and be re- Blaskowitz, aware of the German
placed by the 4th Moroccan Mountain Army’s limited capabilities in the
Division in early October (while the west, was more concerned with hold-
American 1st Airborne Task Force ing on to the Dijon area until the re-
and the 1st Special Service Force con- mainder of his forces from the Atlan-
tinued to secure the southern sector). tic coast could escape. However, he
His forces thus remained split, but de also knew that his pursuers from the
Lattre had asserted himself as at least south would not give him much time
a provisional army-level commander to pause and regroup. Taking all
of two French corps, easing the even- these factors into consideration, he
tual establishment of a French army completed plans to accomplish his di-
command, the First French Army, verse missions by 4 September. 10
sometime in the near future. To protect his southern flank,
Not wishing to make an issue of the Blaskowitz decided to establish delay-
matter, Patch accepted de Lattre’s ing positions along and just south of
amendments to his plans and issued the Doubs River, a small watercourse
supplemental orders on 4 September. flowing generally west and southwest
Bethouart’s II Corps was to advance from the Montbeliard area through
northeast toward the Belfort Gap on the small city of Besancon and joining
an axis that would take it south of the Saone River about thirty miles
Belfort city, and Truscott’s VI Corps south of Dijon. The 11th Panzer Divi-
was to aim for the northern shoulder sion, still operating under the Nine-
of the gap. Truscott, although at first teenth Army’s direct control, was to
fearing that this solution would re- defend the eastern section of the new
strict his freedom of movement, line with a thirty-mile front from
agreed to the compromise and set to Mouchard to the Swiss border. From
work hammering out the details of Mouchard the L X X X V Corps’ 338th
the operations with both his own and
Bethouart’s new staff. 10For additional information on German activi-
ties, see also Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, chs. 4 and
Creation of the Dijon Salient 5; Detmar Finke, “Nineteenth Army, 4–15 Septem-
ber 1944,” CMH MS R-161; Dean H. Krasomil,
“German Operations in Southern France,” ch. 6,
On 3 September, as the Seventh “The Dijon Salient, 1–15 September 1944,” CMH
Army leaders adjusted their plans, MS R–5 1.
184 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

and 198th Infantry Divisions were to march columns and bridges, and its
extend the line westward to the town own lack of transportation. By the
of Dole on the Doubs River, thirty time it arrived, Blaskowitz expected
miles west of Besancon, and from that he would be forced to fall back
Dole twenty miles farther west along to the Saone and even farther east,
the Doubs to the Saone. Backstop- depending on how much pressure the
ping the LXXXV Corps was a second Allies brought to bear on his flanks.
line along the Doubs east of Dole, At the time, elements of the LXIV
centering on Besancon and consisting Corps were already beginning to strag-
of various ad hoc combat formations gle into Dijon. The corps had begun
under Corps Dehnm, which was a provi- its withdrawal with about 82,500
sional headquarters under General troops, of whom some 32,500 were
Ernst Dehner, who had previously members of ground combat units; the
commanded the administrative and remainder belonged to various units
security organization Army Area South- from all branches and services as-
ern France. The main task of all these signed or attached to the Atlantic
forces was to guard the approaches to coast garrisons. Leading elements of
Belfort. the LXIV Corps’ vanguard, the weak
Blaskowitz intended to hold the 159th Infantry Division, reached the
Dijon salient with three corps: the IV Saone River on 4 September; the 16th
Luftwafie Field Corps in the south; the Infantry Division, which lacked three of
LXIV Corps in the west, if it ever ar- its nine organic infantry battalions,
rived intact from the Atlantic coast; entered the salient on the following
and the LXIV Corps, which OB West day. The 360th Cossack Cavalry Reg-
had assigned to Army Group G on 27 ment (horse cavalry) and the 950th
August, in the north. At the time the Indian Regiment (infantry) arrived
IV Luftwaffe Field Corps had only the about the same time, as did the 602d
716th Division and the remnants of and 608th Mobile Battalions (light, mo-
the 189th Division; the forces that torized infantry). These organizations
might be available to the other two represented almost all of the “regu-
corps were uncertain. Nevertheless, lar” combat strength for which the
Blaskowitz thought it possible to hold LXIV Corps had been able to find any
for at least three or four days a loose transportation. Another 50,000 troops
cordon of strongpoints from Givry in were still on the way, including rear
the south, northwest to Autun, then elements, afoot, of the 16th and 159th
north past Dijon to Chatillon-sur- Divisions; army, air force, and navy
Seine, and back east to Langres. The supply and administrative units; and a
western section would be no more number of security, or police, battal-
than an outpost or screening line ions and regiments armed as auxiliary
through which retreating LXIV Corps infantry. Some units and equipment
elements could pass on their way to were entrained but unable to move
Dijon. The missing corps had in- due to Allied air attacks on rail
curred few losses on its way across bridges and switching sites. The LXIV
central France, delayed only by FFI headquarters, which established a
harassment, MAAF air attacks on command post at Dijon on the 4th,
PURSUIT T O THE NORTH 185

felt that the chances of bringing many the southern edge of the salient, the
of these troops into the salient were IV Luftwaffe Field Corps had two major
slim. 11 commands, the 189th Division and
Army Group G’s problems were all Group Taeglichsbeck. The remnant
intensified by the increasingly ramp- 189th, temporarily renamed Group von
ant disorganization and depletion of Schwerin, had two weak infantry battal-
units under its control, especially ions, a four-piece artillery “battalion,”
those now being positioned to defend and some miscellaneous attachments,
the salient. All of these forces had altogether totaling less than 1,200
suffered heavily from the almost inev- combat effectives. Group Taeglichsbeck
itable straggling inherent in retro- included the 602d Mobile Battalion, the
grade movements, and combat casual- 3d Battalion of the 198th Security Regi-
ties had only increased the confusion. ment, an engineer company from the
The result was a defensive order of same unit, three batteries of the 990th
battle so complex that its effective- Artillery Battalion, and an antitank com-
ness was extremely doubtful. For ex- pany from the 16th Division.
ample, north of Dijon, the LXVI Corps T o the southeast, Blaskowitz re-
held the northern edge of the salient garded the threat posed by Patch’s
was an assortment of forces that aggressive Seventh Army as equally
Blaskowitz had been able to scrape worrisome, and the defenses in front
together: the tankless Group Rauch of of the Belfort Gap as little better than
the 21st Panzer Division; the 608th those outposting the salient. In
Mobile Battalion and the bulk of the answer to Wiese’s pleas for reinforce-
16th Division just arriving from the At- ments there, he dispatched the 159th
lantic coast; Group Ottenbacher, a provi- Division to Corps Dehner, which at the
sional brigade composed mainly of time had only a few police and securi-
police and security units; and a host ty units, a couple of undependable Ost
of smaller combat, quasi-combat, and battalions, and a few pieces of light
service units of all types. The mixed artillery. But to the south and east,
force did little to allay Blaskowitz’s the worn-out 11th Panzers and the
fear of an armored attack led by 338th and 198th Infantry Divisions
Patton toward Nancy on the boundary could not have been in much better
between Army Groups G and B. shape. In fact the composition of the
In the west, screening the Givry- Nineteenth Army’s various gruppen
Chatillon outpost line, the LXIV Corps changed from day to day as more ele-
boasted Group Browdowski, consisting ments of the LXIV Corps came into the
of the 615th Ost Battalion, the 4th Bat- Dijon salient and others arrived from
talion of the 200th Security Brigade, a the immediate army rear. Wiese, for
heavy battery of the 157th Antiaircraft example, tried to beef up the 189th
Battalion, a provisional machine-gun Division in the south by adding to it
platoon, and little more. Defending the 726th Grenadiers of the 716th Divi-
sion and the 2d Battalion of the 5th Cos-
sack Regiment. Finally Hitler himself
11See Krasomil, “German Operations in Southern
France,” ch. 5, “The Withdrawal of the LXIV Corps
gave Blaskowitz permission to reorga-
(18 August-4 September 1944),” CMH MS R-47. nize his forces more or less as he saw
186 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

fit, bringing up to strength all of Army 159th Infantry Divisions who were still
Group G’s regular formations by infus- trying to make their way to Dijon. In
ing them with “suitable” personnel light of the rapid French advance,
from all branches of the armed ser- Wiese had already decided to begin
vices within the army group’s area of abandoning the salient, and on that
operation. Only certain specialists and day ordered the LXIV Corps to pull its
technicians were excepted. The result forces back to an area within a ten-
was a slow but steady rise in the mile radius of Dijon. Thus while CC
paper strength of the German divi- Sudre occupied Baume unopposed on
sions, but the effectiveness of the 8 September, the other units of the
filled-in units remained to be seen. French II Corps were busy capturing
Without more training, Blaskowitz be- the growing number of German
lieved that units composed of such forces unable to reach safety. These
fillers had little offensive capability included six railroad trains-one of
and could only be expected to defend them armored-full of LXIV Corps
in place for about two or three days. troops, vehicles, guns, and supplies,
The German defenders would have to and some 3,000 troops from Group
continue relying more on Allied Bauer, another ad hoc march group
supply problems than on their own from the Atlantic. 12 Meanwhile, Wiese
military strength to keep the attackers had become increasingly concerned
at bay. over the widening gap between the
LXIV Corps and the rest of the Nine-
The Seventh Army Attacks teenth Army, as Allied forces east of the
Saone River began their drive on the
Given the weak German defenses, Belfort Gap-Vosges area.
the Seventh Army’s advance north- After regrouping and resupplying
ward continued almost at will be- its forces on 3 September, VI Corps
tween 4 and 8 September. In the had begun its drive northeast on the
west, the French II Corps’ 1st Ar- 4th, heading in the general direction
mored Division slammed into the of Besancon on the Doubs River
ragged line that the IV Luftwaffe Field about fifty miles away. Initially
Corps was trying to improvise between O’Daniel’s 3d Division led the attack
Givry and Chalons-sur-Saone (Map with Dahlquist’s 36th Division on the
1 1 ) . It cleared both towns by the 5th left and Eagles’ 45th in the rear. On
and continued northward another ten the corps’ right, or eastern, flank, the
to fifteen miles before halting on the 3d Algerian Division, the only French
6th to await fuel supplies. During the I Corps unit to have moved up to the
night of 6–7 September responsibility
for defending the sector passed from
12Group Bauer started out of southwestern France
the IV Luftwaffe to the LXIV Corps. as part of the larger Group Elster, which had original-
The change made no difference to ly numbered around 30,000 troops. About two-
the French, however, who continued thirds of Group Bauer, mainly administrative and ser-
pushing north on the 7th, nearing vice personnel, escaped past Dijon, but the 19,000-
20,000 troops of Group Elster’s main body surren-
Beaune and rounding up hundreds of dered to the U.S. Ninth Army far west of Autun on
stragglers from the German 16th and 16 September.
188 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

Lyon area, kept abreast of the Ameri- screen any German forces there.
can units. The rapid Allied advance Later on the 5th, after 3d Division
gave Wiese no time to establish any troops had discovered an intact
kind of defensive line forward of the bridge west of the town, he discussed
Doubs River, and the LXXXV Corps the possibility of outflanking Besan-
had to struggle to construct even a con from the opposite side. However,
thin defensive screen there. trouble late in the day farther east
Approaching Besancon on the caused him to abandon the entire
morning of the 5th, lead elements of idea of bypassing the German de-
the 3d Division began probing fenses. At Baume-les-Dames, eighteen
German defenses and seeking suitable miles east of Besancon, the 3d Algeri-
water crossings east and west of the an Division’s 4th Tunisian Tirailleurs
town. Corps Dehner, responsible for de- had rushed over the Doubs using a
fending the Besancon area, still had damaged bridge, but were then se-
little more than a few security units verely mauled in a German counterat-
under its control, but Wiese had rein- tack by the 11th Panzer Division. With
forced it with a battalion-sized task its other elements scattered south and
force, including a company of tanks, southeast of Baume, the French re-
from the 11th Panzer Division and was quested immediate American assist-
currently hurrying the 159th Infantry ance.
Division into the sector from Dijon.13 Meeting with Bethouart and the
Wiese intended to make a stand here, commander of the 3d Algerian Divi-
if only to give the rest of his forces sion on the morning of the 6th, Trus-
more time to move into their defen- cott decided that it was too risky to
sive sectors. However, on the 5th the simply bypass the German strong-
supporting units of the 11th Panzer Di- points and that they would have to be
vision were about to depart the area, taken by force. To accomplish this he
leaving Besancon defended by a few proposed that his 3d Division seize
88-mm. guns and crews from an anti- Besancon, the 45th Division move
aircraft unit, some engineers, a naval against Baume, and the 3d Algerian-
artillery unit, one security battalion, i ts front somewhat narrowed-launch
and elements of two reconnaissance a concentrated thrust toward Montbe-
battalions. liard.
As the 3d Division brought up its Meanwhile, during the night of 5–6
strung-out forces for a major effort September, Wiese had again been
against Besancon on 6 September, busy reorganizing his defenses. First,
Truscott considered having the 3d he placed the LXXXV Corps headquar-
and 45th Divisions bypass the town ters, which had been controlling the
on the east and allowing units of the sector west of Corps Dehner, in charge
117th Cavalry and the 3d Division to of the Belfort Gap defenses, leapfrog-
ging it to the east and replacing it
13Army Group C had reassigned the 159th Division, with the IV Luftwaffe Field Corps from
with five infantry battalions, from the LXIV Corps to the southern border of his now col-
the Nineteenth Army on the evening of 5 September,
after it had arrived in the Dijon area from the Atlan-
lapsing salient. Second, he moved all
tic coast. 11th Panzer Division elements out of
PURSUIT T O THE NORTH 189

30THINFANTRY,
3D DIVISION,CROSSES DOUBSRIVERAT BESANCON,
September 1944.

the Besancon-Baume region, shifting Subsequently Wiese had to withdraw


them well east of the winding Doubs what remained of the 159th Division
and onto the most direct approaches for a complete overhaul.
to the Belfort Gap. At the same time, West of Besancon, Dahlquist’s 36th
he attempted to fortify Corps Dehner’s Division reached the Doubs River line
weak defenses with the arriving 159th on the 6th, pushed aside the weak
Division. 338th Division elements defending the
Along the Doubs River these shifts area, and, while advancing northeast
did the Germans little good. O’Daniel of the Doubs on 8 September,
managed to move his 3d Division bumped into the IV Luftwaffe Corps’
troops across the Doubs and occupy 198th Division as it was attempting to
the wooded hills around Besancon, move across the rear of the German
thereby surrounding the town before front to launch a counterattack
the German defenders could react ef- against Besancon. A day-long battle
fectively. Despite a garrison that now between the two units around St. Vit,
totaled about 4,200, the strongpoint ten miles west of Besancon, saw the
fell late on 8 September after about German forces routed, convincing
,

two days of desultory fighting, during Wiese that another general withdraw-
which over half the defending troops al was in order.
were captured or made casualties. East of Besancon, Allied operations
190 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

TANKS
OF 45TH DIVISION ADVANCE IN VICINITY OF BAUME-LES-DAMES,
September 1944.

proceeded more slowly. Lack of really pose a strong threat to Belfort


strength in the forward areas because until Bethouart’s I Corps could bring
of transportation and supply prob- more of its divisions up to the front
lems were the major culprits, and line. For now, a successful drive on
there was little that Patch or Truscott Belfort would depend entirely on
could do to solve these difficulties Truscott’s VI Corps.
quickly. On 7 September the 45th Di-
vision’s 180th regiment crossed the To the Belfort Gap
Doubs southwest of Baume with no
opposition, forcing 11th Panzer Divi- By the evening of 8 September the
sion elements to evacuate the town on Nineteenth Army had begun another
the evening of the 8th to avoid encir- major withdrawal along with the rest
clement. T o the southeast, the 3d Al- of Army Group G S forces. The Seventh
gerian Division made some progress Army’s advances through St. Vit, Be-
toward Montbeliard, but was firmly sancon, and Baume in the south made
halted eleven miles short of the city a continued stand along the Doubs
by the bulk of the 11th Panzer Division, River pointless; and, in the west, the
which had finally been infused with French I Corps drive on Dijon was
some new equipment. By then it was rapidly puncturing the German sa-
also evident that the French could not lient. Moreover, OKW had changed
PURSUIT T O THE NORTH 191

the proposed counterattack assembly verse elements of the LXIV Corps, the
area from the vicinity of Dijon to that IV Luftwaffe Field Corps, and Corps
of Nancy, much farther north. Thus, Dehner back to the east and northeast
with just about all of the units arriv- in an attempt to establish a new de-
ing from the Atlantic coast that could fensive line centering around Vesoul,
be expected, the so-called salient had a road and rail hub at the base of the
outlived its usefulness. However, Vosges some thirty miles northeast of
Blaskowitz could not order too deep a the Doubs River line. Only in the far
withdrawal. Patton’s Third Army was southeast, where the 11th Panzer Divi-
still moving east, and OB West had sion and assorted battle detachments
just transferred control of the held the Allied forces at bay before
German First Army–formerly on A m y the Belfort Gap, did the Nineteenth
Group B’s left, or southern, wing–to Army’s front appear relatively stable.
A m y Group G. The change made During 7 and 8 September the
Blaskowitz responsible for launching LXIV Corps redeployed the weak 716th
the Hitler-proposed armored counter- and 189th Divisions to the Auxonne-
attack from the Nancy area against St. Vit area, and prepared to move
the Third Army. Although the army back even farther east on the 9th. In
group commander could now afford what had now become the Nineteenth
to have the bulk of Wiese’s Nineteenth Army’s center, Petersen’s IV Luftwaffe
Army pull back to the Vosges, a cer- Field Corps began falling back ten
tain portion of it plus the entire First miles to the Ognon River. There
Army would have to remain west of Wiese wanted Petersen to establish an
the mountains to defend Lorraine. 14 intermediate defensive line with the
T o effect these changes, Blaskowitz 198th Division and Corps Dehner (now
directed the LXVI Corps to withdraw little more than a regimental-sized
its forces east thirty-five miles from task force of the 159th Division) in the
Chatillon-sur-Seine to Langres, fifty center; the 338th Division on its right,
miles north of Dijon. From Langres or western, wing; and a new forma-
the LXVI Corps’ new front was to tion, Group Degener, on its left, or east-
stretch north some twenty miles to ern,wing. 15Composed of several odd
Chaumont, where it would then swing police and security units, some provi-
northeast to Nancy. He also instruct- sional infantry companies organized
ed Wiese to pull the LXIV Corps back from stragglers assembled at Belfort,
to the Saone, abandoning Dijon, and and a couple of 88-mm. antiaircraft
even farther east should French ad- batteries, this patchwork organization
vances make it necessary; at the same was reinforced with a battalion
time, Blaskowitz gave him permission combat team from the 11th Panzer Di-
to withdraw his forces from the vision and later by a new provisional
Doubs River back to the northeast. security regiment. With Group Degener
Wiese, in turn, began pulling the di-
15The group commander, Brig. Gen. Joachim De-
gener, had formerly commanded the 997th Feldkom-
14The ensuing contest between the U.S. Third mandantur and had led one of the IV Luftwaffe Field
Army and the German First Army is the subject of Corps columns out of southern France. Group Degener
Cole’s The Lorraine Campaign. had initially operated under LXXXV Corps control.
192 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

anchoring the corps’ left wing at sion. Apprised of these changes, Trus-
l’Isle-sur-les-Doubs, and the 338th Di- cott held back the 36th Division, but
vision holding the corps’ right at finally approved its reinforcement of
Ognon, about ten miles north of St. O’Daniel’s units when the 3d Division
Vit, Wiese hoped that he could tie his proved unable to wrest the town from
center defenses into those of the a German garrison that was larger
LXIV Corps, retreating from the sa- than expected. 16 Finally, about noon
lient. However, before the new posi- on the 12th, with units of both the
tions could be firmly established, 36th and 3d Divisions beginning to
Truscott’s VI Corps was again on the surround Vesoul, the LXIV Corps or-
move. dered an immediate evacuation, and
On 9 September Truscott ordered by 1500 that afternoon General
his three divisions to wheel to the O’Daniel pronounced the town
east, pivoting on the 45th Division secure.
in the l’Isle-sur-les-Doubs region. Southeast of Vesoul, the 45th Divi-
O’Daniel’s 3d Division, in the center sion had less distance to travel, but
of the VI Corps line, had the mission the hilly terrain in its area favored the
of taking Vesoul, while Dahlquist’s defense, and Group Degener, reinforced
36th, on the corps’ left, was to swing with armor, gave little ground without
wide to the north, keeping east of the a fight. The German failure to hold at
Saone River, and end up in the Vesoul finally forced Wiese to pull
Vosges foothills. Above the 36th Divi- Group Degener back, but he quickly
sion, the 117th Cavalry was to screen used it to form a new line defending
the corps’ northern flank and tie into the northern approaches to the Bel-
the French II Corps as it pushed east fort Gap under the LXXXV Corps, and
from Dijon. further reinforced the area with the
Resuming its advance on the 10th, 159th Division, somewhat reorganized
the 3d Division encountered strong and strengthened after its ordeal at
resistance along the approaches to Besancon. Below the 45th Divi-
Vesoul by Corps Dehner and the 198th sion, I Corps’ 3d Algerian Division
Division, but, just to the west of the still lacked the strength to make much
3d, Dahlquist’s 36th Division pene- of an impression on the 11th Panzer
trated the defending 338th Division’s Division, now reinforced by Regiment
positions before the unit had time to Menke, a provisional infantry force op-
deploy all its forces. Regarding erating in the more rugged terrain
Vesoul as critical, Truscott considered near the Swiss border.
sending the bulk of the 36th to assist During 13 and 14 September, Trus-
the 3d. However, on the night of 10- cott’s three divisions completed their
11 September, Wiese decided to pull wheeling movement against the Bel-
both the battered 338th Division and
Corps Dehner out of the line, and again 16The exact composition of the Vesoul garrison is
move the boundary between the LXIV unknown, but it apparently consisted of the 602d
Corps and the IV Luftwaffe Field Corps Mobile Battalion (formerly with Group Taeglichsbeck at
Dijon), elements of the 189th and 198th Divisions,
eastward, thereby leaving Vesoul de- and two understrength security regiments, all now
fended only by the weak 198th Divi- controlled by LXIV Corps after the boundary shift.
PURSUIT TO THE NORTH 193

THECHAMPAGNE CAMPAIGN C O M E S TO A CLOSE

fort Gap, moving up to the towns of ber he received new orders from
Fougerolles, Luxeuil, Lure, and Vil- General Patch canceling all current
lersexel. T o the north, units of the operations. Both the Seventh Army
French II Corps from Dijon began to and the VI Corps had now come
arrive above the 36th Division, and in under the authority of Eisenhower’s
the south leading elements of the SHAEF headquarters, whose oper-
French I Corps occupied the sector ational priorities and objectives did
from the 3d Division’s southern flank not envision possession of the Belfort
to the Swiss border. In the German Gap as especially significant. Up to
center the LXIV and IV Luftwaffe Field now Patch, Truscott, and de Lattre
Corps appeared nearly broken; neither had operated almost independently,
was capable of deploying more than a with only loose supervision on the
confusing medley of ill-trained and battlefield from General Wilson, the
poorly armed provisional units in the Allied commander-in-chief of the
path of the American advance. Trus- Mediterranean theater, through his
cott felt that the Nineteenth Army was deputy, General Devers. After 14 Sep-
close to collapse and, on the 14th, tember, however, the plans of Patch
planned to launch what he expected and his principal commanders would
would be a final push into the Belfort have to conform to a larger oper-
Gap. However, early on 14 Septem- ational framework dictated by
194 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

SHAEF. For all purposes the cam- additional support units were brought
paign of southern France was official- ashore until at least Toulon had been
ly over and a new one begun, one in secured. Nor could Patch or Truscott
which the Mediterranean-based Allied have foreseen the complete disorgani-
army would obviously play a lesser zation of the German defenses in
role than before. northern France prior to the start of
ANVIL. The Allied commands were
An Evaluation unable to confirm the breakout from
Normandy until the failure of the
By this time the Seventh Army had Mortain counterattack on 10 August,
chalked up an impressive record. The and by the time that the American
success of ANVILfrom an operational, and Canadian forces in the north
tactical, and technical point of view were beginning their attempt to close
was obvious. Despite the shortage of the Falaise Pocket on the 13th, all
amphibious shipping and the con- 500 or so ANVILinvasion ships were
straints on planning and training, the loaded and ready to sail. Moreover, a
execution of the operation had been German collapse in the north did not
almost flawless. From the German guarantee a German withdrawal in the
perspective, Blaskowitz and Wiese south, however logical that course of
probably could not have prevented action may seem in retrospect.
the Allied lodgment, but their re- Clearly Truscott’s efforts to trap
sponse had been more disorganized the Nineteenth Army and speed up the
than warranted, and the timely with- advance of the VI Corps northward
drawal orders saved them further em- along the Besancon-Belfort axis to
barrassment. Once ashore, Truscott within striking distance of the Rhine
had no intention of remaining within River had not succeeded. Nor had his
the beachhead—as had his ill-fated forces been able to split the front of
predecessor in the Anzio debacle the rapidly retreating Nineteenth Army
barely six months earlier—and nei- or to isolate those units in the Dijon
ther did Patch and de Lattre. Despite salient. The Germans had repeatedly
subsequent speculation over the pos- been able to shift their forces more
sibilities of the battle at Montelimar, rapidly and defend key areas more te-
any extra fuel and vehicles that Patch naciously than either Truscott or
might have been able to bring ashore Patch had believed possible. Never-
under a different loading configura- theless, it was equally clear that the
tion would probably have gone to the French would not have been able to
French divisions driving on the vital concentrate their forces east of Lyon
ports, and not to Truscott’s VI Corps. quickly enough to have undertaken a
An even greater reshuffling of the similar drive, especially since any
ANVIL assault force would probably delays would have made the advance
have changed little as well. The two toward the Belfort area even more
French armored divisions were inex- difficult. As at Montelimar and Lyon,
perienced, and the three mobile Truscott and Patch had once again
American infantry divisions could not shown a willingness to take a calculat-
have moved very far north whatever ed risk, taking full advantage of the
PURSUIT T O THE NORTH 195

campaign’s momentum and ready to ed the lack of close air support, wors-
capitalize on any errors their oppo- ening weather, and general troop fa-
nents might make. Had they attacked tigue. The first problem was a logisti-
toward Belfort on a narrower front, cal and engineering one solved by the
they might have had more success, gradual displacement of airfields
but such a maneuver would also have north, but answers to the other two
exposed the VI Corps’ left, or north- were more elusive. 17
ern, flank to a German counterattack Troop fatigue, affecting both offi-
and in addition would have allowed cers and men, was difficult to quanti-
Wiese to concentrate more of his own fy. On 9 September General Butler,
forces along the immediate and more who had returned to his post as as-
defensible approaches to the gap. In sistant VI Corps commander after
any case, a rapid seizure of the gap Montelimar, noted the declining ag-
itself would not have necessarily gressiveness of the front-line troops
opened up the Alsatian interior and and a tendency to rely more often on
the Rhine valley, since the Seventh artillery and mortar fire in small
Army’s logistical problems would combat engagements. 18 This reluc-
have multiplied even further. tance to close with the enemy—to rely
Logistical problems, mainly fuel more on firepower than on maneuver
and transportation shortages, played on the battlefield–was, he felt, a sign
a major role in slowing down the that the combat troops and especially
Allied advance in both northern and their leaders were beginning to tire,
southern France. Increasing the allo- psychologically if not physically. By
cations of fuel and trucks to the initial that time the VI Corps had advanced
assault force might have helped some- some 300 miles from its ANVILassault
what at Montelimar, but could not beaches in just twenty-six days (Eisen-
have substituted for the seizure and hower’s SHAEF forces had taken
rehabilitation of the larger ports, es- ninety-six days to cover a similar dis-
pecially Marseille. Their early con- tance) and the actual travel mileage
quest by de Lattre’s aggressive was obviously much greater. The 3d
French units gave the Seventh Army Division’s command post, for exam-
an important supply edge over the ple, had moved along some 400 miles
Normandy-based Allied armies, al- of French roads on its way north from
though this advantage would dissipate Alpha Red to Besancon, and many
as the distance between the Mediter- other units, such as the 117th Cavalry
ranean harbors and the battlefield Squadron, had covered even more
grew ever longer. By the time the ground. According to one participant,
Seventh Army had reached the Mo- the VI Corps headquarters units
selle, American engineer units had re- became so adept at moving that
stored the ports, but they were just “those fellows could knock it down
beginning the frantic effort to repair
and expand the French north-south
railway system. Other critical factors 17For a more detailed treatment of logistics and
air support, see chapter 11.
slowing the progress of the Seventh 18Msg, Butler to Truscott, 091900 Sep 44, Entry
Army during early September includ- 100, VI Corps War Rm Jnl, 9 Sep 44.
196 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

and, just like Ringling Brothers around 1,800 replacements, it was


[Circus], set it up again” at a mo- short about 5,200, mostly infantry-
ment’s notice.19 In the rear areas, the men. French casualties were slightly
American and French advance north- higher, although spread out over a
ward had indeed been somewhat of a greater number of units.20With most
circus. Most Seventh Army soldiers of the Allied armies in both France
had come on foot because of the criti- and Italy in the same situation, there
cal shortage of trucks, which was ag- was general competition for infantry
gravated by the continuing need to fillers that, for the time being, could
divert almost all vehicles to support not be fully satisfied except by canni-
the lengthening supply lines. In the balizing new units or turning support
French formations, de Lattre’s offi- units into rifle formations-solutions
cers drafted civilian autos, river boats, that had only adverse effects in the
horse carts, and any type of function- long run.
ing captured vehicles that could fur- Weather was another important
ther the movement of troops and sup- consideration. Inclement weather
plies north. Finally, although the almost always penalizes the attacker
SHAEF troops had certainly seen by reducing the mobility of military
more fighting, they were also a larger forces. By 9 September the French
force, able to distribute the rigors of autumn rains had begun in earnest;
the campaign over many more divi- streams were rising, and cross-coun-
sions; while in the case of the Seventh try movement was becoming progres-
Army, most of the advance had been sively more difficult. Trails and dry-
accomplished by a smaller number of weather roads turned into quagmires,
units operating without respite. Thus, forcing most vehicles to rely on paved
after pushing an average of ten miles routes, many of which were deterio-
per day, normally on foot, through rating rapidly under heavy military
German-defended territory, the for- traffic. In addition, the overcast
ward infantry units of the Seventh weather reduced the amount of air
Army had understandably begun to support available, greatly limiting its
wear out as they approached the Bel- ability to interdict German move-
fort Gap and the Vosges Mountains. ments during September. Terrain was
Casualties also began to influence also a factor, for by 9 September both
VI Corps’ effectiveness. As of the
evening of 9 September the corps had 20The figures cited are only estimates based on
suffered over 4,500 battle casualties conflicting statistics from Seventh Army G–1, G–3,
and G–5 sources; HQ, VI Corps, records; and the
(including 2,050 killed, captured, or records of VI Corps’ major subdivisions. French cas-
missing) and some 5,300 nonbattle ualty figures are especially difficult to arrive at, and
casualties. Of the nearly 9,900 losses, in both armies the attachment and detachment of
various units and the accounting of FFI losses great-
about 2,900 men had been returned ly complicated all strength and casualty summaries.
to duty; although the corps received Officially, VI Corps records indicate that it had an
assigned strength of 64,430 troops and an effective,
or present-for-duty, strength of 62,145, for a short-
19Robert F. Ensslin (a former VI Corps G–2 staff age of 2,285; but the “assigned” strength may not
officer), “SOD Program,” MS (29 Sep 77), in Theo- reflect “authorized” strength or even the strength
dore J. Conroy Papers, MHI. of the units when they first landed.
PURSUIT T O THE NORTH 197

the VI Corps and the French I Corps and some 10,000 prisoners taken by
were well into hilly, often wooded the U.S. Third Army from units that
ground that gave many advantages to Army Group G had dispatched north of
the defense. The combination of all Dijon to protect its weak right flank.
these factors–transportation, supply, The grand total of prisoners alone
fatigue, weather, and terrain–thus (plus the troops isolated on the west
began to blunt the edge of the Sev- coast) came to 131,250, over 40 per-
enth Army’s combat power, especially in cent of Army Group G’s original
the final drive toward the Belfort Gap. strength on 15 August.
An accurate appraisal of the From available sources it is impos-
German actions is difficult. Finally sible to ascertain with any degree of
forced to make a stand between Dijon accuracy the losses in killed and
and Belfort, Wiese and Blaskowitz wounded among the units employed
had managed to hold the area for a by Army Group G through 14 Septem-
few critical days before retiring to the ber. Estimates run as high as 7,000
Vosges and the gap. If the conduct of killed and three times that number
the defense had lacked a certain grace wounded. If so, Army Group G, as of
and finesse, at least it was handled the evening of the 14th, had incurred
well enough to avoid a catastrophe. at least 143,250 casualties, over half
Despite the makeshift character of the of its strength a month earlier.21
successive defensive lines, Wiese was The German units that survived
becoming more skillful at presenting both the arduous trek out of southern
a continuous front to his pursuers, and southwestern France and the
thus guarding his own flanks and, by fighting against Seventh Army’s
persevering, keeping the Seventh French and American forces certainly
Army well away from the German did not resemble cohesive combat or-
border. The losses of both Army Group ganizations by 14 September. All
G and the Nineteenth Army, however, units were grossly understrength and
had been staggering, and Truscott’s underequipped; not one of the Nine-
estimate that Wiese’s forces were teenth Army ’s divisions deserved the
close to a total collapse was correct. title. The German troops were tired-
Between 3 and 14 September the Sev- even more than the VI Corps infan-
enth Army had captured another trymen-and their logistical system
12,250 Germans, about 6,500 of them was a shambles. The 338th Division
taken by VI Corps troops. Adding the had fewer than 3,200 men left on its
nearly 20,000 men of Group Elster,
which had been cut off west of Dijon, 21The percentage loss is somewhat greater if the
the Allies had now captured roughly two divisions with about 10,000 troops, transferred
65,250 men that Army Group G had to OB Southwest, are left out of consideration. Diffi-
culties arise when factoring into the strength and
tried to extricate from southern and loss figures the many provisional units, such Regi-
western France. To this figure must ment Menke, and the many other police units turned
be added the 31,000 German prison- into light infantry. The figures in the text thus re-
ers taken at Toulon and Marseille by flect only the losses of Army Group G as it existed on
15 August, including Luftwaffe, naval, and Army Area
the French, the 25,000 left hopelessly Southern France troops. The figure of 143,250 does
isolated in Atlantic coast garrisons, not include the Atlantic coast garrisons.
198 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

rolls, and of these only 1,100 were repairing and reorienting old fixed
combat effectives. The 159th Division French fortifications in the Montbe-
had less than 3,500 effectives left; the liard-Belfort area. Reserves were
716th Division probably had 3,250; the building up in and around Belfort,
198th not more than 2,400; and the while a steady flow of better trained
189th less than 1,000. And many of replacements and newer equipment
these “effectives” were not experi- had begun to arrive from Germany
enced infantrymen at all, but a mix- for the units facing VI Corps. Be-
ture of police, administrative, and lo- tween 14 and 19 September, for ex-
gistical support, navy, and other ample, the 11th Panzer Division ’s oper-
fillers thrown into depleted units as ational tank strength more than dou-
cannon fodder. The 11th Panzer Divi- bled, even though the unit lost more
sion, which had reached Lyon almost tanks during that period. Army Group
completely intact, had suffered heavy G’s supply lines had also grown much
losses between 3 and 14 September, shorter, making the almost traditional
ending up with only 6,500 men, of logistical problems of the German
whom only 2,500 were in line combat Army less pressing. The approaching
battalions. In addition, the panzer di- winter weather promised to decrease
vision had lost all but a dozen of its even more the effectiveness of Allied
tanks and was down to two operating air attacks and to hide German mili-
self-propelled guns. Furthermore, the tary movements and dispositions from
Nineteenth Army ’s many provisional Allied observation. On the other
kampfgruppen had lost up to 30 per- hand, the German Army had just
cent of their strength during the same about run out of space to trade for its
period, but no one could tell exactly. survival in the west. If the Allied
The good news for Army Group G ’ s armies could engineer a major break-
soldiers was the increasingly favorable through in the weakly held German
defensive terrain into which their lines before the defenders had a
units were now withdrawing as well as chance to recover, the collapse that
the reduced frontage they would have Truscott had hoped for might well
to defend. Already, German support follow. Nevertheless, for both sides
units were constructing hasty de- one major campaign had ended and a
fenses in the Vosges Mountains and new one was about to begin.
CHAPTER XI

Supporting the Campaign


Military support operations were entire pipeline, whether on the pro-
vital to the campaign in southern duction line, at sea, or during the
France, strongly influencing both the complex transferral of cargoes from
operational course of the Allied ocean-going to ground depots and
armies and their rate of advance. Of land transportation facilities at one of
the many aspects of military support, the European ports. With the battle
logistics was by far the most critical to of the Atlantic won by 1944, the next
the ground combat forces. Like most logistical campaign took place on the
contemporary land armies, the Sev- beachheads and in the ports of
enth Army needed to provide an Europe, with Allied military success
almost continuous supply of fuel and on the Continent heavily dependent
ammunition to its various fighting, or on the transfer of men, materiel, and
tactical, components in order to be supplies from ship to shore as quickly
successful on the battlefield. The as possible.
availability of such supplies often de- At this stage, the availability of am-
termined whether the army would phibious vessels was critical for the
conduct defensive or offensive oper- initial deployment of Allied ground
ations as well as the nature and dura- tactical units in Europe, and the ac-
tion of these operations. This supply quisition of continental ports was cru-
capability, in turn, depended on the cial for maintaining these forces logis-
establishment and maintenance of a tically. Early in the war Germany’s
land and sea logistical pipeline that logistical difficulties in North Africa
began in the American industrial and on the Russian front demonstrat-
heartland and wound its way through ed the folly of giving such matters in-
many intermediate bases as well as adequate attention. The American
through various transport modes to and British high commands, more fa-
ports in Europe, and from there to miliar with the difficulties in support-
the users in the field. At each of the ing overseas campaigns, were better
many way stations along the route to prepared, although their own logisti-
the front lines, such supplies might cal problems often seemed to belie
encounter administrative or physical their greater experience.
difficulties, or bottlenecks, which Tactical air support was less critical
could threaten the operation of the given the weakness of the Luftwaffe at
200 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

this stage of the war, but certainly the landings included far less vehicles,
absence of support would have re- POL stocks, troop rations, cargo-han-
tarded the Allied advance, especially dling equipment, and service units
if German air capabilities had been and personnel than an army would
greater. But, to be effective, the tacti- normally need to support a mobile of-
cal air arm-that is, those air units fensive. However, the relatively inef-
dedicated to providing direct support fective German resistance, the accel-
to ground combat forces-also re- erated arrival of First French Army
quired an elaborate system of bases units, and the unexpectedly rapid
and depots, especially as the front penetration northward by all Allied
lines moved deeper inland, and this forces quickly led to a serious short-
network, in turn, was dependent on age of vehicles and fuel. After Monte-
the overall Allied logistical effort. 1 limar, the continued acceleration of
the Seventh Army’s operational time-
Logistical Problems table-caused primarily by its aggres-
sive pursuit of retreating German
With unhappy memories of Sicily, forces-made it nearly impossible for
Salerno, and Anzio in mind, ANVIL the army’s logisticians to solve the
planners had expected strong Allied supply problems satisfactorily.
German resistance and, consequently, On 14 September, D plus 30, the Sev-
had loaded the assault and early enth Army’s French and American
follow-up convoys heavily in favor of units had reached an operational situ-
combat units and munitions. As a ation that most ANVIL planners had
result, the early cargo and personnel not expected until around D plus 120.
On the assault beaches, good
1 More detailed treatment of logistics can be weather, low tidal differentials, weak
found in other volumes of the United States Army surf, and the absence of strong
in World War II series, including Roland G. Rup-
penthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, II (Washing- German resistance combined to mini-
ton, 1959), pp. 38–40, 118–23, 156; Joseph By- mize unloading problems. Although
kofsky and Harold Larson, The Transportation Corps: the delay in seizing the 36th Divi-
Operations Overseas (Washington, 1957), pp. 290-98;
William F. Ross and Charles F. Romanus, The Quar-
sion’s Camel Red beach postponed
termaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany the discharge of some assault ship-
(Washington, 1965), pp. 119–21, 140–47, 169; and ping for about thirty-six hours, the
Alfred Beck et al., The Corps of Engineers: The War
Against Germans (Washington, 1985), pp. 436–60.
unexpected usefulness of Camel
Other published sources included Seventh Army Rpt, Green, together with the other favor-
I, 125–34, 144, 315-22; CONAD History, pp. 21-69; able conditions, easily overcame this
Hewitt, “Executing Operation ANVIL-DRA- handicap. Camel Green not only sub-
GOON,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXX, No.
8 (August 1954). 897–925. stituted for Camel Red for three days,
CMH manuscript sources were Lida Mayo, “The but also took much of the discharge
Corps of Engineers in the War Against Germans,” traffic scheduled for Agay Roadstead.
chs. 16 and 18; and Meyer, “MTO History,” chs.
26–28. Official record sources were Seventh Army After some bulk cargo went ashore
Engr AAR, Jan-Sep 44; 3d Inf Div AAR, Aug 44, over the Agay beach, Agay was closed
sec. IV, Supply; TFs 84, 85, and 87 after action re- on 19 August, and its operations were
ports for southern France; WNTF Rpt Southern
France; and N–2 Section, Eighth Fleet, Survey of
transferred to Camel Red, which had
Assault Beaches, Invasion of Southern France. opened the evening of 17 August.
SUPPORTING THE CAMPAIGN 201

Although some of the 45th Divi- Allied troops and 6,735 vehicles went
sion’s Delta beaches -did not have ashore over Alpha, Delta, and Camel
good exits to the interior, they beaches, as opposed to a preassault
proved generally adequate on D-day. schedule of 84,000 troops and 12,000
Late on the 16th, unloading began vehicles.2 The beaches also handled
over new beaches at the head of the about 50,000 long tons of supplies
St. Tropez gulf, which allowed the (excluding cargo aboard vehicles) on
Delta beach group to close out some D-day. The shortfall from the original
less desirable strands. The Seventh schedule was more than made up by
Army had planned to make some use 17 August, when discharge operations
of minor harbor facilities at St. became centralized under the Beach
Tropez and Ste. Maxime, but the two Control Group, a subordinate agency
ports were employed mainly by naval of Seventh Army G–4. Established a
and air force units; Seventh Army day earlier than planned, the central-
cargo there was limited largely to ized control permitted tighter organi-
medical supplies. zation of discharge operations, as well
Only over the 3d Division’s Alpha as the more expeditious transfer of
beaches, especially Alpha Red on Ca- landing ships and landing craft
valaire Bay, were there serious dis- among beaches as the need arose.
charge problems. At Alpha Red, Coastal Base Section took over both
beach and underwater mines forced a beach operations and the Beach Con-
shutdown for a considerable period, trol Group from the Seventh Army on
delaying the landing of some artillery 9 September, about a week earlier
and armored units for over eight than planned, and continued the cen-
hours before paths could be cleared. tralized control.
At Alpha Yellow on Pampelone Bay, The early capture of Toulon and
offshore sandbars made for wet land- Marseille made it possible to close
ings, causing a number of vehicles to out beach operations sooner than ex-
drown on the shoreward side of the pected-namely, except for one un-
bars and requiring the construction of seasonable storm, before the mistral
long pontoon causeways for LST dis- weather began. The Alpha beaches
charge. In addition, lateral movement stopped handling cargo on 9 Septem-
across the soft sand was impossible ber; the Delta beaches closed out on
for vehicles, and the few good beach the 16th; the last Camel beach shut
exits quickly became jammed. Finally, down on the 28th. Planners had esti-
using logs left behind by the Ger- mated that the beaches could take in
mans, the beach group was able to 277,700 tons of cargo through D plus
put together makeshift roadbeds and
continue unloading; but the beach
2The records do not disclose if the higher figures
was closed on 17 August in favor of a were for the original supply plan or for the revised
new site a mile or so to the east. Had combat-heavy loading plan. All logistical statistics
there been strong resistance at these set forth in this chapter are the authors’ estimates
beaches, the delays might have and are based on sources difficult to reconcile. In
some cases these (and other figures) are carried
proved serious. through to the end of September because there
On D-day, approximately 60,150 were no mid-month statistics.
202 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

30. Actually, they accepted over leviate the service troop shortage in
280,000 tons (excluding POL, vehi- the assault area. Many able-bodied
cles, and cargo aboard vehicles) men in the region had been deported
through 14 September and more than to labor camps or prisons elsewhere,
20,000 additional tons through the while others had joined the FFI or
28th. fled to North Africa. By D plus 5 Sev-
The high rate of discharge over the enth Army agencies had hired only
beaches created its own problems. 1,000 Frenchmen, mostly old men
From the beginning the capabilities of and teenagers; by mid-September
landing ships, landing craft, and only 7,000 French civilians were
DUKWs to put cargo ashore out- working directly for the U.S. Army on
stripped the ability of the Beach the Mediterranean coast.
Group to handle the material and The Seventh Army made an effort
clear the beaches. The principal rea- to use German POWs (mainly Ost
sons were inadequate transportation, troops) in the beach area, but this
lack of service troops and units, short- practice was limited by the rules of
age of beach matting, and insufficient land warfare, local antipathy to
heavy equipment such as cranes, trac- German uniforms, and language and
tors, and bulldozers-deficiencies that security problems. Of even more im-
resulted from the planners’ decision portance was the urgent need to evac-
to load the early convoys heavily for uate most German prisoners from
combat. By D plus 5 the beach clear- southern France in order to forestall
ance and supply forwarding problems further complications of supply activi-
had reached a critical stage. Seventh ties, especially concerning rations. 3
Army and NATOUSA had already Some relief came in the general labor
begun to seek ways to speed the ar- category when, late in August, three
rival of service units and their equip- company-sized Italian service units
ment, especially truck units. But it reached the beach area, and by the
proved difficult to change the sched- end of September about 7,000 Ital-
ule or the cargo of convoys and ships ians were at work under U.S. Army
already loaded or partially loaded, supervision in southern France. Nev-
and the decision to accelerate the ar- ertheless, shortages of U.S. Army ser-
rival of French troops temporarily di- vice troops and indigenous French
verted shipping that might have labor continued to create difficulties,
brought service units from Africa, while the Seventh Army’s rapid ad-
Italy, and Corsica. Moreover, what vance increased the problems of re-
benefits were derived from hurrying supply, not only from the beaches but
forward service units were soon out- also from the ports as they were reha-
stripped by the Seventh Army’s con- bilitated.
tinued rapid and deep penetration.
These problems, especially in regard
to transportation, were by no means
solved by D plus 30, 14 September,
nor even by the end of the month. 3Some 33,000 POWs were evacuated by 8 Sep-
Hiring civilian labor did little to al- tember alone.
SUPPORTING THE CAMPAIGN 203

FRENCH
CIVILIANS IN SEVENTH
RESTORINGRAILWAY ARMYAREA,Nevers, France,
September 1944.

Base Development set up an interim headquarters and


facilities at Toulon, which would be
Viewed from the Allied preassault used for most port and base oper-
estimate that Toulon would not fall ations until Marseille became avail-
until D plus 20 and Marseille no earli- able. But the unexpectedly early sei-
er than D plus 45, the collapse of zure of Marseille prompted a broad
German resistance at both port cities change in plans. Toulon was basically
on 28 August, D plus 13, represented a naval base, and most of its facilities
an acceleration of about four weeks in were ill-suited to the discharge of
the expected progress of the cam- commercial-type shipping. On the
paign in southern France. This early other hand, Marseille, the foremost
success was as important logistically port and second city of France, had
as it was operationally, for port and much better facilities for handling
base development could begin much commercial vessels, provided better
sooner than planners had thought access to highways and railroads, and
possible. was better located to support the ad-
Initially, planners had envisaged vance northward. In the end, Western
that Coastal Base Section (CBS) and Naval Task Force took over responsi-
its French affiliate, Base 901, would bility for the rehabilitation of the port
204 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE
of Toulon, which remained primarily The day after Marseille fell, the
a naval base, and was turned over to 36th Engineer Combat Regiment
French control in October 1944. began moving over from the beach
For the ground and air forces, area to start land-mine removal and
Toulon’s major contribution was the other cleanup projects. On 1 Septem-
employment of improvised docks for ber the U.S. Army’s 6th Port (a termi-
unloading vehicles that had been nal service command) and the 1051st
deck-loaded on cargo ships. This pro- Engineer Port Construction and
cedure allowed such vessels to move Repair Group came ashore aboard
on to Marseille with hatches open and lighters from three Liberty ships an-
ready to discharge general cargo, chored offshore to assist the effort.
thereby saving considerable time in Later in the month the 335th Engi-
the final unloading. Ultimately, neer General Service Regiment took
Toulon became the principal dis- over many of the repair tasks, while
charge point for Civil Affairs cargo Army engineers and U.S. Navy sal-
coming into southern France. The vage units began clearing shipping
first quayside ship unloading at lanes into the inner harbor. On 15
Toulon began on 5 September, and September the first Liberty ship came
commercial unloading-as opposed to into the port of Marseille for direct
naval base activities-was fully under ship-to-shore discharge; and by the
way by 20 September. end of the month eighteen quayside
At Marseille, an advance party of unloading berths were in use.
CBS entered the city on 24 August, During September the port of Mar-
while German demolitions were still seille took in approximately 113,500
in progress. The destruction was ex- long tons of general cargo, 32,800 ve-
tensive: jetties, quays, cranes, and hicles, and 10,000 barrels of POL. In
related discharge facilities and equip- contrast Toulon, in the same month,
ment were destroyed or severely dam- handled about 3,440 long tons of
aged; all port and channel entrances general cargo, 19,000 tons of Civil
were blocked by sunken ships; both Affairs supplies, 23,630 vehicles, and
the inner and outer harbors were 80,000 barrels of POL.
sown with mines; explosive demoli- Port-de-Bouc, a satellite port about
tions, including booby traps and time twenty-two miles west of Marseille,
bombs, had been planted throughout served primarily for the discharge of
the onshore port area; railroad tracks POL products. The FFI had secured
had been ripped up; and warehouses, Port-de-Bouc and three nearby oil re-
transient sheds, and other buildings fineries, which the Germans had not
along the waterfront were badly dam- destroyed. Part of the 335th Engineer
aged. Minesweepers, mostly U.S. General Service Regiment moved
Navy vessels, cleared some 5,000 over from Marseille to undertake the
mines of various sizes and types from repair of port facilities, aided by local
the main harbor and contiguous French contractors, while elements of
waters, while U.S. Army engineers re- the 697th and 1379th Engineer Petro-
moved well over thirty tons of explo- leum Distribution Companies (EPDs)
sives from the dock areas. rehabilitated the lightly damaged re-
SUPPORTING THE CAMPAIGN 205

fineries, aided by oil company em- staff. On 5 September a small ad-


ployees. On 10 September U.S. Army vance office of CBS opened at Greno-
engineers began constructing a pipe- ble, and then moved on to Dijon by
line for 80-octane gasoline from the 18 September. SOS NATOUSA sent
Port-de-Bouc area, but it was early an advanced echelon of its headquar-
November before the line was work- ters to Marseille on 12 September,
ing as far as Lyon. which continued on to Lyon on the
An unplanned, bonus supply base, 14th. During the same period Seventh
Port-de-Bouc came to handle about Army, VI Corps, and CBS were
70 percent of the Allied POL require- making every possible effort to move
ments as well as a substantial amount supplies, dumps, depots, and supply
of general cargo. By the end of Sep- points northward. On 10 September
tember it had discharged approxi- the Seventh Army opened its main
mately 36,840 long tons of general supply station at Amberieu. Engineer
supplies and 240,000 barrels of POL and Signal Corps depots were set up
from twenty-three ships. Total dis- near Bourg-en-Bresse, and a major
charge for the beaches and ports medical supply depot was moved up
through September came to about to a point near Besancon on 13 Sep-
500,000 long tons of general cargo, tember. The forward movement of
over 25,000 tons of Civil Affairs sup- depots and supply points continued
plies, 325,000 troops, 69,000 vehicles, throughout the month.
and 331,600 barrels of POL.
On 8 September Coastal Base Sec- Fuel and Transportation
tion formally opened its headquarters
and became operational at Marseille. Whatever other logistical difficulties
The command was redesignated Con- Seventh Army and CBS faced, all
tinental Base Section (also abbreviat- were overshadowed by the transporta-
ed CBS) on 10 September. Already tion problem. This developed not
the press of events had made it neces- only because of combat-heavy loading
sary for CBS to start assuming logisti- of the assault convoy, but also be-
cal responsibilities from the Seventh cause of a theaterwide shortage of
Army G–4 logistics staff on 1 Septem- truck and railway units as well as Sev-
ber, two weeks earlier than planned. enth Army’s unexpectedly rapid and
At the same time that the CBS head- deep penetration and, finally, POL
quarters opened at Marseille, CBS shortages. Truck requirements esca-
became administratively responsible lated at an alarming rate as combat
for noncombat activities from the units drove farther north and west,
coast north to the Seventh Army’s forcing trucks to make time-consum-
moving rear boundary, initially de- ing, long round trips to beach dumps,
fined as the area south of Lyon. which simultaneously increased gaso-
Meanwhile, the Seventh Army’s line consumption. The rate of con-
rapid drive northward also made it sumption immediately surpassed plan-
imperative for supply agencies to ning estimates. The 3d Division
send representatives forward to main- began to develop severe shortages as
tain close liaison with the army G–4 early as noon of 16 August, D plus 1;
206 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

the rest of VI Corps started to feel problems of truck shortages, time,


the pinch the next day; and by dark and distance. To help alleviate the
on 19 August the gasoline supply sit- general transportation problem, the
uation had become critical. Seventh Army G–4 assumed central-
T o assist, beach officials diverted ized control over all separate truck
LCTs and DUKWs from general un- units as soon as possible and, on oc-
loading to bring ashore about 50,000 casion, took charge of transportation
gallons of packaged gasoline from a organic to the infantry divisions
ship in an early convoy. This measure (which hardly pleased the tactical
proved only a temporary expedient, commanders). The Seventh Army also
however, as the VI Corps’ three divi- found it necessary to impose rigid
sions alone were consuming about movement and traffic controls, which
100,000 gallons of gas per day, and CBS continued to exercise after
as of 21 August only 11,000 gallons taking over traffic responsibility from
were left in beach dumps. Captured the Seventh Army on 9 September.
German POL dumps at Draguignan, Other expedients became necessary
Le Muy, and Digne helped, as did as well. For example, by the end of
gasoline found at damaged French re- August all units coming into France
fineries in the Marseille and Port-de- over the beaches were required to
Bouc areas. But the immediate, criti- reload their organic vehicles with sup-
cal shortage was not alleviated until a plies for the forward combat units
six-million-gallon tanker arrived on and make one round trip to the for-
27 August. The 697th EPD Company, ward area. On the other hand, trucks
which had landed on D-day, unloaded and drivers organic to service units
this fuel at St. Raphael, where the scheduled to move northward were
unit had already constructed storage sometimes retained in the port and
tanks, emplaced tanker discharge beach areas for general supply oper-
equipment, and organized fuel can- ations, thereby slowing forward move-
ning facilities. More help for the for- ment. At one point during the battle
ward area came on 9 September when of Montelimar the Seventh Army G–4
the VI Corps captured another formed a thirty-truck ammunition
German POL dump near Besancon convoy from organic 3d Division vehi-
containing about 183,000 gallons of cles to haul ammunition to the 36th
high-octane gasoline and 36,500 gal- Division-an action that, however
lons of diesel fuel. The gasoline had necessary, retarded the 3d Division’s
to be cut with 80-octane fuel before it own progress northward. In addition,
could be used in American vehicles, the G–4 imposed restrictions on the
but the cutting process boosted the consumption and shipment of some
total amount of fuel available. items of supply in order to gain trans-
Obtaining POL, however, did not portation to move others that were
mean that such products could be de- more sorely needed by units in the
livered to the right units at the right north. Thus, during one period of the
time and place. The same held true battle, the combat troops were put on
for rations, ammunition, and other two-thirds rations so that vehicles
supplies. There still remained the normally used to haul food could be
SUPPORTING THE CAMPAIGN 207

diverted to bring up fuel and ammu- track line up the east bank of the
nition. Rhone was open from Marseille to
Truck shortages forced logisticians Lyon, with a capacity of 3,000 tons a
to undertake railroad rehabilitation day. Before the end of September the
much earlier and on a grander scale repaired western line was pushed out
than had been contemplated during to Dijon, Vesoul, and Besancon, and
ANVIL planning. Sections of the the easterly line, which passed
narrow-gauge coastal railroad in the through more rugged terrain, was
beachhead area were operational- stretched to the First French Army
with French civilian crews-as early as area opposite the Belfort Gap.
17 August and contributed signifi- The urgent need for early rehabili-
cantly to beach clearance operations. tation of the railroads prompted
The main line, standard-gauge rail- changes in the arrival schedules of
road opened from Frejus west to Ste. U.S. Army railroad units. The 703d
Maxime on 23 August, and was ex- Railway Grand Division (originally
tended to the west and north as tacti- scheduled for 25 September) and the
cal circumstances permitted. 713th Railway Operating Battalion
Although the Germans and MAAF (set for 5 September) began unload-
had destroyed many railroad bridges, ing at Marseille on 29 August. The
damage to railbeds and rolling stock parent headquarters of these two
was more limited, and sufficient roll- units, the 1st Military Railway Service,
ing stock and French trainmen were also arrived early and opened an ad-
soon rounded up to allow sections of vanced echelon at Lyon on 14 Sep-
railroad to become operational. 4 tember.
Sometimes rail movements required The accelerated railroad rehabilita-
truck assistance. For example, breaks tion program in this area progressed
in the main easterly railroad line be- faster than a similar effort in Norman-
tween Meyrargues and Sisteron made dy, where German demolitions had
it necessary to transfer cargo from been more thorough. Nevertheless,
trains to trucks at Meyrargues and the railroads were unable to carry
then shift the cargo again to trains at their full share of the supply burden
Sisteron. By mid-September tempo- for many weeks, and French and
rary bridges were in place at major American units had to continue to
breaks, and the eastern line was open depend largely on highway transpor-
as far as Bourg-en-Bresse, 220 miles tation. The supply statistics for Sep-
from the assault beaches. Before the tember tell the story: during the
end of the month, the line had been month trucks moved some 220,000
extended to Besancon with an initial tons of general cargo northward from
capacity of 1,500 tons of cargo per the beaches and ports, while the rail-
day. By 25 September the double- roads hauled slightly more than
63,000 tons. One inhibiting factor in
railroad operations was a general
4Additional information on railroad rehabilitation shortage of high-grade locomotive
comes from Carl R. Gray, Jr., Railroading in Eighteen
Countries (New York Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1955), coal in southern France; another was
pp. 195–201. a lack of sufficient rolling stock to
208 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

meet all demands, and it was well into timber structures.


October before any. new rolling stock Another solution to the bridging
came into Marseille. problem involved curtailing air
One potential transportation prob- strikes. By the end of the battle of
lem was less troublesome than ex- Montelimar, as VI Corps was starting
pected. Until bad weather began north toward Lyon, Seventh Army
about mid-September, the roads in planners estimated that the MATAF-
southern France, especially the main XII Tactical Air Force bridge destruc-
highways, proved to be adequate for tion program, if continued, would do
military traffic. Moreover, in the as- more to slow the Allied advance than
sault area, the combat units found to impede the German withdrawal.
intact bridges or easy fords; and Accordingly, XII Tactical Air Force
again, until the autumn rains began, and Seventh Army agreed that after
forces were able to cross most 28 August bridge strikes would cease
streams with little difficulty as far along the Rhone and Saone river val-
north as Vesoul. On the other hand, leys as well as on the streams to the
Seventh Army’s rapid penetration cre- east. Thereafter the tactical air com-
ated an early bridging problem for lo- mand conducted only limited oper-
gistical support operations. Not an- ations against bridges, directing most
ticipating such a quick breakout from of its strikes west of the Rhone-Saone
the beachhead line, the Seventh Army line along the main routes of with-
had initially brought only one tread- drawal of the LXIV Corps from west-
way bridge company and had sched- ern France into the Dijon salient.5
uled no more such units until after 5
September. But as early as 19 August Rations
urgent requirements for heavy bridg-
ing arose, and the demand steadily in- While no American or French
creased as the Allied advance reached troops suffered from malnutrition
the Durance, Rhone, Drome, Doubs, during the drive north, supplying full
and Saone rivers. Again the problem rations to the forward units became
of rescheduling the arrival of support an occasional problem that first devel-
units-this time, engineer bridge oped early in the over-the-beach
units and equipment-proved diffi- supply phase. Again the general
cult, necessitating the use of field ex- transportation shortage was the main
pedients and the exploitation of local culprit, although the fact that ammu-
resources by engineer units to solve nition and defensive materials had
the more pressing bridging problems. been loaded on top of rations on
By the end of September, U.S. Army many cargo vessels of the assault con-
engineers had constructed eighty- voys also impeded the timely dis-
eight highway bridges, largely from charge of food. In fact, such loading,
locally available material, and had undertaken in accordance with the
also erected twenty-eight Bailey combat-heavy concept, served to com-
bridges. Since Bailey bridge material
was in short supply, these spans were 6For material on air strikes against bridges, see
replaced as soon as possible by heavy AAF III, pp. 434–35.
SUPPORTING THE CAMPAIGN 209

plicate beach operations, because am- From their own supply system,
munition and defensive material had American combat troops received no
to be hurried ashore in order to fresh bread until 26 September. By
obtain rations. This practice led to the end of September only 5,000 tons
some helter-skelter stockpiling at the of cold storage space was available in
beaches and further slowed beach southern France. No reefer trucks or
clearance, especially when it became railroad cars had yet arrived, and by
necessary to hand-sort ammunition the month’s end legal fresh meat was
and other supplies. In the end, many still unavailable.
units, as during the battle of Monteli- At least one unit–the headquarters
mar, had to exist on short rations of the 55th Ordnance Group sta-
from time to time–two K-rations per tioned at Bourgoin, some twenty
day as opposed to the normal three- miles southeast of Lyon–solved its
while other packaged rations were fresh food problem in a highly ques-
often unavailable. tionable manner. Somehow, during
Through the first month and a half the week following the capture of
of the campaign, both the Seventh Lyon on 3 September, the 55th Ord-
Army and the First French Army had nance Group slipped two trucks
to depend primarily on packaged ra- loaded with war souvenirs across the
tions. Local procurement could do Rhone and headed north through no-
nothing to ease the problem, for most man’s-land (some German troops,
of the area to the north as far as Lyon mostly stragglers, were still trying to
was not self-sufficient in basic food- reach Dijon) to make trading contacts
stuffs. In fact, a general food shortage with elements of the U.S. Third
existed in southern France, and what Army. After a risky three-day trip, the
little local surplus could be rounded two trucks returned to Bourgoin
up was urgently needed for civilian loaded with fresh beef and pork,
consumption. German “requisition- candy, tobacco products, and pack-
ing” during the withdrawal further aged rations of types not yet available
complicated the problem, and, until to most Seventh Army’s forward
transportation links could be set up units. 6
with major food-producing areas, a
shortage of fresh food persisted in Manpower
southern France. T o remedy the situ-
ation, the entire schedule of ship- U.S. Army replacement activities in
ments of civilian relief supplies was southern France were the responsibil-
moved up, but little could be done ity of Col. Wilbur G. Dockum, com-
immediately to improve distribution manding the 2d Replacement Depot,
on the mainland. Meanwhile, a few which had previously operated in
lucky soldiers occasionally received
donations of fresh eggs or other food
from French farmers; other troops il-
legally purchased fresh food either 6This incident is described in Lida Mayo, The Ord-
nance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront, United
from farmers or from a rapidly devel- States Army in World War II (Washington, 1968),
oping black market. pp. 289–90.
210 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

Italy.’ The first components of the


depot-one replacement company for
each of VI Corps’ three divisions-
began landing on D-day and were
ashore with 1,800 replacements by 18
August. By 9 September the 2d Re-
placement Depot had brought into
southern France approximately
13,900 replacements of all specialties,
including troops designated as RTUs
(returned to unit), personnel being
returned to their previous units.
Like most other units, the 2d Re-
placement Depot suffered from an
acute lack of transportation. For ex-
ample, two of the first three replace-
ment companies ashore had to leave
their vehicles and most of their equip-
ment behind in Italy. These two units
(with a total of 1,200 replacements)
had to march on foot, mostly at night,
northward behind the divisions they
supported. When the companies
reached forward divisional supply “THELONGAND THE SHORTAND THE
dumps, they sent replacements TALL”:70th Quartermaster Base Depot
onward aboard divisional trucks carry- stocks.
ing rations to the front. Ultimately,
Colonel Dockum was able to secure beach and port area, all components
fifty trucks from stationary antiaircraft of the depot were well forward, By
units, and he used the railroads as the end of September only one re-
much as possible; but his transporta- placement company, at Marseille, was
tion problem was by no means solved left in the rear area.
as of mid-September. Since the casualty rate in southern
By mid-September the 2d Replace- France was lower than expected, no
ment Depot had in France twelve re- critical replacement problems arose,
placement companies under four re- although a shortage of infantry re-
placement battalion headquarters. placements had begun to affect VI
The depot headquarters itself set up Corps by mid-September. The ab-
near Grenoble; and, except for one sence of any major replacement prob-
battalion headquarters and four re- lem is demonstrated by the fact that
placement companies left in the 1,800 replacements due in on D plus
30 were not urgently needed, and the
group was combined with another ar-
7For information on replacements, see Norton
MS, “History of the Replacement Command NA- riving on D plus 35.
TOUSA,” II, ch. 2 and Annex I, CMH. Of the 13,900 replacements and
SUPPORTING THE CAMPAIGN 211

RTUs that had reached southern support activities, with the Seventh
France by mid-September, less than Army's rapid drive north upsetting
4,000 were assigned to the Seventh carefully laid plans and schedules. 8
Army, leaving a balance of about During D-day, three separate medical
9,500 troops available in the replace- battalions began coming ashore, and
ment system. The 13,900 total did each one supplied a collecting compa-
not include about 500 RTUs sent di- ny and a clearing platoon to reinforce
rectly to their units without being ac- the organic medical battalions of VI
counted for in the replacement flow, Corps' three divisions. Three 400-bed
nor approximately 5,100 rotational evacuation hospitals, each supporting
replacements, that is, troops replacing a division, were operational by 19
men rotated to the United States on August, the same day that the first
leave or on temporary duty elsewhere U.S. Army nurses arrived in southern
(most of whom never returned to the France.
theater). Thus, by mid-September Moving the evacuation hospitals
some 19,500 U.S. Army replacements forward behind the supported divi-
from all categories had landed in sions proved difficult, for frequent
southern France. Most of these troops changes of location created the inevi-
were not needed to replace casualties, table transportation problems. Having
but were employed to flesh out arrived in France without all their au-
units–such as the 45th Division and thorized transportation, medical units
many service organizations–that had had to borrow trucks and use ambu-
arrived in France understrength. lances to move their equipment, and
The French had their own replace- even then they found it difficult to
ment system, but relatively few of keep up with the combat units. For
their replacements came from North example, the evacuation hospital sup-
Africa or Italy. Instead, French Army porting the 3d Division closed down
units absorbed FFI personnel by the near Avignon on 7 September, but
thousands, either individually or by then had to wait ten days to obtain
unit. The result complicated logistical enough transportation to move north
problems, for French commanders to the Besancon area. Likewise, part
were soon submitting requisitions for of the 2d ,Convalescent Hospital
rations and equipment that far out- reached Besancon on 17 September,
stripped their authorized require- but the rest of the unit had to remain
ments. In addition, the politico-mili- at Marseille, where its organic trans-
tary character of the resistance made portation was diverted to general
the incorporation of some FFI organi- supply operations. Meanwhile, the
zations into the armed forces a politi- lengthy lines of communication
cal as well as a military matter for the caused forward area hospitals to
French command. become overcrowded and evacuation

Medical Support 8 Additional information' on medical support de-


rives from Charles M. Wiltse, The Medical Department:
Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor' Theaters,
The story of medical supportin United States Army in World War II (Washington,
southern France was like that of other 1965), pp. 370–411.
212 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

hospitals to hold patients for ex- campaign no unusual medical prob-


tended periods of time. lems arose. Neuropsychiatric (combat
Fixed-bed hospitals, totaling 14,250 fatigue) cases were of little moment
beds, were not scheduled to begin ar- during the first month ashore, but by
riving until 25 September. When de- mid-September bad weather, stiffen-
ployed ahead of schedule, they also ing resistance, and tiring troops com-
faced the familiar transportation prob- bined to begin a marked increase in
lems. The 36th General Hospital, for the rate of such cases among combat
example, started unloading on 9 Sep- units. By the end of September trench
tember, but could not open at Aix-en- foot was beginning to develop as a
Provence until the 17th. Similarly, the significant problem, one largely
46th General Hospital reached France brought about by increasingly wet
on 8 September, but was not oper- and cold weather as well as by some
ational at Besancon until the 20th. shortages of suitable clothing and
On D-day, casualties were evacuat- equipment.
ed by LST to Corsica, from where se-
rious cases were flown to Naples.
Hospital ships arrived on D plus 1, Signal Support
and through 21 August transported
all patients to Naples. Thereafter, Like the Medical Corps, the Signal
hospital ships carrying predominently Corps had its problems with transpor-
French patients sailed to Oran in tation and in supporting the Seventh
North Africa. But after the fall of Army’s rapid advance. 9 The general
Toulon and Marseille, French casual- truck shortage forced signal units to
ties remained in the metropole. This overload communications vehicles
change, together with the initiation of with their own supplies, but they still
air evacuation to Italy on 22 August, found that moving wire, batteries, and
the low combat casualty rate, and the radio tubes forward to support
accelerated buildup of medical facili- combat forces was difficult.
ties in France, made it unnecessary to The pace of Seventh Army’s
employ hospital ships after 30 progress also made it futile to employ
August. As more medical facilities even the most advanced techniques of
became available and as weather con- rapid pole setting and wire stringing.
ditions worsened in mid-September, Instead, until mid-September, the
air evacuation steadily diminished. Signal Corps devoted its efforts to re-
Through the end of September, habilitating about 1,715 miles of
U.S. Army hospitals in southern French wire, while stringing no more
France admitted roughly 20,775 than 150 miles of its own. Fortunately,
American troops. Of this total, 160 most of the area over which the Sev-
men died in hospitals, 8,380 were
evacuated to Italy or North Africa,
8,525 were returned to duty, and, at 9 Additional material on Signal Corps problems
month’s end, 3,710 were still in vari- comes from George Raynor Thompson and Dixie R.
Harris, The Signal Corps: The Outcome (Mid-1943
ous hospitals in France. Through 1945), United States Army in World War II
During the first month or so of the (Washington, 1966), pp. 130–31.
SUPPORTING THE CAMPAIGN 213

enth Army traveled after Montelimar naissance squadrons. 10 Until 20


was well-suited to radio. communica- August the XII TAC also had under
tions. However, as the combat units its control 6 A-20 light bomber
moved into more rugged terrain squadrons from the Fifteenth Air
during the latter part of September, Force, while 7 British and 2 American
radio communications had to yield to escort carriers (CVEs) provided rein-
wire for both telephone and teletype forcement with 72 more combat air-
circuits. By the end of the month no craft. The British CVEs withdrew on
critical wire shortages had yet devel- 27 August; the American carriers on
oped, but the demands for wire were the 29th. Heavy bombers of the Medi-
beginning to exceed expectations. As terranean Allied Strategic Air Force,
was the case for almost all other com- which had played a major role in
modities, forward shipment of Signal preassault bombardment, flew their
Corps supplies had already been re- last missions over southern France on
scheduled. 16 August, D plus 1. Mediterranean
Another shortage that stemmed Allied Tactical Air Force (MATAF)
from the Seventh Army’s rapid pene- medium bombers-two wings of B-
tration concerned maps. As early as D 25s and B-26s supported by two
plus 5 , many units of the VI Corps groups of P-38 fighters-from Sar-
had begun to advance beyond the dinia and Corsica were available
area covered by the large-scale through 29 August to support the XII
(1:25,000 and 1:50,000) tactical maps TAC, but they normally operated out-
they had brought ashore. By 19 side the XII TAC’s area of responsi-
August Task Force Butler was operat- bility. This area initially ran from the
ing mainly with 1:200,000 tourist Rhone River east to the Alpine divide
guide maps, while during the battle of and from the coast north to the Isere
Montelimar most units had to maneu- River, flowing into the Rhone from
ver on the basis of 1:100,000 U.S. the northeast near Valence.
Army maps. Before the end of August The Seventh Army’s rapid penetra-
enough 1:100,000 maps were avail- tion also had a serious impact on
able, but as of late September the Allied air support. By 28 August, co-
supply of the more desirable 1:50,000 incident with the decision to halt the
maps was still inadequate. MATAF and XII TAC bridge-destruc-
tion program, few lucrative targets
could be found in southern France
Air Support
within range of MATAFs medium

General Saville’s XII Tactical Air 10The XII Tactical Air Command strength con-
sisted
Command (TAC), which was respon- bomberofsquadrons, the following: 15 USAAF P-47 fighter-
1 1 RAF Spitfire fighter squad-
sible for supporting Allied groundrons, 4 USAAF A-20 light bomber squadrons, 3
operations in southern France, initial- FAF p-47 fighter-bomber squadrons, 1 RAF Beau-
ly had under its command 38 squad- fighter night-fighter squadron, .1 USAAF P-51 tacti-
rons ofaircraft, all based on Corsica, cal reconnaissance squadron, 1 FAF Spitfire tactical
reconnaissance squadron, 1 RAF Spitfire tactical re-
including
19 fighter-bomber(P–47),4 connaissance squadron, and 1 USAAF P-38 photo-
light bomber (A-20), and 4 recon- reconnaissance squadron.
214 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

bombers, and the mediums ceased interdiction sorties over Italy, as op-
operations over the area after the posed to 946 over France. The sorties
28th. The XII TAC, taking over re- over Italy included some flown by XII
sponsibility for all air support in TAC planes based in the coastal
southern France, faced its own range sector of southern France, out of
problems. The command moved range of the Seventh Army’s front.
three P-47 groups and a reconnais- The tactical air units in France
sance squadron to France during the faced supply and transportation prob-
period 23–29 August, but by the 28th lems similar to those of the ground
one group was already complaining forces, with transportation shortages
that its airfield in the coastal sector again creating the most difficulties.
was out of range of the forward The supply of air ordnance, especially
combat zone. By the same date virtu- at forward area fields, was rarely ade-
ally all targets in France, except for a quate, while transportation shortages
few German troop columns west of further slowed the forward movement
the Rhone, were beyond the range of of both XII TAC units and airfield
XII TAC air bases on Corsica. As of 3 construction equipment. The trans-
September the XII TAC had airfields portation difficulties were complicat-
operational as far north as Valence, ed by the constant requirement to
and during the period 6–15 Septem- push units northward, which in turn
ber the command’s units in France reduced the availability of timely air
moved up to fields in the Lyon area, support. Fortunately, the bomb
within range of the Seventh Army’s supply problem did not become criti-
front lines. But this force still repre- cal, since strafing missions proved
sented less than half of the XII TAC’s more appropriate for most air sup-
original strength. port operations in southern France,
The demands of the Italian cam- especially after the fall of Toulon and
paign also reduced the availability of Marseille. Of the 1,045 interdiction
air support in southern France. For sorties that XII TAC pilots flew over
example, on 20 August MATAF had Italy during the period 1–14 Septem-
to divert two P-38 fighter groups ber, 1,021 were bombing missions. In
(used over France primarily for contrast, the 946 sorties over France
bomber escort duties) to operations during the same period consisted of
in Italy, while on 21 and 22 August 673 strafing and 273 bombing mis-
all MATAF medium bombers allocat- sions.
ed to support ground operations in On 15 September control of the
France were diverted to Italy. Re- XII TAC passed from MATAF to the
quirements in Italy, range problems, U.S. Ninth Air Force, based in north-
and weather further limited the XII ern France. At the same time, the XII
TAC’s operations over France. TAC lost control over the units that
During the week of 23–29 August XII had remained on Corsica, mostly Brit-
TAC’s interdiction sorties were split ish fighter squadrons; and these
almost evenly between France and forces, together with the MATAF
Italy, and during the period 1–14 units originally allocated to the sup-
September the XII TAC flew 1,045 port of ANVIL,moved to Italy.
SUPPORTING THE CAMPAIGN 215

Close Air Support bomb line and the infantry’s front


line, but the improvement was one of
Perhaps the most remarkable fea- degree rather than kind.
ture of air operations in the southern The problem was brought home
France campaign was the total ab- most forcefully during the battle at
sence of normal close air support ac- Montelimar. Before the Allied build-
tivities involving the use of air-ground up there, the XII TAC had achieved
liaison teams-or at least forward air excellent results in bombing and
observers in light aircraft, conducting strafing German columns moving up
air strikes in direct support of ground the Rhone valley from Avignon north
combat units. However, with the across the Drome River. But estab-
problems of range, airfield prepara- lishing bomb lines after 20 August in
tion, and continuous redeployments, the Montelimar area greatly restricted
the XII TAC could not respond effec- the use of Allied air power along
tively to direct support requests from Route N-7, the main Rhone highway,
tactical units. By the time aircraft and provided the American tactical
were able to arrive on the battlefield commander with little assistance once
at the proper location, the tactical sit- the situation on the ground became
uation had often changed and the tar- fluid. For example, during the
gets were no longer present. German breakthroughs in the Bonlieu
Because of these difficulties, the area it was impossible for ground
XII TAC limited its direct support to force commanders to obtain air sup-
area concentrations using simple port, because Bonlieu lay south and
bomb-line methods, a system whereby east of the existing bomb line. With-
aircraft bombed or strafed just for- out better air support methods, the
ward of a map line that marked the XII TAC was forced to concentrate
forward elements of the Allied on targets west of the Rhone and
ground units. To be effective, the line north of the Drome, all well outside
obviously had to be changed continu- the immediate ground battlefield;
ously; furthermore, the process took meanwhile the ground commanders
considerable time and occasioned would doubtlessly have preferred a
some argument between ground and few tactical air strikes against German
air commanders. Often bomb lines infantry and armor in the Hill 300
were so far from the ground combat and Bonlieu areas.
front that bombing or strafing mis- Lacking any arrangements or capa-
sions were of no direct help to the bilities for providing true close air
ground forces. At other times the support, XII TAC operations were
ground combat units had to be cau- devoted almost entirely to interdic-
tious about exploiting a drive for fear tion sorties against retreating German
of overrunning the bomb line, thus columns well forward of the Seventh
exposing themselves to strikes from Army’s ground front (and, until about
their own air support. Toward mid- 10 September, against LXIV Corps’
September the VI Corps staff made columns west of the Rhone). But even
arrangements with the air command these operations became more limited
to close the distance between the in scope and number as weather con-
216 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

ditions began to deteriorate toward while retaining technical supervision


mid-September. of the effort. Since the forces in
Despite these difficulties, both XII southern France were ultimately to
TAC and the attached MATAF bomb- pass to SHAEF control, CA plans and
ers performed their interdiction mis- operations in southern France had to
sions successfully, destroying large be carefully attuned with those in the
quantities of German equipment, dis- north; AFHQ and the Seventh Army
persing German troop columns, and thus closely modeled their CA direc-
retarding German deployments. How- tives after those of SHAEF. In both
ever, that interdiction program could the north and the south, the Allies es-
not by itself prevent the movement of tablished no military government.
the Nineteenth Army northward, and Rather, local French civilian agencies
Allied airpower failed to influence conducted and controlled the civil ad-
significantly the outcome of any ministration within France, except for
single ground engagement, except matters concerning Allied military se-
perhaps at Toulon and Marseille. The curity. The principal Allied CA contri-
campaign in southern France thus butions were in the fields of supply
convincingly demonstrated that inter- and coordination.
diction operations cannot substitute Within the Seventh Army, two off-
for true close air support, which cers controlled CA activities, Col.
might have supplied the firepower Harvey S. Gerry, the Seventh Army
needed by ground units when other G–5 staff officer, and Col. Henry
support assets were lacking. Parkman, Jr., who was the senior offi-
cer of Civil Affairs Headquarters, Sev-
Civil Affairs enth Army (CAHQ). Gerry was the
adviser to General Patch on all CA
Civil Affairs (CA) operations are ef- matters, and monitored and coordi-
forts conducted by a military com- nated CA field operations in southern
mand to ensure the safety and well- France. In the field, CA operations
being of the civilian population in its came under the control of Parkman,
area of operation. These measures who was both Chief Civil Affairs Offi-
are based on the legal and humanitar- cer, Seventh Army, and the com-
ian obligations of the command.11 Re- manding officer of the 2678th Civil
sponsibility for conducting CA oper- Affairs Regiment, the headquarters of
ations in southern France was vested which functioned as CAHQ. The
in AFHQ which delegated most of its 2678th CA Regiment had an initial
CA responsibilities to Seventh Army, authorization of 196 officers and 398
enlisted men. Planners estimated that
11 The civil affairs section is based on Harry L. this strength would prove unneces-
Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers sary during early operations in south-
Become Governors, U.S. Army in World War II (Wash-
ington, 1964), pp. 697–706, 751-92; Seventh Army ern France, and so 50 officers and 75
Rpt, I, 69-70; CONRAD History, pp. 48-50; Robert enlisted men were temporarily re-
W. Komer, CMH MS, “Civil Affairs and Military turned to Italy, only to be quickly re-
Government in the Mediterranean Theater,” ch. 21;
and miscellaneous documents and reports of the called when the Seventh Army’s unex-
ACofS G–5 Seventh Army. pectedly rapid advance increased the
SUPPORTING THE CAMPAIGN 217

need for CA personnel. The com- French that CA teams and detach-
mand was thus at full strength in ments of the 2678th CA Regiment
France by the end of September. were quickly eliminated in favor of
Ostensibly, CAHQ and the CA small liaison offices with French gov-
regiment’s component teams and de- ernmental agencies in key geographi-
tachments operated under broad poli- cal locations. This transition also re-
cies established by the Seventh Army flected basic U.S. Army CA doctrine.
G–5, but CAHQ had a technical chan- In the field, CA operations in
nel of communications to G–5 AFHQ southern France represented an
and sometimes received orders direct- Allied effort carried out by American,
ly from this headquarters. Colonel British, and French military person-
Gerry at Seventh Army headquarters nel. SHAEF supplied many of the
complained that CAHQ also estab- American and British personnel, while
lished policy on its own initiative, other American troops, experienced
while Colonel Parkman at CAHQ felt in military government, came from
that the Seventh Army G–5 some- Italy. The First French Army provided
times unduly intruded into field oper- CA liaison officers for Seventh Army’s
ations. Inevitably, discord arose be- combat units, CAHQs various de-
tween the two staffs, and the prob- tachments or offices, and French local
lems were not entirely solved until governmental agencies. As the French
both policy and operational responsi- were unable to supply enough of
bilities became centralized under the these liaison officers, all those as-
6th Army Group’s G–5 late in Sep- signed were markedly overworked for
tember. Even before that time, the the first month or so of CA oper-
AFHQG–5 had to take an active CA ations in southern France.
coordinating role in southern France Food, CA planners estimated,
in order to tie Seventh Army’s civil af- would be the principal civil relief ne-
fairs activities forward of the Army’s cessity in the ANVIL assault area,
rear boundary to those of logistical which was a deficit food-producing
agencies south of the boundary. region. Nevertheless, the combat-
heavy loading concept for early con-
voys prompted planners to delay
Civil Affairs Operations major CA food imports until the D
plus 40 convoy. Preassault plans
Despite some conflicts of interest called for three Liberty ships (or the
and divided responsibilities, direct equivalent) full of CA supplies to
military control of civil activities was reach southern France in five-day in-
limited. As the Allies expected, local crements with the convoys from D
French civilian government officials plus 40 through D plus 80. Initially,
were quickly able to reestablish the relief supplies were to come from the-
civil administration necessary to ater stockpiles, with the French fur-
handle the distribution of relief sup- nishing edible oils from North Africa.
plies that CAHQ furnished through Later shipments were to arrive direct-
Allied military channels. So rapid and ly from the United States.
thorough was the turnover to the The Seventh Army’s rapid drive
218 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE
northward created the same problems critical through September. Neither
for CA units and personnel that faced the Seventh Army nor the logistical
all logistical support agencies in agencies could provide many trucks,
southern France. Although it was ob- and, for purely tactical reasons, the
vious that the scheduled arrival of CA Seventh Army sometimes found it
personnel, supplies, and transporta- necessary to retain control of trucks
tion could not cope with require- allocated to CA activities. In other
ments, accelerating the arrival of CA areas, a lack of coordination ham-
troops and, to a lesser extent, sup- pered the most effective use of avail-
plies proved difficult. Emergency food able transportation for CA purposes.
supplies, hastily loaded as additional For example, although the Allies
cargo on ships from Italy and North found a general surplus of food in the
Africa, began arriving on D plus 10; Lyon region, it was hard to arrange
and the first civil relief Liberty ship transportation to move foodstuffs
began unloading over a St. Tropez south; often empty truck convoys and
gulf beach on 10 September (D plus later empty trains moved back to the
25 as opposed to the original sched- beaches and ports with their capacity
ule of D plus 40). By the end of Sep- for moving food to the coastal region
tember approximately 35,000 tons of unused. The problem was not solved
food earmarked for civil relief had until enough CA officials were avail-
reached southern France. able in the forward area to coordinate
Meanwhile, CA officials on the the movement of food stocks south
ground helped alleviate the more se- with Army transportation units and
rious distribution problems, assisting, commands.
for example, in organizing and dis- The Nice-Cannes area, east of the
tributing food stocks taken from the assault beaches, was an especially
Germans and other stocks that the troublesome region. Here, at the end
FFI had secretly assembled. Seventh of transportation lines, near famine
Army resources were normally used conditions existed for some time,
only in an emergency, or when the compounded by FFI and Allied troop
American units had excess supplies, misconduct such as looting and rob-
labor, or transport. Although CA per- bery. The disorderly conditions were
sonnel were reluctant to tax the hard- largely under control by mid-Septem-
pressed U.S. logistical agencies ber, but Nice especially remained a
during the first part of the campaign hungry area until well toward the end
and were able to obtain most necessi- of September.
ties from local French sources, the Nice was also a center of black
Seventh Army did release 100,000 market activities, which plagued CA
cans of condensed milk and about agencies throughout the coastal area.
3,450 pounds of dried milk from its American troops were guilty of con-
own stocks to meet a critical milk tributing to black market operations,
shortage among small children in the for even common army supplies (es-
coastal areas. pecially rations) as well as Post Ex-
Transportation required for effec- change items brought high prices. By
tive CA relief operations remained the end of September the black
SUPPORTING THE CAMPAIGN 219
market was generally under control at tion of French civilian officials and
Toulon, but remained significant at agencies.
Marseille and Nice despite the best
efforts of CA personnel, in conjunc- Conclusions
tion with other concerned American
and French agencies, to contain it.
The port of Marseille became infa- In summary, logistical constraints
mous as a center of traffic in stolen severely limited operations of the
and pilfered goods, and some officials Seventh Army, the XII TAC, and
estimated that for a time roughly 20 many other Allied units and agencies
percent of all supplies unloaded at through late September. The unex-
the port were subsequently stolen. pectedly rapid and deep Allied pene-
Here and elsewhere the theft of gaso- tration was the direct cause of most of
line became a major problem, and these problems, while a theaterwide
contributed significantly to the Sev- scarcity of service units and an unan-
enth Army’s POL shortages. ticipated shortage of French civilian
Outside of food and transportation, labor, especially at the beach and port
the only major civil relief shortage in- areas, were contributing factors.
volved certain types of medical sup- Commanders and planners at all
plies. Food and medical supply defi- levels did their best to overcome
ciencies were largely overcome before these difficulties, but the lack of vehi-
the end of September, while other cles and fuel was felt throughout the
relief problems did not materialize on campaign. Using captured German
the scale expected by CA planners. supplies and stripping vehicles from
The rehabilitation of civilian commu- ancillary units were only short-term
nication and power facilities proved a solutions, which were sometimes
much easier task than initially estimat- achieved at the cost of overworking
ed; no significant problems with refu- the few troops and equipment that
gees or displaced persons developed; were available. Only the vigorous
and clothing shortages were localized Allied pursuit and the German pell-
and overcome without undue trouble. mell withdrawal northward prevented
Hospitals, hospital equipment (except the logistical situation from being
for some medical supplies), and civil- more detrimental to the expanding
ian medical personnel were generally Allied campaign.
adequate; school buildings were un- Basic to the whole issue of logistical
damaged, although teacher shortages support was the planning concept.
existed. The expectation of a strong, protract-
Like logistical support activities in ed German resistance and possibly
southern France, CA operations major German counterattacks in
through the end of September consti- southern France proved incorrect.
tuted a shoestring success, achieved With hindsight, the Seventh Army
after somewhat hectic beginnings. But planners might have anticipated that
the successful Allied CA effort would Army Group G would be more interest-
not have been possible without the ed in withdrawing its forces north-
universal and wholehearted coopera- ward intact than in defending the
220 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

beaches and ports of southern France Yet, given the complicated nature
to the last man. Thus, overly conserv- of amphibious operations and the pri-
ative intelligence estimates had an ob- orities of the Allied high command,
vious impact on logistical planning, especially the precedence given to the
loading, and scheduling. The result- OVERLORD forces in northern France,
ing combat-heavy loading program the ANVILplanners probably did the
for both assault and early follow-up best they could with the means avail-
convoys left little or no room for lo- able. And while the Seventh Army
gistical flexibility once the situation may have rated German capabilities
ashore turned out differently than ex- too high, the Allied armies would find
pected. The shortage of shipping, es- in the months ahead that the German
pecially amphibious vessels, also re- defenders would not always retreat so
duced logistical flexibility as did the rapidly, even when their manpower
decision to accelerate the arrival of and materiel situation indicated that
French combat units. Efforts to withdrawal was the wisest course of
change unit and shipping schedules action. In short, Hitler and OKW
turned out to be only partially suc- might easily have taken a completely
cessful since many support units and different course of action, ordering
much cargo were locked in to preas- the Nineteenth A r m y to defend in place
sault schedules. The air units were and reinforcing it with units from
subject to the same planning con- western France and Italy. Had this
straints. From their bases in Corsica been the case, the Allied combat-
they were prepared to support a heavy logistical loading would have
lengthy battle on a carefully defined seemed a wise decision, and any pro-
beachhead, but were ill-equipped for posal to structure the ANVIL assault
more mobile operations on the main- force for a more mobile campaign
land. highly premature.
PART THREE

ORDEAL IN T H E VOSGES
CHAPTER XII

Strategy and Operations


While Truscott’s divisions wheeled goons met a small patrol from the U.S.
toward the Belfort Gap, de Monsa- 6th Armored Division at Saulieu,
bert’s French II Corps, on the Seventh twenty-five miles north of Autun,
Army’s western flank, had continued which formally marked the physical
north toward Dijon, periodically de- union of the OVERLORD and ANVIL
layed by fuel shortages. The French armies in northern France. As the II
northern drive from Lyon had been op- Corps moved east, the French and
posed ineffectively by a medley of odd- American forces cemented the junc-
sized German forces— Groups Brow- ture between Dijon and Chatillon,
dowski, Taeglichsbeck, and Ottenbacher and giving the Allied armies in France a
what was left of Group Bauer and the common front from the English Chan-
716th Infantry Division, all under the oc- nel in the north to the Mediterranean
casional supervision of the LXIV Corps in the south. The time had now come
in the south and the LXVI Corps in the to implement existing plans that would
north. On 11 September the French 1st unify the Allied command structure in
Armored Division rolled into Dijon un- France and place the Allied forces from
opposed and, scarcely pausing to join southern France under Eisenhower’s
the celebration of the city’s populace, SHAEF command. Henceforth Sev-
headed north for Langres, about forty enth Army’s operations would conform
miles farther. Approximately fifteen to strategic and operational concepts
miles to the west, the French 1st Infan- determined by SHAEF for the prosecu-
try Division matched its pace, moving tion of the war against Germany. The
north and northeast led by the 13th “champagne campaign” was officially
Foreign Legion Demibrigade, the 2d over.
Dragoons (tank destroyers), and the
1st Naval Fusiliers. Intermittently SHAEF’s Operational Concepts
throughout the day both of de Monsa-
bert’s divisions had telephone contact Patch’s approval on 3 September of
over local lines with the French 2d Ar- Truscott’s plan for a concerted VI
mored Division, part of Patton’s U.S. Corps drive on the Belfort Gap, with
Third Army that had already reached the French divisions of Army B split
Chatillon-sur-Seine. Finally, later in between the attacking American forces,
the afternoon of the 11th, the 2d Dra- was a purely opportunistic measure
224 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

that only temporarily altered the Sev- Eisenhower would assume operational
enth Army’s general .campaign plans. control of the forces in southern
Whatever the results of Truscott’s France on 15 September. At that time
drive, Patch fully intended to imple- Headquarters, 6th Army Group,
ment the deployment concept he had would become operational in south-
promulgated late in August—concen- ern France, and simultaneously con-
trating de Lattre’s French forces on the trol of the XII Tactical Air Command
Seventh Army’s right and Truscott’s VI would pass from the Twelfth to the
Corps on the left. The VI Corps was Ninth Air Force.
then to advance northeast across the Eisenhower, Wilson, and Devers
Vosges Mountains to Strasbourg and agreed that the transfer of operational
the Rhine, while the French divisions responsibility need not wait until
would push through the Belfort Gap to SHAEF assumed logistical and admin-
the Alsatian plains. 1 General Eisen- istrative control except in the field of
hower himself had outlined this de- civil affairs. At the time, SHAEF was
ployment plan as the Seventh Army having logistical problems of consider-
moved toward Lyon, and it had been able magnitude and was in no position
approved by General Wilson as well as to assume the added burden of con-
by General Devers, the commander- trolling logistical operations in south-
designate of the 6th Army Group. ern France. Thus the Allied command-
Shortly thereafter Eisenhower and ers decided that the 6th Army Group
Devers confirmed the concept during would administer its own semi-inde-
coordinating conferences at SHAEF pendent logistical system through
headquarters between 4 and 6 Septem- Mediterranean channels, using sup-
ber. 2 plies arriving directly from the United
Eisenhower had always held that States as well as excess stocks not
command of the ANVILforces should needed in M T O reserves.
be transferred to SHAEF soon after Eisenhower and Devers also deter-
the Seventh Army started moving in mined that the activation of the 6th
strength north of Lyon, an advance Army Group would be accompanied
VI Corps had initiated on 3 Septem- by the transformation of French Army
ber. The date of transfer received B into the First French Army, an or-
consideration during the 4–6 Septem- ganization that would be operational-
ber conferences, and on the 9th, after ly, logistically, and administratively in-
additional long-distance consultation, dependent of Patch’s Seventh Army.
AFHQ and SHAEF finally agreed that Until more American forces became
available, the change would leave
1Seventh Army FO 3 and 4, 25 and 28 Aug 44. Patch with little more than Truscott’s
2 The planning sections are based on the follow- VI Corps to control. Although Devers
ing sources: Seventh Army Rpt, I, 279–86, 327-32;
Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, pp. 1–13, 20–25, 52-56;
decided that Patch would continue to
Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, direct First French Army operations
United States Army in World War II (Washington, until the redeployment was complet-
1973), chs. 1 and 2; Truscott, Command Missions, pp. ed, this somewhat anomalous situa-
441-44; Pogue, The Supreme Command, pp. 228–29,
249–56, 265–66, 288-98; Seventh Army Diary, Aug- tion lasted only unitl 19 September
Sep 44. Devers was understandably dis-
STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS 225

turbed over leaving the Seventh Army SHAEF’s Operational Strategy


with just a single corps. Such an un-
derstrength army command could General Devers, now in the process
play only a minor role in future oper- of assuming direct control of both the
ations against Germany. Devers, in U.S. Seventh Army and the First
fact, had been concerned by the lack French Army, had never commanded
of American strength since the begin- a unit on the battlefield. However,
ning of ANVIL.Once the landings in along with Generals Eisenhower,
southern France were successful, he Lesley J. McNair, and Brehon B. So-
would have preferred transferring the mervell, he had been one of the prin-
entire U.S. Fifth Army as well as the cipal officers used by General Mar-
rest of the Twelfth Air Force from the shall to train, equip, and direct the
Italian to the southern France front. efforts of the American Army in the
Realizing that such a large redeploy- European theater. 3 As commanding
ment was both politically and oper- general of ETOUSA in 1943 and of
ationally impossible, Devers had NATOUSA in 1944, Devers had vig-
sought to have at least the Fifth orously represented the views of Mar-
Army’s IV Corps shipped from Italy shall and the JCS and knew the im-
to southern France. But early in Sep- portance that they attached to a direct
tember Wilson had blocked the move, thrust at Germany through northern
convincing the CCS and the JCS that France. This background had given
the transferral would ruin any chance the new army group commander a
for the success of operations then good feel for the political and person-
under way in Italy. Devers next re- al dimensions of the Allied high-level
quested that one of SHAEF’s Ameri- command, an area where Patch and
can corps be transferred to the Sev- de Lattre had little experience. Now,
enth Army, a proposal that Wilson as one of the major Allied field com-
also made. At the time, Gen. Sir Ber- manders, the energetic and some-
nard Montgomery’s 21st Army Group times outspoken Devers would have
had five corps and Lt. Gen. Omar N. the opportunity to put his ideas and
Bradley’s 12th Army Group had knowledge into action.
seven. But Eisenhower stated that he Like Patch, Devers was well aware
could not spare a corps at that time that realigning the Seventh and First
and believed that the three fresh French Armies was part of Eisenhow-
American divisions scheduled to er’s larger plan for the use of Allied
arrive through southern French ports military power in northeastern
during October and November would France. American forces, Eisenhower
greatly strengthen the Seventh Army, had long since decided, would occupy
even if no additional corps headquar- the center of a broad Allied advance
ters were available. In the end, the in northern France toward the
6th Army Group received no rein- German border (Map 12). For this
forcements, and the Seventh Army
was left with only a single corps head-
1 McNair served as Commanding General, Army
quarters and three infantry divisions Ground Forces, and Somervell as Commanding
in its order of battle. General, Army Service Forces.
226 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

reason he wanted Bradley’s 12th First French Army. The result would
Army Group in the middle of the have forced Eisenhower to deal with
Allied line, between Montgomery’s both French and British national in-
21st Army Group in the north and terests personally, further multiplying
Devers’ 6th Army Group in the south. his command problems. Eisenhower
In mid-September Bradley’s center thus believed it necessary to preserve
command had three armies, but only a significant American complexion in
two were on line, the First and the the 6th Army Group, and so he left
Third, with the Ninth Army still clear- the existing command arrangements
ing the Brittany peninsula in the west. in place.4
Montgomery’s 2 1st Army Group, con- Having accepted the need for the
sisting of the First Canadian and 6th Army Group headquarters on his
Second British Armies, constituted southern wing, Eisenhower was still
the left, or northern, wing of the uncertain regarding the role he would
Allied line, and Devers’ 6th Army assign to it. The northern boundary
Group was its right, or southern, of Devers’ command, as established
wing. The eventual arrival of the by SHAEF, stretched northeast from
Ninth Army in Bradley’s center and Langres past Epinal, about forty miles
the redeployment of Patch’s Seventh north of Vesoul, to Strasbourg on the
Army to the left of the 6th Army Rhine. Although its southern flank
Group would complete the concentra- technically rested on the Swiss
tion of American combat power in the border, the army group also inherited
center of the Allied line. the Seventh Army’s responsibility for
Eisenhower would have preferred outposting the Franco-Italian border
transferring the entire Seventh Army in the far south. Initially Eisenhower
to Bradley’s central army group, but assigned the 6th Army Group three
feared that the First French Army general missions within its main area
might not be ready to undertake total of operations: destroy the opposing
responsibility for the Allied right German forces; secure crossings over
wing. Moreover, without Patch’s Sev- the Rhine River; and breach the Sieg-
enth Army, the 6th Army Group’s fried Line—the generic term SHAEF
American contingent would have con- applied to the German-built West
sisted of little more than some artil- Wall fortifications just inside the
lery and service units directly sup- German border. How these objectives
porting the First French Army; vari- fit into SHAEF’s larger operational
ous logistical and administrative units plans is difficult to discern.
along its line of communications to Following the breakout from the
the Mediterranean; and the 1st Air- Normandy beachhead, the opening
borne Task Force, still outposting the eastern movement of Eisenhower’s
Franco-Italian border area. Under OVERLORD forces had been character-
such circumstances de Gaulle would ized by rapid pursuit, and the ensuing
certainly have pressed for French period by even morenarrow axes of
command of the army group or at
least the elimination of the army 4See Ltr, Eisenhower to Bradley, 15 Sep 44, in
group and an expanded role for the Eisenhower Papers, IV, 2146–47.
228 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

advance because of SHAEF’s inability strated a certain operational rigidity


to support a more general offensive as well as a tendency to measure suc-
logistically. Eisenhower had therefore cess totally in terms of terrain, a
never been able to implement his so- problem that had also beset the Ital-
called broad front strategy. By mid- ian campaign. Moreover, SHAEF’s in-
September logistical concerns had in flexibility in this area was further
fact made the seizure and rapid reha- aggravated by the difficulties Eisen-
bilitation of a major port, Antwerp, hower continued to have in con-
an overriding military objective. Al- trolling the independently minded
though Antwerp had fallen to Mont- Montgomery. Such, perhaps, was the
gomery’s 2 1st Army Group on 4 Sep- inevitable nature of coalition warfare,
tember, the Germans still controlled and Eisenhower’s ability to manage
the approaches to the port from the his sometimes quarrelsome subordi-
Schelde Estuary; the estuary would nates, as well as to fend off their po-
have to be cleared before the port litical chiefs and preserve the alliance,
could be opened. A complementary may have been the most accurate
development was the desire to con- measure of his success in the art of
centrate the Allied ground advance generalship.
against specific objectives that would T o gain his objectives in the north,
seriously impair Germany’s ability to Eisenhower intended to employ
wage war. The closest and most obvi- Montgomery’s 21st Army Group and
ous target was the Ruhr industrial most of the 12th Army Group’s First
area of northwestern Germany, a Army. He also planned to use the
region whose capture would also pro- bulk of his available airborne forces—
vide a wide invasion route into the now in reserve and organized into the
heart of Germany. All these factors First Allied Airborne Army—in the
dictated that the main Allied effort 21st Army Group’s Operation
should be focused along a narrow MARKET-GARDEN, an attempt to envel-
front in the zone of the 21st Army op the Ruhr basin from the north. If
Group, an idea that General Mont- Montgomery’s daring offensive suc-
gomery as well as many high-ranking ceeded, Eisenhower hoped to drive
British political and military leaders across the north German plains and
vociferously advocated. finish the war by the end of the year.
Faced in September with the con- With close to half its strength sup-
tinued logistical impossibility of sup- porting the northern effort, the rest
porting a broad offensive, Eisenhower of Bradley’s 12th Army Group was
adopted Montgomery’s operational relegated to a secondary role. Pat-
concept as the most suitable course of ton’s Third Army, Eisenhower told
action. In doing so, however, he Bradley, was to confine itself to limit-
abandoned the flexibility of the broad ed advances, pushing east to secure
front strategy and made terrain the bridgeheads over the Moselle River in
main Allied objective rather than the Metz-Nancy region, thereby
enemy forces. The failure of the threatening the Saar basin, an indus-
Allied armies to close the Falaise trial region second only to the Ruhr.
Pocket earlier had already demon- This action would also fix German
STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS 229

units in place that might otherwise be ational strategy, SHAEF had no real
deployed north. Once the Third role to assign the newly created 6th
Army had its forces firmly across the Army Group. From a theater point of
Moselle, the 12th Army Group was to view, a major effort in the south
concentrate its remaining resources to seemed pointless. Devers’ forces
help the First Army seize crossings faced a daunting array of obstacles,
over the Rhine immediately south of starting with the Vosges Mountains,
the Ruhr. Then the Third Army could followed by the Rhine River and the
begin moving against the Saar. Al- West Wall, and finally the Black
though the resulting SHAEF cam- Forest, another thirty miles of almost
paign plan appeared somewhat rigid, impenetrable terrain, all highly favor-
it was perhaps complex enough to able to the defense. And even if his
confuse the Germans and still allow Franco-American forces were some-
SHAEF some flexibility if a change in how able to push through these bar-
the main effort became necessary. riers, which was extremely unlikely,
Despite these arrangements, dis- the seizure of Nuremburg or
agreements over operational strategy Munich—just about the only prizes on
still plagued the Allied high command. the other side—did not seem especial-
Eisenhower felt that his plans followed ly worthwhile objectives. However,
the principles of the broad front strate- there were alternatives that neither
gy as much as was practicable; Mont- Eisenhower nor his SHAEF planners
gomery believed they adhered too ever considered: for example, sending
closely to the concept, fearing that the a reinforced 6th Army Group north
Third Army’s secondary thrust against through the Rhenish plains in a vast
the Saar might undermine his single enveloping maneuver against the
concentrated thrust in the north. But in flank or rear of the German forces de-
this matter, Eisenhower strongly dis- fending the Saar and Ruhr regions; or
agreed, believing that ceasing all offen- sending it north as far as Frankfurt
sive operations in the central and and then northeast, following the
southern Allied sectors would allow famous Napoleonic route toward
the Germans to transfer more forces Berlin through the critical Fulda cor-
north or to initiate a major counterat- ridor. Instead, both Eisenhower and
tack elsewhere. The projected efforts his major subordinates remained pre-
of Bradley in the center also enabled occupied with their existing plans
Eisenhower to retain at least the sem- which called for a drive into Germany
blance of a broad front strategy. In by two army groups, one operating
this, however, he was mistaken. His north of the Ardennes forest, and the
new offensives were now closely tied to other to the south. Developing the
fixed terrain objectives, while the aim port of Antwerp and designating the
of a true broad front offensive was the Ruhr and Saar as strategic objectives
destruction of enemy forces, either by had been given some thought earlier
attrition or by maneuver once weak- during OVERLORD planning and now
nesses in the enemy defenses became meshed easily with the operational
apparent. concepts already in place. But SHAEF
Having discarded a flexible oper- planners had never taken into consid-
230 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

eration a major force coming up from ception that the southern sector of
the south, and SHAEF concepts had the Allied line was a dead end. But
not changed after the CCS approved officially at least, 6th Army Group op-
ANVIL, or even after the Seventh erations were part of the larger Allied
Army had landed and sped northward concept. On 15 September, for exam-
faster than anyone expected. ple, Eisenhower promised Bradley
Finding no role for it in the north- that the Seventh Army, even though it
ern offensive, Eisenhower appeared remained part of the 6th Army
to give Devers’ 6th Army Group a Group, would always be maneuvered
somewhat independent status. With to support the 12th Army Group.6 To
only three American divisions and a the CCS and Montgomery, Eisenhow-
French army composed primarily of er maintained that 6th Army Group
colonial troops, Devers’ command operations would be designed primar-
must have seemed insignificant de- ily to support the more important
spite its imposing army group desig- drives farther north and to protect
nation. Nevertheless, although small, the 12th Army Group’s southern
the group had its own independent flank. Possibly SHAEF approved 6th
line of communications and its own Army Group’s offensives toward
logistical base; the French forces Strasbourg and the Rhine only be-
could, in fact, recruit and train re- cause they did not appear to interfere
placements immediately behind the in any way with the northern effort;
battlefield. For the present then, the furthermore, Eisenhower must have
force appeared capable of sustaining hoped that the southern army group’s
itself without making any demands on separate line of communications
SHAEF’s overtaxed logistical system might enable him to increase the 12th
in northern France. This situation, in Army Group’s logistical support at
turn, enabled the group to conduct its some future date once the capacity of
own, more or less separate offensives the Mediterranean supply system had
that could tie down German divisions, been sufficiently expanded. But as
without detracting from the more im- long as Devers remained logistically
portant operations in the center and independent, Eisenhower was appar-
north of the Allied line. But Eisen- ently willing to give him a certain
hower still expected little from the freedom of action. 7
6th Army Group, believing that even
the most successful advances in the
south had little strategic potential. 5
What independence thereby fell to 6Ltr, Eisenhower to Bradley, 15 Sep 44 Eisen-
Devers’ command was the product of hower Papers, IV, 2147.
circumstance—the simple geographi- 7 See Rad, SHAEF to 21st Army Gp, 12th Army
Gp, et al., SHAEF Fwd–14764, 13 Sep 44, in
cal distance between SHAEF’s north- SHAEF File 381, Post-OVERLORD Plng I; Min,
ern and southern wings and the per- SHAEF Special Mtg, 22 Sep 44, in H Q 12th Army
Gp AF File 371.3 MilObjs, I; Rads, SHAEF to 12th
Army Gp and 6th Army Gp, SHAEF Fwd–15934
5 For example, see Ltr, Eisenhower to Montgom- and Fwd–15981, 26 Sep 44; Rad, SHAEF to CCS,
ery, 24 Sep 44, SHAEF File 381, Post-OVERLORD SHAEF Fwd–16181, 29 Sep 44. The last three in
Plng I. SHAEF File 381, Post-OVERLORDPlng II.
STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS 231

egated to a minor supporting role,


and Truscott was obviously dis-
pleased that his current offensive
would have to be halted and his front
moved north opposite the Vosges
Mountains. In contrast, General de
Lattre, unhappy with the current divi-
sion of the First French Army be-
tween Patch’s Seventh, was generally
satisfied with the concentration of the
French on the Allied right wing.9 For
both political and military reasons
that decision, fully supported by
Devers and Patch, was to prove
sound.
Based on Eisenhower’s guidance,
Devers issued new orders calling for
the French II Corps to move from the
sector west of the Saone River, on VI
Corps’ northern flank, to the area
south of the VI Corps, taking over the
territory currently occupied by the
45th Infantry Division. The 36th Divi-
LT. GEN. LUCIANK. TRUSCOTT,Gen- sion would simultaneously stretch to
eral Patch, and General Devers, October the north, taking over the area vacat-
1944. ed by the II Corps. These changes
would put all of de Lattre’s forces op-
Patch and Truscott posite the Belfort Gap, with the II
Corps in the north and the I Corps in
Within the 6th Army Group, the re- the south and Patch’s three-division
actions of the senior commanders to “army” opposite the rugged Vosges
SHAEF’s plans were mixed. 8 General Mountains. Within its zone, the First
Devers was undoubtedly disappoint- French Army was to drive through
ed. Hoping ultimately for a greater the Belfort Gap and then head north
role for his command, he continued to clear the Alsatian plains; to the
to press SHAEF for an additional north, the VI Corps was to march
American corps to strengthen Patch’s northeast across the Vosges, with its
Seventh Army. Patch was also under- axis of advance between Vesoul and
standably unenthusiastic upon receiv- St. Die, and aim at Strasbourg, some
ing word that his forces would be rel- 120 miles from Vesoul.
After fully digesting the Seventh
8 Thissection is based on Truscott, Command Mis- Army’s new orders, Truscott wrote a
sions, pp. 441-45; Seventh Army FO 5, 14 Sep 44; strongly worded letter to Patch
Seventh Army Diary, 13–17 Sep 44; Rad, Devers to
Eisenhower. B–16370. 13 Sep 44. in SHAEF File
381, Post-OVERLORDPlng I. 9 De Lattre, History, pp. 167–69.
232 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

making strenuous objections to the would at least break the stalemate in


change in plans.10 Believing that the Italy, whereas an attack through the
Nineteenth Army was close to total col- High Vosges Mountains would ac-
lapse and that the VI Corps was on complish nothing.
the verge of breaking through the Patch tried to soothe Truscott as
northern shoulder of the Belfort Gap best he could, relaying the news that
to the Rhine, he reminded Patch that the U.S. Senate had recently con-
the Army commander himself had just firmed his promotion to lieutenant
approved the continuation of his of- general. Nevertheless, he could offer
fensive against Belfort and, he felt, little hope that SHAEF's operational
had agreed that the Belfort Gap was concepts could be altered or that the
one of the primary gateways to the VI Corps would be allowed to contin-
German heartland. By the time the ue its offensive against the Belfort
Allies regrouped their forces, the Gap. In this area Patch could do little
Germans would have slammed the more than affirm his confidence in
gate shut. Truscott had had his fill of Truscott and hold out hope that the
winter fighting in the mountains of Germans might also have discounted
Italy, and neither he nor any of his an Allied attack over the Vosges and
troops desired to repeat the experi- thus maintained only a thin defensive
ence in the Vosges. The terrain and shell there.
weather, he pointed out, would allow
the Germans to control the pace of Tactical Transition
any Allied offensive there and, in his
opinion, would waste three fine On 15 and 16 September Trus-
American divisions with little benefit cott's forces resumed their drive east,
either to SHAEF's efforts in the north meeting stiff German resistance on
or to the First French Army's drive the 15th but only scattered opposition
against Belfort. Rather than tying on the following day as the 3d Divi-
German divisions down to defend the sion occupied Lure, the 36th Division
area, a mountain offensive would secured Luxeuil, and the 117th Caval-
allow them to deploy more resources ry Squadron reached St. Loup. Late
elsewhere. In Truscott's opinion the on the 16th, however, Truscott or-
greatest assistance that the Seventh dered a halt to the advance and, in
Army could provide SHAEF was to compliance with Patch's directive of
send the VI Corps directly through the 14th, issued instructions reorient-
the Belfort Gap to the Rhine. If, he ing the corps for an immediate drive
concluded, the VI Corps could not be northeast across the Moselle River
employed properly in France, then it and into the Vosges Mountains
should be returned to Italy under toward St. Die and Strasbourg. 11He
AFHQ control to mount an amphibi- hoped that the French II Corps, rede-
ous operation against Genoa. Such an ploying from the north, could relieve
operation, Truscott was convinced, the 45th Division on his southern
wing by the 17th. Ever the opportun-
10The letter is quoted in full in Truscott, Com-
mand Missions, pp. 441–43. 11VI Corps FO 3, 16 Sep 44.
STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS 233

ist, Truscott wanted to begin as green light to start this new offensive
quickly as possible before the Ger- the following morning. Thus, at 1630
mans had time to recover. But Devers on the 20th, the three VI Corps in-
decided that the northern French fantry divisions began their advance
corps would be unable to complete its toward the High Vosges.12
redeployment until 21 September,
forcing Patch to direct Truscott to German Plans and Deployment
hold his units in place until the trans-
fer of area responsibilities could be Once the Allied armies had broken
completed. Truscott, temporarily out of their OVERLORD beachheads,
frustrated, used the next several days the basic German operational objec-
to have his units bring up supplies tive in northern France was to hold
and secure forward assembly areas for along a defensive line as far west of
the Moselle crossing. During this the Franco-German border as possi-
period the 45th Division also began ble. Ostensibly, this defensive line
deploying from the VI Corps’ right to was to originate at the Schelde Estu-
its left, or northern, wing, replacing ary in the Netherlands and cross into
the departing French. By 18 Septem- Germany near the city of Aachen
ber, Truscott thus had his three divi- (Aix-la-Chapelle). From the vicinity of
sions oriented on the Moselle and the Aachen south to the confluence of the
Vosges, ready to advance northeast Sarre and Moselle rivers near Trier,
on command. the line corresponded to the neglect-
T o Truscott’s surprise, preliminary ed prewar West Wall, sometimes
probes toward the Moselle between known as the Siegfried Line. The
16 and 18 September found German Trier area also marked the boundary
opposition again stiffening in the between Army Groups B and G as of 8
southern part of his sector close to September. 13
the Belfort Gap, but almost negligible From Trier southwest thirty-five
resistance in the north, especially in miles to Thionville, the line followed
the Remiremont-Epinal area along the Moselle River and was therefore
the Moselle. Again the irrepressible designated the Moselle position. At
Truscott sought Patch’s permission Thionville the main defensive line was
for an immediate attack to exploit the to swing sharply back southeast for
situation. This time the reaction was about fifty miles to Sarralbe, corre-
more positive. Although SHAEF had
not yet officially approved the plan to 12Msg, G–3, VI Corps, to G–3, 36th Div, 191025
push the Seventh Army across‘ the Sep 44, in VI Corps War Rm Jnl, 19 Sep 44; VI
Corps Fld Msg 191200, 19 Sep 44; Seventh Army
Vosges, Devers and Patch agreed with Diary, 19 Sep 44. Available record files contain no
Truscott that further delays would written authorization permitting Truscott to reacti-
only allow the Germans to become vate his Field Order 3 of 16 September, and SHAEF
did not officially approve the new offensive until 22
more entrenched along the Moselle September, when Devers and Patch attended a con-
and the western slopes of the Vosges. ference at SHAEF headquarters.
So, with the French II Corps’ rede- 13The principal sources for this section are von
Luttichau, “German Operations,” chs. 16 and 17;
ployment nearly complete, Patch, with and Krasomil, “German Operations in Southern
Devers’ blessing, gave Truscott the France,” ch. 6, CMH MS R-51.
234 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

sponding for the most part with the kept the German First Army off bal-
French prewar Maginot Line. From ance, making it impossible for
Sarralbe the line was to continue gen- Blaskowitz to assemble and direct a
erally south and southwest across the strong armored counterattack with Lt.
Vosges, through the approaches to Gen. Hasso von Manteuffel’s Fifth
the Belfort Gap, and on to the Swiss Panzer Army against Patton’s southern
border. In the area north of Devers’ flank, as Hitler had ordered. The
6th Army Group, the German high Third Army had continually forced
command also wanted to establish a the First Army back, and Blaskowitz’s
western salient at Metz, on the Mo- concerns had been almost entirely de-
selle twenty miles south of Thionville, fensive. At the insistence of von
and, in addition, a buffer line along Rundstedt, whom Hitler had brought
the Moselle from Metz through back to command OB West in early
Nancy, Epinal, and Remiremont, all September, he finally launched a
the way south to the vicinity of l’Isle- counterattack with one panzer corps
sur-les-Doubs. on 9 September, but by the 14th
In mid-September this projected these forces had been shattered by
line, named the Weststellung, or West Third Army units assisted by the Sev-
Line, existed largely on paper. North enth Army’s French II Corps driving
of Aachen, for example, construction east of Dijon.
of permanent fortifications and obsta- T o gain additional strength for a
cles had barely begun, and south of renewed effort, Blaskowitz requested
the city the old West Wall defenses authorization to pull the bulk of the
needed to be completely rebuilt. Be- Nineteenth Army back to the Moselle
tween Thionville and Sarralbe, the River, keeping some forces west of
Maginot Line defensive works, al- the river in front of the Belfort ap-
though more formidable, would proaches. Von Rundstedt referred the
either have to be altered to face west- matter to OKW, and Hitler approved
ward or demolished. South of Sar- the withdrawal on the 15th, with the
ralbe and opposite the 6th Army proviso that Army Group G launch the
Group, the only activity on the trace new counterattack no later then 18
of the proposed line was the hasty September. T o ensure its success, OB
construction of some field fortifica- West ordered Blaskowitz to send both
tions in the Vosges by civilian forced the 11th Panzer Division and the 113th
labor and a few pioneer battalions. Panzer Brigade from the Belfort Gap
As the VI Corps was about to begin area north to von Manteuffel.
its attack, the opposing German By 17 September Army Group G had
forces were desperately trying to buy completed most of the redeployments
time to turn the Weststellung into a and command shufflings necessitated
solid defensive position. A m y Group by the scheduled counterattack. In the
G’s most immediate concern was not far north the First Army held Army
the Belfort Gap or the Vosges de- Group G’s right wing with two corps
fenses, but defenses in the area between Trier and Nancy. In its
around Metz and Nancy. There the center, the Fifth Panzer Army occupied
progress of Patton’s Third Army had a thirty-mile front from Nancy to the
STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS 235

Rambervillers area just north of pushed back the Nineteenth Army units
Epinal. Both armies faced units of holding positions west of the Moselle
Bradley’s 12th Army Group. South of from Remiremont south to the Doubs
Rambervillers, the Nineteenth Army River. The German withdrawal to new
stood opposite Devers’ small 6th defensive lines was well under way
Army Group along a front stretching across most of the front by the morn-
for about ninety miles (Map 23). ing of the 19th, which accounts for
Along the Moselle, from Charmes ten the diminishing resistance experi-
miles south to Epinal, the Nineteenth enced by the VI Corps and the
Army’s LXVI Corps held the river line French II Corps. By the evening of 19
with a motley collection of 16th Divi- September the II Corps French
sion and Group Ottenbacher remnants, troops were within two miles of La
stragglers from other kampgruffen Cote; elements of the 3d Division
chopped up in the Dijon salient, two were scarcely three miles from La
battalions of the 29th SS Police Regi- Longine; the 36th Division had a rein-
ment, and some Luftwaffe and Kriegs- forced infantry battalion two miles
marine “retreads.” from Remiremont; and the 117th
From Epinal southeast eleven miles Cavalry Squadron had closed within
along the Moselle to Remiremont and four miles of Epinal. Thus, although
another eleven miles southwest to La Patch and Truscott feared that the
Longine, the Nineteenth Army ’s LXIV Germans might have reestablished a
Corps took over with the 726th Division firm defensive line by the 19th, both
on its right and the 289th Division Blaskowitz and Wiese were concerned
(Group von Schwerin) on its left. Next whether their units could make much
was the IV Luftwaffe Field Corps with of a showing south of Charmes with
the 338th and 298th Divisions de- the Allied forces seemingly still in hot
ployed on a line, north to south, pursuit.
along a fifteen-mile front west of the How close the Nineteenth Army was
Moselle from La Longine south to La to collapse at this juncture is hard to
Cote, about four miles east of Lure estimate. Due to the command and
on Route N–19. Below La Cote to the administrative confusion throughout
Swiss border, a distance of about the force, even determining its gener-
thirty miles, was the LXXXV Corps, al strength and actual dispositions is
guarding the Belfort Gap with the difficult. Employing the German prac-
259th Division on its right, Group De- tice of counting only troops under the
gener in the center, and the 12th Panzer combat battalion headquarters as
Division on the south. Wiese had combat effectives, Wiese’s infantry
somehow managed to retain the strength numbered about 13,000 men
panzer division until the night of 18– on 19 September, with the total
19 September, but its departure was strength of the divisions deployed
imminent. Only the headquarters of across the Nineteenth Army’s front per-
Corps Dehner, currently based inside haps three to five times as high. But
Belfort city, remained uncommitted. these figures are conjectures only,
From 15 to 19 September Trus- and even these estimates leave out
cott’s final eastward advance had the numerous kampfgruppen, security
STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS 237

and police units, Army service units, fensives were too weak to have any
and Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine troops chance of success. Von Manteuffel’s
filling in here and there as infantry, left wing was quickly forced back by
some of which may have been count- the advance of the U.S. Third Army’s
ed in with the total infantry division XV Corps across the Moselle, and, in
effectives. Other organizations in the the process, Wiese’s northernmost
Nineteenth Army’s area included securi- force, the LXVI Corps, was pushed
ty, fortress, and engineer units, which back farther east. The evening of 19
were generally associated with the September thus found it in disarray,
construction of the Weststellung de- trying to regroup its forces south of
fenses and were thus under Army Rambervillers and hold the Nineteenth
Group G control, but could pass to the Army’s northern flank between the
Nineteenth Army in an emergency. Also Moselle and Baccarat, situated on the
included in this category were the Meurthe River about ten miles north-
four-regiment 405th Replacement Divi- east of Rambervillers.
sion and various static artillery units. Not surprisingly, Hitler had become
Under direct army control, Wiese had increasingly critical of Blaskowitz’s
about 90 pieces of field artillery, performance. The failure of the Fifth
roughly 30 infantry light howitzers Panzer A r m y ’ s counterattack against
(75-mm.), and around 25 dual-pur- the U.S. Third Army and the continu-
pose 88-mm. guns. The 11th Panzer ous withdrawal of the Nineteenth Army
Division, reduced to about 25 tanks as in the face of little more than Trus-
of 19 September, was beginning to cott’s three divisions had predictably
receive some replacements and new angered the German Fuhrer. Hitler
equipment, but was still only margin- had never established a close relation-
ally effective. In sum Wiese would ship with the apolitical Blaskowitz
have an increasingly difficult time and, unwilling to take any action
holding back a general 6th Army against von Rundstedt, relieved the
Group offensive, or even a smaller Army Group G commander on 21 Sep-
one if it was concentrated in the right tember. Blaskowitz was replaced by
area. Lt. Gen. Hermann Balck, formerly the
Meanwhile, events north of the commander of the Fourth Panzer Army
Nineteenth Army’s front had begun to on the Russian front. But whether
threaten its right flank. Von Manteuf- Balck or any other German general
fel’s Fifth Panzer Army launched an could greatly influence the coming
attack toward Luneville on the 18th battles along the German frontier was
and Nancy on the 19th, but both of- problematic.
CHAPTER XIII

VI Corps at the Moselle


When Operation MARKET-GARDEN-thrust through the Vosges might sur-
the Allied airborne-led offensive prise the Germans and provide a back
against the extreme northern sector door to the German border.
of the German defensive line-began
on 17 September, Truscott’s VI Allied Plans and Alignment
Corps had been approaching the
hasty German defenses in the Belfort Truscott’s plans for the assault
Gap. But in the ensuing days, as the against Nineteenth Amy’s re-forming
Allied attack in the north played out defenses called for the VI Corps to
its part, Devers, the new 6th Army push generally northeast across the
Group commander, reorganized the Moselle River and into the Vosges
Allied forces from southern France foothills with three divisions abreast.’
into two armies, Patch’s Seventh The 3d Division was to be on the
Army in the north (with only one right, or southern, wing with its open
corps, the VI) and de Lattre’s First flank tied to the French II Corps; the
French Army in the south (with two 36th Division was to occupy the VI
corps, the I and 11). The shift pushed Corps center; and the 45th Division
Truscott’s sector of advance to the was to take the left, with the 117th
north, and his further movement east- Cavalry Squadron screening VI
ward toward the German border was Corps’ northern flank, adjacent to the
now blocked by the formidable High Third Army’s XV Corps. Responsibil-
Vosges Mountains. During World ity for the left flank was ultimately to
War I the Germans had seized the pass to the 45th Division when it
area in 1914, and the French had completed its displacement north,
never bothered to penetrate there in
strength. The heavily forested, rising 1 Planning information in this section is generally
from VI Corps FO 3, 16 Sep 44; VI Corps Fld Msg
mountainous terrain gave too many 191200A, 19 Sep 44; VI Corps Fld Msg 201900A,
obvious advantages to the defenders. 20 Sep 44; Seventh Army Rpt, I, 289–90, 299; First
However, as the inability of Mont- French Army Personal and Secret Instruction 2, 17
Sep 44 (in Annex IV of de Lattre, Histoire, French
gomery’s 21st Army Group to bring language edition); II French Corps, Directive for the
the northern operation to a successful Relief of VI Corps, 18 Sep 44; de Lattre, History, pp.
182-83; II French Corps, Instruction Personal and
conclusion became evident by the Secret for the Commanders of the 1st DMI, 1st DB,
25th, Patch and Truscott hoped that a 2d DIM, 20 Sep 44.
VI CORPS AT THE MOSELLE 239

and the cavalry squadron was to move II Corps was to head in a more eas-
over to the right -flank of the VI terly direction. General de Lattre
Corps where it would provide close li- planned a two-corps attack to breach
aison with the French II Corps. the Belfort Gap, with the II Corps
The VI Corps’ front for the drive outflanking Belfort on the north while
across the Moselle was about thirty General Bethouart’s I Corps under-
miles wide northwest to southeast, took to drive directly through the gap
approximately twice the width along to Mulhouse, twenty-three miles
which contemporary U.S. Army field beyond. De Lattre hoped that the
manuals expected a three-division First French Army could begin its
corps to deploy. The corps’ northern attack on or about 27 September, but
boundary with the Third Army’s XV Generals Devers and Patch were not
Corps crossed the Moselle about two so optimistic, believing that French
miles north of Epinal and continued logistical and redeployment problems
northeast thirteen miles to Ramber- would push the starting date of the
villers and then another nine miles to French offensive back to mid-Octo-
the Meurthe River at Baccarat. North ber. Until then, the most Devers and
of Epinal, Rambervillers, and Bac- Patch expected from the French were
carat, Maj. Gen. Wade H. Haislip’s some limited attacks in the II Corps’
XV Corps faced the XLVII Panzer sector to support the VI Corps’ as-
Corps of Army Group G’s Fifth Panzer sault.
Army. By 20 September the XV Corps As was his custom, Truscott estab-
was well beyond the Moselle in its lished a series of phase lines for the
sector and was moving into Luneville, new VI Corps offensive, which was to
on the Meurthe River about twenty- begin at 0630 on 20 September.
eight miles north of Epinal. Elements Phase Line I lay generally ten miles
of the XV Corps crossed the Meurthe west of the Moselle and included the
near Luneville on the 20th, and the forward assembly areas needed for
corps’ French 2d Armored Division the Moselle crossing. Phase Line II
had scouting elements within seven included the Moselle River, the rail
miles of Baccarat. and highway center of Epinal on the
At the other end of its new front, Moselle, and the rising ground east of
the VI Corps’ southern boundary ex- the river. After crossing the Moselle,
tended from Lure northeast eighteen Truscott planned to have the attack
miles to cross the Moselle at Le Thil- move in a more northerly direction,
lot, and continued northeast into the pivoting on the 45th Division at
Vosges past Gerardmer, fifteen miles Epinal while the 3d and 36th Divi-
beyond. Route N-486, a secondary sions swung north to Phase Lines III
highway connecting Lure and Ger- and IV, which included Gerardmer
ardmer, marked the boundary be- and Rambervillers. An advance to
tween the VI Corps and the French II Phase Line V would carry the corps’
Corps. center and left flank across the
While Truscott’s VI Corps ad- Meurthe River between Baccarat and
vanced generally northeast to Stras- St. Die. From the corps’ forward posi-
bourg on the Rhine, de Monsabert’s tions on the morning of 20 Septem-
240 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

ber, it was twenty-five to thirty miles visions would begin entering the foot-
to St. Die and another forty miles hills of the mountain range, while
from St. Die to the corps’ long-range O’Daniel’s 3d Division, attacking in
objective, Strasbourg on the Rhine. the south, would already be running
On the eve of the new offensive, into hilly terrain as it approached the
substantial portions of VI Corps were upper Moselle. In the north, along
already on or beyond Phase Line I the line Epinal-Rambervillers-Bac-
and were in position to start crossing carat, the terrain consisted generally
the Moselle. The 3d Division was to of open but hilly farmland, with the
cross in a zone that stretched from Le higher elevations usually thickly
Thillot northwest eleven miles to a wooded (Map 14). Here the 45th Di-
point a mile or so south of Remire- vision would have some of the only
mont, also on the Moselle. Once good offensive terrain in the VI
across the river and on Phase Line II, Corps sector. Elsewhere the ground
the 3d Division was to continue would become progressively more dif-
northeast, cross the Moselotte River, ficult and more thickly forested. From
seize Gerardmer on Phase Line III, the Moselle to St. Die and farther
and drive on to Phase Line IV, sup- east, the elevation of terrain slowly
porting a 36th Division attack toward rose and was increasingly broken up
St. Die. by large hills and mountains whose
In the center, the 36th Division’s valleys served as watersheds for the
crossing zone along the Moselle ex- region. Here the prevailing winds
tended northwest about ten miles from the north and west brought
from the vicinity of Remiremont to moisture-laden clouds that fed the
Arches and Archettes. The division’s dense forests and almost tropical
ultimate objective was St. Die. The vegetation. Once across the crest of
45th Division, which had to redeploy the Vosges, the attackers would find
from VI Corps’ right to its left, was the eastern slopes of the range steep-
going to be a day or two behind the er but more sparsely wooded because
other divisions in moving up to the of the reduced amount of rainfall.
Moselle. The division’s sector along Here, after defending the broader
the river was about eight miles wide, mountain forests on the west side of
and the first important objective was the Vosges, the Germans could be ex-
Epinal. After seizing Epinal and cross- pected to put up a final resistance
ing the Moselle, the 45th was to con- along the great eastern passes that
tinue northeast to secure Ramber- led to the plains below.
villers and Baccarat. The road network through the
High Vosges was barely adequate for
The High Vosges military operations. Most roads ran
along stream valleys dominated by
The High Vosges mountain chain is sharply rising, usually forested, high
about seventy miles long, north to ground. The roads traversing the
south, and some thirty to forty miles High Vosges from east to west even-
wide. After crossing the Moselle, tually left the stream valleys to cross
Truscott’s two northern attacking di- over high, easily defensible mountain
VI CORPS A T THE MOSELLE 241

MAP 14
passes. The few railroad lines gener- ed escarpment overlooking the Alsa-
ally ran north to south and were used tian plains to the east, would provide
by the Germans to strengthen their the Germans with every possible de-
interior lines of communication. fensive advantage. The weather, too,
Everywhere in the High Vosges the would help the Germans. The Allied
rough terrain, first gradually rising forces expected heavy rains to begin
and then falling away to a deteriorat- throughout the mountains during late
242 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

September-and in September 1944 Epinal (Map 15). The leading units


the rains began earlier than usual. encountered only scattered resistance
Rain and fog would reduce visibility from outposts of the 716th Division,
at ground level, while fog, rain, and LXIV Corps. 2
thick overcasts would drastically cur- During the following day, 21 Sep-
tail Allied air support. Throughout tember, the 157th and 180th Infantry
the coming winter, as Truscott and regiments deployed north of the
many other VI Corps soldiers well 179th, and all three began probing
knew from their experiences in Italy, for intact bridges, fords, or at least
the weather would grow steadily crossing sites where assault boats
worse as rain gave way to snow. In could be employed or treadway
summary, the terrain of the High bridges installed. The 157th and
Vosges Mountains, the expected 180th Infantry, both closing in on
weather conditions, the locations and Epinal, encountered the stiffest resist-
routes of the main roads, and the ance. North of Epinal–the 157th’s
broad front assigned to the VI Corps sector-the Moselle was generally
would make it difficult to concentrate fordable for infantry, but the German
American offensive strength for a de- defenders had positioned roadblocks
cisive breakthrough; and the defend- on the approaches to the river, de-
ing Germans would find it fairly easy stroyed most of the bridges over the
to block the limited number of ave- Moselle, and covered likely crossing
nues through the Vosges. However, if sites with artillery and mortar fire
the Moselle could be crossed and the from the opposite bank. At Epinal,
Vosges attacked before the Germans the 180th regiment’s specific objec-
had the opportunity to solidify their tive, the river, was unfordable and,
defenses, and before the weather eighty feet wide, flowed swiftly north-
became significantly worse, the pros- ward between twenty-foot-high banks.
pects of reaching the Rhine at an South of Epinal the unit found only
early date would be greatly enhanced. marginal fording and small boat
crossing sites, and the Germans had
The 45th Division at Epinal blown up the main highway bridge at
Archettes, on the regiment’s right.
On the morning of 20 September, Unable to find suitable crossing
when the VI Corps’ attack began, the and slowed by German roadblocks,
45th Division was still in the process mines, and artillery, the 157th Infan-
of moving north and had no troops in try began extending northward to
position to strike for the Moselle. But Chatel, where the Third Army’s XV
throughout the day the 117th Cavalry Corps already had a forty-ton bridge
Squadron, roaming up and down
roads west of Epinal, secured assem- 2 German information in this chapter derives from
bly ground for regiments of the arriv- Mosenthal, “German Operations in Southern
ing division, and during the late after- France: The Establishment of a Continuous Defen-
noon the 179th Infantry began sive Front by Army Group G, 15 Sep-1 Oct 44,” pp.
16–50, CMH MS R–68; Cole, The Lorraine Campaign,
moving into high ground west of the pp. 205–08, 233-35; VI Corps and 36th Div G–2
Moselle three to four miles south of Per Rpts, 19–30 Sep 44.
244 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

in place. General Eagles, the 45th Di- ments, and booby-trapped buildings.
vision commander, recommended German rifle and machine-gun fire
sending the 157th regiment over the covered many of the obstacles, while
Chatel bridge to descend on the German artillery, armor, and rocket
Epinal area from the north, while the batteries east of the river harassed the
180th Infantry continued its frontal attackers. Late on 22 September the
assault from the west. Truscott quick- Germans began withdrawing their
ly made the necessary arrangements troops to the east bank of the Mo-
with the XV Corps headquarters, and, selle, vacating the western section of
beginning about 2 100 on the 2 1st, Epinal; but with small arms and
the bulk of the 157th began crossing mortar fire they repulsed several at-
at Chatel, with one infantry battalion tempts by the 180th Infantry to cross
wading across the Moselle near Igney, the river before dark. By nightfall the
several miles south, on the 22d. Most regiment had reached the Moselle
of the regiment then assembled near only at Epinal’s northern outskirts.
Vaxoncourt, about eight miles north During the morning of 23 Septem-
of Epinal, and began to advance ber the 180th mopped up most of the
south. section of Epinal west of the Moselle,
Facing the 157th south and south- but could not prevent the Germans
east of Vaxoncourt was the Bois de la from blowing up the last intact bridge
Foresterie, four square miles of forest within the small city. In the afternoon
heavily defended by German infantry, the 2d Battalion, 180th Infantry,
supported by artillery, mortars, and crossed on the north and, after bat-
machine guns emplaced along the tling various LXVI Corps elements,
slopes to the east. On 22 and 23 Sep- drove laboriously up rising ground
tember the 157th Infantry struggled north and northeast of the city. On
south through the woods, while stav- the southern edge of Epinal, German
ing off German counterattacks against artillery and tank fire twice repulsed
the bridgehead. General Eagles had crossing attempts by the 3d Battalion.
expected the 157th to make much Finally, behind heavy supporting fires
faster progress, thereby easing the and the cover of darkness, the battal-
180th Infantry’s frontal assault. In- ion successfully crossed the river that
stead, at dark on the 23d, the 180th evening.
was still having trouble at Epinal, and So far, the motley collection of
the 157th had not yet fought its way forces under LXVI Corps had managed
south out of the Third Army’s sector. to stall both the 157th and 180th
The two-day effort had cost the 157th regiments, but on 24 September
Infantry 10 men killed and 103 German resistance in front of the
wounded. 45th Division’s center and left began
The 180th Infantry had spent 21 to collapse. The 157th cleared the
and 22 September inching its way Bois de la Foresterie, made some
toward the Moselle in the area west progress against the high ground to
and southwest of Epinal, encounter- the east, and pushed troops south to
ing an intricate series of roadblocks, within four miles of Epinal. The
minefields, barbed-wire entangle- 180th Infantry, after repulsing an
VI CORPS A T THE MOSELLE 245

early morning German counterattack, From Archettes, the 179th pushed


finally secured Epinal during the day northeast into the Vosges toward
and probably could have driven well Grandvillers and by dark on the 25th
beyond the city, but delayed further was roughly parallel to its sister regi-
advances pending the completion of a ments to the north. Casualties during
forty-ton Bailey bridge over the Mo- 20–25 September for the 179th num-
selle. Engineers finished the bridge bered approximately 15 men killed,
about 1600 on the 24th, and supplies 40 wounded, and 10 missing.
and vehicles started to roll through
Epinal almost immediately. The 36th Division in the Center
On the 25th, the 157th and 180th
Infantry regiments advanced six miles On the morning of 20 September
northeast of Epinal into the Vosges, the 3d Battalion, 142d Infantry, start-
opposed mainly by German artillery ed toward the river at Remiremont, a
and assault gun fire. By dusk the mile east of its forward position, while
German defenders were thus in full the rest of the regiment moved
retreat all along the 45th Division’s toward the same objective from the
front. But the division’s main prize southwest. As the 142d moved out,
was Epinal itself, a key rail and high- the 141st passed northward through
way center that gave the Seventh its rear, covering the flank of the
Army and VI Corps an excellent 142d and striking for the town of
supply base from which to support Eloyes, on the Moselle River about
future drives into the High Vosges. six miles north of Remiremont. Dahl-
The capture of the city, which Army quist kept his best unit, the 143d In-
Group G and Nineteenth Army consid- fantry, in reserve to exploit any cross-
ered a most important defensive bas- ing sites secured by the two attacking
tion, had cost the 180th Infantry 55 regiments.
men wounded and 30 missing, while Almost immediately the leading
the 157th Infantry, technically in a 36th Division units heading for both
supporting role, had lost 15 men Eloyes and Remiremont met unex-
killed, 170 wounded, and 30 missing pectedly heavy opposition from 189th
during the attack. Division forces, causing Dahlquist to
To the south, the 179th Infantry, adjust the division’s plan of attack.
after several false starts, managed to Initially, he ordered his northern ele-
shuttle its troops across the Moselle ment, the 141st, to send its two unen-
in rubber assault boats during the gaged battalions across the Moselle
night of 21–22 September, and se- between Eloyes and Remiremont,
cured an unopposed bridgehead just with one battalion then attacking
below Archettes, six miles south of north and the other south in order to
Epinal. On the following day the loosen up the German defenses in
179th took Archettes and, only lightly both areas. If suitable crossing sites
harassed by German mortar and small could be secured, he could follow
arms fire, secured the town until the with the 143d; if not, the 143d would
engineers had thrown a forty-ton have to be used to reinforce one of
Bailey bridge over the river by 1330. the main efforts frontally.
246 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

Thus alerted, the 141st began the battalion commander, Maj. Kermit
scouting for likely crossing sites in its R. Hanson. Hanson had led the first
sector-which extended about six two platoons across the river and
miles southeast along the Moselle then had been ambushed by a compa-
from Archettes–and during the after- ny-sized German force that had with-
noon found an excellent ford at Noir held their fire until the crossing
Gueux, a tiny hamlet-cum-church on began. The battalion lost 8 men
the far (east) bank about three miles killed, including Hanson, 7 wounded,
north of Remiremont. On the west and about 20 believed to have been
bank opposite Noir Gueux a narrow captured. Dahlquist, who remained
neck of woods extended to the river, determined to force a crossing and
affording the only covered approach convinced that the German defenses
to the water in the 141st Infantry’s were extremely spotty, reorganized
sector. As the site appeared unde- the battalion and finally pushed it
fended, Dahlquist decided to send the across the river at the original site; he
141st Infantry’s 1st and 3d Battalions then followed it with his entire re-
across at Noir Gueux that night, with serve, the 143d regiment, on the
the two battalions separating thereaf- afternoon of the 21st.
ter, one striking for the rear of the As the 143d moved across, Dahl-
German lines at Eloyes, and the other quist learned that his other two regi-
for Remiremont. ments were still stalled, the 141st
The units started out from their as- around Eloyes (with one battalion still
sembly areas at Raon-aux-Bois about west of the river and one battalion
0100 on 21 September, marching off east) and the 142d outside of Remire-
into a pitch-black night punctuated by mont (with one battalion of the 141st
cold, intermittent rain. As dawn ap- west of the river and the entire 142d
proached, fog blanketed the Moselle regiment still on the east bank).
valley near Noir Gueux, which helped Quickly he ordered the entire 143d
the 141st Infantry’s leading troops regiment north to Eloyes where it
achieve secrecy and surprise. The blocked the exits to the town on the
men of the 1st Battalion waded east, and on the 22d it proceeded to
through the Moselle’s cold waters, clear the town house by house. Be-
meeting no opposition; but shortly tween 23 and 25.September the 143d
after 0700, as the fog began to lift, consolidated the rest of the Moselle
small arms fire started to harass the area in the 36th Division’s northern
attackers. Nevertheless, the leading sector and began pushing into the
unit completed its crossing and Vosges foothills.
headed north for Eloyes. Meanwhile, While the 143d worked over
General Dahlquist himself had arrived Eloyes, Dahlquist regrouped the
at the Noir Gueux crossing site about somewhat lackluster 141st and sent
0945, and found that the 3d Battalion the regiment south to Remiremont.
had been unable to follow the 1st be- There the 142d had started its attack
cause of increased German fire. Sub- on 20 September from a point barely
sequently an attempt to cross about a two miles from the town, but after
mile south resulted in the death of two days of fighting the regiment had
VI CORPS A T THE MOSELLE 247

OF 36TH INFANTRY
TROOPS DIVISIONCROSSTHE MOSELLE,near Lonpuet, September 1944.

no more than a foothold in the west- 143d and the 141st. The 141st Infan-
ern section of Remiremont. However, try, which had started out as the 36th
on the 22d, as the arriving 141st Division’s northernmost element and
threatened the German rear, resist- was now on the division’s right, ad-
ance began to fall apart and the 142d vanced to St. Ame; the 142d ap-
was finally able to secure the town the proached Tendon, and the 143d
following morning. The four-day neared Docelles. Behind them corps
battle for Remiremont had cost the engineers quickly erected a Bailey
142d Infantry 42 men killed, 111 bridge at Remiremont and a heavy
wounded, and 40 missing.3 platoon bridge at Jarmenil. So far, the
On 24 and 25 September, the 141st VI Corps had crossed the Moselle
and 142d regiments realigned them- with relatively few casualties and was
selves and began advancing into the now ready to move into the moun-
Vosges, with the 142d shifting north- tains.
ward into a new sector between the
The German Reaction
3Later it was learned that the Germans had cap-
tured about 35 of the troops classified as missing. Until 25 September the Nineteenth
Most were taken prisoner on 21 September when
Company E, attempting to infiltrate through thick Army ’s LXVI and LXIV Corps had tried
woods to outflank a roadblock, ran into an ambush. to contain the 36th and 45th Divi-
248 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

sions’ penetrations across the Moselle semble near Le Tholy, strike west and
by means of static defenses and local, northwest toward Tendon and Eloyes,
small-scale counterattacks. These ef- and drive the 36th Division back
forts had proved futile, and by dark across the Moselle. In addition, a
on 23 September General Wiese of small armored group of the 11th
Nineteenth Army had decided that such Panzer Division, left behind when the
tactics would continue to be inef- rest of the division moved to the Fifth
fective unless strong armor and infan- Panzer Army’s area, was to make a
try reinforcements could quickly be number of feints to occupy other
brought to bear. His main concern American units in the area. The time
was an Allied drive directly east from when American commanders were af-
the Remiremont-Eloyes area along fected by such obvious chicanery,
Route N–4 17 through Gerardmer and however, was long over.
the Schlucht Pass to Colmar. A possi- The attack began shortly after 1200
ble American drive northeast to St. on 25 September in the hills south-
Die was a secondary concern since it west of Le Tholy and consisted of two
would have to pass through some of understrength grenadier regiments of
the worst and most easily defensible the 198th Division with artillery sup-
Vosges terrain. Wiese also reckoned port. Misty rain and intermittent fog
that he had sufficient strength in the allowed the Germans to move
Epinal area to contain the 45th’s through the mountains unobserved,
bridgehead at least temporarily. Nor and they were able to infiltrate be-
was he greatly worried about the area tween the 142d and 141st regiments.
south of Remiremont, where, on the The first German strikes hit the right
evening of the 23d, elements of the rear of the 142d Infantry, overrun-
LXIV Corps and the IV Luftwaffe Field ning roadblocks along the regiment’s
Corps were still holding O’Daniel’s 3d tenuous, cart-path lines of communi-
Division units west of the Moselle. cation, while farther south the
Furthermore, Wiese knew that French German attack threatened the rear of
forces had taken over the entire the 141st Infantry around St. Ame.
region south of the VI Corps, and he Confused fighting continued until
correctly estimated that it would take dusk, forcing the leading units of the
the First French Army many days, if two American regiments to pull back,
not weeks, to gather enough strength but blunting any serious German ad-
to launch a concerted offensive vance toward the Moselle. As both
toward Belfort. sides regrouped during the early
Seeking reinforcements for the Re- hours of the 26th, Army Group G di-
miremont-Gerardmer area, Wiese de- rected the Nineteenth Army to call off
cided to throw in the 198th Division, the attack. During the previous day,
which Army Group G had already di- 25 September, contrary to Wiese’s es-
rected him to ship north to the Fifth timates, the 45th Division had begun
Panzer Army. Wiese prevailed upon to break out of its Epinal bridgehead,
Army Group G to allow him to employ advancing toward Rambervillers and
the 198th for a counterattack in LXIV threatening to drive a wedge between
Corps’ sector. The division was to as- the LXVI and LXIV Corps. Moreover,
VI CORPS A T THE MOSELLE 249

on the 25th the 3d Division had final- facing even more difficult terrain.
ly established a bridgehead over the Starting out from positions near
Moselle south of Remiremont. It had Faucogney on 20 September, with its
thus become obvious that even a suc- main effort north of Route D–6, the
cessful attempt by the 198th to reach 7th Infantry encountered resistance of
the river would leave both of its varying intensity and took three days
flanks vulnerable to American coun- to move within half a mile of Rupt.
terattacks. However, during the night of 23–24
September some of its troops sur-
The 3d Division on the Moselle prised a German garrison guarding a
bridge over the Moselle at Rupt and
With the 3d Division eight to ten managed to capture the span before
miles short of the Moselle on the the Germans could destroy it.
morning of 20 September, General Throughout the rest of the night the
O’Daniel, the division commander, American infantry staved off several
planned to advance toward the river German efforts to retake or destroy
with two regiments abreast–the 7th the bridge and, with reinforcements,
Infantry on the left and the 30th on secured the area at daybreak.
the right–and the 15th Infantry in During the 24th and 25th the 7th
reserve. The 7th Infantry was to cross regiment, reinforced by a battalion of
at Rupt-sur-Moselle, seven miles the 15th Infantry, pushed its left flank
south of Remiremont, and the 30th north toward Remiremont and in the
Infantry at Ferdrupt, three miles process seized another Moselle bridge
south of Rupt. The boundary be- at Maxonchamp, two miles northwest
tween the two attacking regiments of Rupt. By dark on the 25th, there-
was Route D–6, a mountain road that fore, the 7th Infantry had established
also marked the boundary between two bridgeheads over the Moselle, ex-
the defending LXIV and IV Luftwaffe panded them east of the river, and
Field Corps. come more or less abreast of the 36th
In the 3d Division’s zone of attack, Division units at Remiremont in the
the Moselle was extremely narrow face of only sporadic opposition by
and did not constitute much of a bar- 338th Division elements.
rier, but the terrain along the ap- T o the south, the 30th Infantry had
proaches to the river was much more begun its attack on 20 September, ad-
rugged than in the north. West of the vancing south and southeast of Fau-
Moselle, the German defenses were cogney toward Melay and several
concentrated in sharply rising ground other towns on the left flank of the
that was densely forested on the division’s axis of advance. Initially it
higher slopes and overgrown with hoped to outflank German positions
thick underbrush on other slopes along the easily defensible Route N-
where available maps indicated open 486, the Lure-Le Thillot highway.
ground. The division’s advance would But Route N-486, marking the
also have to be keyed somewhat to boundary between the VI and the
the progress of the French II Corps French II Corps, was in the French
on its southern flank, which was zone of responsibility, and the 30th
250 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE
Infantry was forced to traverse thickly tack against the 36th Division, the
forested ground dotted with numer- 30th could make no progress in its
ous small lakes, but few good roads. new avenue of advance. Rain, fog,
The 198th Division, which employed miserable roads and trails, minefields,
N-486 as a main supply route, readily defended roadblocks, mortar and ar-
recognized the threat of the 30th In- tillery fire, and determined German
fantry’s advance, and defended the infantry resistance combined to slow
area stubbornly. progress. By dusk on the 25th, the
The American regiment, in three 30th Infantry was still short of the
separate columns, spent 20–21 Sep- Moselle and halted, pending relief by
tember pushing south and east, but French forces.
without much success. By the evening
of the 21st, the inability of the French
II Corps to deploy any significant Results
strength northward along N-486, to-
gether with the 30th Infantry’s failure The Americans’ progress in enlarg-
to secure the division’s southern ing their bridgeheads and pushing
flank, began to worry O’Daniel. The east of the Moselle had convinced
3d Division commander, fearing that Wiese by 25 September that another
the Germans would soon exploit the withdrawal was necessary. According-
growing gap between his forces and ly, he proposed to Army Croup C that
those of de Monsabert, urged Trus- he pull the LXVI and LXIV Corps back
cott to persuade the French to take about ten miles to positions between
over the area so that he could con- Rambervillers and Le Tholy. General
centrate his entire division across the Balck, commanding Army Croup C,
Moselle and toward Le Tholy and agreed with Wiese’s proposals, but
Gerardmer. But for the moment von Rundstedt at OB West felt that the
Truscott demurred, and instead di- recommended withdrawal would take
rected the 117th Cavalry Squadron- the Nineteenth Army’s right and center
which the 45th Division had relieved back too close to the southern, for-
on VI Corps’ northern flank-to ward section of the Weststellung, a sec-
move to the 30th Infantry’s right in tion that had come to bear the desig-
order to help protect the exposed nation Vosges Foothill Position. Hitler
southern flank. had already personally directed Army
On the morning of 22 September, Group G to hold the Allied forces west
as the American cavalry unit took of the Vosges Foothill Position in order
over the Melay area aided by the 3d to gain time to improve its main de-
African Chasseurs (the reconnaissance fenses, and von Rundstedt was reluc-
squadron of the French 1st Armored tant to challenge the directive without
Division), the 30th Infantry reassem- due cause. However, continued pres-
bled near Faucogney to strike north- sure from Patton’s Third Army
east across rugged hill country toward against the Fifth Panzer Army north of
Le Chene and the Moselle. But de- the Nineteenth Army ’s LXVI Corps had
spite redeployment of the bulk of the already forced the embattled XLVII
198th Division north for its counterat- Panzer Corps back to Rambervillers,
VI CORPS A T T H E MOSELLE 251

and OB West doubted that its with- defensive terrain almost without a
drawal would stop there. Considering fight. What might have been a major
the situation at Rambervillers, von combat operation for the VI Corps
Rundstedt agreed only to authorize a turned out to be an almost routine
limited withdrawal in the Vosges, al- affair for Truscott’s forces. The speed
lowing the LXVI Corps and the north- of the attack had caught most of the
ern wing of the LXIV Corps to pull German defenders still west of the
back formally to the Rambervillers- river in scattered, hastily prepared
Grandvillers–St. Ame area, but insist- positions, while the more easily de-
ing that Wiese hold on to the more fensible Moselle River was left com-
easily defensible Vosges terrain far- pletely unguarded in many places; VI
ther south. Corps engineers had easily erected
On 26 September Wiese according- bridges over the river in a matter of
ly ordered the withdrawal of both the hours with little interference from
LXVI Corps and the LXIV Corps’ right German artillery fire. Given time, per-
flank element, the 7 16th Division. The haps as little as a few days, the de-
two understrength regiments of the fending German corps might have
198th Division, already operating easily improved their defensive
under LXIV Corps control, were to screens west of the river, covered the
remain and back up the 716th and river line itself with more mobile pa-
189th Divisions. The rest of the 198th trols, reserves, and artillery fire, and
Division was to hold the right flank of turned the river towns into strong-
the IV Luftwaffe Corps south of Rupt. points with stronger reserve forces in
There the IV Luftwaffe was to continue the hills to the east able to counterat-
its successful efforts to jam up the tack any VI Corps bridgeheads. But
American and French attackers in the only in the far south was the Ameri-
hills southeast of Le Thillot. On his can advance significantly retarded-as
northern flank, Wiese hoped that the much by the terrain and French inac-
more difficult terrain that the LXVI tivity as by German defensive
Corps was backing into between Bac- strength. Yet the Americans had only
carat and Bruyeres would ease its de- begun to approach the formidable
fensive tasks. The American offensive Vosges Mountains, and the northern
could not continue indefinitely, and redeployment of Truscott’s energetic
when it did stop, the Germans could VI Corps had been duly noted by the
sink into their Vosges strongholds German high command. Once it en-
and perhaps survive the coming tered the mountains, Wiese had good
winter intact. reason to believe that he could begin
Wiese’s hopes could not disguise to channel the forward progress of his
the fact that the Germans had already relentless pursuer and finally slow
been summarily ejected from good down the tempo of its advance.
CHAPTER XIV

Approaching the Gaps: Saverne


Despite Truscott’s success in forc- angled off to the east into Germany,
ing the Moselle, the natural and man- where it became known as the Hardt
made obstacles between the 6th Army Mountains. The much wider Belfort
Group and the German border were Gap separated the High Vosges from
formidable. For this reason Devers the Jura Mountains and the Swiss Alps.
was not nearly as confident as Trus- But Truscott’s initial drive for the Bel-
cott that the Vosges could be easily fort Gap had fallen short in early Sep-
forced. Facing the German Nineteenth tember, and Patton’s Third Army had
Army in mid-September, the 6th Army been stopped at Metz many miles west
Group had only six divisions on of Saverne and the Sarre River valley to
line-Truscott’s three American in- the north. Since then the German de-
fantry divisions and the equivalent of fenses in both areas had grown strong-
three French divisions under de er, as de Lattre’s French and Patton’s
Lattre’s control, all that he had been American units soon discovered. Until
able to bring up from the south so the First French Army could put most
far. Like the divisions in the two of its seven divisions on line, the Bel-
northern Allied army groups, these fort Gap would be difficult to force,
forces were overextended logistically, and the more narrow Saverne Gap lay
while the real battle for Germany had in the zone of the Third Army’s XV
just begun. Without substantial rein- Corps above Rambervillers and Bac-
forcements, it was doubtful that the carat. Devers thus had no choice but to
6th Army Group could play a major send Truscott’s weary forces into the
role in this struggle. mountains. At the very least the effort
Regarding a sustained offensive over might weaken the German defenses in
the Vosges with serious misgivings, the gap areas, and, if employed careful-
both Devers and Patch considered al- ly, the better-equipped and better-sup-
ternate routes to the German border. ported American infantry might wear
The Vosges barrier could be bypassed the hastily assembled German “grena-
in the north through Saverne or in the diers,’ thin. Nevertheless, a battle of at-
south at Belfort. The Saverne Gap was trition in the mountains was not a mis-
a generally narrow defile that separat- sion that the American commanders or
ed the High Vosges from the Low their troops relished, and Devers and
Vosges, a somewhat lesser range that Patch continued to study the possibility
APPROACHING THE GAPS: SAVERNE 253

of bypassing the Vosges Mountains to Patch, to consider new plans. For the
the north through the Saverne Gap. immediate future, Eisenhower told his
subordinates, the logistical situation
Allied Planning as well as tactical considerations
would continue to make it impossible
By late September, Allied offensive to implement a broad front strategy.
activities throughout the northern Eu- Instead, the main Allied effort would
ropean theater had ground to a halt. have to remain in the north, in the
Montgomery’s drive against the Ruhr sector of Montgomery’s 21st Army
had been stopped at Arnhem, and Group. There, he pointed out, the
Patton’s drive on the Saar had been principal Allied objective was clearing
halted in Lorraine. Both northern the seaward approaches to Antwerp.
Allied army groups had outrun their But Eisenhower also agreed to allow
supply lines, and the 6th Army Group the 21st Army Group’s offensive to
was not in much better shape. 1 Other continue against the Ruhr. The Ruhr
factors contributing to the general effort, in turn, would still require the
slowdown were poor weather, which direct support of a companion offen-
complicated both tactical and logisti- sive by the U.S. First Army, on the
cal problems, and increasingly deter- 12th Army Group’s left, or northern,
mined German resistance. In Eisen- wing; and the logistical support
hower’s mind the only real solution to needed for the entire offensive meant
the logistical problem was an early that the rest of Bradley’s forces,
opening of the port of Antwerp in mainly Patton’s Third Army, would
Belgium. Yet he had postponed con- have to remain in place. The same re-
certed action to open Antwerp in strictions would apply as well to the
favor of MARKET-GARDEN, the 17–24 U.S. Ninth Army, which on 29 Sep-
September attempt to envelop the tember began moving eastward from
Ruhr industrial area from the north. Brittany to take over a sector between
But the support demands of the oper- the First and Third Armies in the
ation only made the already serious middle of the 12th Army Group.
logistical situation of the two north- As for the 6th Army Group, the 22
ern Allied army groups worse. September conference specified that
On the afternoon of 22 September, Devers, with his separate line of com-
with the sss of MARKET-GARDEN munications north from the Mediterra-
already in doubt, Eisenhower met nean, could continue his offensive
with his major subordinate command- toward Strasbourg as well as his efforts
ers, including Generals Devers and to push through the Belfort Gap. Al-
though Eisenhower still considered
that the 6th Army Group’s primary
1 Planning material in this section derives largely mission was to protect the 12th Army
from Pogue, The Supreme Command, ch. 16; Cole, The
Lorraine Campaign, pp. 257-59; MacDonald, The Sieg- Group’s southern flank, the conferees
f i e d Line Campaign, chs. 6 , 8-9; Devers Diary, 21–22 recognized that a rapid Seventh Army
Sep 44; Seventh Army Diary, 21–23 Sep 44; 12th drive to Strasbourg on the Rhine
Army Gp LI 9, 25 Sep 44; Martin Blumenson, ed.,
The Patton Papers, 1940–1945 (Boston: Houghton
would best satisfy that requirement.
Mifflin, 1974), pp. 552–57. During the conference Devers reit-
254 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

erated his request for another U.S. Although General Bradley could
corps for the Seventh Army and spe- hardly view the loss of six divisions to
cifically asked for the Third Army’s the 6th Army Group with pleasure, he
two-division XV Corps, which was op- saw the logistical advantages involved
erating just north of the 6th Army in the immediate transfer of the XV
Group and opposite the Saverne Gap. Corps to Devers’ command. Patton,
Noting that his army group could however, was less complacent and,
easily support both the XV Corps and upon learning of the negotiations re-
at least one more division for that garding his corps, told Bradley that
corps, over its existing line of com- “if Jake Devers gets the XV Corps, I
munications from the south, he point- hope his plan goes sour.” 3 When the
ed out that such a transfer of logisti- transfer was formally announced,
cal responsibility would considerably Patton wrote “May God rot his guts”
ease the burden on Eisenhower’s in his diary. But the armored com-
northern supply system and would mander’s colorful remarks often ob-
also allow Bradley to narrow the 12th scured his more serious side. Patton
Army Group’s wide front. was obviously content to let the 6th
At the time, Devers’ proposals were Army Group’s infantry handle the
especially appealing to the harried fighting in the Vosges and was more
SHAEF tactical and logistical planners. concerned over the decision to halt
Thus, after some consideration of al- the forward motion of his own army
ternatives, Eisenhower, on 26 Septem- in favor of continuing Montgomery’s
ber, decided to transfer the XV Corps offensive in the north.
to the 6th Army Group on the 29th and
to add a third division to the corps A Change in Command
sometime in October. He also decided
that three more American divisions, On 29 September 1944, control of
which had been scheduled to join the the XV Corps officially passed to the
12th Army Group after landing in 6th Army Group and the Seventh
northern France, were to be diverted to Army. Patch thus gained a second
Marseille for the 6th Army Group. All corps with a total effective strength of
told, six divisions either in or sched- approximately 50,500 troops. The
uled to join Bradley’s 12th Army main maneuver elements were the 79th
Group would be transferred to the 6th Infantry Division, with about 17,390
Army Group during September and troops including attachments; the
October. However, Eisenhower in- French 2d Armored Division, with
formed Devers that these would be the roughly 15,435 troops including at-
last transfers of this nature, and he ap- tachments; and the 106th Cavalry
parently did not expect them to change
the role of the 6th Army Group in Group” (ca. June 1945), pp. 14–16 (hereafter cited
future Allied operations.2 as “Hist, 6th Army Gp”); Rad, B-16654, 6th Army
Gp to SHAEF, 25 Sep 44; Rad, SHAEF Fwd-15934,
SHAEF to 6th Army Gp et al., 26 Sep 44; 12th
2Additional details concerning the results of the Army Gp LI 9 ,2 5 Sep 44.
22 September conference come from the following: 3 Blumenson, The Patton Papers, II, 1940–1 945, p.
HQ, 6th Army Group, “A History of the Sixth Army 553.
APPROACHING THE GAPS: SAVERNE 255

Group, consisting of the 106th and


121st Cavalry Squadrons and the 813th
Tank Destroyer Battalion. Corps
troops, exclusive of the two divisions
and their attachments, numbered
around 17,680. More important, the
principal commanders in the XV Corps
had earned excellent reputations in the
fighting from Normandy to the Mo-
selle. The XV Corps commander, Gen-
eral Haislip, and the commander of the
79th Division, Maj. Gen. Ira T. Wyche,
had both done well under Patton’s de-
manding eyes; and the head of the
French 2d Armored Division, Maj.
Gen. Jacques Leclerc, 4 was considered
by most American leaders to be one of
the finest Lank commanders in the
Allied army. Haislip, a West Point con-
temporary of both Patton and Patch,
had commanded the XV Corps since
February 1943, bringing it through the
Desert Training Center in the south-
western United States and then, via MAJ. GEN.WADEH. HAISLIP
Northern Ireland and England, to Nor-
mandy and through northern France.
In the process he had put together a Corps, the XV Corps was exhausted,
corps staff and supporting organiza- and its logistical situation was even
tion that would rival Truscott’s VI worse than that of de Lattre’s French
Corps in excellence. Another plus was units in the south. After over one hun-
Haislip’s close relationship with the dred days of combat and pursuit, the
sometimes difficult Leclerc, who was a infantry units of the 79th Division were
close associate of de Gaulle and a long- tired, and the division was short many
time veteran of the Free French mili- items of supply and equipment. All
tary forces. Although the French ar- three infantry regiments were well
mored division commander’s temper below their authorized strength of
rivaled that of de Lattre, his experience 3,348: the 313th by about 575 troops,
and expertise would prove invaluable the 314th by 360, and 315th by 600.
in the coming battles. The division’s artillery battalions were
The acquisition, despite General short of well-trained personnel and
Devers’ enthusiasm and optimism, was ammunition as well. After visiting the
not without its problems. Like the VI 79th, General Devers estimated that
Wyche’s command needed at least two
4Nom de guerre of the Vicomte Philippe Francois weeks out of the line for rest and re-
Marie de Hauteclocque. plenishment of both personnel and
256 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

supplies.5 For the moment, however, in the Vosges. He could only hope
the unit could not be withdrawn from that German inactivity would allow
its current operation. Leclerc to pull his units out of the
The 2d French Armored Division line, one by one, for rest and mainte-
was hardly in better shape. Reviewing nance.
the division’s status on 28 September, Meanwhile, Haislip struggled to
General Leclerc pointed out that the remedy his own logistical problems.
division was operating largely with Beginning on 29 September, the Sev-
equipment issued in North Africa over enth Army started to provide the XV
a year ago.6 The division’s 4,000-odd Corps with some supplies, notably
vehicles were in need of thorough gasoline and ammunition, which alle-
overhaul, without which maintenance viated the corps’ most urgent require-
problems would soon become unman- ments. Despite Devers’ promises,
ageable. Moreover, much of the nearly however, it was not until the third
twenty-mile front that the division was week of October that rail deliveries at
currently holding north of Ramber- the Seventh Army’s main supply cen-
villers was rough, wooded, and ill- ters, established in and around
suited to armored operations, especial- Epinal, were able to meet all the
ly in wet weather. Such terrain, Leclerc army’s needs, including those of the
pointed out, required strong infantry XV Corps.
forces; his unit, organized along the With the transfer, the 6th Army
standard lines of a U.S. armored divi- Group also became responsible for
sion, had only the three armored infan- carrying out tactical missions already
try battalions and could not be expect- assigned to Haislip’s corps. Devers
ed to hold the same frontage that an and Patch clearly understood that
infantry division with nine infantry bat- these missions included securing the
talions could. In addition, the divi- Luneville area and continuing to pro-
sion’s armored infantry companies tect the right, or southern, flank of
were down to about eighty effectives, the Third Army-both of which re-
approximately one-third of their au- quired the XV Corps’ 79th Division to
thorized strength. Leclerc therefore re- continue clearing the area east of
quested that his defensive sector be re- Luneville. Furthermore, supplementa-
duced as soon as possible. ry Seventh Army orders specified that
Although Haislip accepted Leclerc’s Haislip’s corps was ultimately to seize
evaluation, neither he nor Patch had Sarrebourg, about twenty-seven miles
any infantry to spare. The 79th Infan- beyond Luneville and some ten miles
try was fully occupied in the northern short of the Saverne Gap, and in its
sector of the XV Corps’ front, and all southern sector, to assist VI Corps
of Truscott’s infantry was committed units in capturing and securing Ram-
bervillers. For these operations the
5Devers Diary, 1 Oct 44. boundaries of the XV Corps were vir-
6General Leclerc’s views derive from a document tually unchanged. In the north, its
entitled “General Leclerc’s Opinion on the Possibili- border with the Third Army’s XII
ties Offered to the 2d French Armored Division in a
Defensive Situation and in the Present Zone of Op- Corps followed the southern bank of
erations,’’ in XV Corps G–3 Jnl File, 28 Sep 44. the Rhine-Marne Canal to Heming,
APPROACHING THE GAPS: SAVERNE 257

LECLERC(in jeep)
GENERAL AND STAFFAT RAMBOUILLET

and from there continued northeast LXVI Corps, and, in fact, the effective
along Route N-4 to Sarrebourg; in combat strength of the defending
the south its boundary with Truscott’s corps was about the same as the at-
VI Corps followed a line between tacking American division. But with
Rambervillers and Baccarat. Within the German defenders pulling back
these confines Haislip would fight his on Wiese’s orders and with the ter-
most notable battles during the rain being generally open and rolling
coming months.’ farmland, the 45th had little trouble
advancing. The 157th regiment, with
VI Corps Attacks (26-30 September) elements of the XV Corps’ French 2d
Armored Division on its left, covered
On 26 September Truscott re- the fifteen miles to Rambervillers by
sumed the VI Corps’ drive to the the 29th against scattered resistance
northeast, with the 45th Division on and found that the Germans were be-
the left pushing out of its bridgehead ginning to pull back even farther east
at Epinal (Map 16). At the time, the toward Baccarat. South of the 157th,
division’s sector closely corresponded the 45th Division’s 180th and 179th
to the area defended by the German Infantry had a tougher time, especial-
ly in the slopes and woods west of
7Seventh Army FO 6 , 29 Sep 44. Bruyeres, but managed to reach the
APPROACHING THE GAPS: SAVERNE 259

Ste. Helene-Vimenil area by the 29th German defenses on the roads to Ger-
abreast of one another. The month ardmer by side-stepping behind the
thus ended with all three of the 45th 141st regiment in the St. Ame region
Division’s regiments on a north-south and striking northeast toward Le
line below Rambervillers facing the Tholy, the results were the same. Thus
Vosges Mountains. by the end of September Truscott’s
In the middle and southern sectors forces in the north had easily reached
of the VI Corps’ offensive, the progress Phase Line IV, but those in the center
of the 36th and 3d Divisions through and south, the units that had actually
the Vosges foothills was much slower. begun moving into the mountains,
Aiming directly for Bruyeres, the 36th were hardly beyond Phase Line II. Ob-
Division’s 143d Infantry took two days viously a quick thrust over the Vosges
to break through units of the 716th Di- was unlikely, and Devers and Patch
vision defending the area west of became even more convinced that their
Tendon, while the 142d, with the 141st strength might be better used reducing
securing its right flank, did little better the German defenses in the Saverne
against elements of the 198th Division Gap area north of the High Vosges.
to the south. On the 27th the 142d
managed to advance over the Tendon- XV Corps Before the Saverne Gap (25-30
Le Tholy road, Route D-1 1, the main September)
lateral German communications line in
the region; and on the 28th the 141st By 25 September General Patton,
regiment, relieved of its flank security the Third Army commander, had al-
mission by units of the 3d Division, ready set in motion a XV Corps oper-
moved in between the 143d and 142d ation that was to continue well after
regiments at Tendon for a concerted the corps had been transferred to the
push on Bruyeres. But the prognosis 6th Army Group. News that the Third
for a rapid breakthrough was poor. Army would have to go on the defen-
The terrain was now channeling the sive had aroused Patton’s innate op-
36th Division’s upward advance into portunism, and he had prevailed
narrow, easily defensible corridors upon General Bradley to permit the
where the Germans were attempting to Third Army to undertake some
concentrate their defensive strength. “local” operations to straighten out
South of the 36th, the 3d Division his lines, securing better defensive
found itself in a similar situation. terrain and better positions from
There O‘Daniel had finally brought the which to launch future Third Army
30th regiment as far as Rupt on the offensives. In this process, Patton
Moselle, allowing the 15th and 7th to wanted Haislip’s XV Corps to expand
begin moving into the Vosges east of its control of Luneville, a railroad and
the river on 27 September, but leaving highway hub close to the confluence
the area south of Rupt under German of the Meurthe and Vezouse rivers
control. Once inside the Vosges, the and some eighteen miles north of
experienced 3d Division infantrymen Rambervillers (Map 1 7 ) .
also found the going tough. Although Although elements of the Third
the attacking units tried to bypass Army’s XII Corps had first entered
APPROACHING THE GAPS: SAVERNE 261

Luneville on 16 September, they had northern wing, from Luxembourg to


been unable to clear the city com- Vic-sur-Seille, fourteen miles north of
pletely by the 20th when Haislip’s XV Luneville, Army Group G ‘s First A m y was
Corps took over the sector. Haislip heavily engaged across most of its 75-
immediately tasked Wyche’s 79th Di- mile-wide front. Along Army Group G’s
vision with rooting out the last center, the Fifth Panzer Army, with a
German defenders and securing two thirty-mile front from Vic-sur-Seille to
thickly wooded areas to the east, the Rambervillers, had been roughly han-
Parroy and Mondon forests. The two dled by Patton’s Third Army and was
forests flanked the main roads to Sar- currently capable of little more than
rebourg, providing cover and conceal- defending in place. South of Ramber-
ment for German forces guarding the villers, the Nineteenth Army continued to
approaches to the Saverne Gap, and occupy its ninety-mile front to the
would have to be cleared before the Swiss border, but was having increas-
XV Corps could move farther east. ing problems holding back the 6th
While the 79th Division’s 315th Army Group as the Seventh and First
regiment mopped up the Luneville French Armies brought more of their
area, Wyche’s other two regiments, forces into the front lines. However,
the 313th and 314th Infantry, moved for Balck, a penetration of Army Group
into the Mondon forest, sweeping G’s center presented the gravest
through most of the woods by 23 danger: a drive through the Saverne
September. Then, while Leclerc’s Gap could split his armies, isolating the
French units finished policing the forces in the High Vosges; a drive
light German resistance at the south- north of Saverne into the Saar industri-
ern edge of the forest, all three 79th al basin would have about the same
Division infantry regiments moved up military effect but would also severely
to forward assembly areas on the damage Germany’s strategic war-
southern bank of the Vezouse River making capabilities. From his perspec-
and prepared to move into the Parroy tive then, Truscott’s advance into the
forest on the 25th.8 Vosges or de Lattre’s demonstrations
outside of the Belfort Gap were rela-
The German Situation in the Luneville tively unimportant.
Sector Balck viewed the center of his de-
fensive line with great concern. The
As the 79th Division massed on the Rhine-Marne Canal, running east and
Vezouse River, General Balck, the Army west about six miles north of Lune-
Group G commander, was facing a rap- ville and just off the northern edge of
idly deteriorating situation.9 On his the Forest of Parroy, divided the Fifth
Panzer Army’s sector into two parts:
8For details on the Mondon forest operation, see LVIII Panzer Corps operating north of
Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, pp. 233–35. the canal and XLVII Panzer Corps to
9German material in this chapter is based largely
on John W. Mosenthal, “The Establishment of a
Continuous Defensive Front by Army Croup C , 15
September-1 October 1944,” CMH MS R-68; and corporated into von Luttichau, “German Oper-
ibid., “The Battle for the Foret de Parroy, 28 Sep- ations,” as chs. 17 and 18). See also Cole, The Lor-
tember-17 October 1944,” CMH MS R-74 (both in- raine Campaign, chs. 4 and 5.
262 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

the south. (The canal also marked the Hablainville for about seven miles to
boundary between. the Third Army’s Baccarat. The corps also maintained a
XII and XV Corps.) Since 12 Septem- salient at Azerailles, three miles
ber the Fifth Panzer Army, under Gen- northwest of Baccarat, to block Route
eral von Manteuffel, had been en- N-59, leading southeast from Lune-
gaged in a series of costly armored ville. For the moment Balck and von
counterattacks against the Third Manteuffel decided to leave the de-
Army’s right flank. Although these fensive dispositions of the Fifth Panzer
operations had slowed Patton’s ad- Army unchanged in the south, from
vance, they had also virtually decimat- Baccarat to Rambervillers, but both
ed the armor available to von Man- commanders remained concerned
teuffel. As of 25 September both the about the possibility of a VI Corps
Fifth Panzer Army and its two corps drive on the Saverne Gap from the vi-
were panzer in name only. At the cinity of Rambervillers. 10
time, the LVIII Panzer Corps was con- Defending the new line from the
tinuing its fruitless counterattacks Rhine-Marne Canal to Fremenil was
against the XII Corps, but the XLVII the responsibility of the 15th Panzer
Panzer Corps had abandoned its at- Grenadier Division. The rest of von
tempts to recapture Luneville on the Luettwitz’s sector was held by the vir-
23d, apparently when General Balck tually tankless 21st Panzer Division;
learned from OKW that the 108th Group Oelsner, a provisional infantry
Panzer Brigade, until then slated for regiment; and part of the 113th Panzer
commitment in the Luneville sector, Brigade. Some troops of the 16th Divi-
was to be transferred farther north. sion were also in the XLVII Panzer
This unexpected loss of armor may Corps’ area, while in reserve was the
have also influenced the German de- 112th Panzer Brigade, reduced to less
cision to abandon the Forest of than ten tanks.11 In case of a dire
Mondon and to withdraw the XLVII emergency, General von Luettwitz
Panzer Corps’ right flank north across could call on several fortress battal-
the Vezouse River. ions digging in along forward Weststel-
The new line that Lt. Gen. Heinrich lung positions about fifteen miles east
Freiherr von Luettwitz, commanding of Luneville.
the XLVII Panzer Corps, was to hold Understrength to begin with, the
originated at Henamenil, on the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division also
Rhine-Marne Canal about six miles
northeast of Luneville, passed south 10Baccarat was also on the army boundary, with
across the western face of the Forest Route N-435, which ran north-northeast from Ram-
of Parroy to the north bank of the Ve- bervillers to Baccarat, marking the intra-army
zouse near Croismare, and then ran border.
11 Most of the rebuilding 16th Division was in the
southeast along the Vezouse about sector of LXVI Corps, Nineteenth Army, to the south of
seven miles to the vicinity of Fre- XLVII Panzer Corps. But during the latter part of
menil. Here the defenses-which September, units and parts of units shifted rapidly
were hasty in nature-crossed back back and forth between the zones of the XLVII and
LVIII Panzer Corps and other areas, making an accu-
over the Vezouse and followed a rate order of battle for the Fifth Panzer Army difficult
ridge line south past Ogeviller and to establish.
APPROACHING THE GAPS: SAVERNE 263

lacked some of its organic units.12For for troops and armor mounting coun-
example, a regimental headquarters, a terattacks against the Third Army’s
panzer grenadier battalion, an anti- right flank. Subsequently, the forest
tank company, and a battery of artil- had served the same purpose during
lery were deployed well to the north German attempts to recapture Lune-
with the First Army, while a battalion ville, and German artillery hidden in
of artillery and a tank company were the forest had continued to harass XV
operating north of the Rhine-Marne Corps’ positions and lines of commu-
Canal with the LVIII Panzer Corps. nication in the Luneville area. Von
Shortages were especially acute in the Luettwitz knew he would have to
infantry (panzer grenadier) elements, make a stand in the forest, not only to
where most battalions had fewer than hold back American progress toward
350 troops, less than half their au- the Weststellung and the Saverne Gap,
thorized strength. On the other hand, but also to protect the southern flank
von Luettwitz had been able to beef of the LVIII Panzer Corps as the latter
up the division with several provision- continued its armored counterattacks
al forces-units with limited offensive in the sector north of the Rhine-
capabilities, but adequate for defense. Marne Canal.
In the Parroy forest the division had Roughly ovoid in shape, the Forest
deployed the 1st and 3d Battalions, of of Parroy extends about six miles
its 104th Panzer Grenadier Regament; west to east and over four miles north
Blocking Detachment Berkenhog an in- to south, covering an area of nearly
fantry battalion largely made up of thirty square miles (Map 18). Much of
Luftwaffe personnel; seven to ten tanks the forest area is flat, but thickly
or self-propelled assault guns; and wooded with mostly secondary
more mortars, artillery, and antitank growth of hardwoods, a few stands of
pieces. Additional artillery emplaced older, bigger timber, and an occasion-
on rising ground east of the woods al patch of conifers. Unlike most Eu-
had likely targets within the forest ropean forests, the Parroy was also
carefully registered. Effective German characterized by a thick undergrowth
infantry strength in the forest was ini- that drastically limited observation
tially about 1,200, with total troop and visibility. One third-class east-
strength probably less than 2,000. west route, the Haut de la Fait Road,
passed through the center of the
The Forest of Parroy forest where it bisected the equally
poor north-south Bossupre Road. In
Well before the XII Corps entered addition, the forest was crisscrossed
Luneville on 16 September, the Fifth with fire lanes, logging tracks, and
Panzer Army had established bases and beds of abandoned narrow-gauge rail-
depots deep in the Forest of Parroy, roads of World War I vintage, most
using its cover as an assembly area of which could accommodate armored
vehicles, but on a strictly one-way
basis. Other features included dete-
12As of about 25 September the division had an
authorized strength of 16,140, but an on-duty riorated trenches and minor defensive
strength of approximately 11,930. installations dating back to World
264 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

MAP 18
War I. To these the defenders had acquire better positions for subse-
added mines, barbed wire, road and quent XV Corps attacks. If undis-
trail blocks, new trenches, and turbed, German infantry, artillery,
timber-roofed dugouts; while the and armor in the forest could control
poor September weather produced the main highway (N–4) leading to
cold and often torrential rains, fog Sarrebourg and the Saverne Gap, se-
and mist, mud, and swampy spots-all verely hampering a rapid advance
of which made the Forest of Parroy eastward.
an unpleasant place in which to General Wyche, with Haislip’s ap-
travel, let alone fight a pitched battle. proval, had originally planned a fron-
In the fluid combat conditions that tal attack from the west combined
had existed earlier in September with a single envelopment on the east
1944, the bulk of XV Corps might side of the forest. After meeting little
well have bypassed the Forest of German opposition in the Mondon
Parroy, leaving follow-up forces to forest, the two commanders expected
surround, isolate, and clear any Ger- the same here, hoping that the 106th
mans that remained. But with the Cavalry Group and one infantry regi-
limits imposed on offensive oper- ment of the 79th Division could
ations, General Patton decided to sweep through the forest, while an ar-
secure the area by force in order to mored task force of the French 2d Ar-
APPROACHING THE GAPS: SAVERNE 265

PARROYFOREST

mored Division struck northeast the forest.


across the Vezouse River to isolate Continued inclement weather
the woods on the east. The operation caused Wyche to postpone air and
was to begin on 25 September after ground attacks on the 26th and 27th,
heavy Allied air strikes. and finally Haislip decided to relieve
From the start, little went according Leclerc’s division of its part of the op-
to plan. Poor flying weather forced eration and leave the entire task to
postponement of the air strikes, and Wyche. Meanwhile, American patrols
Wyche was unable to start his attack into the forest had discovered that
until the 25th. In the interim, Leclerc the Germans were preparing to
had sent a small force over the Ve- defend the woods in strength. Ac-
zouse, but German artillery fire broke cordingly, Wyche revised his plans,
up the French infantry formations and deciding to send two infantry regi-
the soggy ground confined the ments into the forest from the west
French armor to the roads, leading while the cavalry group screened the
Leclerc to pull his units south, back area to the north along the Rhine-
across the river, before the 79th Divi- Marne Canal. Abandoning the whole
sion had even begun its assault into concept of isolating the forest on the
266 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

east, both Haislip and Wyche prob- lieving the latter to be more vulnera-
ably felt that a less complex ap- ble, however, he instructed von Man-
proach-concentrating their superior teuffel and Wiese on the 29th to give
artillery and infantry resources in one defensive priority to the Ramber-
sector-was the best solution consid- villers area, where the French 2d Ar-
ering the terrain and weather. mored Division and the VI Corps’
The American attack into the 45th Infantry Division threatened the
Parroy forest finally began on 28 Sep- boundary between the two armies. To
tember, one day before the XV Corps assist von Manteuffel in this task, he
was to pass to 6th Army Group con- moved the boundary of the Fifth
trol. The air attack began at 1400 fol- Panzer Army eleven miles south of
lowed by the ground assault of the Rambervillers, making the XLVII
313th and 315th Infantry at 1630 that Panzer Corps responsible for the area.
afternoon. However, of the 288 Von Manteuffel, in turn, moved his
bombers and fighter-bombers sched- internal corps boundary south, allow-
uled to participate in the preparatory ing the LVIII Panzer Corps, under Lt.
strikes, only 37 actually arrived, again Gen. Walter Krueger, to direct the
because of poor flying conditions; defense of the Parroy forest, while the
and the results of the 37-plane attack XLVII Panzer Corps concentrated its ef-
against a target covering some thirty forts in the Rambervillers-Baccarat
square miles were negligible. In addi- region.
tion, the two-hour interval between Simultaneously Balck and von Man-
the last air strikes and the beginning teuffel reorganized the Fifth Panzer
of the 79th Division’s ground attack Army in order to simplify command
gave the Germans ample time to re- and control problems, consolidating
cover from whatever shock effect the battered units and strengthening ex-
limited bombardment may have had. isting divisions. In the process, the
As a result the 79th Division infantry- 11th Panzer Division absorbed what was
men found themselves locked in a left of the 111th Panzer Brigade; the
bitter struggle with the German de- 21st Panzer Division took over the
fenders as soon as they began to pen- 112th Panzer Brigade (less a battalion
etrate the forest. of the 112th Panzer Grenadier Regament,
Even as the 79th Division began its which went to the 16th Infantry Divi-
attack, General Balck was again reas- sion); and the hard-hit 113th Panzer
sessing the situation in the area. Brigade was incorporated into the 15th
North of the Rhine-Marne Canal the Panzer Grenadier Division. This left Army
LVIII Panzer Corps ’ counterattacks had Group G with only one panzer brigade
ground to a halt with more heavy in reserve, the 106th, which had not
losses in German armor and infantry. yet arrived from the First Army’s area,
With no reinforcements, Balck in- and Balck and von Manteuffel made
structed the Fifth Panzer Army to go on tentative plans to commit this brigade
the defensive all across its front. To in the Rambervillers area.
protect the Saverne Gap, he regarded Balck ended the month of Septem-
both the Forest of Parroy and the ber by admonishing his three army
Rambervillers sector as critical. Be- commanders not to surrender any
APPROACHING THE GAPS: SAVERNE 267

ground “voluntarily.” Every penetra- determined artillery or mortar bar-


tion of the forward lines was to be re- rages on advancing American troops;
stored by an immediate counterattack. and the concentrations were often fol-
Too often, Balck informed them, re- lowed by small infantry-armored
serve forces had been frittered away counterattacks moving at an oblique
by premature commitments to weak angle down one of the firebreaks or
points and to sections of the front dirt tracks. During the night, smaller
only presumably threatened. In the German infantry patrols attempted to
future, all withdrawals would need his infiltrate the flanks and rear of the at-
personal approval and would only be tacking American forces, disorganiz-
authorized if they improved current ing them and interfering with resup-
defensive positions. The Hitler order ply efforts. Often when one American
still stood-to hold west of the West- unit was forced back, the others
stellung in order to allow completion stopped their forward progress to
and garrisoning of fortifications there. avoid exposing their flanks to further
The defense of the Parroy forest German attacks. Poor visibility in the
would represent the first test of forest compounded American com-
Balck’s orders. mand and control problems, and the
frequent German counterattacks put
The Forest and the Fight the attackers on the defensive much
of the time. Again and again disorga-
During these deliberations the U.S. nized American units were forced to
79th Division and the German 15th fall back, reorganize, and launch
Panzer Grenadier Division had been bat- counterattacks of their own to regain
tling throughout the western section lost ground.
of the Parroy forest. The 79th had at- On 1 October both sides sent rein-
tacked from the west with two regi- forcements into the battle. The LVIII
ments abreast-the 315th Infantry Panzer Corps deployed two battalions
north of the Fait Road and the 313th of the 113th Panzer Grenadier Regiment,
Infantry to the south. Both regiments 223th Panzer Brigade, into the forest
made painfully slow progress against accompanied by additional armor. On
determined German resistance, and, the American side, Wyche sent his
by evening on the 30th, the attacking third infantry regiment, the 3 14th,
infantry had penetrated scarcely over into the fray. The division command-
a mile into the dense forest. During er wanted the 314th Infantry to move
this period the fighting quickly fell into the forest from the south, just
into a pattern that continued through- east of the main penetration, and
out the battle. Abandoning any at- push against the flank of the defend-
tempt at a linear defense, the Ger- ers facing the 313th Infantry, allowing
mans maintained a thin screening line that regiment to drop back in a re-
opposite the Allied advance and con- serve role.
centrated their troops at various Although well executed, the maneu-
strongpoints. By day, German for- ver did not seem to shake loose the
ward artillery observers, hidden in German defenses. The 79th Division’s
prepared positions, called down pre- progress remained painfully slow and
268 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

it was not until 3 October that the heaviest preparatory barrage of the
last battalion of the 313th Infantry entire operation, clearing the way for
was relieved. On the same day the the main attack which began at 0650,
Germans once again reinforced their with ample artillery support on call.
troops in the forest, this time with the Initially two battalions of the 315th
2 d Battalion of the 104th Panzer Grena- Infantry drove eastward north of the
dier Regment, 15th Panzer Grenadier Di- Fait Road, while the 3d Battalion,
vision, and a few more tanks and self- 315th Infantry, and the 2d Battalion,
propelled guns. Wyche, meanwhile, 314th Infantry, concentrated against
with Haislip’s approval, shortened the the German strongpoint at the central
front line of the 315th Infantry by crossroads, finally overrunning that
making the 106th Cavalry Group re- position about 1800. Meanwhile, two
sponsible for the northern part of the battalions of the 313th Infantry
American advance and allowing the moved into the line south of the 2d
3 15th to concentrate its forces just Battalion, 314th Infantry, and pushed
above the Fait Road. Between 4 and 6 eastward south of the crossroads; still
October, American infantry units re- farther south the rest of the 314th In-
newed their attacks, pushing eastward fantry aggressively patrolled through
through the middle of the forest and the southern third of the forest. At
overrunning several German strong- dusk the 79th Division’s center had
points near the juncture of the Fait advanced only a mile and a half
and Bossupre roads. The Germans beyond the central crossroads, but
then counterattacked with the under- the infantry commanders hopefully
strength 11th Panzer Reconnaissance noted that German resistance was be-
Battalion (from the 11th Panzer Divi- ginning to diminish.
sion), forcing elements of the 315th During the evening of 9 October
Infantry back from the crossroads. Krueger outlined the status of his
But elsewhere the Americans held forces to von Manteuffel and reported
their ground. Temporarily exhausted, that he was unable to restore the situ-
both sides spent 7 and 8 October pa- ation with the forces available. The
trolling, reorganizing, and resupply- loss of the interior roads and the cen-
ing their forces and, in the American tral strongpoints made further defen-
camp, preparing to resume the offen- sive efforts costly, especially if the
sive on the morning of the 9th. Americans began to threaten the 15th
The new attack began with a diver- Panzer Grenadier Division’s routes of
sionary demonstration at daybreak by withdrawal. The only uncommitted
the 1st Battalion, 313th Infantry, rein- forces were two battalions (with an
forced with tanks, south of the forest. aggregate strength of about 550
Evidently, the ruse met with some troops) of the division’s 115th Panzer
success, for the Germans shelled the Grenadier Regiment and two fortress
roads along the Vezouse throughout battalions, 13 but using these units
the morning and provided little direct would deprive the defenders of their
fire support to their troops in the
Parroy forest. There XV Corps and 13The 1416th Fortress Injantry Battalion and the 51st
79th Division artillery laid down the Fortress Machine Gun Battalion.
APPROACHING THE GAPS: SAVERNE 269

last reserves and leave no maneuver Embermenil, in the center of the


units for operations east of the forest. German line, but elsewhere the divi-
Accordingly, the LVIII Panzer Corps sion made only limited progress in
commander requested permission to the face of heavy German artillery
withdraw from the Parroy forest to a and mortar fire and flooded ground.
new defensive line, and the Fifth Thereafter the dispositions of the di-
Panzer Army and Army Group G had no vision remained essentially un-
choice but to approve the request. changed.
Except for some rear-guard detach- The subsequent inactivity of the XV
ments, the main body of German Corps was due in part to the rede-
troops in the forest withdrew during ployment of many Third Army sup-
the night of 9–10 October to a new port units, which had to be returned
defensive line several miles east of by the 15th. At the request of General
the woods, tying in with the XLVII Devers, Bradley agreed to allow Hais-
Panzer Corps’ 21st Panzer Division at lip to retain two heavy field artillery
Domjevin, with the intercorps bound- battalions, but the XV Corps lost four
ary later moving a few miles south to field artillery battalions, four antiair-
Ogeviller. German losses during the craft gun battalions, a three-battalion
fight for the Forest of Parroy, 28 Sep- engineer combat group, a tank de-
tember through 9 October, numbered stroyer battalion, and some lesser
approximately 125 men killed, 350 units, forcing Haislip to pause while
wounded, over 700 missing (most of he redistributed his remaining sup-
them taken prisoner), and about 50 port forces.
evacuated for various sicknesses. 14 On the German side Army Group B
More significant, however, they had was once again to be strengthened at
now lost their principal forward de- the expense of Army Group G, not only
fensive position along the approaches to satisfy Army Group B’s immediate
to the Saverne Gap. requirements, but also in preparation
for the Ardennes offensive scheduled
More Reorganizations for December.15 The bulk of the 15th
Panzer Grenadier Division withdrew
During 11 and 12 October, the from its lines opposite the 79th Divi-
79th Division and the 106th Cavalry sion during the night of 15–16 Octo-
Group cleared the remainder of the ber, and on 17 October the sector
forest and pushed on to the new passed to the control of the 553d
German defensive lines to the east. A Volksgrenadier Division, 16 with an effec-
final advance by all the 79th’s regi-
ments on the 13th managed to secure 15For the planning and buildup for the Ardennes,
see Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge,
United States Army in World War II (Washington,
14The German casualty figures in the text are 1965), chs. 1–3.
based on various figures given in Mosenthal, CMH 16The German Army began forming Volhgrenadier
MS R–74. A thorough search of 106th Cavalry (“people’s grenadier”) divisions in August and Sep-
Group, 79th Division, XV Corps, and Seventh Army tember 1944. The new divisions had a rather aus-
files failed to produce any usable casualty figures for tere authorized strength of around 12,000 troops.
the 106th Cavalry Group and the 79th Division Division artillery consisted of three instead of four
during the period 28 September through 9 October. battalions; there was no divisional antitank battalion;
270 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE
tive infantry strength of no more than try Division-the new third division
a few battalions. T o bolster the divi- that Eisenhower had promised Devers
sion for its defensive mission, Army in September-to reach the front
Group G reinforced it with the 1416th before the 79th Division resumed the
Fortress Infantry Battalion, the 56th For- offensive. The 44th Division, under
tress Machine Gun Battalion, and the 42d the command of Maj. Gen. Robert L.
Panzer Grenadier Replacement Battalion. Spragins, closed its assembly area
Next, the Fifth Panzer Army head- near Luneville on 17 October and
quarters passed to Army Group B’s during the next few days took over
control on 16 October, leaving Army 79th Division positions from the vi-
Group G with only two subordinate cinity of Embermenil south to the Ve-
army commands, the First and the zouse River, while the 79th concen-
Nineteenth. The First A m y assumed trated on a narrower front for a new
command of the LVIII Panzer Corps in attack.
the north, and the Nineteenth Army On 21 and 22 October the three
took control of the XLVII Panzer Corps regiments of the 79th Division, ad-
in the south. A new boundary, sepa- vancing abreast across a front of
rating the First and Nineteenth Armies, almost two and a half miles, gained
began at Ogeviller and ran northeast nearly a mile and a half in a north-
across the Vosges to pass a few miles easterly direction from Embermenil,
north of Strasbourg. The XLVII thus securing better defensive terrain
Panzer Corps’ attachment to the Nine- as well as better observation of
teenth Army was short-lived, and one German positions. On the 23d the
day later, on 17 September, OB West 44th Division started to relieve the
also transferred this headquarters to 79th Division in place, which then
Army Group B S control, providing the began a much needed rest. Tragically,
Nineteenth Army with the LXXXIX Corps for General Patch, commanding the
headquarters as a substitute. Seventh Army, the relief came two
Logistical problems, bad weather, days too late. His son, Capt. Alexan-
and, apparently, slow intelligence der M. Patch III, commanding Com-
analysis helped prevent the 79th Divi- pany C of the 315th Infantry, was
sion from taking advantage of the killed by German mortar fire on 22
German redeployments east of the October, and the army commander
Parroy forest. Moreover, the XV was to feel the loss deeply for many
Corps was waiting for the 44th Infan- months to come.
For the remainder of October the
and service elements were greatly reduced. On the 44th Infantry Division played a rather
other hand the infantry elements. armed primarily static role, but one that prepared the
with automatic weapons, had markedly more fire- new division for forthcoming offen-
power than the infantry of standard divisions; fur-
thermore, the infantry regiments and battalions of
sive actions. Its activities were limited
the Volksgrensdier divisions had their own organic mostly to patrols and artillery duels,
antitank weapons. Most were built on the remnants and little attempt was made to gain
of older divisions shattered during the earlier fight- new ground. Elements of the 106th
ing in France or on the eastern front; for example,
553d Volksgrenadier Division was formed around cadre Calvary Group maintained contact
and veterans of the 553d Infantry Division. with Third Army units along the line
APPROACHING THE GAPS: SAVERNE 271

of the Rhine-Marne Canal and under- to the rear for sorely needed rest, re-
took limited reconnaissance, but habilitation, and vehicle maintenance.
adopted a generally defensive atti- From 3 through 30 October the divi-
tude. sion lost approximately 35 men killed
To the south, the French 2d Ar- and 140 wounded, most of them as a
mored Division continued to rest and result of German artillery or mortar
refit. From 30 September to 3 Octo- fire.18As dusk came on the 30th, the
ber, units of the division had support- division was preparing to launch an
ed the advance of the VI Corps’ 45th attack to seize Baccarat, an operation
Division to the Rambervillers area, that once again would alarm the
culminating in several sharp engage- German high command and divert
ments along the Rambervillers-Bac- their attention from the more direct
carat highway. On the 3d the French approaches to the Saverne Gap.
armor was relieved of its responsibil-
ities in the zone by the VI Corps’ the division’s organic reconnaissance squadron, the
117th Cavalry Squadron, and, as 1st Moroccan Spahis Regiment. CCR’s basic organi-
zation consisted of the headquarters and one troop
planned, the division went on the de- of the 1st Moroccan Spahis, an armored infantry
fensive for the remainder of the company, a towed antitank company, a battery of ar-
month. mored field artillery, and a platoon of combat engi-
neers. Other units were added as dictated by cir-
During this period the French divi- cumstances and missions. CCR was, in effect, a per-
sion kept three of its four combat manent reconnaissance-in-force organization, but
commands 17 in the line, rotating each could also be employed as a ready reserve if the tac-
tical situation called for it.
18Total XV Corps casualties for the month of Oc-
17 Unlike other French and American armored di- tober, including those of the 2d French Armored
visions, the 2d French Armored Division normally Division, numbered about 365 men killed, 2,310
operated with four rather than three combat com- wounded, 165 missing, and 2,410 nonbattle. During
mands. The fourth, CCR, was named after its com- the month XV Corps received 5,720 replacements
mander, Col. Jean S. Remy, who in the division’s or returnees, and the corps captured over 1,760
administrative structure was also the commander of Germans.
CHAPTER XV

The Road to St. Die


At the beginning of October, the Army’s base areas along the Moselle
American commanders, Generals River led steadily upward into the
Devers, Patch, Truscott, and Haislip, thickly forested Vosges, terrain in
realized that their personnel and which the Germans would continue to
supply problems made it impossible have every conceivable defensive ad-
to launch a general offensive, even if vantage. The steep, wooded hills were
approved by SHAEF. Before any rarely traversable by vehicles, even by
major operations could be undertak- the lighter American tanks and half-
en, their troops had to be rested, re- tracks, while the narrow mountain
placements brought up and trained, roads were easily interdicted; further-
and supply stocks, especially ammuni- more, heavy vegetation made it diffi-
tion and fuel, built up in the forward cult to direct accurate artillery and
area. During this process, front-line mortar fire or to employ direct air
infantry strength would have to be re- support. The forests also tended to
duced by about one-third as infantry compartmentalize the battlefield,
battalions were pulled out of the line making it easy for advancing units to
for brief periods of rest and rehabili- become widely separated and vulnera-
tation. For a while, no regiment could ble to infiltration and enemy flanking
plan to have more than two of its attacks.
three infantry battalions at the front
at any one time. The expectation that The VI Corps
the poor weather experienced in late
September would only worsen during On a larger scale, Truscott was in-
October made ammunition stockpil- creasingly concerned over the difficul-
ing even more necessary. Difficult ty in securing a deep but narrow ad-
flying conditions greatly reduced the vance into the mountains. The VI
amount of air support the ground Corps could not push very far east
troops could count on and increased and northeast of Rambervillers with-
the reliance on artillery and mortar out dangerously exposing its northern
fire. flank. T o avoid such a situation, Patch
Tactical considerations also militat- and Truscott had hoped that Haislip’s
ed against a hasty push to the east. XV Corps would have been able to
All the roads from the Seventh clear the Parroy forest rapidly and
THE ROAD T O ST. DIE 273

then begin a drive northeast of Ram- was to succeed. Route N–59 and the
bervillers abreast of the VI Corps. principal trans-Vosges railroad came
The tenacious German defense of the into St. Die from the north, through
Parroy forest, however, destroyed Luneville and Baccarat; Route N–420
whatever ideas the two commanders and the railroad led northeast from
may have entertained in that regard St. Die through the Saales Pass, on
before October was a week old. As a the most direct route to Strasbourg;
result, the XV Corps was unable to N–59 continued east from St. Die
launch any offensive operations in the through the Ste. Marie Pass to Seles-
southern sector of its zone, and the tat, on the Alsatian plain between
VI Corps was forced to commit siza- Strasbourg and Colmar; Route N–415
ble forces in the Rambervillers area led south and then east through the
throughout October in order to Bonhomme Pass to Colmar; and
secure its northern flank. Route D–8 branched off N–415 on its
On the VI Corps’ right, or south- way south to Gerardmer, Route N–
ern, flank, a similar situation pre- 417, and the Schlucht Pass. Posses-
vailed. There the French II Corps had sion of the Meurthe River mountain
been stalled in the foothills of the town was thus vital to the Allied ad-
Vosges, and the situation was further vance, and the Germans could be ex-
complicated by the diverging courses pected to defend it vigorously if al-
of the two Allied armies, the Ameri- lowed the time to reorganize and
can Seventh moving northeast and strengthen their forces.
the French First advancing east. Nev- VI Corps’ most direct route to St.
ertheless, both Patch and Truscott Die started at Jarmenil, on the Mo-
were willing to take the risks that ac- selle about midway between Epinal
companied a unilateral VI Corps and Remiremont. This axis followed
attack. Both regarded a complete ces- the valley of the small Vologne River,
sation of offensive activity as extreme- passing through open, flat-to-rolling
ly dangerous, giving the Germans too farmland dominated on the north and
much time to build and man defenses northwest by the relatively low,
throughout the Vosges as well as to wooded hills and ridges of the Faite
rehabilitate their own depleted divi- forest and on the south and east by
sions. higher, more rugged, forested terrain.
Despite their tactical and logistical Route N–59A and then Route D–44
limitations, Patch and Truscott still led northeast along the Vologne
favored a limited VI Corps offensive about ten miles from Jarmenil to the
in October. While neither expected a small city of Bruyeres, a rail and road
quick breakthrough to Strasbourg, hub ringed by close-in, steep hills on
they believed that the city of St. Die the west, north, and east. From
was a reasonable objective. On the Bruyeres, Route N–420 went north
Meurthe River deep in the heart of about two and a half miles to Brouve-
the Vosges, St. Die was an industrial, lieures on the Mortagne River-here
road, rail, and communications center no more than a brook. Winding and
that VI Corps would have to seize if hugging the slopes of heavily wooded
any drive northeast across the Vosges hills, N–420 continued northeast
274 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

about four miles to Les Rouges Eaux. The German Defenses


Then the highway climbed and twist-
ed through a dense coniferous forest The fall of Rambervillers in late
to emerge in the valley of the Tain- September had again forced the Ger-
trux Creek about two and a half miles mans to rethink their defensive dispo-
short of St. Die. The city itself lay on sitions.2 For some time the town had
flat ground surrounded by wooded marked the boundary between Army
mountains and hills (some of the hills Group G’s Fifth Panzer Army, which con-
having a peculiar conical shape). The fronted the Third Army’s XV and XII
Meurthe River, flowing northwest Corps, and the Nineteenth Army, which
through St. Die, was normally too faced the Seventh Army’s VI Corps
slow to be much of an obstacle except and all of the First French Army.
in a few places where it ran between American XV and VI Corps oper-
steep banks or manmade retaining ations in the Rambervillers sector had
walls. threatened to drive a wedge between
While keeping his sights on St. Die, the two German armies as early as 28
Truscott initially assigned the 45th September; at that time the Nineteenth
and 36th Divisions the more limited Army’s LXVI Corps, consisting largely
goals of seizing the railroad and high- of the rebuilding 16th Infantry Division,
way hubs of Bruyeres and Brouve- lacked the strength to restore the sit-
lieures. Eagles’ 45th was to make the uation. T o consolidate command in
main effort, striking for Brouvelieures the Rambervillers area, which he con-
and Bruyeres from the Rambervillers sidered critical, General Balck of Army
area, while Dahlquist’s 36th, advanc- Group G had transferred control of
ing from the south, was to keep the LXVI Corps from the Nineteenth Army to
German frontal defenses occupied the Fifth Panzer Army. But on the 30th,
and ultimately assist in clearing Balck had withdrawn the LXVI Corps
Bruyeres.1 The 45th Division’s ad- headquarters from the front and
vance from Rambervillers would send passed control of the 16th Division to
it southeast, down over nine miles of the XLVII Panzer Corps, on the Fifth
forests and country roads along the Panzer Army’s left, or southern, flank.3
southern side of the Mortagne River On the same day Balck also pushed
valley. T o the south, the 36th Divi- the boundary between the Fifth Panzer
sion would have to clear the Vologne Army and the Nineteenth A m y south
River valley and route D–44 from Do- about eleven miles from Ramber-
celles to Bruyeres, a distance of about villers to a northeast-southwest line
eight miles. The VI Corps attack to passing just north of Bruyeres, a line
seize Bruyeres and Brouvelieures was that corresponded roughly to the
to begin on 1 October, and Truscott
hoped to have both objectives in
hand by 8 October at the latest. 2 German information in this chapter is derived
from von Luttichau, “German Operations,” chs. 19-
21.
1 The change in plans came in VI Corps Fld Msg 3 LXVI Corps headquarters took on a training mis-
301200A Sep 44; previously Bruyeres had been the sion in the vicinity of Colmar and on 6 October
36th Division’s main objective. passed to the control of Army Group B.
THE ROAD T O ST. DIE 275

boundary between the VI Corps’ 45th A/V5 and provisional Regiment Baur,
and 36th Divisions. each with five infantry battalions and
Thus, at the beginning of October, some supporting artillery and antitank
the 2d French Armored Division of weapons. But von Luettwitz’s control
XV Corps and the 45th Infantry Divi- over Group von Claer was limited. The
sion of VI Corps faced General von group’s primary mission was to man
Luettwitz’s XLVII Panzer Corps, Fifth Weststellung positions, and its troops
Panzer Army, in the Rambervillers area. could be employed in front-line
The panzer corps consisted (north to combat only with the expressed per-
south) of the weak 21st Panzer Division; mission of General Balck.
Group Oelsner, a provisional infantry South of the Bruyeres-St. Die
regiment made up of security troops, boundary between the Fifth Panzer
engineers, and Luftwaffe retreads, all Army and the Nineteenth Army stood the
soon to be incorporated into the 16th latter’s LXIV Corps, the lines of which
Division; and the lamentable 16th In- extended southward about twenty
fantry Division itself. The 21st Panzer miles to Rupt-sur-Moselle. With the
Division had 65 percent of its author- 716th Division and the 198th Division
ized strength of about 16,675 troops, (less the 308th Grenadiers) on line from
but the unit had little punch left. Its north to south, the LXIV Corps, under
22d Panzer Regiment was reduced to Lt. Gen. Helmut Thumm, faced VI
nine operational tanks, and the 125th Corps’ 36th Division as well as most
and 192d Panzer Grenadier Regiments of the 3d Division.6
were down to about 50 percent of General Wiese of Nineteenth Army
their authorized strengths. The divi- had in reserve the small task force
sion’s only strong points were its high from the 11th Panzer Division as well as
percentage of seasoned veterans and the 103d Panzer Battalion, just arriving
its rigorous training program for re- at St. Die from the First Army’s sector.
placements. The 16th Infantry Division, The 106th Panzer Brigade, intended for
then being reorganized as a volksgrena- the Belfort Gap, had not yet arrived
dier division,4 had an effective from First Army, and Balck had laid
strength of about 5,575 ill-trained tentative plans to divert the brigade
troops, and its three infantry regi-
ments averaged about 35 percent of 5Regiment A / V was one of four fortress regiments
their authorized strength. The Ger- organized by Wehrkreis V, an area command some-
mans rated the division as capable what analagous to the U.S. Army’s domestic area
commands of World War II. With its headquarters
only of “limited defense.” at Stuttgart, Germany, Wehrkreis V included Alsace
Backing up von Luettwitz’s front- within its area of responsibility.
line units were the fortress troops of 6At the end of September the 189th Division
Group von Claer, with a total strength (Group von Schwerin) was still technically part of LXIV
Corps, but on about 28 September what was left of
of about 8,000 men. The group’s the division, a weak regimental combat team, passed
principal components were Regiment to the control of the 198th Division. In late October
the designation 189th Division’ was transferred to
Group Degener of LXXXV Corps, an action undertaken
to ensure that the provisional Degener organization
4The 16th Infantry Division was redesignated the could receive supplies and replacements through
16th Volksgrenadier Division on 9 October. normal channels.
276 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

to the critical Rambervillers sector. infantry and heavy weapons. The


There, Fifth Panzer Army had in re- most Army Group G could promise was
serve Task Force Liehr of the 21st to increase deliveries of ammunition.
Panzer Division and what was left of At the time, Balck felt that the Fifth
Regimental Group Usedom, a unit that Panzer Army, whatever its problems,
had launched a counterattack against was still better off than Wiese’s totter-
units of the French 2d Armored Divi- ing Nineteenth Army in the Vosges and
sion northeast of Rambervillers on 2 the Belfort Gap.
October. 7 Badly damaged during that
action, Group Usedom then had to dis- First Tryfor Bruyeres and Brouvelieures
patch one of its two panzer grenadier
battalions to bolster the forces de- The 45th Division’s attack toward
fending the Parroy forest. Losses, re- Brouvelieures and Bruyeres demand-
deployments, and blocking commit- ed that the Rambervillers area be se-
ments thus left the Fifth Panzer Army cured first, in order to protect the
with no reserve worthy of the name to division’s northern flank. The 157th
support the XLVII Panzer Corps until Infantry and the 117th Cavalry
the 106th Panzer Brigade arrived. Squadron accomplished this task by
Von Luettwitz’s panzer corps had blocking the roads leading northeast,
other problems as well: a shortage of east, and southeast from Ramber-
artillery ammunition; a lack of heavy villers, while maintaining contact with
machine guns and mortars; and, the XV Corps’ French 2d Armored
above all, a critical shortage of infan- Division in the north. These require-
trymen. Consequently, General von ments, however, together with the
Manteuffel, commanding Fifth Panzer German domination of the generally
Army, queried Balck on the possibility open country immediately east of
of withdrawing portions of the panzer Rambervillers with artillery and
corps to the east of Rambervillers, mortar fire, prevented the division’s
where it would find better defensive left from mounting any significant at-
terrain.8 However, the Army Group G tacks toward Baccarat, and left Gener-
commander, adhering to his policy of al Eagles, the division commander,
no withdrawals and immediate coun- with only two regiments for his main
terattacks against any and all Allied effort. Nevertheless, the 45th Division
penetrations, refused permission for commander hoped to outflank the
any retreat and likewise turned down Germans by taking an indirect ap-
von Manteuffel’s requests for more proach to his objective. While push-
ing his 179th Infantry regiment north
7 Group Usedom’s infantry consisted of two panzer through the Faite forest, he wanted
grenadier battalions, one from the 21st Panzer Divi- the 180th to make a wide swing to the
sion and the other from the 15th Panzer Grenadier Di-
vision, supported by six tanks. left, moving up to the Rambervillers
8 It is not clear from available sources, but it ap- area and then heading southeast
pears that von Manteuffel wanted to withdraw XLVII through the Ste. Helene woods, be-
Panzer Corps’ right flank back about five miles or tween two secondary roads (D–50 and
more to the heavily wooded hills and ridges of the
Forest of Ste. Barbe, on the north, and the Forest of D–47) and the small Mortagne River,
Rambervillers, on the south. to attack the German lines from the
278 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

side and rear (Map 19). deeply into the Mortagne forest, by-
At first the attack went as planned. passing German positions on Hill
While the 157th secured Ramber- 385, driving a wedge between two of
villers, the 180th Infantry cleared most the 16th Division’s regiments, and ap-
of the mile-wide Bois de Ste. Helene by proaching to within a mile of Brouve-
29 September, meeting only scattered lieures itself. Reinforcements were
German delaying actions. German de- needed if the 16th was to survive.
fenses, however, stiffened along D–70, At the time Balck could do little. On
a small road that bisected the 180th’s 5 October he released two reserve bat-
advance southward and marked a gen- talions to the XLVII Panzer Corps, which,
eral boundary between the gentle Ste. together with some odds and ends that
Helene woods and the more rugged von Manteuffel had been able to scrape
Mortagne forest guarding the final ap- together, the Army Group G commander
proaches to both Bruyeres and Brouve- hoped would save the situation.9 But
lieures. T o the south, the 179th Infan- von Manteuffel warned that the rein-
try emerged from the Faite forest forcements were inadequate, prompt-
about the same time, but found it diffi- ing Balck to allow portions of the 11th
cult to cross the narrow N–420 valley Panzer Division north of the Rhine-
road skirting the southern edge of the Marne Canal to be pulled out of the
Mortagne forest. By October 2, after line, despite the constant pressure
three days of hard fighting, the 180th there from Patton’s Third Army.
managed to take Fremifontaine, a small The counterattacking force that von
hamlet on D–70, and the 179th secured Manteuffel finally assembled thus con-
Grandvillers; however, the stubborn sisted of the 111th Panzer Grenadiers of
16th Volksgrenadier Division infantry the 11th Panzer Division, ten to twelve
hung on to a defensive network cen- Mark IV medium tanks from the same
tered around three prominent eleva- division, and four infantry battalions
tions-Hills 385, 422, and 489. Never- under 16th Division control. Covered by
theless, the German defenses now ap- German forces on Hill 385, much of
peared ready to collapse. the infantry and a few of the armored
Late on 2 October, as Eagles’ con- vehicles assembled in the Mortagne
verging regiments prepared to contin- valley about three-quarters of a mile
ue the offensive into the forest itself, east of Fremifontaine; the rest of the
von Manteuffel advised Balck that the tanks and additional infantry gathered
XLVII Panzer Corps lacked the means at the head of a ravine about a mile to
to launch a counterattack to recapture the south; and two more infantry bat-
Grandvillers and Fremifontaine, and talions came together another mile far-
two days later he convinced the Army ther south. For the northern elements
Group G commander that the situation of the German counterattack the most
in the sector was becoming irretriev-
able. Heavily engaged in the Parroy 9The reserve battalions came from Regiment A/V.
forest battle, the Fifth Panzer Army had The Fifth Panzer Army had already sent to the XLVII
no significant resources that it could Panzer Corps a 100-man guard company from army
headquarters, two grenadier companies of the 21st
deploy south. By that time the 180th Panzer Division, a battery of light howitzers, and
and 179th Infantry had penetrated three assault guns.
THE ROAD TO ST. DIE 279

83D CHEMICAL (MORTAR)BATTALION,45TH DIVISION,fire 4.2-inch mortars, Grand-


villersarea.

important objective was Hill 422, an west of Brouvelieures and sever the
American-held height three-quarters tenuous contact between the 179th and
of a mile southeast of Fremifontaine 180th regiments, perhaps cutting off
that provided good observation in all the 180th.
directions. The two southern infantry The counterattack, which began
battalions were to support the attack about 0900 on 6 October, took the
on Hill 422 and were also to strike for two 45th Division regiments by sur-
Hill 484, a mile and a half farther south prise. Although the assembly of noisy
and a similar distance east of Grand- tanks and self-propelled guns was dif-
villers, the ultimate objective. 10If the ficult to muffle, the weakening
German counterattack developed German resistance during the previ-
properly, it would slam into the left ous days may have given the Ameri-
and rear of the 180th Infantry north- can attackers a false sense of security;
moreover, deep in the forest it was
difficult to tell friend or foe by noise
10 Troops of the 179th Infantry had been on the alone. By late afternoon the German
northern slopes of Hill 484 since 4 October, but
had not secured the entire hill.
northern wing had seized Hill 422
280 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

and cut off much of the 2d Battalion, ern slopes of the Faite forest, after
180th Infantry, opening a wide gap losing 18 men killed, 64 wounded,
between the two American regiments. and about 25 missing. The 179th had
In the south, however, the two attack- captured around 30 Germans, and the
ing German battalions made little 180th nearly 50.
headway in the Hill 484 sector and The German attack had not suc-
were in turn outflanked by aggressive ceeded in its larger objective—retak-
179th Infantry countermaneuvers. ing Grandvillers and Fremifontaine-
The fighting continued throughout which again illustrated Army Group G’s
the night, quickly degenerating into a inability to push any counterattack
continuous series of violent but con- through to a decisive conclusion. On
fused skirmishes, with neither side the other hand, the operations had
being able to accomplish much in the forced the 179th and 180th Infantry
dark forests. regiments to take up defensive posi-
On the morning of 7 October, the tions; the units would need nearly a
American units began reorganizing week before they were ready to
and started eliminating the German resume offensive operations. The
penetrations. The 180th Infantry XLVII Panzer Corps had at least bought
retook Hill 422 while the 179th isolat- some time for its hard-pressed left
ed the German southern assault flank.
forces from the panzer grenadiers in
the north and, in the process, secured The 36th Division
all of Hill 484. Deciding that no more
could be accomplished, von Manteuf- Truscott had intended that Dahl-
fel directed the 11th Panzer Division ’s quist’s 36th Division only support the
task force to start disengaging during 45th’s attack on the Bruyeres-Brouve-
the night of 7–8 October, leaving the lieures area. At the time, the division
16th Division to reestablish a defensive had been slowly pushing northeast up
line as best it could. the Vologne and D–44 valley, clearing
When the front finally stabilized on out elements of the German 716th In-
9 October, the 180th Infantry had es- fantry Division from the wooded hills on
tablished a new line extending from either side of its advance. By 1 October
the vicinity of Hill 385—still in the 36th Division’s 143d regiment, on
German hands—south across Hill 422 the left wing, had moved through the
to the regimental boundary just north eastern edge of the imposing Faite
of Hill 484. The German counterat- forest to Docelles and Deycimont,
tack had thus forced the regiment to while the 141st regiment, at the divi-
pull its front to the west and south sion’s center, had come up abreast of
about three-quarters of a mile, and the 143d on the eastern side of the
had cost it 5 men killed, 40 wounded, river, crossing first Route D–11 and
and about 30 missing (most of these then D–30 to secure the town of Le-
last, captured). The 179th Infantry panges (Map 20). T o the southeast, the
had also pulled back and was prepar- division’s remaining regiment, the
ing a defensive line extending south- 142d, had emerged from the steep hills
west from Hill 484 to the northeast- and valleys of the Froissard forest to
THE ROAD T O ST. DIE 281

MAP 20

cut D–11 near the mountain hamlet of regiments should be removed from
Tendon. The regiment, reinforced by a the line for rest and refitting, Dahl-
battalion of the 141st, had then gone quist decided to make his main effort
on to occupy two hill masses north of east of the Vologne, through a rectan-
the road, Hills 728 and 827, cutting the gular terrain compartment bounded
716th Division’s lateral communications by the towns of Laval, Herpelmont,
with Le Tholy and threatening Route Houx, and Lepanges—about twelve
D–30, which now became the defend- square miles of mountainous forests
ers’ main supply artery in the region. nearly devoid of human habitation.
But despite their success, all three of Possession of the area would secure
Dahlquist’s regiments were exhausted, his right flank for an advance up the
and the terrain between their current east bank of the Vologne to Bruyeres,
positions and Bruyeres was, if any- leaving the Faite forest to the 45th
thing, even more difficult. Yet any at- Division, with security forces along
tempt to take what was obviously the the river itself covering his left flank.
easiest and most direct route to their To accomplish this, Dahlquist
objective area—marching straight up planned to have the 141st regiment,
the Vologne River valley, with German with its two battalions and attached
units of unknown size in the forests on armor, make the division’s main as-
both flanks—seemed extremely dan- sault between Lepanges and St. Jean-
gerous. du-Marche. The 141st would be sup-
Believing that at least one of his ported by a secondary attack north
282 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

from the ridge line of Hill 728–827 On 2 October he created a similar


toward D–30 between Houx and Re- grouping, Task Force Danzi, to sup-
haupal, and beyond. But Dahlquist port the 141st Infantry on the east
gave the latter task to the 143d Infan- side of the river.12 While a small part
try, transferring it east from the Faite of the force deployed in the St. Jean-
forest area and moving the tired 142d du-Marche area to protect the right
into reserve for a long-needed rest. rear of the 141st Infantry, the main
During the repositioning, the 143d body assembled near Prey, on the Vo-
was even able to occupy the town of logne a mile northeast of Lepanges,
Houx on 2 October; henceforth, a with the principal mission of assisting
small north-south road between Houx the infantry drive toward Herpel-
and Herpelmont would mark the mont. On the 3d, Purdy assumed con-
boundary between the two attacking trol of this force, while retaining com-
regiments. mand of the one west of the Vologne,
During the planning process, Dahl- but both were now subordinate to the
quist had considered making his main 141st regiment.
effort west of the Vologne River, From 1 to 4 October, the 141st,
where his forces might have better still with only two infantry battalions,
complemented the offensive oper- made substantial progress pushing
ations of Eagles' 45th Division. How- through the heavy forests, and by
ever, he felt that such a move, cou- dusk on the 4th it had secured rough-
pled with the pending redeployment ly two-thirds of the rectangle. Its left
of the 3d Division on his right flank flank was on the Vologne near Prey,
from the Le Tholy area, would have and the right had crossed the Houx-
given the defending 716th Division too Herpelmont road toward the western
much room to prepare a counterat- slopes of Hill 676, half a mile south
tack from the southeast, and so he of Herpelmont. However, the regi-
abandoned the idea. ment now began to run out of steam,
One of Dahlquist's major problems casualties started to mount, and the
was making the best use of his attached Nineteenth Army began deploying rein-
armor in this type of terrain. Like most forcements into the area.
other American divisions, he had one In the 143d Infantry's sector,
tank battalion and one tank destroyer progress had been slower. By 4 Octo-
battalion attached, which he habitually
broke up into mixed task groupings. Company B, 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion
He had already formed one such unit, a Company B, 111th Engineer Combat Battalion,
36th Division
small armored blocking force under Lt. 36th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop.
Col. Edward M. Purdy, commanding 12The initial composition of TF Danzi was the fol-
the 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion, to lowing:
Company A, 753d Tank Battalion ( – 3 tanks)
securethe west bank of the Vologne Company C, 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion
River. 11 (–1 platoon)
Reconnaissance Company, 636th Tank Destroy-
er Battalion
1136th Inf Div OI 303100A Sep 44. Initially, the Antitank Company, 141st Infantry
blocking force consisted of the following elements: Company F, 141st Infantry (–1 platoon)
Company B, 753d Tank Battalion One platoon, Company C, 141st Infantry.
THE ROAD T O ST. DIE 283

ber the regiment had cleared the armor along the back roads and main
Houx area, pushed northeast a mile trails, as well as across what open
and a half up the Houx-Herpelmont ground there was, immediately
road, and, on the right, advanced brought down carefully registered
over a mile southeast from Houx German artillery, antitank, and mortar
along Route D–30. But the 143d fire. The LXIV Corps apparently did
quickly discovered that German artil- not suffer from any serious ammuni-
lery and mortar fire prevented them tion shortages.
from using either of the narrow roads The limited Vosges offensive pro-
as a supply route or an axis of ad- duced, in fact, a serious shortage of
vance; like the 141st, the regiment artillery ammunition in the VI Corps,
was forced to depend on a variety of forcing Truscott to place severe re-
time-consuming cross-country routes strictions on the number of daily
for these purposes. Both regiments rounds expended by each of the divi-
also found that German resistance sion’s artillery battalions. Dahlquist’s
grew stronger as their advance carried troops, who were perhaps the most
them slowly to the east-west road nets dependent on indirect fire support
of D–51 and D–50 that the Germans because of the nature of the fighting,
were undoubtedly using to supply felt the restrictions the hardest. As a
their forces. partial remedy, on 4 October Dahl-
Not surprisingly, armor played a quist ordered the division’s tank and
minimal role in the struggle, and in tank destroyer units to be attached to
fact the 141st Infantry units com- one of his three field artillery battal-
plained loudly about the lack of tank ions by night in order to undertake
support. 13 The real problem, howev- the harassing and interdiction mis-
er, was the terrain, which restricted sions normally fired by the artillery
vehicles to back roads and trails that batteries, making at least some use of
were easily interdicted by mines, de- his impotent armor. 14
molitions, and German artillery fire. At about the same time Dahlquist
In addition, rain and fog severely lim- also combined Purdy’s task forces
ited visibility, often leaving the tanks into a larger grouping, Felber Force,
and tank destroyers with nothing at under Lt. Col. Joseph G. Felber, the
which to fire. The rain and heavy commander of the 753d Tank Battal-
military traffic broke up back roads ion.1 5 At the behest of the 141st In-
and turned mountain trails into
muddy quagmires that bogged down
tracked vehicles; booby-trapped road- 14Using armor in this manner was in keeping with
blocks, together with numerous mines current Army doctrine.
15As organized on 5 October Felber Force con-
along most of the better routes, sisted of the following:
slowed the armor to the pace of engi- Company A, 753d Tank Battalion
neer clearing operations. Finally, in Company B, 753d Tank Battalion
most cases, the noisy movement of Company B, 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion
Company C, 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion
Company B, 111th Engineer Combat Battalion
Reconnaissance Company, 636th Tank Destroy-
13141st Inf AAR, Oct 44, p. 8. er Battalion
284 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

fantry, Felber Force passed from regi- Fimenil, about a mile short (south-
mental to division control, but the east) of Laval.
transfer caused some confusion, leav- Meanwhile, by 10 October, the
ing the 141st with little control over 143d Infantry had secured most of
its armored support. By the morning the dominating terrain from the
of 7 October, only two tanks and two southern slopes of Hill 676 south
tank destroyers were physically with nearly three miles to Route D–30
the 141st Infantry. Although a re- near Rehaupal. The regiment’s gains
quest to division headquarters allowed artillery forward observers to
brought a platoon of tanks and an- direct counterbattery fire on German
other of tank destroyers back to regi- positions along the upper (western)
mental control, the bulk of the 36th Vologne River valley west of D–50
Division’s armor remained assigned and on rising ground east of the
to Felber Force under Dahlquist’s river.
direct supervision. Since the advanc- The 142d Infantry began moving
ing infantry could seldom employ back into the line on 5 October, but
more than one or two tanks profitably made limited progress in the area
at any one time, Dahlquist judged it south of the 143d. On 13 October the
best to keep the bulk of the machines 142d took over the 143d Infantry’s
in reserve for the moment. positions from the vicinity of Hill 676
From 4 October through the 14th, south to Route D–30, while the 143d
daily progress of both the 141st and prepared to switch back to the 36th
143d Infantry was measured in yards. Division’s left for a renewed attack
Resistance from the 716th Division toward Bruyeres. In fact, during the
stiffened markedly and, while the op- later stage of their slow advance
position was largely static in nature, northward, the 36th Division regi-
German patrols constantly harassed ments normally deployed only two
the 36th Division’s supply routes. battalions on line, switching them
Herpelmont fell to the 141st Infantry back and forth to give each a seven-
on 8 October, but German artillery to ten-day rest. The division also
fire rendered the road junction un- began preparing to resume VI Corps’
tenable. The 141st nevertheless se- drive toward St. Die, to which the
cured Hill 676 south of Herpelmont, limited gains through 14 October had
as well as the high ground immediate- been a necessary, if costly, prelude.
ly northwest of town. By the evening The 36th Division’s infantry casualties
of 14 October the regiment had also for the period 1–14 October num-
cleared Beaumenil on Route D–50, a bered approximately 85 killed, 845
mile northwest of Herpelmont, and wounded, and 115 missing, for an of-
ficial total of 1,045, almost half of
which were suffered by the tired
Antitank Company, 141st Infantry 141st regiment. 16
36th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop
The change in command from Purdy to Felber
originated with a plan to transfer much of the 636th
Tank Destroyer Battalion to 45th Division control, 16 Sources are the regimental records and AARs
and this redeployment began on 6 October. for October 1944.
THE ROAD T O ST. DIE 285

MAP 21

The 3d Division Corps would soon relieve the 7th In-


fantry, but the division’s principal ob-
Immediately south of the 36th Divi- jective was still Gerardmer, some ten
sion lay the sector of the 3d Division’s miles northeast along Route N–4 17
30th Infantry regiment, which had from St. Ame, with an intermediate
moved to its parent unit’s left flank objective of Le Tholy, about halfway
on 29 September. The 15th Infantry to Gerardmer. At the time, ongoing
held the 3d Division’s center around negotiations with the French to take
St. Ame, and on the far right the 7th over the area had not yet affected the
Infantry held along the Moselle as far division’s plans.
as Ferdrupt, nine miles farther south Located at the junction of Routes
(Map 21). Current VI Corps plans en- D–11 and N–4 17 five miles northeast
visaged that elements of French II of St. Ame, Le Tholy had become the
286 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

center of German resistance in the units with its own 305th Grenadiers, the
region. Route N–417, representing attached 602d and 608th Mobile Battal-
the most direct avenue to Le Tholy ions, two battle groups built on rem-
from the Moselle, ran through a nants of the 196th and 200th Security
mountain valley, along which flowed Regiments, and a host of smaller ad
the Rupt de Cleurie River, actually a hoc units that the 198th Division was
small watercourse no larger than a absorbing to rebuild its depleted
brook. Much of the valley, up to a ranks. Later the 7th Infantry would
mile wide, was given over to open, also encounter troops of the 198th Di-
rolling farmland rising on both sides vision’s 326th Grenadiers on its south-
of the stream to rough, forested hills. ern flank, while on the north the 30th
For over half the distance from St. Infantry would run into elements of
Ame to Le Tholy, Route N–417 ran the 716th Division, the bulk of which
along open slopes east of the river, was battling the 36th Division.
and country lanes provided additional The attack of the 3d Division, Trus-
mobility throughout the valley, at cott’s best and most experienced unit,
least in good weather. However, a ran into trouble from the beginning.
number of stone quarries, usually By 1 October, the slowly advancing
near the tree line, punctuated the 15th Infantry had come up against a
upper slopes of the Cleurie valley on major German strongpoint at one of
both sides of the river, providing the the largest quarries, L’Omet, on the
Germans with ready-made defensive eastern side of the valley, only about
positions. a mile and a half north of St. Ame,
At the end of September General and there the advance of the division
O’Daniel, the 3d Division command- up N–417 halted. Unable to force
er, intended to send the 15th Infantry L’Omet, O’Daniel switched his main
directly up Route N–417 from St. effort to the 30th Infantry still ad-
Ame toward Le Tholy, supported by vancing through the woods west of
the 30th Infantry working through the valley, but even there progress
wooded hills along the western side was slow. Terrain and weather pre-
of the valley. Once de Monsabert’s cluded both armor and air support
French forces arrived in the south, and greatly limited the effectiveness
O’Daniel planned to bring his third of artillery. Not until 10 October did
regiment, the 7th Infantry, up to the the regiment reach Route D–11,
St. Ame area as well to launch a sup- about a mile and a half northwest of
porting, limited objective attack east- Le Tholy, and secure Hill 781, over-
ward along the axis of Route D–23, a looking Le Tholy on the north. There
rather difficult southerly approach to the 30th Infantry quickly discovered
Gerardmer. that the Germans had the town—
Facing the 3d Division was LXIV which was in a shambles—well cov-
Corps’ 198th Division, the unit that had ered by artillery fire and had estab-
earlier counterattacked the 36th Divi- lished strong defenses to the west,
sion in the same area. During the first making a further advance toward Ger-
half of October the German division ardmer temporarily impossible. The
opposed the advance of O’Daniel’s 30th Infantry, accordingly, made no
THE ROAD T O ST. DIE 287

determined effort to clear Le Tholy On 4 October the attack continued


or to push eastward through the behind the supporting fire of three
town. Having suffered some 600 casu- artillery battalions, but made little
alties during the period 30 Septem- progress until tanks laboriously made
ber-10 October, the regiment needed their way up to the west entrance,
to catch its breath. knocking down the stone roadblocks
In the center the 15th Infantry had and finally opening up the interior of
meanwhile found the northern and the quarry to the infantry. The last
southern entrances to L’Omet quarry organized resistance crumbled during
nearly cliff-like and covered by midafternoon on the 5th, with some
German automatic weapons fire, twenty Germans fleeing after most of
while at the eastern and western ap- the defenders had apparently evacuat-
proaches the Germans had piled up ed their positions during the night.
impressive stone roadblocks across a Following the quarry fight, the 15th
narrow route through the quarry. Infantry found the going easier as the
Inside the quarry, passageways, tun- Germans grudgingly gave way. On 6
nels, stone walls, and scrap piles of October the regimental left reached
broken stone provided the defenders the town of La Forge, about halfway
with good cover and concealment. Al- to Le Tholy on Route N–417.
though the number of Germans German artillery and mortar fire
within the quarry at first probably again took command of the highway,
numbered no more than a few hun- however, and it was not until the 11th
dred, reinforcements arrived during that infantry from the 15th regiment
the battle, while other troops manned could secure the town. 18 Thereafter
machine-gun positions in the adjacent the regiment avoided the center of
woods to cover most approaches to the valley, pushed more rapidly across
the quarry. Not surprisingly, infantry wooded hills east of the highway, and
assaults on the quarry between 30 by the evening of 14 October occu-
September and 2 October proved pied a line from Route N–417 just
useless. On the 3d, two tank destroy- south of Le Tholy west another two
ers and two special M4 tanks mount- and a half miles along good, wooded
ing 105-mm. howitzers pumped about holding ground.
500 rounds of high explosive ammu- On the 15th Infantry’s right, the
nition into the German defensive 7th Infantry regiment had begun its
works, while mortars of the 1st Battal- own infiltration of the Vosges Moun-
ion, 15th Infantry, lobbed in a week’s tains. At the end of September the 3d
allotment of ammunition. The effort Battalion, 7th Infantry, held positions
had little effect.17 on high, forested terrain south of St.
Ame, which overlooked, to the east,
17For an account, see Donald G . Taggart, ed.,
the road junction town of Vagney on
History of the Third Infantry Division in World War II Route D–23 and the Moselotte River.
(Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1947),
pp. 248–49. The 15th Infantry’s commander, Col.
Richard G . Thomas, suffered a heart attack on 4 18For heroic action near La Forge on 9 October,
October, and Lt. Col. Hallett D. Edson, the regi- 1st Lt. Victor L. Kandle of the 15th Infantry was
mental executive officer took over the command. awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.
288 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

4.2-INCH MORTARS HIT LE THOLY

At the time the 1st Battalion was still 3–4 October. It began its attack on
based at Rupt-sur-Moselle, seven Vagney late on the afternoon of the
miles south of St. Ame, and had pro- 4th, with the 2d Battalion seizing the
jected some strength several miles up high ground north of the St. Ame-
into the Foret de Longegoutte toward Sapois road, and the other units
the Moselotte; the 2d Battalion was crossing D–23 to secure Hill 822, a
concentrated around Ferdrupt, three mile west of Vagney. After a three-
miles southeast up the Moselle from day battle Vagney fell on 7 October,
Rupt. When relieved by the 3d Alge- two days earlier than the VI Corps
rian Division of the French II Corps, and 3d Division had expected.
the 7th Infantry was to concentrate in This time the Germans defended
the St. Ame area and then seize their mountain strongholds with
Vagney and the nearby forested vigor. About 2020 on the 7th,
heights. German infantry, with the support of
Leaving behind small holding de- two tanks, launched a desperate coun-
tachments, the regiment quietly rede- terattack into Vagney. In the fog and
ployed its two battalions along the darkness the 7th Infantry’s troops
Moselle during the nights of 2–3 and mistook the lead German tank for a
THE ROAD T O ST. DIE 289

vehicle of the 756th Tank Battalion,cott to pull the 3d Division out of a


which had a platoon of mediums in region that had become a dead end
the area. The German armor then for the VI Corps. Truscott wanted the
penetrated quickly into the town, 3d Division to spearhead a renewed
taking the command posts of both theoffensive toward St. Die, while de
1st and 3d Battalions under fire, Monsabert felt the St. Ame-Vagney
which led to a wild melee before theregion would give him a back door to
German force was finally ejected.19 the German defenses at Le Thillot
Brushing off the German counterat-and southward. The subsequent relief
of the 3d Division caused some prob-
tack, the 7th Infantry’s right pushed
up the Moselotte River on the 8th tolems between the American and
secure Zainvillers, a mile south of French commands, and between
Vagney, but not before the Germans Truscott and Patch as well. The 3d
blew the Zainvillers bridge. The left
Algerian Division, beset by supply
meanwhile reached out along D–23 and transportation problems and en-
toward Sapois, a mile and a half west
gaged in a new offensive against the
of Vagney. After three days of stub-Gerardmer-Le Thillot area, had been
born resistance the Germans with- unable to move northward in strength
drew from Sapois, and troops of the as rapidly as the American command-
7th Infantry moved in, ending the ers had expected. Meanwhile German
regiment’s last significant action in
resistance in the Vagney area had
the Vagney area. Plans to push part proved stronger than estimated,
of the 7th Infantry toward Gerardmermaking it dangerous for the 7th In-
along Route D–23 had been aban- fantry to disengage until the Algeri-
doned by this time, and already ele-ans had substantial strength on the
ments of the regiment had moved out ground. In the interim, sharp differ-
of the line as troops of the 3d Algeri-
ences arose between Patch and Trus-
an Division began arriving from the cott over the scope of 7th Infantry
south to relieve the American unit. operations in the area, and later be-
tween the French and the Americans
Reliefand Redeployment when de Monsabert’s forces were fi-
nally able to assume responsibility for
Since 28 September, discussions the additional territory. 20
had been under way between the U.S.
Seventh and First French Armies re- 20The boundary discussions during late Septem-
garding the movement of the inter- ber and early October were complicated, reflecting
army boundary north, which would aheadquarters
series of misunderstandings on the part of the
and commanders most concerned. See
give the French more room to ma- 6th Army Gp LI 1, 26 Sep 44; Devers Diary, 28
neuver against the northern ap- Sep–8Oct44; Seventh Army Diary, 30 Sep–4 Oct
proaches to Belfort and allow Trus- 44; Seventh Army Conf File, Bk 7, Confs of 1 and 3
Oct 44; Seventh Army FO 6, 29 Sep 44; Seventh
Army Rpt, II, 359-61; Rad, CPX-14229, Seventh
19Fatally wounded, 2d Lt. James L. Harris, the Army to VI Corps et al., 4 Oct 44; de Lattre, History,
756th Tank Battalion’s platoon leader in Vagney, pp. 192-98; First Fr Army Personal and Secret Instr
demonstrated extreme heroism during the fight and 3, 30 Sep 44; First Fr Army SO 76, 4 Oct 44; First
was posthumously awarded the Congressional Fr Army, “Note Concerning the Development of
Medal of Honor. Opns on the Front of First French Army,” 9 Oct 44.
290 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

Trouble began on 7 October when small patrols out of Zainvillers. At the


the VI Corps directed the 3d Infantry time, both Truscott and O’Daniel
Division to be prepared to move most were more interested in preserving
of the 7th Infantry out of the line the strength of both the 3d Division
after 1000 on the 8th, replacing the and its 7th regiment for the projected
infantry with engineer and armored drive on St. Die and did not want to
units. During the course of the 8th, commit the regiment deeply into the
however, Seventh Army informed VI Moselotte valley. In the end, the 7th
Corps that such preparations were Infantry left only a small holding de-
premature. Keeping close track of the tachment at Zainvillers, pending the
French progress northward as well as arrival of French troops, and abruptly
their attacks on Le Thillot and Ger- ended its advance in the north after
ardmer, Patch realized that the 3d Al- securing Sapois on the 11th. Follow-
gerian Division could not possibly ing the fall of Sapois, O’Daniel began
take over the 7th Infantry’s positions redeploying the rest of the 7th Infan-
on 8 October, and instead recom- try, replacing them by the morning of
mended that the 7th continue its at- the 12th with two companies of the
tacks eastward in support of de Mon- 48th Engineer Combat Battalion.21All
sabert’s offensive. Truscott objected, American pressure against the
fearing that the attacks would tie up German forces in the area was thus
the 7th Infantry for some days; fur- relaxed, well before the French offen-
thermore, he pointed out that Patch’s sive just to the south ended.
orders of 4 October had limited the By the 12th even Truscott, who
7th Infantry’s responsibilities to the now realized that de Monsabert’s
seizure of Vagney and neighboring corps could initially put little more
high ground. After more discussion, than a reconnaissance squadron and
Patch reluctantly agreed that it would an FFI battalion in the Sapois-
probably accomplish little to have the Vagney-Zainvillers area, began to
7th Infantry advance farther along have second thoughts about the
Route D–34, but insisted that the speed of the 3d Division’s disengage-
regiment maintain strong pressure to ment; he, therefore, directed O’Dan-
the east. iel to leave at least one battalion of
Truscott and General O’Daniel in- the 7th Infantry at Vagney for added
terpreted the Seventh Army instruc- security. However, two days later, on
tions as loosely as possible. On the 14 October, Devers officially moved
9th O’Daniel pulled the 2d Battalion, the interarmy boundary north of
7th Infantry, out of the front line and, Route N–417 and Le Tholy, and be-
by the morning of the 10th, had also tween 14 and 17 October the French
assembled the 7th regiment’s 1st Bat- II Corps assumed responsibility for
talion in reserve at Vagney. Mean- the area, relieving first the remaining
while the two commanders had 7th Infantry battalion and then the
agreed between themselves that the 15th regiment. It was not until 23 Oc-
7th Infantry would make no further
efforts south; consequently, the 7th 21A separate, nondivisional unit attached to VI
never went beyond dispatching a few Corps and reattached to the 3d Infantry Division.
THE ROAD T O ST. DIE 291

tober, though, that units of the 36th ings. In part he felt these difficulties
Division finally relieved O’Daniel’s were a product of the heavy officer
last regiment, the 30th, in the Le and NCO casualties sustained by the
Tholy-La Forge area west of N-417. fighting units in both Italy and France
None of O’Daniel’s regiments had ac- and the resulting decline in leader-
complished much in any of their ship as enlisted men were rapidly pro-
zones since the 11th, giving little sup- moted to take up the slack.22
port to de Monsabert’s offensive be- Other VI Corps officers echoed
tween 4 and 17 October and allowing these concerns. The commander of
the Germans ample time to rebuild the 3d Division’s 15th Infantry felt
their battered defenses before the that his regiment’s quality was slip-
newly arriving French units could ping. Replacements, he averred, were
begin to pose a threat. All in all, the often inept and poorly trained. More-
lack of coordination between the two over, the many veterans of the regi-
Allied forces did not augur well for ment’s bitter fighting in the snow-
the future. drenched mountains of Italy had little
stomach left for another winter’s op-
The Vosges Fighting: Problems and erations in French mountains. In the
Solutions 45th Division the 180th Infantry re-
ported about sixty-five recent combat
As the VI Corps moved into the fatigue cases, while at the same time
High Vosges during late September skin infections were becoming endem-
and early October, wear and tear on ic, largely as the result of constant
its three infantry divisions greatly ac- wet weather and a chronic shortage of
celerated. As early as 26 September bathing facilities. Col. Paul D. Adams,
General O’Daniel, commanding the commanding the 143d Infantry of the
3d Division, observed a significant de- 36th Division, reported an almost
cline in the aggressiveness of his in- alarming mental and physical lethargy
fantry units. Explanations that the among the troops of his regiment,
troops were wet and tired and devel- and General Dahlquist, the division
oping a certain caution–based on a commander, had to tell General Trus-
general feeling that the war would cott that the 36th had little punch
soon be over-failed to satisfy O’Dan- left.
iel, who urged his subordinate com- Dahlquist felt that he had been
manders to emphasize that a go-easy driving his troops too hard and, after
attitude could only prolong the war privately discussing the problem with
and increase casualties. Dahlquist, his regimental commanders, had es-
commanding the 36th, later noted the tablished small division rest camps for
disciplinary problems that all VI his infantrymen. According to Colo-
Corps units were experiencing, espe- nel Adams, the troops needed to be
cially desertions among the line infan- rested continually during the late
try companies in combat (50-60 cases
per division) and the ever-present
22Ltr, Dahlquist to Brig Gen Edward C. Betts,
straggler phenomenon that had af- HQ, ETO, 21 Nov 44, Correspondence, John E.
flicted the corps since the initial land- Dahlquist Papers, MHI.
292 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE
autumn and winter fighting in the received by rail only 20 tons of am-
Vosges because of the terrain and munition, while its units were expend-
weather. “It takes about three days ing ammunition at the rate of nearly
[of rest] with men that age,” he 1,000 tons per day. To make up for
judged. rail deficiencies, the 6th Army Group
You give them three days and they’ll . . . had to continue to rely on long truck
be back in shape without any trouble. Just hauls, but increasingly bad weather,
leave them alone, let them sleep and eat deteriorating highways, vehicle main-
the first day, make them clean up the tenance requirements, and the 400-
second day, and do whatever they want to mile distance from ports to forward
do the rest of the time, and they’ll be
readyto go.23 depots combined to make road trans-
portation increasingly difficult and
Once the division headquarters slow. In addition, moving supplies
became sensitive to the issue of battle from forward depots to units in the
fatigue, Adams felt, the 36th did field also proved arduous as the tacti-
much better despite the hardships it cal forces moved farther into the
had undergone and would continue mountains.
to meet in the future. General Truscott had one solution
Improvements in the Seventh to his tactical transportation prob-
Army’s supply situation might have lems. On 2 October, anticipating the
alleviated some of these problems, hardships of mountain campaigning,
but General Devers’ optimism over he requested two pack trains from
the capabilities of his Mediterranean Italy. After numerous delays, the
supply lines proved premature. De- 513th Pack Quartermaster Company
spite the fall of Marseille, Toulon, finally arrived in the Vosges area on
and the lesser Riviera ports and the 23 November with 300 mules and a
best efforts of Army logisticians in the veterinary detachment. Dividing the
communications zone, the 6th Army mule trains between the divisions still
Group’s land supply lines were still in the Vosges, the mule skinners and
overextended. At the end of Septem- their charges were able to haul ra-
ber the Seventh Army requested daily tions and munitions to the infantry
rail delivery of some 4,485 tons of units by night. Although providing
supplies and ammunition for the forage for the animals was a problem,
period 1–7 October; however, the 6th the users reported little or no inter-
Army Group’s G–4, now responsible ference from German artillery or
for setting rail priorities, could allo- mines and booby traps; and resupply,
cate to the Seventh Army only 2,270 even in the most difficult terrain, was
rail-tons per day, and actual receipts possible. 24 Had the animals and
ran well below that figure. On 5 Oc- trained handlers been readily avail-
tober, for example, the Seventh Army able earlier, they obviously would
received only 1,655 tons by rail, and have been useful throughout the
on the 6th about 1,670 tons. During Vosges campaign.
the same two days the Seventh Army Ammunition was another concern.

23Adams Interv, pp. 7–8. 24SeventhArmy Rpt, I, 549.


THE ROAD TO ST. DIE 293

ARTILLERY
MUNITIONS:VITALIN THE VOSGES

Even before Truscott began his limit- thirty rounds. During much of the
ed October offensive, VI Corps was early part of October, however, Sev-
feeling the pinch of a shortage of ar- enth Army depots could not even fur-
tillery and other types of munitions.25 nish enough ammunition to meet
On 2 October, for example, the 30th these restricted rates. Even .30-caliber
Infantry of the 3d Division reported ammunition was sometimes critically
that it was down to 300 rounds of 81- short, and the 3d Division had to
mm. mortar rounds and was ap- almost denude the support units of
proaching the exhaustion of its M1 small arms ammunition to supply its
rifle ammunition. Severe rationing rifle companies and machine-gun pla-
was the only immediate answer. toons. For several days, in fact, there
Throughout the 3d Division, for ex- was no M 1 rifle ammunition to be
ample, O’Daniel limited 60-mm. found at the Seventh Army’s expand-
mortar ammunition expenditures to ing supply installations in and around
eight rounds per weapon per day and Epinal. T o preserve morale, Truscott
81-mm. mortars to eleven rounds, even prohibited the dissemination of
105-mm. howitzers to thirty-two information on overall ammunition al-
rounds, and 155-mm. howitzers to locations below the level of infantry
regiment and divisional artillery head-
25On the ammunition crisis, see ibid., 540–43. quarters.
294 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

Although the VI Corps’ ammuni- to Dijon, and on the 26th, the Conti-
tion shortages were partly overcome nental Advance Section (CONAD),
by mid-October, quartermaster sup- under Maj. Gen. Arthur R. Wilson,
plies and rations remained a problem. became operational at Dijon, absorb-
Units often had to exist on half-ra- ing the advanced echelon of CBS.
tions or live off packaged, hard ra- Supply agencies along the Mediterra-
tions for days at a time. More serious, nean coast then passed to the control
clothing for wet, cold weather was of a new headquarters, Delta Base
scarce. Winter clothing did not begin Section (DBS), under Brig. Gen. John
to arrive in adequate amounts until P. Ratay. Retaining some personnel
after 20 October, and even by the from the old CBS, DBS obtained ad-
end of the month shoe-pacs (rubber- ditional manpower from Northern
ized boots), heavy sweaters, and Base Section on Corsica, which
extra-heavy socks were available to ceased to exist. At the same time SOS
only about 75 percent of the infantry. NATOUSA (still located at Caserta,
Heavy, long overcoats were on hand, Italy) set up an advanced echelon at
but their usefulness was doubtful, for Dijon under Brig. Gen. Morris W.
the field units reported that the gar- Gilland. The French logistical agency,
ment was “too bulky for reconnais- Base 901, divided its personnel be-
sance and armored units to use in tween DBS and CONAD, with most
their compact fighting compartments of Base 901 moving up to Dion with
. . . [and] so immobilizing that it CONAD, and Brig. Gen. Georges
cannot be worn by the infantry, and, Granier becoming the deputy com-
if issued to them, will be discarded manding general of CONAD for
the first time they attack.” 26The in- French affairs. Although the various
fantry much preferred the long, lined changes were phased in fairly rapidly
M–1943 field jacket, and the 3d Divi- and all became effective on 1 Octo-
sion gradually managed to amass ber, several weeks were necessary
enough of these jackets to outfit its before the new organizations could
infantry battalions. Other units re- function smoothly and support the
ported shortages of signal and engi- army group’s growing requirements.
neer equipment of all types through- However, in some areas theater logis-
out October, but the technical service ticians were powerless. The shortage
units generally accomplished their of artillery ammunition, for example,
missions through improvisation, sub- was a theaterwide concern, and the
stitution, and outright scrounging. solution would ultimately depend on
The solution to many of these increasing production in the United
problems was the strengthening of States and Great Britain.27
the logistical organizations supporting In the end, terrain and weather were
the 6th Army Group. T o this end, on the most decisive factors in defining
18 September the Continental Base the character of the Vosges fighting.
Section (CBS) at Marseille moved an
advanced echelon of its headquarters
27Seventh Army Diary, 13 Nov 44; and for an ex-
tended discussion see Ruppenthal, Logistical Support
263d Inf Div AAR Oct 44, Sec IV, Supply, p. 3. of the Armies, II, 247–63.
THE ROAD T O ST. DIE 295

With only ten good flying days during with forests to continue down the forward
the month of October, Allied air power slopes until the open country is under
was less effective interdicting German small arms fire and artillery observation. 28
troop movements behind the battle- Interestingly, General Balck of Army
field, and Allied ground units were Group G also likened the situation in
more dependent on artillery fire sup- the Vosges to jungle fighting, the key
port despite the shortage of ammuni-
to which he considered to be having
tion. Armor, except as mobile artillery,
was less useful in the mountains, leav- plenty of infantry on hand.29 To this,
ing the bulk of the fighting on both all small-unit commanders could
sides to the infantry battalions; even readily agree.
here the compartmentalized terrain Truscott probably also would have
made it difficult to maneuver units that agreed with these judgments. The
were larger than platoons and squads. weather, terrain, and lack of infantry
In the words of one regimental com- had prevented him from putting more
mander: force in the push to Bruyeres and
Brouvelieures. Nevertheless, the VI
The fighting during the month of Oc- Corps was still in a better position to
tober was comparable to jungle fighting,
where . . . maintenance of direction was make a more decisive effort toward St.
most difficult because of the dense for- Die and ultimately Strasbourg and the
ests. This alone resulted in many errone- Rhine. Securing the Rambervillers area
ous reports as to locations of units and in the north and the sector defined by
enemy positions. Difficulties arose as
orders based on the best available infor- Le Tholy and Route N–417 in the
mation, which was frequently inaccurate, south gave the corps more protection
miscarried,and at times resulted in bitter on both of its flanks, while the 45th and
and unexpected fighting . . . [and he ad- 36th Divisions had just about cleared
vised that] all commanders must report the way to Bruyeres and Brouvelieures
actual conditions carefully, avoiding all
possibility of errors in locations of units in the center. At the same time, both of
and omitting entirely reports based on these divisions had managed to rest
optimism rather than fact. Forest areas many of their infantry battalions, never
must be mopped up thoroughly. Small, putting their full strength on the line.
well-dug-in enemy detachments if not
mopped up will harrass supply columns, In the south, the arrival of French units
and present difficult problemsof liquida- finally allowed Truscott to pull almost
tion because of our inability to use our the entire 3d Division into reserve,
supporting weapons inside our lines. . . . where it would rest and refit for the
Sometimes the enemy deliberately lets us major VI Corps offensive soon to
get as close as seventy-five or one hun-
dred yards to him before disclosing his follow. Meanwhile, on the German
presence with fire, and on occasion lets side, the combat strength of the 16th
the leading elementspass by. This re- and 716th Infantry Divisions had been
ducedthe fightto a small arms fight with steadily eroded, and the two units had
the enemy enjoyingthe advantage
of
good the top of a hill been regularly pushed back, giving
cover....Holding
or even what is ordinarily termed the
military crest of a wooded hill does not 28Extracted from “Conclusions of Regimental
necessarily give us control of the sur- Commander,” 36th Inf Div AAR Oct 44, p. 2.
rounding terrain. We must require all 29Ltr, Balck to Jodl, 10 Oct 44, cited in von Lutti-
units engaged in capturing a hill covered chau, “German Operations,” ch. 20, pp. 13–14.
296 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

them little time to improve their defen- more serious logistical problems and
sive positions and forcing their parent expand their unique supply routes
corps to commit what reserves they had through southern France, a more con-
to shore up their patchwork defensive centrated VI Corps push through the
lines. If the Seventh Army and the 6th Vosges might well split the two weak-
Army Group could solve some of their ening German divisions far apart.
CHAPTER XVI

Approaching the Gaps: Belfort


While the XV Corps moved out of northern, wing, de Monsabert’s II
Luneville toward the Mondon and Corps positioned the French 1st In-
Parroy forests and the VI Corps fantry and 1st Armored Divisions on
began its approach to the Moselle, the northern routes to Belfort; in the
the First French Army had marked center and on the right, or southern,
time, waiting for the men, materiel, wing, General Bethouart’s I Corps re-
and supplies that would ultimately inforced the 3d Algerian Division with
fuel de Lattre’s offensive against the the 9th Colonial Infantry Division and
Belfort Gap. For the moment strong Moroccan Tabor units from southern
German resistance along the ap- France. General du Vigier’s armored
proaches to Belfort made any limited division had finally been strengthened
efforts futile, and the French had to with its third combat command, and,
be content with moving up the rest of like Truscott, he and de Monsabert
their units from southern and central were eager to move east before the
France and deploying them on line. German defenses had solidified. AI-
Yet, perhaps even more than the though many of de Lattre’s units were
American commanders, the French still arriving from North Africa, Amer-
leaders were restless. French territory ican difficulties on the northern flank
and people lay before them—towns, of the French army soon gave the
villages, and hamlets still under French tactical commanders an op-
German rule and subject to the ca- portunity for action. 1
prices of the harsh German occupa- By 23 September both Truscott and
tion. Moreover, the German defenses
still appeared to be weak in many 1 French planning information is from de Lattre,
areas, especially in the mountains History, pp. 182–86 and Histoire (French language
edition), Annexe V, Extrait du Journal de March
where dense forests made it difficult tenu au 3e Bureau de l’Etat-Major de la Ire Armee
to establish a continuous line of re- Francaise, CG II French Corps to CG VI Corps, 23
sistance. It was a temptation that Sep 44; II French Corps, General Opns Order 18,
23 Sep 44; Ltr, CG II French Corps to CG VI
French officers found hard to resist. Corps, 24 Sep 44; 1st French Armored Division,
General Opns Order 19, 24 Sep 44; Ltr, CG 1st
French Armored Division to CG 3d Infantry Divi-
The Initial French Attacks sion, 24 Sep 44; Memo, Lt Col G. F. Hawkens, G–3
Ops, to BG Jenkins, ACofS G–3 6th Army Gp (no
sub), 24 Sep 44, in 6th Army Gp SGS File 565; 1st
On the First French Army’s left, or French Infantry Division GO 25, 25 Sep 44.
298 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

O’Daniel had also become concerned Sudre to move through the sector of
about the growing gap between the the 3d Division and attack Le Thillot
U.S. VI Corps and the French II from the north, on the eastern side of
Corps, especially considering the 3d the Moselle. CC Caldiarou, the new
Division’s failure to make any head- arrival, was to push up Route N–486
way on its right wing toward the Mo- with the 3d African Chasseurs toward
selle. Although French and American Le Thillot from the south; and CC
cavalry units had tried to cover the Kientz and a brigade of the French
sector between the two Allied forces, 1st Infantry Division was to launch a
they had been stretched thin and supporting attack south of the high-
were unable to move up Route N–486 way. The plan obviously called for
to Le Thillot. Le Thillot itself, a key more strength than the limited forces
road junction town on the upper approved by de Lattre; but both de
reaches of the Moselle River, lay in Monsabert and du Vigier, still com-
the French zone of advance and had manding the French 1st Armored Di-
become one of the major anchors of vision, viewed the American request
the German defenses in the moun- as an opportunity to outflank the
tains north of Belfort. Accordingly, main German defenses at Belfort be-
on 23 September, Truscott asked de tween Lure and Issy-les-Doubs, and
Monsabert if his forces could assume hoped that a quick strike by du Vi-
complete responsibility for Le Thillot gier’s entire division might catch the
area. At the time he suggested that Germans by surprise.
the French make an armored thrust The French southern attack began
up N–486 from Lure complemented early on 25 September, and the main
by a second French drive on Le Thil- assault on Le Thillot started on the
lot from the north, using the crossing 26th after the attacking units had
sites at Rupt and La Roche that moved up to forward assembly areas.
O’Daniel’s 3d Division had finally se- De Monsabert’s plans were flexible.
cured. Since the American forces He hoped to catch the Germans un-
were encountering only spotty de- awares and either cut a path through
fenses along the Moselle, there was the southern Vosges to Belfort from
no reason to believe that the French the north or push directly over the
would not find the area equally per- Vosges via Gerardmer and the
meable at some point. Enthusiastic, Schlucht Pass to Colmar and the
de Monsabert quickly passed the re- Rhine. Much depended on speed, sur-
quest on to de Lattre, who approved prise, and the ability of the armor to
the proposal that evening with the find a weak point in the German
proviso that the effort be limited to lines—some road or pass where de-
one combat command of the French fenses had been neglected, poorly or-
1st Armored Division and one regi- ganized, or perhaps completely ig-
mental combat team of the French 1st nored.
Infantry Division. The effort, however, proved prema-
Planning began immediately. De ture. Despite the speed of the attacks,
Monsabert wanted the 1st Armored the French found the Germans better
Division’s Combat Command (CC) prepared than in the north. The
APPROACHING THE GAPS: BELFORT 299

narrow roads leading to Le Thillot Moroccan Tabor Group to the II


jammed the attacking armor, and the Corps, and promising him the 2d
battles for the heavily wooded, steep Tabor Group, the two-battalion
hillsides along the highways put a French parachute regiment, and the
premium on infantry. As the attacks assault battalion as soon as they ar-
slowed down, the Germans were able rived. In addition he increased the
to clog the French avenues of ad- frontage held by Bethouart’s I Corps,
vance even further with reinforce- with the 9th Colonial Division and the
ments, making the quick penetration recently arrived 2d Moroccan Divi-
that de Monsabert and du Vigier had sion, by about fifteen miles, thus al-
hoped for impossible. The fighting lowing the II Corps to narrow its
was similar to that encountered by the focus of attack. Devers, after exten-
XV Corps, now attempting to clear sive negotiations with de Lattre, also
the Parroy forest, and to that which moved the French II Corps boundary
would be experienced by the VI north, to encompass the entire Rupt–
Corps in its drive for Bruyeres and Le Tholy-Gerardmer area, despite
Brouvelieures. Between 26 and 29 the fact that the 3d Division had not
September progress by the French in yet been able to penetrate into the
the southern Vosges was minimal, region very deeply.
and the attacking forces lost about
115 killed, 460 wounded, and 30 Logistical Problems
missing.
Rather than terminate the failing During the boundary discussions,
offensive, de Lattre chose to reinforce de Lattre took the opportunity to
it. Realizing that de Monsabert had thrash out his logistical problems with
surpassed his instructions, he never- Patch and Devers. Charging that the
theless approved the II Corps com- French had been short-changed re-
mander’s initiative. His own estimates garding supplies and equipment, he
regarding the time necessary to bring asserted that the lack of gasoline had
up enough supplies and troops to prevented him from bringing up
launch a major frontal attack against enough troops and ammunition to the
the Belfort Gap had been too opti- battle area, thus forcing de Monsabert
mistic; by the end of September it was to break off his attack before it had a
obvious that the First French Army as chance to succeed. The “unfavorable
a whole would not be ready to treatment” afforded his army in the
resume the offensive until 20 October matter of supplies, he went on, was
at the earliest. In the meantime, de inexcusable and “seriously endan-
Monsabert’s attacks would at least put gered its existence and operations.” 2
some pressure on the enemy and, at
the very least, divert German atten- 2 Draft memo (no subj, no sig), de Lattre for
tion away from the Belfort Gap. For Devers, 30 Sep 44. Apparently, this memo was
these reasons de Lattre agreed to never “formally” delivered to either Devers or
Patch, but copies were used as a basis for discussion
increase de Monsabert’s infantry at both 6th Army Group and Seventh Army head-
strength, transferring both the 3d Al- quarters on 1 October. De Lattre, History, pp. 194–
gerian Infantry Division and the 3d 95.
300 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

GENERALS MARSHALL,DE LATTRE. AND DEVERSvisit French First Army headquarters in


Luxeuil, France, October 1944.

In a memorandum he also included sponsible for the logistical support of


statistics showing that the First the First French Army. In private,
French Army, with five reinforced di- Seventh Army logisticians believed
visions in the forward area, had re- that French supply problems
ceived about 8,715 rail-tons of sup- stemmed largely from inadequacies in
plies between 20 and 28 September, their own supply services. General
while the Seventh Army, with three Devers agreed in part, observing that
divisions at the front, had received the French had been slow to build up
roughly 18,920 rail-tons during the supply surpluses in the forward area.
same period. At the same time, however, he con-
In a subsequent conference to iron cluded that during its period of re-
out these difficulties, Seventh Army sponsibility for French supply, the
representatives initially took the posi- Seventh Army had not adequately
tion that any supplies that the army monitored logistical operations sup-
could spare from VI Corps’ al- porting de Lattre’s forces and had
locations had to be sent to the recent- generally favored Truscott’s units in
ly acquired XV Corps. They also such matters.
pointed out the 6th Army Group—no Based on these judgments, Devers
longer Seventh Army—was now re- instructed the Seventh Army to meet
APPROACHING THE GAPS: BELFORT 301

the most urgent logistical require- officers and agencies—depots, ac-


ments of the First French Army. counting offices, repair facilities, and
Therefore, after the conclusion so forth—allowed the Seventh Army
of a series of conferences with First to control its internal stockage and
French Army representatives on 1 expenditure of supplies and equip-
October, the Seventh Army G–4 re- ment with an efficiency that the
computed requirements and stocks French understandably could not
and allocated 65,000 gallons of gaso- hope to match. As a result, 6th Army
line, 53,000 rations, and about 280 Group logisticians would have to step
tons of ammunition to the French. An in at various times during the coming
additional 60,000 gallons of gasoline campaigns and approve special supply
were to be turned over to them on 2 allocations to the French to make up
October, and the Seventh Army also for critical deficiencies. Until the
agreed to make up daily shortages of French Army had been completely r e -
rations and gasoline for the First built at some future date, there was
French Army until a revised rail- no other solution.
supply schedule for the French went
into effect on 4 October. 3 French Plans
For the moment de Lattre appeared
satisfied. On 8 October, however, Early in October new French plans
during a visit by General Marshall to called for a major assault through the
the 6th Army Group, the French com- High Vosges north of the Belfort
mander launched into another tirade Gap, continuing and expanding de
about his supply problems, embar- Monsabert’s original effort. 5 Some-
rassing Devers and angering Mar- what chastened by his failure to take
shall.4 Later de Lattre more or less Le Thillot, de Monsabert believed
apologized to Devers over the inci- that, despite the reinforcements sent
dent, but there were no easy answers by de Lattre, the II Corps lacked the
to French logistical problems. A basic strength to seize Gerardmer and push
difficulty was the ability of the Sev- through the Schlucht Pass. Instead,
enth Army to consistently “outbid” he hoped to force a passage through
the small French army headquarters the Vosges, taking a more southerly
for supplies and materiel; the larger,
better-trained American staffs were 5The following analysis of the French situation
simply more efficient in forecasting and plans is based on the following: de Lattre, Histo-
the logistical needs of their units and ry, pp. 193-205; First Fr A m y , Personal and Secret
Instr 3, 30 Sep 44; First Fr Army SO 76, 4 Oct 44;
justifying those requests with detailed II Fr Corps GO 26, 30 Sep 44; II Fr Corps GO 27,
statistical data. In addition, the larger 2 Oct 44; II Fr Corps GO 29, 4 Oct 44; I Fr Corps
number of trained American supply Genl Opns Order 6, 3 Oct 44; 5th Fr A m d Div Jnl
de Marche, Sep–Oct 44. In addition to official
French and American records, the following second-
3Devers Diary, 1 Oct 44; Seventh Army Diary, 30 ary sources proved valuable in reconstructing the II
Sep 44, 1 Oct 44; Seventh Army Conf File, Bk 7, Corps’ October story: Le Ile C.A. Dans la Bataille Pour
Conf of 1 Oct 44; Seventh Army Rpt, II, 360. la Liberation de la France, pp. 28-48; La Premiere Divi-
4See Devers Diary, 8 Oct 44; and Forrest C. sion Blindee au Combat, pp. 73-82; Moreau, La Victoire
Pogue, George C. Marshall: Organizer of the Victory, Sous le Signe des Trois Croissants (Algiers: Editions
1943–1945 (New York Viking, 1973), pp. 475–76. Pierre Virillon, 1948), II, 162–92.
302 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

route between Gerardmer and Le transportation problems, would not


Thillot. The 3d Algerian Infantry Di- close the front until the 20th of Octo-
vision, redeploying from I Corps, was ber and consequently could play no
to take over II Corps’ left to make the part in the October attacks. Its arrival
main thrust. The Algerians, covering in France marked the last major ele-
on their left toward Gerardmer and ments of the First French Army to
the Schlucht Pass, were to aim their reach the metropole. With only a few
effort twenty-five miles east across the minor combat and service units of the
Vosges from the Longegoutte forest approved French troop list remaining
to Cornimont and La Bresse and ulti- in North Africa or on Corsica, further
mately to Guebwiller, at the edge of French reinforcements would have to
the Alsatian plain and about thirteen depend on local recruitment and
miles south of Colmar (Map 22). training.
In the center, du Vigier’s 1st Ar- In any case, what de Monsabert
mored Division was to support the Al- needed was not armor, but more in-
gerian effort by renewing its attacks fantry. With de Lattre’s blessing,
in the Le Thillot area and, if success- therefore, he reinforced the attacking
ful, was to continue eastward on units with the 2d and 3d Tabor
Route N–66 through the Bussang Groups, the parachute regiment, the
Pass to St. Amarin and Cernay, seven African Commando Group, and the
miles south of Guebwiller. On the II Shock Battalion. In reserve he left the
Corps’ right, or southern, wing, the 1st Moroccan Tabor Group, the 2d
French 1st Infantry Division was to Algerian Spahis Reconnaissance Regi-
act as a hinge anchoring the eastward ment (an armored reconnaissance
attack in the vicinity of Ronchamp on squadron), and, when it arrived some-
Route N–19. Ultimately, de Monsa- time after 4 October, the 6th Moroc-
bert hoped that the division would can Tirailleurs (a regimental combat
also be able to push eastward just team of the 4th Moroccan Mountain
above the city of Belfort. Meanwhile, Division). De Monsabert also planned
opposite the Belfort Gap, the French to employ a number of FFI units to
I Corps, with the 2d Moroccan Divi- the full extent of their capabilities.
sion on the left and the 9th Colonial During the initial phase of the
on the right, was to undertake a few attack, de Monsabert wanted the 3d
limited attacks to tie down German Algerian Division to push its left east
forces that otherwise might be shifted across the Moselotte River in the
to the II Corps front. Zainvillers and Thiefosse areas. Si-
De Lattre had initially wanted to multaneously, its right was to drive
add the strength of the French 5th north across the Longegoutte forest
Armored Division to the offensive. ridges through the Rahmne Pass, a
The 5th—the third and last of the little over two miles northeast of the
three French armored divisions Moselle. In the center, the 1st French
equipped by the Americans—had Armored Division, reinforced heavily
begun arriving in southern France with light infantry, was to outflank Le
from North Africa on 19 September Thillot on the north via the south-
but, because of French supply and eastern portion of the Longegoutte
304 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

3 D ALGERIANDIVISIONMOVESUP TO THE RUPTAREA

and Gehan forests and cut the tober as the date his corps would
German lines of communication be- start its new attack. All in all, de Mon-
tween the Moselotte valley and Le sabert would begin his October offen-
Thillot in a drive that would carry to sive with more strength than was
Cornimont, on the upper Moselotte available to Truscott’s VI Corps.
valley. At the same time the division
was to continue pressure toward Le The German Defense
Thillot down Route N–66 southeast
from Ferdrupt as well as along N–486 At the beginning of October, Gen-
from the southwest. 6 eral Wiese’s Nineteenth Army had two
The 3d Algerian Division began corps facing de Lattre’s French
moving into its new sector early on 3 forces, the IV Luftwaffe Field Corps in
October, and de Monsabert set 4 Oc- the High Vosges and the LXXXV
Corps in the Belfort Gap, both now
6This description represents a great simplification veteran organizations of the southern
of the French II Corps’ General Operations Order France campaign.’ Facing de Monsa-
29 of 4 October 1944. This order, quite detailed, is
replete with subsidiary tasks, supporting and cover- bert’s attacking II Corps, the IV
ing maneuvers, and secondary routes of attack. Like
most French Army orders, the II French Corps
order contained far more detail than a corps-level 7On German operations, see von Luttichau, chs.
field order of the U.S. Army during World War II. 19–21.
APPROACHING THE GAPS: BELFORT 305

Luftwaffe Field Corps had on line, north concerned about increasing French
to south, the 338th Infantry Division, pressure directly toward Belfort from
the 308th Grenadiers of the 198th Divi- the west and south, an error made
sion, and Regiment C/V. 8 The LXXXV when German intelligence mistook
Corps extended the German front the troop movements of de Lattre’s
south and southeast another twenty- organizational reshuffling for rein-
five miles, blocking the southern ap- forcements to the French forces op-
proaches to Belfort. Facing the far posite the Belfort Gap. Looking over
right of the French II Corps and most the collection of units in Wiese’s two
of Bethouart’s I Corps, LXXXV Corps southern corps, he characterized their
deployed across its front the rebuilt effectiveness as “deplorable,” and
933d Grenadiers,9 the 159th Reserve Di- complained that “never before have I
vision, and three provisional bri- led in battle such motley and poorly
gades—Groups Degener, von Oppen, and equipped troops.” 11 Nevertheless, he
Imisch—employing an assortment of finally decided to divert the small
fortress units, police formations, and mobile reserves from the First Army—
other odds and ends. the 106th Panzer Brigade and the 103d
Balck, Wiese’s superior, decided Panzer Battalion—to the more critical
that the Nineteenth Army urgently Rambervillers-St. Die area at his
needed a strong, mobile tactical re- center, leaving Wiese with only the
serve to supplement the small task detachment of the 11th Panzer Division
force that the 11th Panzer Division had as a reserve in the south.12 Ultimately,
left behind; he, therefore, directed the German forces in the south would
the First Army, on Army Group G’s have to make do with their own re-
northern wing, to disengage the 106th sources.
Panzer Brigade and the 103d Panzer Bat-
talion and dispatch both units south to The II French Corps’ October Offensive
the Belfort sector. 10
Although primarily worried about The renewed offensive of the
the situation in the Rambervillers French II Corps into the Vosges
area, Balck was obviously concerned began on 4 October during weather—
about the German defenses in the heavy rain and dense fog—that could
Belfort Gap. At the time he believed hardly have been worse for either in-
that French operations in late Sep- fantry or armor in the forested moun-
tember around Le Thillot presaged a tains. In general the revised French
more determined effort to outflank dispositions pitted the 3d Algerian
the gap on the north, but was equally Division against LXIV Corps ’ 198th

8Balck had recently given Wiese permission to


commit Regiment C/V, another Wehrkreis V unit, to 11 Ltr,Balck to Jodl, 10 Oct 44, cited in von Lutti-
front-line duty. As reinforced at the front, Regiment chau, “German Operations,” ch. 20, p. 14. Al-
C/V was also known as Group Kipfler. though the letter was written on 10 October, there
9 This unit was formerly part of the 244th Infantry is ample evidence that Balck held the same opinions
Division, the rest of which had surrendered at Mar- at the beginning of the month.
seille in August. 12The force now consisted of an understrength
10The brigade was a separate, nondivisional unit; panzer grenadier battalion, six tanks, and two self-
the battalion was organic to the 3d Panzer Division. propelled assault guns.
306 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

Infantry Division in the Longegoutte rest of the division’s front.


and Gehan forests southeast of St. Alarmed, the Germans began rein-
Ame; the French 1st Armored Divi- forcing 338th Division 13 forces in the
sion against the IV Luftwaffe Field forests, but on the 5th the French ar-
Corps’ 338th Infantry Division centered mored division again made significant
around Le Thillot and the surround- gains. The left drove through
ing mountains; and the French 1st In- Rahmne Pass to the northern slopes
fantry Division against assorted IV of the Longegoutte forest, while the
Luftwaffe and LXXXV Corps units south right pushed through the Gehan
of Le Thillot. Although all the French forest over a mile east of the Mor-
divisions had been beefed up with ad- bieux Pass. The 338th Division there-
ditional infantry—Moroccans, para- upon pulled the 308th Grenadiers 14out
troopers, FFI units, and so forth— of the line and assembled the regi-
they again made little progress during ment for a counterattack on 6 Octo-
the first days of the offensive. De ber.
Monsabert quickly discovered that At first, the German attack achieved
O’Daniel’s 3d Division had done little considerable success, forcing the
more in the Rupt-Ferdrupt area than French to pull back from the passes
secure the Moselle River bridgeheads, and several of the surrounding hills.
and the attacking French found that Confused, bitter fighting raged for
they had to fight their way into the two days as units on both sides
heights above the Moselle before they became isolated or cut off, and both
could even attempt to penetrate the French and German casualties mount-
Vosges valleys and passes beyond. ed rapidly. Meanwhile, to the south,
On the 4th, the main body of the French armor had managed to push
1st Armored Division made no its way down Route N–66 along the
progress toward Le Thillot, but on north bank of the Moselle, but was fi-
the division’s left the attached 1st nally stopped one mile short of Le
Parachute Chasseurs, spilling over Thillot, again failing to take the key
into the 3d Algerian Division’s sector, junction town. The Germans, howev-
found gaps in the German defenses er, had no intention of holding on to
along the southern slopes of the Lon- the two forests. The 338th Division
gegoutte and Gehan forests, and began to break off the action during
pushed several miles north of the Mo- the night of 7–8 October and the next
selle into the Broche and Morbieux night withdrew across the Moselotte,
passes. De Monsabert quickly decided keeping only the northernmost sec-
to exploit the paratroopers’ success tion of the Gehan forest near Corni-
and directed the armored division to
concentrate all possible strength on 13On 4 October the 338th Division sent forward its
its left for a rapid thrust northward headquarters guard company and the 338th Replace-
ment Battalion, and on the next day the Nineteenth
through the two forests into the Mo- Army released two fortress machine-gun battalions
selotte valley. The rest of the division to the division.
was to limit its operations to covering 14 Thisunit was a 198th Division regiment attached
to the 338th Division. At the time the 338th also con-
actions that would maintain some trolled Regiment C / V and its organic 757th Grenadier
pressure on German forces along the Regiment along its front.
APPROACHING THE GAPS: BELFORT 307

mont, and leaving the French with progress was limited on the 3d Alge-
their first foothold in the High rian Division’s left, where flank pro-
Vosges. tection requirements and the need to
The initial affray had been expen- take over American positions ab-
sive for the Germans—the 308th Gren- sorbed much of its strength. Heavier
adiers lost over 200 men taken prison- fighting took place at the center and
er alone-and the Nineteenth Army had especially on the right, where the Al-
to scrape up reinforcements for both gerians assumed responsibility for the
LXIV Corps and IV Luftwaffe Field Corps. Gehan forest sector. They cleared the
The army now sent forward four for- last Germans from the northeastern
tress machine-gun battalions, three part of the Gehan forest on 13 Octo-
fortress infantry battalions, and, dem- ber and the same day cut route N-
onstrating the scope of the German 486 near Travexin, a mile or so south
replacement problem, 150 troops of Cornimont, which fell to the
from an NCO school at Colmar. French on 14 October after the de-
Wiese also sent some assault guns parting Germans had burned down
and the small task force of the 11th most of the village.
Panzer Division northward from the Pausing briefly to redeploy units
Belfort area to Le Thillot, which had and build up supplies, the Algerians
now become the key to the German resumed the attack on 16 October.
defensive line in the area under On the left the objective was La
attack. Bresse, a road junction town between
Taking up the offensive as the Ger- Cornimont and Gerardmer. In this
mans withdrew, the 3d Algerian Divi- sector the 6th Moroccan Tirailleurs of
sion began attacking east and south the 4th Moroccan Mountain Division
from the St. Ame area between 9 and led off. 15 Crossing N–486 north of
13 October. Pushing only about six Cornimont, the Moroccans pushed up
miles east of Vagney, its advance was Hill 1003 (Le Haut du Faing), domi-
continually hampered by foul weather nating the upper Moselotte valley as
and increasing supply problems. The far as La Bresse. A bloody three-day
inability of the II Corps to secure the battle ensued as the 6th Moroccans—
road hub at Le Thillot forced the suffering about 700 casualties in the
French to employ long, circuitous process—first seized the broad height
supply routes through St. Ame to and then secured it against strong
support both the reinforced 3d Alge- German counterattacks. However, the
rian Division and fully a third of the 3d Algerian Division could make no
1st Armored Division. Driving across substantive progress elsewhere during
or along one forested height after an- the period 16–18 October, and the
other, the French gained control of Moroccan infantrymen found it im-
high ground and muddy mountain possible to advance beyond Hill 1003.
trails, but German artillery, mortar,
and antitank fire made it impossible
for them to use the main, paved roads 15The 6th Moroccan Tirailleurs had previously
through the valleys. been de Monsabert’s reserve force and had been
During the period 9–13 October committed only with the concurrence of de Lattre.
308 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

To the south, CC Deshazars 16 of bert’s forces ready or able to drive


the 1st French Armored Division through the passes of the High
drove east along the axis of Route D– Vosges and into the Belfort Gap or
43 from Travexin with the immediate the Alsatian plains. Meanwhile, the
objective of seizing the Oderen Pass, transfer of troops and supplies to de
which would provide a rather indirect Monsabert’s forces had virtually im-
and difficult route across the High mobilized General Bethouart’s com-
Vosges. The combat command’s in- mand, which, during the first half of
fantry advanced about two miles east October, had had little opportunity to
of Travexin along high ground north begin preparations for its own offen-
and south of D–43, but the armor, in sive directly through the Belfort Gap.
the face of German fire, could not Also evident to de Lattre, the
break out of the mountain village. forces of the II Corps had been ex-
Beyond some isolated gains, the best hausted by the slow forest fighting.
the French armored division had to The 3d Algerian Division and its at-
show after three days was possession tachments were spread thin in the
of that portion of Route N–486 north mountains and valleys; the 6th Mo-
of Le Thillot. But the achievement roccan Tirailleurs had been chewed
was of little value to the French as to bits in just three days of action;
long as the Germans still controlled and the 1st Parachute Chasseurs (at-
the junction of Routes N–66 and N- tached to the 1st French Armored Di-
486 at Le Thillot itself and were able vision) was operating on little more
to resupply the town from the south. than esprit de corps. The terrain,
By 17 October General de Lattre coupled with German artillery and
had had enough. Never completely antitank fire, had made it impossible
enamored of General de Monsabert’s for the French 1st Armored Division
plan to drive across the High Vosges to bring its firepower to bear; its own
in a deep, northerly envelopment of infantry forces, some three battalions,
the Belfort Gap, the First French were equally tired. Supply problems
Army commander, on 17 October, were increasing with every yard the
decided to bring the operation to a French gained, while unusually poor
halt. While the II Corps had made weather (exceptionally early snow had
substantial gains in the area north already fallen in the Vosges) compli-
and northeast of Le Thillot across a cated both logistical and tactical oper-
front of nearly twelve miles, de Lattre ations.
concluded that they had been too T o resume the attack, de Monsa-
costly and indecisive. Moreover, south bert would need either fresh infantry
of Le Thillot, the right wing of II reinforcements or direct assistance
Corps had made no significant from Truscott’s VI Corps. De Lattre
progress. Nowhere were de Monsa- realized that both solutions were out
of the question. Truscott, resting the
16Formerly CC Sudre or CCl. On 29 September 3d Division for his main attack on St.
General Sudre became assistant division command- Die, was not about to shift the divi-
er, and Colonel Deshazars de Montgaillard, previ-
ously Sudre’s second in command, took over the sion back to Le Thillot; throwing
unit. more French strength into the Vosges
APPROACHING THE GAPS: BELFORT 309

would probably force de Lattre to limited patrols and perhaps some


postpone his offensive against the minor offensive actions to keep
Belfort Gap for several months. All German attention focused on the
the French infantry, except for mini- area.
mum essential reserves and some General de Monsabert learned of
poorly equipped FFI units of ques- de Lattre’s decision on 17 October
tionable quality, had already been and formally halted the corps’ Vosges
committed. Moreover, Devers was offensive the next day. Although dis-
pressing de Lattre to relieve the 1st appointed that his attacks had not
Airborne Task Force along the Rivi- made greater gains, he continued to
era and in the Maritime Alps, a task feel, with characteristic optimism, that
that could only divert more French further reinforcements would have al-
infantry from the Vosges and Belfort lowed the II Corps to regain its mo-
sections. Even worse, de Lattre soon mentum and drive through the
learned, the French provisional gov- Vosges passes within a short time.
ernment was making plans to mount Yet, de Monsabert could find some
an all-French operation to secure the satisfaction in his corps’ accomplish-
port of Bordeaux on the Atlantic ments since the beginning of Octo-
coast, an effort that might force him ber. The II Corps had freed over 200
to relinquish two of his divisions for square miles of French soil; had
at least several months. driven the enemy from many French
De Lattre thus concluded that the towns, villages, and hamlets; had lib-
tactical situation, the state of his erated thousands of French citizens;
army, and the heavy rains, snowfalls, and, by French estimates, had killed
and freezing temperatures expected about 3,300 Germans and captured
in the mountains (the early harsh over 2,000 more during the period 1–
weather of October seemed to fore- 18 October—the equivalent of nine
shadow a severe winter) made it im- German infantry battalions. 17 The
practicable for the First French Army command had also forced the Ger-
to push strong forces into Alsace mans to reinforce their front with
except through the relatively easy ter- numerous infantry and weapons bat-
rain of the Belfort Gap. A resumption talions from the main Weststellung po-
of de Monsabert’s assault in the north sitions, thereby weakening that defen-
could well result in immobilizing the sive line; it had likewise prompted the
bulk of the First French Army along Germans to redeploy other troops
the western slopes of the Vosges until from the Belfort Gap sector to bolster
springtime. Instead, de Lattre decid- the Vosges front. The French offen-
ed, his offensive center of gravity sive had even forced the German
would have to be shifted back to the commanders to import additional re-
Belfort Gap sector, and preparations inforcements into the Vosges from
to launch his long-planned offensive other areas, including Germany
there would be given first priority.
Henceforth, de Monsabert’s activities
17Based on sketchy sources, French casualties to-
would be limited to consolidating the taled about 450 men killed and 2,000 wounded
gains already made, while conducting during the same period.
310 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

proper. Finally, under the most miser- the 6th Army Group against the
able conditions of terrain and weather German defenses. However, as in the
and while facing shortages of artillery north, such a unified offensive would
ammunition and other supply prob- have to wait for major improvements
lems, the French II Corps had beaten in the Allied supply situation. In the
back the strongest counterattacks the meantime, it remained to be seen
Germans would mount. whether Truscott’s VI Corps or Beth-
Perhaps de Monsabert’s real prob- ouart’s I Corps could profit from the
lem was the inability of Devers at this sacrifices of de Monsabert’s forces
stage to coordinate the efforts of the and the attention that Wiese and
Seventh Army with those of the Balck had been forced to pay to the
French and to move the full weight of southern Vosges.
CHAPTER XVII

Into the High Vosges


While the U.S. XV Corps and the Route N-59 between St. Die and Raon-
French II Corps undertook only limit- 1’Etape (Map 23). DOGFACE, in turn,
ed operations during the second half of would constitute a prelude to an even
October, VI Corps resumed its drive larger offensive scheduled by Devers
toward St. Die on the 15th.’ The re- for mid-November, which would push
newed attack had several objectives. the entire 6th Army Group over the
First was the seizure of Bruyeres and Vosges and through the Belfort Gap.
Brouvelieures. T o sustain the offensive
toward St. Die, the VI Corps still
Planning the Attack
needed the rail and highway facilities in
this region, lying at the center of the
corps’ axis of advance. Second, Trus- General Truscott, commanding the
cott wanted to secure a suitable line of VI Corps, had no illusions about the
departure along the constantly rising, difficulties of carrying DOGFACE
forested terrain east and northeast of through to a rapid conclusion, or even
Bruyeres and Brouvelieures. With of quickly executing the preliminaries
these areas in hand, the VI Corps could of the operation against Brouvelieures
begin its main attack-a three-division and Bruyeres that were to begin on 15
drive on St. Die-on or about 23 Octo- October. While VI Corps’ general
ber, spearheaded by O’Daniel’s 3d Di- supply situation had improved since
vision. Appropriately named Oper- the beginning of the month, some
ation DOGFACE, the attack was to carry problems remained. The distribution
the VI Corps at least as far as the high of winter clothing was far from com-
ground that overlooked a ten-mile plete, critical shortages of mortar and
stretch of the Meurthe River valley and artillery ammunition persisted, and
even stricter rationing had to be im-
posed on artillery expenditures. The
1 The successive American plans are based on the 13th Field Artillery Battalion of the
following sources: Seventh Army Rpt, II, 363–64, 370-
71; Seventh Army Diary, entries of 11, 15, and 19 36th Division, for example, estimated
Oct 44; VI Corps OI 1, 11 Oct 44; VI Corps FO 4, that during the last half of October the
13 Oct 44; VI Corps FO 5, 19 Oct 44; VI Corps OP unit could have fired a ten-day ration of
Plan DOGFACE,15 Oct 44; Msg, VI Corps to 45th
Div, 212100A Oct 44; 3d Inf Div 01 89, 19 Oct 44;
its 105-mm. howitzer ammunition
36th Inf Div 01 12200A Oct 44; 36th Inf Div 01 profitably in about ten minutes. Fur-
191500A Oct 44; 45th Inf Div 01 1, 12 Oct 44. thermore, Truscott felt that the VI
INTO THE HIGH VOSGES 313

Corps lacked the heavy artillery needed the 36th Division to rotate its infantry
for mountain fighting in the Vosges. battalions in the line during the first
About the only bright spot in the pic- half of October had been only partially
ture was the availability of ample am- successful in providing rest and reha-
munition for tanks and tank destroyers bilitation. In addition, all of the divi-
as well as for the cannon companies of sion’s nine infantry battalions had a se-
the infantry regiments. But how much rious shortage of foot soldiers, with the
use the armor would be in the increas- individual rifle companies averaging
ingly difficult terrain was very hard to about 121 officers and enlisted men
predict. out of an authorized strength of 193
Truscott also had misgivings about (but the 442d’s companies averaged
the condition of his infantry. For the 180 men).
DOGFACEpreliminaries against the For the attacks on the Bruyeres-
Bruyeres-Brouvelieures region, the Brouvelieures area, the 36th Division
picture was particularly bleak. On the would have available only the 442d
north the 157th Infantry of the 45th and 143d Infantry regiments. The
Division and the 117th Cavalry Squad- rest of the division was temporarily
ron were fully occupied with securing confined to defensive roles, covering
the VI Corps’ left flank at Ramber- the corps’ right flank and relieving
villers and maintaining contact with the the 3d Division’s 30th Infantry in the
XV Corps. Until the 3d Division’s Le Tholy-La Forge sector. The 36th
thrust, which was to pass through the Division’s right-flank units (and the
45th Division’s right, allowed the 45th 30th Infantry as well) were also to
to redeploy strength northward, the participate in a deception effort de-
157th and 117th could contribute signed to make the Germans believe
little, leaving the burden of the fighting that the 3d Division, rather than rede-
to the 179th and 180th regiments. But ploying, was actually concentrating
these two units had not yet recovered for an attack eastward from the Le
from their failure in early October to
seize Bruyeres and Brouvelieures, and Combat Team (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal
Press, 1946), pp. 49–72. For previous operations of
both were still tired and understrength. the 442d regiment in Italy, see Fisher, Cassino to the
The status of the 36th Division was Alps, chs. 14–15. The last elements of the 442d had
mixed. The division had been rein- pulled out of the front lines in Italy on 6 Septem-
ber. In addition to the 442d Infantry, the regimental
forced for the 15 October prelimi- combat team’s principal components were the 522d
naries by the Japanese-American 442d Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. howitzers) and
Regimental Combat Team. This unit, the 232d Combat Engineer Company. For the 15
composed primarily of American citi- October attack, attachments to the 442d included
the 36th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, 36th Divi-
zens of Japanese ancestry, had arrived sion; Company B, 753d Tank Battalion; Company
in France from Italy at the end of Sep- C, 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion; Company D,
tember and was experienced and rela- 83d Chemical Mortar Battalion; and the 886th Med-
ical Collecting Company. The regiment had a con-
tively fresh.2 However, the efforts of tinuous problem with infantry shortages caused by
the lack of qualified Japanese-American (Nisei) re-
placements in the NATOUSA replacement system.
2 Additional information on the operations of the While still in Italy in late September the 442d had
442d Regimental Combat Team can be found in received about 675 replacements. but most arrived
Orville C. Shirey, Americans: The Story of the 442d directly from the United States.
314 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

Tholy area toward Gerardmer in con- ued to provide the Germans with
junction with the French II Corps of- various natural defensive advan-
fensive to the south. tages-advantages which they could
Truscott expected that the 3d Divi- be expected to improve on through-
sion’s infantry would be in better out the coming battle. T o the left of
shape for the main DOGFACE offen- Route N-420–the main road leading
sive. While the 36th and 45th Divi- to St. Die-the vast, wooded ridge
sions were securing Brouvelieures and mountain complex of the Ram-
and Bruyeres between 15 and 23 Oc- bervillers forest stretched northward
tober, O’Daniel’s division would be over eight miles to Route N-59A,
resting at least two of its infantry linking the towns of Rambervillers
regiments, the 7th and the 15th, for and Raon-1’Etape. The main part of
one week or more following their the forest averaged about five miles in
relief by French II Corps forces. width, west to east; but a southeaster-
However, the division’s 30th Infantry, ly portion, the Magdeleine woods, ex-
holding defensively in the Le Tholy- tended another five miles to culmi-
La Forge area, might not be available nate in heights of some 2,100 feet
until later; therefore, the 3d Division overlooking St. Die. Between Routes
would probably have to begin its N-59A and N-420 only one second-
attack toward St. Die, the main Doc- class road, Route D-32, penetrated
FACE effort, with only two-thirds of its the difficult terrain, although many
combat strength. lesser unpaved roads, trails, and
Truscott also worried about the ter- tracks cut through all reaches of the
rain and weather his troops would be old forest.
facing during both the preliminary To the right and south of Route N-
operations and DOGFACEitself. His 420 lay the equally rugged and wooded
staff expected that precipitation terrain of the Domaniale de Champ
would increase during the last half of forest, bisected only by a third-class
October, with rain, wet snow, fog, road, D-31, which passed along the
mist, and low-hanging clouds continu- valley floor of the small Neune and
ing to hinder both tactical air support Taintrux streams. East of D-3 1 the ter-
and airborne forward observers (artil- rain was equally difficult until reaching
lery spotters in light aircraft). On the the Meurthe River valley and the
ground, forward artillery observers north-south Route N-415, which
would often be unable to see poten- linked St. Die with Gerardmer and
tial targets or analyze the results of roughly constituted the VI Corps’
friendly fire. The rising, rough, and right, or southern, boundary.
often densely forested terrain lying In the DOGFACEpreliminaries, the
on the corps’ route of advance would center and right of the 45th Division,
also complicate the problems of artil- with the 180th Infantry on the north
lery registration and observation. and the 179th to the south, were to
Compared to the Vosges, the affair of seize Brouvelieures and then push
the XV Corps in the Forest of Parroy north of the Mortagne River, east and
would appear tame. west of Route N-420. The 180th In-
The rugged Vosges terrain contin- fantry would first clear the high,
INTO THE HIGH VOSGES 315

wooded ground that the Germans still operations and limited French pres-
held west of Brouvelieures, including sure would keep the Germans on the
Hill 385. At the same time, the 179th defensive in this sector. Then, when
Infantry would seize Brouvelieures the 3d Division began its surprise
from the south and, in support of the attack toward St. Die, German atten-
36th Division’s attack on Bruyeres, tion would be diverted from the 36th
clear the forested hills between the Division’s right flank to the center of
two towns. Once these tasks had been the VI Corps’ zone. The risks seemed
accomplished, the two regiments acceptable.
would secure forward assembly areas Finally, during the DOGFACEpre-
across the Mortagne River for the liminaries the 3d Division was to re-
main DOGFACE attack. deploy secretly to positions behind
As its share of the DOGFACE prelimi- the center and right of the 45th Divi-
naries, the 36th Division was to ad- sion. From there the 3d Division
vance north, with the attached 442d would eventually lead the main attack
Regimental Combat Team on the left on 23 October, striking through the
and its organic 143d regiment on the 45th Division and pushing toward St.
right. The 442d, striking east across Die generally on the edge of the
wooded hills west of Bruyeres, would Rambervillers forest between Routes
seize the town, clear the surrounding D-32 and N-420. Once the 3d Divi-
heights, and then push a few miles far- sion’s surprise attack was well along,
ther to the village of Belmont, coming the 45th Division would shift its
abreast of the 45th Division units on its strength northward to clear the north-
left. Meanwhile, the 143d Infantry ern section of the Rambervillers
would secure crossings over the Vo- forest from D-32 to Route N-59A,
logne River in the Laval region and and the 36th Division would push
then head northeast along the Neune east through the Domaniale de
River valley to Biffontaine, four miles Champ forest, further anchoring the
east of Bruyeres, thereby anchoring the corps’ right flank.
right flank of the assembly area. The
rest of the 36th Division was to hold German Deployments
defensive positions along high ground
south of Biffontaine, ultimately reliev- On 15 October the Fifth Panzer
ing the 30th Infantry, 3d Division, in Army’s XLVII Panzer Corps still held a
the Le Tholy area. 23-mile front that included the rough-
The 36th Division thus had an ex- ly six miles between Rambervillers
tended front-over ten miles from and Bruyeres.3 At the time, the 21st
Biffontaine to Le Tholy–but Trus- Panzer Division had responsibility for
cott evidently felt the division would the northern part of the Ramber-
have little problem with the task. The villers-Bruyeres sector, and the 26th
battles during the first half of Octo- Volksgrenadier Division had the southern
ber had seriously depleted German
strength in the area between the Vo-
3 German information in this chapter is based
logne River and Le Tholy, and Trus- largely on von Luttichau, “German Operations,”
cott estimated that planned deception chs. 19 and especially 21.
316 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

half; the small town of Autry on though the bulk of these troops could
Route D-50 marked the boundary be- be considered adequate for defensive
tween the two units. Below the purposes only, the figures contrasted
Bruyeres region, the Nineteenth Army’s sharply with Seventh Army G–2 esti-
LXIV Corps covered from Laval south mates in October, which gave the
through the area around Le Tholy LXXXIX Corps only 5,200 combat ef-
with the 716th and 198th Divisions. fectives and the LXIV Corps no more
The Germans, however, were in the than 3,000. The low American figures
midst of another command and con- probably reflected the inability of
trol reorganization that was to cause Allied intelligence to track the
some confusion during ‘the ensuing German fortress ( Weststellung) units
battle. On 17 October, XLVII Panzer and their incorporation into the line
Corps headquarters was scheduled to infantry divisions. During the entire
be replaced by the LXXXIX Corps month of October, for example, the
under Lt. Gen. Werner Freiherr von Seventh Army G–2 could account for
und zu Gilsa and responsibility for only six of the nineteen fortress bat-
the corps zone would be transferred talions that the Germans committed
to the Nineteenth Army.4 While the to forward defensive roles, and by the
panzer corps was leaving for the Army end of the month the G–2 assess-
Group B front, von Gilsa arrived on ments allowed for only one of the
the 17th, but with only his chief of three Wehrkreis V fortress infantry
staff and little else; it would be 23 regiments also deployed to the front.5
October before his corps staff was as- Beyond the Weststellung units, Gener-
sembled and fully operational. al Wiese of Nineteenth Army could expect
Additional strength available to the few reinforcements to feed into the
Nineteenth Army included four fortress front lines or to form any reserve.
infantry regiments and twenty fortress Scheduled arrivals for the last half of
battalions (infantry, machine gun, or October included the 201st and 202d
artillery). By 15 October three of the Mountain Battalions, light infantry units
four fortress infantry regiments were or about 1,000 men each.6 Wiese was
fully committed to the front lines, as also to receive an understrength infan-
were all but one or two of the fortress try battalion consisting of troops on
battalions; most were in the process probation from courts-martial and a
of being absorbed into the regular in- similar unit made up of men suffering
fantry divisions. Thus, according to or recovering from ear ailments.
the German system of accounting,
von Gilsa’s LXXXIX Corps had per- 5The German strength figures are cited in von
haps 22,000 combat effectives, and Luttichau, “German Operations,” ch. 21 (for back-
the LXIV Corps, under General ground on the Wehrkreis V regiments, see ibid., ch.
19); the American estimates are from “G–2 History:
Thumm, had as many as 18,000. Al- Seventh Army Operations in Europe,” III, 1–31 Oct
44, William W. Quinn Papers, MHI.
6A large proportion of the troops of these two
4 As related earlier, von Manteuffel’s Fifth Panzer battalions had previously been members of moun-
Army headquarters also left about the same time, tain divisions, and more than 50 percent of these
and its northern corps, the LVIII Panzer Corps, tem- troops, especially the officers and senior NCOs,
porarily became part of the First Army. were experienced.
INTO THE HIGH VOSGES 317

The Nineteenth Army’s main armored available for ground support roles.
reserve in mid-October was the 106th The missions and tactics of Nine-
Panzer Brigade, actually little more teenth Army remained unaltered. Gen-
than a reduced tank battalion rein- eral Balck of Army Group G still in-
forced with supporting combat and sisted that Wiese’s units hold well for-
service units that rendered the “bri- ward of the main Weststellung positions
gade” somewhat self-sufficient. On 15 and counterattack all Allied penetra-
October the 106th was stationed in tions of their forward defensive lines.
the IV Luftwaffe Field Corps’ sector Rejecting the argument that an imme-
south of the LXIV Corps. Also in re- diate withdrawal to the Weststellung
serve was the 1st Battalion, 130th would conserve both men and materi-
Panzer Regiment, located near Cor- el, Balck still hoped that his delaying
cieux, in the LXIV Corps’ sector, about tactics would gain the time needed to
eight miles east ofBruyeres. 7 complete the Weststellung fortifications
The Nineteenth Army’s artillery was in and to man the defenses with newly
better shape. The supply of artillery organized fortress units from Germa-
and mortar ammunition had increased ny. The transferral of so many for-
considerably, and the transfer of for- tress units to the Nineteenth Army’s for-
tress artillery battalions to front-line ward defenses and the continual
support helped ‘to augment defensive delays in the various Weststellung con-
fires. Shorter and more stabilized struction projects because of poor
lines of communication, developing as weather and labor shortages only in-
the Germans grudgingly fell back to creased his determination to make a
the east, further eased ammunition stand well forward of the Vosges Foot-
supply problems, while inclement hill Position, the Weststellung’s first line
weather aided German efforts to of defense on the east bank of the
move ammunition and troops on Meurthe River. 8
highways and railroads during day- West of the Vosges Foothill Position,
light hours by limiting Allied air the Germans constructed only hasty
interdiction strikes. In addition, Allied field fortifications. However, from
artillery ammunition shortages re- bitter experience VI Corps troops
stricted the amount of fire used to knew that the so-called hasty defenses
harass German supply operations, es- they would encounter in the heavily
pecially in the VI Corps area where forested high ground lying north and
Truscott was trying to build up his south of Route 420 could be formida-
stocks for direct combat support mis- ble. All roads and trails would be
sions. Finally each German division in
front of the VI Corps had been rein- 8The Vosges Foothill Position began on the Rhine-
forced by an antiaircraft battalion, the Marne Canal at Lagarde, about twelve miles north-
east of Luneville. The line ran south to the Meurthe
batteries of which were generally po- at Baccarat, followed the east bank of the river past
sitioned at critical points, readily Raon-1’Etape and St. Die to the vicinity of Fraize,
seven miles south of St. Die, and extended on south
past Le Thillot to tie into the defenses of the Bel-
7Some minor elements of the 11th Panzer Division fort Gap. Farther east, generally following the crest
were still in the Nineteenth Army’s zone on 15 Octo- of the Vosges Mountains, lay the Vosges Ridge Posi-
ber, but were soon to move north to the First Army. tion, the final Weststellung defensive line.
318 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

blocked by tangles of felled trees, and Progress against determined resist-


most barriers .would be booby- ance was slow but steady. On 19 Oc-
trapped, mined, covered by machine- tober General Eagles reinforced the
gun fire, or carefully targeted by 179th Infantry with a battalion of the
German mortars and artillery. Numer- 157th from Rambervillers, and by the
ous infantry strongpoints, often well 21st, after repeated attacks, the units
concealed, covered by tree trunks, found German resistance in the area
and supported by artillery and anti- beginning to collapse. By 1540 that
tank weapons, would have to be labo- afternoon the 179th Infantry had
riously eliminated one by one. All but troops in Brouvelieures, where house-
the best-paved roads would break up to-house fighting continued until
under heavy military traffic, and wet dark, while advance units of the 3d
weather would quickly turn lesser Division came up from the south to
roads and mountain trails into quag- secure an intact bridge over the Mor-
mires. Elaborate minefields could be tagne a mile north of Brouvelieures.
expected on critical open ground, and The following day, 22 October, the
randomly sown mines and booby 179th and 180th Infantry regiments
traps along roads and trails. Tree mopped up west of the Mortagne;
bursts from German artillery had however, elements of the 180th, at-
proved especially troublesome in such tempting to seize another bridge, had
terrain, and the VI Corps’ infantry- to fall back west of the river in the
men would also encounter increasing face of heavy German fire, and the
amounts of barbed-wire entangle- defenders quickly destroyed the span.
ments wherever they went. Although successful in occupying
Brouvelieures, Eagles wondered if his
The Preliminary Attacks division would still have to fight its
way north over the Mortagne River to
Elements of the 45th Division’s secure the assembly areas for Trus-
180th Infantry began the offensive cott.
early. On 14 October the regiment The slow advance of the 45th Divi-
cleared the last Germans from bat- sion was balanced by the surprisingly
tered Hill 385 overlooking the rapid progress of Dahlquist’s 36th Di-
Mortagne valley and, with its rear se- vision on the corps’ right wing. Al-
cured, began advancing toward Brou- though fighting across well-defended
velieures; the 179th Infantry joined forested ridges and hills, staving off
the effort on the following day. For numerous small German counterat-
the next four days the two regiments tacks, and subject to heavy German
slowly pushed back into the wooded artillery and mortar fire, the fresh
ridges and hills that they had aban- 442d Infantry had cleared the hills
doned after the German counterattack immediately west and north of
of 6 October, confirming that the Bruyeres late in the afternoon of 18
16th Volksgrenadier Division had made October, unhinging the German de-
good use of the intervening days to fenses at Bruyeres and forcing the
improve old defenses and construct 716th Division’s right wing to with-
new ones. draw. South of Bruyeres, Laval fell to
INTO THE HIGH VOSGES 319

JAPANESE-AMERICAN
INFANTRY(442D RCT) IN HILLSAROUNDBRUYERES

the 143d Infantry on 15 October, and sion and the success of the 36th re-
the regiment had secured several sulted in Truscott’s modifying his
crossings over the Vologne River by plans for the main attack. By noon of
the 17th. On 18 October the 143d 19 October he realized that a danger-
began pushing into Bruyeres from the ous gap was growing between the two
south, while the 442d probed into the attacking divisions because of their
city from the north and west; patrols disparate rates of advance. But he
from the two units began to run into also believed that adhering to his
one another early that evening. The original plan and holding the 36th Di-
next day the 143d Infantry took over vision in the Bruyeres area to wait for
the burden of clearing artillery-shat-the 45th to cross the Mortagne River
tered Bruyeres, while the 442d se- would only destroy the momentum of
cured the heights east of the town the 36th’s attack and give the Ger-
and began advancing farther north mans time to reform their crumbling
toward Belmont and the Domaniale defenses. Accordingly, on 19 Octo-
de Champ forest. ber, Truscott asked General O’Daniel
if one of the 3d Division’s waiting
The 3d Division Attacks regiments, either the 7th or 15th,
could move into the line between the
The slow progress of the 45th Divi- 36th and 45th Divisions on 20 Octo-
320 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

ber from the regimental assembly Volksgrenadier Division back into the
areas near Remiremont. With O’Dan- forests on either side of the road. At
iel’s assurance that at least one and the same time the success of the 3d
possibly both regiments could be Division made conditions easier for
ready by noon on the 20th, Truscott the 36th, which was operating east of
ordered the 3d Division to begin its N-420. On 22 October the 36th Divi-
attack at once, passing through the sion’s Felber Force, an ad hoc ar-
Brouvelieures-Bruyeres area and ad- mored task force commanded by Lt.
vancing northeast on Route N-420, Col. Joseph G. Felber,9 secured Bel-
while pushing into the wooded hills mont; meanwhile, the 442d and 143d
on both sides of the highway. When regiments fought their way across the
available, the 30th Infantry could be southern sector of the Domaniale de
committed on the division’s left. The Champ forest through elements of
new plan, in effect, made the 3d Divi- the 716th Division, halting only after
sion responsible for securing much of reaching the high wooded ground
the 45th Division’s portion of the above the Neune River valley just
DOGFACE line of departure as well as short of Biffontaine.10 In doing so,
for taking over the 45th Division’s the 36th Division had accomplished
mission to attack northeast along its part of the initial DOGFACEobjec-
Route N-420. Nevertheless, it en- tives and, as a bonus, had driven a
abled Truscott to take advantage of wedge between the LXXXIX Corps’
the new tactical situation of the VI 16th Volksgrenadier Division and the
Corps and focused the combat power LXIV Corps’ 716th Division.
of O’Daniel’s 3d Division on a nar- The successes of both the 3d and
rower route of advance without any 36th Divisions were the product of
loss of momentum. Truscott’s rapid change of plans. In
During the afternoon of 20 October addition, the deception operations of
the 3d Division’s 7th Infantry secured the VI Corps and the French II Corps
a key road junction about midway be- had succeeded admirably in keeping
tween Bruyeres and Brouvelieures German attention focused on the
and cleared a steep-sided hill mass Gerardmer sector of the Vosges front.
immediately east of the crossroads. Not until the morning of 23 October
Late in the day the 15th Infantry as- did the Nineteenth Army learn of the 3d
sembled near the junction, and both Division’s redeployment to the VI
regiments began preparations for a
major push north up Route N-420 9This particular Felber Force, only one of many
the following morning. T o all intents led by Colonel Felber, who commanded the 753d
Tank Battalion, consisted of the 753d Tank Battal-
and purposes, the DOGFACEoperation ion (less Companies A, C, and D); 36th Cavalry Re-
itself would commence three days connaissance Troop, 36th Division; Company C
earlier than Truscott had planned. (–), 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion; Company A
(–), 442d Infantry; and Platoon, 111th Engineer
The progress of the 3d Division Battalion, 36th Division,
was rapid. By the 22d the attacking 10German sources state that American troops cap-
reg iments were approachingLes tured Biffontaine on 22 October, but American
Rouges Eaux, about halfway to st. records show that the 442d Infantry did not secure
the town until after a four-hour, house-to-house
Die, forcing remnants of the 26th fight on the 23d.
INTO THE HIGH VOSGES 321

Corps’ center, but by then Truscott’s to clear the Rambervillers forest area,
forces had driven a deep salient into advancing first across the Mortagne
the German forward defenses in the River and then pushing north, using
Bruyeres sector, and the resulting Route D-32 as a phase line. The 45th
confusion in the German front lines Division’s 157th regiment would join
made it even more difficult to move the effort from Rambervillers, and the
local reinforcements to the threatened final objectives of the division would
area. On the evening of 22 October, take it to Routes N-59, N-59A, Raon-
Truscott was thus justified in feeling l’Etape, and the Meurthe River valley.
that once again the German forces The 36th Engineer Combat Regi-
across his front were on the verge of ment 12 and the 117th Cavalry Squad-
complete collapse. ron, both under direct corps control,
However encouraging, the develop- would guard the 45th Division’s left
ing situation forced Truscott to make flank and maintain contact with the
further revisions in his DOGFACE plans XV Corps’ French 2d Armored Divi-
on the 22d.11 On his left, or northern, sion north of Rambervillers.
flank, the 45th Division was preparing In the VI Corps center the 3d Divi-
to cross the Mortagne River in sion’s immediate mission was to seize
strength north of Brouvelieures that the road junction town of Les Rouges
night. In the center, the 3d Division’s Eaux on Route N-420. Once this
surprise attack had exceeded expecta- town was secured, O’Daniel wanted
tions, and its two attacking regiments one of his regiments to advance
were well on their way to St. Die. On northeast toward La Bourgonce,
the right, the 36th Division had two taking the high ground on the north
regiments in sight of the Biffontaine side of Route N-420; meanwhile, the
objective line; in accordance with the rest of the division would push east
basic DOGFACEconcept, both units down both sides of the road, securing
were ready to move on to clear the it as the corps’ main supply route and
northern and eastern sections of the occupying the high ground in the
Domaniale de Champ. Magdeleine woods, overlooking St.
For the moment, Truscott decided Die. The division’s ultimate objective
to leave the corps’ current disposi- was a three-mile stretch of the west
tions unchanged. With the 3d Divi- bank of the Meurthe just north of St.
sion now making the main effort via Die, but not the city itself, the larger
N-420, he directed the 45th Division part of which lay on the opposite side
of the river.
11The new plans described here developed mainly Truscott’s new plans also envisioned
during the course of 22 October, with written more extensive objectives for the 36th
orders being issued on the 23d. Sources for the new
plans included the following: Telecon, CG VI Corps Division. On the left the 442d Infantry
and CG 3d Inf Div, 220745A Oct 44; Telecon, CG was to clear the northern part of the
VI corps and CG 45th Inf Div, 220855A OCt 44;
Telecon, G–3 VI Corps and G–3 3d Inf Div, Domaniale de Champ forest and then
221105A Oct 44; Telecons, CofS 3d Inf Div and assemble in reserve at Belmont. In the
COs 7th 15th and 30th Inf Regts, 22 Oct; VI division’s center, the 143d regiment
Corps FO 6, 23 Oct 44; 3d Inf Div OIs 90 and 94,
23 Oct 44; 36th Inf Div OI 221400A Oct 44; 45th
Inf Div OI 2, 23 Oct 44. 12A nondivisional unit attached to VI Corps.
322 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

was to hold in place while the 141st had lost its hard-charging corps com-
continued the attack, pushing through mander, who had in many ways domi-
the eastern section of the Domaniale nated the Allied campaign in southern
de Champ and securing the high France from the Riviera beaches to the
ground that overlooked La Houssiere. Vosges Mountains. For over two
The regiment’s final objective was the months he had feverishly kept his three
forested hills just west of St. Leonard, a American infantry divisions on the
railroad town on Route N-415 about move, forever harassing the retreating
five miles farther east of La Houssiere Germans and allowing them little time
and a similar distance south of St. Die. to rest and reorganize. His new offen-
Once in reserve, the 442d would assist sive was yet another attempt to destroy
the 141st as necessary. On the divi- the German defenses before they could
sion’s (and the corps’) right flank, the solidify-an attempt that, like those
143d and 142d Regimental Combat before, was to be undertaken in the
Teams, north to south, would defend face of severe Allied logistical difficul-
the area from Biffontaine south to the ties. However, the effort was also
vicinity of Le Tholy; ultimately they marked by much tactical and oper-
would relieve the 3d Division’s 30th ational imagination, such as the secret
regiment still in the Le Tholy area and massing of the 3d Division in the corps’
mesh with the French II Corps’ 3d Al- rear. Lucian Truscott would be missed
gerian Division. in northern France. Nevertheless, the
Truscott, however, would never see new phase of the DOGFACEattack
his revised DOGFACEplans executed. would begin almost immediately under
Destined for a higher level command in the direction of General Brooks. 14
the Italian theater, he turned over the
VI Corps to Maj. Gen. Edward H. spring of 1945. In the Pacific, by contrast, most
Brooks at noon on 25 October and left Army corps commanders were, like Truscott, lieu-
tenant generals (three stars) throughout most of the
the Vosges front.13 The Seventh Army war.
14Brooks had left the 2d Armored Division in
13Truscott took command of the U.S. Fifth Army mid-September, served briefly on the V Corps staff,
in mid-December 1944. Eisenhower’s policy of hold- and arrived at the VI Corps headquarters on 20 Oc-
ing his American corps commanders at the rank of tober where he worked closely with Truscott on
major general (two stars) was not changed until the DOGFACE planning.
CHAPTER XVIII

The Forests of the Meurthe


The departure of General Truscott Dogface Resumed
in the VI Corps was also marked by
another high-level command change As VI Corps commander, General
affecting the 6th Army Group. On 22 Brooks, a quiet New Englander with
October General Devers, command- experience as an artillery officer
ing the army group, turned over his during World War I, was to prove
concurrent command of NATOUSA more reserved and less colorful than
to Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, for- his predecessor, but equally able and
merly Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. innovative. Assigned to Fort Knox,
Army. This rather belated shift re- Kentucky, in September 1941, he had
lieved Devers of what had become taken over the 11th Armored Division
nagging U.S. Army administrative re- in July of the following year; in 1944
sponsibilities in the Mediterranean he had commanded the U.S. 2d Ar-
area and allowed him to devote all his mored Division in Bradley’s army
time and energy to the affairs of 6th group during the campaigns in north-
Army Group. Devers, however, unlike ern France. Although eager to do well
Bradley, continued to operate with in his first corps command assign-
only a small operational staff, moni- ment, Brooks would find the VI
toring problem areas between his two Corps infantrymen much different
subordinate armies and SHAEF head- than his former armored troops and
quarters, but rarely interfering with the Vosges terrain more challenging
tactical operations conducted at corps than the gentler ground to the north.
level, or with the logistical and ad- In fact almost immediately he would
ministrative responsibilities shoul- inherit all the frustrations that had
dered by the larger army-level head- plagued Truscott since crossing the
quarters. In any case, with the XV Moselle and gain a few new ones in
Corps’ battle of the Parroy forest and the bargain.
the French II Corps’ attack in the With Devers’ approval, both Patch
southern Vosges ended, there was and his new corps commander were
little Devers could do while he waited eager to have their new drive on St.
for fresh supplies and fresh units for Die and the Meurthe River under way
a major army group offensive sched- as soon as possible. Thus on the
uled for mid-November. morning of 23 October, the 45th Di-
324 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

vision’s two attacking regiments advance resumed. Elements of the


began crossing the Mortagne River. 157th Infantry reached Route D–32
Despite opposition, units of the 180th about midway across the forest during
Infantry were across the river by 0745 the course of the day; farther south,
and by noon had penetrated over half the 179th Infantry continued north-
a mile northeast into the Ramber- eastward for a mile and a half, while
villers forest, followed quickly by ele- the 180th Infantry, pinched out by
ments of the 179th Infantry. The the other two regiments, reverted to
crossing had cost the 180th’s lead division reserve. By the end of 26 Oc-
battalion nearly one hundred casual- tober the 45th Division had thus pen-
ties, almost all of them suffered etrated the boundary between the
during the initial attempt, and the 21st Panzer and the 26th Volksgrendier
unit captured about one hundred Divisions and, in conjunction with 3d
Germans on the east bank. and 36th Division operations to the
Once across the river, progress was south, had completed the isolation of
rapid. Patrols from the 45th Division most of the 16th Division in the center
soon met elements of the 3d Division; of the American attack.
by the following day, 24 October, South of the 45th, the 3d Division
both of Eagles’ regiments began had resumed its advance toward Les
swinging northward, making gains of Rouges Eaux along the axis of Route
up to a mile through the dense Ram- N-420 on 23 October, with the 15th
bervillers forest. Light resistance was Infantry north of the road and the 7th
less of an impediment than were the Infantry to the south. The 7th Infantry
difficulties of opening supply routes ran into stubborn resistance in the Les
on the dirt roads and trails to support Rouges Eaux sector, but made some
further advances. The 45th Division’s progress south of the highway and fi-
157th Infantry joined the attack early nally cleared the hamlet on the 25th.
on the 25th from the Rambervillers Just short of Les Rouges Eaux on
region, crossing the Mortagne near the 23d, the 15th Infantry moved off
Autry and pushing east and northeast. the highway and began to advance
Meanwhile, south of Autry, the 120th generally northward into the rough
Engineer Battalion, 45th Division, in- forested terrain just west of twisting
stalled a forty-ton bridge across the Route D-7 on 24 October. Progress
Mortagne to support the advance. was fairly steady until the vanguard
During the afternoon of 25 October ran up against a German strongpoint
German resistance stiffened all across on the 25th, centering around a small
the front of the 45th Division, and road junction two miles within the
throughout the night German artillery forest; here the forward movement of
and mortar fire constantly harassed the regiment halted.
the attacking units. Although forward Meanwhile, the 30th Infantry
troops braced for a possible counter- (moving over from the Le Tholy area)
attack, the morning of the 26th re- had rejoined the rest of the 3d Divi-
vealed that the night bombardment sion and, on the 25th, dispatched its
had only been a cover for a general 3d Battalion northward behind the
German withdrawal. Thereafter the 15th Infantry. About a mile south of
THE FORESTS OF THE MEURTHE 325

the strongpoint that was holding up The German Response


the 15th regiment, the battalion cut
east across Route D-7 and headed The rapid thrust of the VI Corps
northeast along woodland trails for a threatened to split von Gilsa’s
mile and a half, encountering almost LXXXIX Corps in the north from
no resistance. By the time the morn- Thumm’s LXIV Corps in the south.
ing was well along, the other battal- Balck and Wiese tried desperately to
ions of the 30th Infantry had fol- remedy the situation. During the
lowed, moving undetected through a night of 23–24 October, the Nineteenth
large gap in the 16th Division’s right Army thus began shifting the rein-
flank. Taking advantage of the situa- forced 933d Grenadier Regiment3 north
tion, the 30th Infantry pushed one from the IV Luftwaffe Field Corps sector
battalion north to Route D–32 while in order to close the gap between the
the other units moved rapidly east, 16th Volksgrenadier Division (LXXXIX
heading directly for the Magdeleine Corps) and the 716th Division (LXIV
woods.1 Corps) that had been opened by the
While the 30th Infantry’s success 36th Division on the 22d. When the
accelerated the 3d Division’s push advance of 36th Division units south-
through the Rambervillers forest, the east of N-420 continued to widen the
progress of the division’s 7th regi- gap on the 24th, Wiese immediately
ment along Route N-420–presum- decided to commit the 602d Reconnais-
ably the easier axis of advance-was sance Battalion and the 201st and 202d
stopped a few miles north of Les Mountain Battalions-the latter unit
Rouges Eaux by what turned out to having detrained at St. Die during the
be the strongest opposition yet en- night of 23–24 October. By the 25th
countered.2 The 7th Infantry had at least some of these units had
come up against the 933d Grenadiers of crossed the Meurthe River west of St.
the 338th Division, representing the Die to assist the disorganized 16th
first major response of the German Volksgrenadier Division in holding on to
Army command to the VI Corps’ of- Route N-420 and closing the gap
fensive. south of the highway in the Doman-
iale de Champ forest. Also reinforcing
1 S. Sgt. Clyde L. Choate, Company C, 601st Tank the 16th Division on 24 or 25 October
Destroyer Battalion, was awarded the Congressional were the two provisional infantry bat-
Medal of Honor for action on 25 October for break-
ing up a German tank-infantry counterattack in the talions made up of probationers and
Rambervillers forest. (The date is uncertain as unit men with ear problems, but these
records seem to indicate that the incident occurred units may have simply been integrat-
several days earlier.) For more information on this
incident, see History of the Third Infantry Division in ed into existing divisional formations.
World War II, pp. 253–54, and 601st TD Battalion, Although the initial German rede-
“Record of Events, Oct 1-31, 1944,” attached to the ployments substantially reinforced the
601st Battalion’s After Action Report for October
1944.
2German records state that Les Rouges Eaux was
lost on 24 October, but 3d Division records show 3 The principal reinforcements for the 933d Grena-
that intense fighting took place at the village on the diers were the 39th Machine Gun Battalion from the
morning of 25 October, and that Les Rouges Eaux Weststellung and the understrength 198th Fusilier Bat-
was not completely secure until late that afternoon. talion from the 198th Division of LXIV Corps.
326 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

center and left of the collapsing volks- Mountain Battalion under accurate ar-
grenadier division, they had done noth- tillery fire as it was detraining at the
ing to strengthen its right wing or the town, and the Germans were there-
equally tenuous situation of the 21st fore unable to commit the 201st along
Panzer Division next door in the Ram- N-420 until the following day. 5
bervillers-Raon-l’Etape area. The only In the sector of the 21st Panzer Divi-
other backup force readily available sion, the German defenders had done
was the 106th Panzer Brigade, which the little better. On 27 October the 45th
Nineteenth Army had already moved to Division’s 157th and 179th Infantry
the northeastern edge of the Ramber- regiments pushed northeast and east
villers forest. But General Wiese was another mile and a half, with the
reluctant to commit the brigade to the 157th maintaining control over Route
direct support of either the 21st Panzer D-32 and the 179th drawing abreast
or the 16th Volksgrenadier Division, pre- of the 15th Infantry as it advanced
ferring to hold the bulk of the unit in into La Bourgonce. The next day, 28
reserve against an expected American October, the 180th Infantry came
advance into the Meurthe River valley back into the line along Route N-
itself via Routes D-7 and D-32. Like 59A, on the division’s left wing, and
the American commanders, Wiese too all three regiments began crossing
found it difficult to employ more than a Route D-32 in force toward Raon-
few armored vehicles effectively in the l’E6 Although
tape. th e division en-
wooded terrain of the Vosges at one countered disorganized but deter-
time. mined resistance throughout the 27th
His decision proved to be sound as and 28th, supply and support prob-
the battered 16th Division appeared to lems played the major role in slowing
have little staying power. During 26 progress. Tracked vehicles repeatedly
and 27 October, the 3d Division’s became mired in the muddy forest
15th Infantry reduced the German trails, while engineers had to work
strongpoint at the D-7 crossroads, around the clock to keep unpaved
cleared the road to La Bourgonce, roads and mountain trails passable
and went on to occupy most of the for even lightweight jeeps. Bringing
town with no opposition.4 To the supplies and ammunition to forward
north, the 179th Infantry of the 45th units remained a major chore.
Division had also reached D-32, and For the Germans, the 45th Divi-
just to the south the 30th Infantry sion’s advances on 27 and 28 October
had continued eastward through the posed new and serious threats. Out-
La Bourgonce area all the way to the flanked in the Rambervillers forest
Magdeleine woods to secure the high
ground overlooking St. Die. These 5About the same time the 1st Battalion, 130th
last gains enabled American forward Panzer Regiment, began withdrawing from its reserve
positions at Corcieux, probably moving to the St.
artillery observers to place the 201st Die area along D-31–the Taintrux valley road-but
German records are unclear on this point.
6With the arrival of the 180th Infantry on the di-
4Differing from the usual reporting pattern for vision’s left, most of the 36th Engineer Combat
this period, the German records state that La Bour- Regiment units that had been securing the division
gonce fell on the 28th rather than the 27th. flank returned to their engineer duties.
THE FORESTS OF THE MEURTHE 327

area, the 21st Panzer Division was of the Domaniale de Champ forest to
forced to relinquish its positions the Neune valley in the vicinity of Bif-
around the town of Rambervillers, fontaine; south of the town, the divi-
which had guarded the road ap- sion would tie in with LXIV Corps
proaches to both Raon-l’Etape and units. Now expecting an early VI
Baccarat. Wiese had hoped that the Corps breakout to the east from the
anemic panzer division might have Rambervillers forest, Wiese also di-
been able somehow to tie its rected the 21st Panzer Division and the
stretched defenses into those of the 106th Panzer Brigade to pull their re-
withdrawing 16th Volksgrendier Divi- maining armor back into reserve posi-
sion near La Bourgonce, but both tions, thereby denying the defending
units were too weak and thinly spread forces any armored support for the
to make a linear defense possible. immediate future. Given the nature of
Preoccupied with efforts to defend the fighting and the terrain, however,
along Route N-420 and to close the it was probably a wise decision.
gap south of the highway between the The Nineteenth Army commander’s
LXXXIX and LXIV Corps, Wiese and actions came somewhat late to be of
von Gilsa had apparently been slow to much help to the volksgrendier divi-
appreciate the extent and significance sion. With the 30th Infantry’s pene-
of a second gap that was developing tration of the Bois de la Magdeleine,
between the 21st Panzer and 16th the division’s chances of establishing
Volksgrenadier Divisions. defenses very far north of N-420
On 28 October Wiese belatedly de- were extremely poor, and Wiese’s
cided to pull LXIV Corps’ 716th Divi- orders indicated that both the Nine-
sion out of its now relatively quiet teenth Army and LXXXIX Corps lacked
sector southwest of Bruyeres and accurate information about the situa-
move the division northward to posi- tion along the 16th Division’s front.
tions between his ailing panzer and Indeed, on 28 October Maj. Gen.
volksgrenadierunits.’ He also instructed Ernst Haeckel, commanding the volks-
these embattled units to pull back grenadier division, was in a state of
toward the Meurthe River, hoping confusion. As a result of nearly insol-
that the 16th Volksgrenadiers in the uble communications problems, he
center of the Allied attack could hold had little control of his tactical units,
a much smaller defensive front be- and many had started to fall apart.
tween the area just east of La Bour- After one of his grenadier companies
gonce and Le Haut Jacques Pass, on deserted to American lines on 27 Oc-
Route N-420 between Les Rouges tober, General Balck came close to re-
Eaux and St. Die. From Le Haut lieving Haeckel, but Wiese kept him
Jacques Pass the 16th Volkspenadier Di- on the job, mainly handling the
vision s main defenses were to contin- German defenses along Route N-420.
ue south through the central portion Although well aware that there were
dangerous penetrations on both
flanks of his unit, the harried division
7 The reinforced 308th Grenadiers of the 198th Divi-
sion, IV Luftwaffe Field Corps, replaced the 716th Divi- commander could do little about
sion in LXIV Corps’ sector. them.
328 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

The Attack Stalls the 141st Field Artillery Battalion


were killed or captured. The attack,
Unknown to Wiese, the 45th Divi- however, soon petered out, and, with
sion was not planning to conduct any its rear secured by the 15th Infantry,
major breakout eastward from the the 30th pressed east to assist the 7th
Rambervillers forest. On the divi- regiment and the rest of the 3d Divi-
sion’s left, the 117th Cavalry Squad- sion in opening Route N-420.
ron had pushed a few miles northeast Despite almost continuous infiltra-
of Rambervillers with no opposition, tion and numerous small, intense
but its flank security responsibilities counterattacks that probably marked
prevented it from advancing more the arrival of elements of the 201st
rapidly. In the forest itself, the move- Mountain Battalion along the regimental
ment of the 45th Division’s three in- front, the 30th Infantry was able to
fantry regiments toward the Meurthe consolidate its positions in the Magde-
River was steady, but also carefully leine woods area and, on 28 October,
measured. The 180th Infantry crossed began to push elements east toward
Route D-32 near the western edge of Hill 616, which dominated the highway
the forest and, on the 30th, after just north of Le Haut Jacques Pass
overcoming stubborn resistance, where the 7th Infantry was still stalled.8
reached Route N-59A. In the center If the hill could be captured, the entire
the 157th Infantry pushed several German defensive position in the pass
miles north of D-32; meanwhile, on would be gravely threatened, as would
the division’s right, the 179th Infantry its line of communications to St. Die.
consolidated positions on high The Germans also recognized the tacti-
ground overlooking La Bourgonce, cal importance of Hill 616 and
staying abreast of the 3d Division’s strengthened the area as best they
15th Infantry to the south, whose could; at dusk on 30 October they were
pace was much slower. still holding back the 30th Infantry’s at-
In the VI Corps’ center the 3d Divi- tacking force half a mile north of the
sion was finding the way to St. Die hill’s summit.9
more difficult. The 15th Infantry had Meanwhile, the 7th Infantry still
spent its time since 27 October mop- had its hands full along Route N-420.
ping up along Route D-7 in the La Despite several days of hard fighting,
Bourgonce area, and on the 30th it the unit had been unable to clear the
began relieving 30th Infantry troops
on the front lines a few miles east of 8 On 28 October the Germans cut the supply lines
La Bourgonce. While the relief was in to the 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, and set up a
progress, a German force–probably strongpoint behind the battalion’s forward units.
troops of the recently redeployed For destroying the position almost single-handedly,
S. Sgt. Lucian Adams, Company I, was awarded the
716th Division–attacked and drove Congressional Medal of Honor.
the intermixed American units back 9During German counterattacks at Hill 616 on 30
southward about a mile; during the October, PFC Wilburn K. Ross, a light machine
confusion, about twenty-five troops of gunner of Company G, 30th Infantry, successfully
threw back a series of German probes, remaining in
the 15th and 30th Infantry regiments an exposed position for nearly five hours, for which
and a forward observer party from he was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.
THE FORESTS OF THE MEURTHE 329

three miles of road between Les During the night of 24–25 October
Rouges Eaux and the entrance to Le the German grenadiers overran the
Haut Jacques Pass, and had been command post of the 1st Battalion,
equally unsuccessful in attempting to 141st Infantry, and completely
bypass German strongpoints by skirt- blocked the main trail to the battal-
ing through the edges of the Doman- ion’s forward elements at Hill 645.
iale de Champ forest just south of the An accounting on the morning of the
highway. Assistance from the 36th Di- 25th revealed that the Germans had
vision was needed, but Dahlquist’s cut off 241 Americans near the hill;
units, stretched thin over a long front, their only contact with the rest of the
had their own problems. regiment was the radio of an artillery
forward observer. 10 As yet, the Ger-
The Lost Battalion mans were only vaguely aware of the
isolated American pocket, since the
While the 45th and 3d Divisions situation within the densely forested
pushed northwest toward the Raon- hills and ridges of the Domaniale de
l’Etape–St. Die area, Dahlquist’s 36th Champ was as murky for the 933d
Division had moved east into the for- Grenadier Regiment as it was for the
bidding Domaniale de Champ forest 141st Infantry.
south of the main attack. On 23 Octo- On 25 October the 2d Battalion,
ber the 442d Infantry, on the 36th Di- 141st Infantry, gained some ground
vision’s left, penetrated several miles in the Hill 624 area, but fell far short
toward the center of the forest, with of reaching the group near Hill 645.
one battalion clearing Biffontaine in The 141st Infantry’s 3d Battalion,
the south. The following day the moving into the battle area from the
442d was relieved by the 141st and north, also met determined resistance
143d Infantry regiments, which con- and made little headway. During the
tinued the drive east. However, the afternoon the isolated group sent out
hapless 141st was soon in trouble a 36-man combat patrol to scout for a
again. When the regiment’s 1st Bat- possible breakout route, but the de-
talion occupied Hills 624 and 645 tachment was subsequently am-
northeast and southeast of Biffontaine bushed. Only five men made it back
on the 24th, the Germans reacted at to the Hill 645 perimeter and only a
once. Near Hill 624, an artillery-sup- single soldier, after being lost five
ported German counterattack cut the days in the woods, was finally able to
supply lines to elements of the 1st reach American lines.
Battalion, and a relief column of the
2d Battalion was unable to reach the 10The group consisted of 237 troops of the 1st
isolated units, having become em- Battalion, 141st Infantry, and four men from other
broiled in several small skirmishes units, including an artillery forward observer from
the 131st Field Artillery Battalion, 36th Division.
itself. The defenders were fresh units For detailed accounts of subsequent operations to
of the 338th Division’s 933d Grenadiers, relieve the group, see the 141st Infantry’s AAR, Oct
which Wiese hoped would stem the 44, pp. 26–46; Shirey, Americam, pp. 63-68; Seventh
Army Diary, pp. 339-44; and, for color, the account
36th Division’s penetration of the in The Fighting 36th (Austin, Tex.: The 36th Division
German intercorps boundary. Association, 1946) (unpaginated).
330 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

DOMANIALE Location of “lost


DE CHAMPFOREST(HIGHVOSGESIN BACKGROUND).
battalion ” is noted.

The situation remained unchanged The next day, 27 October, an exas-


throughout 26 October, but the perated Dahlquist decided to bring
trapped men were running desperately the rest of the 442d Infantry back
short of ammunition, medical supplies, into the line on the 141st Infantry’s
and food. The 2d Battalion, 442d In- left. However, the Japanese-American
fantry, after a two-day rest, came back regiment was immediately subjected
into the line to allow the 141st to focus to armor-supported counterattacks
all its activities on the relief effort, but launched by the 202d Mountain Battal-
the regiment, worn thin by the long ion, which had moved into the Les
weeks of campaigning in the Vosges, Rouges Eaux valley south of N-420.
was unable to clear a path to the isolat-
ed soldiers. The Hill 645 group-by I, when some 600 troops of the 308th Infantry, 77th
now inaccurately dubbed The Lost Division, were cut off in the Argonne Forest during
the period 3-7 October 1918. In fact there were
Battalion-remained cut off. 11 many such “lost battalions” during World War 11-a
common occurrence when attacking units sometimes
outdistanced their companions and became isolated
11 At the time, the American media drew an obvi- by enemy units infiltrating along their flanks and
ous parallel to “The Lost Battalion” of World War rear.
THE FORESTS OF THE MEURTHE 331

T o the east, the 141st Infantry’s tachment even sent a three-man team
progress was again negligible, and the into the forest in an unsuccessful at-
3d Battalion even had to give up tempt to aid the unit.15All this atten-
some ground in the face of German tion undoubtedly pinpointed the loca-
pressure. 12 Increasingly frustrated tion of the small force for the 933d
with the performance of the 141st In- Grenadiers, but the Germans had
fantry, General Dahlquist relieved the become increasingly disorganized and
regimental commander and replaced were unable to mount a concerted
him with Col. Charles H. Owens, the attack to eliminate the American
division’s chief of staff.13 These meas- pocket.
ures brought no immediate relief, During 29 and 30 October, at a
however, to the trapped unit. high cost, the 442d Infantry labori-
On 28 October the two recommit- ously fought its way down the south-
ted battalions of the 442d Infantry eastern arm of the forest. Finally,
moved northeast into the sector of about 1400 on the 30th, a Nisei
the 7th Infantry, 3d Division, in an at- patrol reached the Hill 645 group,
tempt to approach the southeastern marking the end of the struggle. By
portion of the Domaniale de Champ 1600 the bulk of the two 442d battal-
forest from a different angle. But ions had closed around the 141st In-
again progress was painfully slow, and fantry’s isolated force and began
at dusk the 442d’s leading troops evacuating the group’s casualties-
were still over two miles northwest of twenty-six wounded, including
the “lost battalion.” During the day, twenty-two litter cases. The next day
however, the Japanese-American unit the remainder of the group rejoined
captured some ninety Germans, the rest of the battered 1st Battalion,
among them the commanding officer and Owens quickly pulled the unit
of the 202d Mountain Battalion. Mean- out of the line. At the time, the bat-
while, aided by clearing weather, artil- talion had only 490 men left out of an
lery and aircraft managed to deliver authorized strength of about 870.
some supplies to the stranded group. At the end of October, the rest of
While howitzers fired in canisters the 141st Infantry was not in much
filled with chocolate bars, P-47 fight- better condition. During the month
ers of the 371st Fighter-Bomber the regiment had received nearly 650
Group dropped packets of ammuni- fresh enlisted replacements, and an-
tion, K-rations, medical supplies, other 600 enlisted men had returned
radio batteries, and water.14 On the to duty after being out of the line as
same day, the 36th Division’s OSS de- casualties. However, both battle and
nonbattle casualties had risen to the
extent that the regiment was still
12For heroic leadership between 24 and 27 Octo- short about 450 enlisted men, and the
ber, T. Sgt. Charles H. Coolidge, Company M, 3d
Battalion, 141st Infantry, was awarded the Congres-
36th Division as a whole was approxi-
sional Medal of Honor.
13Col. Carl E. Lindquist had taken command of
the 141st on 7 October, and Owens had been chief 15The Overseas Targets: War Report of the OSS, II,
of staff since 12 October. 248. The trio was ambushed, a French agent killed,
14See Seventh A m y Rpt, I , 550–51. and two Americans wounded and captured.
332 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

MEN FROM THE LOSTBATTALION (1st Battalion, 141st Infantry, 36th Division).

mately 4,400 troops below its In addition, fully occupied in the


strength of 1 October. Coming out of southeastern section of the Domaniale
the battle, the attached 442d Infantry, de Champ, the 36th was unable to pro-
after only a relatively short period of vide any assistance to the 3d Division’s
fighting, was emaciated and down to attack up Route D-420. In fact, Brooks
little more than 50 percent of its au- had to shift the 3d Division’s boundary
thorized strength with no replace- about two miles southward to cover the
ments in sight. left flank of the troubled unit. The best
The whole affair of the lost battalion that can be said of the episode was that
was extremely upsetting to both Dahl- the reinforcements sent by Wiese had
quist and Brooks. For five days the also been badly damaged, as the Nine-
relief of the Hill 645 group had con- teenth Army once again ran up against
sumed the energies of the bulk of two the American hard-luck division.
infantry regiments plus a large propor- The VI Corps’ attack, which had
tion of the 36th Division’s supporting seemed so promising at first, ap-
artillery, armor, and engineers. The di: peared to be stalled in the, Vosges
version had prevented the 36th Divi- forests at the end of October. Troop
sion from continuing its advances else- fatigue, poor weather, difficult ter-
where or even starting to approach its rain, ammunition shortages, and fresh
final DOGFACEobjective, St. Leonard. German reinforcements all conspired
THE FORESTS OF THE MEURTHE 333

against any rapid advance to the ized counterattacks. If the battle con-
Meurthe River. With the approach of tinued further, Wiese would have no
winter, time seemed to be working troops to man and defend the Vosges
against the American attackers, and Foothill Positions or any other winter
the first major snowfalls in the moun- defensive line. The fighting in the
tains would make offensive operations Rambervillers and Domaniale de
even more difficult. But the Germans Champ forests, and along Route N-
also had severe problems. The broad, 420 thus seemed to be coming down
grinding American advance was ehew- to a matter of will and stamina-a war
ing up their infantry units bit by bit, of attrition that, without assistance
never allowing them to build up their from the outside, only the more de-
reserve for anything more than local- termined opponent would win.
CHAPTER XIX

The Gates of the Vosges


Initial DOGFACEplanning had pro- better geographical position for the
vided for limited diversionary attacks start of the larger 6th Army Group
by the two Allied corps on either side offensive still scheduled for mid-
of Brooks’ VI Corps, namely, XV November.
Corps in the north and de Monsa-
bert’s II Corps in the south. The lack Planning
of supplies and the general exhaus-
tion of both units had prevented In the north the objective of the
these supporting attacks from taking XV Corps’ supporting attack was the
place. However, by late October both small city of Baccarat, a railroad and
Devers and Patch believed that the highway hub six miles northwest of
time for launching the two secondary Raon-l’Etape. The rapid seizure of
efforts had arrived. The gains made the Meurthe River town before the
by the VI Corps had begun to expose Germans could move reinforcements
its flanks, as the episode of the lost northward would accomplish two ob-
battalion had so clearly pointed out; jectives. First, Baccarat would give the
at the same time, the concentration of XV Corps an alternate route of ad-
the Nineteenth Army ’s reserves on the vance through the approaches to the
VI Corps’ front had correspondingly Saverne Gap. Second, possession of
weakened the defenses facing the U.S. the town would also give the VI
XV and the French II Corps. More- Corps a bridgehead over the
over, both of the flanking Allied corps Meurthe. From Baccarat, Brooks
were somewhat rested and had been could outflank the German Meurthe
able to improve their manpower and River line (the Vosges Foothill Position)
supply situation during the past and send forces south through Raon-
weeks. Attacks by either or both of l’Etape and the surrounding hill
the corps might take some pressure masses, known to the local inhabit-
off Brooks’ forces in the center, al- ants as “the gates of the Vosges”
lowing them to reach their Meurthe (Map 24).
River line objectives before DOGFACE T o accomplish this task, General
ran out of steam. In addition, Devers Haislip, the XV Corps commander,
believed that a general advance by all ordered Leclerc’s 2d Armored Divi-
three corps would place them in a sion to isolate the area by cutting the
336 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

main roads north and east of Bac- troops consumed by the effort would
carat, including the southeastern sec- obviously detract from his buildup
tion of N-59 leading to Raon-l’Etape, opposite Belfort. Moreover, de Lattre
and then to occupy the town itself.1 doubted that much could be accom-
Leclerc’s command was to begin its plished. The division and attached
offensive, planned as a short, two-day FFI units held a twelve-mile front in
affair, on 31 October. rough, forested, rain-sodden or snow-
On VI Corps’ southern flank, a laden terrain; de Monsabert would
French II Corps demonstration by the have difficulty concentrating sufficient
3d Algerian Division was to start on 3 resources of his own to launch a
November and last for three days. meaningful diversion. Contributing to
General de Monsabert, commanding de Lattre’s uneasiness was the knowl-
the II Corps, welcomed the opportu- edge that the relatively fresh and
nity to take some offensive action strong (14,000 troops) 269th Volks-
after having been relegated to a de- grenadier Division from Norway had
fensive role in mid-October. Brig. begun to take over from the depleted
Gen. Augustin Guillaume, command- 338th Division in the area south of
ing the 3d Algerian Infantry Division, Gerardmer.3 But the French Army
was also pleased. German artillery commander hoped that a limited
had been harassing his main supply attack by his II Corps would at least
routes in the Vagney-Sapois area, and keep the Nineteenth Army's attention
a few limited objective attacks would, focused on the Vosges front and away
he felt, push German artillery observ- from the Belfort Gap sector. In the
ers out of the nearby hills and end end, at the urgings of Patch and
the nuisance. A limited push north Devers, he reluctantly drew upon his
would also put his units on better ter- general reserve and provided Guil-
rain for further advances. laume’s division with a combat com-
However, General de Lattre, com- mand of the French 5th Armored Di-
manding the First French Army, had vision, the Shock Battalion, much of
serious misgivings.2 Any supplies and the artillery of the 1st and 5th Ar-
mored Divisions, a tank destroyer bat-
1 While the orders of the Seventh Army and XV talion, and an infantry battalion from
Corps did not specify the seizure of Baccarat, the 2d the 4th Moroccan Mountain Division.
French Armored Division could hardly have accom-
plished its missions–especially cutting Route N- From his own resources General de
59-without taking the city; Leclerc obviously in- Monsabert added an infantry battal-
tended to make Baccarat his primary objective. ion from the French 1st Infantry
2De Lattre, History, p. 206, states that during a Division still located south of the
conference with General Devers on 27 October he
“at once” promised French cooperation for the lim- Algerians.
ited objective attack, but neither the First French
Army account of the conference (copy in First
French Army files and dated 30 October) nor the
Devers diary of 27 October agree with this interpre- enth Army) to Chief of Staff, Seventh Army (no
tation. De Lattre also appears to have been less than subj, but an account of the 31 October conference),
enthusiastic at a conference with de Monsabert and 1 Nov 44.
Brooks on 31 October at the French II Corps com- 3The first elements of the 269th Volksgrendier Di-
mand post. See Seventh Army Diary, 31 October; vision reached the front opposite the French II
and Memo, Col Joseph F. Surrat (G–3 Section, Sev- Corps on 26 October.
THE GATES OF THE VOSGES 337

carat was, in dry weather, suited to ar-


mored warfare, but on 31 October
most of the area was a morass of
flooded streams, water-covered roads,
and mud. However, Leclerc was con-
vinced that by keeping to the upper
slopes of the low hills and ridges
leading to Baccarat he could maneu-
ver his armor in a reasonably effective
manner.
Leclerc’s optimism, especially in the
face of weakened 21st Panzer Division
defenses, proved well founded. More-
over, the 2d Armored Division’s staff
had done its homework well. With
bright cerise cloth panels and pen-
nants boldly displayed for identifica-
tion purposes, the French armored
columns swept southeastward across a
four-mile front. By early afternoon his
left column had cut Route N-435
about four miles northeast of Bac-
carat and had then gone on to clear
GENERALPATCH AND MAJ. GEN. the town of Merviller, a few miles to
EDWARD
H. BROOKS the south. Meanwhile, his right-wing
units had eliminated a long-trouble-
The Attack in the North some German strongpoint at Aizer-
ailles, on the Meurthe River and
Unconcerned with French problems Route N-59 about three miles north-
in the south, Leclerc’s 2d Armored west of Baccarat. Late in the day
Division launched the XV Corps’ set- French armor drove into the eastern
piece attack from assembly areas in half of the isolated town against only
the Mondon forest southeast of Lune- scattered resistance. By 1000 the next
ville at daybreak on 31 September, day, 1 November, CCD of the 2d Ar-
supported by four battalions of corps mored Division had cleared Baccarat
artillery,4 and by the artillery of the and in the process seized an intact
XV Corps’ new 44th Division. The bridge over the Meurthe River.
21st Panzer Division, responsible for On the same day CCV, attacking
the defense of Baccarat and environs, from the northern edge of the
was caught by surprise. The Germans Mondon forest, occupied Ogeviller—
knew that the rolling, generally open on Route N-4 about seven miles
terrain north and northwest of Bac- north of Baccarat-which had former-
ly been a strongpoint on the bounda-
4A battalion each of 155-mm. howitzers, 155-mm. ry between First and Nineteenth Armies.
guns, 4.5-inch guns, and 8-inch howitzers. The French pressed on another mile
338 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

and a half along N-4 to take Herbe- French armored division’s attack,
viller; they then moved southeast pushed two miles farther east into the
along the west bank of the small La sector north of the Vezouse River, se-
Blette River and cleared Montigny, on curing rising ground and driving back
La Blette and Route N-435 about six elements of the 533d Volksgrenadier
miles northeast of Baccarat. The Division.
heaviest fighting of the day took place
at Vacqueville, on a railroad spur line German Reorganization
a mile and a half east of N-435 at
Merviller. Here 21st Panzer Division in- Changes in Wiese’s Nineteenth A m y
fantry, supported by five tanks, held command structure had also contrib-
out until 1730, withdrawing only after uted to the German dislocation in the
the French knocked out three of the Baccarat area. On 28 October the
German armored vehicles. Meanwhile, LVIII Panzer Corps headquarters, con-
CCD opened Route N-59 between Ai- trolling the southern divisions of Army
zerailles and Baccarat, probed south- Group G ’s First A m y , received orders
west along N-435 toward Ramber- to redeploy northward to the zone of
villers to establish contact with VI Army Group B.6 T o replace the depart-
Corps’ 117th Cavalry Squadron, and ing panzer corps headquarters, A m y
sent patrols out southeast of Baccarat Group G directed the Nineteenth A m y to
along Route N-59. transfer von Gilsa’s LXXXIX Corps
By dusk on 1 November, the French headquarters to the First Army. Unable
2d Armored Division had thus accom- to obtain a suitable replacement for
plished its DOGFACE support mission. von Gilsa’s command, General Wiese
The division adopted a generally de- had to shift the zone of Thumm’s
fensive posture and waited for VI LXIV Corps northward to take over the
Corps units to take over in the Bac- LXXXIX Corps sector. The new LXIV
carat-Merviller sector. The two-day ex- Corps front was about twenty-three
ercise had cost the 2d Armored Divi- miles wide and extended from Do-
sion approximately 20 men killed and mevre, on Route N-4 about three
100 wounded, while equipment losses miles north of Montigny, to Saulcy-
included 7 medium tanks, 2 light tanks, sur-Meurthe, three miles south of St.
6 half-tracks, and 1 tank destroyer. The Die. Both Petersen’s IV Luftwaffe Field
division captured about 550 German Corps and Kniess’ LXXXV Corps also
troops and estimated that it had killed had to extend their boundaries north-
over 200 more; known German materi- ward, leaving the IV Luftwaffe Field
el losses included six medium tanks Corps with a front of over twenty-five
and fifteen 88-mm. guns.5 In addition, miles from Saulcy south to Route N-
General Spragins’ 44th Infantry Divi- 66 at Le Thillot; here it tied its de-
sion, taking advantage of confusion in
the German defenses caused by the 6Von Manteuffel’s Fifth Panzer Army headquarters
and the XLVII Panzer Corps headquarters had already
left for the north and, together with the LVIII Panzer
5Most of the 88-mm. guns were on antiaircraft Corps headquarters, would constitute the southern
mounts and, once emplaced, could not be moved command and control organization of the German
quickly. Ardennes Offensive in December 1944.
THE GATES OF THE VOSGES 339

fenses into units of the LXXXV Corps, tack to regain the lost ground. Then,
still holding in front of the Belfort on 1 November, when the 21st Panzer
Gap. 7 Division failed to hold along the Mon-
These command and control tigny-Vacqueville-Bertrichamps line,
changes had become effective be- Balck reluctantly approved the with-
tween 30 October and l November, a drawal of the Nineteenth Army’s right
critical period for both attackers and and center into the forward Weststel-
defenders. On 31 October, with the lung defenses, the Vosges Foothill Posi-
attack of the French 2d Armored Divi- tion. This withdrawal, later hastened
sion well along, it became obvious by attacks of the French II Corps in
that the Nineteenth Army could neither the south, entailed a major redeploy-
counterattack nor hold; Wiese there- ment along the Nineteenth Army’s
fore obtained permission from Balck entire Vosges front, from Domevre
to draw the army’s right wing back to south almost 40 miles to La Bresse in
the general line of Montigny, Vacque- the upper Moselotte River valley,
ville, and Bertrichamps, conceding which was to be finalized by 15 No-
the loss of Baccarat. Wiese hoped that vember. By that date Balck hoped
hastily assembled, weak reserves 8 that construction of the defensive in-
could help the 21st Panzer Division stallations of the Vosges Foothill Position
hold a new line, but on 1 November would be completed.
Leclerc’s armor overran the line Either dissatisfied with tactical
before it could be established, except preparations or frustrated by the in-
temporarily, at Vacqueville. The 21st creasingly dismal situation facing him,
Panzer Division’s right now withdrew Balck, the Army Group G commander,
east of La Blette River; the center also announced a scorched-earth
moved into rising, wooded ground policy for the areas to be vacated by
east of Baccarat and Bertrichamps; the Nineteenth Army. Balck’s orders di-
and the left, under constant pressure rected that, by 10 November, all able-
from the VI Corps’ 45th Division, bodied men between the ages of six-
held on to the mountains surrounding teen and sixty were to be evacuated
Raon-l’Etape, which, Wiese was still to the east bank of the Rhine for use
convinced, was the VI Corps’ major as forced labor. Women, children,
objective. and men infirm or over sixty were to
Uncharacteristically, Balck had ac- be herded into relatively safe areas;
quiesced in the loss of important ter- and each village, town, and city was
rain without insisting that Nineteenth to be completely destroyed as the
Army mount an immediate counterat- German troops left. Apparently not
trusting his regular army officers to
7 The L X X X V Corps boundary was also pulled carry out the harsh measures, or per-
north about five miles to Le Thillot. haps not wanting to impose the
8 The reserves included three infantry “battal-
ions” of little more than company strength, a weak burden on tactical units, Balck ar-
machine-gun battalion, elements of the 106th Panzer ranged for the local SS 9 to undertake
Brigade, and some fortress artillery. Available
records do not show whether any of these reinforce-
ments actually reached the 21st Panzer Division’s 9The Schutzstaffel (protective group) was a uni-
front by 1 November. formed but lightly armed element of the Nazi Party
340 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

the necessary actions. The SS lacked held since mid-October, but they
demolitions and expertise in their managed to occupy high ground over-
use, however, and relied mainly on looking La Bresse and the Moselotte
fire for destructive purposes, leaving valley, through which ran the key
the scorched-earth program subject to German north-south lines of commu-
the vagaries of wind and weather. nication.
The initial German reaction to the
The Attack in the South 3d Algerian Division’s attack was lim-
ited to heavy artillery and mortar fire,
Balck’s orders of 1 November had but on the evening of 5 November
scarcely been distributed when de the 269th Division began a series of
Monsabert’s II Corps launched its counterattacks that lasted through the
DOGFACEsupporting attack at 0800 7th. The cessation of the counterat-
on 3 November, after an hour-long tacks was probably fortunate for the
artillery preparation. 10 Again the Ger- French, because by the end of the day
mans were caught more or less by all the reinforcing units that de Lattre
surprise. Terrain and weather condi- had made available to de Monsabert
tions were unfavorable for the at- were on their way back to the Belfort
tacker, but the 269th Volksgrenadier Di- Gap front. The 3d Algerian Division
vision, still deploying across part of again went on the defensive, as did
the IV Luftwaffe Field Corps front, had the Germans, who feared that the
been unable to organize completely French were only pausing for a brief
the defenses of its new sector. rest before renewing the attacks.
On the left, elements of the rein- The limited French gains in the
forced 3d Algerian Division gained south had not come cheaply. During
only about a mile after fighting for the attack, the 3d Algerian Division
three days in the dense, upland for- and its attachments lost approximate-
ests around Le Tholy. In the center, ly 150 men killed, 670 wounded, and
astride the axis of Route D–23 east of 35 missing. Nevertheless, the effects
Sapois, infantry units advanced over of de Monsabert’s support operations
two miles along dominating terrain were obvious. Concerned about the
north and south of the highway, pen- threat to the sector, Balck and Wiese
etrating some Weststellung positions, were forced to keep substantial
while supporting armor pushed a mile strength in the southern Vosges area,
farther down the road. T o the south, which, because of the rugged terrain,
other French troops advanced only probably could have been held by a
about a mile eastward from positions much smaller force. They were thus
unable to deploy more units to either
organization that constituted an internal political the Baccarat, St. Die, or Belfort sec-
police force. Another branch, the Waffen SS (armed tors. But the true measure of both de
SS), was organized into tactical units similar to those
of the German Army. Monsabert’s and Leclerc’s actions was
10In addition to official French unit records, the the degree to which Brooks’ VI Corps
following material on the II Corps action is based could take advantage of the resulting
on de Lattre, History, p. 206; Le 2e C.A. dam la Ba-
taille pour la Liberation de la France, pp. 57-59; and dismay caused in the German ranks to
Moreau, La Victoire, pp. 199–206. complete its push to the Meurthe.
THE GATES OF THE VOSGES 341

VI Corps Resumes the Attack 157th turned south, guiding on Route


N-424, a secondary road to the
With the French support operations Meurthe. In the north, small detach-
under way, Brooks pressed his VI ments of the 180th Infantry emerged
Corps forces forward in an effort to from the forest on 3 November at the
gain all DOGFACE objectives in time to west bank of the Meurthe River
give his three tired divisions some almost two miles above the bridge to
rest before the army group offensive Raon-l’Etape. But their rapid excur-
began in mid-November. On the far sion proved exceptional. In the center
left, during the opening days of No- the rest of the 180th remained stalled
vember, the 117th Cavalry Squadron, at the pass, and in the south the
with the aid of the 3d Battalion, 36th 157th Infantry progressed scarcely a
Engineers, completed the relief of 2d mile eastward along Route N-424.
French Armored Division units in the With their initial energy spent, the
Merviller-Baccarat-Bertrichamps area, 45th Division foot soldiers again
and was soon joined by elements of began to show the now familiar signs
the 45th Division’s 179th Infantry. of extreme fatigue that had character-
South of Baccarat, however, both ized the entire Vosges campaign.
Eagles and O’Daniel had a hard time On the other side, the German de-
penetrating the strengthened German fenders were in worse condition.
defenses. Unable to halt the 45th Division for
Opposite Raon-l’Etape, the 45th long and with all his reserves commit-
Division’s 180th and 157th regiments ted, General Wiese finally obtained
continued their advance to the permission from Army Group G to pull
Meurthe River through the Ramber- the left of the 21st Panzer Division and
villers forest and along Route N-59A. the right of the neighboring 716th Di-
By 2 November the 180th Infantry vision back almost to the Meurthe
managed to reach the hamlet of St. River valley. At the same time, Balck
Benoit, about halfway between Ram- reluctantly and temporarily trans-
bervillers and Raon-l’Etape, but was ferred the 951st Grenadiers of the First
unable to advance much farther. A Army’s 362st Volksgrendier Division to
few miles northeast of St. Benoit, the Nineteenth Army as a final emergen-
Route N-59A–now no more than a cy reserve. The Army Group G com-
narrow mountain road separating the mander at first expected Wiese to use
Ste. Barbe and Rambervillers for- the 951st Grenadiers to free elements
ests-rose to a height of nearly 1,500 of the 21st Panzer Division for counter-
feet, passing over a divide between attacks in the Baccarat-Raon-l’Etape
the Meurthe and Mortagne water- area. However, lack of time and
sheds at the Chipote Pass. There, means, pressure from the Americans,
about four miles short of Raon- and muddy ground made it impossi-
l’Etape, units of the 21st Panzer Divi- ble for the panzer division to under-
sion made a final stand. Unable to take any offensive measures. Never-
force the pass, some elements of the theless, the 951st Grenadier Regiment,
180th Infantry moved north into the which reached Raon-l’Etape late on 4
Ste. Barbe forest, while the entire November, immediately made its
342 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE
presence felt, halting renewed attacks
by the 180th Infantry-along Route N-
59A on 4 and 5 November. But the
relief was only momentary. South of
N-59A, the 157th Infantry slowly con-
tinued to labor through the Ramber-
villers forests toward the Meurthe,
while north of the mountain highway
the 45th Division pushed additional
forces across the Ste. Barbe wilder-
ness. More important, since 2 Novem-
ber, Eagles’ tired division had slowly
been reinforced by troops from the
fresh U.S. 100th Infantry Division-
the first of the three new divisions
that Eisenhower had promised Devers
back in September, and also the first
new American division that had
reached the Seventh Army since its
campaign in France began.

Operation Dogface Ends

On 9 November Maj. Gen. Withers MAJ. GEN.WITHERSA. BURRESS


A. Burress, commanding the 100th
Infantry Division, formally assumed hills overlooking the western valley of
control of the zone from General the Meurthe north and south of
Eagles. To all intents and purposes, Raon-l’Etape by 11 November; how-
the 45th Division had ended its role ever, the new unit was unable to
in the DOGFACEoffensive. Although eliminate a final German strongpoint
short of its final objective line, the di- directly opposite the town.
vision had nearly pushed the Ger- In the VI Corps center, the 3d Divi-
mans out of the Ste. Barbe and Ram- sion had also resumed its advance
bervillers forests, placing the few toward St. Die during the first week
German units still on the west bank of of November. On the division’s left,
the Meurthe River in an extremely the 15th Infantry moved northeast
awkward defensive position. In addi- from La Bourgonce area and began a
tion, with help from the French 2d slow, methodical advance toward the
Armored Division and the 117th Cav- Meurthe. Much of the ground was
alry Squadron, the division had rolling and open, and the 716th Divi-
moved forces onto the far side of the sion offered only minor resistance at
Meurthe, outflanking the German de- various small villages and hamlets, be-
fensive positions of Raon-l’Etape latedly launching only a single genu-
proper. Subsequently, the 100th Divi- ine counterattack, which proved inef-
sion finished clearing the forested fective. By 9 November the regiment
THE GATES OF THE VOSGES 343

reached positions along rising ground tober. Haffner officially took over the
overlooking the Meurthe valley, suc- 3d Division’s sector on 12 November,
cessfully completing its DOGFACE as- allowing O’Daniel’s weary forces a
signments. brief respite.
In the Magdeleine woods, the 30th Although St. Die remained in
Infantry advanced abreast of the 15th, German hands, the 3d Division, with
clearing the woods and reaching the the impetus of its early attack through
west bank of the Meurthe River only the other VI Corps divisions, had
about a mile north of St. Die by 6 No- reached the west bank of the Meurthe
vember. On the regiment’s right, the and, more important, had secured
7th Infantry, battered and exhausted, Route N-420 as a main supply route
finally broke through Le Haut Jacques all the way from Brouvelieures almost
Pass on 4 November, but only after to St. Die. But the cost had been
having been forced to clear most of high. From 20 October through 10
the wooded area just west of N-420. November, battle casualties within the
Hill 616, east of the pass, fell to the 7th Infantry regiment alone totaled
combined efforts of the 7th and 30th approximately 150 men killed and
Infantry regiments on 5 November, 820 wounded, while the unit captured
after which the remaining elements of about 1,100 Germans. The 3d Divi-
the 16th Volksgrendier Division began sion’s 7th and .30th regiments quickly
falling back on St. Die. By the went into reserve, resting and begin-
evening of 9 November the 7th Infan- ning to prepare for the main Novem-
try had also cleared the wooded area ber offensive. However, since Brooks
immediately south of St. Die, and had had designated the 103d Division’s
sent patrols a few miles down Route third regiment, the 411 th Infantry, as
D-31 into the Taintrux valley. By that the corps’ reserve, the 15th Infantry
time, elements of the 30th Infantry remained in holding positions along
had marched out of the southern the west side of the Meurthe valley
edge of the Magdeleine woods to take north of St. Die.
responsibility for the road junction of While the two fresh divisions had
N-420 and D-31, leaving the battered arrived just in time for Eagles’ and
7th to protect the division’s right O’Daniel’s tired units, Dahlquist’s
flank. workhorse 36th was to have no such
Relief for the tired 3d Division was respite. Although the DOGFACE terri-
on its way. Between 9 and 11 Novem- torial objectives of the 36th Division
ber the 409th and 410th Infantry had been less significant than those of
regiments of the fresh but untried other VI Corps forces-the actual task
103d Infantry Division, commanded of the 36th was to secure the corps’
by Maj. Gen. Charles C. Haffner, Jr., long right flank-the terrain it had
began replacing the 7th and 30th In- faced and the opposition it had en-
fantry. The 103d Division was the countered were, if anything, more dif-
second of the three divisions that Ei- ficult. Throughout early November
senhower had redirected from north- the attached 442d and the organic
ern France to Marseille, where the 141st regiments tried to clear the cen-
103d had begun unloading on 20 Oc- tral portion of the Domaniale de
344 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

Champ forest from Les Rouges Eaux up supplies or to maneuver troops


on Route N-420 south to La Hous- with any degree of dispatch. The
siere. The two regiments finally occu- cold, wet weather took an increasing
pied positions overlooking the upper toll on the mostly Hawaiian-born
Neune River valley, but they still 442d infantrymen; combat losses, al-
faced a medley of German forces- though heavy, were greatly outnum-
mixed elements of the 933d Grenadiers, bered by nonbattle casualties-trench
the 202d Mountain Battalion, and vari- foot, severe colds, flu, and pneumonia
ous fortress units from the Weststel- being the most common illnesses. By
lung-holding strong defensive posi- 7 November the 442d was down to an
tions in the forests between La Hous- average of thirty effectives in each
siere and St. Leonard and in the rifle company, and one battalion had
Taintrux valley. The 143d and 142d to be withdrawn from the front that
Infantry regiments, north to south, day. By the 9th, when the rest of the
remained in holding positions along regiment came out of the forward
the 36th Division's right from the lines, one company could muster only
Neune River valley near Biffontaine seventeen riflemen fit for duty, and
south some ten miles to the vicinity of another only four. The 442d was vir-
Le Tholy, a thin defensive line that tually incapable of further oper-
was beginning to make both Dahl- ations. 11
quist and Brooks a bit nervous. Replacing the dissipated 442d, the
The Germans, however, had no somewhat rested 142d Infantry reen-
thought of offensive action and were tered the forest and by 8 November
more concerned about their own had pushed through the Taintrux
flanks, fearing that a major Allied valley, only about a mile and a half
penetration to St. Leonard or Cor- short of the 7th Infantry's advance
cieux might precipitate a rapid Ameri- from the opposite direction. During
can advance along the relatively good the night of 9–10 November, as part
roads that led north to St. Die, south of Balck's general withdrawal, the re-
to Gerardmer, and east across the maining German units pulled most of
Vosges to Colmar on the Alsatian their troops east of D-31, allowing
plains. The Germans therefore de- units of the 142d regiment to occupy
fended the area stubbornly. From l La Houssiere unopposed and to push
to 4 November, determined German over a mile farther east. There Oper-
infantry resistance, heavy artillery and ation DOGFACEended for the tired
mortar fire, miserable weather, flood- 36th Division, well short of its final
ed streams, inadequate air support, objective, the high ground overlook-
and the now ever-present seas of
French mud severely limited 36th Di- 11Shirey, Americans, p. 71. The 2d and 3d Battal-
vision advances. The Domaniale de ions, 442d Infantry, went back into the lines on 13
November to relieve the 142d Infantry in a quiet
Champ forest network had even fewer sector, but were taken out of the line again on 17
roads than its northern neighbors, November and sent with the rest of the regiment to
and its flooded dirt avenues and trails the French Riviera and the relatively quiet Franco-
Italian border area. At the time the 442d Infantry
mired vehicles and foot soldiers alike, left, it could hardly marshal more than half of its au-
making it nearly impossible to bring thorized strength.
THE GATES OF THE VOSGES 345

COMPANY L, 142D REGIMENT, 36THDIVISION,PULLSBACKTO REARIN SNOWFALL,


near Langefosse, France, November 1944.

ing St. Leonard. Nevertheless the the strength of Brooks’ infantry regi-
right flank of the VI Corps appeared ments, units that had been in almost
secure, and in balance the stubborn continuous operations since 15
incursions of the 36th had attracted August. Certainly by the end of DOG-
much German attention, thereby di- FACE,none of the three “veteran”
verting major units that might have American divisions looked forward to
been deployed in the St. Die-Raon- another major offensive, especially
l’Etape area to jam up the main ad- one which might send them ten miles
vance. farther across the Vosges through
Operation DOGFACE gave the VI even more precipitous terrain. Yet, as
Corps strong positions opposite the Truscott might have reminded them,
Meurthe River line, the so-called the sooner they started, the weaker
Vosges Foothill Position, and thus the of- the German defense would be; and
fensive had achieved its stated pur- this time the VI Corps would have
pose. Balck and Wiese perhaps were welcome reinforcements, including
also satisfied, for the stubborn new infantry and armored formations
German defense, coupled with ad- that would almost double its size and
verse weather and terrain, had sapped striking power.
PART FOUR

THE NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE


CHAPTER XX

Planning the November Offensive


During October and early Novem- support of Montgomery’s 21st Army
ber 1944, the German Army had tem- Group. This redeployment left the
porarily stopped the Allied offensive First Army as Bradley’s center com-
in northwestern Europe. In the sector mand, with Patton’s Third Army still
of the British 21st Army Group, on his right, or southern, wing.
Montgomery’s forces had secured the Beset by logistical difficulties in Oc-
Schelde Estuary by 3 November, and tober, the Third Army had failed-to
minesweepers had cleared a path to open the Metz approaches to the Saar
Antwerp by the 8th. However, several basin which, straddling the border be-
more weeks would be needed to clear tween France and Germany, was
all of the estuary and repair the second only to the Ruhr as a center
harbor before Antwerp could become of German war-making capabilities.
a working port. Meanwhile, Allied tac- The German defense of the Aachen
tical, logistical, and manpower prob- and Metz areas underscored the
lems had been complicated by the continuing ability of the Wehrmacht to
autumn storms and early cold weath- frustrate any narrow “strategic”
er, making it impossible for the right ground advance into Germany of the
of the 21st Army Group or the left of type advocated by Montgomery. As a
Bradley’s 12th Army Group to make result, Eisenhower had become con-
any significant progress toward the vinced late in October that an all-out
Ruhr, Germany’s industrial heartland offensive to defeat Germany by the
(Map 25). The principal accomplish- end of 1944 was impossible. 1All that
ment of the U.S. First Army, on Brad- could be undertaken was a limited of-
ley’s left, had been the costly and fensive program for November and
time-consuming seizure of Aachen probably for December as well.
(Aix-la-Chapelle). There the First Eisenhower saw nothing in the
Army had penetrated over ten miles sector of the 6th Army Group that
into Germany, but was still far short might change his views. Although
of the Ruhr. About 23 October the Devers’ armies had an independent
U.S. Ninth Army, after a brief stint as supply line from the Mediterranean.
the 12th Army Group’s center com- 1 For high-level discussions concerning the possi-
mand, moved up to the left of Brad- bility of defeating Germany by the end of 1944, see
ley’s sector to provide more direct Pogue, The Supreme Command, pp. 307–09.
PLANNING THE NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE 351

the 6th Army Group still needed sever- attacks by the French II Corps had
al weeks to become logistically ready compelled the Germans to commit
for a renewed major offensive effort. strong forces in the mountains, but he
Moreover, the results of 6th Army had no intention of ordering more
Group operations during October led French troops into the Vosges where
Eisenhower to doubt that Devers’ com- the terrain so heavily favored the de-
mand could make any major contribu- fenders. Instead, he continued to pre-
tions to the Allied advance in Novem- pare his I Corps, which had been nearly
ber. On the southern army group’s inactive during October, for a mid-No-
northern wing, the Seventh Army’s XV vember attempt to pierce the German
Corps had done little after clearing the defenses in the Belfort Gap area and
Parroy forest, and Leclerc’s seizure of then advance to the Rhine.
the Baccarat area at the end of the
month represented only a minor action General Planning
across the much larger Allied front. At
the 6th Army Group’s center, the pic- From 16 to 18 October, Eisenhow-
ture was even less encouraging. During er held a series of conferences with
Operation DOGFACEthe VI Corps had his senior commanders concerning
pushed some ten miles through the the course of operations in Novem-
Vosges across a fifteen-mile-wide ber. 3 All of the meetings reflected Ei-
front, but the pace had been slow and senhower’s continued concern with
costly. By November the corps’ three logistical problems. Conferring with
veteran divisions were again at the Devers and Bradley at the 6th Army
point of complete exhaustion; a suc- Group headquarters on 16 October,
cessful November offensive would Eisenhower asked if the army group’s
depend greatly on the capabilities of line of communication from the Medi-
the fresh but untried 100th and 103d terranean could be used to increase
Infantry Divisions and the equally inex- the flow of supplies to the Third
perienced 14th Armored Division, all Army. At the time, Devers estimated
of which were scheduled to enter the that he could probably start passing
front line as soon as possible. 2 1,000 tons of supplies per day to Pat-
To the south of Devers’ American
forces. the First French Army had 3General sources for this subsection are the fol-
made promising gains during October lowing: Pogue, The Supreme Command, pp. 305–11;
Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, pp. 298-318; MacDon-
and November,
but had been decisively ald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, pp. 379-93; Devers
stopped by stiffening German resist- Diary, 16–17 Oct 44; Seventh Army Diary, 16–18
ance in the southern section of the Oct 44; Hist, 6th Army Gp, ch. 3; Final Rpt, G–3
Section, H Q 6th Army Gp, WWII, pp. 16-20;
stoppedby stiffening German resist- SHAEF Internal Memo, 22 Oct 44, sub: Decisions
French commander, was pleased that reached at Supreme Comdr’s Conf, 18 Oct 44; Ltr,
Eisenhower to Devers, 23 Oct 44 (no sub); SCAF
Directive 114 (SCAF-I 14), 28 Oct 44; SCAF-118, 2
2 The 14th Armored Division began unloading at Nov 44. The last four documents are in SHAEF
Marseille on 29 October, and elements of the divi- SGS 381, Post-OVERLORDPlng II. SCAF-114 and
sion were first committed to the Nice area to relieve SCAF-118 also have SHAEF message numbers, re-
units of the 1st Airborne Task Force. The first spectively, SHAEF Main S–64375 and SHAEF Main
major increment of the division did not reach the S–65076. (In Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 310,
forward area of the VI Corps until 20 November. n14, SCAF–118 is mistakenly cited as SCAF–119.)
352 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

ton’s forces after 15 November, but approaches to Antwerp had priority,


would be unable to provide any sub- the 21st Army Group was to push its
stantial assistance earlier. In the Su- right south and southeast from the vi-
preme Commander’s mind, this re- cinity of Nijmegen to clear its sector
sponse only emphasized the impor- west of the Rhine, simultaneously
tance of opening Antwerp for the seeking bridgeheads across the river.
northern Allied armies. The task Meanwhile, forces of Bradley’s 12th
would even have to take precedence Army Group that were north of the
over any renewed attack by Montgom- Ardennes were also to move up to the
ery and Bradley against the Ruhr, and Rhine, swinging their left northward
underlined Allied inability to launch a in conjunction with the 21st Army
decisive offensive against Germany Group’s drive south and at the same
until the following year. time trying for bridgeheads over the
The conferences culminated on 18 Rhine south of Cologne.
October at Brussels, Belgium, where In the center—that portion of the
Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Brad- First Army’s zone lying south of the Ar-
ley worked out plans concerning pri- dennes plus all of the Third Army’s
marily the November operations of sector—12th Army Group forces were
the 21st and 12th Army Groups. This to seize the Saar basin, advance gener-
meeting, in turn, led to the promulga- ally northeast to the Rhine, and secure
tion on 28 October of a new Eisen- bridgeheads over the river opposite
hower directive, Supreme Command- the Frankfurt area. Subsidiary to the
er Allied Forces No. 114 (SCAF-114), main effort north of the Ardennes,
for operations in November and, by these operations were to be timed to
inference, December as well. 4 SCAF- support the northern offensives.
114 demonstrated that SHAEF’s Eisenhower’s SCAF-114 called for
operational concepts had changed only limited offensive actions in the
little since September. The document Ardennes and Vosges areas. The im-
again placed the main Allied offensive mediate task of the 6th Army Group,
effort in the sector held by Montgom- Eisenhower informed Devers, was to
ery’s 21st Army Group and in the protect the right flank of the 12th
part of the 12th Army Group’s zone Army Group, primarily by securing
lying north of the Ardennes, an area the Luneville area. But since the Lun-
roughly between Arnhem and eville “area” had certainly been
Aachen. While securing the seaward secure since the end of the Parroy
forest battle on 10 October, well over
4 Cole,The Lorraine Campaign, p. 298, incorrectly two weeks before SCAF-114 ap-
states that the directive was issued on 18 October, peared, the mission seems a bit su-
“complete with the ‘probable’ dates for new at- perfluous. However, SCAF-114 also
tacks.” But SCAF-114, issued on the 28th, contains
no target dates, and tentative timing was left to
directed Devers to clear the Germans
SCAF-118, issued on 2 November. The delay in from the 6th Army Group’s sector
promulgating SCAF-114 may have been caused by west of the Rhine and ultimately seize
Eisenhower’s desire to be certain that the 21st Army crossings over the river in the vicinity
Group operations to clear the Schelde Estuary
would be successful before he issued any new, of Karlsruhe and Mannheim, some
sweeping orders. forty and seventy-five miles north of
PLANNING THE NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE 353

Strasbourg, respectively. of approach leading east and northeast


The directive again reflected a com- deep into Germany or, alternatively,
promise between a rigid single-thrust north up the Rhine valley to Karlsruhe
strategy and a broad front operational and Mannheim.
concept. Moreover, it outlined a pro- SCAF-114 set no firm timetable for
gram that probably went beyond what the November offensive, but the army
Eisenhower actually had in mind for group and army commanders involved
the near future. The most Eisenhower soon learned that Eisenhower expect-
evidently expected of operations in ed the left of Bradley’s 12th Army
November, if not December as well, Group to lead off the attack against the
was to clear all German forces from the Ruhr sometime between 1 and 5 No-
area west of the Rhine River, from Nij- vember, with the right of the 21st Army
megen in the north to the Swiss border Group following on about 10 Novem-
in the south. Although the directive in- ber. The Third Army, on the right, or
cluded provisions for the opportunistic southern, wing of the 12th Army
seizure of bridgeheads over the Rhine Group, was to begin its attack against
by all three army groups, it also speci- the Saar as soon as its logistical situa-
fied that movement of the Allied forces tion permitted, but no later than five
in strength across the river would have days after the left of the 12th Army
to wait for considerable improvement Group began the offensive. Thus the
in the logistical situation as well as for latest target date for the start of Pat-
the arrival of fresh Allied divisions. Ei- ton’s Third Army offensive would also
senhower was apparently now recon- be 10 November, and it could well be
ciled to the probability that major ad- several days sooner if Bradley’s north-
vances beyond the Rhine, including the ern forcesjumped off early.
seizure of the Ruhr, would be delayed Not surprisingly, given Eisenhow-
until 1945. er’s apparent indifference to the po-
From Devers’ point of view, the tential of the 6th Army Group, nei-
Karlsruhe and Mannheim areas could ther SCAF-114 nor an amendment on
best be considered long-term objec- 2 November, SCAF-118, specified a
tives, since even their approaches were date for launching Devers’ supporting
currently well outside his army group’s offensive in November. However,
operational zone. The 6th Army after consulting with Bradley, Patton,
Group’s own river-crossing plans thus Patch, and de Lattre, Devers set 15
focused on the Rastatt area, about November as his own target date.
twenty-eight miles north of Stras- Several considerations led Devers
bourg. South of Rastatt, the densely to select 15 November.5 First, his G–4
wooded mountains of the Black Forest set the 15th as the earliest date on
dominated the eastern edges of the which the army group’s logistical
Rhine valley, greatly reducing the at-
tractiveness of any bridgeheads over 5Additional material on internal 6th Army Group
the upper Rhine. The Rastatt area thus planning is from the following: 6th Army Gp LI 2,
represented the most southerly cross- 28 Oct 44; Devers Diary, 4 Nov 44; Seventh Army
Diary, 24, 25, and 28 Oct and 3 Nov; Ltr, CG Sev-
ing point where the 6th Army Group enth Army to CG VI Corps and CG XV Corps, 5
might expect to secure good avenues Nov 44.
354 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

system could support a sustained of- Accordingly, Devers planned to


fensive to carry the Seventh Army and have the offensives of both his Sev-
the First French Army to the Rhine. enth and First French Armies begin
In addition, Devers hoped that the on or about 15 November in a series
Seventh Army, especially its VI of attacks. On the Seventh Army’s
Corps, could secure a suitable line of left, XV Corps was to launch its of-
departure for the main offensive by 5 fensive on D-day, presumably 15 No-
November, thereby affording the vember, while on the right the VI
army about ten days to rest some of Corps would strike on D plus 2. The
its worn divisions and to introduce XV Corps was first to head northeast
the fresh 100th and 103d Divisions for Sarrebourg, along Route N–4
into the line. Another consideration about thirty miles north of St. Die.
stemmed from a study by the 6th Then Haislip’s right wing would
Army Group staff of German reac- swing eastward to force the Vosges
tions to major Allied attacks, which Mountains via the Saverne Gap, the
concluded that the Germans usually narrow waist of the Vosges nearly fif-
started moving their general reserves teen miles east of Sarrebourg and-at
either on the evening of the second the western edge of the Alsatian
day or morning of the third day of a plains. Subsequently, the XV Corps
strong Allied offensive. To take ad- would continue northeastward astride
vantage of this pattern, it seemed log- the Low Vosges in a corridor some
ical to stagger the starting dates of twenty miles wide, with the Third
the November offensives of the 6th Army’s XII Corps on the left and the
and 12th Army Groups. Thus, if the Seventh Army’s VI Corps on the
12th Army Group’s Third Army at- right.
tacked on 10 November, the 6th The VI Corps, beginning its attack
Army Group’s Seventh Army should on the 17th, was to advance north-
strike no earlier than three days (13 eastward with its main effort along
November) and no later than five the axes of Routes N–420 and N–392
days (15 November) after the Third through the Saales and Hantz passes,
Army moved. 6 If the attacks could be northeast of St. Die. Breaking out
echeloned in this manner, the Ger- onto the Alsatian plains, General
mans would probably be in the proc- Brooks’ corps was then to seize Stras-
ess of moving reserves to the sector bourg and secure the west bank of
under attack by the Third Army, and the Rhine north and south of the city.
the Seventh Army offensive would Initially, Patch’s Seventh Army plan-
force them to reconsider their deploy- ners estimated that the VI Corps
ments, thereby causing further delays. attack would constitute the army’s
main effort during the November of-
6Citing the Third Army Diary for 5 November fensive, with the XV Corps attack
1944, Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, p. 302, states that drawing off the German reserves. But
on 5 November Devers told Patton that the Seventh as D-day approached, the army staff
Army’s XV Corps would jump off two days after the adopted a more flexible attitude
Third Army’s attack began, but no confirmation of
this statement can be found in 6th Army Group about the relative weight of the two
sources. attacks.
PLANNING THE NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE 355

South of the VI Corps, the French most of them in the 1st Infantry and
II Corps was to mount another three- 9th Colonial Divisions—before winter
day limited objective attack in the weather arrived. As planned before
Vosges Mountains between 10 and 15 ANVILwas launched, the First French
November, both to support the VI Army had begun to tap the manpower
Corps’ offensive and to divert resources of metropolitan France
German attention from the Belfort soon after the Riviera landings; by
Gap. There, de Lattre’s I Corps was early October some 52,000 troops
to launch the main effort of the First from various FFI organizations had
French Army’s November offensive joined de Lattre’s regulars, and the
on or about the 15th and attempt to number rose to over 60,000 by the
breach the gap, not north of Belfort end of the month. 8 Meanwhile, a con-
as long envisioned, but south of the current program of individual recruit-
city along the Swiss border. ment and training had attained some
success in filling holes in the ranks of
The First French Army de Lattre’s regular formations.
The integration of the European
By the end of the first week of No- soldiers into what was in reality a co-
vember, the First French Army’s lo- lonial army proved difficult, and the
gistical situation had improved con- task was further complicated by the
siderably. Nevertheless, General de political differences between the often
Lattre realized that it would be diffi- conservative North African French
cult for his forces to sustain an all-out Army cadre, many of whom had been
offensive against determined German supporters of the Vichy French
resistance for more than ten days or regime, and the more leftist FFI lead-
perhaps two weeks at most. His best ers, especially those who were mem-
hope was that the German defenses in bers of the French Communist Party.
the Belfort Gap would collapse quick- Experimenting, de Lattre had first at-
ly under the weight of a strong, tached battalion-sized FFI units to ex-
sudden onslaught before any major isting organizations, a procedure that
logistical problems arose. worked fairly well for commando-type
He also faced severe manpower units where the light infantry experi-
constraints. 7 Well before the end of ence of the FFI found a compatible
October de Lattre’s command had home. The same process also
begun to run out of trained replace- achieved some success within the ar-
ments from its diminishing resources mored divisions, where the FFI battal-
in Africa. Moreover, de Lattre wanted ions were often welcome additions to
to replace at least 15,200 black troops the infantry-short combat commands.
fro m tropical and subtropical Africa- In the French infantry divisions, how-
ever, the FFI battalions, normally at-
7 The following discussion of French manpower tached as fourth battalions to existing
problems is based mainly on de Lattre, History, pp.
169-78; Devers Diary, 22 Dec 44; Vigneras, Rearm-
ing the French, chs. 18-20; La Ire D.F.L., Epopee d’une 8 Another 60,000 to 75,000 FFI troops, outside de
Reconquete, p. 148; Historique de la Neuvieme Division Lattre’s authority, served in western and southwest-
d’Infanterie Coloniale, pp. 44–47. ern France.
356 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

FRENCHNORTHAFRICANSOLDIERS

regiments, were often misused and sorbed three FFI infantry battalions
neglected, while at the same time cre- and two FFI infantry companies
ating a drain on the supplies and during the process of replacing its
equipment of the parent unit. 9,200 Senegalese troops. 9 Later, due
In the case of the black African to the difficulties of securing sufi-
troops, de Lattre found that the best cient replacements from North Africa
solution was to replace them company to keep all Algerian and Moroccan
by company or battalion by battalion regiments up to strength, de Lattre
with Caucasian forces. In this manner replaced one regiment each of the 3d
some 6,000 FFI troops replaced an Algerian, the 2d Moroccan, and the
equivalent number of black soldiers in 4th Moroccan Mountain Divisions
the French 1st Infantry Division’s line with FFI units.
battalions as well as in some artillery The amalgamation of FFI units into
and service organizations, with the in- the regular formations as well as the
digenous French troops often taking rapid influx of hastily trained individ-
over the arms and equipment, includ-
ing overcoats and helmets, of the de- 9 On completionof the replacement process, the
parting Africans. Although it depend- 4th, 6th, and 13th Senegalese Tirailleurs were re-
designated the 21st, 6th, and 23d Colonial Infantry
ed more on individual recruitment, Regiments, although they were obviously no longer
the 9th Colonial Infantry Division ab- colonial formations.
PLANNING THE NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE 357

ual replacements created serious of these threats involved the 190-mile


problems. Many of the younger men front along the Franco-Italian border
recruited in metropolitan France had from Switzerland south to the Medi-
no military experience at all, not even terranean. As of mid-October the
with the FFI; and those recruits with French held about two-thirds of the
prior experience were unfamiliar with sector with the 4th Moroccan Moun-
the American equipment and organi- tain Division (less one regimental
zation used by de Lattre’s forces. combat team) and numerous FFI
Complicating matters further was de units that were in the process of
Lattre’s practice of maintaining nu- being formed into a provisional
merous FFI-based battalions and regi- Alpine division. The American 1st
ments in addition to organizations Airborne Task Force, including the
that the Combined Chiefs of Staff Canadian-American 1st Special Ser-
(CCS) had approved for the French vice Force, held the southern third of
rearmament program. 10 Since the the front. General Devers had been
CCS would not, and indeed could seeking ways to release these special-
not, provide arms and other equip- ized assault troops from their essen-
ment for such units, de Lattre had to tially static defensive role, and in mid-
juggle First French Army stocks, seek October he alerted General de Lattre
surplus American and British equip- to be prepared to have First French
ment, and use a variety of salvaged Army units take over the southern
and captured materiel to keep the third by 11 November, only days
extra FFI units minimally equipped. before the Belfort Gap offensive was
The effort placed an undue strain on to begin.
the First French Army’s already weak De Lattre predictably objected to
logistical machinery, while at the the extension of his responsibilities in
same time adding to the stress on the far south. The task would prob-
American supply agencies. 11 ably have forced him to return the
Whatever de Lattre’s logistical and 4th Moroccan Mountain Division’s
manpower problems, far greater third regiment to the Franco-Italian
threats to the success of the Belfort front, reducing his strength for the
Gap operation lay in proposals to Belfort Gap offensive. As a counter,
strip the First French Army of some he thus suggested that a substantial
of its strongest units on the very eve number of his black African troops,
of the November offensive. 12The first those currently being replaced in the
1st Infantry and 9th Colonial Divi-
10De Gaulle and the French Provisional govern-
ment followed the same policy outside of the First
SCAF–119 (SHAEF Main S–65164), 2 Nov 44;
French Army’s zone.
11In the end the CCS supported the formation of Memo, Eisenhower to Lt Gen Walter B. Smith
four new French infantry divisions in metropolitan (Chief of Staff, SHAEF), 22 Sep 44; Ltr, Eisenhower
France. See Vigneras, Reaming the French, ch. 20. to de Gaulle, 25 Sep 44; Amendment 1, 31 Oct 44,
12General sources on the diversions include the to 6th Army Gp LI 2, 28 Oct 44. Copies of most
following: de Lattre, History, pp. 203–05, 219–22; high-level documents concerning the diversions are
Hist, 6th Army Gp, ch. 2; Vigneras Interviews; located in the 6th Army Group AG files of RG 407,
Devers Diary, 25 Oct 44 and 4 and 7 Nov 44; Rad, in the 381 series, particularly 381.1 and 381 JPS,
Eisenhower to Devers et al., SHAEF Fwd 14223, 9 and in RG 331, SHAEF SGS File 475/2, France,
Sep 44; SCAF–93 (SHAEF Fwd 16181), 29 Sep 44; Employment of French Forces.
358 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

sions, be reorganized and reequipped dependent on long overland routes


for the task; the climate in the south- for supplies. Moreover, the fact that
ern third of the area was comparative- isolated German forces in the Gir-
ly mild and would impose no undue onde Estuary were blocking access to
hardship on these forces. Devers, France’s second largest port rankled
however, believing he could not pro- French leaders, especially since the
vide the necessary supplies and Germans had left most of Bordeaux’s
equipment for what would be new facilities intact when they evacuated
French units, rejected the idea and the port on 28 August. Finally, there
recommended that de Lattre send the was the matter of internal security.
9th Zouaves, an independent regi- Communist agitation in southwestern
ment, to relieve the American forces France had already been highlighted
in the south. But the French com- by clashes between the various resist-
mander had already earmarked the ance factions, and many conservative
Zouaves for a role in the November Frenchmen like de Gaulle feared
offensive and asked that the relief at some kind of leftist revolution led by
least be delayed until the end of the the strong Communist-dominated FFI
month. Tentatively Devers agreed, groups. The fact that the Communists
but in the meantime he made ar- had been among the first to take up
rangements for the 442d Regimental arms against the German occupiers
Combat Team, which was then rede- and had borne the brunt of the early
ploying south from the Vosges, and resistance struggle only increased
elements of the newly arrived 14th their standing in many French eyes,
Armored Division to take over the which made both the conservative de
border positions. Gaulle and veteran French politicians
Of potentially greater impact on de extremely nervous. In addition, there
Lattre’s forthcoming offensive were was always the possibility that the
plans to divert two of the strongest Germans might mount destructive
French divisions from the Belfort Gap raids out of their defensive enclaves
front. Since early September General or even attempt to reach the relative
de Gaulle had been pressing Eisen- safety of Spain. Had they timed such
hower to authorize an operation to efforts with German operations in the
open the Gironde Estuary, which was northeast, the weakly armed FFI,
the seaward approach to the port of backed only by a few regular Allied
Bordeaux in western France. With all units, would have had difficulty stop-
other Allied-controlled French ports ping them.
devoted almost exclusively to military At first Eisenhower was firmly op-
requirements, there was a pressing posed to such diversions, and on 9
need for a large port that could September he informed the CCS and
handle civilian relief supplies as well Devers that SHAEF would commit no
as equipment and commerce neces- forces to operations in southwestern
sary to begin restoring the French France until German pockets at Brest
economy. The need was especially and at some of the lesser Brittany
acute in the areas of western and ports had been cleared. But de Gaulle
southwestern France, which were still and the French Department of Na-
PLANNING THE NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE 359

tional Defense insisted that the Bor- senhower’s statement, alerted de


deaux area had to be liberated. Feel- Lattre that his 1st Armored Division
ing that his own prestige was at stake, would be employed for operations
de Gaulle proposed that the French against the Gironde Estuary and
1st Armored Division be pulled from added that the French 1st Infantry Di-
the line to help FFI units clear out vision would also be withdrawn for
not only the Gironde pockets, but similar endeavors.14 Meanwhile,
also the Germans still occupying the SHAEF and the French Department
smaller port of La Rochelle, about of National Defense undertook pre-
thirty-five miles to the north. He also liminary planning for an effort to
suggested that the French 1st Infantry clear the Gironde Estuary, dubbed
Division be redeployed to Paris to Operation INDEPENDENCE. 15Much ini-
promote internal security and provide tial groundwork apparently took place
a training base for the new French di- with little or no participation of Gen-
visions. Again Eisenhower applied the erals Devers and de Lattre or their
brakes. No diversions from the First staffs, and it was not until 2 Novem-
French Army, he informed de Gaulle ber that SHAEF directive SCAF- 119
on 25 September, could be counte- made the 6th Army Group responsi-
nanced until the arrival of more ble for the final planning and execu-
American divisions in France. tion of INDEPENDENCE.
Nevertheless, four days later the Devers and de Lattre were obvious-
Supreme Commander began to give ly upset over the prospect of losing
way to political considerations. In- so substantial a force, but neither ap-
forming the CCS that internal security peared to have much influence over
in southwestern France was becoming SHAEF or the French Department of
a major problem, he authorized National Defense regarding this issue.
AFHQ to send appropriate small At the direction of SHAEF, Devers
units of the French rearmament pro- formally outlined the two-division
gram still in North Africa or on Corsi- troop requirement of Operation INDE-
ca to southwest France to help restore PENDENCE for de Lattre on 31 Octo-
order. He also told the CCS that he ber, and also indicated that the Gir-
intended to redeploy additional forces onde Estuary operation would be
there from the First French Army expanded to include the seizure of La
when the military situation made such Rochelle plus another strong German
a withdrawal possible. However, per- pocket at St. Nazaire, ninety miles far-
haps influenced by the cost and de- ther north. Other actions contemplat-
structiveness of Allied operations to ed during INDEPENDENCE included
seize Brest, Eisenhower did not at this sealing off the Franco-Spanish border
time propose any operations to and restoring order throughout
reduce the Gironde pockets. 13
In early October General de 14 See Vigneras Interviews, pp. 30-31; and de
Gaulle, evidently encouraged by Ei- Lattre, History, p. 219. Lt. Col. de Camas recalled
that de Lattre received the alert on 2 October, but
de Lattre stated that he first learned of the proposal
13 The Brest operation is covered in Blumenson, in a letter from de Gaulle dated 7 October.
Breakout and Pursuit, ch. 30. 15Known until 2 November as Operation HIATUS.
360 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

southwestern France, tasks that might let the armored division go until he
divert even more strength from the had decisively broken through the
First French Army. Belfort Gap defenses, and he did not
After receiving SCAF–119, Devers expect such an event before the 20th.
limited the scope of the planned op- Devers, knowing the key role that
eration to the Gironde Estuary and, Haislip had planned for Leclerc’s 2d
on 6 November, provided de Lattre Armored Division in the XV Corps’
wita final troop list for INDEPEND- November offensive, could not agree
ENCE. The operation was to take a to the switch. However, sympathetic
60,000-man bite out of the First with de Lattre’s desire to keep the
French Army, including 45,000 First French Army intact and equally
combat troops. The French 1st Ar- eager t o assure the success of the Bel-
mored Division headed the troop list, fort Gap operation, he made some
followed by the 1st Infantry Division, concessions. Initially, he moved the
the 9th Zouaves, an armored recon- departure date of the French 1st Ar-
naissance squadron, two tank destroy- mored Division back to 16 November
er battalions, and a three-battalion and that of the French 1st Infantry
field artillery group.16 T h e 1st Ar- Division to 28-30 November; he also
mored Division was to depart the Bel- deleted the 9th Zouaves, the recon-
fort front on 11 November, just days naissance squadron, and some service
before d e Lattre’s offensive was units from the INDEPENDENCE troop
scheduled to begin; the French 1st In- list. Subsequently, de Lattre’s supply
fantry Division was to follow on the officers “recomputed” the logistics of
27th. Operations against the Gironde the armored division’s move and de-
Estuary pockets were to begin about cided that its main body would not
10 December and be completed by 1 have to start westward until 21 No-
January 1945. vember. Devers quickly approved this
Conferring with Devers on 7 No- further delay in the armored unit’s
vember, de Lattre again registered his departure, but held the infantry divi-
vehement objections to the diversion. sion’s redeployment to the end of No-
The French commander argued that vember. Thus de Lattre could count
if PENDENCE were to be a 6th on these two units for only a limited
Army Group operation, then the Sev- time, and on 13 November, two days
enth Army should also contribute before the Belfort Gap offensive was
troops to the endeavor, suggesting to begin, the French armored division
that the XV Corps’ French 2d Ar- even sent an advance party to Bor-
mored Division be substituted for his deaux to assist in the projected
own 1st Armored Division. In any move. 17
case, de Lattre insisted, he could not
German Prospects
16During the planning process, the projected
troop list included the French I1 Corps headquar- By the end of the first week in No-
ters, but by 6 November Devers had decided to run vember, the recent Allied attacks had
the operation through a provisional French com-
mand, French Forces of the West, under General de
Larminat. l7 1st Fr Armd Div Jnl de Marche, 13 Nov 44.
PLANNING THE NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE 361

again stretched the Nineteenth Army to turn, was forced to give priority to his
the breaking point. Only the difficult First Army, which was defending the
terrain had slowed the Allied advance Metz area and the Saar against Pat-
in the Vosges and staved off a com- ton’s divisions. With Patton obviously
plete collapse. 18 But General Wiese poised to strike, Balck had already de-
still had no reserves worthy of the cided to send any army group re-
name to contain or counterattack serves to his northern army. The
even a minor Allied penetration. The Nineteenth Army would thus have to
Weststellung defenses throughout the fight its battles with what was left
Nineteenth Army’s sector were in no over after all other German require-
way capable of withstanding a con- ments on the western front had been
certed Allied attack, and the army met.
could not hold the Vosges Foothill Posi- Balck and Wiese believed that the
tion much longer with the declining 6th Army Group’s main effort during
forces Wiese had at his disposal. Fi- November would be a Seventh Army
nally, although the terrain was the attack along the general axis of Bac-
greatest asset of the German defend- carat, Sarrebourg, and Saverne. Bac-
ers in the Vosges, the generally carat lay in the Nineteenth Army’s area
wooded and mountainous 120-mile of responsibility, and Sarrebourg and
front of the Nineteenth Army made it Saverne in that of the First Army. The
difficult for Wiese to shift his forces most immediate danger, the two
back and forth and to supply and sup- German commanders estimated, was
port his thinly spread army. that Patch’s command would open a
Wiese also knew that his command, gap between the First and Nineteenth
like that of General Devers, held a Armies, thereby unhinging the de-
relatively low position in the hierar- fenses of the Saar basin and the Palat-
chy of the western front. At OB West inate. Both commanders also agreed
von Rundstedt’s plans and decisions that the First French Army would
were strongly influenced by his prep- launch a secondary offensive in the
arations for the Ardennes counterof- Belfort Gap sector during November,
fensive, then scheduled for late No- but differed over where de Lattre’s
vember, and he had already stripped blow would fall. Balck thought that
several major armored organizations French operations in the gap area
from Army Group G for this purpose. would constitute only a holding
His other major priority was counter- action to cover the main effort across
ing the expected drive of the north- the Vosges well north of Belfort;
ern Allied army groups against the Wiese, on the other hand, believed
Ruhr. Accordingly, OB West gave Army that the French main effort would be
Group B, which was responsible for centered against the Belfort Gap
holding the Ruhr, defensive priority itself.
over Balck’s Army Group G. Balck, in The Nineteenth Army’s front now co-
incided with that of the 6th Army
Group, for during the second week of
18German material in this section is based largely
on von Luttichau, “German Operations,” chs. 21 November Balck had extended
and 22. Wiese’s sector northward to the
362 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

Rhine-Marne Canal, which also 553d Volksgrenadier Division boasted


marked the boundary between the seasoned troops and good leadership.
Allied 6th and 12th Army Groups.19 T o its south the arriving 708th Volks-
Wiese’s northern army flank was an- grenadiers was nearly up to strength,
chored on the canal near Lagarde, off but lacked training and experienced
the eastern corner of the Parroy leaders; some 70 percent of its non-
forest. General Thumm’s LXIV Corps commissioned officers, for example,
held the army’s right wing from the were former members of the Luftwaffe
canal southeast some thirty-five miles or the Kriegsmarine. 20Farther south the
to Saulcy-sur-Meurthe, three miles 716th Division was reinforced by the
south of St. Die. The LXIV Corps thus 757th Grenadiers, a regiment of the
faced all of the Seventh Army’s XV 338th Division that had remained
Corps as well as most of the VI behind when the rest of the unit
Corps. moved to the Belfort Gap front in late
On 7 November the LXIV Corps had October. Although at best a marginal
on line, from north to south, the two- division, the 716th was still better off
regiment 553d Volksgrenadier Division, than the badly damaged 16th Volks-
the 951st Grenadiers of the 361st Volks- grenadiers, which was still trying to re-
grenadier Division (at Raon-I’Etape), the cover from the beating it had received
weak 21st Panzer Division, the battered fighting in front of the Vosges Foothill
716th Infantry Division, and what was Position defenses around St. Die.
left of the nearly destroyed 16th Volks- Defending the southern section of
grenadier Division. The next day the the High Vosges below St. Die, Peter-
708th Volksgrenadier Division began sen’s IV Luftwaffe Field Corps had two
moving into the German front lines fairly strong divisions-the somewhat
between the 553d Volksgrenadier Divi- understrength but experienced 198th
sion and the 21st Panzer; it first re- Division, most of which faced the VI
lieved the 951st Grenadiers and then Corps’ southern wing, and the strong-
took over for the 21st Panzer Division, er 269th Volksgrenadier Division, which
with both of the retiring units moving confronted the French II Corps. Fi-
north of the canal to become part of nally, at the southern end of the Nine-
the First A m y . The weakened 106th teenth Army’s front, Kniess’ LXXXV
Panzer Brigade, A m y Group G’s only Corps defended the Belfort Gap area
significant reserve, accompanied the with three divisions, the 159th, the
21st Panzer Division northward, repre- 189th, and the 338th—all jerry-rigged,
senting the last of the Nineteenth but well rested and relatively fresh.
Amy’s armor except for some assault- How well and how long this ragged
gun units. defensive line could hold up depend-
Although weak in infantry and artil- ed greatly on the individual unit com-
lery and lacking antitank weapons, the manders, for neither Balck nor Wiese
could do much to assist them.
19The extension was not fully effective until 13
November; previously, the German boundary had 20 The708th Volksgrenadier Division was built on the
roughly followed Route N–4, about ten miles south remains of the 708th Infantry Division, which had
of the canal. been virtually destroyed in Normandy.
PLANNING THE NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE 363

The Final Allied Schedule Thus there was considerable conster-


nation at the 6th Army Group head-
Well into the first week of Novem- quarters when, about noon on 7 No-
ber, General Bradley of the 12th vember, word came that the Third
Army Group still hoped to have his Army’s XII Corps would begin its
First and Ninth Armies launch their attack on the morning of the 8th,
offensives on 5 November, with Pat- whatever the weather conditions. In
ton’s Third Army striking on the order to adhere to the planned, five-
10th. But adverse tactical develop- day maximum interval between the
ments in the sector of the 21st Army 12th and the 6th Army Group attacks,
Group forced a change in plans, and Devers quickly decided to move his
on 2 November Eisenhower and starting date forward from 15 to 13
Bradley decided to reschedule the November if possible. A brief review
First and Ninth Army attacks for the of the logistical situation revealed that
10th. Hoping to have at least part of the two-day acceleration would create
the 12th Army Group under way ear- no major problems, and new orders
lier, however, Bradley asked Patton to immediately went out to Patch and de
have his Third Army begin its offen- Lattre to make the change. Within the
sive as soon as possible and have his Seventh Army, the XV Corps would
XII Corps, just north of the Seventh strike on the 13th and the VI Corps
Army, strike no later than 8 Novem- on the 15th; in the First French Army,
ber.21As events turned out, Patton at- the I Corps would launch the main
tacked on time, but the First and effort against the Belfort Gap on the
Ninth Army attacks were delayed even 13th, and the II Corps would begin
further when Bradley approved a its supporting operations the same
series of day-by-day postponements day. With luck the new attack dates
because of poor flying conditions; ul- might even increase the surprise of
timately he did not begin his offen- the German defenders.22
sive until the 16th. With the final preparations now
All these changes caught the 6th under way, General Devers became in-
Army Group by surprise. On 5 No- creasingly optimistic. He estimated
vember General Devers visited Pat- that the XV Corps would cross the
ton’s command post at Nancy to be Vosges and break out on to the Alsa-
briefed on the Third Army’s tactical tian plains by 1 December; he also
plans and the tentative schedule of thought that the French I Corps would
attack. Devers evidently came away be in the Rhine valley by the 1st, “and
from the briefing with the under- probably sooner.” 23 If Strasbourg
standing that Patton’s terminal date could be taken and the Rhine
was still 10 November, and he did not breached, the possibilities of exploiting
find out about the decisions Bradley
and Patton had reached on the 2d. 22Devers Diary, 5 Nov 44; Seventh Army Diary, 7,
8, and 9 Nov 44; Hist, 9th Army Gp, ch. 3; Final
Rpt, G–3 Sec, 6th Army Gp, p. 20; First Fr Army
21Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, p. 301; MacDonald, Genl Opns Order 148, 1 1 Nov 44.
The Siegfried Line Campaign, p. 393; SCAF-118, 2 Nov 23Devers Diary, 1 1 and 12 Nov 44, with the quo-
44. tation from the 12 November entry.
364 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

such a breakthrough appeared unlimit- dustrial region in one sweep. This time
ed. Devers’ own predeliction was for he would show the other Allied com-
crossing the Rhine above Strasbourg manders what his underrated forces
and exploiting north up the Rhine could do and in the process grind up as
valley toward Karlsruhe, thus trapping many Germany corps and divisions as
the First Army. and isolating the Saar in- possible.
CHAPTER XXI

Through the Saverne Gap


As D-day for the November offensive XV Corps Plans
of the XV Corps approached, Haislip
readied his three divisions, now consti- General Haislip, commanding XV
tuting the smallest Allied attacking Corps, set forth the requirements for
force. His left wing was still anchored his November offensive in succinct
on the Rhine-Marne Canal at Xures, terms: capture and secure Sarrebourg;
about three miles across from the op- force the Saverne Gap; and prepare to
posing flank of the German LXIV Corps exploit east of the Vosges.1 With the
at Lagarde. The XV Corps’ 106th Cav- cavalry force covering along the Rhine-
alry Group screened the corps’ left for Marne Canal, the 44th Division was to
two miles, maintaining contact with the make the main effort initially, heading
Third Army’s XII Corps north of the northeast twenty miles to seize Sarre-
canal. The 44th Infantry Division held bourg from the west and north. The
the next seven miles south to the Ve- 79th Division, coming back into the
zouse River near Domjevin, now in line south of the Vezouse River, would
Allied hands. The French 2d Armored pass through the 2d Armored Division
Division, its front bulging eastward, and head northeast to invest Sarre-
covered the ground from the Vezouse bourg from the south and east. Both
south another eight miles to Baccarat, divisions were to be ready to continue
on the boundary between the XV and the offensive northeast and east after
VI Corps. The 79th Infantry Division, securing Sarrebourg. During this time
out of the line since 24 October and the French 2d Armored Division would
resting south of Luneville, was to play a remain in reserve as the XV Corps’ ex-
major role in the forthcoming attack. ploitation force. When the infantry di-
To strengthen these forces Patch had visions began breaking through the
decided to give Haislip the VI Corps’ German defenses, Haislip planned to
45th Division as soon as it had com- send the armored unit through the in-
pleted its rest after DOGFACE. Thus, al- fantry, striking for the Saverne Gap
though small in numbers, the XV and securing a bridgehead through the
Corps could marshal some of the most Vosges somewhere in the Saverne
experienced units on the entire Allied
front for the assault against the narrow 1 XV Corps FO 11, 8 Nov 44. Sarrebourg itself
Saverne Gap, now defended only by was in the German First Army’s XXXIV Corps’ area of
three weak volksgrenadier divisions. responsibility just north of the Nineteenth Army.
366 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

GENERALS SPRAGINS. POST, Lune-


HAISLIP.AND WYCHEAT XV CORPSCOMMAND
ville, October 1944.

area. The timing of the armored divi- the edge of the Lorraine plateau, and
sion’s attack would be critical. winds down the wooded eastern
The designations Saverne and Sa- slopes of the Vosges in a gradual
verne Gap require some explanation. southeasterly descent. However, the
The small, busy, but pleasant city of Saverne Gap proper lies farther
Saverne lies under the eastern slopes south, originating in the west at Arz-
of the Vosges and at the western edge viller, five miles east of Sarrebourg,
of the Alsatian plains. Through the and emerging at the southwestern ap-
city passes Route N–4, the Paris-Stras- proaches to Saverne itself. The gap,
bourg highway; the main railroad line an almost gorgelike passage through
to Strasbourg; and the Rhine-Marne the Vosges, is scarcely 100 yards wide
Canal and its contributory stream, the at places, but accommodates the main
little Zorn River. Another rail line railroad line to Strasbourg, the Rhine-
leads off to the northeast, while lesser Marne Canal, the upper reaches of
highways and secondary roads come the Zorn River (merging with the
in from the north, south, and east. canal through much of the gap), and
The easiest approach to Saverne a narrow secondary highway. The
from the west is along Route N–4, railroad passes through a number of
which passes through Phalsbourg, on tunnels (one, near Arzviller, a mile
THROUGH THE SAVERNE GAP 367

SAVERNE

and a half long); the canal drops 500 force their way through elements of
feet between Arzviller and Saverne at least three volksgrenadier divisions:
through a series of locks; and the part of the 361st under von Gilsa’s
road hugs the base of the forested, LXXXIX Corps (First Army) north of
towering hills through much of its the canal and all of the 553d and per-
journey. haps half of the 708th under
Haislip estimated that XV Corps Thumm’s LXIV Corps south of the wa-
would encounter no strong, continu- terway (Nineteenth Army). Since neither
ous defensive lines, but instead would of the opposing corps had any mobile
run up against delaying forces at reserves, Haislip expected that the de-
strongpoints at key road and canal fenses would be spotty, but in great
junctures-a judgment that corre- depth; therefore, he instructed his di-
sponded closely with LXIV Corps ’ ca- vision commanders to have their lead-
pabilities. 2His units would have to ing units bypass isolated strongpoints,
leaving them for follow-up forces.
Should the van units became entan-
2German information in this chapter is mainly gled in such defenses, he wanted the
from von Luttichau, “German Operations,” chs. 22
and 24.
second echelons of the attacking
368 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

forces to bypass the action and main- Sarrebourg, with the 324th Infantry
tain the forward momentum. on the left and the 71st Infantry on
the right. At first both regiments ad-
XV Corps Attacks vanced rapidly, but by 0800 the Ger-
mans had recovered from the bom-
After the French 2d Armored Divi- bardment and responded with heavy
sion’s seizure of Baccarat and after and accurate artillery, mortar, and
some minor 44th Division advances machine-gun fire all across the divi-
during the first week of November, sion’s front. By dark, disappointing
little change had taken place along gains had carried the leading battal-
the XV Corps’ front until the night of ions hardly a mile eastward, and the
11–12 November. Then, under cover high point of the day was the capture
of darkness, the 79th Division began of battered Leintrey, a small town at
moving into forward assembly lines in the junction of three secondary roads.
the Mondon forest south of the Ve- Operations on 14 November were
zouse River (Map 26). Heavy rains even less productive, and General
had gradually turned into blizzards Spragins, the division commander,
during the days preceding the attack, decided to commit his reserves, the
and by evening of the 12th wet snow 114th Infantry, in the Leintrey area.
blanketed the entire corps sector. All After passing through the 71st Infan-
streams in the area were flooded, try on the south, the 114th was to
many roads and bridges were under swing north across the fronts of the
water, and the troops described the other two regiments, sweeping
now ever-present French mud as bot- through the defenses of the 553d
tomless.3 In fact, the weather had Volksgrenadier Division from the flank
been so poor that General Devers and rear.
contemplated postponing Haislip’s This somewhat unorthodox-if not
attack; but about 2300 that night he dangerous—maneuver proved suc-
decided to proceed with the offensive, cessful; by the evening of the 15th,
hoping that the Germans might not the 114th Infantry had gained a mile
expect a major attack under such ad- and a half to the east, northeast, and
verse conditions. 4 The 44th and 79th north of Leintrey, thus dislocating the
Divisions, each with two regiments German defenses in the rising, par-
abreast, jumped off on schedule early tially wooded ground. On 16 Novem-
the following morning of 13 Novem- ber the 114th Infantry and the 106th
ber. Cavalry Group mopped up on the di-
Behind an intensive artillery prepa- vision’s left, and the next day the
ration, the 44th Division attacked 324th and 71st Infantry continued
along the axis of the railroad line to their advance east, passing through
the wake of the 114th, which reverted
3XV Corps AAR, Nov 44, p. 13. In mid-Novem- to its reserve status.
ber, flooding along the fronts of the Third and Sev- By 18 November the defenses of
enth Armies was supposedly the worst in the area the 553d Volksgrenadier Division began
since 1919.
4 G–3 Section, H Q 6th Army Gp, Final Report, to unravel in the face of the continu-
World War II, p. 21. ing attack. During the following day
370 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

the 71st Infantry undertook the divi- vision struck south from Blamont,
sion’s main effort and pushed some along Route N–4 and the Vezouse
nine miles along the axis of Route N– River about three miles north of Hal-
4, coming almost within sight of the loville. Then another force, probably
Rhine-Marne Canal, about six miles under the direct control of the LXIV
short of the division’s objective, Sar- Corps, moved up from the southeast.
rebourg. T o the north, the 324th, So ineffectual were these efforts that
now in support of the 71st, kept pace, the 79th Division’s forward units re-
as did elements of the 106th Cavalry ported no unusual activity. Thus, as
stretching eastward along the canal. the 44th Division began to dislocate
The 44th Division had achieved at the 553d Division’s defenses in the
least half of the breakthrough that north, the 79th Division now began to
Haislip had hoped for. penetrate the lines of the 708th Divi-
South of the 44th Division, General sion at will, walking nearly unopposed
Wyche’s 79th Division began its into Harbouey, two miles northeast of
attack on 13 November from a line of Halloville, and continuing its advance
departure near Montigny, at the junc- toward the southern approaches to
tion of Routes N–392 and N–435. By Sarrebourg.
the following day the 314th Infantry At the headquarters of both the
on the left had reached Halloville, Nineteenth Army and the LXIV Corps,
while the 315th on the right pushed the situation began to appear desper-
several miles up Route N–392 toward ate as early as 16 November. Lacking
Badonviller. The Halloville thrust any radio or telephone communica-
threatened to drive a wedge between tions with the 708th Volksgrenadier Di-
the 553d and 708th Volksgrenadier Divi- vision, the German commanders be-
sions and was clearly the most danger- lieved that the converging Allied at-
ous penetration. As the 708th pre- tacks along Route N–4 had pushed
pared a strong counterattack, the back the 708th’s right flank, thus cut-
315th Infantry, moving up to support ting off the 553d Volksgrenadier Division
its sister unit, struck first and sent an from the rest of the corps. Actually
infantry force backed by tanks and the situation was not yet that bleak.
tank destroyers into the German as- During the night of 15–16 November,
sembly area east of Halloville, which the left of the 553d had fallen back in
dispersed the German reserves and, fairly good order to Blamont and re-
in the process, destroyed most of the established a defensive line on the
708th’s assault guns.5 Vezouse to Cirey-sur-Vezouse. About
On the 15th the Germans made the same time, the rather disorga-
two more attempts to restore the situ- nized right wing of the 708th Volks-
ation in the Halloville sector. First, grenadiers began moving into line
elements of the 553d Volksgrenadier Di- south from Cirey along rising, forest-
ed terrain dotted with installations of
5 The 315th claimed the destruction of five assault the Vosges Foothill Position. Neverthe-
guns and “some other vehicles” (315th Inf AAR, less, the condition of LXIV Corps’ de-
Nov 44, p. 16), while von Luttichau’s “German Op-
erations,” ch. 22, relates that the Germans lost nine fenses was rapidly becoming a serious
of the ten assault guns sent into action. problem.
THROUGH THE SAVERNE GAP 371

On 16 November Haislip began to grendier Division withdrew in a vain at-


commit elements of the 2d Armored tempt to establish a new defensive
Division in order to secure the flanks line from Richeval, five miles north-
of both attacking divisions and to east of Blamont, south and east
ensure that the momentum of the of- through Tanconville to Bertrambois
fensive continued. Combat Command and Lafrimbolle. The American and
Remy (CCR) began to push southeast French attackers never gave the 553d
from Halloville along secondary time to pause. By noon on the 19th,
roads, clearing roadblocks and mines the 79th Division’s 314thregiment
and generally disorganizing the 708th was approaching Richeval; the 3 15th
Division ’s lines of communication. On had passed through Tanconville; CCL
the 17th CCV reinforced Remy, strik- had cleared Bertrambois; and CCR
ing east about five miles along Route units had reached out to Lafrimbolle
N–392 from Montigny to seize Ba- in the mountains, a mile and a half
donviller and then swinging north east of Bertrambois. Haislip was now
two miles to Bremenil. Meanwhile, to ready to begin the exploitation phase
the north, elements of CCL (de Lang- of his attack, and at 1345 that after-
lade) began moving up to Blamont noon he turned the rest of Leclerc’s
along Route N–4, as 79th Division in- 2d Armored Division loose.
fantry forces crossed the Vezouse
River to the east, in the face of still The Exploitation Plan
strong opposition from the 553d
Volksgrenadier Division, and began to Leclerc’s immediate objective was
invest the town from the north. Saverne, on the far side of the Vosges
On 18 November, as the 44th Divi- Mountains. Toward this end he had
sion started its deep penetration of divided his division into carefully or-
the 553d Volksgrenadiers’ front along ganized task forces, and he assigned
Route N–4, the right of the 708th to each complementary but independ-
Volksgrenadier Division collapsed, as ent missions, including primary and
Wiese had feared. CCR and elements alternate routes of penetration. T o
of CCV subsequently rolled north- support the division’s scheme of ma-
ward for four unopposed miles to neuver, his staff had also put together
capture bridges at Cirey-sur-Vezouse. every available scrap of information
The Badonviller-Cirey road had been about road conditions, German de-
a main supply route of the German ployments, and German defenses. Le-
defenders, and the French found it clerc planned to lead off with two
clear of roadblocks and mines. On the combat commands, CCD (Dio) and
same day, the left of the 79th Division CCL, each subdivided into two small-
walked unopposed into Blamont. Al- er task forces. After crossing the
though German artillery and mortar Rhine-Marne Canal, CCD units were
fire halted further progress north of to bypass Sarrebourg to the west and
the Vezouse, the effect was only tem- north, head east across the Low
porary.
During the night of 18–19 Novem- 6See 2d Fr Amd Div Preparatory Opns Order
ber, the left wing of the 553d Volks- 189/3, 12 Nov 44.
372 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

Vosges well north of the Saverne Gap important highway and rail junction
in two columns, and then, once on on the Alsatian plains, seventeen
the other side of the mountains, de- miles north of Strasbourg. If neces-
scend on Saverne from the north and sary, however, the French armor was
northeast. South of the canal and also prepared to withdraw all the way
south and east of Sarrebourg, CCL, back to Weyer, on the west side of
also with two columns, was to push the Vosges ten miles north of Sarre-
rapidly east over second-class roads, bourg, in order to protect XV Corps’
crossing the Vosges well south of the exposed northern flank. 7
Saverne Gap; push through the heavi- The so-called Weyer alternative
ly forested mountains to the Alsatian demonstrated that Patch and Haislip
plains; and then swing north to meet were fully aware of the risks involved
CCD. CCV would be in general re- in a deep penetration by the French
serve, ready to reinforce either CCD armored division. By 19 November
or CCL, while CCR, the armored divi- the XV Corps’ left flank was more
sion’s permanent reconnaissance or- than ten miles beyond the right wing
ganization, would support CCL in the of the Third Army’s XII Corps, which
south and secure the division’s ex- was still back in the area just above
tended right flank. If Leclerc’s intelli- Lagarde. Although currently screened
gence estimate was correct, the plan by the XV Corps’ 106th Cavalry
would allow him to avoid the strong Group, the gap could only grow
defenses that he expected in the Sa- larger as Haislip’s forces drove east.8
verne Gap itself and cut through the A similar situation existed in the
mountain passes before the Germans south, where the lengthening bounda-
had a chance to block them. ry with Brooks’ VI Corps at Baccarat
Haislip’s larger objectives also re- was screened by CCR. Both Patch and
quired that Leclerc’s armor secure all Haislip felt, however, that the possi-
eastern exits of the Vosges passes bility of a German counterattack was
from La Petite-Pierre, eight miles minimal. The two opposing volksgrena-
north of Saverne, to Dabo, about dier divisions were falling apart, and
eight miles south of the gap. T o the German forces on both of their
assist, Haislip wanted the 44th Divi- flanks were too concerned with their
sion to seize Sarrebourg as soon as own immediate fronts to assist the
possible and be prepared to relieve 553d or 708th. North of the Rhine-
French armor along the northern por- Marne Canal, the First Army’s south-
tion of the corps’ objective area. In ernmost unit, LXXXIX Corps’ 361st
addition, the 79th Division, now re- Volksgrenadier Division, was fully com-
lieved of its Sarrebourg mission, mitted to the defense of its own
would be ready to exploit the French
gains in the southern half of the 7XV Corps OI 49, 19 Nov 44, as modified by XV
corps’ sector and secure the southern Corps OI 50, 20 Nov 44.
portion of the objective area. Upon 8For XII Corps operations during the period, see
relief by the 44th and 79th Divisions, Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, chs. 7 and 10. Units of
the 106th Cavalry had entered Lagarde on 17 No-
Leclerc was to push his entire ar- vember, finding the Germans departed but the vil-
mored division on to Haguenau, an lage thoroughly mined and booby-trapped.
THROUGH THE SAVERNE GAP 373

sector against the attacking U.S. XII ments of the LXXXIX Corps’ 361st
Corps. South of the XV Corps, the Volksgrenadier Division, which for the
rest of the LXIV Corps had its hands most part lacked any artillery support.
full defending against Brooks’ VI The 361st Volksgrenadiers were in a
Corps attack, now in full swing. Only difficult position. During the night of
by bringing substantial reinforce- 19–20 November, under pressure
ments forward from outside the Nine- from the XII Corps, the division had
teenth Army’s zone could the Germans begun withdrawing into Weststellung
develop any serious threat to either of positions north of Heming, only to
the XV Corps’ extended flanks, and lose the southern portion of its new
this danger seemed remote. Such a line to Haislip’s XV Corps before the
counterattack would take time to as- withdrawal could be completed. Now
semble and deploy, and Haislip still the division had to pull itself even far-
had the 45th Infantry Division in re- ther back in an attempt to keep Sarre-
serve for such contingencies. Never- bourg from falling into the hands of
theless, the Weyer alternative put Le- Allied forces advancing up Route N–4
clerc on notice that his forces might from the southwest. To assist in the
have to return west of the Vosges effort, Balck, the Army Group G com-
should a threat develop. 9 mander, transferred the remnants of
the 553d Volksgrenadier Division from
Seizing the Gap the Nineteenth Army’s LXIV Corps to the
First Army’s LXXXIX Corps; and von
During the afternoon of 19 Novem- Gilsa, the corps commander, ordered
ber CCD assembled south of the for- the 361st Division to assemble a regi-
ward positions of the 44th Division mental task force to reinforce the
near Heming, at the juncture of N–4 553d south of the canal. During the
and the Rhine-Marne Canal. Before night of 19 November von Gilsa also
dawn on the 20th, Allied troops had moved the headquarters of the
secured several bridges over the LXXXIX Corps to Sarrebourg, only to
canal, and at daylight the armored be forced to evacuate the city hurried-
attack began. Initially the 44th Divi- ly on the afternoon of the 20th as the
sion’s 71st Infantry moved northeast 71st Infantry approached. There was
along Route N–4 directly toward Sar- little he could do to salvage the posi-
rebourg. Meanwhile, CCD and the tion. By dark the 71st Infantry had se-
324th Infantry, following all passable cured most of the city, and other 44th
roads, crossed the canal and headed Division units had overrun about half
north, delayed only by scattered ele- of the reinforcements sent to the area
by the 361st Volksgrenadier Division.
9 On 19 November the 45th Division was in a rest As these developments were taking
area near Bains-les-Bains, over fifty miles west of place, CCD had continued to move
the XV Corps’ front lines. Seventh Army OI 14, 15
Nov 44, placed the division on general alert, with
north of the German lines, dividing
one regiment to be ready to move to the XV Corps’ itself into two armored columns. The
sector on twelve hours’ notice and the rest of the di- southern arm, Task Force Quilichini,
vision on twenty-four hours’ notice; Seventh Army
OI 16, 19 Nov 44, changed the alert to six and
reached the Sarre River at Sarraltroff,
twelve hours. over two miles north of Sarrebourg.
374 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

Meanwhile, the northern column, alry encounter any threat to CCD’s


Task Force Rouvillois, captured a rear.
bridge over the river at Oberstinzel, CCD’s second column, T F Quili-
two miles farther north, and by dark chini, had meanwhile headed almost
had sent patrols to Rauwiller, over due east, rapidly covering the eight
three miles to the east. miles from Sarraltroff to Mittelbronn
The French incursions abruptly along Route D–36. After a brief clash
forced the 361st Volksgrenadiers back- with undermanned German defenses
ward along a new defensive line be- at Mittelbronn, the advance halted,
tween Mittersheim, Rauwiller, and for patrols had discovered formida-
Schalbach, facing generally southward ble, well-defended antitank obstacles
to protect the LXXXIX Corps’ rear across N–4 in front of Phalsbourg, a
lines of communication. Whittled mile or so to the east. T o the rear,
down to less than 2,000 infantry ef- the 44th Division’s 324th Infantry
fectives, however, the hapless 361st crossed the Sarre River at Sarraltroff
had little chance of holding either this behind T F Quilichini, and the 114th
new line or its main defensive posi- Infantry, coming out of reserve,
tions still facing west against Third reached out along Route N–4, two
Army units. miles beyond Sarrebourg. South of
Accurately assessing the German Sarrebourg, units of the 79th Division
situation, Col. Louis J. Dio, com- now made an appearance, bypassing a
manding CCD, obtained Leclerc’s CCL fight along the way and moving
permission to have T F Rouvillois up to the main highway, Route N–4.
cross the Vosges through a route far- The American infantry divisions along
ther north than the one planned, both with some of the French armored
to take advantage of German weak- units were thus rapidly converging on
nesses in the area and to further dis- Phalsbourg and the immediate west-
locate any German defenses in the ern approaches to the Saverne Gap.
Vosges or in the open country north South of Sarrebourg, CCL’s north-
of Sarrebourg. Striking out early on ern column, Task Force Minjonnet,
the morning of 21 November, T F had left Bertrambois on the morning
Rouvillois was soon past Schalbach of the 19th and, following a third-
and then swung northeast for about class country road, pushed north two
three miles to Siewiller, at the west- miles through dense forests to be
ern edge of the Low Vosges. Crossing halted just south of Niederhoff. The
a main north-south artery, Route N- southern column, T F Massu, also
61, the force pushed on and by late made little initial progress against
afternoon was at La Petite-Pierre, in 553d Volksgrenadier defenses north of
the heart of the Low Vosges some ten Lafrimbolle, but the thinly dispersed
twisting road miles beyond Siewiller. 553d could not hold out long. In-
Behind TF Rouvillois, the XV Corps’ creasingly disorganized and out of
106th Cavalry Group probed north- communication with its corps head-
ward, securing Baerendorf, Eywiller, quarters, the division tried to estab-
Weyer, and Drulingen on the corps’ lish a new defensive line during the
northern flank. Nowhere did the cav- night of 19–20 November between
THROUGH THE SAVERNE GAP 375

Heming, on the Rhine-Marne Canal, forces south of Saverne. As a remedy,


south and southeast along the Sarre the XV Corps directed the 79th Divi-
Rouge and Sarre Blanche rivers to St. sion to attach two rifle companies to
Quirin, deep in the Vosges.10 the French 2d Armored Division to
On 20 November the French ad- help handle the increasing number of
vance in the south continued. After surrendering Germans. About the
some brief fighting during the morn- same time, General Leclerc decided
ing, TF Minjonnet’s armor cleared that opposition during the day war-
Niederhoff and then swung northeast ranted committing his CCV reserve in
along back roads for about two miles, the southern sector. CCV’s main
crossing the Sarre Rouge and forcing effort was to be made along the Dabo
its way eastward another two miles to Road, with T F Massu passing to its
Voyer. Here it overran 553d Division control. Task Force Minjonnet of
artillery positions and captured some CCL would continue north and north-
200 German troops. Minjonnet’s flank east from Voyer to Arzviller, but was
and rear security were assured later in to double back and follow CCV
the day when the 314th Infantry also through the mountains if strong op-
fought its way across the Sarre Rouge position was encountered. CCR,
and the 313th Infantry moved up to which had been maintaining road-
Niederhoff. blocks along the XV Corps’ right, or
Farther south, TF Massu spent much southern, flank, would reassemble at
of the morning outflanking and break- Walscheid, ready to secure the Dabo
ing through last-ditch positions of the Road behind CCV. 11
553d along the Sarre Blanche west of Amid a heavy rainstorm TF Massu,
St. Quirin, which fell about 1400 on the overrunning small groups of fleeing
20th, thus marking the complete col- Germans, continued southeast up the
lapse of the 553d Volksgrenadier Divi- Dabo Road. That evening, about
sion’s defensive effort. Massu then sped 2000 on the 20th, forward elements
his armor along the twisting mountain of the task force reached the village
roads to Walscheid, five miles— of Dabo, three road miles short of the
straight line distance—northeast of St. Wolfsberg Pass, where they halted to
Quirin, and continued north another refuel and await the arrival of CCV.
three miles to pick up Route D–114, The latter force, moving out of an as-
also known as the Dabo Road, which sembly area near Cirey-sur-Vezouse,
ran uphill to the southeast for eight had traveled east as rapidly as rain
miles through wild, forested country to and road conditions permitted and,
the Wolfsberg Pass. after dark, continued on with all vehi-
Prisoners, mostly from artillery and cle headlights ablaze to catch up with
service units, now began to create a Massu’s forces near Dabo at 0200 on
problem, especially for CCL task the 21st.

10 The Sarre Rouge and Sarre Blanche rivers, or- 11Leclerc issued verbal orders concerning CCV
dinarily well-behaved brooks feeding into the Sarre about 1800 on 20 November and confirmed them
River, had overflowed their banks in mid-November with 2d Armored Division Opns Order 219/3, 21
and could be forded only with great difficulty. Nov 44.
376 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE
Although the Dabo Road could both its flanks were unable to fill in.
have been easily interdicted, the 553d In the north the left wing of the 361st
Volksgrenadierswere no longer interest- Volksgrenadier Division had almost dis-
ed. What was left of the division was appeared, while in the south the rest
surrounded and sought only to of the 708th VolksgrenadierDivision had
escape from the advancing Allied been badly cut up by the VI Corps’
forces. Maj. Gen. Hans Bruhn, the di- 100th Division at Raon-l’Etape. In
vision commander, assembled about fact, between Arzviller and Bertram-
1,800 troops, some light artillery bois—the new northern boundary of
pieces, and all operable vehicles in an the Nineteenth Army— a gap of about
area just north of Voyer. Aided by a ten miles existed with no organized
heavy downpour, Bruhn’s group defense.
hugged the Rhine-Marne Canal and Starting out at dawn on 21 Novem-
passed by several Allied outposts in ber, TF Massu, followed by CCV,
the night, probably units of the 314th reached the Wolfsberg Pass by noon
Infantry, to reach Arzviller before despite spotty, but determined resist-
dawn on the 21st. Another force of ance. Two hours later its leading ele-
some 300 553d Volksgrenadier Division ments, moving as fast as possible
troops farther east somehow sidled down the steep sides of the eastern
past French units along the mountain Vosges, broke through to the Alsatian
roads and also reached Arzviller plains. Massu immediately turned
during the morning of 21 November. north, heading for Saverne, while
With these two groups and miscella- CCV moved east, spreading out over
neous other troops already in the the broad rolling terrain. Meanwhile,
area, Bruhn began to organize the de- TF Minjonnet battled most of the day
fenses of the Saverne Gap proper, at- with scattered elements of the 553d
tempting to tie in his forces with the Volksgrenadiers a mile south of Arz-
existing defenses at Phalsbourg. viller; only after dark did it reverse its
There the German defenders had re- course and cross the Vosges via the
ceived an unexpected bonus, a well- Dabo Road, leaving the Arzviller area
equipped battalion of troops from an to the 79th Division’s infantry units.
NCO school at Bitche, some twenty During the night the German forces
miles north of Saverne. The defenses in the area began withdrawing into
were thus in much better condition. the Saverne Gap gorge for a final
Prior to the XV Corps’ attack, stand.
Bruhn had made provisions for a last- By 22 November, the French 2d Ar-
ditch defense of the most obvious ap- mored Division’s penetration of the
proaches to Saverne, down Route N- Vosges was complete. In the north,
4 and through the gorge of the Sa- T F Rouvillois of CCD broke out of
Verne Gap, but had neglected to pre- the Low Vosges at Wieterswiller, four
pare blocking positions along the miles east of La Petite-Pierre and,
narrow mountain roads north and after overrunning scattered German
south of Saverne, as Leclerc had sur- rear units, sped south seven miles
mised. The 553d was now too weak to across open farmland to Monswiller,
remedy the mistake, and the units on just over a mile north of Saverne,
THROUGH THE SAVERNE GAP 377

where they met elements of Massu’s route.12 By the end of the day only
force. TF Massu had entered the two tasks remained in order to finish
town of Saverne earlier and, without securing the bridgehead that Haislip
much of a fight, had captured over wanted into Alsace: opening the rest
800 Germans, including General of Route N–4 from Phalsbourg to Sa-
Bruhn of the 553d Volksgrenadiers, as Verne and clearing the Saverne Gap
well as part of the LXXXIX Corps gorge.
headquarters. General von Gilsa, the West of the Vosges the 79th Divi-
LXXXIX Corps commander, escaped, sion’s 314th regiment had moved up
at least from the Allies. Dissatisfied to Phalsbourg on the 22d, and on the
with his performance, Balck had re- morning of 23 November the 314th
placed him with Lt. Gen. Gustav and TF Minjonnet made short work
Hoehne, and von Gilsa had left Sa- of the remaining defenders. To the
Verne that morning. But Hoehne, ar- south, the 315th Infantry had entered
riving as von Gilsa left, could do little the Saverne Gap gorge near Arzviller
except pull the bulk of the corps during the afternoon of the 22d, and
headquarters out of Saverne as quick- spent all of the 23d pushing through
ly as possible and move it into the Sa- scattered resistance from mines, road-
Verne Gap gorge. Upon learning that blocks, and demolitions, finally reach-
Bruhn had been captured, the new ing Saverne about noon on the 24th.
corps commander took over what ele- The first phase of Haislip’s XV Corps
ments of the 553d Division he could offensive was complete.
find and, during the night of 22–23
November, led them and his remain- The German Response
ing corps staff northward along back
roads through the Low Vosges to Both Field Marshal von Rundstedt
escape a second potential trap. at OB West and General Balck of Army
While CCL (TF Massu and TF Min- Group G quickly realized that the
jonnet recombined) and TF Rouvil- Allied penetration opened a danger-
lois of CCD cleaned out Saverne and ous gap between the First and Nine-
its environs on the 22d, CCV secured teenth Armies. 13At the same time, pres-
more Alsatian towns and villages sure from the Third Army’s XII
south and southeast of the city, meet- Corps prompted OB West to warn
ing little German resistance. Later in OKW about the possibility of another
the afternoon, TF Minjonnet moved imminent breakthrough on First
northwest up Route N–4 from Sa- Army’s left wing. Taken together, the
Verne and by dusk, after having over- operations of both the XII and XV
run many westward-facing German Corps could well foreshadow a major
defenses, was about a mile short of
Phalsbourg. Meanwhile,TF Quili- 12 General Hoehne’s
escaping elements apparently
chini, which had been operating northcrossed the La Petite-Pierre road, Route D–9, be-
of the Sarrebourg-Phalsbourg area, tween echelons of TF Quilichini.
west of the 13German information in the remainder of this
Vosges, crossed the chapter is from von Luttichau, “German Oper-
mountains to rejoin the rest of CCD ations,” chs. 24 and 25, and from Cole, The Lorraine
via the northern La Petite-Pierre Campaign, pp. 464–70.
378 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

disaster for the Germans, leading to the 49th Infantry Division; 14two scratch
the outflanking of the Saar basin on infantry “battalions” (about 600 troops
the south and east, the destruction of in all) from Wehrkreis VII; and a broad
German military forces west of the miscellany of smaller units that had
Rhine, and ultimately an Allied cross- begun streaming westward across the
ing of the Rhine itself. Rhine from Wehrkreis V and XII. Appar-
Von Rundstedt had already direct- ently, the 256th VolksgrenadierDivision
ed Army Group H, in the Netherlands, was also to pass to the control of Corps
to dispatch the weak, rebuilding 256th Command Vosges upon its arrival in the
Volksgrenadier Division to the front of Haguenau area, beginning about 24
the First Army. Now, on the 21st, he November.
had Army Group H start another worn- Von Rundstedt realized that all these
out division, the 245th Volksgrenadiers, defensive arrangements were largely
south to strengthen the First Army, palliative and that only a strong coun-
and also released the four-battalion terattack held out any hope of prevent-
401st Volks Artillery Corps to Army Group ing an Allied breakthrough of major
G for the same purpose. The First proportions. For this purpose he
Army, in turn, reinforced the 361st needed armored reinforcements, and
VolksgrenadierDivision with its last re- for days he had been importuning
serves, an understrength infantry as- OKW to release the Panzer Lehr ar-
sault battalion and the army head- mored division to him.15 Currently re-
quarters guard company. The 361st fitting behind the battlefield, the Panzer
Division, having failed to hold the Mit- Lehr, commanded by Maj. Gen. Fritz
tersheim-Schalbach line on 21 No- Bayerlein, had been earmarked for the
vember, was to pull its left wing Ardennes offensive, and OKW was re-
northward another three miles and luctant to authorize its commitment.16
hold a front between the towns of However, on the afternoon of the 2lst,
Mittersheim, Baerendorf, Weyer, and the German high command finally ap-
Drulingen, west to east. proved the use of the division, and by
On 22 November von Rundstedt 1800 that evening the unit had started
gave Army Group G a provisional corps south. However, both Hitler and OKW
headquarters, Corps Command Vosges, to specified that Panzer Lehr would have to
consolidate defensive preparation in return northward by 28 November.
the Strasbourg area. To slow Allied Passing control of Panzer Lehr to Army
progress there, Corps Command Vosges
was to establish a screening line from 14The rest of the 49th Division had been dissolved
the Moder River south to Wasselonne, in October.
eight miles southeast of Saverne. How- 15 Theunit’s title reflected its original status as a
ever, to accomplish this mission, Army training formation, but by 1944 its organization was
identical to the other German panzer divisions.
Group G could give Corps Command 16Until 20 November von Rundstedt had hoped
Vosges only a few insignificant elements: to employ a panzer division on the Belfort Gap
Feldkommandantur 987, the occupational front, where the First French Army had already pen-
area command located at Haguenau; etrated to the Rhine; but sometime on the 20th he
decided that the widening gap between the First and
the armed forces command of Stras- Nineteenth Armies presented a more immediate and
bourg itself; the headquarters (only) of far-reaching threat.
THROUGH THE SAVERNE GAP 379

Group G, von Rundstedt admonished from Haguenau, expecting one regi-


Balck to employ the division in its en- mental task force from the division to
tirety for an attack deep into the north- be available on the morning of 24
ern flank of the XV Corps’ penetration November and the rest of the division
in order to end the danger of a split on the 26th. Finally, the Army Group G
between the two armies. The division commander assumed that the 245th
was to assemble near Sarralbe, about Volksgrenadier Division would arrive
nineteen miles north of Sarrebourg, from Holland by 28 November, in
and strike south to cut Route N–4 be- time to help secure the ground that
tween Sarrebourg and Phalsbourg. the Panzer Lehr had taken during its
Supporting the attack would be the armored counterattack.
401st Volks Artillery Corps, the weakened With unjustified optimism, Balck
361st Volksgrenadier Division, and, Balck promised decisive results from the
hoped, the understrength 25th Panzer complicated and decentralized series
Grenadier Division. Balck wanted the of planned operations. However, his
361st and the 25th Panzer Grenadiers to immediate subordinate, General Otto
protect the eastern flank of Panzer von Knobelsdorff, commanding the
Lehr’s attack, blunting any Third Army First Army, was less enthusiastic, be-
(XII Corps) thrust toward Sarre- lieving that the Panzer Lehr would be
Union, fourteen miles north of Sarre- fortunate to hold what little of the
bourg. Sarre River valley region in Lorraine
Balck also directed the Nineteenth his forces still controlled.
Army to organize a task force to link up
with the Panzer Lehr Division in the vicin- Planning the Final Stage
ity of Hazelbourg, on the western
slopes of the High Vosges about six Although hardly privy to all these
miles south of Phalsbourg. To release German plans and preparations,
troops for this supporting attack, Balck Patch’s Seventh Army intelligence staff
authorized Wiese to pull most of his knew that something was brewing on
right-wing units back to the Vosges Ridge the other side by the afternoon of the
Position, including all units between the 22d. Nevertheless, General Patch had
Blamont area and the Saales Pass, a already begun to revise his plans based
distance of about twenty miles. This on the current situation in both the XV
last order reflected Balck’s lack of in- and VI Corpszones. 17On 21 Novem-
formation about the 553d Volksgrenadier ber he decided that the XV Corps was
Division, which he thought was still to direct its main effort after Saverne
holding steady in the Hazelbourg area, toward the capture of Haguenau and
and about the 708th VolksgrenadierDivi- then Soufflenheim, eight miles farther
sion, which had also fallen apart. The
possibility of adding a southernpincer 17 Allied planningin this subsection
is based
to Bayerlein’s northern thrust was thus largely on Seventh Army Rpt, II, 414-15; Ltr, CG Sev-
highly unlikely. enth Army to CGs VI and XV Corps, 21 Nov 44
East of the Vosges, Balck intended (cited in Seventh Army Diary, 21 Nov 44, as Direc-
tive X–193); Seventh Army Diary, 21 and 22 Nov
to have the newly arrived 256th Volks- 44; XV Corps FO 12, 221100A Nov 44; XV Corps
grenadier Division push south and west AAR Nov 44, pp. 29–30.
380 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

east of Haguenau and six miles short of guenau, to strike for Strasbourg and
the Rhine. Haislip was also to leave se- secure the city if it reached the area
curity forces in and west of the Vosges before the VI Corps. He then reas-
to protect his exposed northern flank signed the Haguenau-Soumenheim
and, in the south, to secure the Mol- mission to the 44th Division and
sheim area, about fifteen miles south of tasked the 79th Division, also in the
Saverne. 18 This latter action would process of deploying east of the
project XV Corps forces into the rear Vosges, to support either the 44th or
of German units still holding up the ad- the French 2d, as tactical develop-
vance of Brooks’ VI Corps in the High ments dictated. T h e task of securing
Vosges. the Molsheim area was temporarily
Finally, Patch ordered Haislip to delayed and transferred to the 45th
“attack Strasbourg, employing ar- Division’s 179th regiment, which was
mored elements to assist the VI scheduled to arrive at Cirey-sur-Ve-
Corps in the capture of the city.” 19 zouse from its rest area before dark
Although technically Strasbourg was on the 22d. T h e security and liaison
still a VI Corps objective, the city now mission north of Sarrebourg and west
appeared to be within easy reach of of the Low Vosges would be under-
Haislip’s forces if they acted quickly. taken by the 106th Cavalry Group
Since Brooks’ units were still fighting and by the rest of Eagles’ 45th Divi-
their way through the mountains, the sion as it came out of reserve.
new mission seemed appropriate.
After the fall of Strasbourg, the XV Striking for Strasbourg
Corps ,was then to reconnoiter north-
ward along the Rhine to the Soufflen- Starting out about 0715 on 2 3 No-
heim-Rastatt area, taking advantage of vember, the French 2d Armored Divi-
any opportunity to force a quick sion’s CCL rolled rapidly eastward
crossing. The VI Corps, in turn, across the Alsatian plains with T F
would be prepared to cross the Rhine Rouvillois on the north and T F Massu
in its sector or, more likely, to exploit to the south. 20 Overrunning German
through a XV Corps bridgehead. outposts and minor garrisons in the
Issuing complementary orders dur- small Alsatian farming towns, TF
ing the morning of 22 November, Rouvillois achieved complete surprise
Haislip went a step further in regard and entered Strasbourg at 1030 that
to Strasbourg. After cleaning up the morning. TF Massu, which was to
Saverne area, Haislip ordered Le- have driven into the city from the
clerc’s 2d Armored Division, previ- northwest, encountered stronger
ously assigned the seizure of Ha- German opposition, but ultimately
followed shortly thereafter. Later,
18 Patch’s
directive actually read “occupy the Posi- about 1300 that afternoon, CCV also
tion de Mutzig,” which consisted of semimodernized began pouring into Strasbourg from
old stone forts on rising ground east of Molsheim the west, bringing with it a battalion
and just north of the town of Mutzig along Route
N–392 a few miles into the Vosges.
19Ltr, CG Seventh Army to CGs VI and XV 20For the drive on Strasbourg, TF Rouvillois re-
Corps, 21 Nov 44. placed TF Minjonnet in CCL.
THROUGH THE SAVERNE GAP 381

FRENCH 2D ARMORED DIVISION MOVES THROUGH STRASBOURG

of the 313th Infantry, 79th Division. commanders had apparently ignored


Meanwhile, amid almost incredible any instructions to outpost the Alsa-
scenes of German surprise and con- tian plains and instead had concen-
sternation, Rouvillois’ armor wheeled trated on defending certain sections
through the streets of Strasbourg to of the city, including the vital Kehl
the Rhine, seizing intact bridges over bridges.
the canal-like watercourses in the Throughout 23 and 24 November
eastern section of the city. Ahead lay T F Rouvillois made several attempts
the highway and railway bridges over to reduce the German bridgehead,
the Rhine to the German town of but the result was a stalemate. Lack-
Kehl; scarcely 650 yards short of the ing strength for an all-out assault in
river, however, the French armor ran the urban area, the infantry-poor
into strongly manned German de- French armored units had to be con-
fenses in apartment houses and thick- tent with isolating the German en-
walled bunkers, buttressed by antitank clave from the rest of the city, The
barriers and antitank weapons. Soon Germans, in turn, made no move to
German artillery and mortars em- reinforce or enlarge the bridgehead
placed east of the Rhine began laying and, pending orders to destroy the
down accurate fire that forced Rouvil- bridges, held on mainly to aid the
lois’ troops and vehicles to pull back escape of German troops and civilians
and seek cover. T h e local German able to infiltrate through the French
382 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

vehicles to safety. In the meantime, have to consolidate his existing gains,


T F Massu and CCV mopped up iso- rest and resupply his forces, and be
lated pockets of resistance, took hun- patient.
dreds of German troops prisoner, and Haislip moved quickly to secure Le-
began rounding up German civilians clerc’s narrow supply line across
for internment. By the time the last Alsace. By 24 November all three
elements of the French armored divi- regiments of the 79th Division had
sion left Strasbourg on 28 November, crossed the Vosges and begun to
the division had captured a total of arrive in the Moder River area west of
6,000 German troops—mostly service Strasbourg and just south of Ha-
and administrative personnel—in and guenau. Behind the 79th, the 44th Di-
around the city and had taken into vision’s 324th regiment and the 45th
custody about 15,000 German civil- Division’s 180th regiment took up sta-
ians. From 19 to 24 November the tion along the Alsatian plains north of
Saverne and Strasbourg operations Saverne, and thus the northern flank
cost the French division approximate- of the XV Corps’ penetration east of
ly 55 men killed, 165 wounded, and 5 the Vosges appeared well protected:
missing. O n the southern flank, the 45th Di-
During this period, the situation in vision’s 179th regiment reached Was-
and around Strasbourg made it im- selonne during the afternoon of the
possible for CCV and CCL to concen- 23d and, as planned, struck south for
trate sufficient strength to eliminate Molsheim on the 24th with CC Remy,
the German enclave and seize the encountering little resistance. Late in
Kehl bridges. The disorganized but the day it met elements of the 3d Di-
large number of German troops and vision’s 15th Infantry, the first of
civilians scattered throughout the city, Brooks’ VI Corps units to finally push
including many German-speaking in- through the High Vosges and onto
habitants who were not especially the Alsatian plains.21 The juncture of
sympathetic to the French, posed a the two units augured the arrival of
security problem that led to a wide the rest of the VI Corps units to
dispersal of Leclerc’s available infan- cement the southern flank of Haislip’s
try forces. Having committed the rest penetration. However, CCR and CCD
of his combat forces, CCD and CCR, outposts between Molsheim and
to protect his twenty-mile line of Strasbourg had already reported the
communications across the Alsatian absence of any German threat in the
plains, Leclerc asked General Haislip south, and thus both of Leclerc’s
to speed American infantry into the flanks seemed secure.
city. But developments west of the However, on 23 November, as
Vosges, together with the Seventh Haislip’s infantry regiments were
Army’s directive to move against Ha- pouring across the Alsatian plains, the
guenau, temporarily tied Haislip’s
hands; and Brooks’ VI Corps forces
would probably not be able to reach 21During the course of 23 November a boundary
change placed Wasselonne in the XV Corps sector,
Strasbourg for three or four more but Molsheim and Mutzig remained in the VI Corps
days. In the meantime, Leclerc would zone. Seventh Army OI 18, 23 Nov 44.
THROUGH THE SAVERNE GAP 383

XV Corps commander suddenly forced by units of the 44th Division’s


learned of the arrival of the Panzer 71st and 114th regiments, moved up
Lehr Division on his northern flank to Eywiller and several other towns—
west, rather than east, of the Vosges. all north of what was to have been
He immediately suspended movement the 361st Division’s main line of resist-
of all XV Corps forces across the ance. Finally, on 23 November, the
Vosges and began to reorient troops advance elements of the eastward-
that remained west of the mountains moving 4th Armored Division met
to meet the new threat. First, he units of the 71st Infantry near Fene-
transferred the Haguenau mission trange, completely disorganizing the
from the 44th Division to the 79th, defending volksgrenadier and leaving
which was already positioned reason- the Panzer Lehr Division with no
ably close to the objective area. screening force on its western flank
Second, he ordered the bulk of the for its projected attack south.
44th to concentrate in the area above Von Rundstedt and Balck had as-
Sarrebourg with its 71st and 114th sumed that the Panzer Lehr, with about
regiments and the two squadrons of seventy tanks, would reach the Sar-
the 106th Cavalry. Third, he kept the ralbe area in time to launch its coun-
45th Division’s remaining regiment, terattack early on the morning of 23
the 157th, east of the Vosges as a re- November. However, the division de-
serve. If necessary, Leclerc’s armor ployed southward more slowly than
could also return to the Sarrebourg anticipated; was not in position to
area, but Haislip was apparently con- attack until 1600 on the 23d, at least
fident that the 44th Division could ten hours later than planned; and ini-
handle the danger. tially could muster only thirty to forty
tanks, two of its four panzer grena-
The Panzer Lehr Counterattack dier battalions, and about ten assault
guns for the effort. 22By that time the
During the evening of 21 Novem- XV Corps had begun to react to the
ber and all of the following day, the German buildup, and the Panzer Lehr
361st Volksgrenadier Division had could only hope to achieve some local
attempted to establish a defensive line tactical surprise. Moreover, assistance
facing south from Mittersheim to from other German forces was negli-
Drulingen. The effort was futile, how- gible. The 361st Volksgrenadier Division
ever, and the unit had slowly been
squeezed between the advances of the
22At the time, the Panzer Lehr had only one of its
Third Army’s XII Corps from the two organic tank battalions, with an authorized
west and assorted XV Corps units strength of thirty-five Mark IV and thirty-five Mark
from the south. By dark on the 21st, V tanks, but many had broken down on the ap-
proach march. The missing tank battalion was
elements of the XV Corps’ 106th Cav- scheduled to be replaced by an independent Mark V
alry Group were either in or north of panzerjaeger battalion, but equipment for the unit did
Baerendorf, Weyer, and Drulingen. not arrive in time for the attack. Ltr, Helmut Ritt-
The following day, the XII Corps’ 4th gen to Clarke, 1 1 Feb 88 (Rittgen commanded one
of the Panzer Lehr task groups); and Rittgen, Die Ges-
Armored Division cleared Mitter- chichte der Panzer-Lehr-Division im Westen, 1944/45, ch.
sheim, and the 106th Cavalry, rein- 11.
384 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

was too weak; OKW refused to release Unknown to von Rundstedt, the sit-
the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division for uation of the Panzer Lehr had actually
the attack; and the Nineteenth Army, become much more precarious. While
under strong pressure from both the the German division was moving
VI Corps and the First French Army, south, the XII Corps’ 4th Armored
lacked the means to mount any kind Division, commanded by Maj. Gen.
of counterattack from the south. Nev- John S. (“P”) Wood, had resumed its
ertheless, acting virtually alone, advance west toward Sarre-Union.
Bayerlein’s elite unit launched its Judging the soggy ground west of the
drive southward that afternoon. Sarre River to be unsuitable for ar-
The Panzer Lehr Division advanced in mored operations, Maj. Gen. Manton
two columns: a western one with S. Eddy, the XII Corps commander,
about ten to twelve Mark IV medium obtained permission from General
tanks moving south through Baeren- Haislip to have the American armored
dorf, and a larger, eastern one with unit’s CCB move eastward across the
twenty to twenty-five Mark V heavies Sarre into the XV Corps’ zone, before
(Panthers) moving parallel down swinging north toward Sarre-Union.23
through Eywiller (Map 27). At first A clash between the two opposing ar-
the German armor and accompanying mored formations was inevitable.
panzer grenadiers rode roughshod Crossing the Sarre at two points
over the scattered American advance near Baerendorf on the morning of
elements. By dusk Bayerlein’s forces 24 November, the American combat
had pushed the 106th Cavalry back to command almost immediately ran
Baerendorf and Weyer, and during into the Panzer Lehr Division’s exposed
the night Panzer Lehr’s western col- western flank. House-to-house and
umn broke through Baerendorf to tank-to-tank fighting ensued at Baer-
reach Rauwiller, several miles to the endorf until, during the afternoon,
south, taking about 200 prisoners CCB’s southern column cleared the
from the 44th Division. Temporarily small town, while the northern
putting aside all thoughts of celebrat- column contained German armored
ing a quiet Thanksgiving holiday, ele- units attempting to outflank the em-
ments of the 106th Cavalry and the battled American forces. Elsewhere,
71st Infantry finally slowed down the the 71st Infantry retook Rauwiller
German thrust just south of before dark, and the 106th Cavalry
Rauwiller. Meanwhile, Panzer Lehr’s Group, while losing some ground
eastern column pushed XV Corps along the western slopes of the
cavalry forces out of Weyer and south Vosges, managed to hang on to
to Schalbach, forcing the 114th Infan-
try to move up to cover this second
23In Ltr, Rittgen to Clarke, 1 1 Feb 88, the former
threat. But despite these gains, von Panzer Lehr officer believed that the move by Wood’s
Rundstedt viewed the southward division was prompted by ULTRA information. If
progress of the panzer division as too such was the case, the matter might have been han-
slow, and during the night he advised dled discreetly by Patch and Patton, and the terrain
problems used as an excuse to cover the movement
OKW that the counterattack had little of the armored force east; but available information
chance of success. provides no clue regarding the role of ULTRA.
386 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

Schalbach and stabilize the rest of the the 256th in a defensive role around
American line through Drulingen. Haguenau, an order that effectively
In light of these developments, von disassociated the arriving division
Rundstedt reduced the mission of the from the Panzer Lehr operation. Final-
Panzer Lehr from closing the gap be- ly, Balck learned that the 245th Volks-
tween Balck’s two armies to just grenadier Division, also arriving from
blocking Route N–4 between Sarre- the Netherlands, would not reach the
bourg and Saverne. T h e change prob- First Army’s sector before 3 December,
ably reflected his realization that the far too late to have any bearing on
Nineteenth Army was in n o condition to the situation he was facing in the
launch any kind of supporting attack Sarre valley.
from the south, but the mission was O n 25 November the battle in the
still too ambitious. Although von Sarre River valley resumed. Just before
Rundstedt also directed Balck to feed dawn, the Panzer Lehr’s western column
the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division into launched an attack against the 4th Ar-
the battle, he must have known that mored Division’s CCB elements at
the understrength 25th could not Baerendorf and reoccupied part of
reach the Sarre-Union area until 25 Rauwiller. Confused fighting lasted
November; even then it was doubtful several hours, but again the Germans
that its addition could influence the were forced to withdraw to the north
struggle. and east with little accomplished.
General Balck’s evaluation of the Meanwhile, the stronger eastern Panzer
counterattack became increasingly Lehr column was a bit more successful,
pessimistic throughout the 24th. He overrunning part of the 2d Battalion,
had expected the leading units of the 114th Infantry, near Schalbach. But
254th Volksgrenadier Division to reach American artillery helped turn back
Haguenau that day and had planned further German advances south, and
to commit the units of the division to by afternoon all German offensive op-
supporting attacks east of the Vosges erations in the area had stopped.
as they arrived on the front. However, T h e Schalbach action proved to be
transportation problems continued to the high point of the Panzer Lehr
delay the arrival of the division, and counterattack, and on the evening of
the first units did not reach Haguenau the 25th von Rundstedt, with Hitler’s
until 26 November, with the rest of reluctant consent, called off the oper-
the division following on the 28th.24 ation. The German panzer division
In any case von Rundstedt, who ap- immediately began to withdraw north-
peared to have little faith in the coun- ward to temporary defensive lines be-
terattack, now directed Balck to use tween the Sarre River and Eywiller
to lick its wounds. T h e movement
24The Seventh Army G–2 identified elements of markedthe end of any dangerto XV
the 256th Volksgrenadier Division in the Haguenau Corps’ northern flank. Still relatively
area on 25 November, but they were probably only unscathed, Haislip’s forces were ready
small liaison detachments reconnoitering for assem-
bly and bivouac areas.
to resume their attack to the east.
CHAPTER XXII

To the Plains of Alsace


The Seventh Army’s plans for the northern, wing from the veteran 45th
mid-November offensive called for Division, was moving into the high,
the VI Corps to launch an attack over forested hills leading to Raon-l’Etape.
the Meurthe River no later than two The “Century Division” was about
days after the XV Corps’ offensive four miles short of Raon-l’Etape on
began. Thus, when Patch set the date the northwest and west and nearly
of the XV Corps’ attack for 13 No- two miles shy on the southwest and
vember, the VI Corps’ target date south. From Etival-Clairefontaine, on
automatically became 15 November. the west side of the Meurthe three
But at least as early as 10 November, miles south of Raon-l’Etape, the 3d
General Brooks, the new VI Corps Division’s 15th Infantry held about
commander, realized that his com- three miles of the west bank down to
mand as a whole would not be ready St. Michel-sur-Meurthe, while the rest
to launch a concerted, new offensive of the 3d Division remained in re-
by that date. As of the 10th, the VI serve, resting and training for the VI
Corps had been able to secure the Corps’ new offensive. South of the
western banks of the Meurthe only in 15th Infantry the untried 103d Divi-
the areas of Baccarat and St. Michel- sion, less one regimental combat
sur-Meurthe; around Raon-l’Etape team in corps reserve, was taking over
and in the entire sector from St. Die positions the 3d Division had previ-
to St. Leonard and south, both river- ously held from St. Michel south
banks were still in German hands. T o about seven miles to the vicinity of
secure a broader line of departure for Saulcy-sur-Meurthe. The left of the
the November offensive, Brooks 103d Division was on high ground in
wanted to clear as much of the west the Magdeleine woods overlooking
bank of the Meurthe as possible both St. Die and the Taintrux valley,
before he launched his main attack. but the right was still four rugged
miles short of the Meurthe at Saulcy.
VI Corps Plans South of Saulcy-sur-Meurthe, the left
of the 36th Division was also several
On 10 November the recently com- miles short of the high ground along
mitted 100th Infantry Division, having the Meurthe at St. Leonard; and the
taken over along VI Corps’ left, or center and right of the 36th stretched
388 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

southwest nearly fifteen miles to the 103d Divisions would divert German
vicinity of Le Tholy, where its de- forces from the 3d Division’s front,
fenses meshed with those of the while a lack of progress could expose
French II Corps’ 3d Algerian Divi- the flanks of the 3d as soon as it
sion. crossed the river. If the 3d Division
On 10 November, after considering spent too much of its combat power
a number of alternatives, General securing a bridgehead over the
Brooks settled on a plan of attack that Meurthe, it might lack the strength to
called for refitting the 3d Division force the Saales Pass farther down
and again assigning to it the main Route N-420. T h e new VI Corps
corps effort during the November of- commander was especially concerned
fensive.1 O’Daniel’s 3d was to lead off with the 100th Division’s sector. If the
on 20 November with two regiments 100th was unable to secure the Raon-
assaulting across the Meurthe in the l’Etape area in a timely manner and
St. Michel area to seize a firm bridge- then mount a strong thrust eastward,
head. Then the division would clear a dangerous gap might open up be-
the forested hill masses north and tween the VI and XV Corps that the
northeast of St. Die in preparation for 117th Cavalry Squadron would have
a drive northeast along N-420 difficulty screening. O n the other
through the Saales Pass and ultimate- hand, a sustained drive by the 100th
ly to the Alsatian plains at Mutzig, Division would provide strong sup-
less than fifteen miles short of the di- port for the advance of the neighbor-
vision’s final objective, Strasbourg. ing XV Corps toward Sarrebourg and
Brooks realized that the German the Saverne Gap.
defenses along the Meurthe were Brooks therefore wanted the 100th
weak and lacked depth. Furthermore, Division to start its attacks as early as
Route N-420 between St. Die and the possible, and on 12 November he di-
Saales Pass was broader and in much rected it to proceed immediately
better condition than between Brou- across the Meurthe against Raon-
velieures and St. Die, the scene of the l’Etape and the surrounding high
3d Division’s earlier DOGFACE ad- ground (Map 28). Once this area had
vance. Nevertheless, Brooks was also been taken, the division was to begin
convinced that a rapid breakthrough its main effort by 15 November east-
by the 3d Division hinged on the ward on Route N-424. This second-
progress that the two “junior” divi- ary highway, crossing the Vosges
sions could make before 20 Novem- through the Hantz Pass, joined N-420
ber in securing suitable terrain along at St. Blake-la-Roche, fifteen miles
the Meurthe River from which to east of Raon-l’Etape and five miles
launch supporting attacks. Strong ef- north of the Saales Pass. If the 100th
forts on the part of the 100th and Division could begin this drive by the
15th, five days before the 3d Divi-
1The concept that the 3d Division would make sion’s attack was scheduled to begin,
the main effort dated back at least to VI Corps FO 7 Brooks felt that the success of his
of 7 November. Other alternatives were set forth in
VI Corps Outline Plans A, B, and C, all dated 10 main effort would be assured. The
November 1944. early attack by the 100th would also
TO THE PLAINS OF ALSACE 389

partially satisfy the Seventh Army’s Luftwaffe Field Corps. The LXIV Corps
requirement that the VI Corps launch covered the Nineteenth Army’s front
its portion of the November offensive from the Rhine-Marne Canal south
on the 15th. Given the difficulty that about thirty-five miles to Saulcy-sur-
the 45th Division had experienced ap- Meurthe. 2 The German corps’ north-
proaching Raon-l’Etape, however, the ernmost unit, the 553d Volksgrenadier
task seemed extremely ambitious for Division, confronted only XV Corps
the new division. units. The next division south, the
On the right wing of the VI Corps, 708th Volksgrenadiers, had just reached
Brooks wanted the 103d Division to LXIV Corps’ front. About half the divi-
cross the Meurthe south of the 3d Di- sion held lines opposite the XV
vision’s area, seize St. Die, and then Corps’ sector from the Vezouse River
push south and southeast toward south five miles to the vicinity of Vac-
Fraize and east to Ban-de-Laveline, queville, on the boundary between
thus effectively securing the southern the XV and VI Corps. The rest of the
flank of the main attack. Thereafter 708th Division, standing opposite VI
the division was to advance to the Corps’ 100th Division, extended the
east and northeast abreast of the 3d German lines south another eight
Division toward the Alsatian plains. miles through Raon-l’Etape to Etival-
However, Brooks hoped that the 103d Clairefontaine, which marked the
would be able to clear the west bank boundary between the 708th Volksgren-
of the Meurthe River area opposite adier and 724th Divisions (as well as the
Saulcy and St. Leonard before the boundary between VI Corps’ 100th
main attack on the 20th, and he or- and 3d Divisions). The weak 726th Di-
dered the unit to begin these prelimi- vision, reinforced by the under-
nary operations as soon as possible. strength 757th Grenadiers of the 338th
More or less bringing up the rear, Division, held along the east bank of
the weary 36th Division was to take the Meurthe River from Etival-Claire-
over the areas vacated by the 103d fontaine south six miles to the north-
Division west of the Meurthe, move ern edge of St. Die. The 716th
forward to blocking positions along Division’s front covered all the 3d Di-
the eight miles from Anould to Ger- vision’s sector and about half the
ardmer, maintain contact with de sector of the 103d Division. From St.
Monsabert’s II Corps, and prepare to Die south three miles to Saulcy-sur-
attack east and northeast across the Meurthe the shattered 16th Vollksgrena-
Vosges on order. dier Division, with sundry attachments

The German Defense 2 German information in this chapter derives


largely from von Luttichau, “German Operations,”
chs. 21, 22, and 25. Army Group G pushed the
The German defenders in the cen- boundary between the Nineteenth and First Armies to
tral Vosges would be hard-pressed to the Rhine-Marne Canal on 10 November, but the
stop a determined American advance. change was not fully effective until the 13th. Then,
On 10 November the Nineteenth Army on 20 or 21 November, in the wake of the XV
Corps’ attack against Sarrebourg, Army Group G
faced the U.S. VI Corps with the moved the boundary back south approximately to
LXIV Corps as well as Dart of the IV the Blamont-Strasbourg line.
T O THE PLAINS OF ALSACE 391

such as the remnants of the 201st and es crumbling and often half-filled with
202d Mountain Battalions, faced the water. Virtually no hardened (rein-
rest of the 103d Division. Saulcy lay forced concrete) positions existed
on the boundary between the LXIV along the Meurthe, while work on
Corps and IV Luftwaffe Field Corps, with semipermanent positions such as
most of the latter’s 198th Division bunkers of timber or sandbags fell
facing the 36th Division and the re- far short of the requirements for a
mainder holding in front of the 3d strong, cohesive defensive line.
Algerian Division of the French II Barbed wire was spotty and usually
Corps. 3 thinly strung; numerous machine-gun
The 708th Division, with perhaps and mortar positions had little protec-
3,500 combat effectives, was by far tion; and antitank and antiaircraft
the strongest of LXIV Corps’ divisions, ground emplacements were poorly
but no more than half of its strength constructed. The German defenders
faced VI Corps units on 10 Novem- tried to make up for these deficiencies
ber. The 716th Division, even with the with the liberal use of mines and
attached regiment of the 338th Divi- booby traps.
sion, could muster no more than Lacking troops to fully man even
1,500 infantry effectives, and the 16th the Vosges Foothill Position fortifications
Division, even with nondivisional at- that had been prepared, LXIV Corps
tachments, scarcely 1,000. The IV units deployed their forces in succes-
Luftwaffe Field Corps ’ 198th Division had sive strongpoints. Between Etival and
nearly 2,500 effectives, with perhaps St. Die, for example, the 716th Divi-
two-thirds of that strength in front of sion merely outposted much of the
the 36th Division.4 For a successful eastern bank of the Meurthe with
defense, the Germans would have to small patrols. The Germans hoped
rely heavily on their use of the that any American river crossings
rugged terrain. could be counterattacked from the
In the VI Corps’ projected zone of strongpoints or thrown back by artil-
attack, the forward defenses of the lery fire. Behind the thinly held front
LXIV Corps followed the east bank of line, the LXIV Corps had no reserves,
the Meurthe from the vicinity of and the Nineteenth Army could furnish
Raon-l’Etape south to Fraize, a none.
straight-line distance of about twenty Morale was generally low in the
miles. A fairly complete system of LXIV Corps, especially in the battered
trenches formed the backbone of the 16th and 716th Divisions. Many officers
line, but shoddy workmanship and and men were highly skeptical of the
lack of maintenance left older trench- Meurthe River defense line and were
inclined to regard it as no more than
3Seventh Army G–2 estimates included the 360th a delaying position. According to
Cossack Regiment, with 375 combat effectives, in the such reasoning, once VI Corps units
northern part of the IV Luftwaffe Field Corps’ sector,
but no confirmation of this can be found in avail- had penetrated the Meurthe line, the
able German records. LXIV Corps would slowly fall back to
4The figures for effectives are the authors’ esti- the crests and passes of the High
mates gleaned from conflicting German and Ameri-
can sources. Vosges, the Vosges Ridge Position.
392 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

There many Germans hoped they For the 100th, or Century, Division,
could settle in for the winter and going into combat for the first time,
enjoy the luxury of “hard” defensive the prospects seemed less dismal.
installations-a hope that was to The new troops were both nervous
prove no more than a dream. and excited, anxious about what the
Despite these shortcomings, the future attack would bring, yet more
Germans had some obvious advan- eager than the veteran soldiers to
tages. Once across the Meurthe, the show what they could do.5 General
VI Corps would again be fighting its Burress, the division commander, de-
way uphill in rough, generally forest- cided against a frontal assault on
ed terrain that was easy to defend but Raon-l’Etape across the Meurthe
hard to move through. Inclement River and instead, in agreement with
weather, varying from torrential rains Brooks, planned to attack the now
to heavy snows, could also be expect- heavily fortified area from the rear,
ed to aid the German defensive effort, using Baccarat-which VI Corps had
sharply curtailing VI Corps’ air sup- inherited from the French 2d Ar-
port, making ground movement diffi- mored Division’s earlier attack-as an
cult, and delaying artillery support. assembly area. Burress planned to
Finally, the German corps had re- move two of his regiments across the
ceived artillery reinforcements in No- Meurthe at Baccarat-then secured by
vember and had an adequate stock- the 117th Cavalry-and send them
pile of ammunition. south against the hopefully unforti-
fied, but steep hills north and north-
The Century ( 100th) Division east of Raon-l’Etape. His third regi-
ment and other division elements
For VI Corps veterans of the 3d were to demonstrate west of the river
and 36th Divisions, the crossing of with machine-gun, cannon, and artil-
the Meurthe and projected drive lery fire, drawing German attention
through the passes of the High away from the main effort. If success-
Vosges was painful to contemplate. ful, the maneuver would cut enemy
The ever-worsening weather and ter- supply routes to the town, forcing the
rain as well as the alway-improving Germans either to capitulate or with-
enemy defensive techniques had draw northward in disarray, With
become all too familiar since they had speed and a bit of luck, the fresh divi-
first started across the Moselle River sion might even beat the tired 3d to
on 20 September. The men of the the Alsatian plains and Strasbourg
100th and 103d Divisions, entering beyond.
combat for the first time, would soon On 12 November the 100th Divi-
learn the same lessons that had been sion’s 397th and 399th regiments,
painfully acquired by the GIs of the after an administrative crossing of the
older divisions during the two months
of slow, laborious, and costly prog-
ress that had gained the VI Corps 5The following account is based on the records of
the 100th Division and on the comments of Franklin
scarcely twenty miles toward the Gurley, a veteran of the 3d Battalion, 399th Infan-
Rhine . try.
TO THE PLAINS OF ALSACE 393

398TH INFANTRY, 100TH DIVISION, IN RAON-L’ETAPE AREA, NOVEMBER 1944

Meurthe at Baccarat, attacked south- the VI Corps’ offensive to construct a


eastward toward Raon-l’Etape, about northern extension of the Meurthe
six miles away. On the right, the River line, using a local road, D-8/9,
397th moved along the east bank of as a supply route.6 On both sides of
the Meurthe toward the small village the small road and into the Wilder-
of Bertrichamps and Hill 443, a steep ness forest beyond, the defenders had
abutment flush against the northern built extensive barbed-wire barriers,
edge of Raon-l’Etape. On the left, the cleared fields of fire, and constructed
399th headed east for the town of an impressive network of trenches,
Neufmaisons where it would then foxholes, bunkers, and machine-gun
wheel southeast toward Hill 539, ac- emplacements, which the new Ameri-
tually a steep ridge line that over- can troops quickly dubbed the
looked the Plaine River valley and the “winter line.” They were obviously
northern exits to Raon-l’Etape. As expected by the German grenadiers.
elements of both units began to reach
their intermediate objectives at Bertri- 6Routes D–8 and D–9 were actually a single road,
champs and Neufmaisons, they quick- the designation of which changed as it passed
French interdepartmental boundaries. The forests
ly discovered that the German de- between Neufmaisons and Raon-l’Etape were known
fenders, mostly 708th Division troops, as the Forest of the Wilderness and the Forest of
had taken advantage of the pause in the Small Wilderness.
394 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

The attacking regiments spent the trymen pouring down the hills on
afternoon of the 12th and all of the either side, the defenders began to
13th probing the hidden positions evacuate to the southeast. Early on
with patrols, seeking weak points the 18th, Burress thus reported that
while being surprised at their length Raon-l’Etape proper, although heavily
and breadth. mined and booby-trapped, was clear
On 14 November the 100th began of German troops. The gates of the
a series of battalion-sized attacks Vosges were in American hands.
against the newly constructed line With the fall of Raon- l ’Etape,
and, with additional division and Brooks decided to take advantage of
corps artillery support, penetrated the Burress’ success and proposed sweep-
German positions on the 15th, the ing changes in the corps’ assault
official starting date of VI Corps’ of- plans. 7 Perhaps seeking to avoid
fensive. After policing the remaining costly assaults over the Meurthe River
defenders, both regiments began by the 3d and 103d Divisions, he had
pushing southeast through the forests his staff develop plans for the other
of the Wilderness for their principal two divisions to undertake administra-
objectives. Hindered mainly by rain, tive crossings of the Meurthe near
snow, muddy mountain trails, and Raon- l ’Etape, behind the lines of the
dense woods, the American forces 100th Division. With the 3d Division
began to arrive at the base of Hills still assigned the main corps effort,
443 and 539 sometime on the 16th. the revision called for the 3d and
At the foot of Hill 539, the 1st Bat- 103d Divisions to pass through the
talion of the 399th Infantry overran a 100th and head south and east with
small German force, and one compa- their missions and objectives essen-
ny immediately climbed to the hill’s tially unchanged from the plan of 10
relatively flat summit, the Tete des November. The 100th would assist
Reclos (“top of the wilderness”), actu- the movement by securing the rising,
ally two knolls connected by a short wooded terrain on the far (southeast-
saddle. From there the American in- ern) side of the Plaine River valley
fantrymen could look down on the and then continuing eastward along
Plaine River valley, the back door to the axis of Route N-424. Only the
the Vosges Foothill Position defenses at role of the 36th Division was unaffect-
Raon-l’Etape and southward. The ed.
German response was quick. From At this point VI Corps planning ex-
late morning until dusk the 708th Di- hibited some confusion. Brooks was
vision hurled a series of attacks at the
Tete des Reclos, at one point routing 7The subsequent discussion of VI Corps planning
one of the defending American pla- changes is based on the following: Seventh Army OI
15, 18 Nov 44; VI Corps AAR Nov 44, pp. 28-30;
toons before the position could be re- VI Corps FO 8, 18 Nov 44; VI Corps OI 9, 19 Nov
stored. By the morning of 17 Novem- 44; VI Corps War Room Jnl, 18 and 19 Nov 44; 3d
ber, the 100th Division force on the Inf Div War Room Jnl, 18 and 19 Nov; Taggart, ed.,
hilltop was down to sixty-five men, History of the Third Infantry Division in World War II, p.
266. However, the after action reports of the 3d,
but the German troops were also ex- 100th, and 103d Divisions for November 1944 make
hausted; with more American infan- no mention of the changes discussed here.
TO THE PLAINS OF ALSACE 395

apparently under the impression both from the 716th Division, had occupied
that the 708th Volhgrenadier Division a second series of hill masses across
had completely folded and that the N-59 and the Plaine River; mean-
entire 14th Armored Division would while, a German strongpoint at a
be available for his main attack on the quarry on the southern outskirts of
20th. He therefore planned to use the Raon-l’Etape blocked any advance
new armored division as his pursuit south along Route N-59. The 398th
force and expected to turn the unit regiment, Burress’ third regiment,
loose early, having it pass through the crossed over the Meurthe and passed
infantry divisions and drive east and through the 399th, but could advance
northeast along all passable roads to no farther than La Trouche, a small
the Mutzig area. Only later did he hamlet on Route N-392 about two
learn that the VI Corps would obtain miles east of Raon. Although it had
only one reinforced combat command undoubtedly focused German atten-
from the new armored division. 8 tion away from the St. Die area, the
The new plan would not only avoid 100th Division’s attack had clearly
assault crossings of the Meurthe, but lost much of its steam. Nevertheless,
would also project VI Corps units that evening Brooks issued written
behind and to the east of German de- orders putting the revised plan into
fenses along the river from Raon- effect, and the 3d Division quickly
l’Etape south past St. Die; further- began redeploying its regiments
more, it provided for rapid exploita- toward Raon-l’Etape. 9 Obviously he
tion by mobile armored units, as still hoped that the 100th Division’s
Haislip had done in the north. Execu- attack would regain momentum early
tion, however, would depend on the on 19 November, and that the divi-
100th Division’s continued progress, sion could quickly secure enough
and Brooks must have had some ground to allow the new plan to be
second thoughts as he watched the at- carried out on the 20th.
tacks of Burress’ regiments bog down The revised plan was short-lived.
throughout the afternoon of the 18th During the night of 18–19 November,
in the face of renewed German re- Brooks learned that O’Daniel’s 3d Di-
sistance. The 100th Division troops vision was trying to infiltrate patrols
had, in fact, quickly discovered that across the Meurthe and that a battal-
German reinforcements, perhaps ion of the 15th Infantry had been
alerted to follow if the patrols gained
8The text (para. 3e) of VI Corps FO 8 , issued at a foothold on the east bank. Brooks
1800 on 18 November, as well as the operations immediately approved the initiative
overlay accompanying the FO clearly indicate that
VI Corps expected to gain the entire armored divi- and informed O’Daniel that he could
sion, but Seventh Army OI 15 of 18 November at- start his main attack with full corps
tached only CCA (reinforced) to VI Corps, effective support if the unit could push a
0600 on 19 November. N o time identification can
be found for Seventh Army OI 15, but it must have
reached the IV Corps command post after VI Corps’ 9VI Corps FO 8, 1800 18 Nov 44. Although the
FO 8 had been issued. The principal reinforcement FO was timed at 1800, the VI Corps War Room
for CCA was a medium-tank battalion, which gave Journal for 18 November reveals that the command-
the combat command two tank battalions instead of ers of the 3d, 100th, and 103d Divisions knew of
the usual one. Brooks’ intentions by 0930 that day.
396 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

bridgehead over the river that night. entire division in his 18 November
The 3d Division's proposal hardly plan-passing through the 3d and
outlasted the dawn on 19 November. 100th Divisions and striking directly
During the night the 15th Infantry for Mutzig and Strasbourg.11 But even
made five attempts to send patrols this rider was to be short-lived.
across the Meurthe, but only one
reached the east bank. German resist- The Meurthe River Assault
ance was not the problem, for the
Germans either ignored or were un- For the 3d Division the change of
aware of the crossing efforts. Rather, plans on 19 November created few
the swift, flooding, and rising problems, and the 7th and 30th In-
Meurthe was the culprit, swamping fantry regiments concentrated for the
rubber boats and nearly drowning 20 November crossings in the St.
swimmers. The lone successful patrol Michel area without incident. Never-
crossed near St. Michel-sur-Meurthe, theless, O'Daniel felt that moving
but could not be reinforced; daylight noisy tanks and tank destroyers for-
finally ended the hopes of Brooks and ward to direct support positions near
O'Daniel for a quick, surprise the crossing sites during the night of
Meurthe crossing in the center. Nev- 19–20 November would alert the
ertheless, the absence of any German German defenders. Consequently, he
response to the effort was encourag- kept most of his tracked vehicles well
ing. to the rear and tied them into artillery
The new day brought another dis- fire direction centers to provide indi-
appointment for General Brooks. En- rect fire support. As a result only a
countering heavy German small-arms, few tanks and tank destroyers-those
mortar, and artillery fire throughout that had moved up to the riverbank
the 19th, the 100th Division was earlier-were able to provide direct
again unable to secure the high support for the crossing. However,
ground south of the Plaine River that his precautions proved successful as
held the projected assembly areas and the evening of 19 November saw as-
lines of departure of the 3d and 103d sault boats of the 10th Engineer Bat-
Divisions. By noon on the 19th, talion, 3d Division, ferry several in-
Brooks himself at last decided to fantry platoons across the Meurthe at
abandon the revised plan and return two points just over a mile north of
to an amended version of the earlier St. Michel unopposed. Protected
10 November plan.10 The only sub- against surprise attack from the east
stantial change was the addition of bank, the engineers had installed two
the 14th Armored Division's CCA to footbridges by midnight and added a
the VI Corps' order to battle, and as- light assault boat bridge before dawn
signing to it the mission given to the on the 20th. Shortly after midnight,
troops began crossing the foot-
10VI Corps OI 9 of 19 November, ordering the bridges, and by 0600 five infantry bat-
revision, was issued at 1300 that day, but entries in talions of the 3d Division were assem-
the VI Corps and 3d Division War Room Journals
indicate that Brooks reached his decision an hour or
two earlier. 11VI Corps OI 10, 20 Nov 44.
T O THE PLAINS OF ALSACE 397

bled on the east side of the Meurthe alone accounted for nearly 150 casu-
waiting for the signal to attack. alties within the regiment.
German opposition so far had been On 21 November both the 3d and
negligible, and surprise was apparent- 100th Divisions began to make sub-
ly complete. 12 stantial progress. The 7th and 30th
At 0615, VI Corps and 3d Division Infantry regiments advanced two to
artillery began a thirty-minute barrage four miles in a northeasterly direc-
directed against known and suspected tion, while to the left the 397th Infan-
German strongpoints, assembly areas, try of the 100th Division secured
and artillery positions. Promptly at Clairefontaine and pushed four miles
0645 the artillery fire shifted east- east along Route N-424. German op-
ward, and the infantry moved out to position was spotty and limited large-
exploit the successful night crossing. ly to sporadic artillery and mortar
On the left, the 30th Infantry quick- fire; as before, most delays stemmed
ly secured a section of Route N-59 from supply and transportation prob-
and headed north up the highway lems caused by flooding along the
toward the Clairefontaine and Raon- Meurthe, and were soon compounded
l’Etape area. 13 At Clairefontaine the by inadequate traffic control west of
progress of t h e , advancing infantry the river and by even more changes
was temporarily halted by a German in VI Corps plans.
strongpoint; throughout the day Late on 20 November, General
German defenders thus continued to Brooks decided to send two regiments
control the east-bank junction of of the 103d Division over the Meurthe
Routes N-59 and N-424, between the at the 3d Division’s crossing sites,
3d Division’s 30th Infantry and the rather than to install additional bridges
100th Division’s 397th in the north. farther south. Worsening flood condi-
But, sandwiched between the two tions greatly complicated the effort.
American regiments, the defenders The 103d Division units crossed via the
could not hold out for long. Mean- 3d Division’s footbridges during the
while, to the south, troops of the 7th night of 20-2 1 November without diffi-
Infantry advanced a few miles inland culty until 0600 on the 21st, when one
and then pushed southwest, securing footbridge washed away. A second, its
the area around St. Michel-sur- approaches flooded, had to be re-
Meurthe, where they found few Ger- moved at 0800. By that time the 103d
mans but took heavy casualties from Division’s two regiments had most of
mines and booby traps. Around one their troops across the river, but none
small hamlet, for example, mines of their vehicles or heavy equipment.
The nearby light assault bridge had ac-
12 For a detailed account, see Earl A. Reitan, “The commodated about seventy-five jeep-
Seventh Infantry Crosses the Meurthe (20 Novem- loads of 3d Division supplies and
ber 1944): The American Way of War in a Small
Unit Action,” MS (1986); copy at CMH and an equipment on the 20th, but shortly
abridged version published in Infantry, LXXVI, No. before midnight its approaches became
5 (Sep-Oct 86), 29–33. impassable, leaving 103d Division
13Clairefontaine, on the east bank of the Meurthe,
is not to he confused with its neighbor, Etival-Clair-
units with no opportunity to use the
efontaine, west of the river. span.
398 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

To reinforce the two-division there it would strike out to the south-


bridgehead, the 36th Engineer regi- east into the wild, rocky, forested val-
ment had begun installing a heavy leys of the Sarre Blanche and Sarre
treadway bridge and a Bailey bridge Rouge rivers. Its new objective was to
to the south at St. Michel, with the seize the Schirmeck area at the junc-
treadway having priority. Initially, the tion of Routes N-392 and N-420,
engineers made good progress on the twelve miles southeast of St. Quirin
treadway bridge, but German artillery and ten miles north of the Saales Pass
fire forced a temporary halt to the in order to block a German withdraw-
construction effort, and the treadway al. With German troops in the north
was not ready for traffic until 0700 on now beginning to fall back in disarray
the morning of the 21st. However, before the XV Corps’ offensive,
after about forty heavy vehicles of the Brooks felt that the chances of CCA’s
3d Division had crossed-including making such an end run were good,
elev en tanks and six tank destroyers- including the possibility of isolating
a tank became immobilized in the the 716th and 16th Divisions. The mis-
mud at the eastern exits and blocked sion, once CCA moved out of its cur-
further traffic. About 1100 on the rent location, would also ease the
21st the 36th Engineers opened the traffic problems in the corps’ rear. 14
Bailey bridge at St. Michel, and 3d Despite the crowded roads, the ar-
Division vehicles again began pouring mored unit started off quickly. CCA
across the Meurthe. However, several reached St. Quirin early on 22 No-
hours later VI Corps gave the 103d vember, passed temporarily to XV
Division priority at the Bailey bridge Corps’ control, and then headed
site so that it could support its two southeast in two columns.15 However,
regiments that had crossed down- the route was more difficult than ex-
stream earlier. The net result of all pected, and the command took over
these delays and shifts back and forth two days to reach Schirmeck. Numer-
was a monumental traffic jam on the ous mines along narrow Route N-393
west side of the river, made even and booby-trapped roadblocks of
worse by the arrival of the 14th Ar- felled trees delayed its advance.
mored Division’s CCA into the 3d Di- About three miles west of Schirmeck,
vision’s forward assembly areas a giant road crater proved impassable
during the day. and stalled CCA for over twelve
Another change in plans on the hours. Finally, on 25 November, after
21st contributed to the confusion. At some intense clashes with German
1400 Brooks again altered his plan of units, the armored command arrived
attack, directing CCA to cancel its
projected Meurthe River crossing in
14Whether the traffic jam influenced Brooks’ deci-
the Raon-l’Etape area through the 3d sion to redeploy CCA is not clear from available
and 100th Divisions. Instead, the unit records. VI Corps OI 12 of 21 November, directing
was to take a wide northerly detour, the redeployment, reflects only the tactical intent set
moving north to St. Quirin, which forth in the text.
15Seventh Army OI 17, 22 Nov 44. Much of
had been secured by the French 2d CCA’s route to and from St. Quirin lay north of the
Armored Division on the 20th; from boundary between VI and XV Corps.
TO THE PLAINS OF ALSACE 399

at Schirmeck, only to find that other trapped roadblocks and craters, fre-
VI Corps units had already secured quently covered by small-arms, ma-
the area. CCA’s advance thus had chine-gun, and mortar fire, often
little tactical significance, serving as halted the “highly mobile” task
no more than a training exercise for forces, as they had the armor of CCA.
the new unit. Meanwhile, the foot infantry units
were normally able to bypass such ob-
The 100th and 3d Divisions stacles and march on at a steady pace.
For example, on 22 November,
Late on 21 November General marching infantry of the 100th Divi-
Brooks, convinced that the Germans sion advanced another two miles east-
were rapidly withdrawing across the ward across a broadening front
entire front of the VI Corps, changed astride Route N-424 before the divi-
the nature of his advance from attack sion’s mechanized Task Force Fooks
to pursuit. Ultimately, he sent the could catch up. On the 23d the
100th Division northeastward along 397th’s foot infantry again spearhead-
Routes N-392 and N-424, the 3d Di- ed the division’s drive and advanced
vision north on Route N-420, the nearly seven miles, moving quickly
103d Division east on D-19, and the through the Hantz Pass and capturing
36th Division east on N-59 and N- St. Blaise-la-Roche, at the junction of
415. He also directed each of his four Routes N-424 and N-420 about five
division commanders to organize fast- miles north of Saales. 17 Frustrated,
moving motorized task forces to strike Col. Nelson I. Fooks attempted to use
immediately toward division objec- lesser roads south of N-424, but
tives. Built around the nucleus of an again encountered roadblocks and
infantry battalion, each task force was craters and could gain scarcely two
to include artillery, tank, tank destroy- miles–and that only after his infantry
er, reconnaissance, and engineer had left the trucks to advance on foot.
units.16 These mobile units were to The next day, 24 November, General
bypass weak resistance and isolated Burress disbanded the mechanized
strongpoints, leaving mop-up chores force and turned the advance over to
to the nonmotorized infantry, which the 1st Battalion, 399th Infantry,
would presumably follow at a slower which proceeded to march ten miles
pace. farther to Schirmeck by nightfall.
Although the concept had consider- Meanwhile, another 100th Division
able merit, its execution proved less task force consisting of the 1st Battal-
than successful. Mined and booby- ion, 398th Infantry, and the 117th
Cavalry Squadron had been operating
16Typical was the 100th Division’s Task Force along the Plaine River valley and
Fooks under Col. Nelson I. Fooks, commander of Route N-392 northeast from Raon-
the 398th Infantry: 2d Battalion, 398th Infantry;
100th Reconnaissance Troop: Battery A, 69th Ar-
mored Field Artillery Battalion; Platoon, Company 17The Congressional Medal of Honor was award-
B, 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion; Company A ed to 1st Lt. Edward A. Silk, Company E, 398th In-
(-), 753d Tank Battalion; Platoon, Company B, fantry, 100th Infantry Division, on 23 November
325th Engineer Battalion; Medical and Signal De- 1944 for heroic action in clearing German infantry
tachments, 100th Division. units from the northern section of Route N-424.
400 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

l’Etape. By the evening of 24 Novem- 100th and 3d Divisions had shattered


ber, forward elements, having en- both the 708th and 716th Divisions. As
countered negligible resistance, had the German troops fell back in small
moved fifteen miles beyond the groups to the east and northeast, the
Meurthe; and on the 25th the 117th American units drove through the
Cavalry swung east along N-392 to vaunted Vosges Ridge Position hardly
make contact with CCA of the 14th aware of its existence.
Armored Division, just short of Route The following day, 24 November,
N-420. lead elements of both the 3d and
The 3d Division was not far behind. 100th Divisions set out along Route
With its traffic and supply problems N-420 and the Bruche River valley,
solved, O’Daniel’s forces had struck heading down the eastern slopes of
rapidly and forcefully northeast on 22 the Vosges toward Schirmeck, Mutzig,
November. The division’s motorized and Strasbourg. The two units soon
task force, T F Whirlwind, took off began to compete with one another
along narrow mountain roads north of for the lead, a rivalry fueled by
St. Die. Meeting little resistance, it rumors of a 72-hour pass for whichev-
wound up the day with a six-mile ad- er division reached Strasbourg first.
vance that carried the ad hoc unit to With the 36 on the right bank of the
the outskirts of Saulxures, about a mile Bruche and the 100th on the left, the
south of St. Blaise-la-Roche. T o the two American forces were often visi-
east, the progress of the 30th Infantry ble to each other as they cleared what
along Route N-420, the main highway, few obstacles remained in their paths.
was slower, and the regiment was final- Both divisions reached Schirmeck that
ly stopped half a mile short of Saales evening, captured different sections
that afternoon. Meanwhile, on the far of the town, and resumed the compe-
right, the 7th Infantry encountered the tition on the morning of the 25th.
strongest opposition of the day, and in O’Daniel, complaining that the 100th
one intense fire fight took about 110 was capturing towns in his sector, dis-
prisoners from the 716th Fusilier Battal- banded TF Whirlwind, which had
ion, 71 6th Division, including the battal- spearheaded his drive on the 24th,
ion commander. and allowed the 15th Infantry to take
On 23 November, 3d Division units the lead. Nightfall on the 25th finally
overcame isolated opposition at found 3d Division troops slightly
Saales and Saulxures and joined for- ahead of the 100th Division’s infan-
ward elements of the 100th Division trymen and over halfway to Mutzig.
to clear the road junction at St. Early on 26 November a fresh battal-
Blaise-la-Roche. All along Route N- ion of the 100th’s 399th Infantry, still
420 both divisions found stockpiles of dreaming of a three-day pass, took up
ammunition, barbed wire, and con- the race only to be overtaken by a
struction materials and passed by motorcycle messenger, who delivered
many incomplete, unmanned defen- the news that the division was to be
sive installations, none of which the redeployed north. Patch and Devers
Germans had had the time or the had decided to strengthen Haislip’s
manpower to use. The attacks of the XV Corps as quickly as possible, and
TO THE PLAINS OF ALSACE 401

411TH INFANTRY, 103D DIVISION,IN VICINITY


OF ST. MICHEL

the 100th Division was to be the first valley. The 409th and 411th Infantry
installment. The 3d Division thus regiments successfully undertook this
continued the drive east alone, reach- task during the period 16–18 Novem-
ing the Mutzig area that afternoon ber, while the 4 10th Infantry guarded
and linking up with patrols from the the division’s left flank. Opposition
XV Corps’ 45th Division shortly was minimal. During the night of 17-
thereafter. The VI Corps had finally 18 November, a patrol of the 410th
broken out of the Vosges only to find entered the section of St. Die lying
that Strasbourg, still fifteen miles dis- west of the Meurthe River and found
tant, was already in the hands of the the area deserted. The Germans had
French 2d Armored Division. The 72- already sacked, burned, or otherwise
hour passes would have to wait. destroyed the eastern part of the city
and had herded well over 40,000 ci-
The 103d Division vilians into the western section of St.
Die, which had boasted a prewar pop-
Before General Haffner’s 103d Di- ulation of only 20,000.
vision could launch its mid-November For the November push, the 103d
effort, it had to clear a two-mile-wide, Division deployed the 411th Infantry
triangular-shaped, wooded hill mass on its right wing, adjacent to the 36th
between St. Die and the Taintrux Division, while concentrating the
402 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

regiments crossed the Meurthe over blocks, some stubborn pockets of re-
3d Division bridges during the night sistance built on incomplete defensive
of 20–21 November, immediately installations, and sporadic artillery and
spreading out east and southeast and mortar fire slowed progress, as did
clearing high ground north and time-consuming marches along muddy
northeast of St. Die against light, mountain trails to outflank German
intermittent resistance. On 22 No- strongpoints. By the afternoon of 26
vember, elements of the 409th Infan- November, leading elements of the
try, coming in from the north, en- 103d Division cleared Ville, but were
tered St. Die unopposed. Meanwhile still five miles short of the plains.
the division’s motorized task force,
TF Haines,18 circled around north of The 36th Division
St. Die on back roads, securing much
of Route N-420 from St. Die to Pro- The tired, understrength 36th Divi-
vencheres-sur-Fave. Provencheres fell sion, its rifle companies averaging only
on the 24th under the combined pres- two-thirds of their authorized strength,
sure of TF Haines, the 409th Infantry made the transition slowly from its un-
regiment, and units of the 3d Division finished DOGFACE role into the mid-
coming up along Route N-420. Like November offensive. During the
both the 3d and 100th, the 103d Divi- period 10-19 November the division
sion passed many unmanned German pressed east and southeast, at the same
defensive works and abandoned time taking over 103d Division posi-
stockpiles of military supplies. To the tions west of the Meurthe. By the
south the 411th Infantry forced a evening of 19 November, in the face of
crossing of the eastern section of the intermittent and rather weak resist-
Meurthe near Saulcy-sur-Meurthe on ance, the 36th Division’s left had finally
the 22d against heavy small-arms and reached its DOGFACEobjective, the
machine-gun fire and pushed north high ground west of the Meurthe in the
up N-59 toward St. Die. vicinity of St. Leonard, about five miles
In accordance with new VI Corps south of St. Die. The division had also
orders on the 23d,19the 103d Division gained high, forested terrain overlook-
now advanced in a more easterly direc- ing Anould, located on the flooding
tion toward Ville, a road junction town Meurthe two miles farther south. On
deep in the mountains about ten miles the far right (southeast), 36th Division
east of Saales. The division’s ultimate troops were already within a mile or
objective was Barr, on the Alsatian two of destroyed Gerardmer by 19 No-
plains eight miles northeast of Ville vember, and elements of the 3d Algeri-
and an equal distance south of Mutzig an Division of the II French Corps en-
in the 3d Division’s zone. Heavily tered the town that day.20
mined roads, well-defended road- So far the 36th Division, in the area

18TF Haines was built around the 2d Battalion, 20With its left held largely by weak FFI units and
409th Infantry, commanded by Maj. Lloyd L. dangerously extended northward, the 3d Algerian
Haines. Division could make little progress beyond Ger-
19VI Corps OI 14, 23 Nov 44. ardmer during the rest of November.
TO THE PLAINS OF ALSACE 403

from St. Leonard south about ten to the city of Selestat on the Alsatian
miles to Gerardmer, had been facing plains between Colmar and Stras-
mainly the 198th Division of the IV bourg. Brooks also instructed Dahl-
Luftwaffe Field Corps. During the night quist, the division commander, to
of 17-18 November, however, the launch a secondary effort along the
198th began to pull out of its lines for axis of Route N-415 through Le Bon-
redeployment to the Belfort Gap homme Pass, about five miles east of
front. The movement was beset by Fraize, leading directly to Colmar.
confusion. To cover the withdrawal, The new tasks were onerous for the
the Nineteenth Army directed the weak tired unit. Nevertheless, by 20 No-
16th Volksgrmadier Division to take over vember the 36th Division had already
the 198th's positions in the Anould- moved in strength up to the west
Fraize area, an almost impossible task bank of the Meurthe, and it began
considering the strength of the 16th. crossing the river the next day be-
Although the Nineteenth Army had also tween St. Leonard and Clefcy. Oppo-
instructed the departing 198th to sition came mainly from German artil-
leave a rear guard south of St. Leon- lery and mortar fire, while sodden
ard, apparently the orders were ig- ground, overflowing streams, and
nored. Meanwhile, instead of moving heavily mined areas also slowed
up to the Meurthe River, most of the progress. Gains on the 21st included
arriving 16th Volksgrenadier troops the seizure of Anould and possession
began to occupy the Vosges Ridge Posi- of a large section of Route N-415,
tion, six to ten miles east of the river. which had been the main interior
The 36th Division's boundaries and communication line of the German
missions had also changed. When defenders. But as the 36th Division
Brooks decided to have the 103d Di- moved east, its main effort evolved
vision cross the Meurthe north of St. into a battle for control of N-59, the
Die over the bridges of the 3d Divi- road to the Ste. Marie Pass.
sion, he moved the boundary between From St. Die to the vicinity of Ban-
the 103d and 36th Divisions north- de-Laveline, a distance of about six
ward over three miles. Shortly there- miles, Route N-59 ran along an open
after, Brooks made the 36th Division valley, but soon thereafter it began
part of his pursuit and directed it to twisting steeply upward through heav-
drive east and northeast across its ex- ily wooded hills. Here the road, a
tended front abreast of the remainder major highway to the north between
of the VI Corps. Its intermediate ob- Luneville and St. Die, shrank to little
jective was Ste. Marie-aux-Mines, on more than a minor mountain byway,
Route N-59 about twelve miles easily interdicted and, as the terrain
(straight-line distance) east of St. Die became steeper, increasingly difficult
and two miles east of the Ste. Marie to bypass. German defenses in the
Pass.21 From the pass, the division 36th Division's sector were the best
was to continue eastward twelve miles organized and most complete in VI
Corps' zone, probably reflecting the
21VI Corps OI 1 1 , 20 Nov 44; VI Corps OI 13, work of the veteran and well-led
22 Nov 44. 198th Division, which did much of the
404 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

GERMAN ASSAULT GUNKNOCKED OF 36TH DIVISION.


OUTBY 76-MM. M4 TANK Ste.
Croix-am-Mines area.

groundwork in the area. Although the Marie-aux-Mines fell to the division


16th Division, now responsible for the on the 25th; on the 26th the 36th Di-
defense of the region, was unable to vision pushed three miles farther on
man all the roadblocks and other de- N-59 to Ste. Croix-aux-Mines, seven
fensive works, it held on to many of miles short of the Alsatian plains near
the prepared positions tenaciously. Selestat. Now, like the rest of VI
German resistance on 22 and 23 Corps, the 36th Division was about to
November temporarily held the 36th receive new orders changing its mis-
Division in check along the Meurthe, sions and objectives.22
but on the 24th the pace picked up as Although the American VI Corps
the defensive effort weakened. In the attack had finally suceeded in break-
south, 36th Division troops seized ing through the High Vosges, the of-
Fraize and reached out to within a fensive had begun in a somewhat con-
mile of Le Bonhomme Pass; to the fused and uncoordinated manner.
north, other units cleared Wisembach Perhaps overestimating the German
on Route N-59 about two miles east linear defenses along the Meurthe
of Ban-de-Laveline. Although German River, Brooks had initially tried to
resistance stalled progress in Le Bon-
homme Pass area for two days, Ste. 22VI Corps OI 17, 26 Nov 44
TO THE PLAINS OF ALSACE 405

outflank them instead of penetrating forces as far as he could before out-


through the scattered German strong- running his supply lines or becoming
points as Haislip had done. Certainly mired in the difficult terrain and
the 100th Division’s determined ac- weather. Thus his orders gave a sense
tions around Raon-l’Etape sapped the of immediacy to the entire advance
strength of German defenders and and allowed the German defenders of
shook the entire defensive line loose. the 708th, 716th, and 16th Divisions
Given the initial weakness of the little opportunity to man the Vosges
German line, however, both the 3d Ridge Position.
and 103d Divisions probably could With Strasbourg taken by the XV
have crossed the Meurthe earlier than Corps, Brooks found himself shifting
the 20th, thereby threatening the the direction of his attack from the
German forces that held up the 100th northeast to the east. He sent the
in the Plaine River valley and starting 103d Division to Selestat and the
the drive east almost immediately. Of 36th toward Colmar and, on Patch’s
course, the full-scale offensives in the orders, redeployed the 100th Divi-
Belfort and Saverne Gap areas also sion, on the VI Corps’ northern wing,
helped the VI Corps’ drive, making it to the XV Corps. In this final effort,
impossible for the Germans to throw the VI Corps’ advance was less fo-
in reinforcements this time around. cused and more opportunistic; its suc-
Brooks’ decision to begin the pur- cess would depend greatly on the
suit early in the offensive was correct, ability of the French to make com-
but his forces were probably unpre- mensurate progress toward Colmar
pared to make the transition on such from the south. Before his forces
short notice; and many, like the 14th could advance farther in this new di-
Armored Division, were too inexperi- rection, however, Brooks would need
enced. Nevertheless, like Haislip and additional instructions from his supe-
Truscott before him, Brooks had seen riors, Patch and Devers, regarding the
some daylight and wanted to push his ultimate destination of the VI Corps.
CHAPTER XXIII

Through the Belfort Gap


The first Allied troops to arrive at boundary again turned northeast
the Rhine River in the 6th Army across the Vosges and continued to Er-
Group’s sector of the western front stein, about twelve miles south of
were French, and the signal honor of Strasbourg, and then crossed the
reaching the Rhine first belonged to a Rhine to Offenburg. As the First
detachment of the French 1st Armored French Army’s southern boundary re-
Division, a component of Bethouart’s mained fixed on the irregular but
long-quiescent I Corps. This patrol stable east-west Swiss border, every
reached the Rhine on 19 November at northeastern advance of the northern
Rosenau, some thirty miles east of Bel- boundary would obviously enlarge the
fort and about seventy miles south of army’s frontage as it moved east.
Strasbourg. Thus, even as Haislip pre- In early November de Lattre had
pared to unloose Leclerc’s 2d Armored both of his corps on line with two in-
Division against Saverne and as Brooks fantry divisions apiece and had with-
maneuvered his forces for the crossing drawn his two armored divisions for
of the Meurthe, de Lattre’s French rest and refitting. On the First French
forces had already completed the first Army’s left, de Monsabert’s II Corps
stage of their long-awaited Belfort pen- faced the steep mountains and narrow
etration. passes of the High Vosges, while on
the right Bethouart’s I Corps stood
The First French Army’s Front poised before the long-prepared
German defenses of the Belfort Gap.
While the First French Army began The intercorps boundary led east
to deploy for the November offensive, from the vicinity of Lure, passed
the width of its front had continued to south of Champagney (twenty-five
grow as Devers moved its boundary miles south of Gerardmer), and
with the U.S. Seventh Army northward. stretched east again to Valdoie, just
In mid-November de Lattre’s northern three miles north of Belfort. De
boundary thus followed the trace of Lattre tentatively intended to extend
Route N–417from Remiremont on the the intercorps boundary east and
Moselle northeast to Le Tholy and northeast to Mulhouse, on the Alsa-
then east to Gerardmer deep in the tian plains twenty-five miles south of
Vosges (Map 29). From there, the Colmar.
408 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

The French II Corps had on line, fantry), and a host of lesser units. De
from north to south, the 3d Algerian Lattre also gave I Corps first priority
Infantry Division and the 1st Infantry for units in the First French Army’s
Division, both reinforced by a few general reserve, which would be made
regular and FFI units. 1 The 3d Algeri- available to the two corps as the situa-
an Division held the corps front from tion dictated. 4
the vicinity of Le Tholy southeast Fire support for the French offen-
about ten miles to Cornimont. The sive would have an American flavor.
1st Infantry Division extended the In the I Corps, the artillery was com-
front south almost twenty miles far- manded by Brig. Gen. Carl C. Banks,
ther to Ronchamp, just west of Cham- USA, who was also in charge of the
pagney. U.S. Army’s 13th Field Artillery Bri-
Below these units, the I Corps had gade. For the Belfort offensive, the
on its left a provisional force, Group brigade (exclusive of French units)
Molle,2 holding a front that ran south consisted of the 1st Field Artillery
about seven miles from Ronchamp. Observation Battalion; the 36th Field
On Group Molle’s right was the 2d Artillery Group; and the 575th,
Moroccan Infantry Division, covering 630th, 697th, and 933d Field Artillery
a sector that stretched south ten miles Battalions. In addition, the U.S.
to the Doubs River. South of the Army’s 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion
Doubs, the 9th Colonial Infantry Divi- (4.2-inch) was in direct support of the
sion’s lines ran southeast and then 9th Colonial Division.
east to the Swiss border at Villars, In general, the First French Army’s
eighteen miles south of Belfort. Both forces were rested and in fairly good
divisions had more or less permanent condition for the November offensive.
FFI and regular attachments, while T h e only major exception was the 3d
for the offensive de Lattre intended Algerian Division, which had not been
to reinforce the I Corps with the 5th out of the front lines since it first
Armored Division, CC2 of the 1st Ar- began moving against Toulon and
mored Division, a regimental combat Marseille on 20 August. Although the
team of the 4th Moroccan Mountain division had undertaken n o substan-
Division, 3 two separate tank destroyer tial offensive operations since the first
battalions, the 9th Zouaves (light in- week of November, it had continued
aggressive patrolling in order to focus
1 Since all units discussed in the chapter are German attention on the High
French, the national indicators are generally not Vosges. There its units had been op-
used. In addition, attachments and detachments of
reinforcing units within both French corps changed
erating in the most rugged terrain
frequently, and no attempt is made to follow these
changes in detail.
2 Group Molle was a provisional brigade consist- 4 Both French armored divisions in de Lattre’s
ing largely of FFI units plus a few regular reinforce- command had three brigade-sized combat com-
ments, such as a reconnaissance squadron, a towed mands: CCl, 2, and 3 in the 1st Armored Division;
antitank gun company, and some artillery and mor- and CC4, 5, and 6 in the 5th Armored Division. Ad-
tars. ditional information on force structure can be found
3 The 4th Moroccan Mountain Division was being in First Fr Army Personal and Secret Instr 4, 24 Oct
replaced in the Franco-Italian border area by the 44; and First Fr Army Genl Opns Order 148, 11
newly formed French 27th Alpine Division. Nov 44.
THROUGH THE BELFORT GAP 409

and during the worst weather on the Cap. In static defensive positions
entire French front. The 1st Infantry behind this corps, Fortress Brigade Bel-
Division, by contrast, had seen fort held the city of Belfort and the
relatively little action since late Sep- old stone and masonry forts that en-
tember and, adopting a generally de- circled it. East of these organizations,
fensive attitude, had spent most of provisional Corps Dehner controlled
October absorbing indigenous re- other provisional units along the
placements for its black troops. The Swiss border and temporarily served
2d Moroccan Division had likewise as a reserve headquarters.
engaged in mainly defensive action On 7 November Army Group G
since taking over its sector north of learned that LXXXV Corps headquar-
the Doubs River in early October, as ters was to be transferred to Army
had the 9th Colonial Division south Group B, and on the 14th Corps Dehner
of the Doubs. The 1st Armored Divi- took over the tactical command in the
sion had not been in heavy combat Belfort sector. Having only a skeletal
since mid-October and had come out staff and lacking the normal corps
of the line on the 25th of that month. support units, Corps Dehner was ill pre-
The 5th Armored Division was fresh pared for its expanded role. Officially
but untried. Finally, all units were given the title of corps on 15 Novem-
fully equipped and had devoted sub- ber, the organization became LXIII
stantial time to training and building Corps on the 18th, and its former se-
up their supply stocks. Although the curity mission along the Swiss border
weather conditions had somewhat went to an ad hoc organization desig-
dampened the spirits of the French nated Staff Boineburg. The entire com-
troops for the coming offensive, most mand change could hardly have come
were confident that they would soon at a worse time for the German de-
overcome the best the Germans had fenders.
to offer in the Belfort Gap and the Whatever the deficiencies of the
southern Vosges. corps-level commands, the Nineteenth
Army could rely on several fairly good
Defending the Gap divisions in the Belfort area. On the
north, holding a sector extending
From Le Tholy south about fifteen some five miles south from Le Tholy,
miles to Le Thillot, the left wing of the left of the 198th Division faced
the Nineteenth Army ’s IV Luftwaffe Field part of the 3d Algerian Division. Un-
Corps confronted the left of de Monsa- derstrength but consisting largely of
bert’s II Corps.5 South and southeast battle-tested veterans, the 198th could
about thirty-five miles from Le Thillot be depended on to hold its ground.
to the Swiss border, LXXXV Corps was The rest of the IV Luftwaffe Field Corps
responsible for holding the approach- zone was held by the relatively strong
es to Belfort and blocking the Belfort and fresh 269th VolksgrenadierDivision,
which had recently arrived from
Norway.
5German information in this chapter is based on From the corps’ boundary at Le
von Luttichau, “German Operations,” chs. 22, 23,
and 25. Thillot south about fifteen miles to
410 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

Route N-19—the main east-west quate for defensive purposes.


highway through Belfort—the 159th From a point a mile or so south of
Division held good defensive terrain Hericourt, the 338th Infantry Division
with three rebuilt regiments that had extended the German front south and
felt little pressure since late Septem- southeast over fifteen miles to the
ber. The division, with a southern Swiss border. T h e 338th, facing the
boundary that corresponded roughly right of the 2d Moroccan Division and
to the First French Army's intercorps all of the 9th Colonial Division, was
boundary, faced most of the French the weakest link in the German line.
1st Infantry Division. Two regiments Pulled out of the High Vosges toward
of the 259th were almost up to the end of October, the division had
strength, and the weaker third regi- brought south just two ad hoc infantry
ment was made up of fortress and regiments, both of which were suita-
Wehrkreis V troops. The division had ble only for static defensive missions.6
less than half of its authorized artil- The division was also short of artil-
lery, and its antitank battalion was lery and devoid of reserves, deploying
considerably unders trength. all of its existing infantry on its egg-
From Route N–19 south about ten shell-thin front line. In brief, the Ger-
miles stood the 289th Division, facing mans had inadvertently placed their
Group Molle and much of the 2d Mo- weakest division along what was to be
roccan Division. T h e 189th was also the focal point of the French attack.
responsible for the defense of Heri- Situated slightly to the rear of the
court, a key highway junction and 189th was Fortress Brigade Belfort, with
railroad town about six miles south- two fortress artillery battalions and
west of Belfort. The division was truly several fortress machine-gun compa-
an ersatz unit. T h e division headquar- nies. Necessity had forced the brigade
ters had formerly belonged to the to transfer some of its artillery to the
242d Infantry Division, most of which infantry divisions, while a number of
had been destroyed in southern its remaining guns were captured
France during August. One infantry French and Russian pieces for which
regiment was built on a former police little ammunition was available. T h e
security regiment, and a second on a brigade had recently received thirty
Luftwaffe infantry training regiment; new 88-mm. antitank weapons of
the third had been pieced together German manufacture, but most of
from stragglers and miscellaneous them had arrived lacking vital parts,
small units rounded up in the Belfort such as sights.
area. The division lacked reconnais- As a tactical reserve, the LXIII
sance and engineer battalions, was Corps 7 stationed two understrength
short of both artillery and ammuni- infantry battalions at Belfort, while an
tion, was weak in antitank weaponry, understrength infantry battalion of
and had scant reserves. Nevertheless,
the 189th had had time-since late 6The division's 757th Grenadaers remained at-
September-to weld its disparate tached to the 716th Division in the St. Die area.
7 Although the designation LXIII Corps was not
components together, and the Nine- adopted until 18 November, this title will be used
teenth Army rated the division as ade- throughout the chapter to avoid confusion.
THROUGH THE BELFORT GAP 411

the 189th Division was also earmarked would sooner or later resume their
for a reserve role. However, as was advance across the High Vosges,
the case elsewhere along the Nine- aiming for Colmar on the Alsatian
teenth Army’s front, there were no true plains. Once this had been accom-
reserves. All of the armored units that plished, the Army Group G commander
had once been scheduled for the Bel- thought that the French would then
fort Gap had been diverted either to swing back south to open the Belfort
the First Army or to the Nineteenth Gap by attacking from the rear. Any
Army’s northern front. In an emergen- French pressure toward the Belfort
cy at the Belfort Gap, General Wiese Gap from the west, he believed, was
could call only on the NCO training only an effort to divert Army Group G’s
center at Colmar—some 1,500 troops attention away from a major threat
in all, counting students, faculty, and across the Vosges. For this reason
staff. A more remote possibility was Balck insisted that Wiese keep two of
the 30th SS Grenadier Division, a unit of the Nineteenth Army’s best divisions,
conscripted Russian nationals sta- the 198th Infantry and the 269th Volks-
tioned near Mulhouse who were wait- grenadier, in the High Vosges, occupy-
ing for transportation east across the ing the excellent mountain defensive
Rhine. Following a mutiny in Septem- terrain opposite the French II Corps;
ber, the division had been reorga- meanwhile, the relatively flat area
nized, but was still considered unreli- south of Belfort, a region much more
able. Nevertheless, the unit now had a difficult to defend, was left in the
substantial German cadre (one Ger- hands of the ailing 338th Division.
man to three Russians) and might De Monsabert’s diversionary attack
have some defensive possibilities. of 3–5 November in support of VI
Outside of these forces, however, the Corps’ DOGFACE offensive created a
Nineteenth Army had no other reserves stir at Army Group G headquarters and
from Colmar south to the Swiss undoubtedly confirmed Balck’s esti-
border. mate of French intentions. Mean-
The weaknesses of the German while, de Lattre initiated an elaborate
forces in the Belfort Gap sector re- deception program that also focused
flected a fundamental difference of Army Group G’s attention on the
opinion between General Balck of Vosges. Carefully prepared false or
Army Group G and General Wiese of misleading orders found their way
Nineteenth A m y regarding the inten- into German hands; 8 troop move-
tions and capabilities of the French. ments that never took place were
After de Lattre had halted the at- brought to the attention of the Ger-
tempt by de Monsabert’s II Corps to mans; and fake command posts for I
outflank Belfort on the north in Octo- Corps units were established in the II
ber, Wiese decided that the French Corps sector. Then, as 13 November
would ultimately switch their main
effort to a drive through the Belfort 8First Fr Army Personal and Secret Instr 3-A, 20
Gap itself in order to take advantage Oct 44; First Fr Army Orientation Directive 4, 1
Nov 44; First Fr Army Orientation Directive 5 , 4
of better terrain. Balck, on the other Nov 44. See also de Lattre, History, pp. 217–18 and
hand, was convinced that the French 225.
412 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

approached, all attack units of Beth- from the south. Failing that, the divi-
ouart’s I Corps began moving up to sion was to encompass Belfort on the
their lines of departure under cover north and south, attacking the metro-
of darkness; poor weather, although politan area and the surrounding
creating some problems for the forts from the rear. Initial reinforce-
French, further concealed the assem- ments for the 2d Moroccan Division
bly of attacking forces. included two combat commands of
the 5th Armored Division, CC4 and
French Plans CC5, and four or five FFI infantry
battalions.
T h e role of de Monsabert’s II Below the Doubs River, the 9th Co-
Corps in the November offensive was lonial Infantry Division was to drive
at first limited to maintaining an atti- generally northeast, its left flank on
tude that was aggressive enough to the Doubs and its right on the Swiss
keep the Germans worried about the border. Continuing across a north-
Vosges front. 9 Depending on avail- south stretch of the Doubs (which
able strength and on developments in makes a great loop near Montbe-
the I Corps sector, the II Corps was liard), the division would press north-
ultimately to drive across the Vosges eastward to the general line of the Al-
along the axis of Route N-66 and the laine River between Morvillars and
Bussang Pass in order to join I Corps Delle, on the Swiss border. T h e 9th
forces in the vicinity of Mulhouse. On Colonial Division’s reinforcements in-
the I Corps’ left side, Group Molle cluded CC2 of the 1st Armored Divi-
was to maintain contact with the II sion, the 6th Moroccan Tirailleurs (a
Corps and seize the dam at the regimental combat team) of the 4th
Champagney reservoir, about three Moroccan Mountain Division, the 9th
miles southeast of Champagney, to Zouaves, a tank destroyer battalion,
prevent the Germans from flooding and four FFI infantry battalions. Both
the Lisaine River valley between Heri- the main and secondary attacks were
court and Montbeliard. to begin simultaneously on 13 No-
South of Group Molle, the 2d Mo- vember.
roccan Infantry Division was to
launch the I Corps’ main effort, first The I Corps Assault
driving eastward north of the Doubs
to the Lisaine valley, and then seizing During the night of 9–10 November
Belfort city with the surprise attack I Corps’ leading attack units began
moving up to their lines of departure
9Information on French plans and operations in for the assault on the 13th. T h e
the rest of this chapter is based mainly on de Lattre, weather had been rainy and overcast
History, pp. 224–82; Historique de la Neuuieme Division
d’lnfanterie Coloniale, pp. 51-59; La Premiere Division
for several days, and on the 9th con-
Blindee au Combat, pp. 87-97; Service Historique de tinued heavy rains increased the
l’Armee, Guerre 1939–1945, Les Grandes Unites Fran- flooding along the Daubs and its trib-
caises, Historiques Succincts, Campagnes de France et d’Al- utaries. During the next few days,
lemagne, (1944–1945), 3e Partie (Paris: Imprimerie
Nationale, 1976), pp. 541–92 (hereafter cited as His- problems caused by inclement wealth-
toriques Succincts) . er mounted. Many of the corps’ tem-
THROUGH THE BELFORT GAP 413

porary bridges were washed out or plete lack of visibility forced the
seriously damaged; lesser roads French to cancel the attack. The next
became impassable for wheeled or morning, 14 November, low, dark
even tracked vehicles; wire communi- clouds continued to cover much of
cations failed; radio transmissions the sector, but some clearing took
were sporadic; and low visibility made place north of the Doubs. After an-
the registration of artillery fire almost other quick change of plans, de Lattre
impossible. On the 11th, General and Bethouart ordered the offensive
Bethouart, the I Corps commander, to begin, with the 2d Moroccan Divi-
suggested postponing the attack until sion attacking at 1200 behind a two-
the weather improved. At first d e hour artillery preparation, and the left
Lattre refused to countenance any wing of the 9th Colonial Division
delay, but approved some changes, joining in at 1400. Elsewhere on the
agreeing with Bethouart’s proposal to 9th Colonial front, fog, sodden ter-
have the 9th Colonial Division lead rain, and additional snowfall held the
off the attack. Since the so-called co- division in place.
lonial division was now made up As the French were preparing their
mostly of younger troops from metro- attack, Maj. Gen. Friederich-August
politan France, the French generals Schack, the newly appointed com-
thought that these soldiers might be mander of the defending LXIII Corps,
better able to contend with the mud, decided to take a personal look at his
rain, snow, and increasingly cold unfamiliar front. Schack drove to an
weather than the men of the 2d Mo- observation post near Bretigney, on
roccan Division. Accordingly, the gen- the north side of the Doubs River
erals moved the date of the 9th Colo- about eight miles west of Montbe-
nial Division’s attack up to the 13th liard, and on the way picked up Maj.
and pushed that of the 2d Moroccan Gen. Hans Oschmann, commanding
Division back to the 14th. De Lattre the 338th Infantry Division. Suddenly
also instructed Bethouart to move his French artillery began a devastating
armor forward on the 14th, somewhat barrage that immobilized the observa-
earlier than planned, so as to be tion party-the two generals, each
ready to exploit any success the two with an aide; it was over two hours
infantry divisions might achieve. Fi- before the small group could start
nally, the French army commander di- groping eastward through woods that
rected de Monsabert’s II Corps to artillery fire had turned into a sham-
launch diversionary attacks in the bles. Running into small groups of
Champagney area on 13 and 14 No- Moroccan infantrymen, Oschmann
vember. was killed and the two aides captured,
For both sides, dawn of 13 Novem- but Schack somehow made his way
ber revealed what de Lattre later past the Moroccans and reached his
described as a “Scandinavian land- command post at Belfort before dark.
scape.” 10 Heavy snow had been fall- In the midst of the melee in the
ing for hours, and the almost com- woods, a detailed map of the 338th
Division’s dispositions fell into French
10De Lattre, History, p. 228. hands, along with notes revealing that
414 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

Oschmann, far from expecting a as his own reserve, while allowing the
major attack, had concluded that the 9th Colonial Division to retain CC2
French across his front were digging and the 2d Moroccan Division to keep
in for the winter. For the 338th Divi- CC4 and CC5. If the armored units
sion, the attack of the 2d Moroccan advanced ahead of the infantry, they
Division had thus come as a complete could begin operating independently
surprise, and the response of the de- under the control of the armored di-
fenders was further hampered by the vision headquarters.
absence of both the corps and divi- Despite French advances, no alarm
sion commanders during the early bells rang on 14 November at Army
stages of the attack. To make matters Group G, where Balck continued to
worse, the French artillery fire had regard all activities on the Belfort
also disrupted German wire commu- front as a ploy to divert attention
nications, making it impossible for the from the Vosges. More concerned
LXIII Corps’ staff to obtain an accurate with the situation on the Nineteenth
picture of the situation at the front. A m y ’ s northern front and with the
During the first day of the attack, First Army’s sector, A m y Group G had
14 November, the left wing of the 2d ‘ even begun preparations to move the
Moroccan Division gained little 338th Division north by rail during the
ground against the relatively strong night of 14–15 November. T h e result
189th Division, but in the center and was a tug of war that evening between
on the right the Moroccans broke A m y Group G and the Nineteenth Army.
through 338th Division positions While Balck was directing the Nine-
across a front of nearly six miles and teenth Army to pull the 338th Division
advanced over two miles into the out of the Belfort lines, Wiese, the
German lines. With its attack delayed Nineteenth Army commander, was in-
until 1400, the 9th Colonial Division structing the LXIV Corps to disengage
found 338th Division units south of the division’s missing regiment from
the Doubs on the alert, yet pushed the St. Die area and speed the unit
forward on the left a mile and a half south to the Belfort front. At the
across a three-mile front. same time, Wiese ordered the IV
French armor played only a minor Luftwaffe Field Corps to move two field
role in the early gains, but de Lattre, artillery battalions (one of them or-
hoping for a breakthrough on the ganic to the 338th Division) south to
15th, immediately released the head- Belfort, along with two light antiair-
quarters and CC3 of the 1st Armored craft battalions. Pending the arrival of
Division to the I Corps, leaving only these units, General Schack of LXIII
the division’s CCl as the First French Corps committed his three reserve in-
Army’s main reserve (as well as the fantry battalions in the 338th Divi-
only element of the division immedi- sion’s sector early on the 15th.
ately redeployable to the Atlantic Schack’s reinforcements had little
coast). General Bethouart, the I immediate impact. On 15 November
Corps commander, intended to retain the center and right of the 2d Moroc-
both the 1st Armored Division’s CC3 can Division gained another three
and the 5th Armored Division’s CC6 miles in the 338th Division’s sector; to
THROUGH THE BELFORT GAP 415

the south, the 9th Colonial Division telephone and teletype lines of the
overran some of the 338th Division’s German-controlled French civil com-
strongest positions and seized a munications system.
number of important road junctions. During the course of 16 November,
By dark the 338th Division’s front was General de Lattre released CCl of
thus completely disorganized, and the 1st Armored Division from army
General Wiese directed the LXIII reserve. This move came as some-
Corps to pull the division back a mile thing of a surprise to General du
or two in an attempt to stabilize it Vigier, who commanded the armored
along a new line. Then-and only division, for he had been prepared to
then-did Wiese seek permission start C C l toward the Atlantic coast
from Army Group G to execute the on the 18th, with the rest of the divi-
withdrawal. Lacking accurate informa- sion following on the 21st. O n the
tion regarding the situation on the 17th, however, de Lattre officially
Belfort front, however, Balck contin- halted further deployments for INDE-
ued to call for the complete disen- PENDENCE and told du Vigier that de-
gagement of the 338th from the partures for the Atlantic coast would
south, leaving Wiese with little choice be postponed a minimum of four
except to procrastinate, thereby creat- days. 11
ing a temporary stalemate over the De Lattre’s action must have had at
matter. least the tacit approval of General
On 16 November French armor, Devers, who was having increasing
previously slowed by mud, disinte- doubts about removing any major
grating roads, and extensive mine- units from the First French Army at
fields, began to play a more decisive such a crucial point in the Belfort
role. With their left flank along Route Gap offensive. On the 16th Devers
N–83, the Hericourt-Belfort highway, told Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick E. Mor-
elements of the 5th Armored Division gan, the SHAEF Deputy Chief of
and the 2d Moroccan Division Staff, who was visiting the 6th Army
reached a point scarcely a mile short Group command post, that no French
of Hericourt and the Lisaine River. units would be withdrawn from the
T o the south and along the Doubs, Vosges and Belfort fronts as long as
the Moroccans and attached armor they continued their current drive; he
advanced another two miles to the believed that Morgan agreed with his
east and northeast. Even farther south position.12 Thus, for at least a few
the 9th Colonial Division’s attack fi- more days, Bethouart’s attacking
nally gathered momentum, with the
support of the 1st Armored Division’s 11De Lattre, History, p. 221; 1st Fr Armd Div Jnl
CC3, and advanced up to three miles. de Marche, 15–16 Nov 44; La Premiere Division Blindee
au Combat, pp. 90-91; First Fr Army Warning Order
On the far right, close by the Swiss 156, 16 Nov 44; Msg, 72/OP/3.8, First Fr Army to I
border, French troops reached the vi- Fr Corps et al., 17 Nov 44. Initially, de Lattre in-
cinity of Glay, seizing more road junc- tended to use CCI in the II Corps sector, but he re-
tion towns and further disrupting turned the command to 1st Armored Division con-
trol on 19 November; Historigues Succincts, 2e Partie,
local German tactical communica- pp. 883–89.
tions, which depended heavily on the 12Devers Diary, 16 Nov 44.
416 RIVIERA TO.THE RHINE

corps could look forward to employ- not his to make, and Balck’s orders
ing two full armored divisions against made the German situation in the
the weakening German forces on the south even more precarious.
Belfort front. Finally, during the evening of 16
On the other side, the German November, Balck gave Wiese permis-
commanders had been unable to re- sion to undertake a limited withdraw-
solve their differences. All day long al. T h e LXIII Corps was to pull
on the 16th, Wiese continued to back to the Lisaine River, between
argue with Army Group G over the re- Hericourt and Montbeliard, and the
deployment of the 338th Division, southern elements of General
which by dark was becoming so disor- Schack’s 338th Division were to make a
ganized that its disengagement would parallel withdrawal between Montbe-
have been extremely difficult. By that liard and the Swiss border. But
time even OKW was becoming per- Wiese, acting on his own, had already
turbed about the situation and in- approved a similar withdrawal on the
formed OB West that a French break- previous evening, so Balck’s new di-
through at the Belfort Gap had to be rections had little bearing on the situ-
prevented at all costs; OB West quickly ation around Belfort.
relayed these instructions to Army
Group G. About 2000 on the 16th, Breakthrough
General Balck, now under pressure
from his superiors to reevaluate the On 17 November the German front
entire situation, decided to leave the began to fall apart. The 2d Moroccan
338th Division in place and to send in- Division and its armored attachments
stead the much better 198th Division overran 189th and 338th Division posi-
of the IV Luftwaffe Field Corps to the tions and pushed bridgeheads across
First Army. At the same time Balck di- the Lisaine River between Luze, Heri-
rected that the shattered 16th Volks- court, and Montbeliard. To the south,
grenadier Division and the weak 716th the center of the 9th Colonial Division
Division, both still deployed in the St. pushed east about five miles to Heri-
Die area, be moved south to replace moncourt. Its left wing joined the Mo-
the 198th Division in the southern roccans at Montbeliard, and its right
Vosges. wing, led by CC2, reached out to Abbe-
After absorbing these orders, Gen- villers, three miles northeast of Glay,
eral Wiese of Nineteenth Army must encountering only spotty resistance.
have felt that he had won a battle but Sensing an imminent breakthrough,
lost a campaign. He had intended to General Bethouart issued new orders,
redeploy the 198th Division to the Bel- which de Lattre tentatively approved.
fort Gap and the 16th Volksgrenadier Du Vigier’s 1st Armored Division (re-
Division to his northern flank, leaving inforced)13was to assemble in the Ab-
only the 716th Division in the St. Die
area. In retrospect, he probably 13At this juncture the reinforcements included the
would have been content to lose the 6th Moroccan Tirailleurs (a regimental combat team
of the 4th Moroccan Mountain Division), the 9th
338th, if he could have retained the Zouaves, the separate tank destroyer battalion, and
198th. The decisions, however, were a nondivisional reconnaissance squadron.
THROUGH THE BELFORT GAP 417

bevillers-Herimoncourt area in order 17 November General Balck decided


to strike east between the Rhone- to leave the 198th under Wiese’s con-
Rhine Canal and the Swiss border. trol, but specified that he move the
His main effort was to take place on division to the Nineteenth Army’s north-
the left with the first objective being ern flank, where the attack against
Morvillars, seven miles northeast of Sarrebourg by Haislip’s XV Corps
Montbeliard and close to the south was beginning to have an effect. For
bank of the canal. Then du Vigier was the moment Balck approved the
to push on to Dannemarie, a rail and transferal of only one regimental
road center along Route N-19 on the combat team of the 269th Volkspena-
south side of the canal about twelve dier Division south, from the IV
miles east of Belfort. Behind the 1st Luftwaffe Field Corps’ Vosges front to
Armored Division the 9th Colonial the Belfort area. That evening, prob-
Division was to mop up, secure the ably because of pressure from OKW
armored division’s left flank, and and OB West, Balck finally decided
seize bridgeheads along the Rhone- that the French operations around
Rhine Canal between Montbeliard Belfort were more significant than he
and Morvillars. had first believed, and he approved
In part, the bridgehead mission was the movement of the 198th Division,
designed to support attacks against along with the regiment of the 269th
Belfort by the 2d Moroccan Division Volksgrenadiers, to the Belfort Gap.
and the attached combat commands About the same time he also gave
of the 5th Armored Division. Howev- Wiese permission to pull the LXIII
er, indications are that de Lattre and Corps back to the Weststellung-actual-
Bethouart felt that Belfort could be ly, a southeastern extension of the
secured in a few days primarily by in- Vosges Ridge Position- from Hericourt
fantry forces and that the combat southeast to the Swiss border.
commands of the 5th Armored Divi- Once again the German reaction
sion could be returned to division come too late to affect the situation
control by noon on 19 November. on the ground. The withdrawal, which
Then, de Lattre envisaged, the entire concerned primarily the 338th Divi-
armored division could begin an ex- sion, began after midnight, and dawn
ploitation along the general axis of on 18 November found 338th troops
Route N–83 from Belfort northeast to still retreating east. To avoid French
Cernay and ultimately to Colmar. T o roadblocks and to take advantage of
accomplish this, the division was first the best roads, most of the units
to move south and then east, crossing south of the Rhone-Rhine Canal with-
the Rhone-Rhine Canal at or near drew through Morvillars with the
Morvillars and continuing north to N- intent of reforming along the Allaine
83, bypassing all of the urban Belfort River and Route N-19A. There the
region on the east. northern trace of the Swiss border
Meanwhile, a new struggle between would greatly reduce the frontage
Army Group G and the Nineteenth Army that the survivors of the 338th would
had developed over the deployment have to hold. However, the withdraw-
of the 198th Division. About noon on al plans required the division first to
418 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

FRENCHLIGHTTANKS
AT HUNINGUE

reassemble in the Allaine River valley armored force seized a bridge over
and then to move into the Weststellung the Allaine; meanwhile, closer to the
positions, many of which were little Swiss border, other armored units
more than symbols on a map. probed eastward four miles beyond
Again the French gave the Germans Delle to Courtelevant without en-
no respite. Long before the German countering significant opposition.
redeployments could be completed, This last advance took place along
units of the 1st Armored Division had Route N-463, a good highway that
penetrated the Weststellung positions led toward the Rhine, less than
from Morvillars southeast to Delle, twenty-five miles away.
having encountered mainly service The French advance continued the
troops and security detachments. next day, 19 November, but with little
Only in the Morvillars area did the success on the left wing where the
338th Division successfully defend a Germans held on to part of Morvil-
Weststellung location, but French lars. There CC2 of the 1st Armored
armor broke into the Allaine valley Division and elements of the 9th Co-
well south of Morvillars and pushed lonial Division were unable to secure
north across the river for about three any crossings over the Rhone-Rhine
miles. At Delle, two miles beyond the Canal and, in the face of stiffening
Weststellung southern anchor, another opposition, made scant progress
THROUGH THE BELFORT GAP 419

toward Dannemarie. French losses Atlantic coast, this time until mid-De-
now began to mount, and casualties cember. However, the redeployment
in the armored command alone in- of the 1st Infantry Division remained
cluded 30 men killed, about 60 set for the end of November. Having
wounded, and 11 tanks destroyed. already postponed the start of INDE-
T o the south CC3, starting out PENDENCE from 10 December to 1
from Courtelevant before dawn, January, Devers now pushed the start-
headed eastward in three columns. ing date back even further to 10 Janu-
Pushing along Route N-463 through ary, a delay that SHAEF approved.15
Seppois and over the Largue River,
the advancing armor reached Largit- The Battle of the Gap
zen north of the highway, Moernach
south of the road, and Waldighofen However promising the Rosenau
in the center, located on N-463 penetration, the French situation in
eleven miles east of Courtelevant and the Belfort Gap at dusk on 19 No-
only twelve miles from the Rhine vember was by no means secure. The
River. During the afternoon of the operations of the 2d Moroccan Divi-
19th, an advance detachment of the sion against Belfort had not pro-
command swung off along back gressed as rapidly as hoped, and de
roads; it avoided almost all German Lattre found it necessary to leave the
defenses and reached the Rhine at 5th Armored Division’s CC6 attached
Rosenau, twelve miles northeast of to the Moroccan unit, while the rest
Waldighofen, a little after 1800 that of the armored division moved south.
evening. 14 Reinforcements soon came In fact, the 2d Moroccan Division,
forward, and the 2d Battalion of the even with the support of CC6, was
68th African Artillery, 1st Armored unable to clear the Belfort area until
Division, lobbed a few shells across 25 November. 16 A second major prob-
the Rhine–the first French artillery lem was the failure of the 9th Coloni-
fire to fall on German soil since the al Division and CC2 to secure cross-
spring of 1940. The breakthrough ings over the Rhone-Rhine Canal,
had been achieved. thus making it impossible for the 5th
As de Lattre received word that his
forces had reached the Rhine, Gener- 15De Lattre, History, p. 221; Vigneras-de Camas
al Devers had more good news for Intervs; Devers Diary, 21 Nov 44. The exact chro-
the French commander. Devers had nology of the decision to postpone the 1st Armored
Division’s redeployment is a bit vague. De Camas
again been able to postpone the de- indicates that the decision was made on 19 Novem-
parture of the 1st Armored Division ber; de Lattre’s work cites 20 November; and the
for Operation INDEPENDENCE on the Devers diary shows that Devers did not reach a firm
decision until the 21st, when he received SHAEF
approto postpone INDEPENDENCEto 10 January.
14The detachment consisted of a platoon of 1 60 n 20 November the 2d Moroccan Division and
medium tanks and a platoon of armored infantry CC6 passed to de Lattre’s direct control, and on the
and was under the command of 1st Lt. Jean Carrelet 22d they came under the command of d e Monsa-
de Loisy of the 2d African Chasseurs, a tank battal- bert’s II Corps. CC6 remained with the II Corps
ion organic to the 1st Armored Division. Lieutenant until late December; the 5th Armored Division
de Loisy was later killed at Mulhouse on 23 Novem- never operated as a complete division until late
ber. April 1945.
420 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

Armored Division to begin its drive miles to Chalampe, where several


toward Cernay. Instead the armored major bridges crossed the Rhine.
division was temporarily immobilized However, Dannemarie on Route N-19
in the Montbeliard region, where its was still an objective of the 1st Ar-
long columns of vehicles clogged the mored Division, which indicated that
supply routes of the 9th Colonial and de Lattre felt the muscle of both divi-
1st Armored Divisions. sions would be needed to hold the
A third danger was the nature of broad area north of the French pene-
the French penetration. The 1st Ar- tration. Finally, de Lattre remained
mored Division’s CC3 had poked out confident that the inexperienced 5th
a very slender salient to the Rhine, Armored Division (less CC6) would
and its supply routes east from Delle somehow find a way to breach the
were extremely vulnerable. In order Rhone-Rhine Canal on the 20th and
to secure the armored command’s launch a drive north toward Colmar,
lines of communication eastward, which would parallel the 1st Armored
Bethouart’s forces would have to Division’s projected advance north
clear and hold the cut-up, hilly, and along the Rhine. A second break-
largely wooded terrain south of the through by the 5th Armored Division
Rhone-Rhine Canal from Morvillars would also greatly hamper any
to Dannemarie, as well as similar ter- German efforts to interdict the supply
rain south of Route N-19 from Dan- lines of the 1st Armored Division
nemarie to Altkirch. Although de along Route N-463 and would com-
Lattre was not an ULTRA recipient, plete the German rout.
he knew from his own sources that On the other side of the front,
the German 198th Infantry Division had General Wiese of Nineteenth Army, at
moved out of the Vosges and must dusk on 19 November, was consider-
have expected it to arrive in the ing another major withdrawal, aban-
threatened area shortly. 17 doning Belfort and pulling his army’s
De Lattre gave the task of securing southern flank all the way north to
the French penetration to the 9th Co- Mulhouse. At OB West, however, von
lonial Division. He ordered the 1st Rundstedt was adamantly opposed to
Armored Division, joined by its CCl giving up Belfort without a protracted
on 20 November, to clear the west fight. Instead, he directed A m y Group
bank of the Rhine from Huningue (on G to hold at Belfort and, at the same
the Swiss border) north seventeen time, to mount a counterattack south
of the city, cutting off the French
17 The 3d Algerian Division had quickly noted the penetration and pushing their forces
unit’s departure, while Devers had learned of the back south and west of the Allaine
movement from ULTRA Msg HP 7173, 200213 Nov valley.
44, copy in ULTRA Collection, MHI. This piece of
ULTRA information was also inadvertently passed
Finding the means to hold Belfort
down to the VI Corps on the 20th which caused and simultaneously mounting a coun-
great consternation among ULTRA officers because terattack Dosed major problems for
of a possible security breach. All ULTRA informa- Wiese. Duringtheperiod 17–19 No-
tion had to be confirmed by some other source
before it could be released and acted upon. Bussey, vember the German command had
ULTRA Report. shifted four battalions of the 189th
THROUGH THE BELFORT GAP 421

Division to the 338th Division’s sector, Casting about for additional forces,
a step that weakened the defenses of Wiese secured permission to employ
Belfort city but did little to stay the the unreliable 30th SS Division. Initial-
French advance. 18 By November, the ly, the division’s role was to be limit-
490th Grenadiers of the 269th Volksgren- ed to a holding mission along the
adier Division had also reached the Largue River, which Route N-463
front with orders to push down the crossed at French-held Seppois. How-
Allaine valley south of Morvillars. ever, the redeployment of the 198th
Before the 490th could attack, howev- Division, which was scheduled to
er, the French had driven past the launch an attack toward Delle and the
valley and attacked Morvillars in Allaine valley during the night of 19-
strength. The 490th had then de- 20 November, was so slow that Wiese
ployed defensively in the vicinity of assigned to the 30th SS a supporting
Brebotte, on the Rhone-Rhine Canal offensive role. While the 198th Divi-
three miles northeast of Morvillars, at sion struck for Delle, the 30th SS Divi-
least blocking further advances along sion was to retake Seppois and block
the canal to Dannemarie. On the the Largue valley north and south of
same day, two Wehrkreis V infantry Route N-463.
battalions, hurriedly brought across It was almost dark on 19 November
the Rhine, deployed along the canal before the 198th Division had assem-
to the northeast of the 490th Grena- bled sufficient forces (actually, hardly
diers; it was these forces that prevent- more than a regimental combat team)
ed the French from crossing the wa- in the Dannemarie area for its coun-
terway, which would have allowed the terattack south. With little or no prior
5th Armored Division to begin its reconnaissance, the division moved
drive to the northeast. Additional re- southward through terrain character-
inforcements on the way included an- ized by poor roads, swamps and lakes,
other infantry battalion, a small and many stands of thick woods.
armor-infantry task force with ten Early on the 20th, its leading ele-
tanks, and an antitank company, all ments reached Brebotte, Vellescot,
from Wehrkreis V; meanwhile, Wehrkrezs and Suarce, about halfway to the final
V I I was preparing two regimental objective, Delle; but they were finally
combat teams for deployment west of halted after running into French
the Rhine. Other units that would armor and infantry deploying for an
arrive in the Belfort Gap sector within attack in the opposite direction,
a day or two included the 280th As- toward Dannemarie. The result was
sault Gun Battalion and the 654th Anti- inconclusive fighting throughout the
tank Battalion, the latter unit equipped afternoon of the 20th centering
with thirty-six new 88-mm. guns around Suarce. Meanwhile, to the
mounted on Mark V (Panther) tank east, elements of the 30th SS Division
chassis. advanced to a point just over a mile
north of Seppois, but had to withdraw
18 Counting the 189th Division battalion that LXIII under French pressure. T h e French
Corps had committed to the 338th Division’s sector
on 15 November, the 189th lost five battalions, rep- then set up blocking positions in the
resenting well over half its infantry strength. Largue valley to protect the Seppois
422 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

bridges, across which a steady stream drive north. 19 His field commanders,
of French military traffic passed however, may have viewed an early
throughout 20 November. seizure of undefended Mulhouse as
While CC2 and elements of the 9th necessary to secure the flank of a
Colonial Division turned back the major drive north. In addition, the
198th Division’s first counterattacks, lure of historic Mulhouse, the second
the 1st Armored Division was ready most important city of Alsace after
to begin its part of the drive north. Strasbourg, may have influenced the
By 1000 on 20 November, CC3 had French officers. Whatever the case,
assembled in the area of Bartenheim, about 1330 on 20 November, CC3
three miles west of the Rhine at Ro- struck northwest toward Mulhouse
senau; CC 1, coming forward through from Bartenheim. Encountering only
Delle and Seppois, began pulling into scattered resistance, the armored task
Waldighofen about noon. Meanwhile, force achieved considerable surprise
an armored reconnaissance squadron, as leading units pushed into that por-
speeding northeast along Route N-73 tion of Mulhouse lying south of the
from Moernach, reached Huningue Rhone-Rhine Canal. On the following
on the Rhine River near the Swiss day, the 21st, CC3 crossed the canal
border, but was unable to eliminate a and cleared most of Mulhouse north
strong bridgehead that the Germans of the waterway; but it was 25 No-
had established on the west bank of vember before the last Germans evac-
the Rhine, nor could it create a uated the city-the same day that the
bridgehead of its own on the east last Germans left Belfort.
bank. Du Vigier’s other major unit also
At this juncture, French operations converged on Mulhouse. CC 1, which
also began to exhibit some confusion. could have swung eastward past the
Like Patch, de Lattre had no clear rear of CC3 on 20 November to initi-
idea of his army’s long-range objec- ate a drive toward Chalampe, instead
tives once the Rhine had been headed for Altkirch, ten miles south-
reached and Belfort cleared. T h e for- west of Mulhouse. By dark, leading
mulation of more specific plans to elements were within three miles of
clear the entire Alsatian plains or Altkirch. After a sharp clash with 30th
force a crossing of the Rhine had not SS Division troops, the task force
yet begun. Although de Lattre’s gen- cleared the small city on the 21st and
eral plans had called for the early sei- advanced four miles farther north
zure of Mulhouse, he began to attach along the Rhone-Rhine Canal to III-
more importance to a deep drive furth.
north along the Rhine to the Cha- T h e commitment of CCl and CC3
lampe bridges as the offensive pro- at Altkirch and Mulhouse left only a
gressed; between 18 and 20 Novem-
ber, he had conveyed these ideas to
Generals Bethouart and du Vigier. De 19In contrast, I Corps orders dating back to 17
Lattre was, in fact, ready to let the 1st November provided that the 1st Armored Division
would, if possible, seize Mulhouse by surprise
Armored Division bypass Mulhouse attack, thus giving priority to Mulhouse rather than
on the east in order to speed the Chalampe.
THROUGH THE BELFORT GAP 423

small 1st Armored Division element, Division for the planned drive on
Detachment Colonnier, along the Cernay must have been even more
Rhine. Consisting of an armored in- frustrating. Now, as the rest of the
fantry company and a tank destroyer 198th Division and other reinforcing
platoon, it nevertheless undertook the elements arrived, the French situation
task of driving north to Chalampe became more precarious. Perhaps in-
and seizing the Chalampe rail and evitably, since it had been de Lattre’s
highway bridges across the Rhine. On forces that led off the 6th Army
20 November Detachment Colonnier Group’s November offensive, it was
moved out from Kembs, four miles these attacking forces that first cap-
north of Rosenau; reached Hom- tured the attention of the German
bourg, five miles farther north that high command and were now about
afternoon; and arrived at the south- to feel the consequences of their early
ern outskirts of Ottmarsheim, just success.
three miles short of Chalampe, on the By 20 November, with the arrival of
morning of the 21st. But, this was as German reinforcements both north
close as any French formation would and south of the Rhone-Rhine Canal
come to Chalampe for two and a half west of Dannemarie, Bethouart’s I
months. On 23 November German Corps forces were unable to make any
counterattacks forced the detachment significant progress east of Morvillars.
to withdraw to the west side of the Now leading the corps’ attack in this
Harth forest between the Rhine and area, the 1st Armored Division’s CC2
Mulhouse. Meanwhile, the Germans had been unable to advance over the
were able to retain and reinforce theircanal or move along its southern side
west bank bridgeheads at Chalampe any farther than Brebotte and Velles-
and Huningue and, in between, estab- cot. Thus, Task Force Miquel,20lead-
lish new bridgeheads at Rosenau, ing the 5th Armored Division from
Loechle, and Kembs. De Lattre’s Montbeliard east along N-463 to
hopes for an early drive north up the Delle and then north through Morvil-
Alsatian plains at least as far as Cha-lars, soon learned that the division
lampe had begun to fade away and, would have to fight its own way
given the First French Army’s limited across the canal. By midmorning T F
strength along the Rhine, may not Miquel reached Brebotte, where the
have had great potential anyway. unit took over from elements of CC2
and managed to advance northeast
The German Counterattacks another two miles, constantly under
fire from German weapons north of
The inability of du Vigier to secure the canal. Forward elements attempt-
the western banks of the Rhine be- ed to cross the canal, but were
tween Chalampe and Huningue was thrown back with heavy losses. This
undoubtedly disappointing for Gener-
al de Lattre. However, the continued
German resistance in the area south- 20TF Miquel consisted of a reconnaissance squad-
ron, a company of armored infantry, a company of
west of Dannemarie and the failure of medium tanks, and a combat engineer platoon, all
Bethouart to free the 5th Armored organic to the 5th Armored Division.
424 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

INFANTRY-TANK TEAM OF THE 5TH ARMORED DIVISION, Belfort, November 1944.

check left T F Miquel with its vehicles soaked terrain. Soon a large traffic
strung out back to Morvillars and jam twelve miles long blocked the
then south on Route N–19A in the narrow roads all the way back to
Allaine valley. Forward movement Montbeliard, and the French were
was further impeded by CC2 vehicles unable to untangle the confused situ-
in the Brebotte area as well as by con- ation for about thirty-six hours.
voys bringing supplies up to CC2 and Late in the evening of 20 Novem-
elements of the 9th Colonial Division. ber de Lattre directed CC2 to move
Behind TF Miquel, the 5th Armored out of the Brebotte-Vellescot-Allaine
Division’s next column, CC5, began valley area in order to give the 5th
just north of Delle and stretched back Armored Division room to maneuver
all the way to Montbeliard, where the its stalled components. De Lattre then
5th Division’s CC4 could not even wanted the 5th, with its two combat
move out of its assembly areas be- commands on line, to cross the
cause of the crowded road conditions. Rhone-Rhine Canal, push one task
Efforts to bypass roadbound units force north toward Cernay, and swing
and push more strength up to the the other eastward to seize Danne-
Brebotte-Vellescot area came to marie, previously an objective of the
naught, for both wheeled and tracked 1st Armored Division. If the armored
vehicles quickly bogged down in rain- units were still unable to force their
THROUGH THE BELFORT GAP 425

way across the canal, de Lattre in- 463 near Courtelevant, behind CC2.
tended to make more changes in his The 1st Armored Division operating
plans, by having the 1st Armored Di- to the east was thus isolated, cut off
vision strike out for Cernay from the from its sources of supply.21
Mulhouse area and by giving the 5th With supply convoys of the 1st Ar-
Armored Division the task of pushing mored Division and rear elements of
north along the west bank of the CC2 already backed up at Delle, the
Rhine to Chalampe. However, he re- arrival of CC4 created another traffic
alized that such a switch would jam. But clearing N-463 east of Delle
absorb many precious hours, danger- had immediate priority. Moving as
ously slowing the momentum of his fast as it could, CC4 managed to work
attack. In either case the bulk of the its way around the confusion and
9th Colonial Division would have to overrun the German roadblock by
protect the northern flank of I Corps’ noon. But at 1430 the Germans again
penetration above Route N-463, leav- cut the road, and CC4 was not able to
ing no more than one detached regi- reopen the highway until 1700. Mean-
ment to support a more determined while, elements of CC2 had returned
advance north along the west bank of from Waldighofen to help out near
the Rhine. Courtelevant and to clear secondary
Sorting out all of the involved units supply routes south of N-463. Scat-
understandably proved difficult. tered German elements, however,
Somehow, during the night of 20–21 continued to block the lesser roads
November, CC2 extricated itself from below N-463, and the highway itself
the Brebotte-Vellescot area, back- was still threatened by German forces
tracked through Delle, and began operating in the forests north and
reassembling its components in the south of the highway.
Waldighofen area on Route N-463 by Redeploying part of CC2 to protect
noon of the 21st. Along the Rhone- the supply routes heading east from
Rhine Canal, however, CC5 of the 5th Delle immobilized the rest of the
Armored Division, remained partially combat command in the Waldighofen
entangled in the traffic jam and could area. As a result, de Lattre’s efforts to
make no progress in either crossing push more French strength north up
the canal or advancing northeast the west side of the Rhine River were
toward Dannemarie. At the same again frustrated. He had hoped that
time, CC4, under local orders to CC2 could continue northward from
secure the Suarce area and then strike Waldighofen to take over the task of
north for Dannemarie, bypassed the securing the Mulhouse area while
traffic jam and reached Delle about CC3 regrouped for the push north-
0930, shortly after most of CC2 had ward. By dark on the 21st, however,
passed through on its way to the his latest hopes for the seizure of the
Rhine. Events now took a turn for the Chalampe bridges had evaporated in
worse, however, from the French
point of view. At Delle, CC4 learned
21The German roadblock apparently lay at the
that the Germans were holding junction of Routes N-463 and GC–13 (leading
Suarce and had cut the vital Route N- north to Suarce), a mile or so east o f Courtelevant.
426 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

the face of increasing German pres- Germans back several miles toward
sure. the canal and Dannemarie. Obviously
Much of that pressure on 21 No- the reinforcements that Wiese expect-
vember came from the 198th Division, ed had not arrived at the 198th Divi-
which, by the end of the day, had fin- sion’s front.
ished deploying its main body from Throughout the 22d the Germans
Vellescot to Courtelevant.22 T h e 30th continued to threaten Route N-463
SS Division added some pressure in east of Courtelevant and blocked the
the Altkirch region and along the highway intermittently, but at least
Largue valley north of Seppois. The one 1st Armored Division fuel convoy
following day, 22 November, Wiese of broke through to the east.23 The un-
Nineteenth Army intended to push a stable situation along N-463 contin-
large part of the 198th Division, rein- ued to stall traffic at the Delle bottle-
forced by elements of the 654th Anti- neck, however, and the one regiment
tank Battalion, south to the Swiss of the 9th Colonial Division that was
border near Rechesy, a mile or so to have deployed to the Rhine could
south of Courtelevant. Another force, not move past Delle. Meanwhile, wait-
built on elements of the 30th SS Divi- ing at Mulhouse deep inside the
sion and the rest of the antitank bat- German lines, CC3 had to bring in its
talion, was to strike south for Seppois outposts and reconnaissance units as
and then continue south and south- German reinforcements, many of
east to help 198th Division units cut them crossing the Rhine over the
any secondary French supply routes Chalampe bridges, began moving
south of N-463. Wiese hoped that the toward the city.
106th Panzer Brigade, the 280th Assault During 23 November Wiese wanted
Gun Battalion, and a Wehrkreis V infan- the 198th Division to continue block-
try regiment would reach the Seppois ing Route N-463 as well as all sec-
sector during the day to assist. ondary east-west roads in the area,
On the morning of 22 November moving some of its forces all the way
the 308th Grenadiers of the 198th Divi- down to the Swiss border. 24T h e Nine-
sion, again cutting Route N-463, teenth Army commander expected that
reached Rechesy and Pfetterhouse on the 106th Panzer Brigade and the 280th
the Swiss border, but French forces Assault Gun Battalion would reach the
halted a northern thrust from Pfetter- 198th Division’s sector during the day,
house to Seppois. Above Seppois the but he directed the 198th to move out
attack of the 30th SS Division came to on the 23d without waiting for the
a quick halt in the Largue valley a armor to arrive. In addition, he or-
little over two miles north of Route
N-463; to the west, French forces fi- 23The German situation at this point is briefly
nally captured Suarce and pushed the outlined in ULTRA Msg HP 7440, 221702 Nov 44,
but the decoded intercept does not reveal any infor-
mation that was not available to the French through
their own intelligence sources.
22The organized remnants of the 338th Division 24In part, the insistence on sealing the Swiss
had withdrawn north of the Rhone-Rhine Canal on border stemmed from a German suspicion that the
19 or 20 November, and only stragglers remained French were using Swiss roads to bypass German
to the south. roadblocks.
THROUGH THE BELFORT GAP 427

dered the 30th SS Division, with ele- Ottmarsheim on Route N-68 about
ments of the 654th Antitank Battalion 1000 on 23 November. There they
in support, to resume its attack south- prepared to move farther south along
ward against Seppois. the Rhine and then directly west to
O n 23 November it was the assist the 198th Division. But as the
German deployments that were beset panzer unit reached Ottmarsheim,
by confusion and disarray. North of Wiese informed Balck that other units
Seppois, the 30th SS Division was had recaptured a key bridge across
again unable to make any progress the Huningue Canal in the middle of
south and instead had to pay consid- the Harth forest about five miles east
erable attention to the 1st Armored of Mulhouse. Acting on this informa-
Division’s C C l , which had started to tion, Balck directed the 106th to cross
push west and north from Altkirch, the bridge, bypass Mulhouse on the
heading for Dannemarie and threat- east, and feint toward the area be-
ening its rearward supply lines. T o tween Altkirch and Mulhouse. Then
the south, the German counterattack the brigade was to swing back to the
reached its high point in the morning, Huningue Canal, turn south and then
when the 198th Division’s 308th Grena- west to bypass Altkirch, and drive di-
diers established a strong roadblock rectly toward Seppois. The entire ma-
on Route N-463 about two miles west neuver was exceedingly complicated,
of Seppois; secured most of the and Balck only made the situation
Rechesy-Pfetterhouse-Seppois road worse by directing that the armored
south of the main highway; and pa- brigade be committed piecemeal as its
trolled routes in and out of the Swiss various components reached the
border to the south. The regiment front. Instead of concentrating the
was clearly overextended, however, tank brigade for a rapid, powerful
and could not be expected to hold thrust, Balck invited the unit’s de-
these positions without reinforcement struction in detail.
from German armor arriving that Not surprisingly, the maneuver was
afternoon. a total failure. During the afternoon
Again the German reinforcement of 23 November, as the 206th Panzer
effort was late, and the constant Brigade moved toward Mulhouse rein-
switching back and forth of units may forced by several weak infantry battal-
have almost exhausted the Nineteenth ions, it ran up against units of the 1st
Army’s staff and transportation ca- Armored Division and quickly became
pabilities. Transportation problems engaged in a day-long armor duel
virtually halted the southward move- with the French. T h e next morning,
ment of the 280th Assault Gun Battal- 24 November, the battle continued
ion, and confusion in the German with CC2 plus the artillery of the 1st
high command prevented the 106th Armored Division repulsing a series
Panzer Brigade from reaching the criti- of attacks by forces assigned or at-
cal area. Apparently, the armored bri- tached to the 106th in the area imme-
gade’s leading elements had moved diately east and southeast of Mul-
over the Rhine River bridges at Cha- house. At the same time, French fire
lampe and motored south, reaching made it impossible for the German
428 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

brigade to move southward. many hamlets and farms along the


The lack of expected armored sup- way. The diversionary effort had
port sealed the fate of the 308th Gren- ended quickly around the 16th, but
adiers of the 198th Division. During the on 19 November the 3d Algerian Di-
afternoon of 23 November, French vision noticed that the 198th Division
units regained control of Route N- was pulling out of its lines and lost no
463 through Seppois, isolating the time in following up. The left wing of
308th Grenadiers from the rest of the the division reached destroyed Ger-
198th Division north of the highway; ardmer, while five miles to the south
the next day French forces swept the other troops of the division entered
Rechesy-Pfetterhouse area, destroying burned-out La Bresse.
most of the regiment. What was left O n the same day, 19 November,
of the 308th-less than 300 troops- the 1st Infantry Division, on the II
crossed the border into Switzerland Corps’ right, or southern, wing,
to be interned. The French break- began a series of attacks to support
through at the Belfort Gap was now the I Corps’ 2d Moroccan Division,
complete, and the German counterat- which was having considerable diffi-
tack a failure. culty clearing the city of Belfort.
Holding its position on the left in
The Belfort Gap Secured order to maintain contact with the 3d
Algerian Division, the 1st Division
When Bethouart’s I Corps initiated planned to push its center east along
its drive through the Belfort Gap on the axis of the Chevestraye Pass and
14 November, the immediate mission Plancher-les-Mines toward Giro-
of de Monsabert’s II Corps was to magny, on Route N-465 about eight
maintain sufficient pressure across its miles north of Belfort. Its leading
mountainous front to keep some forces would then exploit seven miles
German attention focused on the farther east to Rougemont-le-Chateau
High Vosges.25On 15 November, at and Masevaux, at the southern edge
the request of VI Corps, the II Corps of the Vosges; meanwhile, the divi-
had mounted a limited attack on its sion’s right would push east from
left flank in conjunction with the 36th Ronchamp to seize Champagney and
Division, pushing southeast through nearby high ground and then head
Le Tholy toward Gerardmer. The generally east and northeast. The
French effort, undertaken largely by plan was, in effect, a modified revival
FFI units attached to the 3d Algerian of the attempt to outflank Belfort on
Infantry Division, passed through Le the north that de Lattre had called off
Tholy and advanced along Route N- in mid-October.
417; in doing so, the French discov- The attack began on 19 November.
ered that the Germans had burned In the center, the 1st Division found
that the once-strong German defenses
in the Chevestraye Pass area had been
25Information on II Corps operations in this sec- vacated, and the attackers pushed on
tion is based on de Lattre, History, pp. 259-60; Le 2e
C.A. d a m la Bataille pour la Liberation de la France, pp. to a ridge overlooking Plancher-les-
59-71; Historiques Succincts, 3e Partie, pp. 127–53. Mines. On the right, Champagney,
THROUGH THE BELFORT GAP 429

where the French encountered exten- French hands, would obviously threat-
sive minefields and liberally sown en the rear of the German counterat-
booby traps, fell the same day with tacking forces around Dannemarie, as
only spotty resistance, and troops of well as those defending along the
the 1st Division met elements of the Rhone-Rhine Canal to the west. Each
2d Moroccan Division near the Cham- side would thus be attempting to
pagney reservoir to the south. attack the rear of the other.
The Moroccans, meanwhile, had De Lattre’s new orders called for
penetrated farther into the city of Bel- the II Corps to push its center
fort and had slowly begun to elimi- through Rougemont-le-Chateau and
nate the remaining German defend- drive for Burnhaupt on the Doller
ers. On the 20th, in order to allow River. The Moroccans on the corps’
the I Corps to concentrate on oper- right would secure Belfort, and the
ations to the east, General de Lattre Algerians on the left would push east
took direct command of the 2d Mo- across the Vosges through the Bus-
roccan Division and two days later sang and Schlucht passes. This ac-
passed control of the unit to de Mon- complished, de Monsabert’s forces
sabert. were to take Cernay, ten miles west of
While the 3d Algerian and 2d Mo- Mulhouse, and join Bethouart’s I
roccan Divisions progressed slowly in Corps forces, now reinforced by the
the northern and southern sectors of rest of the 4th Moroccan Mountain
the widened II Corps zone, the 1st Division from the Italian Alpine front.
Infantry Division in the center contin- The two corps would then begin a
ued to forge ahead and moved into concentrated push north to Colmar
Giromagny north of Belfort nearly and eventually Strasbourg, thus liber-
unopposed on the 22d. The division’s ating all of Alsace.26
left flank then pressed toward the O n 23 and 24 November the 1st In-
great bulk of the Ballon d’Alsace, six fantry Division again made significant
miles north of Giromagny, as the progress, reaching the crest of the
right, keeping in touch with the Mo- Ballon d’Alsace on the left, the out-
roccans to the south, reached Val- skirts of Sewen on the Doller River in
doie, two miles north of Belfort. the center, and a point just two miles
Impressed by the 1st Division’s short of Rougemont-le-Chateau on
progress and concerned over the the right. Despite these gains, howev-
German counterattacks south of the er, de Lattre decided on the 24th that
Rhone-Rhine Canal, de Lattre issued his plans were too ambitious. In the
new orders on 22 November, calling Vosges, the 3d Algerian Division con-
for a general exploitation across the tinued to meet determined German
First French Army’s entire front. resistance and made little progress;
Bethouart’s I Corps was to advance on the corps’ right the 2d Moroccan
north and de Monsabert’s II Corps Division remained stalled by some
move generally east, thereby squeez- German-held strongpoints in and
ing the German forces in the middle.
A northern advance in strength to 26First Fr Army Genl Opns Order 163, 22 Nov
Mulhouse, which was already in 44; de Lattre, History, p. 269.
430 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

around Belfort. To the east, I Corps the region south of Sewen, Masevaux,
faced steadily increasing German Burnhaupt, and Mulhouse. For this
pressure in the Mulhouse region, purpose de Lattre’s orders called for
while the 198th Division, now with a double envelopment by the I and II
some armored support, still had suffi- Corps, with the pincers to close at
cient strength north of Route N-463 Burnhaupt. Bethouart’s I Corps, hold-
to threaten I Corps’ main supply ing firmly at Mulhouse, was to push
route in the Courtelevant-Seppois part of its strength west from Mul-
area. Also influencing his thoughts house and northwest from Altkirch
was the imminent loss of the 1st Divi- toward Burnhaupt, and de Monsa-
sion, which would be pulled out of its bert’s II Corps was to strike for Burn-
lines within a few days to redeploy to haupt from the west. In the II Corps’
the Atlantic coast for Operation INDE- sector the main effort would have to
PENDENCE. 27 The 2d Moroccan Divi- be made by the 2d Moroccan Division
sion (plus CC6) and the 3d Algerian and its attached CC6, but de Monsa-
Division would then have to take over bert intended to keep the 1st Infantry
the 1st Division’s sector, greatly dilut- Division in the line pushing eastward
ing the combat strength of the II as long as possible.
Corps. Finally, de Lattre had to take At dawn on 25 November de Monsa-
into consideration the losses of men bert’s forces were surprised to find that
and equipment that the First French the German troops facing them in the
Army had suffered over the past ten gap area had withdrawn during the
days (14-24 November) as well as his night, and both the 1st Infantry and 2d
declining stocks of ammunition, fuel, Moroccan Division immediately accel-
and other supplies. erated their drives east. On that day the
Recognizing the limitations of his 1st Division pushed to within half a
strength and realizing that a major mile of strongly defended Masevaux; to
operation to clear all of Alsace was at the south, the Moroccans were not
least temporarily out of the question, even able to regain contact with the re-
de Lattre issued new orders on the treating Germans. On the other hand,
24th outlining a more conservative de Monsabert realized that the Ger-
plan.28The primary objectives of the mans were probably trying to build up
revised plan were securing the entire some sort of defensive line along the
Belfort Gap area and destroying the trace of the Doller River in order to
remaining forces of the LXIII Corps as hold up the French advance and ex-
far north as the Doller River-roughly tract their remaining forces from the
Dannemarie-Suarce area. Both he and
27As of 24 November the 1st Infantry Division Bethouart would have to move their
was still scheduled to move westward during the forces as rapidly as possible if their trap
period 28 November-7 December, with the 1st Ar-
mored Division following a week or so later.
was to close before the Germans could
28De Lattre discussed the basics of the new plan escape.
with Generals de Monsabert and Bethouart during De Lattre received a needed boost
the afternoon of 23 November, and he issued the on the 26th when General Devers an-
plan in directive form about noon on the 24th as
First French Army General Operations Order 167. nounced yet another postponement
De Lattre, History, p. 272. of First French Army redeployments
THROUGH THE BELFORT GAP 431

and, in the process, further eroded


the German forces facing the 6th
Army Group. The Burnhaupt Maneu-
ver, taking place from 25 through 28
November, had bagged some 10,000
German prisoners, most of them from
the LXIII Corps, which had lost at
least another 5,000 prisoners earlier
during the period 14–24 November. 30
However, French manpower losses
from 14 through 28 November were
also serious and numbered 1,300
killed, 4,500 wounded, 140 missing,
and over 4,500 nonbattle casualties.
French materiel losses included about
55 medium tanks, 15 light tanks, 15
tank destroyers, 15 armored cars, and
50 half-tracks, while many more
combat vehicles had been damaged,
and all were in need of overhaul.
Moreover, the task of clearing all of
upper Alsace was only half complet-
ed.
FRENCH TROOPSRAISE TRICOLOR De Lattre’s inability to achieve all
over Chateau de Belfort, November 1944. his objectives reflected some of the
inherent weaknesses of his army. Al-
for INDEPENNCE. Now the 1st Infan- though de Lattre himself had person-
try Division would not have to be ally supervised the actions of both
pulled out of the lines and reassem- corps, giving de Monsabert and Beth-
bled until 2 December, and the 1st ouart considerably less freedom than
Armored Division not until the 5th.29 Patch had afforded Truscott, Haislip,
This delay enabled both French corps and Brooks, his span of control was
to resume their envelopments with limited, especially as the advance
confidence, and on the afternoon of began to stretch French staff and
28 November, after much bitter fight- communications capabilities thin. In
ing, the pincers closed at Burnhaupt. addition, many of his key units, such
The completion of de Lattre’s as the 5th Armored Division, were
“Burnhaupt Maneuver” marked the relatively inexperienced, and many of
end of the First French Army’s No-
vember offensive. By seizing both 30De Lattre, History, p. 282. On p. 284 de Lattre
Belfort and Mulhouse, the French had adds another 10,000 Germans killed during the
completely outflanked the German period 14–28 November, for a total of some 25,000
defenses in the Vosges Mountains killed or captured; but von Luttichau, “German Op-
erations,” ch. 25, gives Nineteenth Army’s total losses
during the period 10–30 November only as “in
296th Army Gp LI 3, 26 Nov 44. excess of 10,000 men.”
432 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

his infantry units were made up of re- consequences for du Vigier’s armor.
cently recruited soldiers with little T h e arrival of reinforcements such as
more than the rudiments of military the 106th Panzer Brigade might have
training. The trained military techni- been delayed if they were forced to
cians necessary to fill out the First cross the Rhine north of Chalampe,
French Army’s ordnance, signal, engi- but the lag would have been of no
neer, and other support units were in consequence. In short, the German
extremely short supply, making it dif- infantry counterattack south of Dan-
ficult for French forces to sustain an nemarie, which temporarily interdict-
extended armywide battle for any ed the French 1st Armored Division’s
length of time. The projected losses supply lines, was the primary factor
to support Operation INDEPENDENCE behind de Lattre’s inability to project
were another major factor that ham- more strength along the Rhine
pered French planning, causing con- throughout the offensive.
fusion and hesitation. Thus, although The end of the battle on 28 No-
de Lattre was unable to drive all the vember saw the French consolidating
way up the Rhine valley, he probably their gains in and around Belfort,
did the best anyone could have with while the Germans continued to pres-
his existing resources and constraints. sure I Corps units in the Mulhouse
In this respect, Wiese’s insistence that area and in the region between Mul-
the 198th Division be brought south house and the Rhine, building up new
and deployed as quickly as possible defenses along the line of the Doller
across the 1st Armored Division’s line River west of Mulhouse and holding
of communications probably saved tenaciously to the mountainous ter-
the day for the Nineteenth Army. How- rain north of Masevaux. Although
ever, given the confusing orders from Wiese still controlled a large portion
Balck, the Germans were fortunate of the Alsatian plains in the region
not to have suffered even heavier around Colmar, General Devers now
losses in the Belfort Gap. believed that those units of the Nine-
Whether an early seizure of the teenth Army still west of the Rhine
Chalampe bridges would have affect- would soon withdraw across the river.
ed the situation is moot. French con- Furthermore, he estimated that once
trol of Chalampe might have left Mul- the forces of the First French Army
house in German hands and stretched had caught their breath, they would
du Vigier’s slender supply lines even be able to police up the rest of the
thinner. A stronger drive north along German troops between Mulhouse
the Rhine might also have made it and Strasbourg, with the help perhaps
easier for Wiese, if he had the nerve, of one or two American divisions.
to concentrate the 198th Division and However, considering the winter
other early reinforcements for a more weather and the exhaustion of his
intensive counterattack south of Dan- own troops and supplies, de Lattre
nemarie, obviously with undesirable was by no means so hopeful.
CHAPTER XXIV

Lost Opportunities
By the end of November, Devers’ rivers, canals, and other small but
6th Army Group had shattered flooded waterways.
Wiese’s Nineteenth Army in a series of The two major German counterat-
hammering blows, Haislip’s XV Corps tacks, the excursions of the Panzer
had led off on 13 November in the Lehr in the north and the 198th Divi-
north, followed one day later by Beth- sion in the south had been ad hocaf-
ouart’s II Corps in the south. In the fairs, poorly planned and never rein-
center, Brooks’ VI Corps had already forced. The German high command
begun the first of several preliminary and control system was incapable of
attacks to set up his main thrust over keeping pace with the tempo of the
the Vosges. Nowhere did the initial Allied operations and was unable to
Allied assaults meet any effective respond effectively. As a result, the
German resistance. By 19 November, U.S. Seventh Army and the French
the day that de Lattre’s forces First Army were slowly squeezing the
reached the Rhine, the 3d Algerian German Nineteenth in a giant vise:
Division had finally occupied Ger- Haislip’s XV Corps reached the Rhine
ardmer deep in the Vosges; Brooks’ on the 23d, and Brooks’ VI Corps
100th Division had taken Raon- began pouring down the other side of
l’Etape; and Haislip’s infantry had ad- the Vosges on the 25th; de Lattre’s
vanced nearly to Sarrebourg. T w o First French Army occupied Belfort
days later, on the 21st, Leclerc’s and the entire gap area during the
armor had begun exploiting north same period. In the process, six of
and south of both Sarrebourg and Sa- the Nineteenth Army’s eight infantry di-
Verne nearly unopposed; Brooks had visions were nearly destroyed: the
ordered his infantry divisions to begin 553d and 708th on the approaches to
a pursuit across the High Vosges; and Saverne; the 716th and 16th in the
du Vigier’s French 1st Armored Divi- High Vosges; and the 338th and 198th
sion had taken Mulhouse and Altkirch around Belfort. Only the 269th and
deep in the German rear. All this had the 159th remained in fair condition,
been accomplished in cold and ex- ensconced in the heart of the Vosges
tremely wet weather over terrain that Mountains immediately west of
was either heavily forested and moun- Colmar. For the moment it appeared
tainous or laced with innumerable that only these two divisions (to be
434 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

joined shortly by two more from the realizing that the area had been lost
Netherlands) and a large mishmash of to the French that morning. However,
personnel and units—the sweepings even without full knowledge of the
from both the Vosges-Alsatian battle- 198th Division’s operations, General
fields and the German trans-Rhine Wiese, commanding the Nineteenth
military regions—were left to defend A m y , understood that the situation in
the borders of the German Reich the south was rapidly deteriorating.
against the still relatively undamaged The last defenses in and around Bel-
6th Army Group. fort were about to collapse, and the
operations of the 106th Panzer Brigade
The Colmar Pocket in the Mulhouse area were achieving
little. With no more reserves and no
By 24 November the German high reinforcements expected, Wiese rec-
command was constantly reevaluating ommended to Balck that Army Group
the rapidly deteriorating situation of G’s southern boundary be pulled back
Wiese’s Nineteenth Army. Both it and to the east and north immediately.
A m y Group G faced severe difficulties. Balck agreed with Wiese’s assess-
In the north, the Allied breakthrough ment. The Army Group G commander
to Strasbourg had opened a gap of judged that the attacking Allied army
fifteen to twenty miles between the group would probably attempt to en-
First and Nineteenth Armies; in the circle and destroy the Nineteenth Army
south, French forces had made a simi- as quickly as possible by means of
lar penetration, thus threatening concurrent drives south from Stras-
Wiese’s army with a double envelop- bourg and north from Mulhouse.
ment. Isolated and beset by major at- During the morning of 24 November,
tacks from the Seventh Army’s VI he therefore suggested to von Rund-
Corps in the center, Wiese knew that stedt at OB West that the Nineteenth
his forces were once again close to Army withdraw on its southern front
complete collapse. Fresh units as well to the line Ballon d’Alsace–Dolleren–
as more replacements and more Rougemont-le-Chateau-Montreux. Al-
equipment were desperately needed if though the proposed withdrawal
the Nineteenth was to survive this new would surrender the city of Belfort as
crisis intact. 1 well as the last German strongpoints
Initially both the Nineteenth A m y in the region, it would also shorten
and Army Group G had lacked timely, and consolidate the Nineteenth Army’s
accurate information about the situa- southern front.
tion in the south, especially the status Apparently OB West made no imme-
of the 198th Division in the Seppois diate reply to this recommendation,
area. Early on the 24th the two head- which was probably just as well be-
quarters apparently assumed that the cause, during the course of the day,
298th still held blocking positions Balck learned that French troops had
from Suarce to the Swiss border, not seized the Ballon d’Alsace2 and were

1 German information in this chapter is based on 2Actually, troops of the French 1st Infantry Divi-
von Luttichau, “German Operations,” chs. 23–25. sion reached the crest of the Ballon d’Alsace on 24
LOST OPPORTUNITIES 435

nearing Dolleren. This news, together ation in the north, he felt, could be
with more information about the better handled by the Panzer Lehr Divi-
worsening situations in the Belfort sion and other units already in the
and Seppois sectors, evidently im- Sarrebourg-Saverne-Strasbourg area.
pelled Balck, during the afternoon of During the course of the late after-
24 November, to suggest an even noon, as information on the situation
deeper and more extensive withdraw- in the Saverne area arrived at OB
al along Nineteenth Army’s southern West, von Rundstedt began to recon-
flank. Balck recommended to von sider the matter. With the apparent
Rundstedt that a new, southward- failure of the Panzer Lehr to accom-
facing defensive line be established plish its mission, he became pessimis-
ten miles farther back, anchored at tic and notified OKW that only imme-
Thann and extending through Route diate reinforcements—at least two
N–66 and Mulhouse and then east panzer divisions and one infantry divi-
across the Harth forest to the Rhine. sion, all fully up to strength—could
With such a withdrawal, Balck con- salvage the situation in northern
cluded, the 198th Division, the 106th Alsace. But OKW, husbanding. all
Panzer Brigade, and the 654th Antitank German reserves for the Ardennes
Battalion could be released from the counteroffensive, had little to offer, as
Mulhouse-Seppois area and dis- von Rundstedt must have expected.
patched northward to deal with the That being the case, the OB West com-
Saverne Gap-Strasbourg penetration mander informed his superiors that
of the U.S. Seventh Army. further efforts to close the gap be-
Balck’s second recommendation tween his two armies would have to
created some consternation at OB be abandoned, and that the Nineteenth
West and OKW, for it clearly implied Army would have to fall back to avoid
that Balck was proposing to give up destruction.
the Nineteenth Army’s presumed hold Although von Rundstedt still hoped
on the Swiss border as well as a con- that Wiese’s endangered army could
siderable chunk of German-controlled hold at least temporarily along its
real estate in southern Alsace. Re- southern flank, both he and Balck had
flecting a lack of accurate informa- come to the obvious conclusion that
tion, von Rundstedt still believed that the only solution to the Nineteenth
the major threat to the Nineteenth A m y Army’s difficulties was a complete
came from the Allied drive through withdrawal across the Rhine, and they
the Belfort Gap; he could not under- passed that evaluation on to OKW. As
stand how Army Group G could consid- they expected, however, Hitler had no
er redeploying the 198th Division intention of voluntarily giving up
northward, when all indications were reannexed Alsace to the French and
that the Nineteenth Army’s southern refused to discuss the matter; the
flank needed reinforcement. The situ- German political leader even ordered
his army planners to assess the pos-
sibility of canceling the Ardennes
November, but they lost much of it to a German
counterattack on the 25th. The Germans then held
counteroffensive in favor of a major
the Ballon until the afternoon of 26 November. counterattack in Alsace and Lorraine.
436 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

Although he quickly abandoned this then south about thirty-five miles,


idea, Hitler remained adamant in his generally following the Vosges Ridge
refusal to authorize a withdrawal to Position, to Dolleren, deep in the
the east bank of the Rhine in the upper reaches of the Doller River and
south, and he insisted that the areas five miles east of the Ballon d’Alsace.
of Alsace still under German control T h e realignment would generally
be held at all costs. However neces- affect only the LXIV Corps and the XC
sary or logical from a purely military Corps, the redesignation given the IV
standpoint, the Fuhrer would counte- Luftwaffe Field Corps on 22 November.
nance no withdrawal across the T h e situation on Nineteenth Army’s
Rhine. Wiese’s army would either sur- southern flank still remained vague,
vive or die. as did the positions of the First Army
In the face of Hitler’s decision, von above Erstein. Until the battlefield
Rundstedt had difficulty authorizing became clearer, little more could be
any withdrawals for Wiese’s reeling done.
forces. Between the evening of 24 In the Vosges and north of Colmar,
November and the afternoon of the the German units that were still intact
26th, he approved a series of local began occupying the new line on the
boundary changes based on individual night of 24–25 November without in-
tactical situations, but felt he could go cident. Meanwhile, on the Nineteenth
no further. Forbidding Balck and Amy’s northern and southern flanks,
Wiese to redeploy the 198th Division the situation continued to deteriorate.
northward, he emphasized that south- By late afternoon of 26 November
ern Alsace was to be held at all costs von Rundstedt, with accurate and up-
and that only minor adjustments to-date information finally at hand,
within their defensive zones would be concluded that the southern flank of
considered. the Nineteenth Army had to be with-
With Hitler’s reluctant consent, OB drawn immediately, and he finally
West issued orders late on 24 Novem- persuaded OKW to approve a new de-
ber authorizing the Nineteenth Army to fensive line somewhat short of the
fall back on a new defensive line that trace that General Balck had original-
more or less reflected the gains the ly proposed. The new southern main
Allies had made. The boundary be- line of resistance was to begin at Ma-
tween the First and Nineteenth Armies sevaux, about six miles southwest of
was again moved south, this time to Thann, and extend generally eastward
Erstein, on the Ill River about twelve along the axis of the Doller River to
miles south of Strasbourg and four Mulhouse and then on to Hombourg
west of the Rhine. The defenses were and the Rhine. Further discussion be-
to extend westward nineteen miles tween OB West and OKW provided for
past Barr to Le Hohwald, located in a the redeployment of the 198th Division
particularly rugged section of the and 106th Panzer Brigade to the Nine-
Vosges. From Le Hohwald, the new teenth Army’s northern flank, not for
westward defensive line was to slant Balck’s avowed purpose of striking at
southwest thirteen miles to Ste. XV Corps’ penetration to Strasbourg,
Marie-aux-Mines on Route N–59 and but rather to help hold the new Er-
LOST OPPORTUNITIES 437

stein–Barr–Le Hohwald line north of Even this task, however, was depen-
Colmar. Von Rundstedt’s earlier deci- dent on the influx of thousands of re-
sion to halt further attempts to close placements for the army’s eight hol-
the gap between the First and Nine- lowed-out infantry divisions and at
teenth Armies went unchallenged. least some antitank, artillery, and as-
During the night of 26–27 Novem- sault guns. If successful, the bridge-
ber Hitler gave his reluctant assent to head would keep the Allies at arm’s
the withdrawal in the south, and length from the German border and
about 0200 on the 27th von Rund- would threaten both flanks of the 6th
stedt issued the necessary orders. At Army Group’s two penetrations. But
the time, Wiese retained some faint the creation and maintenance of the
hope of driving the French out of the pocket would also consume steadily
Mulhouse area, and German troops diminishing German military re-
near Seppois were still threatening sources that might be used more
the French supply route on N–463. profitably elsewhere.
But time was running out. The
German forces holding out in the Bel- A Dubious Decision
fort city area had already withdrawn
during the night of 24–25 November; On 24 November, the Allied high
during the 26th, French forces command initiated a series of deci-
reached the outskirts of Masevaux, sions that would have a major impact
threatening the Nineteenth Army’s new on the course of the war in Europe.
Doller River line before it was firmly At the time, Patch’s Seventh Army,
established. Wiese had no time to elated by the success of its advance
consider further attacks against the through the Saverne Gap to Stras-
French flanks or rear. bourg and the Rhine, was planning
The Hitler-approved directives of more ambitious undertakings. Despite
24 and 27 November committed the some uncertainties regarding the se-
Nineteenth Army to the defense of a curity of XV Corps’ flanks both east
vast bridgehead west of the Rhine, a and west of the Vosges, and despite
bridgehead that soon became known the fact that forward elements of the
in the Allied camp as the Colmar Panzer Lehr Division were scarcely six
Pocket. Initially, the salient had a base miles away from the XV Corps’ com-
along the Rhine River forty-five miles mand post at Sarrebourg, planners
long between the Erstein and Mul- from the 6th Army Group, Seventh
house areas; in the center it extended Army, and XV Corps staffs were
more than twenty-five miles westward speeding preparations for a Rhine
from the Rhine into the High Vosges. crossing in the Rastatt area north of
Both OKW and OB West estimated Strasbourg. Rather than move south,
that, without major reinforcements, Devers still preferred to have the Sev-
the Nineteenth Army could hold the enth Army strike north across the
Colmar Pocket bridgehead for about Rhine against all German expecta-
three weeks, a time span probably tions. Orders had already gone out
dictated by the date set for the alerting specialized river-crossing
launching of the Ardennes offensive. units to start moving to forward as-
438 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

sembly areas, and by the afternoon of ammunition, and miscellaneous other


24 November, amphibious truck supply problems. 4
(DUKW) companies were rolling During the brief stopover, Patton
toward the Rhine from rear area urged that either a portion of his sev-
depots and training centers. 3 enty-mile front be assigned to Devers
As yet no firm date had been set or the XV Corps be returned to
for the Rhine River assault. Before Third Army control, preferably the
the November offensive, however, latter. 5 Bradley was also anxious to
Devers and Patch had looked forward have his main effort against the Saar
to a Rhine crossing between 10 and basin gather some momentum, but
20 December, and they now acceler- judged that a transferal of forces
ated the projected effort to the first would be too time-consuming. In-
week of December. A VI Corps ex- stead he favored narrowing Patton’s
ploitation north through a XV Corps front so that the Third Army com-
bridgehead would begin no later than mander could concentrate his attack-
the second week of the month. The ing forces against a smaller number
project, however, immediately ran up of objectives; reassigning the south-
against serious opposition within the ern portion of Patton’s zone to
Allied camp. Patch’s Seventh Army would best sat-
O n 24 November, as the German isfy this requirement. Although Eisen-
high command debated its options, hower was apparently noncommittal,
Eisenhower and Bradley began a tour he also seemed to have made up his
of the Allied southern front. The two mind that something drastic had to be
American generals first visited the done to assist Patton.
Third Army command post at Nancy, Eisenhower and Bradley next trav-
where they found Patton’s attacking eled to Luneville. There, after joining
forces roadbound and nearly halted. Devers and Patch, they proceeded
Abominable weather, flooding, and first to Haislip’s new XV Corps head-
military traffic were breaking up what quarters at Sarrebourg and then to
few good roads remained passable in Brooks’ recently opened command
Patton’s sector, and elsewhere the post at St. Die.6 At Sarrebourg the
ground had turned into a sea of mud. energetic Haislip proved an anxious
Additional factors delaying Patton’s host, exuberant over the capture of
troops just to the north of the Sev- Strasbourg but concerned over the
enth Army included a high rate of
nonbattle casualties (with trench foot 4For further details see Cole, The Lorraine Cam-
predominating), lack of infantry re- paign, ch. 12.
5For an account, see Hansen Diary, 24 Nov 44,
placements, extensive German mine- Chester B. Hansen Papers, MHI. (Hansen was one
fields, a growing shortage of artillery of Eisenhower’s aides.)
6The account of the Eisenhower-Bradley visit to
the 6th Army Group is based on the following
3See Ltr, Engr Seventh Army to CO 40th Engr sources: Devers Diary, 24–25 Nov 44; Hansen Diary
Regt, 21 Nov 44 (as cited in Seventh Army Diary, 21 (first draft), 24–25 Nov 44, Chester B. Hansen
Nov 44); Seventh Army OI 19, 24 Nov 44; Seventh Papers, MHI; Intervs, Thomas Griess with Devers,
Army Rpt, II, 418-19; comments of John S. Gutherie, 29–30 Dec 69 and 17–20 Aug 70 (copy CMH); Sev-
former G–3, Seventh Army, on draft MS, Oct 88 enth Army Diary, 24–25 Nov 44; and XV Corps
(hereafter referred to as “Gutherie comments”). AAR, Nov 44.
LOST OPPORTUNITIES 439

southward progress of the Panzer Lehr Eisenhower continued to insist that


through the Sarre River valley. At St. Devers halt all preparations for a
Die, the usually serious Brooks was Rhine crossing and turn the Seventh
more relaxed, elated over his success Army north to assist Patton’s forces
in finally pushing his command over as quickly as possible. Although cur-
the Vosges and urging all of his scat- rent SHAEF directives had provided
tered forces to continue the pursuit. for the opportunistic seizure of
Within both headquarters Eisenhower bridgeheads across the Rhine during
and Bradley found the corps staffs the November offensive by all partici-
busily planning to push their forces pants,8 the Supreme Commander now
farther east, seize bridgeheads over ruled firmly against a Seventh Army
the Rhine, and cross into Germany crossing. Furthermore, he proposed
itself. Eisenhower, however, quickly transferring two divisions from the
ended these preparations. Concerned 6th Army Group to Bradley’s 12th
about Patton’s flagging offensive, he and extending the boundary of Hais-
wanted the Seventh Army’s axis of lip’s XV Corps to the northwest.
attack reoriented from the east to the Devers objected bitterly to each of
north, through the Low Vosges and these measures, arguing that the Sev-
against the First Army’s southern flank. enth Army was the force that ought to
At Haislip’s command post, he even be strengthened and not the Third. If
issued verbal orders on the 24th di- assisting Patton was the primary ob-
recting the XV Corps to halt all prep- jective then, he contended, a Seventh
arations for a Rhine crossing, change Army Rhine crossing at Rastatt fol-
direction immediately, and advance lowed by a drive north to envelop the
generally northward astride the Low Saar basin was the best solution. On
Vosges Mountains in close support of this point, however, Bradley strongly
the Third Army. Supporting Patton’s disagreed: attempting to force the
advance into the Saar basin was to Rhine against the prepared defensive
have first priority. positions of the West Wall was fool-
Somewhat stunned by the new hardy and would only lead to failure.
orders, Devers was determined to Exasperated, Devers countered that
challenge them. Returning to the 6th the Germans currently had few if any
Army Group headquarters at the Her- troops in front of the Seventh Army
itage Hotel in Vittel that evening, the and that Patch’s reconnaissance pa-
three principal American ground trols across the Rhine had found the
commanders had a late formal dinner defenses there completely unmanned.
and then retired to Devers’ private Eisenhower was unmoved. He in-
office to talk over the entire matter. structed Devers to use whatever
The ensuing discussion lasted until strength was necessary to clean up
the early hours of the following day the area between the Vosges and the
and saw a heated argument between
Eisenhower, Bradley, andDevers. 7 discussion from information in the Devers diary, the
Griess-Devers interviews, and Memo, Bradley to G–
3, H Q 12th Army Group, 26 Nov 44, Bradley
7 The Hansen diary only notes that the meeting Papers, MHI (copy CMH).
took place, and the author has reconstructed the 8 SCAF–114, 28 Oct 44; SCAF–118, 2 NOV44.
440 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

Rhine but to turn the Seventh Army southern sector of the 6th Army
north as quickly as possible, attacking Group altered his decisions. There-
west and east of the Low Vosges. fore, between 25 and 26 November,
There would be no Rhine crossing. Patch’s Seventh Army staff drew up
Eisenhower did compromise, howev- new plans based on Eisenhower’s in-
er, promising Devers he would allow structions. As quickly as possible the
the 6th Army Group to keep its two XV Corps was to advance generally
divisions and even obtain a second ar- northward with its right on the crest
mored division, if Devers agreed to of the Low Vosges and its left along a
keep his troops on the west bank of boundary between the 6th and 12th
the Rhine. In the end, the 6th Army Army Groups, which would be
Group commander had no choice but pushed westward and northward in
to go along with the new directive, order to narrow Patton’s front. Ulti-
suggesting only that the XV Corps mately, the Seventh Army’s VI Corps
take over part of Patton’s sector west would also head northward on the
of the Low Vosges in order to give eastern side of the Vosges, clearing
Haislip more room to maneuver (not the area from the Low Vosges Moun-
wishing him to be limited to the tains to the Rhine.10 Satisfied that
mountains). But none of the three they had no alternative, Patch and
commanders was fully satisfied with Devers wanted to turn the Seventh
the results of the meeting, and all Army north as rapidly as possible
were stung by the tenor of the discus- before the Germans could move rein-
sions. The Supreme Commander re- forcements into the area, especially in
portedly came out of the conference the sector west of the Low Vosges
“mad as hell” over Devers’ open criti- along the German border.
cism of his operational strategy, while The new army group boundary, ef-
Devers emerged equally angry, won- fective 26 November, ran north
dering if he was “a member of the roughly along the Sarre River, from
sameteam.” 9 Thus, instead of abat- Fenetrange to Ramstein in Germany;
ing, the tension between Eisenhower there it turned east to cross the Rhine
and Devers seemed only to have near Mannheim, about seventy-five
grown. miles north of Strasbourg (Map 30).
The following day Eisenhower and Both Devers and Patton were dis-
Bradley concluded their visit, touring pleased with the arrangement. The
the French front before returning 6th Army Group commander felt that
north via Vittel on the morning of the the natural boundary was the Saar
26th. Nothing Eisenhower saw in the River itself between Fenetrange and
Saarbrucken, while Patton believed
9This final material is based on notes taken by that the Vosges chain was the more
Brig. Gen. Daniel Noce, the AFHQ Assistant Chief logical dividing line. Both were un-
of Staff for Operations (G–3), who visited the
SHAEF theater 2–7 December and spoke with both
Brig. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower’s chief 10Seventh Army Diary, 25 and 26 Nov 44; 6th
of staff, and Brig. Gen. David G. Barr, Devers’ chief Army Gp LI 3, 26 Nov 44; Rad, 6th Army Gp to
of staff, regarding the Vittel meeting. See Notes of 4 SHAEF, BX–20454, 26 Nov 44; Ltr, CG Seventh
Dec 44, Daniel Noce Papers, U.S. Military Academy, Army to CGs XV and VI Corps, subj: Directive,
West Point, N.Y. dated 27 Nov 44; and SCAF–136, 27 Nov 44.
442 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

doubtedly interested in the politics of lower Alsace.


the matter: Patton’s XII Corps might Devers was clearly upset over the
have been transferred to Devers if the results of the meeting with Eisenhow-
Sarre River boundary had been er and Bradley. The 6th Army Group
chosen, and Devers’ XV Corps could commander regarded Eisenhower’s
have been lost to Patton had the decision as a major error, holding
Vosges been selected. The 26 No- that he ought to have reinforced suc-
vember boundary was thus a SHAEF- cess-that is, the Seventh Army’s
imposed compromise that satisfied no breakthrough to the Rhine-and that
one. 11 Eisenhower was more concerned with
Whatever the influence of the territorial objectives than with de-
boundary arrangements, Eisenhower’s stroying the enemy. Devers judged
basic decision against an early Rhine that Patton had started his armored
crossing by the Seventh Army had a exploitation too early and without
profound effect on the course of op- due regard for the terrible weather
erations along the western front. The conditions. 13 Furthermore, he be-
specific results are, of course, debata- lieved that Patton’s Third Army logi-
ble. At the time, however, Devers, cally belonged in the 6th Army Group
Patch, and Haislip were certain that and that the Third and Seventh
the XV Corps could seize a bridge- Armies working closely together
head in the Rastatt area with relative could easily crack the German Saar
ease and that the VI Corps would basin defenses, if that was what Eisen-
soon be ready to exploit northward hower wanted. 14
through that bridgehead, thereby out- Obviously these sentiments were
flanking German fortifications west of not shared by Eisenhower and Brad-
the Rhine. Devers was also confi- ley. The Supreme Commander ap-
dent-mistakenly, as it turned out 12— peared extremely reluctant to capital-
that the First French Army, with the ize on the Seventh Army’s unexpect-
aid of one or two Seventh Army divi- edly rapid breakthrough to Stras-
sions, would make short work of the bourg and the Rhine, and he seemed
battered Nineteenth Army in the Colmar to attach little or no significance to
Pocket. At the time neither he nor his the concomitant First French Army
staff appears to have been aware of drive through the Belfort Gap to the
Hitler’s determination to hold on to Rhine and the possible collapse of the
Nineteenth Army. Instead, Eisenhower
11In addition to sources previously cited, the held to his policy that called for de-
boundary material is based on the following: stroying all German forces west of the
George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1947), p. 177; Devers Diary, 24 Rhine, from the Netherlands south to
and 26 Nov and 19 Dec 44; Blumenson, Putton the Swiss border, before initiating any
Papers, I, 1940–1945 (Boston: Houghton Mimin, major operations east of the river. His
1974), p. 582.
12Indicative of Devers’ early optimism about the
operational concept also dictated that
reduction of the Colmar Pocket was the fact that 6th the main Allied effort take place in
Army Group LI 3 of 26 November called for the
36th Division to be withdrawn from Colmar Pocket
operations by 30 November. LI 4 of 2 December re- 13Devers Diary, 23 Nov 44.
moved that restriction. 14See Devers Diary, 24 Nov and 5 Dec 44.
LOST OPPORTUNITIES 443

the north. Perhaps no one at SHAEF between Devers’ two widely separated
had expected the comparatively small armies. As a result, Patch had even
6th Army Group to achieve so much, fewer forces with which to continue
especially in the tough Vosges terrain. his general offensive. Finally, Devers
Furthermore, a Rhine crossing by the still faced the loss of two French divi-
Seventh Army might well have de- sions for operations on the Atlantic
manded that Eisenhower switch his coast. Thus, just when he felt most
main effort from the sector of Mont- strongly that his command should be
gomery’s 21st Army Group to that of heavily reinforced, Devers could fore-
Devers’ 6th Army Group, an extreme- see only a net dilution of his strength.
ly difficult task. With these consider- His gloom was at least partially dis-
ations in mind, Eisenhower may have pelled by the expected arrival of the
simply concluded that he was having remainder of the 14th Armored Divi-
enough trouble dealing with Mont- sion and all of the new 12th Armored
gomery and the British without trying Division in early December, although
to force through such a major change both units needed additional training
of direction in the main Allied ground before they would be ready to fight.16
thrust. The political demands of The influence of Patton on Eisen-
waging a coalition war could not be hower’s decision may have been inci-
denied. 15 dental, and the threat of transferring
In balance, Devers was fortunate to two divisions from the Seventh to the
escape from the conference with his Third Army may have been only a
command intact, having only narrowly means to keep Devers in line. Subse-
averted the loss of at least two experi- quently, Patton confided his belief
enced divisions, and perhaps the that Patch’s Seventh Army should
entire XV Corps as well, to Patton’s have pushed the VI Corps across the
Third Army. Far from being rein- Rhine,17 indicating that he did not
forced, Devers had to face the exten- share the worries of his superiors re-
sion of the army group boundary to garding the security of the Third
the west and north, which would only Army’s right flank. Even if the, VI
limit the power that the Seventh Corps had crossed the Rhine, Patton
Army, without reinforcements, could would still have had the bulk of ev-
bring to bear. The Seventh Army, in enth Army’s XV Corps on his right
turn, was to lose three more experi- flank west of the river,18 a point that
enced divisions temporarily: Leclerc’s Eisenhower and Bradley seem to
French 2d Armored Division and
Dahlquist’s 36th Infantry Division to 16SHAEF reassigned the arriving 12th Armored
help de Lattre’s forces clear the Division from the U.S. Ninth to the Seventh Army
Colmar Pocket; and O’Daniel’s 3d In- on 27 November 1944.
17 Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 1940–1945, p.
fantry Division, which was tasked to 583.
guard Strasbourg and cover the gap 18This assumes, as did Seventh Army plans, that
no more than two XV Corps .divisions would be
needed to establish a bridgehead near Rastatt, and
15 For Eisenhower’s relations with Montgomery in that these two would be returned to the west bank
November 1944, see Pogue, The Supreme Command, once the VI Corps had passed through the bridge-
ch. 17. head.
444 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

have ignored. Another possibility, the saving of other thousands of lives.20


apparently dismissed with little con- The Seventh Army, Davidson con-
sideration, was to have Patton’s cluded, had “provided [Eisenhower]
armor-heavy Third Army supply the with an opportunity to depart from
exploitation force that would drive his broad front strategy . . . and
northward out of the XV Corps’ pro- make a lightning thrust across the
jected bridgehead. Although the rede- Rhine in the Strasbourg-Rastatt
ployments necessitated by cranking area.” 21Indeed, a strong push up the
Third Army forces into the Rastatt east bank of the Rhine toward Mainz
bridgehead equation would have cre- and Frankfurt might have forced
ated difficult logistical and tactical Hitler to commit his carefully hus-
problems, such a maneuver was not banded reserves in order to prevent
impossible. the complete destruction of Army
Discussing the matter thirty years Group G; and in the south the rem-
after the event, Lt. Gen. Garrison H. nants of the Nineteenth Army could
Davidson, the Seventh Army Engineer hardly have been expected to increase
in 1944, who would have been largely their strength in the Colmar Pocket in
responsible for moving Seventh Army the face of such dangerous penetra-
units across the Rhine, still felt that tion. 22 Almost thirty-five years to the
Eisenhower’s Sarrebourg decision day after Eisenhower’s fateful deci-
was, to say the least, open to ques- sion, Col. Donald S. Bussey, then the
tion.19 At the time, Seventh Army en- ULTRA officer at Seventh Army
gineers were prepared to support an headquarters, retained as his “most
assault crossing of the Rhine on a vivid recollection of that event . . .
two-division, or eight-battalion, front. the long faces around the headquar-
Citing the thorough preparations un- ters when we were denied the oppor-
dertaken by the Seventh Army engi- tunity to exploit [the] breakthrough
neers to support the effort, General to the Rhine. . . . 23 ”

Davidson wrote: For General Patch and all his staff


It is interesting to conjecture what might the abrupt changes must have been
have been the effect of the exploitation of particularly disappointing. Eisenhow-
an unexpected crossing of the Rhine in er’s decision meant that the Seventh
the south in late November or early De-
cember and an envelopment of the Ar- 20Garrison H. Davidson, Grandpa Gar: The Saga of
dennes to the north along the east bank One Soldier As Told to His Grandchildren (privately re-
of the Rhine. . . . I have often wondered produced, 1976), pp. 94-95; also Ltrs, Davidson to
what might have happened had [Eisen- Brig Gen Hal C. Pattison (Chief of Military History),
hower] had the audacity to take a calcu- 23 Jul 68, and to Robert Ross Smith, 20 Dec 80
lated risk as General Patton would have (copies at CMH).
instead of playing it safe. Perhaps success 21Ibid., p. 95.
would have eliminated any possibility of 22According to the Griess-Devers interviews,
the Battle of the Bulge; 40,000 casualties Devers and his staff were well aware that the Ger-
there could have been avoided and the mans had placed the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies in
war shortened by a number of months at reserve and were concerned that these forces might
be used against the Seventh Army following the fail-
ure of the Panzer Lehr counterattack.
19In November 1944 Davidson was a brigadier 23Ltr, Donald S. Bussey to Smith, 27 Nov 79
general. (copy CMH).
LOST OPPORTUNITIES 445

Army’s principal effort was not to be bridgehead. Had the Seventh Army
directed at Germany east of the begun crossing the Rhine in strength,
Rhine, but rather against German ter- the reserves that were later poured
ritory west of the river. The direction into the Colmar Pocket would have
of Patch’s main push would thus have been needed elsewhere, and Hitler
to be changed from east and north- might have been more amenable to a
east to generally north, a switch that general withdrawal back across the
forestalled any chance to develop a upper Rhine if the Reich heartland
shortcut into the heart of Germany were under a more immediate threat.
east of the Rhine. In addition, the Explaining his decision in a letter
Seventh Army would lose most of its to General Marshall on 27 November,
priceless momentum. Eisenhower’s Eisenhower once more revealed that
orders required major regroupings he had only a limited role in mind for
within both of the army’s corps; as a the 6th Army Group. All current 6th
result, neither corps would be ready Army Group operations, Eisenhower
to launch another major offensive told the American Chief of Staff,
until 5 December. These delays, in “are, of course, merely for the pur-
turn, would provide the First and pose” of cleaning up Devers’ area
Nineteenth Armies with a much needed before turning the bulk of Seventh
respite, during which they would be Army northward to undertake, in con-
able to rest and reorganize their units junction with Patton’s Third Army, “a
and absorb replacements and materi- converging attack upon the great sa-
el.24 lient in the Siegfried Line west of the
In the end, Eisenhower’s Sarre- Rhine.” If only Devers could “hur-
bourg decision also reinforced Hit- riedly throw his weight north,” then
ler’s own plans. First, it confirmed the Patton’s chances of success would be
German leader’s decision to adhere to greatly improved, and he was “anx-
a counteroffensive in the Ardennes ious,” he admitted, “to get the thing
instead of switching the main effort to speeded up.” 25 Once again Eisen-
Lorraine and northern Alsace. hower had opted for an operational
Second, the decision gave the Ger- “strategy” of firepower and attri-
mans a free hand to continue the Ar- tion-the direct approach-as op-
dennes buildup, which could proceed posed to a war of opportunistic ma-
without facing the crisis that a Rhine neuver. The Seventh Army was to
crossing by the Seventh Army would have no opportunity to fully exploit
have created. Finally, it allowed the the hard-won successes of the Sa-
Nineteenth Army to reorganize while Verne Gap and Strasbourg.
continuing to maintain the Colmar
25Quotes from Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 27
24Seventh Army Rpt, II, 418, 455–59. Nov 44, Eisenhower Papers, IV, 2320–21.
PART FIVE

THE CAMPAIGN FOR ALSACE


CHAPTER XXV

A Change in Direction
By evening on 26 November 1944, zenau, about five miles northeast of
Patch’s Seventh Army had begun to Strasbourg (Map 32). On the 27th,
redeploy its forces in compliance with Patch intended to transfer the French
General Eisenhower’s decision to 2d Armored Division, which was cur-
send the army northward. West of the rently securing the Strasbourg area,
Low Vosges and north of Sarrebourg, to the VI Corps, and give Brooks’
its new Fenetrange-Ramstein bounda- 100th Infantry Division to Haislip to
ry with the Third Army defined the make up for the loss. The XV Corps
future axis of advance of the Seventh would thus have four infantry divi-
Army. In the far south, however, its sions—the 44th, 45th, 79th, and
old Gerardmer-Selestat-Erstein border 100th—to make the initial assault
with de Lattre’s First French Army north. Although the Seventh Army’s
was unaltered and would remain so subsequent deployment was rather
until Brooks’ VI Corps finished push- awkward, the continued German
ing its way east and northeast through weakness in the center of Patch’s
the High Vosges. At the time of the command-the gap between the First
new orders, only elements of O’Dan- and Nineteenth Armies of Army Group
iel’s 3d Division had actually reached G —allowed him to split his forces in
the Alsatian plains, while the 103d this manner without running too
and 36th Divisions were still fighting great a risk.
through the high mountain passes.
Thus, temporarily at least, the Sev- The XV Corps Sector
enth Army would be advancing in two
different directions—east through the West of the Low Vosges,1 in the
High Vosges and, in the area between Saar River valley, 26 November found
Sarrebourg and Strasbourg, north the Panzer Lehr Division and elements
toward the German border. The of the 361st VolksgrenadierDivision pull-
northern effort was initially to be con- ing northward to a delaying line be-
ducted by Haislip’s XV Corps alone; tween Wolfskirchen, Eywiller, and
consequently, Patch made the bound-
ary between his XV and VI Corps an 1 The Low Vosges are generally considered to be
the section of the Vosges Mountains that extends
east-west line from Wasselonne, at northeast from the Saverne Gap about thirty miles
the base of the Vosges, to La Want- to the Lauter River.
A CHANGE IN DIRECTION 451

Durstel. About the same time, the Frohmuhl, on Route N–419 in the
25th Panzer Grenadier Division was clos- Low Vosges.3 The weak 361st Volks-
ing on Sarre-Union, about five miles grenadier Division, which had been of
to the north, intent on stemming any little help securing Panzer Lehr’s coun-
further American advance. Pursuing terattack, was to redeploy eastward
the German units were CCB of the and, after absorbing remnants of the
4th Armored Division, part of the 553d Volksgrenadier Division, hold over
Third Army’s XII Corps operating in ten miles of the new front along N-
the XV Corps’ zone, and two regi- 419 and the Moder River from Froh-
ments of the XV Corps’ 44th Divi- muhl to Ingwiller, across the Low
sion—the 71st and 114th—assisted by Vosges Mountains. 4
the corps’ 106th Cavalry Group. East of the Vosges the 245th Volks-
During the day, the rest of the 4th grenadier Division, which had yet to
Armored also entered the XV Corps’ reach the First Army’s area of oper-
sector, pressing for Sarre-Union and ation from the Netherlands, was to
bypassing the 44th Division’s slower- cover the front from Ingwiller south-
moving infantry. 2 east twelve miles along the Modec to
As their forces retreated north, Schweighausen. Pending the arrival of
Army Group G and the First Army began the 245th, the sector would be held
to develop plans for establishing a by miscellaneous units under Corps
more substantial east-west defensive Command Vosges, reinforced by the re-
line in front of the German border. connaissance battalion of Panzer Lehr.
Not expecting their forces to hold the The 256th Volksgrenadier Division, the
Wolfskirchen-Durstel area for long, leading regiment of which reached
General Balck and General von Kno- Haguenau on 26 November, would
belsdorff, who commanded the First hold the final sixteen miles of the new
Army, hoped to establish a new series line, from Schweighausen past Ha-
of positions that stretched east from guenau to Gries and then to the
Sarre-Union, through the Low Vosges Rhine River at Gambsheim, about ten
and along the Moder River, past the miles northeast of Strasbourg.
small city of Haguenau, and on to the Responsibility for establishing and
Rhine—as straight-line distance of defending the new Sarre-Union–
nearly forty-five miles. Contrary to Gambsheim line would be vested in
earlier plans, Panzer Lehr was to
remain in the First Army’s rear area for 3The directive of 21 November that released the
the time being, while the 25th Panzer Panzer Lehr for its abortive counterattack had stipu-
lated that the division would return northward by
Grenadier Division would hold along 28 November to prepare for the Ardennes offensive.
the new main line of resistance from Apparently this restriction was lifted on or about 24
Sarre-Union east about nine miles to November, when Hitler postponed the Ardennes
operation to mid-December.
4 The 553d Volksgrenadier Division had been almost
2 Information on German operations in this chap- eliminated while defending Sarrebourg against the
ter is from von Luttichau, “German Operations,” XV Corps’ Saverne Gap offensive. Apparently not
chs. 25 and 26, and for the delaying action ch. 23. all remaining troops of the 553d went to the 361st
The operations of the U.S. 4th Armored Division in Division, however, for a reconstituted 553d Division
late November are covered in Cole, The Lorraine appeared in the German order of battle of January
Campaign, ch. 10. 1945.
452 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

the LXXXIX Corps, currently reorga- 106th Cavalry. Farther east, outpost-
nizing north of Haguenau after ing the Alsatian plains and protecting
having lost much of its staff and the northern flank of the French 2d
almost all of its equipment in the Sa- Armored Division from Saverne to
verne area. The corps became oper- Strasbourg, was the 45th Division’s
ational again on 28 or 29 November, 180th regiment; on its right was the
taking over the missions and units as- 79th Infantry Division, with all three
signed to Corps Command Vosges. of its organic regiments holding the
At first, the German defenses were sector south of Haguenau.
extremely weak east of the Vosges. Haislip intended to reorganize and
The 361st Volksgrenadier Division, for beef up these forces before attacking.
example, was still greatly under- During the next two days he relieved
strength: one regiment had only two the 45th Division’s 179th regiment of
battalions, one of which could muster its security responsibilities in the Was-
only 150 troops; another regiment selonne area south of Saverne and sent
consisted of a single infantry battalion it north to the right of its sister unit, the
with 300 effectives; and a third had 180th. Next, when the 100th Infantry
two battalions of 300 men each. The Division passed to his control on the
two divisions coming from Army Group 27th, he began deploying it north of
H in the Netherlands were not in Saverne, as he moved the 324th regi-
much better condition. The 256th ment back to its parent unit on the
Volksgrenadier Division’s three regi- other side of the Low Vosges and re-
ments had only two half-strength bat- turned the 157th regiment to the 45th
talions each, and the 245th Volksgrena- Division on the other side. The net
dier Division’s six infantry battalions result of this complicated switching
were even weaker. Furthermore, the would give each of his four northward-
245th contained a large percentage of facing divisions their three organic in-
former navy and air force personnel fantry regiments, while presenting a
that had been shoveled into the army, continuous front to the German de-
and its artillery consisted of captured fenders and allowing the divisions to
Russian guns with little ammunition. attack in strength as soon as possible.
On 26 November General Haislip, The XV Corps thus had on line, west to
the XV Corps commander, had ele- east, the 44th, 100th, 45th, and 79th
ments of three infantry divisions in- Infantry Divisions. The gradual arrival
termixed across his northern front to of the rest of the new 14th Armored
deal with these German forces. In the Division, which Patch had earmarked
XV Corps sector west of the Vosges for the drive north, would also help.
was the 44th Infantry Division with its However, the process of reorienting
71st and 114th regiments reinforced his entire command north, to include
by another regiment, the 157th from the corps’ logistical, fire support, engi-
the 45th Division, and elements of the neer, and intelligence elements,
106th Cavalry Group. East of the proved time-consuming, and it would
Vosges and directly north of Saverne be several days before all of Haislip’s
was the 44th Division’s third regi- forces could test the new German
ment-the 324th-and the rest of the line.
A CHANGE IN DIRECTION 453

The VI Corps Sector on the 26th, five miles short of the


Alsatian plains and about fifteen miles
While the XV Corps aligned itself southwest of Molsheim. The 103d Di-
for a drive north, Brooks’ VI Corps vision’s immediate objectives were Le
continued to push through the Hohwald and Barr, both focal points
Vosges, intending to clear the entire on the defensive line that the Nine-
area from the mountains to the Rhine teenth Army was trying to establish
of all German forces in its sector. On north of Colmar.
26 November, Leclerc’s 2d Armored Farther south, the 36th Infantry Di-
Division held the Strasbourg area vision’s leading unit, the 142d Infan-
with CCL and CCV, but was sched- try, had reached St. Croix-aux-Mines,
uled to be transferred to the VI on Route N–59 about seven miles
Corps on the 27th; the tired 3d Divi- south of Ville as well as seven miles
sion would take over responsibility short of the Alsatian plains. St. Croix
for Strasbourg. Brooks wanted the ar- had been another projected defensive
mored unit to drive south toward Er- focal point of the Nineteenth Army, but
stein, Selestat, and Colmar, which the 142d infantrymen had taken t h e
would complement the advance of his town before the Germans could
infantry divisions from the west. To deploy enough strength there for a
that end, CCV captured two east-west protracted defense. South and south-
bridges over the I11 River on the 26th, west of St. Croix, however, the rest of
several miles south of Strasbourg; the tired 36th Division was strung out
CCD, in reserve, prepared to lead the for about twenty miles, encountering
drive south; and CCR continued to stubborn resistance in the High
patrol along the Bruche River and Vosges west of Fraize, as had its
Canal west of Strasbourg, maintaining neighbor, the 3d Algerian Division,
contact with the 3d Division in the vi- which was still stuck in the vicinity of
cinity of Molsheim. The 3d Division Gerardmer.
had entered Molsheim on the 26th The Nineteenth Army had not yet
and pushed four to five miles farther been able to form a solid defensive
north and south into the vineyards of ring around its Colmar bridgehead.
the Alsatian plains, meeting little re- In VI Corps’ sector on 26 November,
sistance. As the rest of its compo- Thumm’s battered LXIV Corps held
nents arrived on the plains, leading the area between Selestat and Barr,
units of the infantry division began guarding the approaches to the Alsa-
moving into Strasbourg on the night tian plains with bits and pieces of the
of 26–27 November, freeing the rest 708th Volksgrenadier and 716th Infantry
of Leclerc’s armor for the drive south. Divisions. East of Barr to the Rhine,
Other VI Corps elements posi- the northern edge of the bridgehead
tioned themselves to assist. CCA of was screened by a provisional unit,
the 14th Armored Division, still part Division Buercky, assisted by a melange
of Brooks’ corps, moved into Mol- of SS elements, security police, ambu-
sheim in the wake of the 3d Division; latory hospital patients (including a
to the south, leading elements of the company of VD cases), and some en-
103d Infantry Division reached Ville gineers, all backed by an 88-mm. anti-
454 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

aircraft battalion and a few assault November. Patch wanted the VI


guns. During the 26th, the 106th Corps’ two southernmost divisions,
Panzer Brigade, redeploying after its the 103d and the 36th, to complete
abortive and costly counterattack their push over the Vosges and, as-
against French I Corps forces around sisted by CCA of the 14th Armored
Mulhouse, closed Division Buercky’s Division, to secure Barr and Selestat
sector to take up positions in the vi- as quickly as possible. As noted
cinity of Erstein. The 280th Assault above, on the 27th Patch formally
Gun Battalion accompanied the bri- transferred Brooks’ 100th Division to
gade, and both promised to give Haislip and Haislip’s French 2d Ar-
some concrete form to the German mored Division to Brooks, with the VI
defenses north of Colmar. Corps’ 3d Division assuming all secu-
Southwest of the LXIV Corps, Peter- rity responsibilities for the Strasbourg
sen’s XC Corps (formerly the IV area. Once Barr and Selestat had
Luftwaffe Field Corps) continued to hold been secured, however, Patch intend-
out in the High Vosges, defending the ed to turn the entire VI Corps north-
western approaches to Colmar and ward, leaving only Leclerc’s armored
facing part of the U.S. 36th Infantry Di- division in the area north of Colmar.
vision as well as the 3d Algerian Divi- At the time, he estimated that Le-
sion and other elements of the French clerc’s division, reinforced by a few
II Corps. The XC Corps had the barely regiments of VI Corps infantry that
viable 26th Volksgrenadier Division on its stayed behind, could easily mop up
right and the 267th Volkgrenadier Divi- the German forces left between Seles-
sion, now the Nineteenth Army’s best unit, tat and Colmar, a distance of about
on its left; both divisions occupied ex- ten miles, joining units of the First
cellent defensive terrain. Farther south French Army as they drove north
Schack’s LXIII Corps, facing the bulk of from Mulhouse. Furthermore, Patch
the First French Army, defended the expected all American forces support-
southwestern and southern portions of ing the effort to be redeployed north-
the Colmar Pocket with what was left of ward by 30 November. Clearly both
the 159th, 187th, 338th, and 178th In- he and Devers still believed that the
fantry Divisions and the problem-ridden Germans would not make a strong
30th SS Division. The next day, 27 No- effort to hold the Colmar bridgehead.
vember, as de Lattre’s forces complet- Constrained from advancing across
ed their double envelopment at Burn- the Rhine, they were thus anxious to
haupt, Wiese began transferring the turn the bulk of the Seventh Army
battered 298th Division northward to north to support the attack of Pat-
strengthen the LXIV Corps. Initially he ton’s Third Army into the Saar, per-
planned to concentrate the 198th in the haps beating him to the German
area of Selestat, a critical rail and road border. 5
junction city on the Alsatian plains ten Based on Patch’s initial guidance,
miles south of Barr and less than fif-
teen miles north of Colmar.
5 6th Army Gp LI 3, 26 Nov 44; Ltr Directive, CG,
Seventh Army’s plans for this Seventh Army, to CGs, XV and VI Corps, 27 Nov
sector were in a state of flux on 26 44; de Lattre, History, pp. 280–81.
A CHANGE IN DIRECTION 455

Brooks gave more specific instruc- the same time, the VI Corps’ 117th
tions to his VI Corps units on the Cavalry Squadron moved from Was-
26th. First he ordered CCA of the selonne to the Gambsheim area north
14th Armored Division to move of Strasbourg and subsequently, on
quickly from the east in multiple col- 29 and 30 November, attempted to
umns in order to secure the section of occupy Gambsheim. The light mecha-
Route N-83 south of Erstein behind nized unit lacked the strength, howev-
the main German defensive line. er, to handle the growing German
Once the French 2d Armored Divi- forces in the area and fell back to La
sion had taken Erstein, it was to pass Wantzenau, thus screening the VI
through that portion of the road se- Corps’ northern boundary.
cured by CCA and advance rapidly to With these forces securing his
the Selestat area. CCA was then to re- northeastern flank, Brooks continued
group in the vicinity of Benfeld, five to direct the 103d and 36th Divisions
miles south of Erstein, and be pre- through the remaining German
pared to reinforce other units as nec- Vosges defenses in the VI Corps
essary. The 103d and 36th Infantry sector. South of the 30th Infantry, the
Divisions were to continue pushing 103d Division’s 411th Infantry
east to the Alsatian plains and then reached Le Hohwald on the 27th and,
secure the area behind the French ar- despite determined local resistance,
mored division as Leclerc’s forces sent one column through to the Alsa-
moved south. Finally, the 36th Divi- tian plains at the western edge of
sion was to earmark one regimental Barr, about twenty miles south of
combat team to reinforce the French Molsheim. Barr, however, turned out
2d Armored Division as far as an east- to be well defended, and a two-day
west line through Colmar. Presum- fight ensued that involved much of
ably the 36th Division would also re- the 41lthInfantry as well as elements
deploy north by 30 November, as of the 14th Armored Division’s CCA.
specified by Patch. 6 As units of Haffner’s 103d Division
struggled through Le Hohwald to
The VI Corps Advance Barr, the French 2d Armored Division
(27 November-4 December) and CCA of the U.S. 14th Armored
Division began the drive south. Ini-
On 27 November the bulk of the 3d tially CCA split into three columns;
Infantry Division moved into the one approached Barr from the north,
Strasbourg sector and by 1 December while the other two moved against the
had cleared the city of the bridgehead German strongpoint at Erstein. Of
that the Germans had been able to these, the first column pushed east di-
maintain. Southwest of Strasbourg the rectly toward Erstein while the second
3d Division’s 30th regiment policed moved southeast, swinging behind the
the area south of Molsheim and tem- strongpoint in the vicinity of Benfeld.
porarily provided an infantry battal- Meanwhile, the bulk of the French 2d
ion for Leclerc’s initial drive south. At Armored Division began to advance
on Erstein from the north, directly
6VI Corps OI17, 26 NOV44. down Routes N-83 and N-68.
456 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

As the French and American armor nate enough to recover all eight of the
advanced, they encountered a series abandoned medium tanks, still in ser-
of difficulties that were to plague viceable condition, as well as nineteen
mobile operations on the southern of Company B’s tankers. 7 The men of
Alsatian plains for many months. All the 14th Armored Division were ac-
waterways, regardless of size and pur- quiring their experience the hard way.
pose, were running high, and many The new American armored unit had
were at flood stage as a result of difficulties in the Erstein area as well.
heavy rains. The soft, water-soaked German defenses and counterattacks
ground restricted vehicles to the main forced the southern column out of
roads, which were often mined and Benfeld, about five miles south of Er-
blocked by all types of barriers. The stein, on the 27th, while the Erstein de-
Germans had destroyed almost all of fenders unceremoniously threw back
the bridges in the area, however the northern column on the 28th. Fi-
small, and targeted the most signifi- nally relieved by elements of the
cant crossing sites with mortar and ar- French 2d Armored Division, CCA re-
tillery fire. Rain and sometimes snow grouped its scattered units on the night
continued to curtail Allied air support of 28–29 November just south of Barr,
operations and also interfered with and prepared to resume operations
radio communications. All these fac- south. Meanwhile, late on the 28th, Le-
tors reduced the mobility of the clerc’s CCD pushed into Erstein from
Allied armored units, making it diffi- the northeast against strong resistance
cult for them to operate with speed and, after a pitched battle, occupied
and efficiency. most of the city by dark. Here the
Throughout 28 November heavy French tactical experience paid off, en-
fighting took place at both Barr and Er- abling them to wield their tank, artil-
stein. At Barr the 411th Infantry bat- lery, and armored infantry forces more
tled into the town from the west, at- efficiently than the novice American
tempting to clear each house and formation.
building one by one; meanwhile, the T h e next day, 29 November, the 2d
supporting CCA column entered the Armored Division’s CCD mopped up
city from the north and east. This at Erstein and, against steady resist-
proved a costly mistake. With little ac- ance, slowly spread out to the west,
companying infantry, the armor found southwest, and south. As the rest of
itself out of place in the narrow streets Leclerc’s division rolled up to the
and lanes; it lost eighteen tanks in the Barr-Erstein area, CCA of the 14th
course of the day, eight of which were Armored Division, still game, began
abandoned when Company B of the advancing south of Barr, but was pre-
48th Tank Battalion was forced to with- vented from moving more than a mile
draw from the town, leaving behind or so toward Selestat because of a
most of its equipment and many of its
dead, wounded, and missing. The fol- 7Seventh A r m y Rpt, II, 448–49; and Capt. Joseph
lowing day, 29 November, the 103d Di- Carter, The History of the 14th Armored Division (Atlan-
ta: Albert Love Enterprises, n.d.), n.p. These two
vision’s foot soldiers finally cleared sources offer greatly differing accounts of the same
Barr, and the armored unit was fortu- episode.
A CHANGE IN DIRECTION 457

series of destroyed bridges. American timetable had been upset.


While the fighting was taking place Yet, until the morning of 29 Novem-
at Barr and Erstein, the rest of the ber, General Patch and his G–2 ap-
103d Division had pushed slowly peared to believe that the increasing
through the Vosges, bypassing Barr German resistance in the northern
on the south, and had reached Dam- section of the Colmar bridgehead was
bach-la-Ville, five miles north of Se- only a temporary condition, repre-
lestat, on 30 November in the face of senting an effort to cover a phased
only scattered German resistance. and orderly Nineteenth Army withdrawal
South of the 103d, Dahlquist's 36th east across the Rhine.8 If so, the Sev-
Division had continued its slow, enth Army and VI Corps staffs must
ragged advance directly on Selestat, have been surprised when, during the
all the while pushing laboriously over 29th, the French 2d Armored Division
some of the highest and most rugged reported encountering troops of the
hill masses of the High Vosges. While 198th Division, and the 36th Division
the 141st regiment operated off to reported capturing members of the
the southwest in the Bonhomme Pass 106th Panzer Brigade. 9 Obviously a
area, the 142d and 143d Infantry, Nineteenth Army withdrawal across the
pressing generally eastward, found Rhine would not have required rede-
some towns and villages unoccupied ploying these two units north from
and passed many unmanned road- the Belfort-Mulhouse sector. With
blocks. Nevertheless, progress was this new information, Devers, Patch,
slow because of time-consuming, and Brooks began to reevaluate their
cross-country marches to outflank own plans. Initially, however, their
manned German strongpoints; the only change was to rescind the 30
difficulties of pushing armor through November deadline on the redeploy-
the narrow, easily interdicted moun- ment of the involved American forces
tain roads; and the continual prob- north. The VI Corps would have to
lems of resupply. Moreover, as the continue its offensive south against
36th Division neared the Alsatian Selestat, and for the moment Hais-
plains, German resistance, although lip's XV Corps would have to carry
still somewhat disorganized, contin- out the northern offensive alone. 10
ued to stiffen. The first major ele- On 30 November VI Corps began
ment to reach the plains, the 3d Bat- its advance on Selestat. The 14th Ar-
talion, 142d Infantry, emerged from
the mountains on 30 November, five 8 Seventh Army Conference File, 29 Nov 44; Sev-
miles south of Dambach-la-Ville and enth A r m y Rpt, II, 448.
only two miles west of Selestat. 9The two German units had started northward on
Patch had expected that by 30 No- 27 November in accordance with OKW and OB West
orders. If ULTRA warned Patch of this move, he
vember both Barr and Selestat would may have withheld the information from his subor-
have been secured and that the dinates until it could be confirmed by other sources.
French 2d Armored Division would There is no evidence, however, that ULTRA helped
have reached Colmar, making it possi- out here.
10 Amendment, 30 Nov 44, to Ltr Directive, CG,
ble to redeploy the rest of Brooks’ Seventh Army, to CGs, VI and XV Corps, 27 Nov
American forces north. Obviously the 44.
458 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

SELESTAT, CITYAREAWITH ILLRIVERIN FARBACKGROUND


CENTRAL

mored Division’s CCA, after an in- 83 all the way to Selestat. To the east,
tense fight, captured St. Pierre on a CCD column pushed south along
Route N–422, thus opening the road the Rhine from Kraft to Friesenheim,
south of Barr; the next day it reached while CCV moved into line for the
the towns of Scherwiller and Eber- first time between CCR and CCD. On
sheim, both just a few miles north of 3 December the French division
the city. However, CCA began rede- halted, awaiting new orders, along an
ploying north on 2 and 3 December east-west line roughly between Eber-
to join its parent unit in the XV sheim and Friesenheim, with the Ger-
Corps, and units of the 103d Infantry mans still entrenched close to the
and French 2d Armored Divisions Rhine on the unit’s left flank.
quickly took over its positions. While the French armor moved
As American forces slowly con- south, avoiding the larger urban
verged on Selestat from the west and areas, the 103d Infantry Division en-
north, Leclerc expanded his hold on tered Selestat on 1 December, accom-
the central and eastern portions of panied later in the afternoon by units
the Alsatian plains. CCR took Benfeld of the 36th Division. By the 2d, the
on 1 December and cleared Route N– two divisions had four battalions of
A CHANGE IN DIRECTION 459

infantry—well supported with armor though terrain objectives were clearly


and artillery—inside the city as well as unappetizing to Devers and Patch, they
other units surrounding it on the out- gave the effort their full support, di-
side. But despite the overwhelming recting Haislip to start his redeploying
Allied strength in the area, it took forces north as soon as possible. On 26
nearly three days to clear the city of November, while the rest of the XV
German defenders, with the last re- Corps reorganized and prepared for
sistance ending only on the afternoon the new mission, Haislip ordered the
of 4 December. 11 44th Division, currently the only unit
With the fall of Selestat, the VI facing north, to continue its operations
Corps’ mission officially ended. Patch west of the Low Vosges in support of
had decided to leave the 36th Divi- the Third Army’s 4th Armored Divi-
sion, half of which was still in the sion in the Saar River valley. At the
Vosges, to help Leclerc’s 2d Armored time, the 4th Armored was attempting
Division make the final push south to to penetrate the German Wolfskir-
Colmar. Accordingly, the rest of chen-Eywiller-Durstel delaying line
Brooks’ VI Corps forces including the just south of Sarre-Union; Haislip at-
103d Infantry Division began moving tached the 44th Division’s 71st regi-
north. However, the matter of Colmar ment to the armored unit in order to
was obviously not settled. Progress speed up the effort, while sending the
against the northern edge of the 44th’s other regiment in the area, the
pocket had been extremely slow, and 114th, north across the western slopes
advances in the west and south by the of the Vosges.
tired and undersupplied First French The 4th Armored Division, weary
Army had been even less successful. and roadbound by heavy rains and
Now, with Devers pulling forces out flooded streams, made slow progress,
of the Colmar region and Wiese con- but reached Wolfskirchen and
stantly reinforcing the defenders Eywiller on the 27th, Durstel on the
within, closing down the pocket was 29th, and Sarre-Union on 1 Decem-
becoming increasingly difficult. ber, although it took four more days
to secure the city. By that time the
The X V Corps Moves North 4th had passed out of the XV Corps’
(26 November-4 December) sector, and the 71st regiment had re-
turned to 44th Division control. 12
In the northern sector of the Seventh East of the 4th Armored Division,
Army’s area of operation, the objec- the 114th regiment kept pace, taking
tives of Haislip’s XV Corps were tied to Tieffenbach on 28 November and
the Third Army’s rate of advance. Al- thus penetrating the planned German
main line of resistance before it could
11 The Congressional Medal of Honor was posthu-
be established. However, as the regi-
mously awarded to Sgt. Ellis R. Weicht, Company F, ment moved east along Route N–419
142d Infantry, 36th Division, for heroic action at St.
Hippolyte southwest of Selestat; his was the first of 12For details of 4th Armored Division operations
several such awards to American soldiers in this during the period 26 November-4 December, see
area during December 1944 and January 1945, at- Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, pp. 469–71, 521–25,
testing to the bitterness of the fighting. and 530–31.
460 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE
into the mountains, it came up Not wanting to channel his attacks
against more organized defenses and along the easily defensible roadway,
was unable to reach its new objective, Haislip planned to bring the rest of
Frohmuhl. South of Tieffenbach and the 100th Division up the crest of the
Frohmuhl, the 121st Cavalry Squad- Low Vosges, have it attack through
ron of XV Corps’ 106th Cavalry the center of the German positions
Group pushed reconnaissance ele- between Frohmuhl and Ingwiller, and
ments into the Low Vosges, where then continue north with the 44th Di-
they encountered increasing numbers vision on its left to seize several key
of German patrols and reported Maginot Line positions about twelve
German armor and infantry moving miles away. Specifically, Spragins’
east along N–419. The traffic may 44th Division was to strike northeast
have marked the redeployment of the for the fortified high ground at and
361st Volksgrenadier Division and Panzer near the town of Siersthal, and Bur-
Lehr’s reconnaissance battalion. Mean- ress’ 100th Division, with two regi-
while, the 44th Division’s third regi- ments, was to head for Bitche, four
ment, the 324th Infantry, had just re- miles east of Siersthal and the center
turned from the other side of the of some of the strongest Maginot
Vosges, and moved up to the N–419 Line fortifications. The 100th’s other
area to help consolidate the division’s regiment, the 397th, was to outflank
hold on the key roadway. By 2 De- and overrun the German defenses on
cember the 114th Infantry had finally Route N–419 west of Ingwiller and
seized Frohmuhl, while the other two then join the rest of the division. The
regiments of the 44th Division two-division attack would begin on 3
pushed a few miles north of N–419; December across a front of about
progress, however, was still extremely twelve miles through rugged, heavily
tedious. wooded terrain that greatly restricted
On the other side of the mountains, armored support. 13
east of the 44th Division’s sector, Now it was the turn of Haislip’s
units of the 45th Infantry Division forces to try their skills at mountain
had already joined the assault on the fighting. The XV Corps’ attack
German Vosges defenses. On 28 No- through the width of the Low Vosges
vember the 45th Division’s 157th began on the 3d as scheduled, but
regiment had taken Ingwiller, but the neither of the two participating divi-
100th Division’s 397th regiment, tem- sions was able to push more than a
porarily attached to the 45th, had few miles north during the first two
been able to push only about a mile days. All across the front, the defend-
or so along N–419 northeast of the ing Germans used observed artillery
town by the evening of 2 December. and mortar fire to slow American
On both sides of the Low Vosges the progress, while demolitions, road-
361st Volksgrenadiers, realizing that the blocks, minefields, and a series of
N–419 mountain road was the key to minor counterattacks contributed to
its defensive position, had begun to
defend the highway with more deter-
mina tion. 13XV Corps FO 14, 2 Dec 44.
A CHANGE IN DIRECTION 461

the delays. The central Vosges area objective line by the 30th. Only on
proved particularly difficult. Attacking the far right, around Mertzwiller, did
from the vicinity of La Petite-Pierre its units encounter any serious diffi-
deep in the mountains, units of the culties. There the 180th Infantry was
100th Division managed to advance unable to force a crossing of the
four miles northward by 3 December, Moder River southwest of Mertzwiller
reaching the hamlet of Puberg just until 30 November, and even then the
south of Route N–419, pushing a lone Germans managed to keep the regi-
infantry battalion across the road on ment at arm’s length from the town.
the 4th. T o the east, however, other Despite the delay at Mertzwiller,
division elements were thrown out of Haislip was heartened by the advance
Wingen-sur-Moder on the night of 3– of the 45th Division and directed it to
4 December by a German counterat- continue north and northeast to a
tack in which one American rifle com- new objective line-a railroad run-
pany was surrounded and eventually ning between Niederbronn-les-Bains,
forced to surrender. German troops six miles northeast of Rothbach, and
continued to hold the Wingen area Mertzwiller.15As the division resumed
and parts of Route N–419 through its attack on 1 December, however, it
the 4th, thereby making it difficult to finally began to encounter heavier re-
supply the 100th Division forces and sistance, marking the arrival of the
delaying the longer drive toward the 245th Volksgrenadier Division ’s leading
corps’ Siersthal-Bitche objectives. elements into the LXXXIX Corps’
East of the Vosges, Haislip also sector. Additional factors that slowed
sent the 45th and 79th Divisions the advance included an increase in
northward with what forces were prepared defensive measures—mine-
ready to attack, trying to keep their fields, roadblocks, demolitions, and
advance roughly parallel to the 44th so forth-and, most important, the
and 100th Divisions in the Vosges. growing difficulty of the terrain as the
Advancing on a much broader front, 45th Division pushed into the Low
the units headed for an artificial line, Vosges foothills. Nevertheless, the di-
eighteen miles wide, between Roth- vision was within a few miles of its
bach on the west, at the base of the objective by 4 December, actually
Vosges, and Bischwiller on the east, pushing across the railway at Gunder-
with the boundary line of the two di- shoffen in the division center. Mertz-
visions at Mertzwiller, about eight willer, however, remained in German
miles southeast of Rothbach. 14 hands. Eyeing its location on the
Their progress was slow but not as boundary between the 45th and 79th
painful as in the Vosges because of Divisions, Haislip suspected that the
the open terrain and the late arrival Germans were attempting to develop
of defending German forces. On the the town into an assembly area and
left, Eagles’ 45th Division took Ing- strongpoint that might threaten the
willer on the 28th, Rothbach on the flank of either division.
29th, and most of what was left of the
15XV Corps OI 57, 1 Dec 44; XV Corps FO 14, 2
14XV Corps FO 13, 27 Nov 44. Dec 44.
462 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

AND PACKMULE MAKETHEIR


SOLDIER Vosges, 1944.
WAY IN HEAVYSNOWFALL,

On the XV Corps’ far right, the ob- small German infantry forces, both
jectives of Wyche’s 79th Division were units approached the southern banks
more modest. With the 256th Volks- of the Moder between Schweighausen
grenadier Division beginning to close and Haguenau on the following
the Haguenau area on 26 November evening, only to discover that the
and with strong German forces occu- Germans had evacuated most of their
pying the Gambsheim area on the di- forces across the river. There the
vision’s right flank, Haislip directed regiments halted, waiting for further
the 79th to undertake only strong orders.
reconnaissance to the north and
northeast without becoming seriously An Evaluation
engaged. Wyche, the 79th Division
commander, posted both the 313th Advancing in two different direc-
Infantry and the attached 94th Caval- tions on two widely separated fronts
ry Squadron on his right, facing had greatly dissipated the combat
Gambsheim; on the 29th he began power of the Seventh Army, as every-
probing toward the south bank of the one should have expected. Eisenhow-
Moder River with the 314th and er’s decision on 24 November to turn
315th regiments. Encountering some the 6th Army Group’s main effort
artillery and mortar fire but only north had not only halted Patch’s
A CHANGE IN DIRECTION 463

plans for a drive into Germany north- Devers had underestimated the
east of Strasbourg, but had also pre- German ability to strengthen the
vented him from applying more pres- bridgehead and overestimated de
sure against the northern edge of the Lattre’s ability to keep his basically
Colmar Pocket. Although the German colonial army moving against sudden-
decision to reinforce and hold the ly renewed and greatly strengthened
bridgehead came as a surprise to all German resistance. Of course,
the Allied commanders, Eisenhower SHAEF still had the option of ignor-
clearly believed that the Seventh ing the Colmar Pocket, ringing it with
Army’s new mission of supporting the defensive units, postponing Oper-
Third Army’s advance toward the ation INDEPENDE, outposting the
Saar industrial region was far more Franco-Italian border with FFI units,
important than clearing the southern and sending the better part of de
Alsatian plains. The Allied Supreme Lattre’s army north to assist Patch
Commander had forcefully communi- and Patton in forcing the Saar. Both
cated this point of view to Devers in the terrain in the south and the oper-
November. Eisenhower had never at- ational goals of Eisenhower would
tached much importance to the ex- seem to suggest that such measures
treme southern sector of the Allied would have at least been considered.
front, and might understandably have But politico-military constraints as
been upset that Devers and Patch had well as German unpredictability prob-
not chosen to redeploy the VI Corps ably made this course of action un-
sooner. Having the VI Corps attack likely. The German high command
northwards in the greatest strength had often been quick to take advan-
possible and at the earliest possible tage of gambles made by Allied com-
date would force the German First manders in the past, and a major set-
Army to divert even more of its forces back on the western Allied front
that opposed the U.S. Third Army. might threaten the entire alliance.
Of course, a crossing in the Rastatt Like Jellicoe, commander of the Brit-
area and a subsequent drive north up ish battle fleet in World War I, Eisen-
the east bank of the Rhine might have hower could also have lost the war in
accomplished the same result, but the space of an afternoon, and the
without giving any immediate assist- Allied Supreme Commander re-
ance to the effort against the Colmar mained understandably cautious in
Pocket. There both Eisenhower and his operational deployments.
CHAPTER XXVI

On the Siegfried Line


The opening days of December tween the two armies north to Plob-
1944 found General Devers increas- sheim, seven miles below Strasbourg.
ingly disturbed over the Seventh These changes relieved both Patch
Army’s slow progress northward as and Brooks of any further responsibil-
well as the even slower advance of ity for the Colmar area, although the
both the Seventh and the First French Seventh Army continued to provide
Armies toward the city of Colmar.1 logistical support for the two trans-
After conferring with General de ferred divisions. With these reinforce-
Lattre on 1 December, Devers once ments and the continued deferral of
again postponed French redeploy- Operation INDEPENDENCE, Devers
ments for Operation INDEPENDENCE,wanted the First French Army to
thereby hoping to accelerate the renew its offensive as soon as possible
elimination of the Colmar Pocket. and finish the job of clearing south-
Now the French 1st Infantry Division ern Alsace.
was to start westward on 9 December Having presumably settled matters
instead of the 7th, and the French 1st concerning the Colmar Pocket and IN-
Armored Division on the 17th instead DEPENDENCE,General Devers turned
of the 10th. For similar reasons the his attention to the Seventh Army’s
6th Army Group commander decided attack northward. At its current rate
to transfer operational control of the of advance, Haislip’s XV Corps would
U.S. 36th Infantry Division and the be unable to protect and support the
French 2d Armored Division from the right of Patton’s Third Army. In fact,
Seventh to the First French Army, ef- by 2 December, the 4th Armored Di-
fective 5 December. As a corollary, vision of the Third Army’s XII Corps
Devers also moved the boundary be- was already waiting impatiently for
the XV Corps’ 44th Division to come
1 The basic sources for this section are 6th Army up on its right before continuing its
Gp LI 3, 26 Nov 44; 6th Army Gp LI 4, 2 Dec 44; advance northward. 2 T o speed up the
Ltr, CG, 6th Army Gp, to CG, First French Army,
sub: Movement of Units Scheduled for Operation advance of the 44th and his other
INDEPENDENCE,1 Dec 44, in 6th Army Gp Doc File, forces toward the German border and
Nov–Dec 44; Devers Diary, 2 Dec 44; Seventh Army
FO 7, 2 Dec 44; Seventh Army Rpt, II, 453-62; XV
Corps FO 14, 2 Dec 44; VI Corps OI 21, 2 Dec 44; 2 The 4th Armored Division .was also waiting for
VI Corps FO 9, 5 Dec 44; de Lattre, History, pp. XII Corps’ 26th Infantry Division to come up on its
285-87; and Seventh Army OI 27, 3 Dec 44. left.
O N THE SIEGFRIED LINE 465

the West Wall, Devers estimated that


he would need the full power of
Patch’s Seventh Army, including both
the XV and VI Corps, and on 2 De-
cember he issued orders to that
effect.
With Devers’ instructions in hand,
Patch quickly published implementing
directives the same day, outlining new
corps boundaries, deployments, and
missions. Brooks’ VI Corps was to
move north and position itself to the
right of Haislip’s XV Corps. The new
boundary between XV and VI Corps
would run from the vicinity of Sa-
verne north and northeast along the
crest of the Low Vosges Mountains,
which was essentially the same
boundary that Haislip had previously
established between the 100th and
45th Divisions. West of the new
boundary the XV Corps, now consist-
ing of the 44th and 100th Infantry Di-
visions, would continue the attack BRIG.GEN.ALBERTC. SMITH
northward on a narrower sector ap-
proximately ten to fifteen miles wide.
To the east, the VI Corps would push north as quickly as possible relieving
northward across a much broader the 3d Division of its static mission
front of about thirty miles with the and making another experienced divi-
45th, 79th, and 103d Infantry Divi- sion available for the drive north.
sions, leaving the 3d Division behind A final arrangement involved the
to secure the Strasbourg area. To XV Corps’ new 12th Armored Divi-
strengthen the offensives of both sion. As December opened, General
corps, Patch gave each an armored di- Eddy, the XII Corps commander, in-
vision: the 14th Armored Division, formed General Patton, in charge of
now united under Brig. Gen. Albert the Third Army, that the worn 4th
C. Smith, went to Brooks; and a fresh Armored Division was no longer ca-
unit, the recently arrived 12th Ar- pable of making any substantive con-
mored Division, commanded by Maj. tribution to XII Corps operations,
Gen. Roderick R. Allen, went to Hais- and suggested that Haislip’s XV
lip. In addition, Devers wanted to Corps, with a much narrower front,
have elements of the new 42d, 63d, could spare a division to relieve the
and 70th Infantry Divisions, sched- tired unit temporarily. The 12th Ar-
uled to begin disembarking at Mar- mored Division was the obvious can-
seille in early December, brought didate for the proposed substitution.
466 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

Patton put the question to Patch, who


agreed in principle, but was under-
standably reluctant to lose control of
the unit. However, Devers, Patch, and
Haislip realized that the proposition
was sensible. The 12th Armored Divi-
sion would find the hilly but generally
open terrain of the 4th Armored Divi-
sion’s sector more suitable than the
rough, forested ground of the Low
Vosges over which the XV Corps in-
fantry divisions were advancing.
Moving slightly to the west, the new
armored division would have a much
easier time breaking in its various
components, while giving the 4th Ar-
mored Division-which had given a
good account of itself earlier during
the Panzer Lehr Division’s counterattack
against the XV Corps—a well-earned
rest. In the end, the involved com-
manders worked out a compromise:
the 12th Armored would move into
the XII Corps’ sector to relieve the MAJ. GEN.RODERICKR. ALLEN
4th, but would not pass to General
Eddy’s command and instead would halt or at least delay the advance of
remain under General Haislip’s “tacti- the Third and Seventh Armies to the
cal control.” Subsequently CCA of West Wall.4 As December opened,
the 12th Armored Division began re- leadership and morale within the First
lieving forward elements of the 4th Army was low. What had once been
Armored on the morning of 7 Decem- considered an excellent organization
ber, and the last of its units were out had fallen on hard times. Both von
of the line by evening of the next Rundstedt at OB West and Balck at
day. 3 Army Group G felt that the headquar-
ters had developed a withdrawal psy-
The German Situation chosis; at the same time, its units had
run up a sobering total of defections,
While the Seventh Army was reor- desertions, and surrenders in the face
ganizing for its December offensive, of continuous pressure from the
Army Group G and the First Army were American Third and Seventh Armies.
taking what measures they could to Furthermore, von Rundstedt and
4 This section is based on von Luttichau,
3 Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, pp. 525, 533-34; “German Operations,” ch. 26; and CMH MS C–003,
Seventh Army OI 30, 6 Dec 44; XV Corps OI 62, 6 Col. Kurt Reschke, Chief of Staff, LXXXIX Corps, 26
Dec 44. Jun 48.
O N THE SIEGFRIED LINE 467

Balck were increasingly dissatisfied ing the corps front by about ten
with the conduct of the First Amy’s miles. Next, von Rundstedt decided
commander, General von Knobels- to transfer the X C Corps headquarters
dorff, and a series of events soon re- from the Nineteenth Army’s center to
sulted in his relief. On 1 December the First A m y , inserting it between the
von Rundstedt warned Balck that XIII SS and the L X X X I X Corps; initial-
Army Group G would have to redeploy ly the transferred corps would control
even more units to Army Group B for little more than the 25th Panzer Grena-
the Ardennes offensive, specifically dier Division. This action ultimately
the Panzer Lehr Division, 11th Panzer Di- pushed the L X X X I X Corps’ western
vision, and the 401st and 404th Volks boundary farther east to the Camp de
Artillery Corps—all First Army units. Bitche, a large prewar French Army
After learning of the impending installation.5 For the Seventh Army,
transfers, von Knobelsdorff informed these boundary adjustments meant
Balck that he could not accept re- that Haislip’s XV Corps would face
sponsibility for stabilizing his front if both Petersen’s XC and Hoehne’s
these forces were withdrawn, nor L X X X I X Corps, while, from the crest
could he hold his section of the West of the Low Vosges east to the Rhine,
Wall with the forces that would Brooks’ VI Corps would meet only
remain. The following morning, 2 De- L X X X I X Corps forces.
cember, von Knobelsdorff reported Increasingly concerned over Ameri-
being ill, and von Rundstedt immedi- can advances east of the Low Vosges
ately replaced him with Lt. Gen. Hans and apparently doubting the ability of
von Obstfelder. First Army headquarters to supervise
Von Obstfelder took command of a and coordinate the operations of four
rather demoralized army that consist- corps, von Rundstedt, on 8 Decem-
ed of three corps: the L X X X I I on the ber, raised the L X X X I X Corps head-
far right, or west; the XIII SS in the quarters to the status of an independ-
center, with its southeastern flank in ent command, directly under Balck’s
the vicinity of Sarre-Union; and the Army Group G and on the same eche-
L X X X I X Corps, which occupied a front lon as the First and Nineteenth Army
of over forty-five linear miles from headquarters. Designated Group
Sarre-Union east to the Rhine. The Hoehne, the new command consisted
LXXXII Corps and the XIll SS Corps mainly of the 361st, 245th, and 256th
faced Patton’s Third Army, as did Volksgrenadier Divisions and had an ef-
L X X X I X Corps units in the Sarre- fective strength of about 9,000
Union area, while the rest of the troops, of which some 5,500 could be
L X X X I X Corps held the German front considered infantry combat effectives.
opposite the Seventh Army. On 8 December Group Hoehne also
During the first week of December picked up Division Raessler and the 21st
the German high command made sev- Panzer Division. The panzer division
eral changes in these arrangements.
First, von Obstfelder moved the right, 5The XC Corps, formerly the IV Luftwaffe Field
or western, boundary of the L X X X I X Corps, did not become fully operational in the new
Corps east to Bitche, thereby narrow- zone until 10 December.
468 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

was greatly understrength at the time, control (Map 32). On the corps’ left,
with no more than 2,200 combat ef- the 44th Division’s 324th and 114th
fectives, and would need several days Infantry secured the Ratzwiller area
to redeploy to Hoehne’s sector. Divi- on the 5th and seized Montbronn on
sion Raessler, with about 4,700 troops, the 6th. Although operating in more
was responsible for preparing the rugged and more forested terrain, the
West Wall defenses in Group Hoehne’s 100th Division easily kept pace,
sector; however, a standing directive moving up from N–419 to the area
from Hitler forbade the employment east of Montbronn and occupying
of any West Wall troops forward of Mouterhouse, all against negligible
the fortification line, so the acquisi- German resistance. The 106th Caval-
tion was of no immediate advantage. ry Group, meanwhile, initiated an ex-
Both General Hoehne and his tensive mountain patrolling program
neighbor, General Petersen, had the east of the 100th Division to protect
mission of holding the area in front XV Corps’ right flank.
of the West Wall until 16 December, The initial gains of 5 and 6 Decem-
the scheduled date for the start of the ber made Haislip optimistic, and he.
Ardennes offensive. While accom- urged both divisions to push on rap-
plishing this task, Balck also instruct- idly to their current objectives:
ed both commanders to preserve the Siersthal and nearby high ground for
integrity of their units so that they the 44th Division, and Bitche and as-
could fall back on the West Wall rea- sociated fortifications for the 100th.
sonably intact and contribute to its The divisions would then drive on to
defense. Von Rundstedt agreed to “develop” the German West Wall de-
this additional guidance, but made it fenses.
6 Atthe time, forward elements
clear to all concerned that the West of the 44th Division were only four
Wall was to be a final line from which miles short of Siersthal, and the lead-
no further German withdrawals could ing 100th Division units were about
be countenanced. the same distance from Bitche. Hais-
lip also expected that operations by
The XV Corps Offensive North the fresh 12th Armored Division on
the XV Corps’ left, or western, flank
Late on 4 December, as the reorga- would assist the advance of both
nized XV Corps prepared to continue units.
its drive north, the German forces in On 7 December, however, the
front of Haislip’s command began a German defenses in front of Haislip’s
limited withdrawal. As a result, the two divisions suddenly became more
XV Corps’ attack on the 5th at first active. Infantry resistance stiffened
encountered little resistance. Quickly markedly, and advancing American
elements of the 100th Division’s troops came under heavy and accu-
397th and 398th Infantry regiments rate mortar and artillery fire, which
cleared the Wingen-Ingwiller section forced several local withdrawals. De-
of Route N–419 through the Low
Vosges, thus placing the entire east- 6 XVCorps OI 62, 6 Dec 44; XV Corps OI 63, 7
west mountain road under American Dec 44.
470 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE
laying German forces clung to ham- Tank Battalion eight medium tanks as
lets and towns and turned isolated well as many casualties, including the
stone farmhouses into minor strong- life of its commander, Lt. Col. Mont-
holds that slowed American progress. gomery C. Meigs.7 Like the 14th Ar-
The retreating units had destroyed or mored Division, the 12th was acquir-
damaged all bridges, left craters in ing its experience the hard way.
roads, and blocked almost all routes On 12 December the German
of advance with booby traps and forces facing the 12th Armored Divi-
mines including many made of plastic sion, apparently exhausted, withdrew,
and clay, which the American troops and CCA, now reinforced by CCR,
found hard to detect. The terrain, es- had little trouble consolidating its
pecially in the 100th Division’s sector, previous gains. On 16 December the
became more rugged as the advance XII Corps’ veteran 80th Infantry Divi-
moved north, and its difficulty was in- sion began taking over the 12th Ar-
creased by hasty field fortifications mored Division’s sector, and on the
that went up wherever the Germans 17th the armored division reverted to
chose to make a stand. Rain, fog, and XV Corps reserve. The division’s in-
occasionally snow and ice now added troduction to combat between 7 and
to the discomfort of the XV Corps’ 15 December had cost approximately
infantrymen, while the heavily over- 5 officers and 40 enlisted men killed
cast skies continued to limit air sup- and 15 officers and 140 enlisted men
port. From 5 to 20 December the XII wounded.
Tactical Air Force supporting the 6th While Allen’s 12th Armored Divi-
Army Group was able to provide sig- sion was operating in the Rohrbach
nificant air support on only four days, area, Spragins’ 44th Division took an-
and on three of those days poor visi- other five hard days—7 through 11
bility curtailed the planned missions. December—to battle its way north-
On the same day that German re- ward to Siersthal. This town finally
sistance stiffened, the 12th Armored fell to the 71st Infantry late on the
Division’s CCA moved into forward 11th, just as the 324th Infantry was
positions west of Ratzwiller and, on coming up on the west between
the 9th, launched an attack over open Siersthal and Rohrbach. But on the
terrain toward Singling and Rohrbach XV Corps’ right, the 100th Division,
near the 6th Army Group boundary. fighting its way across rough, forested
Passing through undefended or light- country, found the going tougher; at
ly manned Maginot Line positions, dusk on the 11th it was still over two
the American armor secured Singling miles short of Bitche.
on 9 December and Rohrbach on the
10th and then continued to push
northward. Above Rohrbach, howev-
er, mines and later accurate German
antitank fire and armored counterat-
tacks halted CCA on the 10th and 7Colonel Meigs, USMA 1940, was a descendant
of Dr. John F. Meigs, brother of Maj. Gen. Mont-
11th, forcing several withdrawals. gomery C. Meigs, the Quartermaster General of the
This series of actions cost the 23d Union Army.
O N THE SIEGFRIED LINE 471

GENERALS
COMMANDING THE NEXT MOVE. Generals Allen and Spragins
CONTEMPLATE
are on the left.

The Fortresses of Bitche strength and would abandon the area


after only token resistance.
The capture of Siersthal opened a In deciding to make a stand at the
potential route, through the valley of Ensemble de Bitche, the Germans had
the Schwalb River, bypassing the chosen well. Unlike most Maginot
German-held Maginot Line installa- Line forts, which were positioned pri-
tions in the Bitche area on the west. marily against attacks from the north
By the end of 11 December, however, and east, many of the installations in
it was evident that the Germans had the Bitche area could also defend and
chosen to hold the forts around fire effectively against an assault from
Bitche, threatening the flank of any the south. The Ensemble stretched
American advance that ignored these eastward about eight miles from the
strongholds. Reluctantly, Haislip thus vicinity of Hottviller past Bitche and
ordered both of his infantry divisions the Camp de Bitche to Fort Grand
to prepare assault operations against Hohekirkel. The major works lay on
the western and central fortresses. rising ground north of Route D–35,
Both he and his division commanders the east-west road running through
hoped that the Germans would not the valley in which the town of Bitche
defend the fortresses in any great was located.
472 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

Westernmost of the larger fortifica- The Germans were able to employ


tions was Fort Simserhof with ten some French artillery, including a few
separate fortified complexes, or disappearing guns, while German
“units,” all situated on commanding field artillery and mortars emplaced
ground south of Hottviller and ap- north of the fortresses added to the
proximately two miles north of Route defense. Although the latter could be
D–35. About a mile and a half east of neutralized by counterbattery fire,
Simserhof was Fort Schiesseck with American artillery, up to 8-inch and
eleven units, the most extensive of all 240-mm., would find the fortifications
Bitche area installations; just on the themselves nearly impervious except
south side of D–35 from Fort Schies- at entrances, escape hatches, and
seck was the much smaller Fort Freu- open gun emplacements; the ord-
denberg, with only a single major nance delivered by XII Tactical Air
unit. Another mile and a half east of Force fighter-bombers would fare no
Schiesseck and centered half a mile better. In the end, the reduction of
north of Bitche spread Fort Otterbiel the massive forts would depend large-
with four or five larger units; and, ly on teams of infantry and combat
continuing east, several rather isolat- engineers.
ed installations dominated Route D– The XC Corps’ 25th Panzer Grenadier
35 for the two miles between Bitche Division was responsible for defending
and the Camp de Bitche. The Ensem- Forts Simserhof, Schiesseck, and Ot-
ble ended in the east with Fort Grand terbiel, and Group Hoehne’s 361st Volks-
Hohekirkel, which had five major grenadier Division for Fort Grand Ho-
units all located about a mile east of hekirkel and the installations in the
the Camp de Bitche. Camp de Bitche area. However, with
The units of the main installations the rapid changes in the German
were each formidable fortifications boundaries during this period, many
built of reinforced concrete, with of the troop reassignments could not
walls and overheads that were three be put into effect before the Ameri-
to ten feet thick. Some had as many can attack, and the defensive respon-
as five underground levels, while sibilities for the central fortresses
others had no ground-level entrances were somewhat blurred.
and could be reached only through From the American point of view,
long tunnels. Barbed-wire entangle- the lay of the land and the position-
ments surrounded most of the fortifi- ing of the major installations dictated
cations, supplemented by elaborate that the Ensemble de Bitche forts
antitank obstacles. Most of the instal- should be taken out sequentially,
lations were mutually supporting and from west to east. Thus, on 13 De-
provided broad, clear fields of fire in cember the 44th Division led off the
all directions. Gaps between the XV Corps’ effort with an attack on
major units were covered by hasty Fort Simserhof, the westernmost for-
field fortifications, and many of the tification. While the 71st Infantry
German troops initially occupied such made the main assault from the Hol-
positions rather than the interiors of bach area south of the installation,
the larger installations. General Spragins sent the 324th In-
O N THE SIEGFRIED LINE 473

NOVEMBER1944
71ST REGIMENT,44TH DIVISION,FORTSIMSERHOF,

fantry east across the Schwalb River the regiment captured some minor
to seize high ground north of the fort positions between Forts Simserhof
in the vicinity of Hottviller in order to and Schiesseck and, reinforced with
secure the flank of the attack. The combat engineers, began pushing
324th’s effort met little opposition, northward in another attempt to
but the 71st Infantry’s advance on the invest Simserhof on the east.
fort proved painfully slow. On the Progress, however, was again slow.
left, the 71st was subject to intense During the next four days, 14
German artillery and mortar fire; on through 18 December, Spragins put
the right, a German counterattack all the artillery, tank, and tank de-
from the Freudenberg Farm area, half stroyer fire that he could marshal
a mile west of Fort Freudenberg, frus- against the major installations of Sim-
trated attempts by the regiment to serhof, while the 71st, fighting off nu-
outflank Simserhof on the east. The merous small counterattacks, focused
44th Division ended the first day of its infantry-engineer assault teams
the assault with little to show for its against the fort’s ammunition and
efforts. personnel entrances, which were all
On 14 December the 71st Infantry about 1,500 yards south of the main
regained some lost ground and se- units. By evening of the 17th, troops
cured Freudenberg Farm. In addition, of the 71st Infantry, with engineer
474 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

support, had entered the under- had built well), it did appear to shake
ground portions of Simserhof, while the morale of the defenders. Equally
other elements of the regiment on the important, Burress’ infantry com-
surface had penetrated a number of manders used the two days to plan
the strongest fortifications. O n the their approaches to the fortifications
morning of 19 December, the 71st more carefully.
launched a final attack to clear the Resuming the attack on 17 Decem-
last Germans from the installations, ber, the 398th Infantry recaptured
only to find that the remaining de- small Fort Freudenberg 8 and secured
fenders had withdrawn northward the two southern entrances to Fort
during the night. On the same day, Schiesseck. The strong German oppo-
the 44th Division’s 114th regiment sition lessened somewhat on the 18th,
moved into the town of Hottviller allowing the 398th Infantry, with en-
without opposition. With the fall of gineer support, to begin closing on
Simserhof and Hottviller, the division the main units of the fort. As each
began regrouping for an attack north unit was reached, infantry-engineer
to the West Wall, gratefully leaving teams engaged any Germans remain-
the rest of the Ensemble de Bitche to ing on the ground level, and then
the 100th Division. dropped explosives down elevator
O n 14 December General Burress, shafts, stairwells, and ventilating con-
commanding the 100th Infantry Divi- duits to isolate the lower levels. T h e
sion, had sent the 398th Infantry di- American troops generally made no
rectly toward Forts Freudenberg and attempt to descend into the depths of
Schiesseck without any extensive pre- the fortifications, satisfied with sealing
liminary bombardment, about the off the lower sections of each installa-
same time that the 44th Division was tion and interring any Germans that
beginning to invest Simserhof. Like remained.
the 71st Infantry, the 398th quickly O n 20 December the 398th secured
learned that the Germans intended to the last of Fort Schiesseck’s eleven
present more than token resistance. major units, and the regiment, with
Moving north out of the wooded hills the rest of the Century Division, pre-
south of Bitche and Route D–35, the pared to push on toward the German
advancing American infantry was met border, roughly eight miles north of
by accurate artillery fire from both Bitche. A few forces stayed behind in
Forts Schiesseck and Otterbiel and the Simserhof-Schiesseck area to pro-
was forced to pull back almost imme- tect the division’s right flank. Bitche
diately. Burress then brought up his itself remained in German hands, as
corps and division artillery, including did Forts Otterbiel and Grand Hohe-
some heavy 240-mm. pieces, to begin kirkel and the entire Camp de Bitche
a two-day bombardment, supplement- area. Haislip may have hoped that the
ed when possible by air strikes. Al-
though a later investigation would 8Both the 44th and 100th Divisions claimed the
show that the firepower exercise capture of Fort Freudenberg. Elements of the 44th
Division reportedly found the fort empty on 14 De-
caused no significant damage to the cember, but German troops may have reoccupied
installations themselves (the French the position later.
O N THE SIEGFRIED LINE 475

Germans occupying the Ensemble de The VI Corps Offensive North


Bitche would leave once they were no
longer in a position to delay his ad- On 5 December General Brooks,
vance to the West Wall and their own the VI Corps commander, assumed
escape routes to the north were operational control of the 45th and
threatened. Unknown to the XV 79th Infantry Divisions, which were
Corps commanders, events occurring spread across a front of about thirty
outside of their area of operation miles from the Low Vosges to the
had already made the question Rhine. During the following days he
academic. bolstered these units with the 14th
The 398th Infantry’s operations Armored and 103d Infantry Divisions,
against the Ensemble de Bitche from inserting the 103d between the 45th
14 through 20 December cost the and 79th and assembling the 14th Ar-
regiment approximately fifteen men mored in the rear, ready to move up
killed and eighty wounded; the low on command. Temporarily O’Daniel’s
casualties stemmed in part from the 3d Infantry Division, still assigned to
decision to use firepower instead of the VI Corps, would remain around
potentially costly infantry assaults Strasbourg.
against the prepared positions. Heavy Brooks’ offensive plans called for
artillery and air bombardments, sup- the 103d and 79th Divisions to under-
plemented as often as possible by take the main effort in the strength-
direct tank and tank destroyer fire, at ened Seventh Army drive north to the
least kept the German defenders West Wall.9 Wyche’s 79th, on the
under cover, unable to man weapons corps’ right, or eastern, sector, was
or maneuver above the ground, and initially to lead the main attack,
allowed American infantry and engi- moving north up the right bank of the
neers to infiltrate the approaches to Rhine with Haffner’s 103d on its left.
the individual blockhouses in order to The 79th Division was to attack on 9
do their work. December, and the 103d Division on
Of at least equal importance was the 10th. When Brooks decided the
v o n Rundstedt’s guidance to the field time was right, Smith’s 14th Armored
commanders directing the defense of Division would pass through the 103d
the Bitche area: to prepare to with- and head for Wissembourg, about
draw to the West Wall once the Ar- seventeen miles north of Haguenau.
dennes offensive was under way and There the armored division would
to preserve unit integrity during that secure crossings over the Lauter
withdrawal. Both Generals Petersen River, which marked the German
and Hoehne thus regarded the En- border in the Wissembourg area, and
semble de Bitche as no more than a prepare to exploit northward through
delaying position. Had they manned the West Wall.
these installations with greater The 45th Division, in a supporting
strength, the seizure of Simserhof and role, would conduct limited objective
Schiesseck would have been a much
more expensive affair for the Ameri- 9 See VI Corps FO 9, 5 Dec 44; Seventh Army FO
can forces. 7, 2 Dec 44; VI Corps OI 22, 6 Dec 44.
476 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

attacks on the VI Corps’ left wing sion’s axis of advance was beginning
until 10 December; it would then to take Frederick’s forces deep into
strike northeast from the vicinity of the broadening Low Vosges Moun-
Niederbronn-les-Bains, the division’s tains, where heavily wooded hills and
current objective, to support the main valleys channeled and constricted for-
effort. The 45th would have a new ward movement. Every village and
commander for the December offen- hamlet became a German delaying
sive. General Eagles had been wound- position difficult to outflank; road-
ed on 30 November when his jeep hit blocks, demolitions, and mines
a mine, and Maj. Gen. Robert T. abounded; nearly every bridge was
Frederick, formerly the commander of destroyed or damaged; and German
the 1st Airborne Task Force, took artillery and mortar fire seemed to in-
command of the division on 4 Decem- tensify with each step American
ber. troops took toward the West Wall.
The VI Corps confronted the bulk On the division’s right, the 180th
of Group Hoehne’s forces. On General regiment, still operating in reasonably
Hoehne’s right, or western, sector the open terrain, cleared most of Mertz-
361st Volksgrenadier Division held the willer on the 5th; but the next day a
Low Vosges area from the Camp de German infantry-armor counterattack
Bitche southeast about twelve miles drove the Americans south, back
to the vicinity of Niederbronn-les- across the Zintsel du Nord Brook,
Bains.10The weak 245th Volksgrenadier which bisected the town. 11 The Ger-
Division occupied the zone from Nie- mans chose not to follow up their
derbronn southeast about ten miles success, and on 7 December a battal-
to the Moder River at Schweighausen, ion of the 410th Infantry, 103d Divi-
covering a gap of generally open, sion, coming from the High Vosges
roiling ground between the Low front, relieved the 180th Infantry,
Vosges and the Haguenau forest. The thus allowing Frederick to pull the
sector from Schweighausen to the regiment back for the main attack
Rhine, over fifteen miles, was the re- three days away.
sponsibility of the stronger 256th Meanwhile, the 45th Division’s
Volksgrenadier Division. 157th regiment was able to slowly
In preparation for the main series outflank German defenses at Nieder-
of attacks on 9 and 10 December, the bronn on the west and north, and fi-
45th and 79th Divisions conducted nally occupied the town on 9 Decem-
several preliminary operations to ber. However, the 179th regiment, in
secure their lines of departure. O n 5 the division’s center, made little head-
December the 45th Division’s three way, and the area around Gunder-
regiments continued their push up to shoffen, between Niederbronn and
the Niederbronn-Mertzwiller railway Mertzwiller, remained in German
line, but progress was slow. The divi-
11VI Corps AAR, Dec 44, p. 13; 45th Div AAR,
Dec 44, p. 8. The division report estimated the
10Subsequent information on German forces in German force at 200 infantry and 4 tanks; the corps
this chapter comes from von Luttichau, “German report put it at 75 infantry and 3 tanks—discrepan-
Operations,” ch. 26. cies that were common in such documentation.
O N THE SIEGFRIED LINE 477

hands. Although it had defended its Rhine, slowed the light armor down
sector fairly well, the 245th Volksgrena- somewhat, but by evening the leading
dier Division, one of Group Hoehne’s cavalry units had reached the western
weakest units, had taken severe losses edge of Gambsheim. The following
from the continued 45th Division at- day, 8 December, resistance faded. By
tacks and would have difficulty carry- noon, after twenty-five soldiers from
ing on the fight. the 256th Volksgrenadier Division sur-
The preparatory actions of the 79th rendered, the 94th Cavalry cleared
Infantry Division were more crucial. the town and surrounding area, thus
Both Brooks and the division com- ending the threat to the 79th Divi-
mander, General Wyche, were con- sion’s flank and allowing Wyche to
cerned with the corps’ right flank. As use all three of his infantry regiments
long as the Germans held the Gamb- for the main attack.
sheim area on the west bank of the
Rhine, Wyche felt obliged to secure VI Corps Attacks (10–20 December)
the sector between Gries and Weyer-
sheim with the 313th regiment and to For Brooks, the 79th Division’s ini-
post the attached 94th Cavalry Squad- tial assault across the Moder River
ron below Weyersheim as well. 12 In and through Haguenau was the most
the south, the 117th Cavalry Squad- critical phase of the offensive. A delay
ron, temporarily attached to the 3d here would have repercussions all
Infantry Division, screened the Gamb- along the front, while a successful
sheim area from La Wantzenau, just crossing could set a good pace for
north of Strasbourg. This entire the entire advance. Located on VI
effort, all because of a small German Corps’ right wing, the 79th had two
bridgehead west of the Rhine, was ab- infantry regiments—the 3 15th and the
sorbing too many units, and the 79th 314th—facing the Haguenau area,
Division commander wanted Gamb- west to east, and a third-the 313th—
sheim secured before he moved his in reserve securing the division’s right
division north. flank. Initially Wyche planned to
Wyche gave the task of clearing attack north on 9 December, directing
Gambsheim to the 94th Cavalry his main effort east of Haguenau. He
Squadron, which had been reinforced wanted his forces to cross the Moder
by a platoon of medium tanks, two River in the vicinity of Bischwiller,
companies of armored infantry, and a some four miles southeast of Ha-
battery of 105-mm. self-propelled ar- guenau, and then drive north for
tillery. After a thirty-minute artillery about fifteen miles to Seltz, a mile or
preparation early on 7 December, the so west of the Rhine. To screen the
squadron attacked, at first meeting left flank of the projected Moder
stiff resistance. Automatic weapons River crossing, he wanted to pull the
and well-directed mortar and artillery entire 315th regiment out of his left
fire, some from positions east of the wing and have it swing behind and
through the 314th to seize Kalten-
12 The 94th Cavalry Squadron was on loan from house, about two miles northwest of
the 14th Armored Division. Bischwiller. T o screen the right side,
478 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

he ordered the 94th Cavalry Squad- ture intact a major bridge over the
ron to advance northward from Moder. By the end of the day the
Gambsheim. The 313th regiment, regiment had cleared Bischwiller,
currently in reserve, would undertake crossed the river, and pushed north-
the main effort, striking north for the ward another mile.
Moder River at Bischwiller, as the The breakthrough at Bischwiller
314th moved up to the Moder around opened up many possibilities for
Haguenau, keeping the German de- Wyche. On 10 December, with the
fenders occupied and ready to rein- 314th and 315th Infantry still stalled
force any of the principal attacking in the Haguenau-Kaltenhouse area,
forces on Wyche’s order.13 Wyche had a battalion of the 315th
The 79th Division faced Group sidestep to the east, cross the Moder
Hoehne’s 256th Volksgrenadier Division, at Bischwiller, then strike out west
which was understrength as well as along the northern side of the Moder,
weak in supporting armor, antitank hitting the German defenders on their
weapons, and some type of artillery. flanks and occupying Camp d’Ober-
Although it was occupying good de- hoffen, a former French Army train-
fensive terrain and had been receiving ing center. Meanwhile the 313th In-
some reinforcements from east of the fantry consolidated its bridgehead
Rhine, the 256th had no designated and continued to push north, advanc-
reserves, and Group Hoehne could ing to Schirrhein, four miles north of
supply none. Neither Brig. Gen. Ger- Bischwiller, while elements of the
hard Franz, commanding the 256th, 94th Cavalry Squadron reached Herr-
nor Generals Hoehne and Balck ex- lisheim, three miles north of Gamb-
pected the unit to hold back a general sheim, on the 79th Division’s right.
attack. While German attention was fo-
With the Gambsheim area secured cused on the Haguenau area, the 45th
by 8 December, the 79th Division and 103d Infantry Divisions began
launched its attack on the 9th as their offensives in the west. On 10
planned. The 256th Volksgrenadiers ap- December the 157th Infantry, leading
peared to have concentrated their de- the 45th Division’s attack on the
fenses around Haguenau, and the di- corps’ extreme left wing, gained over
rection of the 79th Division’s main two miles north and northeast of Nie-
effort took them by surprise. Al- derbronn, while the 180th Infantry,
though the 314th reached the Moder coming back into the line, passed
only with great difficulty and the through the 179th regiment to cross
315th was stopped about a mile short the railway line and Route N–62 at
of Kaltenhouse, the advance of the Gundershoffen, three miles south of
313th on Bischwiller was only lightly Niederbronn. The 180th then swung
opposed. Striking north at 0645 with- off to the northeast as the 411th In-
out any preliminary artillery bom- fantry of the 103d Division came up
bardment, the 313th managed to cap- on its right to push two miles east of
Gundershoffen against diminishing
13VI Corps FO 9, 5 Dec 44; 79th Inf Div FO 25, resistance. Another three miles to the
7 Dec 44. south the 103d Division’s 410th In-
O N THE SIEGFRIED LINE 479

313TH REGIMENT,79THDIVISION,IN THE M5 Light tanks


VICINITYOF BISCHWILLER.
are on the road, December 1944.

fantry recaptured Mertzwiller after fense of the forest could have caused
bitter house-to-house fighting, an serious trouble. Now, however, the
action that included the recovery of full weight of the VI Corps’ assault as
about eighty men of the 180th Infan- well as the earlier offensives of the
try who had been hiding out in the XV Corps began to have a decided
town since 6 December. effect on the weary German defend-
After Mertzwiller, the 410th ad- ers, and by evening of the 10th the
vanced over a mile eastward into the entire German line had begun to give
western fringes of the vast Haguenau way.
forest, which extended east about The attacks of the 45th and 103d
twenty miles. Laced by minor roads Divisions on 10 December had caught
and logging trails, the forest lay on the weak 245th Volksgrenadier Division
generally flat land cut by numerous unprepared to conduct an organized
small streams that in wet weather defense, and by the end of the day
could severely curtail troop and vehi- the unit had begun to fall apart.
cle movements. In addition there Hoehne was quick to appreciate that
were several Maginot Line installa- its collapse would threaten the flanks
tions in the eastern third of the of both his other divisions; as a par-
forest, and a determined German de- tial remedy, he narrowed the 245th’s
480 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

sector somewhat, forcing the 256th to 14th Armored Division, and the 117th
extend its right flank to the north- Cavalry Squadron, with one troop of
west. But with the continued penetra- the 94th attached, took over the right
tion into the 256th Volksgrenadier Divi- flank security mission. 14
sion’s front by the 79th Division along In the west, the 157th Infantry,
the Rhine, the measure was obviously 45th Division, secured Nehwiller on
unsatisfactory. Sometime that night, 11 December against little opposition,
therefore, with the approval of Army breaking through Hoehne’s projected
Group G, Hoehne directed both the defensive line before it could be es-
245th and 256th to withdraw two to tablished. The 157th then pushed
six miles north to a secondary defen- northeastward through the Low
sive line. The new line was to begin Vosges another mile or so, while the
at Nehwiller, a little over two miles 180th Infantry, on the 45th Division’s
east of Niederbronn, and extend right, gained about three miles. But
twenty miles eastward to the Rhine at the terrain facing the 45th was now
Fort Louis. The decision meant that becoming increasingly difficult. In the
Group Hoehne would abandon both 103d Division’s sector, the 411th and
Haguenau city and most of the Ha- 409th Infantry advanced nearly three
guenau forest without further fight- miles, piercing the planned German
ing, but given his strength as well as line near the road junction town of
his instructions to preserve the integ- Woerth; on the division’s right, the
rity of his forces, General Hoehne felt 410th Infantry seized Walbourg on
that he had little choice. At Army the northeastern border of the
Group G, General Balck reluctantly ac- Haguenau forest. Neither of the two
quiesced to the withdrawal. divisions encountered any significant
During 11 December all three of German opposition.
Brooks’ attacking infantry divisions O n the 12th the German rout con-
made considerable progress. On the tinued. In the Vosges the 45th Divi-
corps’ right, the 79th Division’s 314th sion seized Philippsbourg on the
regiment moved into Haguenau un- corps’ far left and outflanked a
opposed in the morning, and the German strongpoint at Lembach, only
315th secured the area between about four miles short of the border.
Bischwiller and Haguenau, uncover- To the east the 103d Division kept
ing large stocks of unused German pace, reaching Surbourg on the
supplies and equipment in Camp northern edge of the Haguenau
d’Oberhoffen. Still pushing north- forest; along the Rhine, the 79th Divi-
ward, the 313th Infantry met strong sion occupied Soumenheim and ad-
resistance at Soufflenheim, but recon- vanced eight miles farther north to
naissance patrols probing the eastern Niederroedern and Seltz. Wyche, the
portion of the Haguenau forest de- 79th Division commander, expected
tected no enemy presence. Along the
Rhine other patrols advanced the
lines three miles north from Herrli- 14With control of the 117th Squadron passing
from the 3d to the 79th Division, a battalion of the
sheim. During the day most of the 3d Division’s 7th regiment assumed responsibility
94th Cavalry Squadron rejoined the for the Rhine area around Gambsheim.
ON THE SIEGFRIED LINE 481

German counterattacks from the east- at best only a weak shell of defenders
ern section of the Haguenau forest, confronted his forces, he reviewed his
but his patrols there found only dam- plans for the commitment of the ar-
aged bridges, abandoned roadblocks, mored unit on the evening of the
and empty Maginot Line installations. 12th. Originally he had intended to
The 256th Volksgrenadier Division was have the armored division pass
no longer trying to contest his divi- through the 103d Division and strike
sion’s advance. for Wissembourg. However, after the
By 12 December Brooks had 256th Volksgrenadier Division put up a
become convinced that the Germans respectable defense in front of the
would not stand and fight, but would 79th Division on 9 and 10 December,
instead attempt a series of delaying he considered passing the 14th Ar-
actions as they fell slowly back to the mored through the right flank of the
German border and the West Wall. 103d, swinging it north of the
The cold weather plus the rain, rough Haguenau forest and east to the
terrain, demolitions, mines and road- Rhine, thus striking the German de-
blocks of all types, mortar and long- fenses around Haguenau f r o m the
range artillery fire, and tactical supply rear. However, with the 256th now
problems were more responsible for rapidly retreating, Brooks decided to
retarding American progress than any insert the 14th Armored Division be-
ground combat action on the part of tween the 1036 and 79th Divisions.
the Germans. As for Group Hoehne’s This action would allow both infantry
forces, 12 December was a disaster. divisions to concentrate on narrower
Hoehne’s small staff was no longer fronts for a continuing push north
able to keep pace with the tempo of and would provide the armored divi-
changing events nor could it direct its sion with a sector of its own without
subordinate units in any coherent masking the advance of the others.
manner. In the center the 245th Volks- Brooks therefore directed the ar-
grenadier Division finally collapsed, and mored division to move up to the Ha-
the 256th along the Rhine was not in guenau forest area and attack north-
much better shape. Deep in the ward at daylight on 13 December
Vosges the failing 361st Volksgrenadiers, across a nine-mile-wide front between
under increasing pressure from Hais- Surbourg and Niederroedern. Still
lip’s XV Corps around Bitche, could aiming for Wissembourg, the division
do little to assist their neighbors. was to secure crossings over the
Only the emergency arrival of the Lauter River southeast of the town,
192d Panzer Grenadiers of the 21st while the 103d and 79th Divisions,
Panzer Division forestalled a complete their sectors of advance substantially
breakthrough in Hoehne’s front. narrowed, would continue northward
abreast of the armored forces to the
Drive to the West Wall German border. 15 For the second

With the Germans reeling, Brooks


was now ready to commit Smith’s 15See VI Corps FO 9, 5 Dec 44; VI Corps OI 23,
14th Armored Division. Believing that 9 Dec 44; VI Corps OI 25, 12 Dec 44; 14th Armd
482 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

time since taking command of the VI finally took isolated Lembach and
Corps, General Brooks had ordered reached Wingen on 14 December. On
what amounted to a general pursuit. its right flank, the 103d Division con-
Leading off for the 14th Armored tinued northward, meeting heavy re-
Division on 13 December, CCB quick- sistance at Climbach, a road junction
ly reached Surbourg and then swung town two miles east of Wingen. There
east six miles along the northern edge the 3d Platoon of Company C, 614th
of the Haguenau forest to Hatten Tank Destroyer Battalion (towed), a
before encountering significant oppo- black unit of a 411th Infantry task
sition. CCA followed CCB to Sur- force, lost three of its four guns and
bourg and continued northeast about suffered 50 percent casualties, but
two miles to Soultz-sous-Forets, threw back a strong armor-supported
where the armor linked up with the counterattack by the 2 I s t Panzer Divi-
103d Division’s 409th Infantry sion.16 Elsewhere the 103d’s advance
coming in from the west. O n 14 De- met less resistance, and division ele-
cember CCA gained another five ments reached Rott on the 13th and
miles along the axis of Route N–63, the Wissembourg area the following
the Haguenau-Wissembourg road, day.
and wound up the day in a fire fight
three miles south of Wissembourg. Into Germany
CCB, on the same day, pushed north-
east seven miles from Hatten to Salm- By the morning of 15 December,
bach, about one mile short of the Brooks’ VI Corps was ready to move
Lauter River and the German border. across the German border in
As armored patrols approached the strength. In the broadening Low
small river, they found it flooded, Vosges, the 45th and 103d Infantry
measuring up to eighty feet across in Divisions prepared to push through a
some areas and not easily fordable. rough, wooded axis of advance, five
Meanwhile, the VI Corps’ infantry to six miles wide, with four regiments
divisions continued their steady ad- on line and two in reserve. In the VI
vances during 13 and 14 December. Corps center, the 14th Armored Divi-
On the 13th, the 79th Division re- sion concentrated against Wissem-
sumed its drive northward just east of bourg and Schleithal, aided by the
the armored division, clearing Seltz right wing of the 103d Division. T o
and Niederroedern after much house- the east the 79th Infantry Division fo-
to-house fighting; it then advanced cused on Lauterbourg and the Lauter
another two miles north to Eberbach
and reached the Lauter River near 16The platoon received a Presidential Unit Cita-
Scheibenhard and Lauterbourg on the tion for the action, and 1st Lt. Charles L. Thomas
of Company C was awarded the Distinguished Ser-
14th. vice Cross for heroic action and outstanding leader-
In the far west the 45th Division, ship. For an account, see Ralph Mueller and Jerry
struggling through the Low Vosges, Turk, Report After Action: The Story of the 103d Infantry
Division (Innsbruck, 1945), pp. 48-49; and Mary
Penick Motley, ed., The Invisible Soldier The Experience
Div FO 1 , 1 1 Dec 44; 14th Armd Div FO 2, 12 Dec of the Black Soldier, World War II (Detroit: Wayne
44. State U Press, 1975), pp. 166–77.
O N THE SIEGFRIED LINE 483

River, still using armored cavalry than keeping pace, reached the
units to screen its right flank on the German border north of Wingen and
Rhine. The final drive north would at 1245 sent a patrol into Germany.
take all of the units directly into the On the 45th Division’s right, the
vaunted West Wall, the defensive 411th Infantry of the 103d Division,
works that the German Army had after cleaning up the Climbach area,
been preparing for several months a crossed the German border at 1305
few miles inside the German border. and continued north. To the east, in
Facing the center of the VI Corps the Lauter River area, the 79th Divi-
was the weak 21st Panzer Division inter- sion’s 315th regiment cleared the
mixed with remnants of the 245th southern half of Scheibenhard and
Volksgrenadier Division and filled in sent patrols across the river into the
here and there by yet a few more German half of the town (Scheiben-
rear-echelon units turned infantry. To hardt). In the meantime, the 313th
the west the 361st Volhgrenadier Divi- Infantry had come up on the right
sion still had a precarious hold on its and, after more house-to-house fight-
mountain defensive line from the ing, had forced the Germans out of
Camp de Bitche to the area just Lauterbourg, placing the southern
northwest of Wingen; to the east the bank of the Lauter firmly in the hands
256th Volksgrenadier Division was at- of the 79th Division.
tempting to make a final delaying By late afternoon of 15 December,
stand on the Lauter River. Mean- VI Corps forces had thus reached or
while, behind all of Group Hoehne’s crossed the German border at half a
flagging forces, Division Raessler and dozen locations. At this point General
the other designated fortress units Hoehne, having committed all his
were preparing to make their first de- forces and realizing that a stand at
fense of the West Wall. the border itself was impossible, de-
During the morning of 15 Decem- cided that the moment had finally
ber, the 14th Armored Division’s come for a complete withdrawal into
CCA cleared Riedseltz, but ran into the West Wall defenses. Accordingly
intense artillery fire and a German he informed Balck of his decision,
tank-supported counterattack while emphasizing that an immediate with-
attempting to move farther north, drawal was necessary if he was to pre-
probably indicating the arrival of ad- serve the integrity of his remaining
ditional 21st Panzer Division units to forces and use them to strengthen the
reinforce the 256th Volksgrenadiers. fortified line. At Army Group G head-
CCA repulsed the assault, destroying quarters Balck had learned that the
two tanks, but gained little more long-awaited Ardennes offensive was
ground. Elsewhere VI Corps units definitely to be launched on 16 De-
were at first more successful. Al- cember and concluded that Group
though harassed by artillery and Hoehne had fulfilled its stated mission:
mortar fire, the 45th Division’s 157th to hold in front of the West Wall
Infantry gained almost two miles of until the Ardennes operation began.
rugged terrain on the division’s left; At 2045 on 15 December, he there-
meanwhile the 180th Infantry, more fore approved the withdrawal of Group
484 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

Hoehne into the West Walldefenses. 17 forced a general withdrawal back


Balck’s decision was not well re- across the Lauter. T h e experience of
ceived at OB West. Von Rundstedt at the 103d Division was much the same.
first refused to condone the with- O n the 14th Armored Division’s front
drawal and severely criticized Balck in the VI Corps’ center, American
for the conduct of operations in armor occupied Wissembourg and
Hoehne’s area. The field marshal Schleithal on the 16th and reached
wanted to halt the withdrawal, but out to Schweighofen, a mile or so
Group Hoehne had already begun pull- into Germany; but by the 19th
ing back and there was little he could Smith’s armored units were able to
do to reverse the movement. Von hang on to only a few precarious
Rundstedt insisted, however, that the bridgeheads in the face of German
361st Volksgrenadier Division continue counterattacks and increased artillery
to hold across the Vosges and that fire. In the east, combat engineers
the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division of XC had erected some bridges over the
Corps continue to defend the Maginot Lauter unmolested, which allowed
Line positions west of the Camp de 79th Division units to push several
Bitche where the XV Corps was at- miles into Germany, but this advance
tacking. Balck relayed these directives also stalled by the 19th.19 The VI
to Hoehne at midnight, allowing Corps had now reached the outer
Group Hoehne to withdraw everything works of the West Wall and would
except the 361st Volksgrenadier Division, need a respite before attempting a
but warned him that the West Wall major penetration of the somewhat
was to be the final German position- overrated defensive line.
“there youdie.” 18
Between 16 and 20 December VI Stalemate at Colmar (5-20 December)
Corps units found that German resist-
ance would slacken, but then stiffen By 5 December General Devers had
remarkably as the units bumped into turned almost the entire Seventh
the West Wall defenses. In the Army north, still expecting that Gen-
Vosges the 45th Division seized the eral de Lattre’s First French Army
German mountain village of Noth- could finish off the Colmar Pocket as-
weiller and the town of Bobenthal on sisted by Dahlquist’s 36th Infantry Di-
the upper reaches of the Lauter River vision and Leclerc’s armor. At the
on the 16th, and reached Bundenthal time de Lattre assigned both units to
and Nieder Schlettenbach a few miles the French II Corps, although they
farther north by 18 December. There would still be supported logistically
its advance ended, and on the 18th by the Seventh Army. Devers and de
and 19th German counterattacks and Lattre were accordingly surprised
intense artillery and mortar fire when the German defensive effort

17See ULTRA Msg HP9500, 152157 Dec 44,


ULTRA Collection, MHI. l9 For heroic action near Berg, Germany, on 19
18 Von Luttichau, “German Operations,” ch. 26, December, Technical Sergeant Robert E. Gerstung,
p. 42, citing the Army Group G War Diary for 15– Company H, 313th Infantry, 79th Division, was
16 December 1944. awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.
O N THE SIEGFRIED LINE 485

TROOPS OF THE 45TH DIVISIONMAKEHOUSE-TO-HOUSE


SEARCH,
Bobenthal, Germa-
ny, 1944.

continued to solidify and, rather than police chief Heinrich Himmler to


meekly withdrawing across the Rhine, oversee the task. Himmler was to
the Nineteenth Army held in place. command Army Group Oberrhein, a new
Once again Wiese attempted to fill up headquarters controlling Wiese’s
the depleted combat battalions of his Nineteenth Army in the Colmar region
now ten infantry divisions 20with a va- as well as a mixture of defensive for-
riety of military personnel from all mations on the east bank of the Rhine
branches and services. On the 10th, south of Lauterbourg. Oberrhein would
Hitler’s determination to hold the be a semi-independent headquarters
trans-Rhine enclave was sharply un- and treated as a separate theater com-
derscored by the appointment of mand; thus Himmler reported not to
von Rundstedt’s OB West, but directly
20These ten included, approximately clockwise to OKW, and in practice answered
from the south, the 30th SS Division; the 338th,
189th, and 159th Infantry Divisions; the 269th, 16th,
only to Hitler himself. Himmler, in
and 708th Volksgrenadier Divisions; the 716th and turn, replaced Wiese on 15 December
198th Infantry Divisions; and Division Burke; all were with Lt. Gen. Siegfried Rasp, appar-
controlled by the LXIV and LXIII Corps, with some ently finding the long-time command-
of the divisions initially able to marshal perhaps no
more than a few thousand men or the equivalent of er of the Nineteenth Army less than en-
one or two combat battalions. thusiastic regarding his new mission.
486 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

For the next few weeks the com- T o crack this defensive enclave, de
mand changes proved effective. How- Lattre planned a full-scale offensive.
ever questionable his military abilities, Bethouart’s I Corps would attack
Himmler was able to accelerate the north through Cernay on 13 Decem-
infusion of replacements into both ber, and de Monsabert’s II Corps,
the Colmar area and the east bank de- with the U.S. 36th Infantry and the
fenses by having the immediate French 2d Armored Divisions at-
German interior scoured more thor- tached, would push south from the
oughly for supplies, equipment, and Selestat region on the 15th. 21 But de
manpower. In addition, the direct Lattre’s mid-December offensive
presence of the head of the dreaded probably never had the strength nec-
secret police undoubtedly ensured essary for success. T h e November
that no unauthorized withdrawals oc- fight through the southern portion of
curred and inspired local German the High Vosges and the Belfort-Mul-
troop commanders to defend each vil- house drive had been more difficult
lage, water crossing, and road inter- than Haislip’s advance to Strasbourg,
section more vigorously. and had exhausted French manpower
At the time of the VI Corps’ rede- and materiel resources. Furthermore,
ployment northward, its attacks in the with their weaker logistical and per-
north had reduced the base of the sonnel support systems, the French
Colmar Pocket from about fifty to units always took longer to recuperate
forty miles—from the town of Rhinau than their American counterparts. In
in the north to Kembs in the south— December Devers regarded the en-
but the pocket still extended about demic French shortage of infantry
thirty miles to the west, reaching the replacements as de Lattre’s most im-
upper Thur River valley deep in the mediate problem, followed by the
High Vosges (Map 33). On the south- shortage of line officers with experi-
ern border of the pocket, the Nine- ence handling African colonial troops.
teenth Army had managed to secure the Efforts to attach militia elements to
Harth forest area between Mulhouse regular units continued to have seri-
and the Rhine and to form a solid de- ous drawbacks, and the recruiting and
fensive line from St. Amarin in the training of new personnel, especially
Vosges to Cernay and the Thur River. officers and technicians, could not be
To the west, in the High Vosges, accomplished overnight.
German units continued to defend From the French commander’s
the mountain passes in the area that point of view, the need to commit
once marked the gap between the strong forces to Operation INDEPEN-
First French and U.S. Seventh DENCE in western France was his
Armies. On the northern edge of the greatest frustration. Ordered again to
pocket, between Selestat and the begin redeploying major troop units
Rhine, Wiese and his successor, Rasp, for an endeavor entirely unrelated to
had gradually reinforced the area with his current mission, he could only rue
mainly infantry units of all types, so that
each Alsatian hamlet and crossroads 21This section is based primarily on Seventh Army
had become a defensive strongpoint. Rpt, II, 503–27, and de Lattre, History, pp. 287–300.
488 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

his misfortune. On 5 December the since it first began to push through


French 1st Infantry Division had the Vosges in October, the 36th was
begun moving west; by the 18th, the exhausted, and Dahlquist finally re-
main body of the division had closed quested the division’s immediate
on western France, and major units of relief. With Devers’ approval, Patch
the 1st Armored Division were pre- replaced it with O’Daniel’s rested 3d
paring to follow. Suddenly, SHAEF Infantry Division on 15 December.
agreed to yet another postpone- Recalling his promise at the Vittel
ment.22Although the infantry division conference in November to clear
quickly turned around and headed southern Alsace, Devers hoped that
back to the main front, it could obvi- de Lattre’s renewed offensive, with
ously play no part in the renewed of- the help of one of the Seventh Army’s
fensive against Colmar. To Devers strongest units, would finally com-
and de Lattre, the entire redeploy- plete the task.24 Provisionally Ameri-
ment affair was a waste of effort. can engineer units assumed responsi-
Meanwhile, the tired 36th Division bility for the Strasbourg area, and the
and the roadbound French 2d Ar- 36th Division went into a reserve
mored Division had continued to plug status.
their way south. Between the Rhine At the same time that Dahlquist was
and the I11 rivers, Leclerc’s armor had having problems pushing the 36th Di-
difficulty penetrating the canal-laced, vision farther, Devers began having
water-soaked Alsatian plains without serious difficulties with Leclerc. The
more infantry. West of the Ill, Dahl- commander of the French 2d Ar-
quist’s 36th Division, initially strung mored Division was extremely unhap-
out between the Bonhomme Pass in py with his new orders and had gone
the High Vosges and the Selestat to Paris to plead his case with de
region on the plains, managed only to Gaulle, later arguing that the mission
clean out a portion of the Kaysers- of clearing the Alsatian plains be-
berg valley during ten days of heavy tween the Rhine and Ill rivers was
fighting, taking one small village after more appropriate for an infantry divi-
another while fending off almost con- sion. He also requested that his ar-
tinuous German counterattacks. mored unit be returned to American
Progress was agonizingly slow, but control immediately, even though,
from their observation posts in the like the 3d and 36th Divisions, it was
mountains, 36th Division troops still supported logistically by the Sev-
could see German soldiers walking enth Army. Angry, Devers personally
the streets of Colmar. 23 So near, yet mediated the altercation and privately
so far. In almost constant combat considered for a short time either dis-
banding the unit or having Eisenhow-
22 Theoperation was postponed officially on 14 er ship it off somewhere else. He kept
December. See 1st (French) Infantry Division Move- his misgivings to himself, however,
ment Order, 4 Dec 44; 1st Inf Div Jnl de Marche, 5 feeling that the real problem was the
and 19 Dec 44; Fr Forces of the West Jnl de
Marche, 13, 18, and 22 Dec 44; Vigneras-de Camas
Intervs; La Premiere Division Blindee au Combat, p. 102. 24 SeeLtr, Devers to Eisenhower, 18 Dec 4 4 (copy
23 Adams Interv, pp. 21–22. CMH).
O N THE SIEGFRIED LINE 489

“bitter hatred” between Leclerc, de which nullified de Lattre’s numerical


Monsabert, and de Lattre over past superiority in tanks and other ar-
political differences. Avoiding any mored vehicles. In addition, German
open discussion of such matters, control of the Ill-Rhine area exposed
Devers informed Leclerc that the mis- the flank of de Monsabert’s offensive
sion was necessary and that he had no to infantry counterattacks from the
infantry to spare. The justifiably east, thus blunting the strength of
famous “deuxieme division blindee”
the Franco-American attack toward
would have to make the best of a dif-
ficult situation. The problem with Le- Colmar. 26
clerc and the hostility among the vari- On 22 December, after more than
ous French elements would nag one week of fruitless attacks against
Devers throughout the rest of the the Colmar Pocket, Devers finally or-
war. 25 dered a halt to the effort. Develop-
On 15 December, shortly after the ments to the north, on the front of
arrival of O’Daniel’s 3d Division, de General Bradley’s 12th Army Group,
Lattre renewed his offensive against now began to have a major effect on
the pocket, with de Monsabert’s II Allied military operations throughout
Corps striking through the Kaysers- western Europe. This concern led Ei-
berg-Selestat area for Colmar city and senhower to order the 6th Army
Bethouart’s I Corps again heading for Group to adopt a defensive posture,
Cernay. For the first few days, howev- and de Lattre’s forces once again
er, the attacks went nowhere; neither broke off the action against Colmar.
the American division nor the French
forces were able to make more than a Epilogue
few dents in the now strengthened
German defenses. As elsewhere News of the German Ardennes
throughout the Allied front, offensive attack had spread rapidly through the
operations continued to be slowed by staffs of the Seventh Army and the
increasingly cold, wet, and overcast 6th Army Group during the evening
weather. In the flooded southern Al- of 16 December. Initially there was
satian plains, especially in the area some jubilation. Not believing at first
between the I11 and Rhine rivers, ve- that the assault would pose any severe
hicles of all types found it impossible difficulties for Bradley’s forces, many
to operate off the narrow roads, of Devers’ commanders hoped that
the German effort in the north might
25See Devers Diary, 13–15 and 22 Dec 44, and correspondingly weaken German
also entries for 17 and 31 Jan and 11 Feb 45; Ltrs, strength in the south, thereby offer-
A. Diethelm (French War Minister) to Devers, 13
Dec 44; Devers to Diethelm, 18 Dec 44; Devers to
Leclerc, 18 Dec 44 (copies CMH); and Henry 26For heroic action in the Kaysersberg area north-
Maule, Out of the Sand: The Epic Story of General Le east of Colmar between 16 and 18 December 1944,
Clerc and the Fighting Free French (London: Odhams, Congressional Medals of Honor were awarded to T.
1966), pp. 230–31, 259–75. Ultimately, the French Sgt. Bernard Bell, Company I, 142d Infantry, 36th
2d Armored Division, with Leclerc still in command, Infantry Division; 1st Lt. Charles P. Murray, Jr.,
was sent to western France for operations against Company C, 30th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division; and
the German Atlantic pockets and did not return to S. Sgt. Gus Kefurt, Company K, 3d Battalion, 15th
the main front until May. Infantry, 3d Infantry Division.
490 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

ing the Seventh Army a unique op- toward the threatened front. The next
portunity to break through the West day, 19 December, General Eisenhow-
Wall defenses into the German interi- er held a major command conference
or. 27 But such wishful thinking did at Verdun with Devers, Bradley,
not last far beyond 18 December as Patton, and various high-ranking staff
the strength of the German offensive officers. There the Allied Supreme
became more evident. A successful Commander’s primary concern was
German offensive in the north, threat- the Ardennes sector, and the urgent
ening Antwerp and the entire Allied need to prepare counterattacks
rear, would be a disaster for all. 28 against the northern and southern
Once again the weight of Allied shoulders of the German penetration.
combat strength began to shift north, Eisenhower and Bradley put Patton’s
although this time for different rea- Third Army in charge of the southern
sons. Late on the 18th, SHAEF or- counterattack, changing its direction
dered the Third Army’s 80th Infantry of advance from east to north. T o
and 4th Armored Divisions to rede- support the effort, Devers’ 6th Army
ploy northward for the Ardennes, Group was to halt all offensive oper-
which forced Haislip to quickly re- ations and be ready to yield ground if
commit the 12th Armored to the va- necessary. Furthermore, the 6th Army
cated sector. At the same time, Brad- Group would be responsible for most
ley instructed Patton, the Third Army of the sector vacated by the Third
commander, to halt all preparations Army. Priority in supplies, equipment,
for his own offensive, then scheduled and manpower would go to the forces
for the following day, and prepare to fighting in the Ardennes.
send more of his divisions northward. With this guidance, Devers ordered
Patton complied but was disgruntled, the offensives against the West Wall
feeling that the Seventh Army’s drive and the Colmar Pocket abruptly
into the West Wall had loosened up ended. He also directed the Seventh
the German defenses in the Third Army to undertake responsibility for
Army’s sector. However, he rapidly the extended front, spreading out to
recovered both his composure and his the west and northwest over twenty-
enthusiasm after learning of the grave five miles. The increased frontage
situation in the north and the impor- meant that even without Eisenhower’s
tance of his new mission. instructions, the Seventh Army would
These changes were only the first have to cease offensive operations, re-
signs of a rapid Allied reorientation organize its forces, and adopt a de-
fensive posture by straightening out
27See messages cited in the VI Corps War Room its front lines and echeloning its
Journal for 16 December. troops in depth. 29
28Following section is based on Pogue, The Su-
preme Command, pp. 374–77: SCAF–151, 20 Dec 44;
Privately General Devers was hardly
Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 1940–1945, p. 598; pleased with the new orders. Recall-
Patton, War As I Knew It, pp. 188-89; Hugh Cole, ing Eisenhower’s decision on 24 No-
The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, United States Army
in World War II (Washington, 1965), pp. 484-88;
and Ladislas Farago, Patton: Ordeal and Triumph, (New 29 20 Dec 44; 6th Army Gp LI 5, 21
SCAF–151,
York: Ivan Obolensky Inc., 1964), pp. 703–04. Dec 44.
O N THE SIEGFRIED LINE 491

vember halting the Seventh Army’s Seventh Army would have to absorb
Rhine crossing in the Rastatt area, he the new frontage. To accomplish this,
felt that his command was once again Patch decided to leave his corps
being called on to bail out the north- boundary intact, but to transfer the
ern army groups “just as we are 103d Infantry Division from the
about to crack the Siegfried Line by center of the VI Corps line to the left
infiltration . . . which would permit of the XV Corps. There, with ele-
us to turn both east and west, threat- ments of the 12th Armored Division
ening Karlsruhe to the east and loos- and the 106th Cavalry Group, it
ening up the entire Siegfried Line in would be responsible for almost all of
front of the Third Army to the west.” the new sector. As a precaution, he
Although recognizing the necessity of also pulled the 14th Armored Divi-
turning the Third Army north against sion back into reserve.
the German Ardennes offensive, South of Strasbourg, General
Devers believed it a “tragedy” that Devers made no changes in the
the Allied high command “has not boundary between the U.S. Seventh
seen fit to reinforce success on this and the First French Armies: Al-
flank.” 30 though calling off the current effort
Once the territorial adjustments against Colmar, he directed the First
were made, the new boundary be- French Army to be prepared to
tween the 12th and 6th Army Groups resume its offensive no later than 5
would be located near St. Avold, January by which time he expected
roughly twenty-seven miles west of the emergency in the north to be
the old 26 November line.31 Patch’s over. 32

30Quotes from Devers Diary, 19 Dec 44.


31SCAF–151, 20 Dec 44; 6th Army Gp LI 5, 21
Dec 44. 326th Army Gp LI 6, 21 Dec 44.
CHAPTER XXVII

Northwind
When the Germans began their Ar- bulge, or salient-a large, rolling
dennes offensive on 16 December plain bounded by the Franco-German
1944, the 6th Army Group was pre- border, with the small Lauter River
paring for a new thrust into German on the north and the larger Rhine
territory and making another try at River on the east. South of Stras-
the Colmar Pocket. At first Devers bourg, the Colmar Pocket bowed the
had hoped that the German focus in front of the First French Army
the north would facilitate his own of- inward, forcing it to disperse its units
fensives. But this expectation was in a semicircle around the German-
quickly dispelled by Eisenhower’s de- held salient. The French II Corps oc-
cision on the 19th to have the 6th cupied the northern perimeter of the
Group halt all offensive operations pocket from the Rhine to the High
and assume a significant portion of Vosges, and the French I Corps held
the Third Army’s area of responsibil- the southern sector above the Belfort
ity. The subsequent realignment Gap. As the army group slowly made
placed Devers’ forces in an awkward the transition from offensive to defen-
position, For the moment the front of sive operations, its commanders rec-
the 6th Army Group remained stable, ognized that their long curving front
but resembled a reverse letter S with lines were particularly unsuited for
its double bulge-a northern one be- the new mission.
tween Saarbrucken and Strasbourg, In mid-December the 6th Army
with the Haguenau forest and the Group could muster roughly eighteen
town of Lauterbourg at its apex, and divisions: two armored and six infan-
a southern one north of Mulhouse try in the U.S. Seventh Army and
around the city of Colmar. Eisenhow- three armored and seven infantry in
er’s order froze Patch’s Seventh Army the French First. 1Although all were
in the upper portion of the reverse S
and de Lattre’s First French Army in 1 These included the U.S. 12th and 14th Armored
Divisions and the 36th, 44th, 45th, 79th, 100th, and
the lower half. In the north, the U.S. 103d Infantry Divisions in the Seventh Army, and
XV Corps held a narrow alley across the French 1st, 2d (Leclerc), and 5th Armored Divi-
the Sarre River valley between Saar- sions, the 1st and 16th (a new unit) Infantry, 3d Al-
gerian, 2d Moroccan, 4th Moroccan Mountain, and
brucken and Bitche, and the U.S. VI 9th Colonial Divisions, and the U.S. 3d Infantry Di-
Corps occupied the Lauterbourg vision in the First French Army.
NORTHWIND 493

combat effective, many had been lient, and Rasp’s Nineteenth Army,
worn thin by the heavy winter cam- under Army Group Oberrhein, which was
paigning, and others were still rela- below it. Altogether these forces
tively new and untested. Only two of amounted to about twenty divisions,
the armored divisions, the French 1st but many were at half strength and
and 2d, could be considered experi- some could field only a few thousand
enced, and the U.S. 12th had just re- combat troops. Although Himmler’s
cently arrived. In addition, all were political influence gradually increased
suffering severe shortages in supplies, the manpower, supplies, and materiel
equipment, and manpower because of available to the upper Rhine front,
the increased demands of the north- the Ardennes battlefield continued to
ern armies and the still limited logisti- receive the largest share of German
cal support available to the Allied military resources for the moment.
ground combat forces throughout the Once the main German offensive
theater. A new corps headquarters, began to bog down, however, the
the U.S. XXI, had also recently ar- eyes of Hitler and OKW turned south.
rived in the 6th Army Group’s area,
but was likewise inexperienced with Planning Operation Northwind
few supporting forces. (21–27 December 1944)
Initially the opposing German
forces were in worse condition. Most By 21 December the German high
of the German Army’s better- command had begun to examine its
equipped and better-manned units operational alternatives on the battle-
were in Field Marshal Walter Model’s field. The momentum of Army Group
Army Group B, which was fighting in B’s attack in the Ardennes had begun
the Ardennes; the offensive there had to dissipate, the important road junc-
diverted German supplies, equipment, tion at Bastogne was still in American
and manpower away from the Vosges- hands, and pressure on the southern
Alsace sector. The creation of Army flank of the German advance was
Group Oberrhein on 10 December had steadily mounting as Patton wheeled
further encumbered German oper- his Third Army north.3 However,
ations in the south.2 The new head- both Hitler and von Rundstedt real-
quarters was completely independent ized that the Allies had greatly weak-
of von Rundstedt’s OB West, and its ened their southern army group to
creation had divided command and meet the Ardennes thrust and be-
control of the German forces that lieved that a fresh German offensive
were opposite the 6th Army Group in the south could exploit this weak-
between von Obstfelder’s First Army, ness. At the very least it would bring
under Army Group G and OB West, some relief to Model’s hard-pressed
which was above the Lauterbourg sa-
3 German planning information is based on von
Luttichau, “German Operations,” ch. 27; “Oper-
2Army Group Oberrhein (“Upper Rhine”) controlled ation Northwind” file, Box 1, William W. Quinn
the Nineteenth Army in the Colmar Pocket as well as Papers, MHI; and Paul Rigoulot, “Operation Nord-
the XIV SS Corps and a variety of military and para- wind: 1–26 janvier 1945” (unpublished MS, ca.
military units east of the Rhine. 1988), pp. 1–70 (copy CMH).
494 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

forces in the Ardennes. The attacking forces could be concen-


Von Rundstedt’s staff at OB West trated fairly easily using the road and
initially proposed an attack north of rail net around Saarbrucken, and the
Saarbrucken by Army Group G toward axis of advance was relatively flat with
Metz, threatening to envelop either enough roads to support a rapid ar-
Patton’s Third Army to the north or mored thrust. But von Rundstedt and
Patch’s Seventh in the south. But Blaskowitz were uneasy over their
Hitler and von Rundstedt quickly shortage of armor and lack of air sup-
concluded that they lacked the re- port, and argued that the open nature
sources for such an ambitious under- of the Sarre River valley made it too
taking. Instead Hitler, who had dangerous for a successful offensive.
moved his headquarters from Berlin Instead, they favored a main effort
to Command Post Adlerhorst near Bad farther east, from the Bitche sector in
Nauheim in earIy December in order the Vosges, judging that the heavily
to keep a close watch over the entire forested hills and mountains would
campaign, approved an attack south offer the attackers cover from Allied
of the Saarbrucken area toward the air observation and interdiction
Saverne Gap, with the goal of split- during the critical first phase of the
ting the U.S. Seventh Army and clear- attack. In addition, about half of the
ing northern Alsace. If successful, the large Maginot Line fortresses around
German high command intended to Bitche were still in German hands,
launch a second series of attacks from providing cover and concealment for
the Sarre valley-Saverne area toward the assembly areas. Although road
Luneville, Metz, and the rear of communications into the Bitche area
Patton’s Third Army, tentatively and along the projected Vosges line
code-named Operation ZAHNARZT of advance were more limited, the
(“Dentist”). 4 Von Rundstedt ordered two generals believed that swiftly
General Blaskowitz, who had returned moving infantry could exploit what
to replace Balck as the Army Group G they suspected was a weakly defended
commander on 22 December, to gap in the American lines between
begin planning immediately and au- the Seventh Army’s two corps; with
thorized the rehabilitation of two their infantry units gradually pushing
mobile divisions (panzer or panzer south to the Saverne Gap, they could
grenadier) to form the core of the at- send their mobile panzer reserves
tacking force. into either the Sarre River valley on
In the days that followed, the the west or the Alsatian plains on the
German military leaders debated sev- east.
eral operational plans. Hitler favored Both plans had serious disadvan-
a main effort southeast of Saar- tages. A Sarre River offensive would
brucken along the Sarre River valley have to pass through the American-
to Phalsbourg and the Saverne Gap. occupied portion of the Maginot Line
and would be open to Allied air at-
tacks during daylight hours. A drive
4For a discussion of ZAHNARZT alternatives, see
von Luttichau, “German Operations,” ch. 28, pp. from Bitche through the Vosges
21–24. Mountains, on the other hand, would
NORTHWIND 495

leave the XV Corps and the bulk of Year’s Eve 1944. Code-named NORD-
the American armored forces free to WIND (“Northwind”), these attacks
counterattack the western flank of the would begin the last major German
advance. In addition, both plans as- offensive of the European war.
sumed supporting attacks by Army
Group Oberrhein to keep the U.S. VI The Defense of Strasbourg
Corps occupied, actions over which (26 December 1944–1 January 1945)
OB West had no control or authority.
On 27 December Hitler, von Rund- In the Allied camp the rapid shift
stedt, and Blaskowitz approved a from offensive to defensive oper-
rough compromise. Under the oper- ations had created both military and
ational control of the First Army, one political problems for the 6th Army
panzer grenadier and one infantry di- Group. 5 Initially Eisenhower had di-
vision would punch a hole in the rected Devers to cease all offensive
American Sarre River valley defenses, operations while the Ardennes battle
while four refitted infantry divisions remained unresolved and to shorten
would push off from the Bitche area his own defensive lines in order to
along a southwest axis of advance make more forces available for the
through the Vosges. Blaskowitz would struggle in the north. Elaborating on
keep his strongest units, the equiva- these guidelines on 26 December, he
lent of two panzer divisions, in re- ordered the 6th Army Group to pull
serve to exploit any breakthrough. its “main line of defense” back to the
However, on Hitler’s instructions, the Vosges Mountains, compressing its
reserve units were to remain in the elongated front and making one corps
Saarbrucken area in the expectation headquarters, with one armored and
that the main effort would develop one infantry division, immediately
along the Sarre River valley. In addi- available for theater reserve. Despite
tion, Blaskowitz’s request that units of Allied successes in the Ardennes, Ei-
Army Group Oberrhein launching sup- senhower judged the final outcome
porting attacks be placed under Army still in doubt; he had also become
Group G’s jurisdiction was disap- alarmed at new intelligence reports
proved, as was his proposal to delay pointing to another German military
the start of the offensive until more buildup opposite the Seventh Army.
troops and materiel could be assem- As a result, he wanted Devers to pull
bled. Hitler informed Blaskowitz that the VI Corps completely out of the
Army Group Oberrhein would launch Lauterbourg salient as soon as possi-
supporting attacks north and south of ble. A meeting between Eisenhower
Strasbourg, but only after the main and Devers the following day in Paris
effort down the Sarre River valley confirmed the directive and the new
corridor had been successful. He also Allied intelligence. Devers, however,
felt that speed was essential, and
he scheduled the beginning of the
First Army ’s two northern attacks—one 5Material relating to the defense of Strasbourg is
based primarily on John W. Price, “The Strasbourg
down the Sarre valley and the other Incident” (1967), CMH MS; and de Lattre, History,
through the Low Vosges—for New pp. 301–13.
496 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

was convinced that this second the ability of Brooks’ VI Corps to


German offensive would most likely hold the exposed Lauterbourg salient
come down the Sarre River valley, against a determined German attack
well north of the exposed salient, and was understandable. The terrain oc-
did not attach any urgency to the pro- cupied by the Seventh Army was diffi-
jected withdrawal. In fact, the 6th cult to defend. The lower Vosges
Army Group commander came away mountain range bisected its front,
from the conference impressed with greatly limiting lateral movement be-
the need to hold Strasbourg as well tween the XV and VI Corps to several
as other significant urban centers in easily interdicted mountain roads. A
northern Alsace.6 German drive southwest, either
On returning to his headquarters through the Low Vosges or along its
on 28 December, General Devers in- eastern or western slopes, would
structed Patch to have the VI Corps threaten the flanks of both American
prepare three intermediate withdrawal corps; and if the Saverne Gap area,
positions to be occupied only “in the just twenty miles inside the American
face of heavy attack,” as well as a final lines, fell, the entire VI Corps within
defensive line on the eastern slopes the Lauterbourg salient would be
of the Vosges. The first intermediate trapped. The threat of a complemen-
position was to follow the trace of the tary German attack from the south by
American-held portions of the Magi- forces from the Colmar Pocket only
not Line just inside the Franco- made SHAEF more nervous, as did
German border; the second was to lie the Allied failure to predict the Ar-
between Bitche, Niederbronn, and dennes offensive. Perhaps the Allied
Bischwiller (on the Falkenstein, Zint- high command had been relying too
sel, and Moder rivers); and the third heavily on ULTRA and other sophis-
would be between Bitche, Ingwiller, ticated intelligence sources and had
and Strasbourg. A final defensive po- now simply given up attempting to
sition would pull the VI Corps all the second-guess German intentions.
way back to the Vosges. But Devers Whatever the case, Eisenhower con-
saw no need to carry out any of these tinued to insist that Devers withdraw
withdrawals until a more specific his forces from the salient as quickly
threat presented itself and therefore as possible and pull his defensive
indicated no execution dates for lines all the way back to the eastern
them. Instead he transferred Leclerc’s slopes of the Vosges Mountains. The
2d Armored Division from the First shift would greatly reduce the defen-
French Army to the American Sev- sive responsibilities of the Seventh
enth to further beef up Patch’s com- Army, making it easier to concentrate
mand and make up for the projected forces in the Sarre River valley or, if
loss of an American armored division necessary, dispatch more reinforce-
to the SHAEF reserve. 7 ments to the Ardennes.
General Eisenhower’s concern over Once again Devers questioned the
wisdom of Eisenhower’s operational
6Devers Diary, 27 Dec 44. guidance. Despite the Supreme Com-
7 6th Army Gp LOI 7,28 Dec 44. mander’s clear-cut instructions on the
NORTHWIND 497

matter, the 6th Army Group chief re- at all costs. Believing Allied forces
mained reluctant to make such a could use the city to anchor a defensi-
major withdrawal without cause. ble east-west line along the Rhine-
Patch supported him, regarding it as Marne Canal, he warned that French
“a terrifically difficult proposition to forces would defend Strasbourg “no
give up a strong defensive position matter what comes.” On the same day
when you feel confident that you can he also sent a direct communication
hold it,” and both dragged their feet to de Lattre, outlining his stand and
in executing the order.8 The delay fi- ordering the First French Army com-
nally led to an angry call by Eisen- mander, “in the eventuality that the
hower’s chief of staff, General Bedell Allied Forces retire from their present
Smith, on New Year’s Day, relaying positions to the north . . . to take in
the Supreme Commander’s displeas- hand and assure the defense of Stras-
ure over the Seventh Army’s failure bourg.” The Free French leader was
to carry out the withdrawal and or- prepared to challenge the Allied high
dering Devers to issue the necessary command in order to spare the city
instructions at once.9 But Devers had an almost certainly vengeful German
more than one reason to put off the reoccupation. Finally, on the night of
matter. As Patch had pointed out to 2–3 January, Juin had a long confer-
him earlier, Eisenhower’s more exten- ence with Eisenhower’s chief of staff
sive withdrawal concept would uncov- over the matter and relayed de
er the entire northern Alsatian plains, Gaulle’s threat to withdraw the First
including the city of Strasbourg, and French Army from SHAEF control if
would have great political ramifica- Strasbourg was abandoned. 10Simulta-
tions for the Allied alliance. neously de Lattre began making uni-
Violent French objections to any lateral plans to pull the 3d Algerian
hint of abandoning Strasbourg or Division out of the High Vosges to
northern Alsace without a fight were defend the city. 11 The controversy
predictable. De Gaulle had learned of thus threatened to disrupt the entire
the withdrawal planning almost imme- Allied chain of command and greatly
diately on 28 December; two days complicate the Allied response to a
later he had General Alphonse Juin, fresh German offensive in Alsace.
his chief of staff in the Ministry of Na-
tional Defense, send a strong protest Preparationsfor the Attack
to SHAEF, accompanied by an offer (27-31 December 1944)
of three newly formed FFI divisions
to help defend Strasbourg city if nec- As the Allied leaders debated the
essary. De Gaulle personally restated
the French position on 1 January
10For an account of the conference, see Ltr,
1945, conceding that it might be nec- David G . Barr to Devers, 5 Sep 67 (copy CMH).
essary to abandon the salient but de- Barr, who was Devers’ chief of staff at the time, was
manding that Strasbourg be defended present at the meeting and related that de Gaulle’s
threat was communicated by a French draft memo
that was somehow passed on to the American gen-
8Devers Diary, 29 Dec 44. erals toward the end of the session.
9Devers Diary, 1 Jan 45. 11Vigneras Intervs, pp. 35–36.
498 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

fate of Strasbourg, the two contend- sion as it arrived from the defunct
ers prepared for a final struggle in Finnish front. In reserve, temporarily
northern Alsace. Between 27 and 30 under the direct control of Army Group
December the First Army withdrew the G, lay the XXXIX Panzer Corps, under
designated assault divisions from Lt. Gen. Karl Decker, with the re-
their defensive sectors, which quipped 21st Panzer and 25th Panzer
stretched the fronts of the remaining Grenadier Divisions-the former with 18
divisions thin, and attempted to cover medium (Mark IV) and 31 heavy
the many gaps with fortress units and (Mark V) Panther tanks, and the latter
a miscellany of odd formations, espe- with 9 medium and 20 heavies, with
cially recently formed Volkssturm mili- about 20 additional Panthers and
tia. While the signal elements of the more assault and self-propelled guns
departing units remained temporarily en route, which had been temporarily
in place to give the impression of delayed by Allied air attacks on the
normalcy, the German staffs shunted German transportation network. To
scarce supplies, equipment, and re- further strengthen the reserve forces
placements into anemic units and and serve as a basis for Operation
moved artillery into supporting posi- ZAHNARZT, OB West began prepara-
tions. Opposite the U.S. XV Corps, tions for assembling the 10th S S
which was defending the Sarre River Panzer Division, the 7th Parachute Divi-
valley area, General Max Simon’s XIII sion, and other units behind the lines
SS Corps readied NORDWIND’s pri- of the First Army. 12
mary assault force, consisting of the Blaskowitz obviously would have
17th SS Panzer Grenadier (“Gotz von preferred assembling all of these
Berlichingen”) and the 36th Volksgren- units first and giving the initial assault
adier Divisions, the 404th and 410th forces more time to train replace-
Volks Artillery Corps, the 20th Volks ments and break in new equipment.
Werfer (rocket-launcher) Brigade, two But further delays threatened to end
armored flame-thrower companies, what was clearly a fleeting tactical op-
two army artillery battalions, and one portunity to penetrate the weakened
observation battalion. In the Bitche Seventh Army lines. Not even his
area the second attacking force con- “Arrow Flash” convoys-the equiva-
sisted of General Petersen’s XC Corps lent of the American “Red Ball Ex-
on the right, or western, wing, con- press”-were able to negotiate the
trolling the strengthened 559th and maze of tangled lines and broken
257th VolksgrenadierDivisions, and Gen- bridges behind the front lines with
eral Hoehne’s LXXXIX Corps on the any speed. Just prior to the offensive,
left, or eastern, wing, with the refitted Blaskowitz thus agreed to strengthen
361st and 256th Volksgrenadier Divisions. the attacking 17th SS Panzer Grenadiers
The Vosges forces were also beefed
up by additional self-propelled and 12Von Rundstedt had also considered the 11th
assault guns, supported by two army Panzer Division for ZAHNARZT, but later committed
it on 18 January in a minor attack north of the main
artillery battalions and an army engi- Alsatian battlefield. See CMH MS R-91, Magna E.
neer battalion, and later reinforced by Bauer, “Army Group G, January 1945” (December
the experienced 6th SS Mountain Divi- 1956).
NORTHWIND 499

with a company of Panthers (ten ties so badly damaged that most of


heavy tanks) from the 21st Panzers to Germany’s military strength could be
ensure the success of the initial as- devoted to the eastern front in the
sault. By that time he had also re- months ahead. To accomplish this the
ceived one company of the 653d Su- German Army had to keep the initia-
perheavy Antitank Battalion with a few tive, attacking the Allied forces wher-
monstrous seventy-ton, 128-mm.- ever they were weak and using speed
gunned Jagdtigers (turretless assault to avoid being crushed by Allied ma-
guns based on the Mark VI “Royal teriel superiority. Hitler discussed the
Tiger” chassis). This gave him about details of the forthcoming operation
eighty tanks, mostly heavies, in re- individually with each commander,
serve to exploit any breakthrough at continually emphasizing both its ne-
the beginning of the operation, with cessity and its possibility for success.
more armor on the way. 13 To all he stressed that the objective
On the morning of 28 December of NORDWIND was neither terrain
Blaskowitz brought his attacking nor prestige, but “manpower . . . the
corps and division commanders to OB destruction of enemy forces.” 14
West headquarters at Ziegenberg and
then, after a twenty-minute bus ride, Preparations for the Defense
to Hitler’s Adlerhorst for a personal ( 1 9–31 December 1944)
pep talk by the Fuhrer. For most of
the participants, it was the first time For the American soldiers in the
that they had ever seen their supreme Seventh Army, the last two weeks of
commander in person. Although December were also busy as com-
physically in poor condition, Hitler manders reoriented their units from
led off with a fifty-minute speech that offensive to defensive postures. 15 Be-
showed he had lost none of his per- tween 1 9 and 26 December, Patch’s
sonal magnetism. Despite tremendous forces took over large portions of the
sacrifices, he conceded, the Ardennes Third Army’s front, thus allowing
offensive had failed. Perhaps no one Patton to shift more forces into the
was to blame. With the Russians Ardennes sector. As a result, the Sev-
threatening in the east, however, he enth Army found itself holding a
impressed on them that defeat in the front of about 126 miles-84 miles
forthcoming offensive was unthink- from the Saarbrucken area east to
able. The Western Allies had to be Lauterbourg, and another 42 miles
stopped and their offensive capabili- south along the Rhine—with only six
infantry divisions. This worked out to
13Army Group G’s constantly changing order of about twenty miles of front per divi-
battle and its equipment situation during this period sion, six miles per regiment, or two
make it difficult to ascertain the exact number and per battalion-with the two armored
type of tanks and assault guns committed. In fact,
many units and machines entered the battle as they
arrived on the front. Neither the 6th Mountain SS Di- 14Quoted in von Luttichau, “German Oper-
vision nor the X X X I X Panzer Corps headquarters, for ations,” ch. 27.
example, was available at the start of NORDWIND, 15 For general information on American actions
both arriving a day or two later. See Rigoulot, “Op- before and during NORDWIND, see Hist, 6th Army
eration Nordwind,” pp. 51–53. Gp, pp. 106-58; Seventh Army Rpt, II, chs. 22–23.
500 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

divisions in reserve. Patch believed he


had no choice but to use the Low
Vosges as a dividing line between his
two corps and placed his own head-
quarters at Saverne, directly behind
the middle of his defenses. Expecting
the main German attack down the
Sarre River corridor, he concentrated
the bulk of his strength in General
Haislip’s XV Corps, west of the
Vosges, with three infantry divi-
sions-the 103d, 44th, and 100th-on
line covering about thirty-five miles of
total frontage, backed by the new
12th Armored Division. East of the
Vosges, General Brooks’ VI Corps
held the upper, open portion of the
salient, from Bitche to Lauterbourg,
with the 45th and 79th Divisions,
while using the 36th Division to cover
its Rhine River front from Lauter-
bourg south to Strasbourg; the 14th
Armored Division was his reserve. Al-
though not enthusiastic about aban- BRIG.GEN.HENRYH. LINDEN
doning the Lauterbourg salient, both
Devers and Patch agreed that Brooks barked at Marseille and arrived at the
should start pulling his forces back at front with little besides their infantry
the first sign of a major German regiments. Without waiting for their
attack. attached artillery, armor, and other
Even before these dispositions supporting elements, Patch organized
could be finalized, Devers passed them into task forces, each consisting
SHAEF’s requirements for two divi- of the three infantry regiments and a
sions down to the Seventh Army. Al- small command group led by the des-
though he could ill afford to spare ignated assistant division commander.
them, Patch promptly nominated the Task Force Linden controlled the 42d
36th Infantry and 12th Armored Divi- Division’s regiments, Task Force
sions for the SHAEF reserve. Their Harris those of the 63d, and Task
departures left his defensive lines Force Herren those of the 70th.16
paper thin. As a partial remedy,
Devers brought Leclerc’s 2d Armored 16The task forces were commanded by Brig.
Gens. Henry H. Linden, Frederick M. Harris, and
Division back and began rushing ele- Thomas W. Herren. For a detailed account of the
ments of three new infantry divi- operations of Task Force Herren’s 275th Infantry
sions-the 42d, 63d, and 70th-into regiment during NORDWIND, see Donald C. Pence
and Eugene J. Petersen, Ordeal in the Vosges (Sanford,
the battle area. All three were untest- N.C.: Transition Press, 1981); for the 274th regi-
ed units that had recently disem- ment, see Wallace R. Cheves, ed., Snow Ridges and
NORTHWIND 501

southeast of Bitche, Patch inserted a


small mechanized screening force to
cover the Vosges area between Hais-
lip’s 100th Infantry Division in the
north and Brooks’ 45th Division in
the south. This element, Task Force
Hudelson, consisted of two cavalry
squadrons, a detached armored infan-
try battalion, and a few supporting
detachments. A similar screening
force held the extreme left, or north-
eastern, flank of the Seventh Army, in
the crease separating the XV Corps
from the Third Army’s XII Corps. In
reserve was the bulk of the 14th Ar-
mored Division in the VI Corps zone,
while the French 2d Armored Divi-
sion performed the same function for
the XV Corps. The withdrawn 12th
Armored and 36th Infantry Divisions
remained uncommitted, but were also
in the Seventh Army’s rear area
around Sarrebourg and available in
BRIG.GEN.FREDERICK
M. HARRIS an emergency. Still expecting a major
German thrust down the Sarre River
valley but unsure of the location and
These three formations together with magnitude of secondary offensives,
Leclerc’s armor would have to fill in Devers moved his own advance head-
the many gaps in the Seventh Army’s quarters from Phalsbourg in the Sa-
lines. verne Gap area to Luneville, forty
With these additions and losses, miles to the rear. Nevertheless, he al-
Patch reorganized his defenses, ini- lowed de Lattre to retain control of
tially placing the inexperienced infan- the U.S. 3d Infantry Division in the
trymen of Task Forces Linden, Colmar Pocket region and even rein-
Harris, and Herren along the Rhine forced it with a regiment from Task
River front under the VI Corps. He Force Harris. The 6th Army Group
later transferred two of Task Force commander remained optimistic and
Harris’ regiments as well as the entire still saw no need for a precipitous
French 2d Armored Division north to withdrawal from the Lauterbourg sa-
the Sarre River valley area to bolster lient or from anywhere else. After
Haislip’s XV Corps. In his center, steadily pushing enemy forces back
for the past five months, Devers and
Pillboxes (privately published, n.d.) (copy MHI); and his fellow generals were confident
for all three, the 70th Infantry Division official
records for December 1944-January 1945 at the that the Seventh Army could stop any
WNRC. German attack, and they had no in-
502 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

tingency plans for all possible aspects


of the coming battle. SHAEF levies
on the newly arrived regiments fur-
ther exacerbated the shortage of
infantry, forcing Patch to begin con-
verting some of his Army service per-
sonnel into foot soldiers and engineer
units into rifle battalions, even before
the expected offensive began. 17 Re-
gardless, the line units continued to
mask their weaknesses by aggressive
patrolling against the German lines,
at times conducting raids across the
Rhine, gathering information on
enemy preparations, and giving some
combat experience to the new infan-
try units in the process.
On 29 December, three days before
Hitler had scheduled NORDWIND to
begin, specific German intentions
were still unclear to the American de-
fenders. Allied analyses of enemy rail
and road traffic, radio intercepts, pris-
oner-of-war reports, and air recon-
BRIG.GEN.THOMAS
W. HERREN
naissance over the battlefield indicat-
ed major German troop buildups in
tention of voluntarily surrendering the Saarbrucken area, beyond the
the ground their troops had painfully Rhine, and in the Colmar Pocket. In-
taken during the past several months. telligence at the 6th Army Group
Aware of the impending German headquarters placed the 21st Panzer
offensive, American infantrymen on Division and the 17th SS and 25th
line prepared as best they could. Fox- Panzer Grenadier Divisions somewhere
holes and trenches had to be excavat- in the Zweibruecken area, about ten
ed in the frozen earth, fields of fire miles behind the Sarre River line;
planned and cleared, minefields and American patrols had identified ele-
other obstacles constructed, prear- ments of these units and nine
ranged artillery and mortar barrages German infantry divisions on their
plotted, and telephone lines laid to fronts. The Seventh Army G–2, Colo-
replace the less-reliable radio commu- nel Quinn, believed that the total
nications system used in the offense. strength of opposing German infantry
Slightly to the rear, staffs and sup- was equal to about twenty-four or
porting units brought up and stocked twenty-five American battalions, but
supplies—ammunition, fuel, and
food—worked replacements into un- 17 The conversion program is discussed in Sev-
derstrength units, and prepared con- enth Army Diary, pp. 460–61, 465–66.
NORTHWIND 503

BUILDING DEFENSIVE
WORKSIN THE SNOW.111th Engineer Battalion, 36th Division,
in Weibruch area.

the size of the armored forces was a order of battle and an analysis of
question mark. He estimated that the Luftwaffe air reconnaissance orders
enemy would either launch a major pinpointed the Sarre River valley as
attack with three mobile divisions the major area of attack. However,
down the Sarre River valley or “with ULTRA remained mute on specific
forces currently in contact and in im- German intentions.19
mediate reserve . . . launch a series Patch’s evaluation of intelligence
of limited objective attacks.” The estimates was strongly influenced by
latter alternative, he believed, was the the tactical situation. In his judgment,
most likely.18 The Seventh Army the Sarre River corridor approach still
ULTRA officer, Maj. Donald S. represented the gravest threat to the
Bussey, disagreed, feeling that cur- Seventh Army; a penetration there
rent information on the German could split his forces and leave the VI

18 “G–2 History: Seventh Army Operations in 19Bussey Interv, 19 Aug 87; Bussey, ULTRA
Europe,” V (1-31 December 44), Box 2, William W. Report; Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second
Quinn Papers, MHI. World War, III, 2, p. 664.
504 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

bourg salient-one that would place


the VI Corps’ main line of resistance
on an east-west, Bitche-Strasbourg
line (as later suggested by de Gaulle)
by 5 January.
As New Year’s Day approached,
Devers and Patch increasingly regard-
ed the Sarre River valley as the prin-
cipal danger point. On 30 December
Devers even authorized Patch to use
elements of the SHAEF-designated
reserve units in his area, the 12th Ar-
mored and 36th Infantry Divisions, to
establish a secondary line of defense
behind the XV Corps. The following
day Patch ordered the 14th Armored
Division, the only reserve in the VI
Corps area, north to Phalsbourg,
where it could provide even more re-
inforcements for the XV Corps.
Clearly the American commanders ex-
pected the main German effort would
take place west of the Vosges and had
GENERALS DEVERS AND PATCH prepared an appropriate reception.
CONFERat Luneville, On New Year’s Eve, a Sunday
evening, Patch met with both his
corps commanders at Fenetrange, the
Corps stranded on the Alsatian XV Corps headquarters, and warned
plains. In fact, the Germans had al- them to expect a major enemy attack
ready signaled a preference for the during the early morning hours of
region’s offensive possibilities with New Year’s Day. Late afternoon air
the Panzer Lehr Division’s counterattack reconnaissance had reported German
back in November; obviously the troop movements all across the north-
same route promised the Germans ern front.20 Local festivities for the
their best chance of tactical success, holiday would have to be postponed.
especially since any offensive there Haislip’s forces, he predicted, would
could be easily supported from the bear the brunt of the impending of-
Saarbrucken road nets. For these rea- fensive, but Patch was confident that
sons Patch, with Devers’ blessing, his units were up to the task. Still
continued to build up his forces west there was no definite knowledge of
of the Low Vosges and, despite con- specific German intentions or the
tinued SHAEF pressure for a com- scope and size of the predicted at-
plete VI Corps withdrawal to the tacks. Inclement weather had cur-
Vosges, planned only a partial and
gradual retirement from the Lauter- 20Cited in Bussey Interv, 19 Aug 87.
NORTHWIND 505

tailed further aerial reconnaissance, advanced in suicidal open waves,


and signal intercepts had revealed cursing and screaming at the Ameri-
little. Outside the American command can infantrymen who refused to be in-
post, a new snowfall covered the timidated. The infantry of the 36th
woods and forests of the Low Vosges Volksgrenadier did little better. Al-
Mountains east of Fenetrange with a though Simon’s forces finally man-
deceptively innocent coating of white, aged to poke a narrow hole, about
giving little hint of the coming strug- two miles in depth, at Rimling on the
gle. right wing of the 44th Division, the
100th Infantry Division held firm. In
The New Year’s Eve Attacks the days that followed the Germans
(31 December 1944–5January 1945) saw their small advances continuously
eroded by repeated counterattacks
The German First Army launched its from the 44th, 100th, and 63d (TF
initial attacks on schedule a few hours Harris) Division infantry supported by
before New Year’s Day, with Simon’s elements of the French 2d Armored
XIII SS Corps pushing south over the Division.22 Allied artillery and, when
Sarre River valley and Petersen’s XC the weather broke, Allied air attacks,
and Hoehne’s LXXXIX Corps heading together with the bitter cold, also
in the same general direction through sapped the strength of the attackers.
the woods of the Low Vosges (Map On 4 January the German high com-
34).21 In both cases the leading mand formally called off the effort. As
German echelons began to hit the General Simon, the attacking corps
main American lines about midnight. commander, caustically observed, the
In the Sarre valley the assault force Sarre assault had shown only that the
was met by determined resistance German soldier still knew how to
from the 44th and 100th Infantry Di- fight and how to die, but little else.
vision troops, who were well dug in Blaskowitz, with Hitler and von Rund-
and deployed in depth. Expecting the stedt’s approval, obviously chose not
major attack in this area, Patch and to throw the German armored re-
Haislip had jammed the XV Corps serves into the battle there, as
zone with three infantry divisions but- planned, and sought weaker links in
tressed by the two regiments of Task the American lines.
Force Harris and—if the theater re- The second attack, launched from
serve units are counted—two armored the Bitche area south through the Low
and another infantry division in re- Vosges, was more successful. Believing
serve, with a third armored division that the major German effort would be
arriving. The German attack barely
made a dent in the beefed-up Allied 22For heroic action in defense of his unit’s perim-
line. In some cases the SS troopers eter on 1 January 1945, Sgt. Charles A. Gillivary,
Company I, 71st Infantry, 44th Infantry Division,
was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor, as
was Tech. Sgt. Charles F. Carey, Jr., 379th Infantry,
21This section is based on official U.S. Army 100th Infantry Division (posthumously), several days
records; von Luttichau, “German Operations,” ch. later for action on the night of 8–9 January 1945, in
28; and Rigoulot, “Operation Nordwind,” pp. 71– which he commanded an antitank platoon near
128. Rimling.
NORTHWIND 507

MEN OF THE 100TH DIVISION MACHINE-GUNPOSITION,near Riml-


MAINTAINHEAVY
ing, 1945.

west of the mountains—or more con- tain front from the Bitche area on the
cerned with the thin VI Corps lines in west to the vicinity of Neunhoffen on
the Lauterbourg salient to the east- the east. This ad hoc group, com-
the American generals had not expect- manded by Col. D. H. Hudelson, con-
ed an enemy drive through such rough sisted of the 94th and 117th Cavalry
terrain, where snowy, narrow roads bi- Squadrons, with mostly jeeps and
sected rather than paralleled the south- light armored cars, and the half-tracks
ward German axis of advance. The as- of the 62d Armored Infantry Battal-
sembly areas of the attacking infantry ion, reinforced only by a tank destroy-
on New Year’s Eve had been hidden in er company.23To screen the area Hu-
the Maginot Line bunkers still in delson had established a series of
German hands: there had been no strongpoints on the mountain roads
preattack artillery bombardment to
warn the defenders; and the overcast 23The task force was built around CCR of the
14th Armored Division, with the divisional and
sky and thick mountain forests had pro- corps cavalry squadrons substituting for the combat
vided cover for the assault throughout command’s organic tank battalion. Also attached
the first day of the offensive. were Company B, 645th Tank Destroyer Battalion;
Company B, 83d Mortar Battalion; Company A,
On 31 December Task Force Hu- 125th Armored Engineer Battalion; and 1st Battal-
delson held a roughly defined moun- ion, 540th Engineers.
508 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

that entered his sector from the east with an additional regiment from
and west, supplementing them with Task Force Harris (63d Division) and
small patrols and checkpoints. Rather then with the 36th Division’s 141st
than stopping a determined attack, regiment, which Patch released to
his job was to delay and channel it Haislip late on 1 January. Together
until reinforcements could arrive. But these units, with an assist from the
Hudelson’s delaying power proved 14th Armored Division, channeled the
limited during the early hours of 1 advancing German infantry away from
January. Moving south through the the Sarre River valley to the south
dark forests, leading elements of the and east.
559th, 257th, 361st, and 256th Volks- Across the Vosges, with fewer
grenadier Divisions easily penetrated the forces at his immediate disposal,
positions of the small American Brooks was forced to make major
mechanized force, bypassing strong- changes in the dispositions of his
points and scattering the roadbound corps. First he withdrew two inexperi-
armored units as they withdrew and enced infantry regiments of Task
tried to regroup.24 Hudelson’s local Force Herren (70th Division) from
counterattacks were hampered by the the Rhine front and moved them
snow-both wheeled and tracked ve- across the interior of the VI Corps
hicles losing traction on the icy area to plug up the eastern exits to
mountain roads-and were too minor the Vosges, under the direction of
to have any effect on the general Frederick’s 45th Infantry Division. In
progress of the German offensive. the center, blocking the way to Phals-
Quickly the various components of bourg and Saverne, Brooks and Fred-
the light mechanized unit found erick inserted two regiments of the
themselves retreating to the east and 45th Division as well as another on
west, abandoning many of their snow- loan from Wyche’s 79th Division; they
bound vehicles in the process. backfilled the 45th’s northern front
During the next four days the at- with a combat engineer regiment, the
tacking infantry divisions pushed 36th C, temporarily converted to in-
south through the Vosges for about fantry, and backstopped all of these
ten miles; but the real contest for forces with parts of the 14th Armored
control of the vital mountain exits Division still under VI Corps control.
began almost immediately, as rein- Such complex switching completely
forcing American units tried to keep entangled the 45th, 79th, and 70th
the German volksgrenadiers bottled up Division forces. By 4 January, for ex-
in the Low Vosges forests. On the ample, the 45th Division had crossed
western edge of the advance, the U.S. its extended front, from east to west,
100th Infantry Division held firm, parts of the 179th and 180th Infantry
strengthening its right shoulder first (organic to the 45th) and elements of
the 276th Infantry (Task Force
24 No records from Task Force Hudelson survived, Herren) in the Vosges; the 313th In-
and the above information is based on a Seventh fantry (reinforced with battalions of
Army Historical Officer interview report, “Task
Force Hudelson, 14th Armored Division, 21 Decem-
the 314th and 315th Infantry, all from
ber 1944–1 January 1945” (ca. 1945), MHI. the 79th Division), elements of the
NORTHWIND 509

274th and 275th Infantry (Task Force of the 45th and 79th Divisions, rein-
Herren), and the 157th Infantry (or- forced by more battalions from Task
ganic) along the eastern exits to the Force Herren as well as units of the
Vosges; and the 36th C Engineers to- 540th Engineers, which also served
gether with leftovers from the 179th as infantry, continued to protect the
and 180th Infantry on its regular vital Vosges exits, constantly counter-
northern front. Very quickly Frederick attacking the now overextended
found himself trying to control eight German forces.
different regiments, half of which had At this point Patch decided to move
commanders and staffs that had never the entire 103d Infantry Division, now
been in combat before. Although unengaged, from the far northwestern
these hasty measures contained the wing of the XV Corps over to the
advance of the German infantry divi- eastern shoulder of the German
sions at least temporarily, they left Vosges advance, thus relieving Task
very few troops to defend the Lauter- Force Herren elements that had
bourg salient farther east. begun to wear thin and beginning his
As American reinforcements met own counteroffensive against the
German attackers, the battle quickly flanks of the German penetration. 26
turned into a bitter winter infantry On the other side, the German com-
fight focusing on the towns that lay manders, to guard against such a
along the snow-covered mountain threat, had begun to deploy the 34th
roads. Here at Lemberg, Sarreins- Volksgrenadier Division from Simon’s
berg, Wildenguth, Wingen, Wim- XIII SS Corps in the Sarre area to
menau, Reipertswiller, Mouterhouse, Hoehne’s LXXXIX Corps in the Vosges
Baerenthal, Philippsbourg, Dambach, in order to strengthen the base of the
and a host of other tiny Alsatian salient. Hemmed in on three sides,
mountain villages and hamlets, the however, the German offensive
Americans finally began to hold their through the Low Vosges seemed to
ground. Yet, even before the four at- be coming to a complete standstill by
tacking volksgrenadier divisions began the 5th. Brooks had been able to
to flag, Blaskowitz and von Obst- move his forces over to the Vosges
felder, the First Army commander, faster than any of the German com-
started feeding elements of the 6th SS manders had thought possible, and
Mountain Division (“Nord”) into the the green troops of Task Force
battle. The SS division, an experi- Herren along with the converted en-
enced unit trained and equipped for gineers had fought with an enthusi-
cold-weather warfare, fresh and at full asm that belied their inexperience.
strength, began to deploy on the bat- Without possession of the exits to the
tlefield sometime on 2 January and Vosges, Hitler refused to commit the
was soon spearheading a renewed mobile reserves, and as long as the
drive south.25 Nevertheless,
elements
into northern Norway and returned to Germany via
Oslo and Denmark in November and December.
26Its place was taken first by a regiment of the
25The SS division had been fighting on the Finn- 36th Division and then by the new XXI Corps,
ish front until the autumn of 1944, when it retreated which supervised a miscellaneous collection of units.
510 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

Americans controlled the Saverne Blaskowitz’s disposal and the strength


Gap and the road networks on either of the Allied forces west of the Low
side of the Vosges, they could bring Vosges, however, perhaps the failure
reinforcements into the area faster of what Hitler hoped would be the
than the attackers. With nowhere to main German effort was inevitable.
go, NORD WIND was essentially a fail- The inability of the successful
ure. Blaskowitz and von Obstfelder, Vosges attacking forces to break out of
however, still had their uncommitted the mountain exits was another matter
armor reserves-but so did Patch and entirely. Here the divided German
Devers. The struggle was far from command structure on the Alsatian
over. front clearly contributed heavily to the
ultimate lack of success. Had Army
Command and Control Group Oberrhein launched supporting at-
tacks across the Rhine at the start of
Both German and American post- the offensive, Brooks might not have
battle autopsies of the NORDWIND been able to transfer the three regi-
offensive severely criticized the plan- ments of Task Force Herren from the
ning and conduct of the Sarre River Rhine to the Vosges so readily, and at
valley attack. The XIII SS Corps had least some of the eastern mountain
put the assault together hastily, and exits might have fallen to the advanc-
even the American commanders were ing volksgrenadiers. Although Blaskowitz
surprised by its poor execution. The might still have elected not to employ
division-level leadership and staff his panzer reserves through the
work of the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Vosges, the results would have greatly
Division in particular proved marginal. increased his options. But as future
The unit was unable even to bring its events would show, Himmler had his
armor up to the battle area until the own objectives in mind, and the lack of
third day because of icy road condi- coordination between A m y Group G
tions and limited engineer support; and Army Group Oberrhein during NORD-
the German demolition effort had W I N D and in the ensuing campaign
been too thorough when they had va- was remarkable.
cated the area in early December. Ar- T h e Allied commanders had their
tillery support had also been badly own serious command and control
coordinated, as had just about every- problems. For example, General Le-
thing else. In fact, during the battles clerc’s extreme reluctance to place his
for northern Alsace the SS division 2d Armored Division under de
went through about five division com- Lattre’s control was well known. Al-
manders, mostly SS colonels with though publicly emphasizing the
comparatively little military experi- better logistical support available
ence. 27 Given the means at from American corps and army com-
mands, he privately harbored strong
feelings against many senior officers
27Rigoulot, “Operation Nordwind,” p. 53. On of the First French Army, whose loy-
American evaluations of its performance, see “G–2
History: Seventh Army Operations in Europe (1-31 alty to the Allied cause and the Free
Dec 44),” V, William W. Quinn Papers, MHI. French in particular had come rela-
NORTHWIND 511

tively late in the war. The ghost of quired the 6th Army Group to fall
Marshal Petain’s Vichy regime had al- back to the Vosges, thus temporarily
ready begun to cast its long shadow relinquishing Strasbourg to German
over France. However, both the Ar- control. Yet, on the same day, he also
dennes and NORD WIND attacks tem- requested that SHAEF “clarify” its in-
porarily made the matter academic, as structions on the matter. At the time,
Leclerc’s armor was needed more in the VI Corps had just begun planning
the north and, for the moment, was for the first phase of the withdrawal,
better employed supporting Patch’s pulling back from the Bitche-Lauter-
thinly spread forces. bourg trace to the Maginot Line, but
The defense of Strasbourg was an- had made no concrete preparations
other matter and demanded immedi- for anything further. T h e following
ate resolution. Devers himself was still day, 2 January, de Gaulle reviewed
reluctant to pull his entire line back Juin’s report, sent orders confirming
to the Vosges, preferring to reinforce de Lattre’s responsibility for the de-
Brooks with the three proto-infantry fense of the city, and dispatched Juin
divisions, and was probably content to SHAEF headquarters to argue the
to let de Lattre buck the decision on matter with Eisenhower’s chief of
Strasbourg up to their political and staff. Juin’s meeting with General
military superiors. The entire concept Smith, related earlier, fully alerted Ei-
of abandoning all of northern Alsace senhower to the weight that the
was fraught with danger. Such a French political leader gave to the
major withdrawal would have surren- safety of the French city. Massive re-
dered much of the easily defensible prisals against Strasbourg’s citizens by
Rhine front, exposed the northern vengeful German military, paramili-
flank of the French II Corps above tary, or police units were likely, and a
the Colmar Pocket, and placed the belated defense of the city by French
entire Saverne Gap under German ar- forces bereft of American support
tillery fire, while making it highly un- might have severe implications re-
likely that the Allies could regain the garding future Franco-American rela-
territory in the near future. After tions. On the other hand, a decision
being surprised in the Ardennes, Ei- to surrender Strasbourg to the Ger-
senhower may have simply become mans out of hand might well have ad-
too cautious, overreacting to the verse repercussions on de Gaulle’s
smaller threat posed by the initial own political plans, strengthening the
NORDWIND assault forces and then Communist leadership centered in the
unwilling to reverse the order when resistance movement. For these rea-
the offensive came well to the west of sons, de Gaulle asked Churchill and
the Lauterbourg salient. Roosevelt to intervene in the dispute.
Eisenhower’s decision to press on Churchill quickly concurred, and at a
with the withdrawal continued to SHAEF staff conference held the fol-
place Devers in a dilemma. On 1 Jan- lowing day, 3 January, and attended
uary, as NORDWIND began, he in- by Churchill, de Gaulle, Eisenhower,
formed General Touzet du Vigier, an Smith, Juin, and their assistants, the
emissary of Juin, that SHAEF had re- Allied commander in chief agreed to
512 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

suspend the withdrawal. Actually, Ei- complete withdrawal was less press-
senhower appears to have reversed ing. Allied unity was thus preserved,
the order just prior to the conference and cooperation between American
and passed down the change to and French soldiers in the field re-
Brooks. With the situation in the Ar- mained undisturbed. But events that
dennes stable and the initial German followed soon proved that Eisenhow-
NORDWIND attacks confined to the er’s concern over Brooks’ position
areas above the Lauterbourg salient, a was not completely unwarranted.
CHAPTER XXVIII

The Battle of Alsace


Operation NORDWIND proved only General Otto von dem Bach’s XIV SS
the first in a series of German attacks Corps, the 553d Volksgrenadier Division,
against the 6th Army Group, which reinforced with armor and commando
American soldiers dubbed collectively units, spearheaded the main effort,
the New Year’s Eve offensive. Alto- which fell on the right, or eastern,
gether, between 5 and 25 January, the flank of Brooks’ VI Corps across. the
German Army undertook four addi- west bank of the Rhine at Gamb-
tional multidivision offensives against sheim, just ten miles north of Stras-
the U.S. Seventh Army and another bourg. Two days later, on 7 January,
against the First French Army just Rasp’s Nineteenth Army initiated an-
above the Colmar Pocket. Although other attack south of the city near
most of these attacks were hastily Rhinau, on the northern edge of the
planned and executed with little fi- Colmar Pocket. Code-named Oper-
nesse, some caught the Americans by ation SONNENWENDE (“Winter Sol-
surprise, and together they threat- stice”), the southern offensive includ-
ened to overwhelm the tired units of ed attacks by Thumm’s LXIV Corps,
the Seventh Army. Having already with the 198th Volksgrenadier Division,
been greatly weakened by the massive the 106th Panzer Brigade, and other ar-
diversion of military supplies and re- mored elements (with forty to fifty
placements to the Ardennes, Patch’s heavy tanks and assault guns). T h e
forces somehow had to find the new series of attacks at Rhinau and
means from their own strength and Gambsheim not only threatened the
resources to turn back the multiple southern flank and rear of the VI
German threats. Corps, but also the city of Strasbourg.
On 5 January, as Patch began de- If Hitler could not take Antwerp in
ploying the 103d Division east of the the north, then Himmler was deter-
Vosges, Himmler’s Army Group Ober- mined to present him with Strasbourg
rhein began its NORDWIND “support- in the south. The two attacks quickly
ing” attack.1 Under the direction of
quarters in its zone: the LXIV and LXIII under the
1 Information in this chapter is from von Lutti- Nineteenth Army in the Colmar Pocket, with about
chau, “Southern France,” ch. 29; Rigoulot, “Oper- four divisions each, and the XIV SS and XVIII SS as
ation Nordwind,” pp. 128-225; and U.S. Army unit well as Wehrkreis V, all with various forces on the
records. Army Group Oberrhein had four corps head- east side of the Rhine.
514 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

GAMBSHEIM-RHINE
RIVERAREA

forced Patch to shelve any plans for January and the transfer of responsi-
an offensive by the 103d Division in bility for the defense of the Stras-
the Vosges or any expectations of im- bourg area to the French II Corps by
mediate relief from the French in the the 6th. However, before these ar-
south. rangements could be completed,
Himmler’s forces had attacked at
The VI Corps Gambsheim and Rhinau, preventing
de Lattre from moving any strength
North of Strasbourg, the departure up to the Strasbourg area to provide
of first Task Force Harris and then immediate relief. 2 Thus, almost
Task Force Herren had stretched the single-handedly, with its units scat-
three inexperienced regiments of tered along the Rhine front, Task
Task Force Linden (42d Division) thin Force Linden tried to counter the
over a broad, marshy 42-mile Rhine
front. To ease matters, Devers had fi- 2At the time Brooks was also in the process of ex-
nally approved an immediate VI tending the boundary of the 79th Division westward
to relieve the 45th Division of its northern responsi-
Corps withdrawal south from the bilities, but the Gambsheim attack on his eastern
Lauter River to the Maginot Line by 2 flank caused him to rescind the change.
THE BATTLE OF ALSACE 515

penetration. But with no organic tinued to hold the mountain exits,


signal, artillery, or transportation and the 276th Infantry (TF Herren),
units of its own and with only a few led by a battalion of the recently com-
platoons of 79th Division armor in mitted 274th, even managed to clear
direct support, the scattered rifle bat- Wingen of SS troops by the afternoon
talions of the task force were over- of the 7th after several days of bitter
matched. Ferrying troops and ar- fighting.3 On VI Corps’ eastern flank,
mored vehicles across the Rhine as however, the canals, streams, and de-
quickly as possible, the initial assault stroyed bridges made it difficult for
force was able to brush aside the either side to advance; Brooks’ coun-
weak American counterattacks and terattacks were no more successful
rapidly expand the width of the than the German efforts to expand
bridgehead to about ten miles. Mean- their foothold across the Rhine, which
while in the west, fresh units of the now centered around the towns of
6th Mountain SS Division bulled Gambsheim, Herrlisheim, and Offen-
through the 45th Division’s patch- dorf.
work defensive line in the Vosges and On 8 January, Combat Command B
captured the town of Wingen, which (CCB) of the 12th Armored Division,
represented the southernmost pene- consisting mainly of the 56th Ar-
tration of the initial NORDWIND of- mored Infantry Battalion and the
fensive. The VI Corps was now heavi- 714th Tank Battalion, attempted to
ly engaged on both its flanks, and seize Herrlisheim at the center of the
Brooks was just about out of reserves. German bridgehead by a direct attack,
Devers and Patch reacted quickly. The ensuing action typified the expe-
On 6 January, with the uncommitted riences and frustrations of armored
36th and 103d Infantry Divisions units fighting in built-up areas.
headed for the Vosges front, they Unable to put its vehicles across a
transferred the rest of the 14th Ar- series of waterways just west of the
mored Division to Brooks, urged de town, the unit ultimately had to as-
Lattre to push additional forces up to sault the northern outskirts of Herrli-
the Strasbourg area as quickly as pos- sheim with its dismounted infantry.
sible, and began deploying the army The lone battalion remained over-
group’s final reserve, the inexperi- night, locked in combat with tank-
enced 12th Armored Division, to the supported German grenadiers, and
VI Corps area as well. The busy VI could make no further progress. On
Corps commander tried to counter the 9th, when the American medium
the Gambsheim threat, first, by rein- tanks attempted to move up to the
forcing the area with a few more in- edge of a nearby canal in support,
fantry battalions from the 79th Divi- they were picked off one by one, “like
sion’s now greatly weakened northern ducks in a shooting gallery,” by high-
front, and second, on 8 January, by
committing a recently arrived combat 3For action in the Wingen area, 5–7 January
command of the 12th Armored Divi- 1945, the 2d Battalion, 274th Infantry, 70th Infantry
Division, received the Presidential Unit Citation. For
sion against the bridgehead. treatment of the action, see Cheves, Snow Ridges and
In the Vosges, Brooks’ forces con- Pill Boxes, pp. 47–86.
516 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

714THTANK BATTALION,12THARMORED DIVISION,NEARBISCHWILLER,


FRANCE.
Guns point to Drusenheim, January 1945.

velocity German antitank cannons; the used as infantry fillers, the battalion
remaining armored vehicles quickly finally had to withdraw on the night
withdrew. of 10–11 January, feeling fortunate
During the 10th, several supporting that it had not been cut off and com-
M8 self-propelled guns also tried to pletely destroyed. Herrlisheim was
move up closer to the town using dif- not a good place for a new armored
ferent approaches, but they ended up division. 4
crashing through the thick ice cover-
ing the local canals and could not be The French II Corps
extracted until nightfall. Just about
the only American armor able to Fortunately for Brooks, the German
reach Herrlisheim, the 714th’s light attack south of Strasbourg never
tanks, proved useless in combat, but became a serious threat. Well before
they were able to bring up supplies
and evacuate the wounded-one tank 4Account based on 12th Arm Div AAR, Jan 45;
serving only to cast a beam on the and Seventh Army Historical Office, Interv Rpt,
operating table of a nearby first-aid “Initial Assault on Herrlisheim by the 56th Armored
Infantry Battalion of the 12th Armored Division
station. Although reinforced during during the Period 8–11 January 1945” (ca. 1945),
the day by a company of engineers MHI.
THE BATTLE OF ALSACE 517

territory that the 2d Armored Divi-


sion had secured back in December.
The extension of German control
north to Erstein, which would include
a small logistical bridgehead at
Rhinau, was then to serve as a spring-
board for an advance to Molsheim,
another ten miles northward, until
eventually Strasbourg was invested.
Both Rasp and the LXIV Corps com-
mander, General Thumm, had misgiv-
ings about the operation from the be-
ginning, recognizing that ultimate
success would depend on the Nine-
teenth Army receiving reinforcements
and on the main attacking forces
north of Strasbourg doing most of
the work. Nevertheless, spurred by
Himmler, the two generals did what
they could.
Charged with the initial assault,
Thumm concentrated his attacking
forces on the west side of the Rhone-
RIFLEMAN OF 70TH DIVISIONsearching Rhine Canal, believing that the
for snipers, Wingen, January 1945. French forces between the canal and
the Rhine would simply fall back if
the offensive, de Lattre had replaced Erstein could be taken quickly
Leclerc’s departing armor with units enough. This proved the case when,
of the French 5th Armored Division on 7 January, the bulk of the German
and the French 1st Infantry Division, armor and one regiment of the 198th
as the latter deployed back from its Volksgrenadier Division drove north,
abortive mission on the Atlantic coast. reached Erstein during the first day of
With these units in place, de Monsa- the attack, and then swung back to
bert was in the process of pulling the the southwest along the I11 River to
3d Algerian Division out of the trap French units engaging the rest of
Vosges and moving it up to Stras- the 198th’s forces. Although most of
bourg when the German Colmar- the surrounded French troops man-
based attacks began at Rhinau.5 aged to escape across the III that
The initial objectives of SONNEN- night, Thumm’s forces, reinforced by
WENDE were limited and consisted of one regiment of the 269th Volksgrena-
a triangular zone between the I11 and dier Division, currently in reserve on
Rhine rivers fom Selestat to Erstein, the east side of the Rhine, cleared the
representing about a fourth of the entire west side of the I11 River by the
11th and secured the west bank of the
5See de Lattre, History, pp. 313–23. Rhine as far as Erstein. There, on 13
518 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

January, Operation SONNENWENDE talions and support troops of the 45th


formally ended. Although Hitler had and 79th Divisions and some ele-
previously directed Himmler to con- ments of Task Force Linden (242d
tinue his attack northward with the regiment). As a result Brooks’ right
entire 269th Division, he later canceled wing and right flank were as jumbled
the order, and a renewal of the offen- as his left, with Wyche’s 79th Division
sive from Colmar never occurred. By trying to control the following forces:
18 January the 269th Volksgrenadier Di- from east to west, elements of the
vision was on its way to the eastern 222d (TF Linden), 315th, 313th, and
front, but its scheduled replacement, 232d (TF Linden) Infantry occupying
the 2d Mountain Division, had yet to mainly Maginot Line positions; and,
arrive. Thumm was thus left with an from north to south along the Rhine
even larger perimeter to defend with and around the Gambsheim bridge-
fewer units, supplies, and equipment head, elements of the 314th Infantry,
than he had had at the beginning. CCB of the 14th Armored Division,
the 232d Infantry, and finally ele-
The X X X I X Panzer Corps Attacks ments of the 3d Algerian Division,
which had begun to trickle in from
The fourth German assault against the Vosges-all with a variety of tank,
the Seventh Army began in earnest tank destroyer, engineer, and cavalry
on 7 January along the vulnerable units mixed in.
northern portion of the Lauterbourg Suddenly, with the commitment of
salient. On the previous day the 21st Panzer and 25th Panzer Grena-
Blaskowitz had finally obtained per- dier Divisions in the north, the entire
mission from Hitler to commit the American defensive effort appeared
panzer reserve units in this area, and to be in grave danger. Nevertheless,
Decker’s X X X I X Panzer Corps arrived for a time the Americans were able to
to control the operation, with both ar- hang on. In the center of the Lauter-
mored divisions and the 245th Volks- bourg salient, the heterogeneous col-
grenadier Division in support. Carefully lection of American units occupying
monitoring the progress of the offen- old Maginot Line fortifications put up
sive, the Army Group G commander an energetic defense against some-
was convinced that American rede- what listless German armor. Lack of
ployments from the Lauter River area proper reconnaissance as well as 79th
had greatly reduced American de- Division minefields and artillery
fenses in the zone and that a quick stalled the German tanks as did the
strike all the way to Saverne was pos- weather, icy terrain, and the unex-
sible. By that time Brooks had with- pected presence of Task Force
drawn his defending forces five to ten Linden (42d Division) units. Mean-
miles back to the American-held por- while the remainder of Brooks’ corps
tions of the Maginot Line-the first of tried to hold the flanks at Gambsheim
his planned three-phase withdraw- and in the Vosges, keeping the salient
als-and the VI Corps defenses that from caving in. Disturbed by the lack
remained were indeed extremely of progress on the 7th, Blaskowitz
weak, consisting of a few infantry bat- personally visited the Lauterbourg
THE BATTLE OF ALSACE 519

48TH TANK 14TH ARMOREDDIVISION,OUTSIDE


BATTALION, OF RITTERSHOFFEN,
January 1945.

front to find out what was holding up Armored Division, which assumed
his panzer units, threatening to court- operational control of assorted infan-
martial all of the principal armor try units of the 242d and 315th Infan-
commanders for their lack of aggres- try above the Haguenau forest and
siveness. Finally, on 9 January, Deck- was supported by most of its own ar-
er’s armor pierced the VI Corps tillery plus that of the 79th Division,
center, driving it back to the Ha- fought a sustained action with Deck-
guenau forest and forcing Brooks to er’s panzers. The German command-
commit his final reserve, the 14th Ar- ers, in turn, reinforced the attacking
mored Division, near the towns of troops on the night of 13–14 January
Hatten and Rittershoffen. Here Amer- with the 20th Parachute Regiment (7th
ican tanks met German armor in Parachute Division), and on the 16th
towns, fields, and roads, and the with the 104th Infantry Regiment (47th
bitter fighting continued. The VI Volksgrenadier Division), thereby stead-
Corps was battling for its life on three ily raising the stakes of the contest.
sides. But along the entire front of the VI
The battleground now began to re- Corps, division and regimental com-
semble a general melee. Between 10 manders gradually lost control over
and 20 January General Smith’s 14th the battle, and the struggle devolved
520 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

into a fierce tactical conflict between nesses. Both sides employed armor
opposing battalions, companies, pla- inside the town, but the half-blind
toons, and smaller combat units. tank crews had to be protected by a
The heaviest fighting was concen- moving perimeter of infantrymen and
trated in the two small Alsatian towns could only play a limited supporting
of Rittershoffen and Hatten, both just role. In Hatten, even with strong in-
north of the Haguenau forest and a fantry and artillery support, no
mile or so apart.6 Chance and circum- German or American tanker dared
stance had led the Germans to seize push his vehicle around “the bend”—
the eastern sections of both towns a slight turn in the town’s marginally
and the Americans to occupy the wider main street that was covered by
western parts, making the fields and several antitank weapons from both
roads in between a no-man’s land of sides.
artillery, antitank, and small-arms fire. By 15 January, as the German com-
Efforts by each party to cut the resup- mitment of infantry in the two towns
ply routes of the other by armored escalated, the Americans found them-
sweeps continually failed in the face selves increasingly on the defensive;
of strong tank, antitank, and artillery resupply and the evacuation of casual-
fire from both sides. The battle thus ties became major operations, as did
boiled down to a desperate infantry the continual reorganization of their
fight within the towns, with dismount- shrinking perimeters to consolidate
ed panzer grenadiers and armored in- the territory they were able to hold.
fantrymen fighting side by side with As elsewhere the cold weather kept
the more lowly foot infantry. 7 Almost bodies from deteriorating, and the
every structure was hotly contested, troops reached a consensus among
and at the end of every day each side themselves that no one would be
totaled up the number of houses and evacuated for shock, since everyone
buildings it controlled in an attempt who was left fell into that dubious
to measure the progress of the battle. category. Nevertheless, the American
Often in the smoke, haze, and dark- armored division and the attached in-
ness, friendly troops found them- fantry managed to hang on, complete-
selves firing at one another, and few ly stalling the Germans’ main effort,
ventured into the narrow but open but in the process they lost perhaps
streets, preferring to advance or with- one-third of their combat strength in
draw through the blown-out interior men and equipment.
walls of the gutted homes and busi- An equally desperate fight took
place in the Vosges between Mouter-
6 Following account based on the 14th Arm Div house and Baerenthal involving the
AAR, Jan 45; and Seventh Army Historical Office, 45th Division’s 157th regiment and
Interv Rpt, “Hatten, 14th Armored Division, 10–20
Jan 45,” MHI. For a German view, see Hans von
additional units of the 6th SS Mountain
Luck, Panzer Commander (New York Praeger, 1989), Division. Although the struggle lasted
pp. 181–92. seven days, from 14 to 21 January, it
7 Forcombat leadership and heroic action inside began in earnest on the 15th when
Hatten on 9–10 January, the Congressional Medal
of Honor was awarded to M. Sgt. Vito R. Bertoldo, one of the 157th Infantry’s battalions
Company A, 242d Infantry, 42d Infantry Division. managed to penetrate the German
THE BATTLE OF ALSACE 521

defensive positions and the other bat- The Panzer Assault


talions were unable to follow. During
the next t w o days the German de- Since the beginning of the X X X I X
fenders, after unsuccessfully trying to Panzer Corps’ offensive in the north on
push the battalion back, managed to 7 January, the German high command
surround it and cut it off from its had debated incessantly over the role
sister units. This isolated force, made of the final German reserves, includ-
up of five companies (L, I, C, K, and ing the 10th SS and 11th Panzer Divi-
G), hung on for three days while vari- sions and the 7th Parachute, 47th Volks-
ous elements of the 45th and 103d grenadier, and 2d Mountain Divisions,
Divisions and the 36th Engineers many of which were beginning to
tried unsuccessfully to break through arrive at the front in strength. On the
the German blockade, continually evening of the Sth, Blaskowitz pro-
hampered by sleet and blinding snow- posed using the parachute, volksgrena-
storms as well as by severe shortages dier, and mountain units now assem-
of artillery ammunition and other bling in the First Army area to assist
supplies. With food running low and the infantry units in capturing- the
their own small-arms and mortar am- eastern exits to the Vosges and from
munition growing short, the remain- there striking west with the two addi-
ing soldiers of the 157th’s trapped tional panzer divisions toward Ha-
force formed a small defensive perim- guenau and Gambsheim, while Deck-
eter, placing the wounded in foxholes er’s forces kept the Americans busy in
so that they could be cared for by the north. With the exception of the
those who were still fighting. On the 22th Panzer Division, Hitler agreed to
20th, the end was near. With only commit all of the ZAHNARZT forces
about 125 able-bodied soldiers left, to Alsace, but insisted that the 20th
the trapped infantrymen tried to infil- SS Panzer Division be employed east of
trate out. News of the Malmedy Mas- the Haguenau forest, along the
sacre in the Ardennes had spread Rhine, to link up with Army Group
throughout the Seventh Army, and Oberrhein’s forces in the Gambsheim
few wished to surrender to the SS bridgehead; the remainder of the re-
troops. But in the end only two enlist- serves could be used in whatever way
ed men reached Allied lines. Shortly the field commanders thought best.
thereafter the remainder of the regi- However, by the time these decisions
ment was withdrawn from the front had been made and communicated to
for rest and refitting; the SS mountain the front, Decker’s breakthrough to
unit was equally battered, however, Hatten and Rittershoffen, about noon
and had to be taken out of the line on the 9th, together with the failure
several days later. 8 of both Hoehne in the Vosges and
von dem Bach at Gambsheim to move
8 157th Rgt AAR, Jan 45. The survivors were PFC out of their respective enclaves, ap-
Benjamin Melton and Private Walter Bruce; regi- peared to support the immediate
mental casualties for the month included 32 killed,
244 wounded, 472 missing, and 70 known prisoners
of war. For a popular account, see Leo V. Bishop et an Infantry Division (Nashville, Tenn.: The Battery
al., eds., The Fighting Forty-Fifth: The Combat Report of Press, 1978), pp. 142–46.
522 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

commitment of the reserves in the turned to his headquarters, apparent-


center, behind the XXXIX Panzer ly giving up the idea of a rapid break-
Corps. through; about the same time Hitler,
T h e problems inherent in the awk- judging that the XXXIX Panzer Corps
ward command and control arrange- was again completely bogged down,
ments of the Germans again became decided to transfer responsibility for
apparent, making it difficult for them continuing the offensive east of the
to implement any of the proposals Vosges to Army Group Obeuhein. T h e
rapidly or to take advantage of the decision became effective on 12 Janu-
tactical situation on the battlefield. ary, with the X X X I X Panzer Corps
Hitler issued his instructions regard- headquarters and the 20th SS Panzer
ing the reserve forces sometime on and 7th Parachute Divisions going to
the 9th, but Blaskowitz did not re- Himmler; with the 2 1st Panzer, 25th
ceive them until about twenty-four Panzer Grenadier, and 47th Volksgrena-
hours later, probably about the same dier Divisions (upon arriving) coming
time that OKW was passing the news under Hoehne’s LXXXlX Corps,
of Decker’s breakthrough on to moving out of the Vosges; and with
Hitler. Meanwhile, leading elements almost all of the Vosges assault forces
of the 14th Armored Division had ar- taken over by Petersen’s XC Corps. 9
rived in the Hatten-Rittershoffen area While the Germans proceeded to shift
on the 10th, temporarily blocking any their commands in order to comply
further German drive south. Although with these changes, the 10th SS Panzer
Decker might have attempted to Division continued to assemble in the
bypass the Haguenau forest on the Lauterbourg area for the main drive
east or west, he could not afford to south.
have an entire enemy armored divi- Patch and Brooks also used the
sion on his lines of communication, at next few days to reorganize their
least not until additional reinforce- forces and strengthen their defenses.
ments arrived to free his mobile units The end of the Nineteenth Army’s of-
from the embattled area. However the fensive in the Rhinau-Erstein area on
ZAHNARZT reserves reached the 13 January allowed de Lattre to accel-
front in bits and pieces, forcing erate the deployment of the 3d Alge-
Blaskowitz and von Obstfelder to feed rian Division to Strasbourg, and the
them into the battle in small incre- arrival of the U.S. 103d Infantry Divi-
ments, as they had done with the 6th sion in the VI Corps zone had given
SS Mountain Division. Thus, on 10 and Brooks an opportunity to begin pull-
11 January, units of the 7th Parachute ing some the exhausted T F Herren
entered the struggle at Hatten and regiments out of the line. Even
Rittershoffen, but Blaskowitz, in ac-
cordance with Hitler’s orders, began 9 The LXXXIX and XC Corps remained under the
assembling the 20th SS Panzer Division First Army, with the X C Corps now controlling the 6th
northeast of what he considered the Mountain SS Division and the 36th; 256th, 257th, and
critical battle area for a drive along 361st Volksgrenadier Divisions, and the 559th Volksgren-
adier Division going to Simon’s XIII SS Corps (which
the water-soaked west bank of the still controlled the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier and 19th
Rhine. Later in the day Blaskowitz re- Volksgrenadier Divisions).
THE BATTLE OF ALSACE 523

SHAEF had begun to pay some atten- spearheaded a final German drive
tion to the southern battlefield, in- from Lauterbourg south down the
forming Devers several days later that west bank of the Rhine River, scatter-
it would make the 101st Airborne Di- ing the defenders from Task Force
vision and additional artillery avail- Linden and the 79th Division and
able to the Seventh Army as soon as linking the northern attacking forces
possible. 10Patch now transferred both with those in the Gambsheim bridge-
the 36th Infantry Division and the head. Some 10th SS units had even
rest of the 12th Armored Division to been ferried directly into the bridge-
Brooks, who quickly directed them to head from the east bank of the Rhine.
begin closing the Gambsheim area in From there, the German commanders
order to relieve units of the 79th In- hoped to continue south and then
fantry Division and TF Linden, which drive west, behind the VI Corps' main
were equally tired. 11 Except in the line of resistance, striking for the Sa-
Hatten-Rittershoffen area and in Verne Gap. Both Patch and Brooks
some sections of the eastern Vosges, had expected a resumption of the of-
the front appeared relatively quiet for fensive, but the main axis of the
a few days, with the notable exception German attack came as something of
of incessant strafing attacks by a surprise. The American unit that
Luftwaffe aircraft, many of them re- took the brunt of the attack was thus
portedly jet fighters that were easier not Wyche's worn 79th Division or
heard than seen. Both sides took the Smith's embattled 14th Armored, but
opportunity to rest and resupply their Allen's new 12th Armored Division
forces, contending with the freezing operating on the western flank of the
temperatures as best they could and Gambsheim bridgehead.
preparing to renew the contest once On 16 January the 12th Armored
again. had begun another effort to seize
Herrlisheim, the possession of which
The Final Attack would have cut the principal German
north-south communication line
On 16 January the XXXIX Panzer within the Gambsheim bridgehead.
Corps, with the 10th SS Panzer Division, This time CCB was to renew its ef-
the 7th Parachute Division, the 384th forts north of Herrlisheim, again at-
and 667th Assault Gun Brigades, and tacking east over the Zorn River;
even the Reichfuehrer's Escort Battalion, meanwhile CCA, with two armored
infantry battalions and a reinforced
10Devers Diary, 18Jan 45. tank battalion, made an administrative
11From its reserve location at Sarrebourg, the crossing of the Zorn south of the ob-
36th Division had first sent its 141st regiment to aid jective area at Weyersheim, still in
the 100th Division on 1 January and began follow-
ing with the rest of the division on the 3 d the 142d
American hands, and moved up on
regiment had been temporarily diverted west to Herrlisheim from the opposite direc-
cover the gap left by the departing 103d Division. tion. General Allen hoped his two
The 36th Division thus initially arrived at the Gamb- units could encircle and isolate the
sheim area with only one regiment, the 143d, but
the 142d soon followed, allowing the division to town, which current intelligence indi-
assume responsibility for the area on 19 January. cated was being held only by about
524 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

HERRLISHEIM

500 to 800 disorganized German in- attack by the 43d Tank and 66th Ar-
fantrymen. Once Herrlisheim was sur- mored Infantry Battalions south of
rounded and the Germans found Herrlisheim met determined resist-
themselves unable to reinforce the ance. CCA quickly discovered that the
town, Allen felt that his three organic Germans had positioned antitank and
infantry battalions could clear the in- assault guns in the woods south of
terior relatively easily. Obviously the Herrlisheim as well as in another
mission was more suited to an infan- town, Offendorf, about a mile south-
try division, but until either the U.S. east of the command’s objective. At
36th or the French 3d Algerian daylight on the 17th, Allen ordered
moved up to the area in strength, both of his combat commands to
Allen’s unit was the only uncommit- renew the attack, with CCA pushing
ted force left to Brooks for the task. two fresh companies of the 17th Ar-
The attack went badly from the mored Infantry Battalion, under Maj.
start. CCB was again unable to span James W. Logan, into the southern
all the water crossings in the north, outskirts of Herrlisheim; while the
where German artillery interfered 43d Tank Battalion, commanded by
with bridging efforts; and a night Lt. Col. Nicholas Novosel, skirted east
THE BATTLE OF ALSACE 525

of the town; and the 66th Armored supported by armor and artillery
Infantry Battalion, reinforced by ele- against all of his positions. The divi-
ments of the 23d Tank Battalion and sion immediately responded with con-
more artillery, made another attempt centrations of artillery fire to support
at the woods to the south. Logan’s the isolated infantrymen, but from his
force subsequently advanced on foot, central command post Logan relayed
reaching the southern edge of Herrli- that his units were constantly being
sheim without incident, while Novo- forced to give ground. A final mes-
sel’s force of twenty-eight white- sage—“I guess this is it”—about 0400
washed Sherman tanks moved off to told Allen that the battalion had been
the east. overrun. Only a few of the surround-
By noon both units had reported ed infantrymen survived to escape in
meeting heavy opposition, as did the darkness of the early morning
other CCA elements still trying to hours. But of the tank battalion there
clear the area south of Herrlisheim. was still no clue.
What occurred thereafter remains As later intelligence reports would
somewhat hazy. By late afternoon the show, CCA had unexpectedly run into
17th Battalion’s infantrymen ap- the leading elements of the 10th SS
peared to have consolidated their po- Panzers, which had linked up with von
sitions in the southern section of the dem Bach’s hard-pressed Gambsheim
town, and Allen decided to leave forces and evidently continued their
them there for the night. No trace, drive south. Regarding the fate of the
however, could be found of the 43d 43d, an American artillery observer
Tank Battalion. The battalion S–3 flying over Herrlisheim on the 18th
had reported taking German antitank ended some of the mystery. He re-
fire at 0849 that morning; Logan’s ported several destroyed tanks in the
17th Armored Infantry had lost radio eastern section of Herrlisheim and,
contact with the 43d about 1000, and flying east of the town, spotted 4 or 5
shortly thereafter Novosel had given more and then 12 to 15 others, dug
his unit’s location as somewhere in in and deployed in a circle for all-
the eastern section of Herrlisheim. around defense, some painted white
Around 1330, a final radio message and others burned black. At once
sent by someone in the 43d indicated Allen began preparations for a rescue
only that the battalion commander’s mission with his entire division; how-
tank had been knocked out and that ever, further air reconnaissance re-
the unit was now east of the town. vealed German troops and vehicles
That night the rest of CCA togeth- around the motionless American
er with the supply trains of the 43d tanks, and the effort was abandoned.
Tank Battalion searched in vain for That evening German radio broad-
some sign of the missing armored casts boasted that an American lieu-
unit. Meanwhile, inside the town, tenant colonel and 300 of his men
Logan noted a steadily increasing had been taken prisoner at Herrli-
number of enemy probes throughout sheim and 50 American tanks cap-
his lines, and about midnight he re- tured or destroyed. The 12th Division
ported large-scale infantry attacks officers could only speculate that the
526 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

43d had run into an extensive anti- The new VI Corps positions behind
tank ambush between Herrlisheim the Moder River greatly reduced the
and Offendorf early on the 17th, had frontage Brooks’ units would have to
taken refuge in the eastern section of hold, but surrendered no great ad-
Herrlisheim, and had been forced out vantage to the advancing Germans. In
into the open by infantry attacks for a fact, it took another four days for
final stand. Like many of the other ar- Hoehne, Decker, and von dem Bach
mored units, the 12th was paying a to bring all the attacking German
steep price for its introduction to sus- units with their supplies and equip-
tained combat. 12 ment up to the new American posi-
Outflanked by this new attack on tions. By that time, Brooks had the
his right, and with both of his at- 45th, 103d, 79th, and 36th Infantry
tached armored divisions exhausted, Divisions on line (west to east), and
Brooks finally elected to withdraw. had moved the survivors of the 12th
On the night of 20–21 January those and 14th Armored Divisions and Task
units of the VI Corps north of the Force Linden back into reserve. In
Haguenau forest pulled back, moving addition, stronger French forces were
southwest toward the Moder River. in place north of Strasbourg, and Maj.
The movement took the attacking Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor’s 101st Air-
Germans by surprise and prevented borne Division was en route to the
them from pursuing the retreating front. With these forces the VI Corps
Americans, giving Brooks time to or- was able to contain a final series of
ganize new positions along the Zorn, German attacks, undertaken during
Moder, and Rothbach rivers with little the night of 24–25 January during a
interference. driving snowstorm. T h e attacking
forces briefly managed to penetrate
12The 12th Armored Division Graves Registration the new VI Corps lines in three
Report of 23 February indicated that the tanks places, but were promptly ejected by
inside the town had been destroyed by panzerfausts—
infantry antitank rockets-and the tanks to the east 14th Armored and 42d Infantry Divi-
by high-velocity cannons, a conclusion that was but- sion counterattacks. The following
tressed by the many antitank positions later found day Patch’s forces began counterat-
in the area littered with 75-mm. and 88-mm. shell
casings. Some twenty-eight destroyed tanks of the tacking across the German line, with
43d Tank Battalion were later recovered, as were the 100th and 45th Divisions on the
the bodies of the battalion commander and many of west and the U.S. 36th and the
his men; furthermore, tank tracks through the snow
indicated that the Germans had evacuated four French 3d Algerian on the east, forc-
American tanks across the Rhine when they with- ing the Germans to protect their
drew from the area. The account of the action is gains and putting them on the defen-
based on the following sources: Seventh Army His-
torical Office, Interv Rpts, “12th Armored Division sive again. Repulsed once more and
at Herrlisheim” (interviews with members of the with the Americans still game, the
17th AIB and the 43d Tank Bn, 12th AD); ibid., German high command had had
“Weyersheim-Herrlisheim Area: CCA, 12th Ar-
mored Division, 16–21 Jan 45” (both ca. 1945); and enough and on 26 January, with their
Ltr, H Q 12th Armored Division, 1 Feb 45, sub: In- reserves exhausted, finally called a
vestigation of Circumstances in the Action of the halt to what had clearly become a
17th Armored Infantry Battalion and the 436 Tank
Battalion, both of the 12th Armored Division, 17–18 battle of attrition. As suddenly as it
January 1945,” all at MHI. had begun, the German offensive was
THE BATTLE OF ALSACE 527

over. By the end of the month Hitler tacks eased Army Group Oberrhein’s as-
had replaced Blaskowitz with Lt. Gen. sault across the Rhine at Gambsheim
Paul Hauser, an SS officer, and had rather than the reverse. But by the
sent most of the better German for- time Hitler agreed to give one head-
mations to the Eastern Front, leaving quarters, in this case Army Group
those forces opposite the 6th Army Oberrhein, operational control over the
Group weaker than they had been at primary attacking forces on 13 Janu-
the beginning of the offensive. ary, surprise had been lost as well as
much of the German offensive punch.
A n Analysis Although badly battered by this date,
the Seventh Army and its two corps
In the end, the Germans expended were still intact and functioning well.
much strength for little gain. Seventh Allied success in the Ardennes had al-
Army casualties for the month of Jan- lowed Devers to retain both the 12th
uary numbered about 14,000, while Armored and 36th Infantry Divisions
the attacking German forces lost and throw them into the battle. Fur-
almost 23,000 officers and men.13 ther assistance came as the rest of the
Moreover, the Allied losses could be 42d, 63d, and 70th Infantry Divisions
replaced; the German casualties could and, from the SHAEF reserve, the
not. From the beginning, the division 101st Airborne Division arrived, and
of authority between OB West, Army as SHAEF increased the priority of
Group G, and First Army in the north supplies, equipment, and manpower
and Army Group Oberrhein and Nine- allocated to the 6th Army Group. The
teenth Army in the south greatly hin- timely arrival of the 103d Division al-
dered German chances for success. lowed Patch to pull Task Force
Army Group G’s initial NORDWZND at- Herren into reserve, while the 36th
Division performed the same service
13As elsewhere, casualty figures are only rough for Task Force Linden and the 12th
estimates, and the figures presented are based on
the postwar “Seventh Army Operational Report,
Armored Division; the 101st Airborne
Alsace Campaign and Battle Participation, 1 June Division, slated to replace the bat-
1945” (copy CMH), which notes 11,609 Seventh tered 79th Division, was never really
Army battle casualties for the period, plus 2,836
cases of trench foot and 380 cases of frostbite, and
needed. The withdrawal of the VI
estimates about 17,000 Germans killed or wounded Corps out of the Lauterbourg salient
with 5,985 processed prisoners of war. But the VI and behind the Moder River greatly
Corps AAR for January 1945 puts its total losses at
14,716 (773 killed, 4,838 wounded, 3,657 missing, improved its defensive posture and
and 5,448 nonbattle casualties); and Albert E. Cow- tightened up the front of the Seventh
drey and Graham A. Cosmas, “The Medical Depart- Army in general, while the arrival of
ment: The War Against Germany,” draft CMH MS
(1988), pp. 54–55, a forthcoming volume in the the 3d Algerian Division safeguarded
United States Army in World War II series, reports Strasbourg city. In addition, the com-
Seventh Army hospitals processing about 9,000 manders, staffs, and combat troops of
wounded and 17,000 “sick and injured” during the
period. Many of these, however, may have been re- Patch’s three new divisions were, by
turned to their units, and others may have come the end of NORDWIND, undoubtedly
from American units operating in the Colmar area more experienced and more confi-
but still supported by Seventh Army medical ser-
vices. Von Luttichau’s “German Operations,” ch. dent.
29, pp. 39–40, puts German losses at 22,932. The Americans had good reasons
528 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

for their confidence. For many Sev- with little support and even less direc-
enth Army soldiers, this had been tion from higher headquarters, regi-
their first real engagement with at- ments, battalions, and companies
tacking German forces whose strength stubbornly clung to key towns, water-
was equal or superior to their own. In ways, and road junctions, while corps
the contest, their leaders—Devers, and divisional artillery and service
Patch, and the corps, division, and units desperately tried to see that
regimental commanders-had done each unit was given at least enough
well, proving more than adept at support to enable it to survive. Offi-
switching large American units back cers stayed awake by loading them-
and forth to meet the wide variety of selves with Benzadrine, while NCOs
German threats, and had little diffi- tried to stave off the effects of bitter
culty keeping pace with the German- cold on their men with fires and hot
orchestrated tempo of operations. coffee.15 For all of them, it was their
Devers’ decision to rush the nine first experience at conducting a sus-
brand-new infantry regiments into the tained defensive effort.
line before the attacks had even Neither Devers nor Patch relied ex-
begun was perhaps his most impor- cessively on their exceptional intelli-
tant contribution, while Patch’s plan gence capabilities, which may have
to reinforce the Sarre valley area and told the Allied leaders that the
to rely elsewhere on defense in depth German high command had the abili-
proved sound. The Seventh Army ty to attack in their sector, but not
could not be strong everywhere, and where and when the major assaults
the Germans probably could have would actually occur. In fact, both
penetrated Brooks’ lines almost any- commanders were still concerned
where on the long VI Corps front over the possibility of a new German
without, however, achieving decisive offensive slightly west of the Sarre
results. Good use of interior lines of River valley area, where the withdraw-
communications, especially the lateral al of the 103d Division had temporar-
road networks through the Vosges, ily weakened the boundary zone be-
more than made up for the VI Corps’ tween the Seventh and Third
thin lines and its exposed position in Armies.16 For this reason Patch con-
the Lauterbourg salient. But Devers tinued to retain Leclerc’s 2d Armored
was probably accurate when he stated Division-arguably the 6th Army
that “Ted Brooks . . . fought one of Group’s best armored force-in re-
the great defensive battles of all times serve west of the Vosges behind Hais-
with very little.” 14 lip’s XV Corps.
In the field, American officers and In the air, poor flying conditions
men at the tactical level performed prevented the defenders from making
well, especially considering the gener- full use of their tactical air superiori-
al confusion that resulted from the
rapid movement of units back and
forth across the battlefield. Often 15Interv, Clarke with Theodore C. Mataxis
(former commander, 2d Battalion, 274th Infantry,
Task Force Herren), 3 Aug 88.
14Devers Diary, 17 Jan 45. 16Devers Diary, 8–9Jan 45.
THE BATTLE OF ALSACE 529

ty. During January alone, Allied air- behind the battlefield. Poor visibility
craft were grounded nearly half the limited the command’s effect on the
month. But the German Air Force battlefield, but the threat of Allied air
high command failed to take full ad- attacks greatly influenced German de-
vantage of the weather. Although the ployments. Equally important, air re-
start of Operation NORDWIND had connaissance had tracked the general
been accompanied by a massive German buildup opposite the XV
Luftwaffe attack of about 700 aircraft Corps, when ULTRA intercepts gave
against Allied air bases, which de- no warning of a German attack.
stroyed over 150 planes and damaged ULTRA itself was of marginal use
many more, the strikes had been di- during the battle, and the information
rected almost totally against airfields it supplied was often many days out
in Belgium and the Netherlands and of date. For example, on 31 Decem-
had no impact on the campaign in ber ULTRA intelligence officers be-
Alsace. Moreover, German losses lieved that the 6th Mountain SS Divi-
during the strike were also high, and sion had started to leave Norway in
the Luftwaffe was unable to sustain early December, but had no informa-
such efforts, normally flying no more tion regarding its destination. A de-
than 125 to 150 sorties per day across crypt of 4 January reported that the
the entire Western Front. Although last elements of the division had de-
briefly sending 150- 175 sorties into parted Norway a week earlier; a de-
the Alsace area to support the final crypt available on 6 January of a 28
attacks in the Lauterbourg salient, the December message referred to large
effort had a negligible effect on the movements by rail to Army Group G; a
battlefield. 17 American commanders decrypt on the following day, 7 Janu-
reported numerous strafing attacks by ary, disclosed that the mountain SS
German aircraft during the period, division was in the Kaiserslautern area
but no sustained effort to disrupt on the 5th; and a decrypt of 10 Janu-
their lines of communication. ary finally placed it on the battlefield
For the 6th Army Group, the sup- under Hoehne’s LXXXIX Corps. 18 Ac-
porting 1st Tactical Air Command tually the unit had entered the battle
concentrated its air strikes north and on 2 January, eight days earlier,
east of the Saar, Lauter, and Rhine where it had been promptly identified
rivers in the German communications by opposing Seventh Army units.
zone behind the battlefield, especially ULTRA, nevertheless, performed a
in the railway marshaling areas, thus valuable function, enabling its users
making it difficult for the German to verify the welter of often conflict-
ground forces to move supplies and ing information that poured in during
reinforcements up to the front lines the battle from POW reports and
or to move troop units laterally other conventional sources. In these
matters, experience and common
17According to Bussey’s ULTRA Report, ULTRA
intercepts had warned the Allies of the main air
attack, and ULTRA Msg BT 2834 200541 Jan 45 al- 18ULTRA information provided by Hinsley et al.,
ludes to the final air support activities against the VI British Intelligence in the Second World War, III, 2, pp.
Corps. 665–66.
530 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

sense were more valuable to intelli- diers the most problems. In general
gence officers than exotic sources of they may have performed better than
information. For example, no one at their German opponents, many of
SHAEF headquarters or anywhere whom, according to a wide variety of
else was taken in by information ap- American reports, appeared intoxicat-
parently planted on 26 January indi- ed during the initial phase of the at-
cating that the entire II SS Panzer tacks, shouting a variety of slogans
Corps, with its divisions, had been and epithets at the defenders and ad-
transferred from the Ardennes to vancing in successive waves over open
Army Group G for commitment to the terrain. The average American GIs,
Alsatian campaign. 19 always somewhat cynical, were nota-
On the German side, order-of- bly unimpressed by the German per-
battle information concerning Sev- formance and, in effect, by the whole
enth Army’s dispositions was often Nazi military mystic.
hazy, especially in regard to the loca- Shortages of personnel and equip-
tion of Patch’s armored divisions ment could not completely explain
behind the battlefield. OB West and the marginal German showing. Given
the First Army, for example, expected the scarcity of ammunition, transpor-
to find the 36th Division in the tation, and radio communications,
Vosges instead of Task Force Hudel- German artillery support was under-
son, and the shallowness of the Amer- standably poor at times, but was not
ican defenses there may have been a critical to German success. Their best
welcome surprise. Less pleasing, how- efforts were consistently the result of
ever, was the appearance of Leclerc’s surprise attacks without artillery prep-
2d Armored Division instead of the aration and quick infantry penetra-
inexperienced 12th in the Sarre River tions through gaps in the American
valley, as was the discovery that the lines. In contrast, German armor, the
Seventh Army had not deployed more exploiting component, was technically
formations north to the Ardennes. impressive but tactically disappoint-
The stiff resistance from some of the ing. American officers reported that
green American units must also have the heavier German armored vehicles
been unexpected. slipped on the icy roads, were contin-
On the ground most American sol- ually hampered by mines and de-
diers, from new privates to seasoned stroyed bridges, and were too easily
veterans, had little idea of the scope separated from their supporting in-
or magnitude of the successive offen- fantry. The attackers’ well-armored
sives. According to many participants, but turretless assault guns were better
the average infantryman had only two suited to the defense, and the large
concerns, “not letting his buddies Panther and Tiger tanks did not do
down and surviving.” Often it was the much better. Perhaps they never had
weather, in one of the coldest winters much of a chance. Finally, the super-
of the decade, rather than the Ger- heavy German tanks like the Royal
mans that gave American foot sol- Tigers and Jagdtigers were extremely
powerful machines, but their weight
19Hinsley, p. 668. and high fuel consumption made
THE BATTLE OF ALSACE 531

their positioning on the battefield dif- no business throwing themselves into


ficult, and they may have only wasted built-up areas like Hatten, Rittershof-
the limited supplies and trained man- fen, and Herrlisheim. But Brooks, a
power available to the attackers. former armored division commander
American combat support was su- himself, had no choice in this matter,
perior, and the prompt availability of and both the 12th and 14th Armored
adequate artillery, engineer, signal, were at least able to enter the battle
and logistical support may have been arena rapidly, reinforcing critical
decisive in many tactical engage- areas and blunting the final German
ments. Combat engineers often found drives south. Yet, like Blaskowitz,
themselves in the forefront of the Devers would have liked his armored
battle, building or destroying bridges, units to have had more training and
constructing obstacles and minefields, experience.
or serving as infantry alongside of ar- Not surprisingly, armor losses on
tillery forward observers, medical per- both sides were high, because the
sonnel, radio operators, truck drivers, critical fighting was centered around
and other rear-echelon soldiers. key crossroads and river crossings in
Others, whose tasks kept them farther built-up areas where armored vehicles
in the rear, worked around the clock became easy prey for mines and in-
at supply depots, repair facilities, and fantry antitank weapons. Here both
artillery sites, and many crowded the sides were relatively strong: the
daily religious services to pray for standard American 57-mm. antitank
those on the front lines. cannons were buttressed by 75-mm.
Some materiel and logistical failings and 76-mm. pieces, and the Germans
were difficult to overcome. Artillery fielded similar high-velocity artillery;
munitions still had to be carefully the American bazooka rocket-launch-
rationed, and even the newer tanks ers were matched by the German pan-
and tank destroyers, equipped with zerfaust. On the defense, the German
higher-velocity guns, were inferior in antitank gunners had a distinct advan-
many ways to their German counter- tage over the American crews because
parts. All had greater speed, mobility, of the comparatively light frontal
and range than their opponents, but armor of the Allied tanks. Neverthe-
they were still outclassed in armored less, good cooperation between U.S.
protection and firepower. Devers him- tank-infantry teams and supporting
self judged the American tank equal artillery usually compensated for such
to the average German machine, but technical disadvantages within the
even before the battle he had been more experienced American divisions.
concerned over the readiness of his Experience, not armor plating, was
two American armored divisions.20 the key; accordingly, Smith’s 14th Ar-
Like the German panzer divisions, mored Division, having received its
they were organized and equipped initiation in street fighting the previ-
primarily for mobile warfare and had ous November in southern Alsace, did
much better at Hatten and Rittershof-
fen than Allen’s inexperienced 12th
20See Devers Diary, 9 and 16 Jan 45. did at Herrlisheim.
532 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

As in other campaigns, the entire drawal to the Moder. But in the field
battle underlined the continued im- where the battles were fought, neither
portance of well-trained infantry and the vast Allied fleets of flying ma-
experienced tactical commanders and chines nor the heavily armored
staffs as well as the need for a com- German land battleships had much of
mand system that delegated the an effect. Success in battle thus came
proper amount of authority to the im- down to the ability of infantry forces
plementing echelons. In the case of on both sides to attack and defend
the controversial withdrawal from the and the ability of their corps, division,
Lauterbourg salient, it was Eisenhow- regiment, and battalion commanders
er, Devers, and the Allied political to position them effectively on the
leaders who discussed the overall im- battlefield and make the best use of
plications of the proposal; Patch, the supporting manpower and machinery.
army commander, who brought the In the end it was the capability of the
VI Corps back to the Maginot Line; machine to serve the foot soldier in
and Brooks, the corps commander, the field, rather than the reverse, that
who ordered the final tactical with- proved decisive.
CHAPTER XXIX

The Colmar Pocket


By the end of the German winter trition of men and materiel throughout
offensives, the battered Western the winter fighting in the Vosges. The
Front traced a ragged line across Bel- French commander continued to have
gium, France, and Germany from the difficulty in overcoming his weak sup-
North Sea down to the Swiss border. port organization and in turning FFI
The first Allied order of business was militia and local draftees into conven-
to straighten this line, pulling it taut tional soldiers. The Ardennes emer-
and reducing its length as much as gency finally forced him to call off the
possible. Shorter lines would mean effort. For the Germans, maintaining
fewer troops at the front, thus allow- the pocket also presented severe prob-
ing the commanders of the three lems. French aggressiveness had kept
army groups to move more units back almost the entire Nineteenth Army busy
to the rear for rest and recuperation in defense of the salient, greatly limit-
and, ultimately, to concentrate them ing its ability to assist German attacks
for a final thrust into the German in the north. The northern offensives,
interior. In northern Alsace, the in turn, had siphoned off any reserves
German attack, which forced the VI that might have been committed to the
Corps out of the Lauterbourg salient pocket, making Operation SONNEN-
and onto the more defensible Moder WENDE, the Nineteenth Army's contribu-
River line, had partially solved this tion to the battle of Alsace, a limited
problem, reducing the VI Corps front affair that only lengthened the vast
by more than half. To the south, how- 130-mile defensive perimeter around
ever, the Colmar Pocket still created a the city of Colmar
large fifty-mile gap in the Rhine front
of the First French Army, an enemy- Planning the Colmar Offensive
held salient that threatened the flanks
of any future French advance east- Even as the German attacks in north-
ward into Germany. ern Alsace reached their peak, Devers
In early December de Lattre had was preparing for a new major offen-
tried to eliminate the pocket, but his sive against the 850-square-mile
renewed offensive had been under- Colmar Pocket. 1 Allied intelligence
mined by the demands of Operation 1 General information on Allied planning and op-
INDEPENDENCE and by the constant at- erations in this chapter is based on the following
534 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

sources, including ULTRA, showed as possible, they were also concerned


that the Germans did not intend to about the ground the French had re-
transfer the rest of their armored cently been forced to relinquish
forces to the Alsatian front and indicat- around Erstein and about the possi-
ed that de Lattre’s headquarters may bility of having to make a last-ditch
have greatly overestimated the size of defense of Strasbourg. For the
the German forces now remaining in moment, Devers thought the First
the pocket. Nevertheless, the 6th Army French Army was too weak to see the
Group commander was prepared to re- operation through alone and prom-
inforce the French with considerable ised to seek additional units from the
American support to ensure that the SHAEF reserve.
southern Alsatian plains were swept Two days later, during a visit by Ei-
clean. Devers wanted the Colmar senhower’s chief of staff to the 6th
Pocket eliminated once and for all, Army Group, Devers put the question
preferably in January or early February to Bedell Smith, asking for two Amer-
before rainfall and warmer tempera- ican divisions—an infantry division to
tures turned the frozen farming area reinforce O’Daniel’s 3d Division at
into a quagmire. The weather was criti- Colmar and an armored division to
cal for the timing of the attack. The 6th replace Leclerc’s unit, which he also
Army Group expected that, after the intended to return south. Smith ap-
heavy snowfalls of December and early parently convinced Eisenhower that
January, the weather would break in the request was justified and cabled a
the latter half of January, giving the favorable response to Devers the fol-
French some clear skies and clear roads lowing day, 14 January; he promised
for the offensive, an expectation that the 6th Army Group both the 10th
agreed with official SHAEF weather Armored and 28th Infantry Divisions,
predictions. But once slightly warmer but warned Devers that the 28th, still
weather began to melt the accumulated badly battered from the Ardennes
snowfall, military operations would fighting, was capable of only limited
again become extremely difficult. offensive action.
On the afternoon of 11 January, Meanwhile, Devers had already or-
Devers and de Lattre conferred at dered his own staff to put together a
Vittel regarding a renewal of the general operational plan for d e Lattre
Colmar offensive. Although both men based on the expected reinforcements
were eager to begin the effort as soon and the employment of the U.S. XXI
Corps headquarters, which Devers
sources: Hist, 6th Army Gp, ch. 6; Seventh A r m y Rpt, had temporarily placed in charge of
ch. 24; HQ, II Corps, Report on the Offensive Op- Patch’s northern flank. 2 Dubbed Op-
erations by II Corps for the Reduction of the
Colmar Pocket, 28 Feb 45; HQ, I Corps, Chrono-
logical Report on the Operations from 20 January 2On 6th Army Group planning, see Jonathan O.
to 9 February 1945 to Reduce the Colmar Pocket, Seaman, “Reduction of the Colmar Pocket: A 6th
24 Feb 45 (English version at CMH); XXI Corps Army Group Operation,” Military Review, XXXI, No.
AAR, Jan 45; de Lattre, History, pp. 334-401; and 7 (October 1951), 45–46. (Seaman served in the 6th
“The 5th French Armored Division at Colmar,” Army Group G–3 section during World War II and
Military Review, XXIX, No. 9 (December 1949), 77– later commanded a U.S. corps-level force in South
83 (reprinted from the Revue historique de l’armee). Vietnam.)
THE COLMAR POCKET 535

eration CHEERFULby the Americans, sion supporting the northern effort in


the basic concept was a simultaneous accordance with its limited capabili-
attack on both sides of the pocket ties as it arrived on the scene. Despite
toward the major surviving Rhine the rather precarious situation of the
River bridge near Neuf-Brisach, about VI Corps in the north, Devers was
seven miles east of Colmar city. The confident that Patch could handle the
French I Corps was to lead off in the situation there and wanted to move
south with a drive from Mulhouse di- against the Colmar Pocket while the
rectly to the bridge area, conducting a Germans were still overextended and
secondary attack in the mountains the weather prognosis was good.
north of Thann in order to tie down De Lattre accepted the 6th Army
German forces. After the German re- Group’s planning concept to use the
serves had hopefully moved to the southern attack to draw off German re-
south, Maj. Gen. Frank W. Milburn’s serves and concentrate the main effort
XXI Corps was to direct the main against the Neuf-Brisach bridge, trap-
effort; while Milburn sent two Ameri- ping as many Germans inside the
can infantry divisions and Leclerc’s pocket as possible. 3 In the north, de
armored division against the Neuf- Monsabert’s II Corps, already consist-
Brisach area, assisted perhaps by an ing of the U.S. 3d, the French l s t , and
airborne assault, the French II Corps the 3d Algerian Divisions, would be re-
would seize Colmar itself. The 6th inforced with both the French 5th Ar-
Army Group planners estimated that mored Division and the U.S. 28th In-
Operation CHEERFUL would take fantry Division, under Maj. Gen.
about one week and, after studying Norman D. Cota. Cota’s weak division
weather and flood records, recom- was to take over the northwestern pe-
mended that it begin in early Febru- rimeter of the pocket, along the Kay-
ary, certainly before the 20th. sersberg valley just above Colmar city,
Devers accepted the general oper- while the 3d Algerian Division
ational concept, but was more wor- screened the extreme northern perim-
ried about rising temperatures than eter south of Strasbourg. O’Daniel’s 3d
cloudy skies and insisted that the op- and the two other French divisions
eration begin much earlier, without would be concentrated in between, just
either Milburn’s corps or Leclerc’s south of Selestat, for the thrust at
armor if necessary. De Monsabert’s Neuf-Brisach and the Rhine. To pro-
French corps would have to direct the vide more combat power, Devers also
main effort, which, he agreed, should agreed to begin deploying Leclerc’s 2d
not be toward Colmar but against Armored Division south to the Stras-
Neuf-Brisach. SHAEF’s negative re- bourg area as quickly as he could and
sponse regarding the availability of to move the U.S. 12th Armored Divi-
airborne forces, an unnecessary com- sion into the Kaysersberg-Selestat area
plication, did not disturb Devers. He
ordered de Lattre to begin the effort
by attacking from the south on 20
3First Fr Army, Personal and Secret Directive 7,
January and from the north on the 15 Jan 45 (Annex VII of de Lattre, Histoire, French
22d, with the U.S. 28th Infantry Divi- language edition).
536 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

by the 22d as a reserve for the French.4 could be breached quickly before the
With these additions, de Monsabert Germans could react.
decided that the American 3d Divi- On the southern edge of the
sion, reinforced by one infantry regi- pocket, General Bethouart’s I Corps
ment from Task Force Harris (63d In- prepared to support the main effort
fantry Division) and supported by one by beginning its attack two days earli-
combat command of the French 5th er than de Monsabert and striking
Armored Division, would make the north with two divisions, the 4th Mo-
main effort, pushing southeast from roccan Mountain and the 2d Moroc-
the area between Selestat and Kay- can Infantry, using the 9th Colonial
sersberg. On its left, the French 1st Infantry Division at the base of the
Infantry Division, with some of Le- pocket as a pivot. The French 1st Ar-
clerc’s armor attached, would push mored Division would provide some
east, covering the northern flank of tank support to the attacking forma-
the American unit. The extreme tions, but the bulk of du Vigier’s ar-
flanks of the offensive would, in turn, mored command would initially
be screened by the rest of de Monsa- remain in reserve. Departing from the
bert’s French units in the north and 6th Army Group’s planning concept,
by Cota’s 28th Division in the south. Bethouart wanted his Moroccan divi-
Once the U.S. 3d Division had se- sions to make the main effort on the
cured bridgeheads over the Colmar left (west) between Thann and Cernay
Canal, about halfway to the Rhine, over the Thur River toward Ensi-
the French commander was prepared sheim, while the 9th Colonial pushed
to commit the rest of the 5th Ar- into the suburbs and woods north of
mored Division to seize the objective Mulhouse. Once these forces had
area, leaving Leclerc and some at- cleared a roughly triangular shape of
tached FFI forces to mop up any Ger- territory between Cernay, Ensisheim,
mans left in the Erstein salient north and Mulhouse and had secured
of Neuf-Brisach. At the beginning, bridges over the I11 River at Ensi-
however, the main attacking forces sheim, the 1st Armored Division
would ignore both the Erstein salient would pass through the French lines
and Colmar itself and would advance and drive for Neuf-Brisach.
southeast, between these two more North of Thann, in the High
obvious objectives. The projected Vosges, de Lattre had replaced the 3d
route of advance would take them Algerian Division with the new
across four major water barriers: the French 10th Infantry Division, which
Fecht and I11 rivers, the Riedwiller had been assembled primarily from
Brook, and the Colmar Canal. Each FFI resources, and expected the unit
was critical, and de Monsabert hoped only to guard the western boundaries
that, with speed and surprise, all four of the pocket on the slopes of the
Vosges.
As everyone now realized, the
4The French 2d and the U.S. 12th Armored Divi- Colmar terrain presented many chal-
sions were temporarily replaced by the U.S. 10th
Armored Division, which began arriving in the Sev- lenges to the Allied forces, both north
enth Army area on 17 January. and south. Because of innumerable
THE COLMAR POCKET 537

streams, brooks, small rivers, and de Lattre’s most pressing supply and
canals on the projected routes of ad- equipment shortages, aided by the
vance of both corps, considerable quiet that had finally descended on
bridging equipment was required. To Patch’s Seventh Army front to the
make the maximum amount available, north.
the French replaced many of the exist-
ing Bailey bridges in their areas with The German Defense
timber structures, and Devers man-
aged to obtain a bridge company from In mid-January 1945 the mission of
the Third Army to provide direct sup- General Rasp’s Nineteenth Army was to
port for the U.S. 3d Division. But tie down the largest possible number
bridging remained scarce and had to of Allied forces west of the Rhine,
be carefully rationed; ultimately much giving OKW more time to redeploy
more had to be made available to the German units to the Eastern Front
French from Seventh Army and theater and reorganize the defenses of those
reserves during the course of the oper- that remained. In addition, on 22 Jan-
ation. Other shortages existed uary Army Group Oberrhein ordered
throughout the First French Army: ini- Rasp to be prepared to renew his at-
tially only ten days’ worth of ammuni- tacks in the northern corner of the
tion and one day’s reserve of gasoline pocket in support of what was to be
were available at forward depots; large the final German effort against
numbers of vehicles were deadlined Brooks’ VI Corps along the Moder
and awaiting repair due to a lack of River. At the time, Rasp and his two
spare parts; and the manpower losses corps commanders would have pre-
suffered during the November offen- ferred to conduct a gradual, fighting
sive had not yet been replenished. withdrawal to the east bank of the
O’Daniel’s 3d Division was in better Rhine and eventually to deploy the
shape, having been relieved by Cota’s bulk of the Nineteenth Army north of
28th on 19 January, but had been fight- the Black Forest, where the major
ing a fierce seesaw battle for control of Allied offensives were expected to
the Kaysersberg valley since its arrival occur.6 But the abrupt termination of
on the northern approaches to the offensive in northern Alsace on
Colmar. 5 Before the offensive and the 26th at least freed them from any
during the days that followed, the 6th further supporting requirements.
Army Group staff endeavored to satisfy Inside the Colmar Pocket the Nine-
teenth Army controlled two corps head-
5 For heroic action during these generally unher- quarters, eight infantry divisions, and
alded skirmishes, Congressional Medals of Honor one armored brigade. General
were awarded to three 3d Division soldiers: Lt. Col. Thumm’s LXIV Corps held the northern
Keith L. Ware, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion,
15th Infantry, for action on 26 December 1944; 1st
half of the pocket with the 189th and
Lt. Eli Whiteley, Company L, 15th Infantry, also for 198th Infantry Divisions and the 16th and
action on the 26th; and T. Sgt. Russell E. Dunham,
Company I, 30th Infantry, for action on 8 January
1945. Colonel Ware, later promoted to major gen- 6German information in this chapter is based pri-
eral, was killed in action in Vietnam while com- marily on Magna E. Bauer, “The German Withdraw-
manding the 1st Infantry Division in 1969. al from the Colmar Pocket,” CMH MS R–56.
538 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

708th Volksgrenadier Divisions. 7 Oper- Destroyer (Panzerjaeger) Battalion. Expe-


ation SONNENWENDE had left the rienced infantry was also in short
198th in the Erstein salient and the supply, with most of the line battal-
708th Volksgrenadiers holding a north- ions fleshed out with hastily trained
south line along the I11 River from Se- fillers and recruits. By now, such con-
lestat south to Colmar, supported by ditions must have seemed almost
the 280th Assault Gun Battalion. At normal to the Nineteenth Army staff,
Colmar, the 289th Infantry Division took which could still count on many ad-
over the defensive perimeter, which vantages that made it difficult for the
stretched westward into the Vosges Allies to summarily eject its forces
where the 16th Volksgrenadiersoutpost- from the area. Rasp had some 22,500
ed the mountainous western section of effectives (versus an Allied estimate of
the pocket. In the south Lt. Gen. Erich 15,000); short interior lines of com-
Abraham, who had replaced Schack as munication; good wire communica-
commander of the LXIII Corps on 13 tions down to at least the battalion
December, had the 338th, 259th, and level; ample rations and stocks of
716th Infantry Divisions, with the weak mines and small-arms ammunition;
338th in the mountains northwest of and a secure rear area. The weather
Thann, the 159th centered around and terrain heavily favored the de-
Cernay, and the 726th opposite Mul- fense, as did the Alsatian network of
house. In army reserve were the 206th small towns, each of which could be
Panzer Brigade and the 269th Infantry Di- turned into a tiny fortress; together
vision; however, the latter unit was cur- they provided a ready-made strong-
rently in the process of deploying to point defensive system that enabled
the Eastern Front, and its replacement, Rasp to make the best use of his
the 2d Mountain Division, was still no- poorly trained but highly motivated
where in sight. troops. The failure of the French and
All of the line divisions were under- Americans to make any vital penetra-
strength, undertrained, and under- tions in this system during the past
equipped, having only about 30 to 40 month attested to its effectiveness,
percent of their antitank weapons and but Rasp’s fixed defensive arrange-
little ammunition for their more nu- ments also made it difficult to con-
merous artillery pieces. Armor was centrate his forces for local counterat-
even scarcer, totaling perhaps sixty- tacks of any significance.
five operational tanks and assault Key to Rasp’s defensive effort was
guns, and was concentrated generally his ability to secure two major bridges
in the armored brigade and two over the Rhine, which, because of
mobile antitank units, the 280th As- their sturdy construction, had proved
sault Gun Battalion and the 654th Tank impossible to destroy by air attacks.
The first was a single-track, rein-
forced railway bridge at Brisach (two
7 The U.S. XV Corps had destroyed the 708th miles east of Neuf-Brisach), which the
Volksgrenadier Division during the November offen- German soldiers had already awarded
sive, but the German high command had reconsti-
tuted the unit sometime in December and moved it an honorary Iron Cross for surviving
to the Colmar front. massive Allied bombing assaults; the
THE COLMAR POCKET 539

second was the Neuenburg bridge ward several miles during the first day
just opposite the French town of Cha- of the attack and striking hard at the
lampe, which de Lattre had consid- boundary between the German 159th
ered seizing back in November. In ad- and 716th Divisions. But the adverse
dition the Nineteenth Army maintained weather and terrain together with the
numerous permanent ferry sites along elastic German defenses broke the
the Rhine capable of handling 8-, 16-, tempo of the advance during the
40-, and even a few 70-ton loads. night. Throughout the 21st, the Ger-
Near Brisach alone were four 10-ton, mans launched a series of small
six 16-ton, and one 70-ton ferry sites, armor-supported counterattacks and
two cable ferries, and one fuel pipe- managed to hold on to Cernay and
line; furthermore, all road networks limit French gains above Mulhouse.
on the German side of the Rhine Although failing to achieve the deep
were in good condition. But the two penetration that the I Corps com-
bridge sites were critical for the sur- mander had hoped for, the attacks at
vival of the Nineteenth Army, and the least succeeded in drawing the Nine-
German commanders predicted that teenth Army’s scant armor reserves
the Allies would eventually try to southward. Army Group Oberrhein ap-
seize them. No one at either Nineteenth proved the immediate commitment of
Army headquarters or at Army Group the 654th Tank Destroyer Battalion and
Oberrhein, however, expected that the also ordered the 106th Panzer Brigade
attempt would be made before the and later arriving elements of the 2d
battles in the north had ended and Mountain Division southward to the
the Allied forces had taken some time threatened area. Initially, however,
to recover. neither Himmler nor Rasp attached
any great significance to the actions,
which, they believed, represented no
The Initial Attacks more than a limited diversionary
effort to reduce pressure on Stras-
bourg in the north.
As scheduled, the French I Corps Despite the attention that Rasp
attack jumped off in the south on 20 would direct to his northern sector sev-
January with Bethouart’s two Moroc- eral days later, the I Corps attack re-
can divisions undertaking the main mained stalled in the south for the rest
effort from Cernay to Ensisheim, the of the month. Bethouart shifted his
9th Colonial Division making a sec- main effort slightly east, where the 9th
ondary foray north of Mulhouse, and Colonial had done a bit better, but the
other units conducting a small diver- results were the same. German resist-
sionary maneuver north of Thann ance was stubborn and their defenses
(Map 35). Unhappily for the southern were organized in depth, with the
French forces, Allied weather predic- French attacks channeled by roads, for-
tions proved incorrect, and the offen- ests, streams, and small towns through
sive began in the middle of a driving a series of heavily defended choke
snowstorm. Bethouart’s forces easily points. Furthermore, the slow pace of
achieved tactical surprise, driving for- the French advance allowed bypassed
THE COLMAR POCKET 541

defenders to pull back in an orderly panthers and some tanks and assault
manner, aided by the heavy snowfall guns, to the division to give it reserve
and overcast skies that limited Allied muscle, but he lacked the infantry
air support and vehicle mobility. At the strength in the area to give the de-
end of the month, after eleven days of fense more substance and depth.
fighting, the 159th Division maintained General O’Daniel, still commanding
its hold on Cernay, and the I Corps the experienced 3d Division, fully un-
forces were still a disappointing five or derstood the difficulties that would
six miles short of Ensisheim, their in- face his troops. The arrival of the U.S.
termediate objective. At the time, 28th Division in the Kaysersberg area
Bethouart reported that his infantry had at least given him the opportunity
was exhausted, his stocks of artillery to rest his infantry for a few days while
ammunition almost depleted, and two he concentrated them for the attack.
of his armored division’s three tank With the French 1st Infantry Division
battalions reduced to between sixteen supporting his advance on the left, and
and eighteen operable armored vehi- with both units substantially reinforced
cles apiece. CCl alone had lost thirty- with experienced armored units,
six tanks during the offensive to O’Daniel was confident that a rapid
German mines. breakthrough could be achieved. Spe-
In the north de Monsabert’s II cifically he planned to begin the 3d Di-
Corps attack began on 22 January, vision’s attack with a successive series
also on schedule, and initially of assaults by his four infantry regi-
achieved more success. General ments (the 7th, 15th, and 30th and the
Thumm, the LXIV Corps commander, attached 254th). Each was to push di-
had noted the Allied buildup between rectly east for a few miles and then
Colmar and Selestat as well as the re- drive south for another five to ten
inforcement of the U.S. 3d Division miles; the next attacking regiment
by what he assumed was the entire would pass through the rear lines of
American 63d Infantry Division (actu- the first and then attack east for a few
ally it was one T F Harris regiment). miles before turning south as the first
Since he was under orders to hold the had done. In this way O’Daniel hoped
entire Erstein salient, however, the to sidestep the entire division south-
German commander had no opportu- east to the Colmar Canal and beyond,
nity to consolidate his defending opening a path for a final drive by the
forces or to strengthen those facing French 5th Armored Division on Neuf-
the American units. Instead, he in- Brisach. At that point the 28th Division
structed the 708th Volksgrenadier Divi- could extend its front westward, allow-
sion to maintain only a thin defensive ing most of the 3d Division to support
screen west of the I11 River, keeping the final push. The maneuver might
enough forces to the rear for strong, also deceive the Germans into believ-
local counterattacks in order to pre- ing that the Americans were trying
vent its front from being pierced by a either to outflank Colmar city or
single concentrated attack. He also at- threaten the Erstein salient, when their
tached the 280th Assault Battalion, with real objective was the Neuf-Brisach
a dozen or so heavy Mark V jagd- bridge and ferry sites.
542 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

The Bridge at Maison Rouge behind and to the east of the others.
McGarr’s regiment set out from
Successful river crossings were vital Guemar around midnight, trudging
to the Allied attack. On the first two through the deep snow. In addition to
days of de Monsabert’s offensive, 22 his semiautomatic M1, each rifleman
and 23 January, all went according to carried four bandoleers of ammuni-
the 3d Division plan, Operation tion, three fragmentation and one
GRANDSLAM. 8 The division’s 7th In- white phosphorous grenade, one
fantry regiment, commanded by Col. day’s worth of K-rations, one blanket
John A. Heintges, crossed the Fecht and one shelter half, and inevitably
River at Guemar, which was already cigarettes, toilet articles, and other
in Allied hands, around 2100 on the miscellaneous personal items, includ-
21st and proceeded south. There it ing letters and pictures from home.
would spend the next four days clear- The temperature was well below
ing the forests and towns between the freezing, but the dark Colmar forest
Fecht and Ill rivers for about ten cut the wind somewhat, which made
miles, rolling up Thumm’s 9 thin the foot march more bearable. The
screening forces in the process. Fol- unit’s initial objective was the Maison
lowing in the footsteps of the 7th, the Rouge bridge, a medium-sized
30th Infantry, under Col. Lionel C. wooden span over the Ill River oppo-
McGarr, was also to cross the Fecht at site the southeastern corner of the
Guemar during the night of 22–23 forest. Once this crossing site had
January. McGarr planned to have his been secured, along with a road junc-
unit march east through the Colmar tion a few miles beyond the Ill, the
forest, previously cleared by the 7th engineers were to bring up bridging
regiment, secure crossing points over equipment early on the 23d, enabling
the Ill, and then push south, parallel- the entire force to move across the Ill
ing the advance of the 7th, clearing for its advance south.
the towns of Riedwihr and Holtzwihr, Shortly after entering the Colmar
and finally seizing crossing points forest, McGarr split the regiment into
over the Colmar Canal. O’Daniel had two attacking forces; he sent the 3d
attached one tank and one tank de- Battalion southeast directly for the
stroyer company to the regiment to bridge and the 1st Battalion east with
screen its open, eastern flank until the instructions to cross the Ill about
next attacking regiment, the 15th In- 1,500 yards above the bridge site and
fantry, could swing into position move down to the crossing site from
the north. Subsequently, the 1st Bat-
8Information presented in the following section is talion managed to cross the Ill in
based on the 3d Inf Div AAR, Jan 45; and the small- rubber boats during the night unop-
unit accounts taken from the Seventh Army Histori-
cal Office, Interv Rpts, “Operation Grand-slam,
posed and sweep down the east bank
30th Infantry Regt., 3rd Infantry Division,” and “La of the river, surprising a small detach-
Maison Rouge: The Story of an Engagement,” MHI. ment of Germans at the bridge. By
9 For heroic action during a German counterattack 0530 the next morning, McGarr’s unit
on 25 January 1945, Pfc. Jose F. Valdez, Company
B, 7th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division, was posthu- thus found itself in possession of a
mously awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. fairly large but worn timber bridge
THE COLMAR POCKET 543

over the Ill as well as the crossroads force. The Americans had not expect-
located about a mile or so east of the ed to find the structure intact and had
bridge and the small farm complex of planned to begin constructing an ar-
Maison Rouge in between. 10 mored treadway bridge to the north
During the early morning hours of later in the day. The capture of the
the 24th, McGarr consolidated the span, however, changed these plans,
bridgehead, bringing the rest of his and McGarr judged that his accompa-
forces up to the area as quickly as nying vehicles could use the bridge
possible, organizing defensive posi- after engineers reinforced it. Division
tions for the expected German coun- engineer officers confirmed McGarr's
terattack, and pushing patrols out to estimate around 1330, but could not
the east, southeast, and south. Out- guarantee completion of the work
side of several strands of trees along until early the next morning. The
the Ill River and a small parallel river at the crossing site was about 90
stream, the troops found little natural feet wide; the bridge was about 100
cover in the area, with broad, snow- feet long, consisting of two 30-foot
covered Alsatian fields stretching off approach ramps and two 20-foot
to the east of the river for several center spans. One of the attached
miles. About two miles to the south- thirty-ton Sherman tanks had been
east stood the Riedwihr woods and, run up and down the west ramp,
beyond the small forest, the towns of causing the structure to shake and
Riedwihr and Holtzwihr, both inter- sway violently, which ended any ideas
mediate regimental objectives. With the tankers might have had of charg-
apparently no German response to ing across.
the crossing immediately forthcom- Throughout the day McGarr
ing, McGarr decided to continue the became increasingly nervous about
advance as quickly as possible. He di- his lack of armor or antitank support
rected the 1st Battalion to move east of the river. As early as 1142,
through the Riedwihr woods toward leading elements of the 1st Battalion
Riedwihr; the 3d to pass behind the had reported hearing enemy armor
1st and advance on Holtzwihr, a mile around Riedwihr and later, from the
or so farther south; and the 2d to eastern edge of the Riedwihr woods,
follow the 1st into the Riedwihr had seen a few German armored vehi-
woods as a reserve. O'Daniel had al- cles running through the town. Con-
ready radioed McGarr at 0755 that cerned, McGarr pressed the engineers
morning, impressing on him the need for immediate assistance with the
for speed and the necessity of push- bridge; they decided that, as an expe-
ing across the Colmar Canal by the dient, strengthening the center spans
following night. somewhat and reinforcing the surface
The bridge at Maison Rouge pre- with treadway bridging would enable
sented a problem for the attacking it to hold the heavier vehicles. How-
ever, when the treadway sections fi-
nally arrived around 1500, the engi-
10The 30th Inf AAR, Jan 45, gives two different
times for the specific seizure of the bridge, 0530 neers found that too little had been
and 1130, but does not explain the discrepancy. brought forward to cover the entire
544 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

bridge and warned that the arrival of into the icy Ill River. Harmon escaped
additional sections might be delayed with a few bruises, but obviously no
several hours because of the heavy more American vehicles would be at-
traffic on the 3d Division’s supply tempting to cross the river for many
routes. Informed of the difficulty, hours, and the 30th Infantry would
O’Daniel again called McGarr at 1555 have to fight on alone. The crews of
and instructed him to continue his ad- the remaining tanks and tank destroy-
vance south without the armor. Speed ers could do little more than place
was essential if the momentum of the their machines in supporting posi-
attack was to continue. tions along the opposite bank of the
At 1630 McGarr ordered his units river.
to begin their assaults on Riedwihr What occurred during the next sev-
and Holtzwihr. Almost immediately eral hours is unclear. Apparently all
both attacking battalions ran into three of McGarr’s battalions suddenly
trouble. The 3d Battalion moved into found themselves in the midst of a
Holtzwihr sometime between 1630 general German counterattack from
and 1700, but was counterattacked by elements of the 708th Volks-grenudk-
strong infantry-tank teams and re- Division and the 280th Assault Gun Bat-
ported having difficulty holding on. talion. The 30th Infantry’s antitank
The 1st Battalion met heavy enemy forces, bazookas and 57-mm. can-
fire as soon as it approached Ried- nons, had no chance against the heav-
wihr and was barely able to reach the ily armored jagdpanzers and jugd-
outskirts of town. Both units request- panthers (assault guns on Mark IV and
ed immediate assistance to deal with V tank chassis). Around 1800 one of
the enemy armor. the American tank officers, after
Impressed by the need to bring crossing the damaged bridge on foot
some tanks across the Ill at once, the to reconnoiter the opposite side, re-
engineers took a calculated risk. With- ported streams of panicked soldiers
out waiting for additional bridging from the 30th pouring back from the
supplies, they decided to overlay both Riedwihr woods in complete disorder,
of the unsteady bridge ramps with abandoning weapons and attempting
treadway sections and hoped that the to climb over the damaged bridge. In
shorter center spans could take about the background he noted white trac-
ten medium tanks. About 1700, after ers from German automatic weapons
running three of the regiment’s towed mingled with the red tracers of Amer-
57-mm. antitank guns and movers ican arms-someone was still fight-
and a large ten-ton truck across the ing-but most of the regiment ap-
bridge, Lt. John F. Harmon drove the peared to be taking refuge along the
lead tank up the reinforced ramp and stream and riverbanks or braving the
onto the center span. Almost immedi- cold waters of the Ill to reach the op-
ately, as soon as the thirty-ton Sher- posite shore. There, frustrated tank
man had cleared the eight-inch high and tank destroyer crews watched the
treadway and hit the wooden surface, debacle, and shortly thereafter, as the
the bridge gave way, with tank and sunlight began to fade, they spotted
lieutenant falling “like an elevator” the squat German assault guns
THE COLMAR POCKET 545

moving up two by two, each section the crossroads completely exposed


covering the advance of the other. and without any cover, requested per-
Antitank and artillery fire kept the mission to pull the unit back to the
counterattacking force at bay for a tree line, but was instructed to hold
while, but sometime after dark the in place: division engineers were just
bridgehead appeared to be in completing a new treadway bridge to
German hands, though no one could the north, and armored support could
tell for sure. 11 be expected shortly.
At 2030 that night, as the 30th In- For the next several hours the men
fantry collected itself on the west side of Company I frantically chipped
of the Ill, O’Daniel ordered Lt. Col. away at the frozen ground, digging up
Hallett D. Edson, commanding the at best a few inches of dirt, ice, and
15th Infantry, to secure the bridge- snow and wondering when the tanks
head, see to the repair of the struc- would arrive. They finally came about
ture, and resume the 3d Division’s three hours later, but from the wrong
attack as soon as possible. Loss of side. At 0800 on the 24th, the Ger-
momentum had to be avoided at all mans launched their second counter-
costs. Edson alerted his 3d Battalion attack against the bridgehead with
and immediately sent two of its rifle thirteen heavy assault guns and a
companies, I and K, directly through company or more of infantry. As the
Guemar and the Colmar woods and enemy machines began pushing
over the Ill, following the trail that through the mile or so of fields be-
the 30th Infantry’s 1st Battalion had tween Company I and the Riedwihr
taken twenty-four hours earlier. De- woods, the American soldiers scram-
scending on the Maison Rouge area bled into their makeshift foxholes and
from the north, as their predecessors watched and waited, lying flat on the
had done, the two companies scat- frozen ground. Friendly artillery soon
tered a small German holding force caused the attacking infantry, barely
around 0500 on 24 January, rounded visible at first, to disperse and lag
up a number of 30th regiment infan- behind; but the assault guns, accom-
trymen who had somehow survived panied by a few tanks and lighter ar-
the night on the east bank, and pro- mored vehicles, continued toward
ceeded to secure the area as best they them at a steady pace. The company
could. Instructed to defend both the commander and his forward observer
bridge area and the crossroads, the ticked off the German progress for
battalion commander gave Company many to hear—800 yards away, then
K the responsibility for the crossing 600, and then 500. A few panicked
site and sent Company I out to and fled, and others asked their offi-
occupy the crossroads. As dawn came, cers, “Can we go?” The rest stayed,
the Company I commander, finding although, as one sergeant later re-
called, “we all practically had one
foot out of the foxhole,” and when
11 Initial German reports indicated that 145 pris- the company commander finally made
oners had been taken during the counterattack.
Bauer, “The German Withdrawal from the Colmar the decision to pull back, “we didn’t
Pocket,” p. 38. have to give the order very loud.”
546 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

That morning, shortly after 0800, the 30th Infantry, rather dazed but also
company was overrun. Some soldiers embarrassed and angry, regrouped
were crushed under the German tank and reorganized. The average
treads or machine-gunned where they strength of its rifle companies had
lay; others managed to fall back into fallen to seventy-two or seventy-three
the Company K area closer to the men, and the survivors later added a
river; still others were shot while new verse to the regimental ditty:
trying to surrender. Most of the 3d But we have our weaker moments
Platoon was thought to have been Even when success is huge
captured. ’Cause the outfit took a licken
The success of the German coun- at the bridge at Maison Rouge.
terattack again proved brief. As it
swept through Company I and moved But three days later, on 27 January,
on against Company K, direct Ameri- after only a brief respite, the 30th In-
can tank and tank destroyer fire from fantry went back into action as if
across the river forced the German nothing had happened. O’Daniel’s
assault guns back, and the German in- high opinion of the unit and his
fantry was unable to budge the de- equally high expectations of its per-
fenders by themselves. In the north, formance remained unchanged.
however, two American tanks and a The fighting at Maison Rouge typi-
tank destroyer, which had finally man- fied the back-and-forth flow of the
aged to cross the new treadway Allied advance in the north and
bridge, charged south and rolled into south. In both areas the attackers
the battle area “bumper-to-bumper,” found the Germans deployed in
where they were promptly picked off depth, counterattacking whenever
by the German tank gunners. The possible but lacking the strength or
battle for the bridgehead thus contin- mobility to do more than wear down
ued throughout the rest of the morn- the advancing forces. As the 15th In-
ing and into the early afternoon, with fantry entered Riedwihr on the night
neither side able to completely secure of 25–26 January, O’Daniel was slip-
the area. At last, around 1430 that ping the 254th Infantry regiment
afternoon, the 1st Battalion, 15th In- behind the 15th and directing it at
fantry, counterattacked from the the next 3d Division objective, Jeb-
north with more armor, finally reliev- sheim. On the 26th and 27th, the
ing those at the bridge site: “here Germans made a spirited defense of
they come . . . if that ain’t a beautiful the town, a key north-south communi-
sight . . . strictly a Hollywood finish cations junction, while launching re-
. . . j u s t like the movies.” The rest of peated armor-supported counterat-
the regiment soon followed. tacks in the Riedwihr area, but to no
Edson’s regiment continued south, avail. On 26 January 1945, in the
advancing on Riedwihr, Holtzwihr, much-contested Riedwihr woods, 2d
and the Colmar Canal, while the Lt. Audie Murphy, one of the most
German forces pulled back east, still decorated U.S. soldiers of the war
unsure of the 3d Division’s specific and later a popular film star, earned
axis of advance. West of the Ill the the Congressional Medal of Honor
THE COLMAR POCKET 547

for turning back several German at- with some of its rifle companies now
tacks from the turret of a burning down to about thirty able-bodied men,
tank destroyer. 12 With equal determi- its offensive capabilities were greatly
nation, the 254th secured Jebsheim reduced.
by the 28th and continued east.
O’Daniel recommitted the 30th In- Reorganization
fantry south of Riedwihr on the 27th.
McGarr’s unit again took Holtzwihr From the beginning of the effort
and drove south, reaching its original Devers had been concerned about de
objective, the Colmar Canal, on the Lattre’s strength as well as the vagar-
29th. Meanwhile, de Monsabert ex- ies of weather and terrain. Despite
tended the front of the U.S. 28th Divi- the advances by American troops, the
sion eastward, freeing Heintges’ 7th progress of the French forces north
regiment for employment elsewhere; and south had not been encouraging.
furthermore, to the north the French As early as the 27th the slow forward
1st Infantry Division, which had also movement of both attacks and the
encountered difficulties maintaining a heavy expenditure of ammunition had
bridgehead over the Ill, began making convinced the 6th Army Group com-
substantial progress, securing the 3d mander that more American assist-
Division’s northern flank. With the ance was needed. Assessing the situa-
30th Infantry on the canal and the 28th tion on that day, Devers was dissatis-
Division moving east, O’Daniel finally fied, feeling that the French units
sidestepped both the 7th and 15th lacked “the punch or the willingness
regiments between Riedwihr and Jeb- to go all out,” but he also noted
sheim, putting them over the Colmar that, contrary to expectations, “the
Canal on the night of 29–30 January, weather, with three feet of snow, has
abreast of the 30th Infantry. The fol- been abominable,” and had slowed
lowing day all three regiments drove progress everywhere on the Allied
south several miles, securing the canal front. He was, however, proud of the
crossing sites for the French 5th Ar- 3d Division’s accomplishments, de-
mored Division. By the 30th therefore, scribing the earlier Maison Rouge
O’Daniel had pushed a fairly substan- episode as “one of those unpredict-
tial wedge into the German lines, with able things in war.” He noted that
the 30th Infantry outflanking Colmar O’Daniel, “sound, sober . . . but just
city on the east; the 254th advancing as determined as ever to carry on,”
out of Jebsheim toward the Rhone- took full responsibility for the tactical
Rhine Canal and the Rhine River; and mistakes made there.13
the 7th and 15th regiments, supported At the time, SHAEF had already
by French armor, facing south and promised Devers two more American
southeast toward Neuf-Brisach. Here infantry divisions, the 35th for Patch
the advance halted. The 3d Division and the 75th for de Lattre; further-
was exhausted at least temporarily and, more, Devers was now ready to

12At the time, Lieutenant Murphy commanded 13Above quotes from Devers Diary, 24 and 27
Company B, 15th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division. Jan 45.
548 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

commit Milburn’s XXI Corps and H in Holland. The German armies on


Allen’s 12th Armored Division to the the Western Front were thus once
Colmar struggle. Basically Devers again united under von Rundstedt’s
wanted the XXI Corps to control the OB West.
three American infantry divisions, the In preparation for the command
3d, 28th, and 75th, for a final drive change, Army Group G had already re-
on Neuf-Brisach, with the 12th Ar- viewed the situation of the Nineteenth
mored in reserve. De Lattre agreed Army in the Colmar Pocket and, as
and also assigned the French 5th Ar- early as the 25th, had concluded that
mored Division entirely to Milburn, the enclave was no longer important
leaving Leclerc’s 2d Armored Division to the German defensive effort in the
with de Monsabert. General Milburn, west. The current Allied attacks were
who had been alerted to the mission threatening to isolate and destroy the
well before the start of the offensive, German divisions in the Erstein sa-
intended to continue using O’Daniel’s lient, and their evacuation seemed the
3d to spearhead the attack, but now first order of business. In sum, the
reinforced it with most of the 5th Ar- staff recommended that either the
mored Division in order to beef up entire pocket should be abandoned
the tired American regiments. Cota’s or, at the very least, the northern ex-
28th Division, assisted by Maj. Gen. tension at Erstein should be evacuat-
Ray E. Porter’s 75th, another worn- ed and the forces used to strengthen
out veteran of the Ardennes, would the northern shoulder. On the night
continue to fill in the southern flanks of 28–29 January Hitler finally agreed
of the advance, while de Monsabert’s to the partial withdrawal in the north,
II Corps forces secured the northern but insisted that the pocket be de-
flank. The 12th Armored Division, fended as long as possible. v o n
still recovering from its ordeal at Rundstedt was of the same opinion,
Herrlisheim, would temporarily re- mistakenly believing that a renewed
main in reserve north of Colmar. Allied offensive against the Saar basin
With these forces plus additional allo- was imminent and that a continued
cations of artillery ammunition from diversion of Allied resources against
the 6th Army Group, de Lattre Colmar would significantly delay the
planned to renew the dual offensive start of this endeavor.
on 1 February. German intelligence in the Colmar
Significant changes had also oc- area was faulty. The German com-
curred on the opposing side. On 29 manders generally remained ignorant
January General Paul Hauser, a of American reinforcements until the
combat-experienced SS officer, as- troops actually appeared on the bat-
sumed command of Army Group G, in- tlefield, and they continued to believe
cluding all forces formerly assigned to that the primary Franco-American ob-
Army Group Oberrhein. At the same time jective in the north was a drive direct-
Hitler dissolved Army Group Oberrhein, ly east from Selestat to Marckolsheim,
assigned Himmler a command on which would reach out to the Rhine
the Eastern Front, and appointed River and both isolate the forces in
Blaskowitz commander of Army Group the Erstein salient and secure a
THE COLMAR POCKET 549

springboard for a later offensive the Erstein salient), and another from
against the Neuf-Brisach bridge. At the 2d Mountain Division. Not surpris-
no time did they appear to discern de ingly, the counterattacks were uncoor-
Lattre’s intention of attempting a dinated and ineffective. Elsewhere
double envelopment from north and similar situations were common, and
south; instead they judged that de the German commanders remained
Lattre’s forces in the west and south unable to discern the main axis of de
would simply try to exert pressure on Lattre’s offensive or even to predict
all sides of the pocket until something the next objective of O’Daniel’s side-
gave way. stepping division.
Inside the pocket the defensive sit- Only on 30 January, with the entire
uation of the Nineteenth A m y was also 3d Division pouring over the Colmar
becoming muddled. To assist in the Canal, did Rasp, Hauser, and von
defense of both Cernay and Ensi- Rundstedt begin to perceive that the
sheim in the south and Marckolsheim Allied drive was headed directly for the
in the north, Rasp had authorized his bridge at Neuf-Brisach and not Marck-
corps commanders, Thumm and olsheim; at the same time they conclud-
Abraham, to begin withdrawing sever- ed-again mistakenly–that the objec-
al battle groups from the Vosges. As tive of the French drive in the south
a result, units from the 16th Volksgren- was the Neuenburg bridge at Cha-
adier and the 189th and 338th Infantry lampe. Yet almost all of their “re-
Divisions had become hopelessly serves”-forces from the Erstein sa-
mixed with those of the other divi- lient and those from the Vosges–had
sions in a helter-skelter fashion; these been committed elsewhere, and they
mixtures were then further infused had no means of stopping a renewed
with a miscellany of service and sup- Allied drive or reinforcing those units
port forces turned into infantry as that appeared to lie in its path. As a
well as with units of the 2d Mountain result, on the night of the 30th, A m y
Division, which had begun arriving in Group G sent new orders to Rasp, speci-
the pocket sometime after the 20th fying that his main mission was to
and were being fed piecemeal into the “assure the survival” of the German
battle. For the American and French pocket across the Rhine for as long as
commanders, the German tactical sit- possible and authorizing him to with-
uation was often equally confusing, draw most of his forces from the
with many of the 3d Division’s regi- Vosges front, leaving only reconnais-
ments identifying elements of four or sance detachments to hold the moun-
five different German divisions on tain passes. The Nineteenth Army was
their front. The net result was the henceforth to concentrate all of its
fragmentation of the entire German combat power on the northern and
defensive effort. On the 29th, for ex- southern shoulders of the bridgehead.
ample, Thumm had tried to counter Rasp, in turn, ordered the immediate
the surprise American assault south evacuation of all forces in the Vosges
over the Colmar Canal with a few bat- that had no organic transportation as
talions of the 189th Division, one from well as the transfer of all heavy equip-
the 198th (currently deploying from ment and support installations to and
550 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

RAILWAY BRIDGEAT NEUF-BRISACH FINALLY


DESTROYED

across the Rhine, while sending what positions had too many gaps that
reinforcement he could from the west were easily exploited; and they con-
to protect his two major bridge sites. tinued to be unable to move adequate
How much time he had to shuffle his reinforcements to threatened areas.
units around was a question mark, es- The U.S. 75th Infantry Division had
pecially since OKW had so far refused begun moving into the First French
to authorize the withdrawal of any of Army area on 27 January and by the
his forces across the Rhine. evening of the 31st started to relieve
O’Daniel’s 3d Division regiments
The February Offensive south of the Colmar Canal for the
final push. Again O’Daniel attacked
The second Franco-American surge east and then south, first slipping the
against the Colmar Pocket proved 30th Infantry behind the others and
successful. Although the Germans still moving it east to the Rhone-Rhine
tried to jam the Allied advance at key Canal for a drive south with units of
road and water junctions, especially the French 5th Armored Division.
those on their own lines of communi- Next, with the arrival of Porter’s 75th
cation, the Allied penetration of their Division on the battlefield, he trans-
initial strongpoint defense system was ferred both the 7th and 15th Infantry
too deep; their secondary and tertiary to the far side of the Rhone-Rhine
THE COLMAR POCKET 55 1

Canal, turning them south as well. fenses crumbling elsewhere, raced to


The 254th Infantry brought up the Rouffach from the south. The drives
rear. By 3 February elements of all split the Colmar Pocket wide open.
three 3d Division regiments were ap- Between 5 and 9 February, as the
proaching Neuf-Brisach, and the Ger- supporting American divisions rede-
mans began a last-ditch defense of ployed northward, French forces fin-
the bridgehead with all available man- ished cleaning out the pocket. In the
power.14 On the 5th, with the old for- north de Monsabert’s forces swept
tress town nearly surrounded, the the west side of the Rhine from Er-
Germans started to evacuate the area, stein to Marckolsheim, while in the
and by noon of the following day, 6 west units of the new French 10th In-
February, the entire sector was under fantry Division and the 4th Moroccan
Allied control. Mountain Division policed up the in-
Inside the pocket the German de- terior of the pocket. T o the south,
fenses around the city of Colmar had Bethouart directed his main effort
already collapsed. While the 3d Divi- against the last German bridgehead at
sion attacked toward Neuf-Brisach, Chalampe, using the 1st Armored and
first the attached 254th regiment and the 2d Moroccan and 9th Colonial Di-
then the regiments of the 28th Divi- visions. Here German resistance re-
sion steadily pushed against the mained fierce for a few days, but the
northern approaches to Colmar in the French managed to penetrate across
Kaysersberg valley. By 2 February the Ill River on 5 February, secure
Cota’s units had cleared the city’s Ensisheim on the 6th, and reach the
suburbs against diminishing resist- Rhone-Rhine Canal by the 7th. There
ance, allowing units of the French 5th they were joined by Leclerc’s armor
Armored Division to drive into the on the 8th; the next morning, ele-
heart of Colmar nearly unopposed. ments of the 9th Colonial reached the
Immediately de Lattre agreed to Rhine at Chalampe, forcing the Ger-
commit the U.S. 12th Armored Divi- mans to destroy the remaining bridge
sion through the 28th Division for a at 0800. This final act marked the end
drive south; two days later American of the Colmar Pocket and the German
armored task forces, moving south presence in upper Alsace as well.
along two parallel axes, met French I
Corps elements at Rouffach during Tactics and Techniques
the early morning hours of 5 Febru-
ary. By that date the bulk of Beth- For the troops on the ground, the
ouart’s southern forces had finally by- fighting rivaled the harshness of the
passed German emplacements around earlier advance through the Vosges.
Ensisheim and, finding enemy de- Here the French were at a disadvan-
tage: the ranks of their specialized
14For heroic action on 3 February while serving colonial troops were stretched precar-
as a forward observer around Biesheim, about two iously thin, and many Caucasian in-
miles north of Neuf-Brisach, T5g. Forrest E. Peden, fantry replacements had little more
Battery C, 10th Field Artillery Battalion, 3d Infantry
Division, was posthumously awarded the Congres-
than a few months of military training
sional Medal of Honor. at best. They were good enough for
552 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

NEUF-BRISACH
(OLDFORTRESSTOWN)

static defensive operations, but less tank teams, seemed to rise to the oc-
able to perform the tactically more casion as they approached each of the
complicated mission of attacking. fortified Alsatian towns on their route
Only the stubbornness of their own of advance. 15
officers and the assistance of the By this time, experienced units like
Americans finally gave them the edge. the 3d Division had almost uncon-
In this area, the U.S. 3d Infantry Divi- sciously perfected their combined
sion showed everyone why it was con- arms teamwork to a fine art, enabling
sidered one of the finest units in the them to overcome the physical fatigue
American Army. Shrugging off the that most of the soldiers, officers and
Maison Rouge bridge incident, the di- enlisted men alike, must have felt. In
vision’s stellar performance was clear- the Colmar campaign, the American
ly vital to the First French Army’s armor-supported infantry units sent
overall success. Although it was an out small patrols to scout each town
“old” division that theoretically had
been “fought out”-exhausted-by 15Information in this section on the 3d Division is
the end of its Italian campaigning, its based primarily on Seventh Army Historical Office,
Interv Rpt, “The Colmar Pocket, 7th Regiment, 3d
small units, especially the infantry- Division, 22 Jan-8 Feb 45,” MHI.
THE COLMAR POCKET 553

INFANTRY
FRENCH INTOCOLMAR
ADVANCES

briefly, while the main attacking lars where the defenders usually con-
forces prepared to assault the area. If gregated and greeting survivors with
the town was defended, the infantry the traditional “Hindy Ho” (Hande
moved forward covered by the direct Hoch, or literally “hands up”). Mean-
fire of supporting tanks and tank de- while, American artillery shells des-
stroyers; stronger resistance merited tined for “Krautland” streamed over-
additional support from mortars and head, striking the opposite side of the
artillery and perhaps even tactical air town or interdicting the roads beyond
strikes if available. Once foot soldiers that might carry German reinforce-
reached the outskirts of town, a few ments, or perhaps only “softening
tanks might move up to support up” the unit’s next objective down
deeper penetrations, but the rest the line.
stayed clear of the built-up areas, cov- T h e American troops were brave,
ering the flanks of the attacking force but not foolhardy. As elsewhere, the
and maybe shifting their position to 3d Division combat soldiers had an
one side of the town or the other in abiding fear of the German flat-trajec-
order to prevent reinforcements from tory, high-velocity cannons-the so-
arriving. Inside, infantrymen searched called 88s (although most were 75-
each house deliberately from top to mm. pieces)-as well as German
bottom, tossing grenades in the cel- mortar fire (for its accuracy) and the
554 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

buzz-saw-like German machine guns fected by the weather, limited to the


(with a higher rate of fire than the daytime, and dependent on good air-
American equivalents). 16 In the eyes ground communications-something
of the average soldier, however, the still lacking at the tactical unit level.
German tanks presented the most se- As a result, small-unit commanders in
rious problem. Because of the better the 3d Division and other Allied in-
armor protection of the heavier fantry elements often could do little
German vehicles, tanks and assault more than direct artillery and mortar
guns alike (foot troops tended to fire on German armored units, at
identify all as Tigers), the bazookas least keeping the German machines
and 57-mm. antitank guns organic to on the move and separating them
the infantry battalions and regiments from supporting infantry. Even ba-
were relatively ineffective, as were the zooka fire could force the largest
37-mm. cannons of the cavalry units; German tanks to keep their distance;
even the 75-mm. and 76-mm. (3-inch) although direct hits from any of the
guns of the tanks and tank destroyers available American weapons might
had to close to within 300 yards or not destroy such machines, they often
less to do any damage to the frontal caused damage to treads, periscopes,
armor of the German machines.17 radios, and other ancillary equipment,
Contemporary American military doc- or at least shook up the German
trine regarded the tank primarily as crews enough to make them leave.
an anti-infantry rather than an anti- For the half-blinded German panzer
tank weapon and, in the infantry-tank troops, friendly infantry support was
team, expected supporting tanks to as vital to them as it was to the Amer-
engage enemy automatic weapons, ican tankers, for at close range even
while infantry dealt with opposing the smallest antitank weapons could
antitank gun crews, and artillery and immobilize the heaviest tank of the
tank destroyers handled enemy battlefield.
armor. In practice, however, even the Fighting below the Colmar Canal
self-propelled, turreted American tank on 30 January, for example, one 7th
destroyers found it difficult to close regiment private managed to KO
within effective firing range of (“knock out”) an advancing armored
German armor, while American artil- panzerjaeger by arcing his bazooka
lery often had only a limited effect on rocket high in the air, about 200
such moving targets. Fighter-bombers yards out, somehow hitting the vehi-
were one answer, but they were af- cle on top and destroying it, a rather
extraordinary feat-or tale. Later the
16For discussion, see Samuel A.3 et al., same day, another 7th Infantry bazoo-
The American Soldier: Combat and its Aftermath, II (N.Y.: kaman inflicted similar damage on a
Wiley, 1949), 231–41 (1965 edition) (studies based
on data collected by the Research Branch, Informa- Mark IV medium, firing at it point-
tion and Education Division, War Department, blank from a window as it passed
during World War II). through a town the unit was attempt-
17See Christopher R. Gabel, Seek, Strike, and De- ing to secure. However, in this case a
stroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War
II, Leavenworth Paper 12 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: second German tank, obviously wiser,
Combat Studies Institute, 1985), pp. 52–54. elected to withdraw about 1,000 yards
THE COLMAR POCKET 555

to the side of the town, content to higher-velocity guns and more armor,
pump high-explosive shells and ma- and with their newer TDs (tank de-
chine-gun fire into the American posi- stroyers) in direct support, equipped
tions despite their best efforts to with the very effective 90-mm. anti-
chase it away with rocket and artillery tank cannons. Experience had taught
fire. Fortunately for the 3d Division, them to leave wider gaps between ve-
the Nineteenth Army had few such ma- hicles and to stagger the gaps as well,
chines, partly because of the difficulty allowing individual drivers to vary
in fielding them. As the Americans al- their speeds, thus preventing German
ready knew, the terrain of southern antitank gunners from “leading” their
Alsace was not conducive to the em- target effectively. Placing artillery and
ployment of large armored forma- even direct fire on possible enemy
tions. antitank sites also cut down on losses,
For the 12th Armored Division, one as did switching the point, or lead,
of the least-experienced units in the position between the most experi-
American Army, which was still recov- enced crews. In this way the 12th Ar-
ering from its initiation at Herrli- mored leapfrogged from town to
sheim, the push from Colmar to town-one task force passing through
Rouffach marked its transition to a an area secured by the other-until
veteran unit. 18 Here the division’s the junction was made with southern
mobile tank-infantry task forces had French forces, suffering relatively few
greater success, duplicating the com- casualties in the process. The experi-
bined arms tactics used by the 3d Di- ences here would soon be put to
vision units to the north. Dismounted good use in the final campaign to
infantry cleared the outskirts of each come.
town before tanks and tank destroyers
moved forward, with the tanks taking In Retrospect
enemy automatic weapon positions
under fire and the infantry probing The struggle for the Colmar Pocket
for antitank mines and gun positions. had few immediate implications for
Inside the town, infantry skirmish either Allied or German operations
lines preceded each tank by twenty- elsewhere. The formation of the
five yards or more, attempting to pocket itself was almost an accident, a
secure all of the entrances to the product of two factors: Eisenhower’s
town first (to prevent the arrival of eagerness to have Patch’s Seventh
reinforcements) before completely Army turn north, and Hitler’s deter-
clearing the town itself. On the road, mination to hold on to at least a por-
armored commanders led off with tion of southern Alsace at all costs.
their latest model Shermans, with T h e resulting inability of the 6th
Army Group to eliminate the pocket
18Information on the 12th Armored Division is in December was perhaps inevitable.
based on Seventh Army Historical Office, Interv De Lattre’s First French Army was
Rpts, “Colmar Pocket Cut Off by the 66th Armored clearly superior to the German Nine-
Infantry Battalion and the 43d Tank Battalion of the
12th Armored Division during the Period 4–7 Feb-
teenth in terms of materiel and sup-
ruary 1945,” MHI. plies but, when all was said and done,
556 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

probably greatly inferior in terms of forts of the Seventh Army had been
trained manpower. The French lacked “poorly handled,’’ and that Eisenhow-
the command and control and the lo- er was probably trying to do too
gistical apparatus to conduct a sus- many things at once with the limited
tained offensive in the face of deter- resources available.20Devers, aware of
mined opposition, and even their the opinions of the 12th Army Group
combat leadership lacked the depth to commander, noted only that his own
sustain heavy losses on the battlefield forces had repeatedly supported the
within the ranks of junior officers and northern army groups when they
NCOs. Furthermore, the terrain and were in trouble and that it was unfair
weather repeatedly dulled the cutting to begrudge the 6th a few divisions
edge of their combat formations, when they were desperately needed. 21
making a repeat of the quick penetra- T h e cost of the Colmar battle was
tion that they had achieved south of heavy on both sides. The 6th Army
Belfort (and at Saverne) in November Group staff estimated American casu-
extremely unlikely on the southern alties around 8,000 and French losses
Alsatian plains. Perhaps it would have about twice that number, but only
been better to leave a defensive hold- some 500 American soldiers were
ing force around Colmar in Novem- killed in action; in both national com-
ber and turn the bulk of the First ponents, disease and noncombat inju-
French Army north along with Patch’s ries accounted for almost a third of
Seventh. the losses and probably even more. 22
Eisenhower continued to hold The deep snow, freezing tempera-
Devers responsible for the Colmar tures, and numerous water crossings
Pocket, describing it during a visit to caused a marked increase in trench
the 6th Army Group headquarters on foot and frostbite, and the mixed
27 January as the only “sore” on his Franco-American casualty evacuation
entire front and emphasizing the need flow prevented medical services from
to eliminate the enclave as soon as keeping a precise tally of the toll
possible.19 The Supreme Commander taken by the weather. German casual-
was now more than willing to send as- ty records are even more sparse than
sistance to both Patch and de Lattre, usual. During the operation, the 6th
ultimately providing five American Army Group recorded 16,438 Ger-
combat divisions (the 24th, 35th, and mans taken prisoner in the Colmar
75th Infantry, 10th Armored, and area and obviously thousands more
101st Airborne) and 12,000 service were killed or wounded, while non-
troops to Devers by the end of the battlefield casualties from the weather
month. As might be expected, Gener- may also have been high. On 10 Feb-
al Bradley, commanding the 12th
Army Group, was upset by the trans- 20HQ, 12th Army Cp, Bradley MFR, 23 Jan 45,
fer of combat forces south, feeling Bradley Papers, MHI.
that Devers was “using up” all of his 21Devers Diary, 16 Jan 45.
rested divisions, that the defensive ef- 22For example, between 22 January and 6 Febru-
ary 1945, the 3d Division’s 7th Infantry recorded
134 dead, 584 wounded, and 249 nonbattle casual-
19Devers Diary, 27 Jan 45. ties.
THE COLMAR POCKET 557

ruary the Nineteenth Army recorded pocket with every man at his disposal.
over 22,000 permanent (killed or Renewed Allied attacks on the 1st
missing) casualties, and Rasp prob- only increased the confusion in the
ably saved no more than 10,000 German high command, as the ap-
troops of all types.23 Certainly no pearances of first the U.S. 75th Infan-
more than 400 to 500 combat effec- try Division and then the 12th Ar-
tives from each of the eight divisions mored Division were suddenly noted
managed to escape across the Rhine. on the battlefield. On 3 February, as
Allied losses of combat vehicles be- Allied forces were investing Neuf-Bri-
cause of enemy action and mechanical sach and simultaneously driving south
breakdown were also high, but most out of Colmar, Army Group G began
were recoverable, while the German proposing various contingency plans
defenders lost most of what they had for a greatly reduced salient across
permanently. As an effective fighting the Rhine and at least a partial Nine-
force the Nineteenth Army had ceased teenth Army withdrawal to Germany.
to exist. Hauser could not afford to lose all
The high German losses were a these forces, which would be desper-
direct result of the decision by Hitler ately needed north of Alsace where
and von Rundstedt to maintain the the main Allied attack would inevita-
pocket as long as possible. By 1 Feb- bly come. Nevertheless, at 1940 that
ruary, despite standing orders to the evening OKW again informed the
contrary, General Rasp, the Nineteenth German field commanders that the
Army commander, had at least begun pocket was to be maintained at all
to deploy most of his forces out of costs and that the Nineteenth Army was
the Vosges and to move service to defend the shoulders of the pocket
troops and damaged equipment east to the last man. There would be no
of the Rhine in expectation of a with- withdrawal.
drawal order. The order never came. These final instructions from OKW
Hitler’s directions to stand fast in the remained unaltered to the end. By the
pocket arrived at Army Group G head- 5th, neither Rasp nor his corps com-
quarters at 1719 that night and were manders could influence the battle or
immediately passed on by telephone organize an orderly withdrawal. On
to the Nineteenth Army. Von Rundstedt the night of 5–6 February, OB West
fully supported the decision and, approved the Nineteenth Army’s plan
while approving a limited withdrawal for a final stand in the southeast
from the Vosges, personally informed corner of the pocket along the
Rasp that he was to defend the north- Rhone-Rhine Canal, but instructed it
ern and southern shoulders of the to delay any evacuation until the last
possible minute. Nevertheless, be-
23Bauer, “The German Withdrawal from the
tween 6 and 9 February, Rasp took
Colmar Pocket,” p. 110, notes that Army Group G put responsibility for starting to evacuate
Nineteenth Army losses between 20 January and 5 at least some of his equipment over
February at only 800 dead, 2,596 wounded, and the Rhine, either by ferry or over the
3,129 missing, but also points out, as an example,
that a postwar report placed casualties in the 2d Neuenburg bridge, while the bulk of
Mountain Division alone at approximately 7,500. what combat forces remained at-
558 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

tempted to fall back on Chalampe.24 German river border. Outposting the


On the night of 7–8 February the river with FFI units and a few regular
German high command again insisted formations, the French units finally
that the bridgehead be held without had a chance to rest, recovering and
thought of retreat; OKW had inter- repairing equipment that had begun
preted the redeployment of American to wear thin and absorbing new re-
forces from the battlefield after the cruits into their units in much the
fall of Neuf-Brisach as the end of the same way as the Germans had been
Allied offensive there. At that point, doing.
however, the Nineteenth Army had no In the north, Patch’s Seventh Army
control over the conduct of the battle, made several limited attacks to im-
and what remained of the Colmar prove its posture for future offensive
Pocket was no more than an enclave operations. While the bulk of the VI
seven miles wide and two miles deep. Corps remained in place on the east-
Hitler’s permission to withdraw finally west Moder River line, the U.S. 36th
arrived at Army Group G headquarters Infantry Division on Brooks’ right, or
at 1445 on the 8th and was transmit- eastern, wing pushed into the Gamb-
ted to the Nineteenth A m y by tele- sheim bridgehead area on 31 January
phone shortly thereafter. But by that to close up the slight indentation in
time the order served no purpose. the corps’ front line, finally retaking
The Nineteenth Army had been sacri- Rohnviller, Herrlisheim, Offendorf,
ficed for no appreciable gain. and Gambsheim itself. Although as-
sisted by CCB of the 14th Armored
Toward the Final Offensive Division, flood conditions continued
to limit the use of armor, and a short-
The battles of northern Alsace and age of munitions throughout the army
those in the Colmar Pocket had seri- group greatly reduced artillery sup-
ously depleted the fighting capabili- port, thus turning what had been
ties of the German Army. During the planned as a rapid, concentrated
last weeks of February and the first drive against weak units of the XIV SS
weeks of March, the 6th Army Group Corps into a series of small, hard-
made final preparations to exploit this fought infantry engagements that only
weakness during its forthcoming drive ended on 11 February.25
into Germany. In the First French To the north, the XV Corps also
Army zone, de Lattre’s forces swept conducted a number of limited offen-
the entire Colmar area, from the sives in the Sarre valley region with
Vosges to the Rhine, and moved up the U.S. 70th, 63d, and 44th Infantry
to the more easily defensible Franco-
25For their actions at Oberhoffen, two soldiers of
24German records indicate that by 7 February the 142d regiment of the 36th Infantry Division
6,997 motor vehicles, 37,000 horse-drawn vehicles, were awarded Congressional Medals of Honor: Sgt.
and 488 artillery pieces and antitank guns had been Emile Deleau, Jr., of Company A,. posthumously, for
brought back across the Rhine; but the figures are heroism during the division’s initial assault on the
suspect, and the implication that this equipment was town on the night of 1–2 February 1945; and Sgt.
evacuated only after 5 February as part of a planned Edward C. Dahlgren, for bravery during the final
withdrawal effort is incorrect. German counterattack on 1 1 February 1945.
THE COLMAR POCKET 559

Divisions, seizing the heights above and loading, minimize the lateral
Saarbrucken as well as key terrain be- movement of large units, and, when-
tween Saarbrucken and Bitche. ever possible, rely more heavily on
German forces opposite Haislip’s the French rail system. As the Riviera-
units offered only minimal resistance based armies grew ever larger and
when engaged, briefly defending a plunged ever deeper into the Europe-
few prepared strongpoints, such as an heartland, logistics remained criti-
the old Schlossberg fortress in the cal. The Franco-American forces
70th Division’s zone of attack and the under Devers, Patch, and de Lattre
Bliesbrucken and Bellevue farm com- had come a long way since the rela-
plexes in the zones of the 63d and tively simple landings in the sunny
44th. However, on both the Sarre south and the heady drive up the
valley and Gambsheim fronts, mines Rhone River valley.
and booby traps took a high toll of Properly fueled and supplied, the
American soldiers, as did the cold, 6th Army Group was now a powerful
wet weather. fighting force and one that was still
For most of the 6th Army Group, growing steadily in size and combat
the last days of winter were spent re- power. By the end of February all
organizing and retraining, stocking major American participants in the
supplies and equipment, improving Colmar struggle had returned north,
local defensive positions, and plan- including the XXI Corps, the three
ning for future operations across the infantry divisions, and the 12th Ar-
German border. Unit commanders mored Division. In the ensuing reor-
conducted formal training programs ganization, the Seventh Army re-
for new recruits in basic weaponry, turned the 10th Armored Division to
map reading and use of the compass, the U.S. Third Army, the 101st Air-
and squad- and platoon-level tactics borne Division to the SHAEF reserve,
and worked new soldiers into their and eventually the 28th, 35th, and
seasoned units; even veterans in rear 75th Divisions to the 12th Army
areas performed range firing to re- Group. For the moment at least, de
sight weapons, while those on the Lattre retained control of the French
front lines conducted periodic raids 2d Armored Division, while Patch
into German territory. The logistical kept the 3d Algerian, and also re-
buildup was critical. Food and, with ceived a new unit, the 6th Armored
the reduction in mobile operations, Division, to replace Leclerc’s force. In
fuel supplies were adequate, but the early March, after further shuffling
general shortage in munitions forced and resting of these tired units, the
Devers to drastically curtail almost all Seventh Army had three corps with
expenditures of large-caliber weapons eight infantry divisions and one ar-
and urgently request supplemental mored division on line as well as
supplies from SHAEF. At the same three infantry divisions and two ar-
time, to avoid a complete deteriora- mored divisions in reserve.26South of
tion of the local French road network,
the 6th Army Group had to place se- 26From roughly north to south, the XXI Corps
vere restrictions on vehicle speeds with the 70th and 63d Infantry Divisions; the XV
560 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

Strasbourg the First French Army French-in the field. T h e 6th Army
could put two corps with three ar- Group, now stronger than ever, was
mored and four infantry divisions-all ready for the final offensive in West-
ern Europe. 27
Corps with the 44th, 100th, and 79th Infantry Divi-
sions; and the VI Corps with the 42d and 103d In-
fantry Divisions, the 14th Armored Division, and the 27For the final operations of the Allied 6th, 12th,
French 3d Algerian Division. In reserve were the 3d, and 21st Army Groups from March to May 1945,
36th, and 45th Infantry Divisions–Truscott’s “old see Charles B. MacDonald, The Last Offensive, United
divisions”-and the 6th and 12th Armored. States Army in World War II (Washington, 1973).
CHAPTER XXX

Riviera to the Rhine: An Evaluation


The operations of the Seventh lengthy struggle is doubtful, and with-
Army and the 6th Army Group consti- out such a force Bradley’s 12th Army
tuted one of the most successful Group would have had great difficulty
series of campaigns during World holding the additional frontage from
War II. Although opposed by many the Luneville-Saverne area to the
Allied political and military leaders Swiss border. With the added
from its inception and largely ignored strength of German units retreating
by historians of the war, the campaign unscathed from the Atlantic and Med-
in southern France, including the iterranean, the German counterattack
ANVILlandings, the seizure of Toulon against the Third Army’s exposed
and Marseille, and the battles for the southern flank in September 1944
lower Rhone valley, set the stage for might have been far more effective,
the more significant ventures to the drastically retarding the initial Allied
north. The subsequent pursuit north drive to the German border in the
up the Rhone and Saone valleys, the north. More important, Allied
drive northeast of Lyon to the Belfort strength in northeastern France
Gap, the difficult Vosges campaign would have been much diluted with-
that followed, and the ultimate con- out the forces of the 6th Army
quest of Alsace were critical to Allied Group, and the Ardennes counterof-
military fortunes on the Western fensive-or something similar-might
Front. Perhaps the greatest contribu- have had a better chance of success
tion of the southern invasion was or, at the very least, done more
placing a third Allied army group- damage. In such a case the starting
one with two army headquarters, date for the final invasion of Germany
three corps, and the equivalent of ten might have been greatly delayed with
combat divisions—with its own inde- unforeseen consequences.
pendent supply lines, in northeastern
France at a time when the two north- The Campaigns
ern Allied army groups were
stretched to the limit in almost every The significance of the ANVILland-
way. Whether a third army group ings themselves is difficult to evalu-
could have been supported by the At- ate. An earlier invasion date would
lantic ports without an exceedingly undoubtedly have meant much stiffer
562 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

opposition, but could also have di- tage of German weaknesses in the
verted German reinforcements from south. Had more fuel and vehicles
the OVERLORD invasion area in Nor- been available, Truscott would have
mandy and possibly resulted in an been able to bring more pressure to
earlier Allied breakout there from the bear on Montelimar and other loca-
beachhead. Allowing the ANVILforces tions along the German route of with-
to remain on the Italian front, howev- drawal and could have done more
er, would have given no immediate damage. In the same vein, the de-
assistance to OVERLORDand only mands of security and invasion time-
eased additional German deployments tables made it difficult for the ANVIL
to Normandy. In Italy Allied success commanders to make full use of the
in the rugged Italian peninsula north strong FFI organization in southern
of Rome would have, at best, forced France. Had more coordination be-
the German defenders back into even tween the two components been pos-
more defensible terrain along the sible, Allied combat power during the
Alps, while lengthening Allied supply Riviera-Rhone campaign would have
lines and dispersing Allied ground been significantly increased.
combat strength. But even a success- In balance, Blaskowitz and Wiese
ful march across the Po and over the were fortunate to escape from the
Alps to the borders of Austria and south with any forces at all. In this re-
Hungary would have profited the spect the German tactical command-
Allied cause little if the campaign in ers deserve no more than an average
northern France had been indefinitely grade for their performance during
stalled. Moreover, without the south- the early campaign. It was not the
ern invasion the Germans might have weakness of their forces, but their in-
retained strong forces in southern ability to best use what they had that
France. The Allied breakout at St. Lo made the ANVILlandings such a suc-
never isolated the German forces in cess and made the German withdraw-
the south, and certainly they would al north such a harrowing one. From
have been able to survive more easily beginning to end, the southern
than the smaller German forces in the France campaign and the operations
Channel and Atlantic ports. In such a that immediately followed were char-
scenario the bulk of the Nineteenth acterized by the aggressiveness of the
Army might well have been transferred American and French commanders
to Italy, more than matching the and their ruthless pursuit across the
strengthening of Allied forces there if coast and hinterlands of southern
ANVIL had been permanently can- France and then north up the Rhone
celed. valley. If the aggressive personality of
Although the landings themselves Lucian Truscott, the American VI
were eminently successful, Allied lo- Corps commander, seemed to domi-
gistical limitations, specifically the nate the drive north, certainly he was
shortage of amphibious shipping, well matched by the enthusiastic, dy-
made the ANVILcampaign plan some- namic Devers, the competent but
what inflexible and prevented Patch more taciturn Patch, and the fiery de
and Truscott from taking full advan- Lattre, all of whom pushed with equal
AN EVALUATION 563

determination for early seizure of the was, in effect, grabbing what territory
great French ports, without which the he could before his inevitable supply
northern campaign could not have problems made further advances im-
been supported. The German leaders, possible.
in contrast, appeared to be confused Two months later, however, the sit-
and indecisive. Rarely did they try to uation had changed dramatically, and
take the initiative, even at the local Eisenhower’s November decision not
level. There was no organized de- to exploit in some way the Belfort
fense of the critical ports, and and Saverne penetrations to the
German forces in Italy did not even Rhine is difficult to understand. Al-
attempt to pose a threat to the vul- though long gone, Truscott would
nerable Allied eastern flank. Only the have been the first to remonstrate the
Allied shortage of fuel and vehicles call. At the time, the Seventh Army
saved Wiese’s forces from a worse might have moved south in strength
disaster. The later stubborn German to help the First French Army clear
resistance in the Vosges by forces that the Alsatian plains around Colmar.
were less well trained and equipped Or it could have moved north; ad-
only underlined the poor initial per- vancing up either the west or east
formance of the Nineteenth Army in the banks of the Rhine through Rastatt,
Riviera campaign. Lauterbourg, and beyond, thereby
Despite Truscott’s judgments re- unhinging the German Saar basin de-
garding the state of the German Nine- fenses and achieving significant oper-
teenth Army in mid-September and the ational (destruction of the German
VI Corps’ ability to force the Belfort First Amy) and strategic (the Saar in-
Gap, the Seventh Army would have had dustries) goals. Instead, both Eisen-
extreme difficulty in achieving more hower and Bradley sought to have
than a local tactical success in this area. Devers’ American forces go directly
Given the army’s precarious logistical to the aid of Patton’s stalled Third
situation and the ever-growing dis- Army, taking over portions of the
tance between the southern ports and Third Army’s front and transferring
the front lines, both Patch and Trus- two divisions from the Seventh to the
cott probably would have been unable Third Army. Yet, at the time, Patch’s
to exploit an early penetration of the Seventh Army had no more than two
Belfort Gap, despite the more favor- armored divisions (one French divi-
able weather conditions that prevailed. sion and one completely inexperi-
The subsequent campaign showed how enced American unit) and seven in-
easily the Vosges-Rhine area could be fantry divisions, four of which were
held by relatively weak infantry forces, nearly exhausted. Giving up any of
which were often hard to dislodge these forces would have made it even
without a major attack. Devers warned more difficult for Patch to push north
Patch at the time that the VI Corps was on both sides of the Vosges (in direct
“living with just one day’s supplies support of the Third Army) and si-
ahead of the game,” 1 and Truscott multaneously hold Strasbourg in the
center and assist the French in the
1 Devers Diary, 16 Sep 44. south. Devers later blamed himself
564 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

for overestimating the ability of de they clearly outnumbered their Allied


Lattre’s forces to clear the Colmar opponents who were also defending
area, but it is doubtful that he could less favorable terrain than the Ameri-
have given the French any more as- cans in the north. During the cam-
sistance without ignoring Eisenhow- paign, the American soldiers fought
er’s instructions to support Patton in well, but it was good intelligence
the north. Eisenhower’s later criticism analysis and effective defensive de-
of Dever’s inability to eliminate the ployments that gave the Seventh
Colmar Pocket thus appears both Army troops, including nine new in-
unfair and unjustified. 2 In any case, fantry regiments that were rushed to
the Germans surely wasted as much the front with no combat experience,
manpower holding the awkward a distinct edge over the American de-
wedge of terrain-primarily for politi- fenders in the Ardennes. Patch,
cal reasons-as the Allies did sur- Brooks, and Haislip, making good use
rounding it, and in the process Army of their interior lines of communica-
Group G was never able to use the tion, were able to checkmate almost
better defensive terrain along the every German initiative and, when the
upper Rhine River and in the Black pressure became too great, conduct a
Forest, or to put much of an effort rapid, orderly withdrawal that the
into its final West Wall defenses. Germans were unable to exploit.
More to the point, a Seventh Army Nevertheless, the German offensive
crossing of the Rhine at Rastatt or its was a close call. Had the attackers
penetration of the German West Wall been able to articulate their units with
immediately west of the Rhine would the speed and, most important, with
have made the German defensive the unity of purpose that character-
buildup in the Colmar region ex- ized the movements of their oppo-
tremely unlikely and, at best, a waste nents, the results might have been far
of the Wehrmacht’s declining manpow- different. The capture of Saverne
er resources. would have threatened the survival of
NORDWIND proved a true test of the VI Corps, greatly strengthened
the 6th Army Group, the Seventh the position of the Germans in the
Army, and the associated American— Colmar Pocket, isolated the First
and French—corps, divisions, and French Army in the south, and
regiments. Although the attacking opened the rear of Patton’s Third
panzer, panzer grenadier, and infan- Army to German armor just when his
try divisions may have been fewer in forces were directing their main effort
number than the German forces sent to the Ardennes in the north. Al-
into the Ardennes counteroffensive, though perhaps neither the Ardennes
and decidedly less well equipped, counteroffensive nor the NORD WIND
attacks ever had the chance of deci-
2 See also Russell Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants sively reversing German fortunes in
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), pp. the west, greater success in either of-
550-51; and F. W. von Mellenthin (former Army fensive would have assuredly delayed
Group G chief of staff), Panzer Battles, trans. H .
Betzler, and ed. L. C. F. Turner (Norman: Universi- the end of the war in Europe.
ty of Oklahoma Press, 1951), p. 334. If the actions of the American gen-
AN EVALUATION 565

erals were critical in halting NORD- riority (as did Allied munitions short-
WIND, credit for the victory in the ages 3), the German commanders,
Vosges must go to the American and again conducting a rather unimagina-
French small-unit commanders and tive defense at the division and corps
their unheralded infantrymen. The levels, were rarely able to use the ter-
campaign in the High Vosges from rain and their interior lines of com-
late September to early December munication to stem the steady Allied
was one of the bitterest contests of advance by force of arms.
the war. There the American army,
corps, and divisional commanders had The Soldier
little room for maneuver, and their
direct influence on the battles was From the sunny beaches of the Rivi-
limited. Waged in wet, cold, and then era to the frozen forests of the Vosges,
frozen mountain jungles where the the campaign gave the average Ameri-
materiel superiority of the Allied can soldier a tour of the European
forces had little impact, the mountain heartland that he would not soon
battles continually tested the skill and forget. As one later exclaimed as he re-
determination of the average soldiers turned home, “I wouldn’t trade the ex-
and their small-unit leaders. Despite perience for a million dollars—but I
the advantages that the terrain con- wouldn’t give a nickel to do it all over
ferred on the German defenders, the again.” 4 Recalling his reactions going
constant fighting steadily sapped the into combat for the first time, one
strength of the Nineteenth Army, forc- former infantryman described his emo-
ing the German high command to tions as “taciturn; diffident; frightened,
throw ever greater numbers of their almost meek; mechanically going for-
precious infantry into the mountain ward,” as his unit moved up to the line,
forests in a losing war of attrition. where, surrounded by “an alien land-
The war in the Vosges ultimately scape,” he contemplated his situation.5
made the relatively rapid penetrations Closer to the front, he recalled, conver-
of the Belfort and Saverne gaps possi- sation languished and tension steadily
ble and reduced the manpower avail- mounted. Rifles, ammunition belts,
able for the battlefields in the north. and hand grenades were mechanically
Nevertheless, for the Allied troops, checked and rechecked; helmets
the Vosges campaign was an uphill clamped down a bit snugger; chin
struggle all the way, with success de- straps tightened. The sudden sound of
pending on a policy of almost con- small-arms fire and artillery electrified
stant pressure. Attacking French and each man, paralyzing him for a few sec-
American infantry, supported by
armor and artillery when feasible,
3 For a comprehensive treatment, see Ruppenthal,
continually exploited small gaps in Logistical Support ofthe Armies, II, 269–73.
the German lines, always pushing the 4Interv, Clarke with Robert Stuart, Seventh Army
defenders back and wearing them veteran, 25 Jun 88.
down bit by bit. Although weather 5The following description is based on a draft
manuscript prepared by Ralph M. Morales regard-
and terrain largely canceled out ing his experiences as a rifleman in the 254th Infan-
Allied air, armor, and firepower supe- try during the Colmar campaign in January 1945.
566 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

AMERICANINFANTRYMEN

onds as he automatically hunched ber “the incessant, unrelenting


closer to the ground. Then, as the unit noise . . . the fellows attacking, our
moved forward to “the objective,” the artillery fire, my rifle jerking with
noise of exploding shells grew deafen- every shot . . . [and] the German
ing, each one causing the earth to fire pouring into us, and how, at any
shake and pieces of dirt, metal, and instant, a bullet might smash into
wood to whine overhead. The tangy me.” His emotions in battle alternat-
smell of burnt powder filled the air and ed between a kind of detachment-“a
the sounds of men screaming and offi- state neither easily achieved nor easily
cers cursing and yelling were quickly defined”-and “a feeling of fear,
lost in the general din. Then suddenly stark, cold fear . . . [that he] fought
the attack was over-the goal reached, to control.”
the objective secured. At that point, he At rest, the foot soldier’s lot was
recalled, “the fear we had felt descend- little better. Far from the amenities of
ed on us like an avalanche, leaving us the rear bases, he explained:
only cold and wet and exhausted.” An infantryman has to fashion means for
Later, attacking at Jebsheim in the his comfort. He has to resort to expedi-
Colmar Pocket, he could only remem- encies to ameliorate some of the harsh-
AN EVALUATION 567

ness of field living for he becomes filthy Trench foot reached epidemic pro-
by tramping for days without washing; his portions in mid-November through-
hair becomes matted, dirty and stiff with out the American front lines and in-
the constant wearing of the metal helmet,
and as he tries to comb it, it falls in tufts, creased sharply during the next four
and his scalp pains to the touch. He picks months whenever units were in pro-
up ticks, fleas, and body lice from sleep- longed action. The problem quickly
ing in hay stacks, on open fields, holes in received command attention in all
the ground, with animals in barns, and in units: dry socks went forward with
demolished, filth-spewed hovels. And he
just might conceive, as we once did, of daily rations; and the availability of
dousing his clothes and body with gaso- shoe-pacs, insulated rubber boots, in-
line in order to rid himself of lice. creased. Trench-foot control officers,
teams, and committees were created
The severe cold weather was another to discuss, formulate, and enforce
constant problem. Feet quickly became preventive measures, and a SHAEF-
wet either with perspiration or from sponsored press campaign was
tramping through the snow or fording launched to encourage them. But the
small streams and brooks. With more only reliable solution was the regular
experience the infantryman learned to rotation of units from the field, and
carry extra socks close to his body, American manpower policies as well
either to dry them or keep them dry as the general combat situation on
while on the move. But feet inevitably the Western Front rarely allowed
became wet and cold in the field, grow- such measures to be taken on a large
ing alternately numb and then sore as scale. In the end, solutions to the
more skin was rubbed raw. Most sol- problem depended primarily on the
diers continued to hobble on, attempt- ingenuity of small-unit leaders and
ing to dry or at least air their feet at the infantryman himself. Yet, even in
every momentary halt; both trench foot a highly disciplined unit such as
and frostbite were gnawing concerns. O’Daniel’s 3d Division, the incidence
Disease took a measured toll of the of cold injuries rose dramatically a
6th Army Group infantrymen, as it few days after each major operation
had in all combat formations during began. The Seventh Army’s rate of
the war. Because of the weather and these injuries was almost always sub-
terrain during the Vosges and Alsa- stantially less than that of the neigh-
tian campaigns, trench foot and frost- boring Third Army throughout the
bite were the primary causes of non- winter, reflecting either greater com-
battle casualties. Both were the result mand attention or the experience ab-
of extensive tissue damage due to sorbed by the VI Corps and its three
prolonged exposure to cold and veteran divisions during the preced-
dampness, conditions that were ing winter in Italy.7
common in the front lines throughout Neuropsychiatric disorders-shock
the long winter. 6 and combat exhaustion-also deplet-

6 Information on cold weather casualties is drawn States Army in World War II (Washington: Office of
from Tom F. Whayne and Michael E. DeBakey, Cold the Surgeon General, 1958), pp. 7–28, 127–210.
Injury, Ground Type, Medical Department, United 7See tables, ibid., pp. 411, 450.
568 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

ed the ranks of the combat infantry- fresh edges of many new American
men, and testimonies of the hollow, combat units—an acceptable trade-off
blank faces of the young soldiers for the experience acquired in learn-
coming out of the line were ing to survive.
common. 8 Again, rotation of units The rapid campaign put a terrific
was the best solution, but could rarely burden on combat commanders at all
be done. Between 15 August and 31 levels. Most had done surprisingly
December 1944, a period of four and well on the battlefield with a new
a half months, the Seventh Army suf- army, and from Montelimar to the
fered over 10,000 psychiatric cases, of Vosges and on to the Alsatian cam-
which about one-third were returned paigns, few were relieved, although
to duty; between 1 January and 31 many, especially in the lower ranks,
March 1945, a three-month period were casualties. At the tactical level,
but with double the number of forces, the indirect attack became the hall-
the army sustained over 3,700 more mark of the American commanders;
cases, of which two-thirds were re- even their opponents noted that the
turned to their units. Contemporary Americans rarely attempted a frontal
analyses of these statistics showed assault, feeling perhaps that in always
that the high rate in 1944 was attrib- striking for their enemy’s flanks or
utable to the larger number of veter- rear they had become predictable. 9
ans in the three “older” divisions; the But despite their superiority in mate-
rate steadily shrank as attrition re- riel and firepower, Seventh Army offi-
duced their number, while the high cers were hesitant to use their infan-
return rate of 1945 was mainly due to try in direct assaults against even
the inability of inexperienced medical hastily prepared defensive positions.
personnel in the newer divisions to Speaking for the career officers,
diagnose such cases properly. Further General Dahlquist noted the intense
studies showed that frequent changes psychological pressure on the regi-
in leadership also resulted in higher mental, divisional, and corps com-
psychiatric casualty rates-a result manders as well as the difficulties of
that could easily be seen in the 36th maintaining control over all their di-
Division’s three regiments—while, not
unexpectedly, the rates for all units 9For German evaluations of American perform-
increased during prolonged combat ance, see, for example, World War II German offi-
operations. How such problems af- cer debriefings (copies at NARA and MHI), espe-
fected the majority of soldiers, offi- cially Lt. Gen. Walter Botsch, Chief of Staff, Nine-
teenth Army, B–213, pp. 11–12, and B–515, pp. 58–
cers and men alike, was not analyzed 64; and Drews, “Remarks Regarding the War Histo-
at the time, but the general wear and ry of the Seventh Army,” John Dahlquist Papers,
tear of combat, especially offensive MHI; and comments on 36th Division in Martin
Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, United States Army in
operations, must have worn away the World War II (Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 289. But
newer American divisions had a harder time, as
8This section is based on Alfred O. Ludwig’s chronicled in Romie L. Brownlee and William J.
“Seventh U.S. Army,” a section in Neuropsychiatry in Mullen III, Changing an Army: An Oral History of Gener-
World War II, II, Medical Department, United States al William E. DePuy, USA Retired (MHI/CMH joint
Army in World War II (Washington: Office of the publication, GPO, n.d.), pp. 43–66, 78–79, 85–87,
Surgeon General, 1973), pp. 334–66. 90–91.
AN EVALUATION 569

verse subordinate elements, whether high number of losses among small-


in the pursuit or deep in the French unit officers and NCOs that his units
mountains. 10During the Alsatian cam- suffered in the Vosges. 12
paign he brushed off the matter of Such difficulties undoubtedly con-
physical danger as the “least worry” tributed to the disciplinary problems
of a division commander, explaining that afflicted many American combat
that the most “terrible strain” was units in the European theater-
“the responsibility for the men you AWOLs, desertions, stragglers, com-
have committed to an action—the bat refusals, and so forth. But the
ever-present gnawing wonder if you troubles experienced here were, in
have taken the right step because usu- balance, minor and fairly common-
ally, once deployed, the decision is ir- place. In this regard French officers
revocable.” Partly to escape such had a much harder time controlling
pressures, Dahlquist found himself their African troops recruited in the
visiting the front-line battalions when- colonies who had perhaps a lesser
ever he could, where, he found, “con- stake in the war than their American
fidence is usually the highest.’’ 11 counterparts, and even the Wehrmacht
From a higher perspective, General had its special disciplinary battalions
Patch, the Seventh Army commander, (sonderbataillons) composed of unruly
was most concerned over the effects German soldiers whose enthusiasm
of the campaign on the junior leader- for battle was unsatisfactory. In other
ship in combat units. Although in No- areas the surrender of small units and
vember 1944 SHAEF had lifted previ- the refusal of some to advance reflect-
ous restrictions limiting the number ed the nature of the war: the inability
of direct officer appointments to of conventionally armed troops to
twenty per division every ninety days, continue fighting when cut off from
and had given division commanders their sources of supply, especially am-
unlimited authority in this area, no munition and fuel, and the growing
new officers from outside the theater ineffectiveness of both troops and
were expected until March 1945; fur- troop leaders when isolated or when
thermore, the massive use of direct simply left in the field too long. Tacti-
commissions was risky. Patch estimat- cal commanders on both sides and at
ed that the older divisions, the 3d, all levels were well aware of these
36th, and 45th, had just about used conditions and constantly sought to
up their leadership resources from use them to their advantage, outma-
the enlisted ranks through attrition; neuvering their opponents, rather
and, despite the slightly more elabo- than overrunning them with frontal
rate training programs for direct ap- assaults, and wearing them down
pointment candidates, there seemed through continuous attack and harass-
no satisfactory way to make up for the ment activities of all kinds.
In the French colonial units cultural
and linguistic differences between of-
10 Dahlquist Ltr, 25 Aug 44, John E. Dahlquist
Papers, MHI.
11Dahlquist Ltr, 2 Jan 45, John E. Dahlquist 12For discussion, see Seventh Army Diary, pp.
Papers, MHI. 376, 520A-521.
570 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

ficers and men made it difficult to re- that Brooks had thrown into the gen-
place experienced cadre, and de eral Hatten-Gambsheim area with
Lattre’s blanchiment (“whitening”) of mixed results—and he had a difficult
his tropical African units proceeded time persuading his two armored divi-
slowly.13American military leaders, in sions to accept platoons of black vol-
contrast, had no such excuse for the unteer riflemen to bolster their de-
poor treatment often given to black pleted infantry ranks. Had more black
American soldiers whose cultural and volunteers been used in this manner,
intellectual background was essential- the combat strength of all Seventh
ly no different from that of their Cau- Army units would have been measur-
casian troops. Although black combat ably improved and the shortage of in-
units had compiled an excellent histo- fantry greatly alleviated. 15
ry in the regular Army since the In both black and white units, Afri-
American Civil War, the Army made can and European, the quality of
its own segregationist policies worse leadership often determined whether
by relegating blacks mainly to support or not a unit fought well. Neverthe-
units. After its successful action at less, the postwar conclusions reached
Climbach, the black 614th Tank De- in S. L. A. Marshall’s Men Against Fire
stroyer Battalion continued to per- were unsettling. Based on his exten-
form well; after proving itself in sive field research of American troops
combat, its members later related that in the European and Pacific theaters,
they quickly developed close ties with Marshall charged American troops
the white regiments of the 103d Divi- with a widespread lack of aggressive-
sion. Although disappointed that their ness in combat, citing the low per-
unit had never been reequipped with centage of riflemen that claimed to
the new self-propelled guns, they have fired their weapons in combat. 16
bragged that even with their towed
pieces, the 614th “could still split
trail, beat them to the draw, and hit 15For further treatment, see Ulysses Lee, The Em-
the target.” 14In March 1945 another ployment of Negro Troops, United States Army in
World War II (Washington, 1966), especially pp.
black unit, the 761st Tank Battalion, 667-87, 700-704.
joined the 103d Division, and in the 16 S. L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire (New York:
ensuing campaign across Germany Morrow, 1947), p. 56. Based on his interviews, the
author noted that the rate of soldiers firing their
the two units often led the advance of weapons in battle was never greater than 25 percent
the division. But in this area the Sev- and generally closer to 15 percent, but with a very
enth Army had not learned its lessons high participation rate by those equipped with auto-
well. Patch later chose to dissolve an- matic weapons. For a repeat of the charge during
the Korean War, see George Juskalian, “Why Didn’t
other black tank destroyer battalion— They Shoot More?” Army Combat Forces Journal, V,
an inexperienced and poorly led unit No. 2 (September 1954), 35. For recent challenges
to Marshall’s research, see Roger J. Spiller, “S. L. A.
Marshall and the Ratio of Fire,” Journal of the Royal
Service Institute, XXXIII, No. 4 (Winter 1988), 63-71;
13For some discussion, see Rita Headrick, “Afri- Fredric Smoler, “The Secret of the Soldiers Who
can Soldiers in World War II,” Armed Forces and Soci- Didn’t Shoot,’’ American Heritage, XL, No. 2 (March
ety, IV, No. 3 (Spring 1978), 501–26. 1989), 36-45; and Russell W. Glenn, “Men and Fire
14Quotes from Motley, ed., The Invisible Soldier, p. in Vietnam,” Army, XXXIX, No. 4 (April 1989), 18–
170. 26.
AN EVALUATION 571

Most U.S. soldiers, he concluded, ently produced better soldiers than


relied too much on armor, artillery, did their Allied counterparts. 18 Im-
or airpower to push back or destroy plied was the assumption that
the enemy. However, as one former German officers and men fought
infantryman of the 7th Infantry regi- longer, harder, and better than their
ment (3d Division) recalled, American opponents, despite vastly inferior re-
small units generally did not advance sources, and that their ultimate failure
in linear formations (abreast), but at- on the battlefield was primarily due to
tacked in small groups of infiltrating overwhelming Allied materiel and
columns led by officers and NCOs manpower superiority. Their success,
and, if available, supported by auto- critics believed, lay in two factors: the
matic weapons, tanks, and artillery. superior leadership of the German of-
Skirmish lines could be built up when ficer corps and the strong interior
engaged, but were difficult to control “cohesion” of the German small-unit
for any length of time, and attacking combat formations. The former was
in open waves, as the Germans had the product of good training, sound
done at the beginning of NORD- doctrine, and a military tradition t h a t
WIND, was often suicidal. Under such emphasized leadership on the battle-
conditions, he noted, it was some- field; the latter, strong unit cohesion,
times difficult and even dangerous to was the result of a training and re-
fire one’s rifle during the attack, espe- placement system that attached the
cially when other friendly soldiers German soldier to the unit in which
were all around and the enemy was he would be fighting from the time of
difficult to locate.17 In defensive posi- his induction into the Wehrmacht until
tions the situation was often quite dif- the moment he entered the battle-
ferent, but then American soldiers,
especially those interviewed by Mar-
shall in the latter part of the war, 18For general clinical background, see Edward A.
Shils and Morris Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disinte-
were rarely on the defensive. gration in the German Wehrmacht in World War
Despite these explanations, the al- II,” Public Opinion Quarterly (Summer 1948), 280-
leged reticence of American infantry 315; Samuel Stouffer et al., Studies in Social Psychology
has merited considerable attention in World War II; and Herbert Spiegel, “Psychiatry
with an Infantry Battalion in North Africa,” Neuro-
since World War II, and Marshall’s psychiatry in World War II, II, 111-26. For the contro-
accusations seem to have been fueled versy, see Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German
by the performance of the U.S. sol- and U.S. Army Performance, 1939–45 (Westport,
dier in subsequent conflicts. Evolu- Conn.: Greenwood, 1982); and Trevor N. Dupuy, A
Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff
tion of the criticism is somewhat com- 1807–1945 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
plex. Postwar American scholars, 1977); Richard A. Gabriel and Paul Savage, “Cohe-
seeking explanations for German mili- sion and Disintegration in the American Army: An
Alternative Perspective,” Armed Forces and Society, II,
tary successes during the war, con- No. 3 (Spring 1976), 340–76, and their subsequent
cluded that the German Army consist- Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army (New
York: Hill and Wang, 1978), both deal essentially
with a later period; and, in a more popular vein,
Max Hastings, “Their Wehrmacht Was Better Than
17 Reitan, “The Seventh Infantry Crosses the Our Army,” Washington Post (and others), 5 May 85,
Meurthe,” MS, p. 13. C1–4.
572 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE
field.19Taking up where S. L. A. Mar- have pointed out that the German ter-
shall left off, these critics have con- ritorial recruitment and replacement
tended that the American infantrymen system, hardly unique, was inefficient
lacked such advantages and thus and unable to keep German units up
made poorer soldiers in the field. T h e to strength or ensure a uniform qual-
impersonal American replacement ity of training. T h e lack of combat ef-
system, which assigned soldiers solely fectives, especially in the German in-
according to the immediate needs of fantry battalions, may have made their
the combat units, was often cited as actual ratios of enlisted men to offi-
the primary reason behind the sup- cers and combat to noncombat
posedly low cohesion in American (“tooth to tail”) even lower than
fighting units and their correspond- those of the American Army, which
ingly lower performance on the bat- has often been criticized in this
tlefield. One military researcher even regard (higher ratios indicating a
constructed elaborate models, or lean, or efficient, military force; lower
equations, showing that even in ratios signifying one with supposedly
defeat German units outperformed excess “fat,” that is, too many officers
American units and inflicted more or support units). Other historians
casualties on the Americans than have directly challenged the battle-
should have been expected, given the field performance models, pointing
general situation and the manpower out, for example, that the Americans
and materiel available to both forces faced a much higher proportion of
at the time of the battle. T h e Ameri- the better German formations, the
can soldier was good, but the German panzer and panzer grenadier divi-
soldier was better.20 sions, while the Wehrmacht posted
A complete examination of these most of its neglected infantry divi-
charges is clearly beyond the scope of sions to the Eastern Front, where
this book; however, since they obvi- mass was more important than qual-
ously impinge on many aspects of the ity. Still others have noted that
Seventh Army’s campaigns, some dis- German inability to sustain their sup-
cussion is needed. Not surprisingly posedly high combat power on the
other writers have challenged many of battlefield made claims of superior
the assumptions and conclusions military prowess irrelevant. An army
made by these authors, deeming them is the measure of many things, and,
either erroneous or irrelevant.21 Some for example, General Erwin Rommel’s
successes in the western desert must
be balanced by his failure to expand
19See Samuel J. Newland, “Manning the Force the Libyan ports and thereby ease his
German-Style,’’ Military Review, LXVII, No. 5 (May
1987), 36–45, and other related articles in this issue.
20See Trevor N. Dupuy, Numbers, Predictions, and
War (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1979). Review, LXVI, No. 7 (July 1986), 44-56; and John
21For example, see the various critiques of Gabri- Sloan Brown, “Colonel Trevor”. Dupuy and the
el and Savage in “Commentary on ‘Cohesion and Mythos of Wehrmacht Superiority: A Reconsider-
Disintegration in the American Army,’ ” Armed Forces ation,” Military Affairs, L, No. 1 (January 1986), 16–
and Society, III, No. 3 (Spring 1977), 457-90; Roger 20, and the ensuing rejoinders by Dupuy and Brown
A. Beaumont, “On the Wehrmacht Mystic,” Military in subsequent issues.
AN EVALUATION 573

continual logistical problems.22 What has placed more attention on the ca-
good did it do the Wehrmacht to put pabilities and accomplishments of the
its best formations and impressive average foot soldier, whose exploits
war machines on the battlefield, if it are often undocumented and forgot-
failed to provide the means to sup- ten.
port and sustain them?
In southern France and during the Allied Strategy and Operations
campaigns in the Vosges and Alsace,
the discussion is still ambiguous, and Allied “strategy” in western Europe
judgments are amply colored by na- and the relationship between General
tional and personal prejudices. Were Eisenhower and General Devers have
new troops to be considered “fresh,” also been subjects of much debate.
or were they to be judged “green” Ironically, the British and American
and liable to panic or make mistakes positions on Allied ground strategy
on entering the battlefield? Were seem to have reversed themselves be-
older units “worn out” or “experi- tween 1943 and 1944. At first, Prime
enced”? Poor logistical capabilities Minister Winston Churchill and. his
curtailed the mobility of German British commanders leaned heavily
panzer divisions just as inclement toward a peripheral operational strat-
weather reduced the impact of Allied egy that took advantage of the superi-
airpower on the battlefield, and unit or mobility (seapower) of Allied mili-
cohesion was of little use to anemic tary forces in order to attack the
infantry battalions that could obtain German-held Continent at many
no replacements. In the 6th Army points, thereby eroding Germany’s
Group, perhaps all that can be said is military strength. (The RAF bombing
that the American and French infan- campaign against Germany fit into
trymen did the job that had to be this category, as did Britain’s early
done, and it is doubtful that even economic blockade of the Continent.)
with better small-unit leadership or The Americans, on the other hand,
cohesion they could have accom- led by General Marshall and the U.S.
plished their missions sooner or suf- Joint Chiefs of Staff, favored a more
fered fewer casualties in the process. direct approach and championed a
As the Wehrmacht discovered time and war-winning ground strategy involv-
time again, too much focus on one ing the concentration of all Allied re-
aspect of an army only caused serious sources for the OVERLORD cross-
difficulties elsewhere, which ultimate- Channel invasion, followed by a direct
ly affected the entire organism. Sort- strike into the German heartland over
ing out and mathematically weighing the north European plains. (The land
all of the variables on the battlefield strategy had its counterpart in the
is probably an impossible task. Never- U.S. Army Air Force’s strategic bomb-
theless, at least the ongoing debate ing campaign.) Eisenhower’s position
in the debate seems ambiguous, but
once charged with the Allied cam-
22See Martin van Creveld, Supplying War: Logisitics
from Wallenstein to Patton (New York: Cambridge Uni-
paign in northern France, he appears
versity Press, 1977), pp. 181–201. to have supported a “broad front,” or
574 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

flexible, operational strategy, aimed land, where he was charged with the
at destroying German military forces buildup for the OVERLORD attack; the
west of the Rhine and then pushing two were often at odds over the dis-
into Germany itself. The British, how- tribution of resources between the
ever, led by Field Marshal Montgom- two theaters. Then, when Eisenhower
ery, advocated a war-winning ground came to England in early 1944 to
strategy involving either a knife-like head the invasion force, he recom-
thrust deep into the German heart- mended that Devers be made deputy
land or at least the immediate seizure to General Wilson, Eisenhower’s suc-
of the Ruhr industrial area, thereby cessor in the Mediterranean theater.
ending Germany’s war-making capa- At the time, Marshall felt that Eisen-
bilities. Lacking the logistical re- hower was trying to ship out his po-
sources for a broad front campaign, tential rivals for the post of Supreme
Eisenhower adopted the British point Allied Commander, and he was dis-
of view, but seems to have compro- turbed that Eisenhower rejected
mised somewhat by giving Bradley’s Devers for any high command posi-
southern force, Patton’s Third Army, tions in the invading forces. Never-
the task of seizing the Saar basin— theless, Marshall approved the trans-
also a “strategic” industrial region— fer, feeling that Eisenhower would be
which kept his American generals in more at ease with generals who had
Bradley’s center army group occupied served under him during the recent
along with many German divisions. campaigns in the Mediterranean. As a
But this operational plan allowed the result, Devers and Eisenhower were
Germans to concentrate their inferior again at opposite ends of the Allied
defensive resources against two rela- European military effort, competing
tively narrow and easily recognizable for a limited number of military re-
Allied axes of advance, and it denied sources. Thus, Eisenhower may have
Eisenhower the flexibility to shift his been unpleasantly surprised in July
attacks elsewhere once his main offen- 1944 when he learned that Marshall
sives were halted. intended to appoint Devers to head
In this regard, Eisenhower’s plans the new army group moving up from
were undoubtedly influenced by na- southern France. Although acquies-
tional considerations—keeping the cing to the appointment, he may have
Allied coalition intact—and by his retained serious reservations regard-
evaluations of the various Allied com- ing the capability of the newly desig-
manders. His personal dislike for nated army group commander. On
General Devers was well known, as the other hand, the politically astute
was his supposedly low opinion of Eisenhower must have realized that
Devers’ military abilities. In 1943, the appointment of Devers would
when Eisenhower commanded the ensure the survival of ANVIL,a vital
Allied forces in the Mediterranean consideration given the difficulties Ei-
theater, Devers, who was Eisenhow- senhower was personally facing in
er’s senior in age and also a protege Normandy at the time.
of General Marshall, occupied a The success of ANVILand the sub-
somewhat analogous position in Eng- sequent drive north apparently did
AN EVALUATION 575

not change the Supreme Command- tainly the forces under the 6th Army
er’s feelings toward General Devers. Group had chalked up an impressive
In the end, his misgivings may have record of military successes during
only reflected personality differences the November offensive, the Alsatian
between the two high-ranking offi- battles, and the reduction of the
cers. Such differences, however, can Colmar Pocket. His record prior to
have a direct effect on an individual’s November had been equally impres-
actions and may explain, in part, Ei- sive. The success of ANVILhad led di-
senhower’s reluctance to assign addi- rectly to the acquisition of Marseille
tional forces to the 6th Army Group and other Riviera ports, opening up a
when it was established in September major Allied logistical gateway to
or even to consider allowing it to ex- France for Eisenhower’s hungry
ploit the Saverne Gap penetration in armies. By September the southern
November 1944. On 1 February of ports were accounting for over one-
the following year, in preparing an fourth of the Allied supplies arriving
evaluation of American generals re- in France and over one-third during
quested by Marshall, Eisenhower’s October and November; they w e r e
low estimation of Devers was striking. not surpassed by Antwerp until some-
Rating him twenty-fourth of thirty- time in March 1945 (Table 1). More-
eight-far below all of the other prin- over, going back further, Devers had
cipal Army commanders—he de- always been a proponent of both
scribed him as “loyal and energetic” OVERLORD and ANVILand, on becom-
and “enthusiastic, but often inaccu- ing deputy commander of the Medi-
rate in statements and evaluations.” terranean theater, was one of the
He added that, despite the fact that principal officers who kept ANVIL
Devers’ accomplishments were “gen- alive. As the Commanding General,
erally good, sometimes outstanding NATOUSA, he continued logistical
. . . he has not, so far, produced preparations for the southern France
among the seniors of the American invasion throughout early 1944, even
organization here that feeling of trust after the operation had been tempo-
and confidence that is so necessary to rarily canceled. In this respect, the
continued success.” Devers was still Allies probably could not have under-
not part of the team.23 taken ANVILwithout the attention that
Eisenhower’s low assessment of Devers had devoted to it.
Devers is highly questionable. Cer- Once securely installed as the 6th
Army Group chief, Devers took issue
23Quotes from Eisenhower Memo, 1 Feb 45, in with Eisenhower’s operational guid-
Eisenhower Papers, IV, 2466–69. Eisenhower rated ance. Initially he viewed the Supreme
Bradley and Spaatz tied for first; Smith, his chief of
staff, third; Patton, fourth; Clark (in Italy), fifth; and Commander as more concerned with
Truscott, sixth. See also Pogue, Marshall: Organizer of the acquisition of territory—the Saar
the Victory, pp. 372-75; Omar N. Bradley, A General’s and the Ruhr—than with the destruc-
Life: An Autobiography (New York Simon and Schus-
ter, 1983), pp. 210, 217; Dwight D. Eisenhower, tion of the German Army. Although
Crusade in Europe (Garden City: Doubleday, 1948), p. fully accepting Eisenhower’s decision
216; and Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, p. 580.
None of these sources, however, sheds any direct
to concentrate on destroying the
light on the matter. German Army west of the Rhine,
576 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE
AT CONTINENTAL
TABLE1—TONNAGESDISCHARGED PORTS: JUNE 1944–APRIL 1945
[Long Tons8]

aExclusive of bulk POL and vehicles.


b Including Granville.
Source Historical Report of the Transportation Corps, ETO, Vol. VII, April-June 1945, App. 7, Table 8A

Devers obviously favored a more ning the war.” 25 His own attitude
flexible “operational” strategy for toward Eisenhower was equivocal. Ac-
SHAEF, one that would allow the 6th cording to the Seventh Army oper-
Army Group to exploit its successes ational chief (G–3), Col. John S.
on the battlefield. Even before taking Guthrie, Devers was often openly crit-
over the army group, Devers had ob- ical of Eisenhower’s judgments when
served that it was “not cracking the such matters came up in 6th Army
line or pushing the enemy back to a Group o r Seventh Army staff meet-
line or river” that was important, ings.26 Since Devers expressed his
“but the destruction of the enemy misgivings publicly, Guthrie thought
itself that counts”; he emphasized it inevitable that Eisenhower would
that “we must capture the German have learned of them and that Maj,
army or what exists of it and take our Gen. David G. Barr, the affable 6th
minds off terrain.” 24 H e did agree Army Group chief of staff, played a
that Antwerp was an exception, but vital role in smoothing out the diffi-
judged that the port and the Schelde culties between the two commanders.
approaches should have been secured Eisenhower was certainly stung by
before Montgomery continued his ad- Devers’ criticism of his operational
vance; he labeled the British com- strategy during their 24–25 November
mander “a prima donna who thinks meeting and was surely angered by
more of himself than he does of win-
25Devers Diary, 5 Oct 44; see also 16 Oct 44 en-
24 Devers Diary, 11–12 Sep 44 (Devers was pri- tries.
marily addressing the Italian campaign in this 26 See Guthrie’s comments on draft MS; Telecon,
entry). Clarke-Guthrie, 1 1 Aug 88.
AN EVALUATION 577

his almost open refusal to withdraw allowing the two large subordinate
the Seventh Army from the Lauter- army headquarters to run their own
bourg salient in December. The can- logistical and administrative affairs,
cellation of Operation INDEPENDENCE,he also had his own staff serve as a
whatever its merit, on the pretext that link between the armies and the thea-
de Lattre's forces were on the verge ter headquarters and the theater com-
of eliminating the Colmar Pocket, munications zone logistical and per-
must also have been annoying. Al- sonnel agencies. Consistent with U.S.
though Eisenhower may have overrat- Army doctrine of the time, his army
ed Devers' political influence within group headquarters thus performed a
the upper echelons of the American minimal amount of administrative
high command, the persistent differ- functions and, except for engineer
ences between the Supreme Com- and signal services, had none of the
mander and Field Marshal Montgom- special staff sections that were nor-
ery may have made Eisenhower even mally found at the army headquarters
less forgiving of Devers' independent level. 28
attitudes. Not surprisingly then, Ei- Patch, the Seventh Army command-
senhower continued to be more com- er, proved more enigmatic than
fortable dealing with Bradley, a long- Devers, Truscott, or any of the other
time subordinate and friend, than major commanders in the 6th Army
with more demanding commanders Group. Rarely did his hand appear on
such as Montgomery, Truscott, or the battlefield. Yet, it was Patch and
Devers. In the upper reaches of the not Truscott who had made almost all
Allied high command, there was room of the critical planning decisions for
for only a few mavericks, like the iras- ANVIL and had kept a tight rein on
cible Patton. the U.S. VI Corps until de Lattre's
Within his own headquarters, Army B forces were well on their way
Devers, was less controversial. If into Toulon and Marseille; thereafter
some of his verbal directives were he did his best to keep his rather jum-
vague at times, he delegated enough bled Franco-American army on the
authority to enable subordinates, such road to Lyon and Belfort. Unlike his
as Barr, Maj. Gen. Reuben Jenkins German opponents, however, Patch
(his G–3), and even the young liaison rarely stepped into the daily fighting
officer, Lt. Col. Henry Cabot Lodge, arena and was more concerned with
to clarify his wishes to Patch, de seeing that the combat forces under
Lattre, and others.27In general, he his command, both French and Amer-
ran the 6th Army Group as an oper- ican, received the men, equipment,
ational rather than a strategic or tacti-
cal command, assigning general ob-
28Headquarters, 6th Army Group, had a total
jectives to his two army commanders strength of only 311 officers and 1,221 enlisted
and preferring to let the corps com- men. On the functions of the 6th Army Group, see
manders fight the battles. Although Hist, 6th Army Gp, ch. 1,“Concept and Organiza-
tion"; G-3, 6th Army Group, Final Report (July
1945), p. 3; Ltr, Maj Gen Reuben E. Jenkins to Col
27Telecon, Clarke-Guthrie, 1 1 Aug 88; Ltr, Guth- Robert N. Young, 28 Jan 47, Reuben E. Jenkins
rie to Clarke, 22 Oct 88. Papers, MHI.
578 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE

and supplies necessary to accomplish ters as ammunition stockage and ex-


their missions. This task was, in fact, penditures, backing up the under-
the primary textbook responsibility of standably weak French logistical and
an American army headquarters; fur- administrative support organizations.
thermore, given the compartmental- Although French commanders gener-
ized nature of the Vosges campaign, ally regarded many of the administra-
there was little else for him to do tive and logistical elements that sup-
once the mountain barrier had been ported U.S. combat forces as luxury
reached. But during the German of- items, American commanders gave
fensives in Alsace, Patch quickly even their lowly laundry units a high
changed his role and became an degree of respect: dry socks and uni-
active tactical commander, juggling forms were vital to the health of their
forces between his two corps and the army and could not be ignored.
army reserve and keeping close track Like Eisenhower, Devers also found
of the course of the battle, current in- himself arbitrating, or at least at-
telligence on enemy dispositions and tempting to mediate, between Allied
intentions, and the status and plans of military needs and national (French)
his own forces. Still he allowed his political concerns regarding such mat-
two corps commanders the freedom ters as Operation INDEPENDENCE, the
to fight their own battles within their defense of Strasbourg, the security of
assigned zones, backstopping them the Franco-Italian border, and the
with advice and assistance. In this supply of FFI units in the First French
regard, his actions continued to re- Army. Here his diplomatic skills were
flect his quiet, almost paternal style of sorely tested, but he was generally
command. Although sometimes re- able to iron out the many difficulties
garding the antics of Patton as both among his various constituents, mini-
“greatly amusing” and beneficial to mizing their impact on military oper-
Third Army morale, he never at- ations. Although having been forced
tempted to emulate his well-known to listen to de Lattre’s temper on
neighbor, who would later come to many occasions (as had Patch and
symbolize the entire American Truscott in the past) and viewing him
combat effort in northern France. 29 as “difficult to handle,” Devers re-
De Lattre, whose First French Army garded the French commander as a
headquarters was more tactically ori- man of “great courage [who] . . . will
ented, did not see the role of his fight the 1st French Army realistically
army headquarters in this light and and effectively,” and he went on to
kept a much closer rein on his corps make good use of his sometimes trou-
and division commanders than Patch blesome ally. 30
did. In many nontactical areas, how- Devers, Patch, and de Lattre had
ever, de Lattre’s authority was more two additional concerns that often
limited, and Devers and his staff often went unnoticed: the Franco-Italian
had to assist the French in such mat- front and the German pockets on the

29Quote related in Wyant Interv, 20 Jun 88. 30Devers Diary, 7 Nov 44; see also 8 Oct 44.
AN EVALUATION 579

Atlantic coast of France.31 Both areas the Franco-Italian frontier despite the
threatened to divert important general inactivity of the German
combat resources from the 6th Army forces there. After taking command of
Group throughout the entire cam- the 6th Army Group in September,
paign. Initially, Eisenhower had de- Devers would have preferred to
cided to generally ignore the German deploy both the French 4th Moroccan
enclaves at Lorient, St. Nazaire, and Mountain Division and General Fred-
La Rochelle as well as those on either erick’s airborne-Special Services task
side of the Gironde Estuary blocking force to the Vosges area as quickly as
the approaches to Bordeaux. At the possible, replacing them with FFI
insistence of de Gaulle, however, in forces; but he judged that the French
early November the Supreme Com- militia was not up to the task. Not
mander had made Devers responsible until the end of November was
for clearing the Gironde Estuary. Devers able to exchange the Moroc-
Thus began Devers’ long struggle cans for a newly created French
with SHAEF, the French provisional Alpine division along the northern
government, and the First French frontier, and not until March 1 9 4 5
Army over the deployment of forces were enough additional French forces
to support Operation INDEPENDENCE, available to fill in along the southern
always a somewhat questionable sector. By then Devers had replaced
effort. Ultimately, General de Larmin- Frederick’s task force first with the
at’s French Forces of the West head- 442d (Japanese-American) Regimental
quarters launched the often-post- Combat Team, then with elements of
poned endeavor in mid-April 1945 the 14th Armored Division, and final-
and, with the assistance of Leclerc’s ly with bits and pieces of other Amer-
2d Armored Division and a U.S. artil- ican units that were arriving in south-
lery brigade, completed the affair in ern France, placing them under the
about one week. But by then the control of the U.S. 44th Antiaircraft
Allies had no need for additional Artillery Brigade. But with several
ports, and the entire operation, essen- weak German divisions stationed op-
tially an internal French political posite the frontier, constantly posing
effort to boost the legitimacy of de a threat to the 6th Army Group’s line
Gaulle’s provisional government, rep- of communications, neither Patch nor
resented a waste of both 6th Army Devers could afford to ignore this
Group and First French Army military area. Moreover, they were never able
strength. to employ any of Frederick’s elite
The Italian border was another forces in the north, and Eisenhower
matter entirely. From the beginning ultimately incorporated the airborne
of ANVIL,Patch had no choice but to units into the SHAEF reserve and re-
maintain strong holding forces along organized the Special Service units
into an infantry brigade under Brad-
ley's 12th Army Group.32
31For a full treatment, see Robert Ross Smith,
“The German Pockets on the Atlantic” and “The
Franco-Italian Border: Protecting the Southeast 32The airborne units began departing the Alpine
Flank,” CMH MSS. front on 15 November, the 1st Airborne Task Force
580 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE

After World War II, German offi- ment elsewhere; but such movements
cers, when asked about the possibility depended more on the ability of Roo-
of conducting an attack against the sevelt and de Gaulle to iron out their
Riviera-Rhone area from northern political differences and make greater
Italy, cited a host of difficulties that use of the FFI.
precluded even the consideration of Finally, the role of ULTRA in the
such an operation. Most important Seventh Army and the 6th Army
were OB Southwest’s lack of transporta- Group operations should be noted.
tion to make and support a shift of T h e availability of the German with-
forces; the Alpine terrain and weather drawal orders on 17 and 18 August
that any offensive would have to face; represented a rare intelligence coup.
the lack of air support to protect such Normally individual ULTRA inter-
an extended movement; and, above cepts revealed only mundane infor-
all, the constant pressure exerted by mation that had to be collated with
Wilson’s forces on the main Italian thousands of other intercepts and in-
front.33On the other hand, the ability telligence reports from other sources
of the Wehrmacht to secretly mass and before any value could be attached to
support a small number of mobile it. Truscott’s overreaction to the re-
forces along the Alpine front was ported presence of the 11th Panzer Di-
never beyond its scope-as the much vision east of the Rhone on 22 August
larger concentration of divisions for illustrates the danger of depending
the Ardennes offensive demonstrated. too greatly on these sources; in any
Even the remote possibility of such an case, German commanders rarely dis-
attack was enough to keep the Allied cussed specific operational plans over
high commands concerned. If greater the radio, and tactical commanders
economy of force was necessary, then often altered plans prepared by
those units stationed by Bradley and higher headquarters because of
Devers on the Atlantic coast were the changing situations in the field. In
most likely candidates for redeploy- many other areas ULTRA was mute—
such as the direction of the German
withdrawal north of Lyon or the es-
headquarters was dissolved around the 25th, and tablishment of the Colmar Pocket.
the 1st Special Service Force was relieved shortly Therefore, those who relied too heav-
thereafter. The Special Service Force units were for-
mally disbanded on 6 January 1945. The Canadian ily on these sources, such as Bradley’s
troops returned to their national command, and the 12th Army Group before the Ar-
American components formed the nucleus of the 1st dennes offensive, sometimes suffered
and 2d Battalions of the newly organized 474th In-
fantry Brigade, along with the independent Norwe- unpleasant surprises. 34 As noted in
gian-American 99th Infantry Battalion. On the Spe- the official British history of the intel-
cial Service Force transfer, see Eisenhower Papers, IV, ligence effort, if the Germans had at-
2232n.
33Ltr, Lt Gen Walter Warlimont (former deputy
tacked in the Aachen sector, instead
chief of staff for operations at OKW) to CMH (n.d., of in the Ardennes, “the [available]
recvd 12 Oct 57); Ltr, Lt Gen Siegfried Westphal intelligence would have been quite
(former chief of staff at OB Southwest) to CMH, 23
Oct 57. Both letters were in reply to a questionnaire
sent to the generals by CMH historians on 17 Sep
57 (copies CMH). 34See Bradley, A General’s Life, pp. 350–52.
AN EVALUATION 581

compatible with that outcome.” 35 doubtful whether even von Rundstedt


NORDWIND was another case in could have predicted the place or
point. Although ULTRA order-of- date of these last attacks.36 Neverthe-
battle information, together with less, ULTRA played a major role in
other intelligence sources, may have confirming other intelligence informa-
suggested the possibility of a German tion acquired by more conventional
thrust down the Sarre River corridor, means, and was one of many factors
it was unable to predict the German that promoted the success of the
infantry assault south of Bitche, the Allied forces from the Riviera coast
switch of the German mobile divi- and their decisive contribution to the
sions to the Lauterbourg salient, or Allied campaigns in northeastern
the double offensive of Himmler’s France during the fall and winter of
A m y Group Oberrhein—although it is 1944–45.

35 Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World


War, III, 2, 430–31. 36See Ltr, Bussey to Smith, 27 Nov 79.
Bibliographical Note
Representing the final campaign Official Records
volume of the United States Army in
World War II series published by the Over the years the official records
U.S. Army Center of Military History of the U.S. Army during World War
(CMH) (formerly the Office of the II have migrated to the National Ar-
Chief of Military History), this work is chives and Records Administration
based primarily on the official records (NARA) and are currently housed at
of U.S. Army units and commands. the National Archives in Washington,
These sources contain monthly oper- D.C., and at the Washington National
ational reports submitted by each Records Center in nearby Suitland,
headquarters, from army through Maryland. Under the direct control of
regiment and separate battalion, and the Military Field Branch and the
retired unit records, including jour- Military Reference Branch, both sec-
nals, message and correspondence tions of NARA’s Military Archives Di-
files, planning documents and oper- vision, these records can be found in
ational orders, maps and overlays, a few key “record groups” (RG).
and special reports, studies, and simi- Most combat unit records are located
lar memoranda, the volume of which in RG 338 (“U.S. Army Com-
is roughly proportional to the size of mands”—records retired by units) or
the concerned headquarters. Also of RG 407 (“Unit Records”—required
vital interest are the personal papers reports such as monthly operational,
and diaries of leading participants, as or after action, reports). Material re-
well as special after action interview lating to both the Supreme Head-
reports done by Army historians in quarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
the field and a wide variety of semiof- (SHAEF), and Allied Forces Head-
ficial unit histories whose distribution quarters (AFHQ is contained in RG
has been extremely limited. Most 331 (“Allied Operations Headquar-
combat records are on file at the Na- ters”), while RG 165 (“War Depart-
tional Archives under the numerical ment General and Special Staffs”) in-
military designation of the retiring cludes significant message traffic be-
unit, and citations to such material tween Washington agencies and the
have been made only when specific overseas commands.
reference to them occurs within the Naval records cited in the text are
text. still under the control of the Depart-
584 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE
ment of the Navy and managed by the but invaluable document extensively
Operational Archives section of the used is the three-volume diary kept by
Naval Historical Center. Other official General Devers, one copy of which is
records, or at least copies of them, currently located at CMH and another
can also be found at CMH, or at the at the Devers Collection in York.
archives maintained by the U.S. Upon completion of this volume,
Army’s Military History Institute most of the supporting material at
(MHI) at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylva- CMH will be retired and the Center’s
nia; the Marshall Library in Lexing- copy of the “Devers Diary” will be
ton, Virginia; the Devers Collection in transferred to MHI.
York, Pennsylvania; and the Eisen-
hower Library in Abilene, Kansas. Foreign Records
Records used by the authors from
these institutions have been noted in The account of German operations
the text citations. in this volume is based primarily on
monographs prepared within CMH by
Unofficial Records Charles V. P. von Luttichau and several
other German-language historians, as
Personal papers and related materi- cited in the text. These authors, in
al of Generals Marshall, Eisenhower, turn, based their studies on official
and Devers are held by the institu- German records captured or seized
tions noted above. Other papers of during the war and on a series of post-
participants can also be found at MHI war manuscripts written by former
together with a number of transcribed German commanders under the aus-
interviews that have proved useful. In pices of the U.S. Army. Copies of the
addition, large collections of unit his- monographs prepared by Mr. von Lut-
tories, of widely varying length and tichau and his colleagues are available
quality, exist at MHI, CMH, and other at CMH and MHI. T h e official German
military libraries. For this volume the war records have been returned to
most important studies of this nature Germany, but microfilm copies are
are the three-volume Seventh Army held at NARA and are available to re-
Report of Operations, prepared by Army searchers. Also on file at NARA are the
historians in Europe using primary German-authored manuscripts, num-
documents; the History of the Headquar- bering over two thousand studies, cata-
ters Sixth Army Group, a short narrative loged and indexed in the Guide to For-
with many documents appended; and eign Military Studies, 1945–54, and
the three-volume “diary” of General under the supervision of the Military
Patch, actually an official journal pre- Reference Branch.
pared by the Seventh Army staff. ULTRA documents, including the
Copies of all three works are located raw transcripts of decoded and trans-
at CMH. Also at CMH are a number lated German message traffic during
of supporting files for this project, in- World War II, are located in the
cluding smaller monographs, inter- NSAKSS Cryptologic Documents
views, and other material prepared or Collection in RG 457 (“National Se-
gathered by CMH historians. A final curity Agency/Central Security Ser-
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 585

vice”) at NARA. Copies of the inter- paigns in Tunisia, Italy, France, and
cepts and associated studies are also Germany. These documents, together
available at MHI, where their signifi- with large numbers of French Army
cance can be further clarified by Col. plans, reports, and other special stud-
Donald S. Bussey, the former Seventh ies were microfilmed by CMH histori-
Army ULTRA officer who retired to ans in 1948 and later supplemented
the Carlisle area. by additional records and information
French records include a nearly supplied by the Service Historique de
complete collection of daily journals, l’Armee. T h e microfilm has now been
situation reports, and operations retired and is in the custody of
orders for all French divisions, corps, NARA’s Military Reference Branch in
and higher headquarters for the cam- RG 319 (“Army Staff”).
Basic Military Map Symbols
Symbols within a rectangle indicate a military unit, within
a triangle a n observation post, a n d within a circle a supply
point.

Military Units—Identification

Airborne units are designated by combining a gull wing


symbol with the arm or service symbol:
Size Symbols
T h e following symbols placed either in boundary lines or
above the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifying
arm or service symbol indicate the size of military organization:

EXAMPLES
T h e letter or number to the left of the symbol indicates the
unit designation; that to the right, the designation of the parent
unit to which it belongs. Letters or numbers above or below
boundary lines designate the units separated by the lines:

Weapons
Index
Aachen: 233,349 Third: 174, 191, 197, 226, 228, 234, 237, 238, 239,
Abbevillers: 416-17 242, 244, 250, 253, 263, 269, 349, 351, 363, 438,
Abraham, Lt. Gen. Erich: 538,549 439, 449, 451, 459, 464, 465, 466, 467, 490, 499,
Adams, S. Sgt. Lucian: 328n 559,561. See also Patton, Lt. Gen. George S.,Jr.
Agay Roadstead: 114-15 Fifth: 27, 28
Ain River: 175 Seventh: 24, 28, 30-33, 43,51-52, 75, 78, 79, 85-87,
Air Force, U.S. Ninth: 214 108, 133-34, 137, 186, 194-97,202, 226, 230, 238,
Air Service Command, XII: 46, 47n 245, 253-54, 273, 300, 301, 406, 433, 437, 438,
Air support:38-39,110, 112, 116, 117, 140 439, 440, 442, 443, 445, 449, 454, 464, 465, 466,
Airborne Infantry Division, 101st: 523, 526, 527, 556, 467, 475, 484, 489, 490, 491, 492, 496, 499, 500,
559. See also Parachute units. 501, 502,513,518, 523,527, 528, 558, 559, 561. See
Airborne Task Force, 1st: 38, 45, 51, 77, 79, 91, 98, 101, also Patch, Lt. Gen. Alexander M.
102,104,105,129,579n Ninth: 226, 253, 349, 363
Aircraft: 213, 214, 331 Armored Divisions
Airfields: 124 4th: 383,384,451, 459, 464,465,466,490
Aix-en-Provence: 134, 136, 137, 139, 141, 142 6th: 223, 449, 560n
Aizerailles: 337, 338 10th: 534,556,559
Alexander, General Sir Harold R. L. G.: 24 12th: 443, 465, 466, 468, 470, 490, 491, 492n, 493,
Algiers: 31 500, 515, 523, 526, 527, 531, 535, 547, 551, 555,
Allaine River: 418,424 559,560n
Allen, Maj. Gen. Roderick C.: 465, 523, 524, 525 14th: 351, 396, 443, 452, 453, 455, 456, 465, 475,
Allex: 159, 162, 164 480, 481, 484, 491, 500, 501, 504, 507n, 508, 515,
Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ: 23, 25, 26, 28-29, 518,519,522,526,560n
30,3l-32,38,47,50,216,217,224,359 Armored Battalions
Alsace: 435, 436,498 17th Infantry: 524,525
Alsatian plains: 382, 402,432,454, 455, 456, 458 56th Infantry: 515
Altkirch: 420,422,426, 433 59th Field Artillery: 132
Amberieu: 205 66th Infantry: 524-25
Amtracks: 89n Army Air Forces Service Command 46
Anould: 403 Army Groups
Antheor Cove: 65,75,79,82,107,113,114 6th: 224, 225, 226, 229, 230, 235, 252, 253, 254, 256,
Antwerp: 228 300, 301, 323, 334, 349, 351, 352, 353, 354, 359,
ANVIL 361, 362, 363, 364, 415, 423, 431, 434, 439, 440,
assault: 4246,90-92, 107, 108-18 470, 471, 489, 490, 491, 492-93, 495, 501, 502,
evaluation of: 194 527, 528, 529, 534, 537, 548, 555, 558, 559, 560,
logistics: 46-52, 199-202 561. See also Devers, Lt. Gen.Jacob L.
military command arrangements: 24-34 12th: 225, 226, 228, 230, 235, 253, 254, 349, 352,
mission: 21 362, 363, 439, 440, 489, 491, 559. See also Bradley,
personnel and materiel: 201-02 Lt. Gen. Omar N.
planning: 3-4, 8, 9, 12, 14-21, 22, 30-34, 73-75, Army Service Forces: 48
77-79,80-81,83,104 Arnhem: 253
site selection: 3-5, 7-9, 71-76 Arnold, General Henry H.: 4n
support: 43-44,81-83 Arziller: 366, 375, 376, 377
training for: 89-91 Aspres: 145, 151-52
Anzio: 13, 14, 32 Atlantic Fleet: 46
Archettes: 245 Aubagne: 139, 140
Ardennes, battle of: 489-90,493,495,499 Autry: 316, 324
Argens River: 65, 73, 79, 80, 104, 106, 113, 114, 120, Auxonne: 191
121, 123,129 Avignon: 65,105,137,161
Arles: 106, 142
Armies Baccarat: 239, 262, 266, 271, 327, 334, 337, 338, 341,
First: 226,253, 349, 352, 363 351,365,393
590 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE
Bach, General Otto von dem: 513, 521, 525, 526. See 510, 518-19, 522, 527, 548. See also German units,
also German units, Corps, XIVSS. Army Groups, B.
Badonviller: 371 Boats
Baerendorf: 374,383,384,386 APA 50
Baerenthal: 520 APD: 92,98
Baessler, Maj. Gen. Johannes: 65, 68, 128, 131, 138 Apex: 110,117
Bains-les-Bains: 373n CVE: 44
Balck, Lt. Gen. Hermann: 237, 250, 261, 262, 266-67, Hospital: 212
274, 275, 276, 278, 305, 317, 325, 327, 339, 340, LCA: 98,99
341, 344, 361, 377, 379, 383, 386, 411, 414, 416, LCI: 50, 78, 92
417, 427, 432, 434, 435, 436, 451, 466, 467, 468, LCPR 98
480,484,494 LCT 78,92
Ballon d’Alsace: 429, 436 LCVP: 110, 117
Banks, Brig. Gen. Carl C.: 408 Liberty: 217,218
Barjols: 126, 128, 129, 130, 131 LSI: 50, 92,98
Barr: 402,437,453,455,456,457 LST 50,78, 118,201
Barr, Maj. Gen. David G.: 576,577 P T 100,104
Bartenheim: 422 Bobenthal: 484
Base 901: 203 Bois de la Foresterie: 244
Baume-les-Dames: 186,188, 190 Bonlieu: 159, 162
Bayerlein, Maj. Gen. Fritz: 378,384 Bordeaux: 358,359
Beach Control Group: 201,202 Bougnon Bay: 112
Beaches Bourg-en-Bresse: 173, 175, 177, 181, 205
Alpha: 201 Bourgoin: 209
Alpha Red: 108-10,201 Bouvet, Lt. Col. Georges Regis: 39
AlphaYellow: 110, 111-12, 201 Bradley, Lt. Gen. Omar N.: 29, 225, 254, 259, 269, 323,
Camel: 201 351, 352, 353, 363,438, 439,440,490, 556, 563. See
CamelBlue: 114, 115 also Army Groups, 12th.
Camel Green: 113,114,115,117,122, 123,200 Brebotte: 421, 423, 424, 425
CamelRed: 114,115, 117,121,122,200 Bremenil: 371
Delta: 201 Brignoles: 126, 129, 130, 131
DeltaBlue: 112, 113 Brisach: 538,539
Delta Green: 112 British Chiefs of Staff: 3, 4n, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17,
Delta Red: 112 18,20, 22,24-25. See also Combined Chiefs of Staff
DeltaYellow: 112, 113 (CCS).
Beaune: 186 British units: 107
Belfort: 198, 298, 305, 409, 420, 422, 428, 429, 430, Second British Army: 226
431,437,486 2d Independent Parachute Brigade: 38n, 101, 102,
Belfort Gap: 71, 173, 182, 183, 186, 223, 231, 232, 233, 104,118
234, 235, 239, 252, 299, 304, 305, 309, 362, 363, 4th Parachute Battalion: 102
409,415,419,428,430 5th Parachute Battalion: 102
Bell, T. Sgt. Bernard: 489n 6th Parachute Battalion: 102
Belmont: 315 21st Army Group: 225, 226, 228, 238, 253, 349, 352.
Benfeld: 455, 456,458 See also Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Bernard.
Bertoldo, M. Sgt. Vito R.: 520n 64th Light Artillery Battalion: 39n
Bertrambois: 371,374,376 Desert Air Force: 25
Bertrichamps: 339,341, 393 Royal Navy: 47
Besancon: 173,183, 184,188,189,190 Special Air Service Brigade: 42
Bethouart, Lt. Gen. Emile: 182, 188, 239, 297, 308, Broche Pass: 306
413, 414, 415-16, 422, 423, 430, 431, 539, 541, Brooke, Field Marshal Sir Alan: 4n
551. See also French units, Corps, I. Brooks, Maj. Gen. Edward H.:, 322, 323, 332, 334, 340,
Bieringer, Brig. Gen. Ludwig: 118 341, 343, 344, 387, 388, 389, 392, 394-95, 396,
Biffontaine: 315, 320, 322, 329, 344 397, 398, 399, 438, 439, 453, 455, 457, 464, 475,
Bischwiller: 461, 474, 480 477, 481, 482, 508, 509, 514n, 515, 518, 519, 522,
Bitche: 467, 468,471,472, 474, 481 523,526,528,531,532,564. See alsoCorps, VI.
Black market: 218-19 Brouvelieures: 274, 279, 311, 313, 314, 315, 318, 320,
Blamont: 371,380 343
Blaskowitz, General Johannes: 56,57-58,59, 62, 63,65, Bruce, Pvt. Walter: 521n
66, 105- 06, 134-35, 136, 137, 174, 183-84, Bruche River: 400
185-86, 191,234, 235, 494, 495, 498-99, 505, 509, Bruhn, Maj. Gen. Hans: 376,377
INDEX 591
Brussels conferences: 352-53 Chatillon-sur-Seine: 191, 223
Bruyeres: 259, 273, 274, 311, 313, 314, 315, 318, 319, CHEERFUL, Operation: 534-35
320,321 ChevestrayePass: 428
Bundenthal: 484 Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo: 11
Burnhaupt Maneuver: 431 Chipote Pass: 341
Burress, Maj. Gen. Withers A.: 342, 392, 394, 395, 399, Choate, S. Sgt. Clyde L. 325n
474 Churchill, Winston S.: 3, 4, 9, 14-15, 16-17, 20, 21-22,
Bussey, Col. Donald S.: 444,503 511,573
Butler, Brig. Gen. Frederick B.: 80, 132-33, 144, 145, Cirey-sur-Vezouse: 370, 375
147,149-52, 159, 162,163-64,165,168,169, 170, Citadel: 111
195 Civil Affairs operations: 216-19
Civil Affairs Regiment, 2678th: 216-17
Caffey, Brig. Gen. Benjamin F., Jr.: 31 Civilian labor, French: 219
Cairo Conference: 11 Clairefontaine: 397
Camp d’Oberhoffen: 478,480 Clark, Lt. Gen. Mark W.: 24, 30-31, 32, 36. See also
Camp de Bitche: 467,471,472,483 Armies, Fifth.
Campaign analysis: 3, 21-22, 52, 70, 95-96, 107, Clefcy: 403
121-25, 167-70, 194-200, 219-20, 229-30, 310, Climbach: 482, 483
311, 322, 345, 404-05, 431-32, 442-45, 462-63, Coastal Base Section: 47, 48, 51, 201, 203, 204. See also
510-12,527-32,550,551-58,561-81 Continental Base Section.
Canadian Army, First: 226 Cochet, Maj. Gen. Gabriel: 41-42
Cannes: 65,218 Cogolin: 110, 111, 112
Cannon, Maj. Gen. John K.: 25 Collobrieres: 110, 111, 121
Cape Cavalaire: 75, 82, 107, 111 Colmar: 538, 541,545,547,551
Cape Negre: 99 Canal: 543,546,547,549
Cape St. Tropez: 76 Pocket: 464, 484-86, 488, 489, 490, 492, 501, 502,
Cape Sardineaux: 11 2 513,517,533-37,548,549,551,556
Carcassonne Gap: 59, 71,96 Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS): 3-4, 7
Carey, T. Sgt. Charles F.,Jr.: 505n and ANVIL planning: 12, 13, 15
Casablanca Conference (1943): 4 and French forces: 357,358,359
Castellane: 145 and OVERLORD operation: 12, 13
Casualties and QUADRANT Conference: 9
Allied 98, 99, 100, 101n, 103-04, 115, 118, 122, 140, and SEXTANT Conference: 11
156, 166, 167, 177, 179-80, 196, 211, 212, 244, Committee of National Liberation: 26
245, 246, 247, 271, 280, 299, 324, 328, 329, Communists: 358
331-32, 338, 340, 343, 382, 397, 419, 431, 470, Condillac Pass: 158, 160, 161, 162, 163-64, 165
475,482,521n,525,527n,556 Continental Base Section: 204, 206
German: 98, 99, 164, 165, 166, 168, 177, 269, 307, Conway, Lt. Col. Theodore J.: 147
309,331,338,343,527,557 Coolidge, T. Sgt. Charles W.: 331n
Cavalaire Bay: 108, 201 Corcieux: 317, 326n, 344
Cavalaire-sur-Mer: 111 Cornimont: 307, 408
Cavalry units Corps
3d Reconnaissance Troop: 112,129 IV: 32-33
94th Squadron: 462,477,478,480,507 VI: 14, 36, 37, 45, 50-52, 77, 78, 79, 90, 91, 92, 114,
106th Group: 254-55, 264, 269, 270-71, 365, 368, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126, 134, 137, 150, 173,
370,372, 374,380,383,384,451,452, 468 175, 182, 186, 192, 194-97, 206, 223, 231, 233,
106th Squadron: 255 235, 238-40, 245, 247, 249, 251, 257-59, 272-74,
117th Squadron: 112, 132-33, 158-59, 177, 178-80, 275, 276, 300, 311, 313, 314, 320-21, 323, 325,
192, 195, 232, 235, 238, 239, 242, 250, 271, 276, 327, 332-33, 334, 338, 340, 343, 345, 363, 372,
313, 328, 338, 341, 342, 392, 399-400, 455, 477, 373, 382, 384, 387, 389, 392, 395, 396, 397, 398,
480,507 402, 404-05, 428, 433, 434, 438, 440, 449, 453,
121st Squadron: 255 454,455-59,465,475,476,479, 482-84, 486,492,
Cernay: 486,489,538, 539,541,549 495, 496, 501, 504, 507, 508, 513, 514, 515, 518,
Chalampe: 423,425, 426, 427, 539,551,558 519, 522, 526, 527, 533, 537, 558, 560n. See also
Chalons-sur-Saone:186 Brooks, Maj. Gen. Edward H.; Truscott, Maj. Gen.
Champagney: 413,429,430 Lucian.
Chappuis, Col. Abel Felix Andre: 141 XII: 256, 259, 261, 262, 365, 372, 373, 383, 442, 451,
Charmes: 235 464,465,501
Chateau Condillac: 149 X V 252,254-57,259-61,262,268, 269,270,272-73,
Chatel: 244 274, 300, 311, 313, 334, 337, 351, 362, 363,
592 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE
Corps—Continued DOGFACE, Operation: 311-22,334-45,351,411
XV—Continued Dole: 184
365-73, 375, 377, 383, 384, 389, 417, 433, 437, Doller River: 429,430,432,436,437
438, 439, 440, 442, 449, 451, 452, 457, 459-62, Dolleren: 436
464, 465, 466, 467, 468-70, 472, 479, 481, 484, Domaniale de Champ forest: 314, 315, 320, 321, 322,
491, 492, 496, 498, 500, 501, 504, 505, 509, 528, 325,327,329,332, 333,343-44
559n-60n. See also Haislip, Maj. Gen. Wade H. Domevre: 338,339
XXI: 493, 509n,534, 547, 559 Domjevin: 269,365
Corsica: 7,8, 9, 29, 30,40, 47, 91,92,98, 100 Doubs River: 183,184,188,189,190, 191,235,412
Cota, Maj. Gen. Norman D.: 535,548 DRAGOON: 8n. See also ANVIL.
Courtelevant: 418, 419, 425, 426 Draguignan: 68,105,107,121,129,169
Crest: 147, 149, 150, 156, 159, 160, 175 Drome River: 147,149,159,164,166,167
Critchfield, Lt. Col. James H.: 165 Drulingen: 374,383,386
Crittenherger, Maj. Gen. Willis D.: 33n DUKWs: 44,78,202
Croix Haute Pass: 145, 150 Dunham, T. Sgt. Russell E.: 537n
Cuers: 124 Durance River: 84,130, 131,132, 133,134, 142,157
Cunningham, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew B.: 4n, Durstel: 451,459
24n, 82
Cunningham, Admiral Sir John H. D.: 24,24n Eagles, Maj. Gen. William W.: 37, 174, 175, 244, 276,
318, 341, 342, 476. See also Infantry Divisions, 45th.
D-day troop landings: 98-104 Eaker, Lt. Gen. Ira C.: 25, 29, 82
Dabo: 375 Eberbach: 482
Daho Road: 375,376 Ehersheim: 458
Dahlgren, Sgt. Edward C.: 558n Eddy, Maj. Gen. Manton S.: 384,465,466
Dahlquist, Maj. Gen. John E.: 37, 38, 117, 122-23, 146, Eden, Anthony: 12n
151, 152, 154, 155, 156-57, 163, 164, 168, 169, Edson, Lt. Col. Hallett D.: 545, 546
170,175,245,246,330,331,344,488 Eisenhower, General Dwight D.: 7, 9, 10-11, 13, 14,
Dambach-la-Ville: 457 14n, 15-16, 18-20, 21, 25-26, 28, 29-30, 50, 224,
Dannemarie: 417,419,420 225, 228-30, 253, 342, 343, 349, 351, 352, 353,
Davidson, Lt. Gen. Garrison H.: 31, 33n, 444 358, 359, 363, 438, 439, 440, 442, 445, 489, 490,
De Gaulle, General de Brigade Charles: 26, 27-28, 495, 496, 511, 512, 532, 555, 556, 563, 564,
357n,358,359,497,504,579 573-77, 579. See also Supreme Headquarters,
Deane, Maj. Gen. John R.: 12n Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF).
Decker, Lt. Gen. Karl: 498,519,521 Eloyes, battle of: 245, 246
Defense Area L a Rochelle: 135 Embermenil: 269, 270
Degener, Brig. Gen. Joachim: 191n Engineer units
Dehner, Lt. Gen. Ernst: 58, 184. See also German units, 10th Battalion: 396
Corps, Dehner. 36th Combat Regiment: 326n,398,509,521
Deleau, Sgt. Emile, Jr.: 558n 120th Battalion: 324
Delle: 418, 421, 425, 426 334th General Service Regiment: 132, 204
Demetz, Col. Andre: 31 540th Regiment: 509
Desert Training Center: 255 support by: 205
Deux Freres Point: 100 English, Capt. Robert A. J.: 31
Devers, Lt. Gen. Jacob L.: 24, 28-30, 33-34, 49, 87, Ensemble de Bitche: 471-75
193, 224-25, 231, 233, 238, 239, 252, 253-54, 255, Ensisheim: 539,541,549,551
256, 259, 269, 272, 299, 300-301, 309, 310, 311, Epinal, battle of:233,235,24245,248,256,257
323,334, 336, 342, 349, 351-52, 353-54, 357, 358, Erstein: 406, 436-37, 454, 455, 456, 457, 517, 522, 534,
359, 360, 363, 364, 368, 400, 406, 415, 419, 430, 541,548,551
432, 437, 438, 439, 440, 442, 443, 454, 457, 459, Esterel: 101, 114, 115, 121
495-96, 497,500,501-02, 504, 510,514, 515, 523, Etival-Clairefontaine: 387, 389, 391
527, 528, 531, 532, 534, 547-48, 556, 559, 562, E u r o p e a n T h e a t e r of Operations, U.S. Army
563-64, 574-75, 577, 578, 579. See also Army (ETOUSA): 29
Groups, 6th; North African Theater of Opera- Eywiller: 374, 383, 386, 449, 459
tions, U S . Army (NATOUSA).
Digne: 133,169 Fairbanks, Lt. Cmdr. Douglas E.: 104
Dijon: 173,183,184,191,205,223 Fait Road: 267, 268
Dio, Col. Louis J.: 374 Faite forest: 276, 278
Docelles: 247 Falaise Pocket: 56, 134, 228
Dockum, Col. Wilbur G.: 209. 210 Felher, Lt. Col. Joseph G.: 149, 320
Doenitz, Grand Admiral Karl: 56, 57n Felher Force: 320
INDEX 593
Fenetrange: 383,440, 449,504 339, 340, 351, 362, 363, 406, 408, 409, 411, 413,
Ferdrupt: 249 419, 428, 429, 430, 433, 445, 484, 486, 489, 492,
Field Artillery Battalions 514, 535, 548. See also Monsabert, Maj. Gen.
1st Observation: 408 Aime de Goislard de.
13th: 311 Expeditionary: 27, 39,40
59th Armored: 132 Divisions, Armored 126n, 131
141st: 328 1st: 40, 80, 172, 182, 183, 186, 223, 297, 298, 302,
575th: 408 306, 307, 308, 336, 359, 360, 415, 416, 418, 419,
602d: 39n 420, 422, 425, 426, 427, 431, 433, 464, 488,
630th: 408 492n, 493,551
697th: 408 2d: 27n, 223,239, 254,255,256,257, 264-65,271,
933d 408 275, 276, 334-35, 337, 339, 341, 342, 360, 365,
Field Artillery Brigade, 13th: 408 368, 371, 375, 376-79, 398, 401, 443, 449, 452,
Field Artillery Group, 36th: 408 453, 455, 456, 457, 458, 464, 488, 489n, 496,
Fighter-Bomber Group, 371st: 331 500, 501, 505, 517, 528, 535, 548, 559. See also
Fleet, U.S. Eighth: 24,31,46-47 Leclerc, Maj. Gen. Jacques.
Food supplies: 208-09,217-19 5th: 40, 302, 336, 408, 409, 414, 415, 419-20, 423,
Fooks, Col. Nelson I.: 399, 399n 424,431,517,547,548,550,551
Force 163: 31-33,35,38, 39 14th: 358,558
Forts Divisions, Infantry
Freudenberg: 472,473,474 1st: 40, 80, 129, 172, 181, 182, 183, 223, 297, 298,
Grand Hohekirkel: 471,472,474 336, 355, 356, 357-58, 359, 360, 408, 409, 410,
Otterbiel: 472 428,429,430,431,464,488,517,535,541,547
Schiesseck 472,473,474,475 2d Moroccan: 40, 183, 299, 356, 408, 409, 410,
Simserhof: 472,473,474,475 413,414,415,416,419,428,429,430,551
Fraize: 391,404,453 3d Algerian: 40, 80, 91, 175, 181, 182, 186, 188,
Franco-AmericanJoint Rearmament Committee: 46 190, 192, 297, 299, 302, 304, 305, 307, 308, 322,
Franz, Brig. Gen. Gerhard: 478 336, 340, 356, 388, 391, 402, 408-09, 428 429,
Frederick, Maj. Gen. Robert T.: 38, 77, 476, 508,509 430, 433, 453, 454, 517, 518, 522, 526, 527, 535,
Free French government: 41. See also De Gaulle, 559,560n
General de Brigade Charles. 4th Moroccan Mountain: 40, 183n, 307, 336, 356,
Frejus: 79, 113, 114, 117, 121, 123, 207 357, 408,551
Fremenil: 262 9 t h Colonial: 40, 91, 182-83, 299, 355, 356,
Fremifontaine: 278 357-58, 408, 409, 410, 413, 414-15, 416, 417,
French Department of National Defense: 358-59 418,419-20,422,539,551
French Forces of the Interior (FFI): 41-42, 68, 80-81, 10th: 551
84, 96-97, 104, 107, 142, 145, 149, 168, 174, 181, Combat Commands
204,211,336,355-57,408,428 CC1: 408n,414,415,420,422,427,541
French Provisional government: 357n CC2: 408, 409, 414, 416, 418, 421, 423, 424, 425,
French units: 26, 31, 41, 164, 174, 261, 306, 309, 355, 427
357 CC3: 408n,414,415n, 419,420,422,425n, 426n
Armies CC4 408,414,423,424
B. SeeArmies, First French. CC5: 408,414,424
First French: 31, 39-41, 47, 48, 50, 77, 80, 92, CC6 408,414,419,430
172, 209, 217-18, 224, 231, 238, 248, 252, 273, CCA: 286, 384, 396, 398-99, 400, 453, 455, 456,
297, 309, 336, 351, 355-60, 363, 384, 406, 457,466, 470,482,483,523,524,525
408-09, 410, 414, 415, 423, 429, 430, 431, 433, CCB: 451,482,515,518,523,524,558
454, 464, 491, 492, 496, 497, 533, 534, 537, 550, CC Caldiarou: 298
552, 555, 558. See also Lattre d e Tassigny, CCD: 337, 338,371,373,382,456,458
General Jean de. CC Deshazars. See CC Sudre.
of Free France: 26-27 CC Kientz: 181,298
North African French: 355,356 CCL (de Langlade): 371,374,375, 377,380,453
Corps CCR (Remy): 271n, 371, 372, 375, 382, 458, 470,
I: 40, 182, 183, 190, 197, 238, 239, 297, 299, 305, 507n
351, 363, 406, 408, 412, 413, 414, 422n, 423, CCS: 48-49
428, 429, 430, 432, 454, 489, 492, 539, 541, 551. CC Sudre: 41, 79-80, 91, 123-24, 126, 129,
See also Bethouart, Lt. Gen. Emile. 131-32,186,298
11: 40, 126, 127, 133-34, 183, 192, 223, 231, 233, CCV 375,380-81,382,453,458
234. 235. 238. 239. 249. 250. 273. 297. 298, 299, Regiments
304, 305, 308, 309-10, 311, 314, 320, 334, 336, 1stParachute Chasseur: 306, 308
594 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE
French units—Continued 178, 179, 192, 203, 232, 233, 244, 245, 246,
Regiments—Continued 247-49,250-51,253,26669,27640,297,298-99,
1st Spahis: 271n 305-09, 318, 321, 324, 328, 329, 331, 332, 336,
1st Tabor Infantry: 40 341, 344, 349, 351, 368, 370, 371, 374, 376, 377,
2d Algerian Spahis: 181,302 380, 382, 384, 386, 421-24, 425-28,429,433,454,
2d Parachute Chasseur: 42n 455,456,457,459,460- 62,468,470,473-75,476,
2d Tabor Infantry: 40 479, 480, 481, 483, 484-85, 486, 488, 489, 495,
3d Parachute Chasseur: 42n 505-10, 513, 514-15, 518-23, 524-26, 533, 537-
3d Tabor Infantry: 40 39,544-45,551,561,563,564
4th Tabor Infantry: 40 German troop strength: 56-62,69-70, 138
9th Zouaves Infantry: 358,360,408,416n German units: 63,64-65
Moroccan: 80,91,297,299, 302,306 Army Groups
Tirailleurs B: 56, 59n-60n, 63, 134, 173, 182n, 183, 191, 233,
4th Senegalese (21st Colonial Infantry Regiment): 269, 270, 338, 361, 467, 493. See also Rommel,
356n Field Marshal Erwin.
4th Tunisian: 188 G:56,58,59-65,66-67,84,85,86,9&97,105-06,
6th Moroccan: 307,308,416n 134-37, 173, 183, 184, 185, 186, 188, 190, 191,
6th Senegalese (6th Colonial Infantry Regiment): 197-98, 233, 234, 237, 245, 248, 250, 266, 269,
356n 338, 341, 361, 378-79, 389n, 409, 411, 414, 415,
7th Algerian: 141 416, 417, 420, 433, 434, 451, 466, 467, 480, 483,
13th Senegalese (23d Colonial Infantry Regi- 493, 498, 518, 548, 549, 557, 558. See also
ment): 356n Blaskowitz, General Johannes.
Battalions H: 378, 452, 548
2d African Chasseur: 419n Armies
3d African Chasseur: 250, 298 Army Area SouthernFrance: 58,70, 184
62d Armored Infantry: 507 Ligurian: 64
68th African Artillery, 2d: 419 First:59, 63, 191, 234, 261, 270, 305, 338, 361, 362,
Commando Groups: 44,92,98 364, 377, 378, 379, 411, 414, 416, 434, 436, 437,
African: 39, 40, 77, 99-101, 111, 120, 128-29, 137, 439,451,466,467,493,495,498,505,509,530
138 Fifth Panzer: 234-35, 237, 248, 250, 261-62, 263,
Task Forces 266, 269,270,274,275,276,278
Massu: 374, 376, 377, 380, 382 Nineteenth: 105, 106, 107, 130, 134-36, 164, 167, 168,
Miguel: 423-24 170, 173, 175, 180, 185, 186, 190, 191, 193, 194,
Minjonnet: 374,375,376,377 197-98,234,235-37, 245,247, 248,249, 261,270,
Quilichini: 373, 374, 377 274, 276, 304, 308, 316, 317, 325, 327, 332, 334,
Rouvillois: 374, 376-77, 380, 381 338-40,341,361-62, 370,376,377,379,384,389,
Miscellaneous 391, 403-04, 409, 410, 414, 417, 427, 433, 434,
1st Naval Fusiliers: 223 435, 436, 437, 453, 457, 467, 485, 486, 493, 513,
2d Dragoons: 223 517, 522, 533, 537, 538, 539, 548, 549, 555, 556,
13th Foreign Legion Demibrigade: 223 558, 563. See also Wiese, General Friedrich.
Air force: 46 Corps
Detachment Colonnier: 423 Command Vosges: 378
Group Molle: 408 Dehner: 165,184,188,189,191,192,235,409
Naval Assault Group: 39, 77, 100-101 Kniess. See Corps, LXXXV.
N a y : 47 IV LuftwaffeField: 70, 137, 142, 168, 174, 180, 181,
Fretter-Pico, Maj. Gen. Otto: 65, 68 184, 186, 188, 191, 192, 193, 248, 249, 251,
Friesenheim: 458 304-05, 306, 307, 317, 325, 338, 340, 362, 389,
Frohmuhl: 460 391, 403, 409, 414, 416, 417, 436. See also
Fuel: 204-06 Petersen, Lt. Gen. Erich.
XIII SS: 467, 498, 505, 509, 510, 513n
Gambsheim: 455, 477, 478, 513, 514, 515, 518, 521, XIV SS: 493n,513, 558
523,558 XXXIXPanzer: 498,518,521,522,523
Gap: 145,147,150,153 XLVIIPanzer: 239,250,261-62,266,270,274,280,
Gapeau River: 126,127,133 315,316
Gay, Brig. Gen. Hobart R.: 31 LVIIPanzer Reserve: 61-62
Gehan forest: 306, 307 LVIII Panzer: 59, 63, 261, 262, 263, 266, 267, 269,
Gerardmer: 403,406,428,453 270,338
German Air Force. See Luftwaffe. LXII:65, 67, 68, 69, 105, 107, 118, 132
German opposition: 62, 98, 103, 104, 105-08, 110-22, LXIII: 410, 416, 417, 430, 431, 454, 485n, 513n,
114-16, 129-32, 133, 140, 149-50, 153-62, 175, 538. See also Corps, Dehner.
INDEX 595
German units—Continued 159th Infantry: 184, 185, 186, 188, 189, 191, 192,
Corps—Continued 198, 235, 362, 410, 433-34, 454,485n, 538, 539,
LXIV: 63, 65, 70, 135, 174, 184, 186, 188n, 191, 541
192, 193, 215, 223, 235, 248, 249, 251, 275, 307, Reserve: 305
316, 317, 320, 325, 327, 338, 362, 365, 367, 370, 189th Infantry: 130, 136, 167, 177, 184, 191, 192n,
373,389,391,414,436,453,454,485n, 517,537 198, 235, 245, 251, 362, 410, 411, 414, 416,
LXVI: 184, 185, 191, 223, 235, 237, 244, 247, 248, 420-21,454,485n, 537, 538,549
250,257, 274 198th Infantry: 66, 67, 130, 131, 136, 137, 153, 155,
LXVI Reserve: 59,63 158, 163, 164, 166, 167, 168, 184, 185, 189, 191,
LXVIl Panzer: 275,276,278 192, 235, 248, 249, 250, 251, 259, 275, 305-06,
LXXV 136 316, 362, 391, 403-04, 409, 411, 416, 417, 420,
LXXX: 59,63 421, 422, 423, 426, 427, 428, 430, 432, 433, 434,
LXXXII: 467 436,454,457,537,538
LXXXV:59, 106, 130, 131, 136, 137, 142, 143, 153, 198th Volksgrenadier:513, 517,549
157, 161, 164, 167, 168, 174, 188, 191n, 192, 242d Infantry: 106, 108, 111, 113, 115. See also
235, 304, 305, 306, 338-39, 362, 409. See also Baessler, Maj. Gen.Johannes.
Kniess, Lt. Gen. Baptist. 244th Infantry: 65, 66, 67-68, 118, 119, 121, 128,
LXXXVI: 59, 62 129,130, 131, 140,305n, 410
LXXXX: 270, 316, 320, 325, 327, 338, 367, 373, 245th Volksgrenadier: 378, 380n, 452, 461, 467, 476,
374,377, 461,467, 498,505,509,522 477,479-80,481,483,488,518
XC: 454,467,472,484,498,505,522 256th Volksgrenadier: 378, 379, 386, 452, 462, 467,
401st Volks Artillery: 378, 379, 467 476,477,478,480,481,483,484,498,508,522n
404th Volks Artillery: 467,498 257th Volksgrenadier:498,508,522n
410th Volks Artillery: 498 269th Volksgrenadier: 336, 340, 362, 409, 411, 417,
Divisions: 60-63 421,433- 34,454,48511,517,518,538
Buercky:453-54 338th Infantry: 63, 66, 67, 106, 130, 136, 137, 143,
Panzer Lehr: 378-79, 383, 384, 386, 433, 434, 435, 161, 163, 164, 165, 167, 168, 183, 185, 189,
437,439,449,460,466,467,504 197-98, 235, 249, 305, 306, 325, 336, 362, 389,
Raessler: 467,468, 483 391, 410, 411, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 421,
2d Air: 59 433,454,485n, 538,549
2d Mountain: 518, 521,538,549 361st Volksgrenadier: 372-73, 374, 376, 378, 379,
5th Mountain: 136n 383-84,467,472,476,481,483,484,498,507
6th SSMountain: 498, 509,515, 520-21, 522, 529 405th Replacement: 237
7th Parachute: 498, 519,521, 522, 523 553d Volksgrenadier: 269-70, 338, 362, 367, 368,
10th SSPanzer: 498,521,522,523,525 370,371,373, 374,375,376,377,389,433,513
11th Panzer: 63, 66-67, 70, 130, 131, 136, 137, 141, 559th Volksgrenadier:498, 508
142-43, 150, 151, 153, 155, 157, 167, 168, 170, 708th Volksgrenadier:362, 367, 370, 371, 376, 379,
180, 183, 185, 188, 190, 191, 192, 198, 234, 237, 389,394,395,400,405,433,453,538,541,544
260,275,278,280,307, 467,521 716th Infantry: 184, 191, 192n, 198, 223, 235, 242,
15th Panzer Grenadier: 262, 266, 267, 268, 269 251, 259, 275, 316, 318, 320, 325, 327, 328, 341,
16th Infantry: 184, 185, 186, 235, 262, 266, 274, 342, 362, 389, 391, 395, 400, 405, 410n, 416,
275, 278, 280, 391, 405, 433. See also 16th 433,453,538,539
Volksgrenadier. Brigades
16th Volksgrenadier: 275n, 315-16, 318, 320, 324, Fortress Belfort: 409, 410
325, 326, 327, 343, 362, 389, 391, 403, 404, 416, 20th Volks Werfer: 498
454,485n,537-38, 549 106th Panzer: 266, 275-76, 305, 317, 327,362,426,
17th SSPanzer: 59,62,498-99,502,510 432,434,436,454,457,513,538
21st Panzer: 262, 266, 269, 275, 276, 315, 324, 326, 108th Panzer: 262
327, 337, 338, 339, 341, 362,467, 481,482, 483, 111th Panzer: 266
498,499,501,518,522 112th Panzer: 262,266
25th Panzer Grenadier: 379, 384, 386, 451, 454, 467, 113th Panzer: 234,262,266,267
472, 484,498,502,518,522 384th Assault Gun: 523
30th SS Grenadier: 41 1,421,422,426,427,485n 667th Assault Gun: 523
36th Volksgrenadier:498, 505, 509, 522n Groups
47th Infantry: 519,521,522 Battle Group Baessler: 131
49th Infantry: 378 Bauer: 186,223
90th Panzer Grenadier: 136n Browdowski: 185, 223
148th Infantry: 65, 69, 107, 115, 128, 136 Claer, von: 275
157th Mountain Reserve: 62, 70, 135, 150, 151 Degener: 191-92,235,275,305
596 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE
German units—Continued 933d Grenadier: 106,165,305,325,329,331,344
Groups—Continued 950th Indian: 184
Elster: 197 951st Grenadier: 341-42,362
Hax: 158,159,163,164,165 Battalions
Hoehne: 467, 468, 472, 476, 477, 478, 480, 481, Ost: 60, 108
483-84 Reichsfuehrer’sEscort: 523
Irmisch: 305 lst, 104th Panzer Grenadier: 263
Kipfler:305n Ist, 130th Panzer: 317, 326n
Oberrhein: 485, 493, 495, 513, 514, 522, 527, 537, Ist, 765th Grenadier: 112
539,548 2d, 5th Cossack: 185
Oelsner: 262,275 2d, 104th Panzer Grenadier: 268
Oppen, von: 305 2d, 765th Grenadier: 113,116,117-18
Ottenbacher: 185,223,235 3d, 104th Panzer Grenadier: 263
Navy West: 56, 58 3d, 198th Security: 185
Rauch: 185 4th, 200th Security Brigade: 185
Schwerin, von: 177, 185, 235, 275n 11th Panzer Reconnaissance, 11th Panzer: 158, 159,
Taeglichsbeck:185,223 162,179,268
Thieme: 154, 158-59 39th Machine Gun: 325n
Wilde: 158, 159, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167 42d Panzer Grenadier Replacement: 270
Regiments 51st Fortress Machine Gun: 268n
A/V: 275 56th Fortress Machine Gun: 270
Baur: 275 I03d Panzer: 275
C/V:
305 119th Replacement: 158, 163
Kessler: 69, 107 157th Antiaircraft: 185
Menke: 192 198th Fusilier: 325n
Wehrkreis V: 275, 305n, 316, 378, 410, 421, 513 201st Mountain: 316, 325, 326, 328, 391
Wehrkreis VII: 378,421 202d Mountain: 316, 325, 330, 331, 344,391
Wehrkreis XII: 378 280th Assault Gun: 421, 426, 427, 454, 538, 541,
8th Grenadier: 68 544
15th Grenadier: 106, 131 602d Mobile: 184,185,192n,325
15th Panzer (Groupe Thieme): 163 608th Mobile: 184, 185
18th Luftwaffe Flak: 106, 157 615th Ost: 185
19th SS Police: 235 653d Superheavy Antitank: 499
20th Parachute: 519 654th Antitank: 421, 426,427
22d Panzer: 275 654th Tank Destroyer (Panzerjaeger):538
63d Luftwaffe Infantry Training: 155, 157, 158, 163 661st Ost: 68, 69
71st Luftwaffe Infantry Training: 150, 167, 177 669th Engineer: 161
104th Infantry: 519 716thFusilier: 400
104th Panzer Grenadier: 268 807th Azerbaijani: 68
110th PanzerGrenadier: 161,163,165 990th Artillery: 185
111th Panzer Grenadier: 278 1038thAntitank: 113, 116
113th Panzer Grenadier: 267 1416th Fortress Infantry: 268n, 270
115th Panzer Grenadier: 268 Miscellaneous:
119th Panzer Artillery: 163 Admiral Atlantic Coast: 58
125th Panzer Grenadier: 275 Blocking Detachment Berkenhoff: 263
192d Panzer Grenadier: 275,481 Feldkommandantur 987: 378
239th Grenadier: 69, 121 Fighter Command Southern France: 59
242d Artillery: 68 Fortress Gironde North: 135
305th Grenadier: 106,158,159,161,162,163,165,166 Fortress Gironde South: 135
308th Grenadier: 161, 165, 166, 305, 306, 307, 327n, Kriegsmarine: 235,237
428 Naval Command French Riviera: 58
326th Grenadier: 159, 161, 166 Naval Command Languedoc: 58
360th Cossack Cavalry: 184 Ost Legions: 58, 70
490th Grenadier: 421 Regimental Group Usedom: 276
726th Grenadier: 185 Security Forces West:58
757th Grenadier: 165, 167, 362, 389,410n Staff Boineburg: 409
765th Grenadier: 68, 69 Task Force Liehr: 276
91 7th Grenadier: 68 Third Air Force: 56
918th Grenadier: 68 6th Security Flotilla: 58
932d Grenadier: 106,107 564th Liaison Staff: 135-36
INDEX 597
Gerry, Col. Harvey S.: 216,217 Herimoncourt: 416,417
Gerstung, T. Sgt. Robert F.: 484n Herren, Brig. Gen. Thomas W.: 500n
Gillivary, Sgt. Charles A,: 505n Herrlisheim: 478,523, 524, 525,526, 548, 558
Gilsa, Lt. Gen. Werner Freiherr von und zu: 316, 373, Hewitt, Vice Adm. Henry K.: 24-25, 43, 44-45, 50,
377 78-79,82,92,133
Giromagny: 429 HIATUS, Operation. See INDEPENDENCE, Operation.
Gironde Estuary: 359,360 High Vosges: 240-41, 304, 307, 309, 351, 379, 382,
Glay: 415 404-05,406,428,433,449,486,488,492,565
Glider Battalions: 102-04 Highways: 108n
550th Infantry Airborne: 38n-39n, 103,118 D-6 148,149,249
602d Field Artillery: 103 D-7: 324,325,326
Goering, Reichsmarschall Hermann: 56n-57n D-8/9: 393,393n
Gonfaron: 121, 126 D-11 (Tendon-Le Tholy): 259
Gothic Line: 20 D-19: 399
GRANDSLAM, Operation: 542 D-23: 340
Grandvillers: 245 D-25: 113
Grane: 159,162,164 D-32: 321,324,325,326,328
Graziani, Marshal Rodolfo: 64 D-35: 471,472,474
Great Britain. See British Chiefs of Staff;British units. D-36: 374
Greek Navy: 47 D-43: 308
Grenoble: 145, 146, 150, 151-52, 174, 205 D-44 273,274
Gries: 477 D-47: 276
Gross, Brig. Gen.Jean: 47, 48 D-50: 276,316
Guemar: 545 D-70: 278
Guerrillas, French. See French Forces of the Interior D-114 (Dabo): 375,376
(FFI). D-420: 332
Guillaume, Brig. Gen. Augustin: 336 GC-13: 425
Gundershoffen: 461, 478 N-4 (Paris-Strasbourg): 257, 264, 337-38, 366, 370,
Guthrie, Col.John S.: 576 371,373,374, 376,377,386
N-7: 119, 121, 126, 129, 132, 148, 149, 154, 156, 159,
Haeckel, Maj. Gen. Ernst: 327 160,162,163, 164,166
Haffner, Maj. Gen. Charles C . , Jr. See Infantry N-8: 130
Divisions, 103d. N-19: 235,410,420,424
Haguenau: 378, 379, 380, 383,386, 462,477,478,479, N-59: 262, 273, 336, 337, 338, 395, 397, 399, 402,
480, 481,482,492,519,526 403,404,436,453
Haines, Maj. Lloyd L.: 402n N-59A. 273,326,328,341,342
Haislip, Maj. Gen. Wade H.: 239, 255, 256, 257, 264, N-61: 374
265, 266, 268, 269, 272, 334, 360, 365, 366, N-62: 478
367-68, 371, 372, 373,380, 382-83,384, 386, 438, N-66: 304,338
439, 442, 452, 459, 460, 461, 462, 465, 466, 468, N-68: 427,455
471, 474-75, 490, 505, 508, 559, 564. See also N-73: 422
Corps, XV. N-83 (Hericourt-Belfort):415, 455, 458
Halloville: 370 N-97: 121
Hanson, Maj. Kermit R.: 246 N-98: 110,111, 112,113,115,120
Hantz Pass: 399 N-392: 371,395,399,400
Harbouey: 370 N-415: 273,314,322,399,403
Harmon, Lt. John F.: 544 N-417: 248,406,428
Harmony, Col. John W.: 150, 151, 152, 156, 159-60, N-419: 459,460,461,468
165n N-420: 273-74, 278, 314, 317, 320, 324, 325, 326,
Harrirnan, W. Averill: 12n 327,328,330,333,343,344,388,399,400,402
Harris, Brig. Gen. Frederick M.: 500n N-422: 458
Harth forest: 486 N-424 341,397,399
Hatten: 482,519, 520, 521, 523 N-435: 337,338
Hauser, Lt. Gen. Paul: 527,548,549,557 N-463: 418,419,421,423,425,426,427,437
Hazelhourg: 379 N-486 (Lure-Le Thillot): 239, 249-50, 298, 299, 304,
Heintges, Col. John A.: 542 307,308
Heming: 375 N-559: 108,110,111
Henamenil: 262 Hills
Herbeviller: 338 294: 149
Hericourt: 410,416,417 300: 149,154,156,158,159,160,162,163,165,166
598 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE
Hills—Continued 2d, 180th Infantry: 113,119,280
385: 278,280,315, 318 2d, 314th Infantry: 268
422: 278,279,280 2d, 442d Infantry: 330
430: 149,156,158, 162,164,165,166 2d Chemical Mortar: 408
443: 393,394 3d, 15th Infantry: 111
484 280 3d, 30th Infantry: 111, 324, 328n, 542, 543, 545-46
489: 278 3d, 36th Engineers: 341
539: 393,394 3d, 141st Infantry: 113, 114, 115, 245, 246, 247, 329,
616: 328,343 331
624 329 3d, 142d Infantry: 162,165,245,457
645: 329,331,332 3d, 157th Infantry: 112, 165
1003 (Le Haut du Faing): 307 3d, 180th Infantry: 113
Himmler, Heinrich 493, 513,517, 518, 539, 548 3d, 314th 268
Hitler, Adolf: 53, 55, 56, 63-65, 67, 87, 134, 136, 173, 111th Engineer: 159
183, 185, 234, 237, 250, 378, 386, 435, 436, 437, 111th Medical: 132
468, 485, 493, 494, 495, 499, 505, 509, 518, 521, 41 1th Infantry: 455, 456
522,527,548,555,557,558 Infantry Divisions
Hodge, Lt. Col. CharlesJ.: 178 3d: 36, 37, 78, 79, 80, 90, 126, 131, 139, 142, 143,
Hoehne, Lt. Gen. Gustav: 377, 468, 475, 479-80, 483, 161, 163, 164, 165, 170, 175, 177, 181, 186, 188,
484,498,521,526 189, 195, 205, 206, 211, 232, 235, 239, 240, 248,
Holtzwihr: 543,544,546,547 249-50, 259, 275, 298, 306, 313, 314, 315, 318,
Hombourg: 423,436 320, 324, 325, 328, 332, 342-43, 387, 388, 389,
Hospital units 395-96, 398, 400, 401, 443, 449, 453, 455, 465,
2d Convalescent: 211 475, 477, 488, 489, 501, 535, 537, 541, 542, 543,
36th General: 212 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552-55, 560n. See also
46th General: 212 Beaches, Alpha; O’Daniel, Maj. Gen. John E.
Hottviller: 471, 472, 473, 474 “Iron Mike.”
Hudelson, Col. D. H.: 507-08 15th: 110, 111, 112
Hull, Cordell: 12n 24th: 556
Huninque: 422, 423 28th: 534,535, 541, 547,548,551,559
Huninque Canal: 427 30th: 110, 111, 249-50
Hyde, Henry: 88 35th: 547,556,559
Hyeres 36th: 36, 37, 38, 113-17, 120, 121, 123, 126, 132,
Islands: 91, 138 134, 142, 145, 147, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155-56,
Roadstead 74,76 157-58, 164, 169, 170, 175, 177, 178, 181, 186,
206, 231, 235, 238, 239, 240, 245-48, 249, 250,
Igney: 244 259, 275, 280, 313, 314, 315, 318, 320, 324, 325,
I11 River: 453, 488, 489, 517, 538, 542, 543, 544, 547, 329, 331-32, 343-44, 345, 387-88, 391, 399,
551 402-04, 428, 443, 449, 453, 454, 455, 457, 458,
INDEPENDENCE,Operation: 395-60, 415, 419, 431, 432, 459, 464, 484, 486, 500, 501, 504, 508, 509n, 515,
464,486,533 523, 526, 527, 558, 560n. See also Dahlquist, Maj.
Infantry Battalions Gen. John E.
lst, 7th Infantry: 111 42d: 465,500,514,526,527,560n
lst, 15th Infantry: 111,546 44th: 270, 337, 338, 365, 368, 370, 371, 380, 383,
Ist, 30th: 542,543, 544 449,451,452,459,460,500,505,558-59,560n
Ist, 141st (“The Lost Battalion”): 114-15, 121, 246, 45th: 36, 37, 78, 79, 111, 112, 121, 123, 126, 142,
329-32 143, 152, 164-65, 177, 181, 186, 192, 233, 238,
lst, 143d: 159, 162, 165 239, 242, 245, 247-48, 250, 257, 259, 260, 274,
Ist, 157th Infantry: 112-13 275, 276, 314, 315, 318, 319, 320, 323-24, 328,
lst, 180th Infantry: 113 339, 342, 365, 373, 380, 387, 401, 449, 452, 460,
lst, 313th Infantry: 268 461, 465, 475, 478, 479, 480, 484, 483, 500, 501,
Ist, 398th Infantry: 399 514n, 515, 520, 521,560n. See also Beaches, Delta;
lst, 399th Infantry: 399 Eagles, Maj. Gen. William W.
2d, 7th Infantry: 111 49th: 378n
2d, 15th Infantry: 112 63d: 465,500,505,508,558-59
2d, 114th Infantry: 386 70th: 465,500, 508,527,558-59
2d, 141stInfantry: 113, 114-15, 121, 329 71st: 368,370,373,470,472-74
2d, 142d: 156 75th: 547,548, 550,556,559
2d, 143d Infantry: 115,132 79th: 254, 255, 256, 264, 265, 266-68, 269, 270, 368,
2d, 157th Infantry: 113 370, 371, 374, 375, 376, 380,382, 383, 449, 452,
INDEX 599
Infantry Divisions—Continued 398th: 395,468,474,475
79th-Continued 399th: 392-93,394,400
461, 462, 465, 475, 476, 477, 478, 480, 481, 482, 409th: 343,401-02,480,482
483, 484, 500, 508, 509, 514n, 515, 518, 523, 526, 410th: 343,401-02,478-79
527,560n 411th: 343,401-02,455,456,478,480,483
80th: 470, 490 442d 38,329,331,332,
85th: 36 Ingwiller: 460, 461, 468
100th: 342, 351, 376, 387, 388, 389, 392-401, 433, Intelligence
449, 452, 461, 465, 468, 470, 474, 501, 505, 508, Allied 50, 64, 65, 84, 85-89, 122, 134, 168, 173, 220,
526,560n 270,316,379,533,564.See also ULTRA.
103d: 343, 351, 387, 389, 392, 396, 397, 398, 399, German: 105-06, 128, 174, 305,548
401-02. 449, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, Invasion Training Center, Seventh Army: 90
465, 475, 476, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 484, 491, Ismay, General Sir Hastings: 12n
509,513,515,521, 522,526,527,560n,570 Issy-les-Doubs: 298
Infantry Regiments Italian campaign: 7, 10, 11, 14-15, 18, 23, 32, 37-38,
7th: 100,108,110-11,120-21,128-29,166,249,320, 63, 64-65,214
331, 324, 325, 328-29, 343, 344, 396, 397, 400,
480n, 541,542,547,550 Japanese-Americans. See Regimental Combat Teams:
15th: 111, 166, 249, 324, 325, 326, 328, 342, 343, 442d.
382,387,395-96,400,541,545,547,550 Jarmenil: 247,273
30th: 121, 166, 259, 313-14, 315, 320, 324, 325, 326, Jebsheim: 546,547
328,343,396,397,400,455,541,542-47,550 Jedburgh teams: 42
37th: 120 Jenkins, Maj. Gen. Reuben: 577
71st: 383, 384, 451,452, 459 Joint Air Commission: 46
114th: 368,383,384, 451,452,459,460,468,474 Joint Chiefs of Staff: 3-5, 7-8, 11, 14, 15-16, 17, 18, 19,
141st: 129, 145, 150, 154, 156, 159, 161, 164, 165, 20,21
167, 246, 248, 259, 322, 329, 330, 331, 343-44, Joint Rearmament Commission: 47
457,508,523n Juin, Gen. Alphonse: 497
142d: 114, 115-18, 121, 122-23, 129, 145, 150, 152, JuraAlps: 181
153, 156, 160, 162, 164, 166, 167, 246-47, 248,
259,344,453,457,523n Kaltenhouse: 478
143d: 121, 129, 145, 146, 151, 152, 153, 154, 156, Kaysersberg: 489,541,551
159, 160, 164, 167, 168, 246, 259, 313, 315, Kefurt, S. Sgt. Gus: 489n
321-22,329,344,457,523n Kehl: 381,382
157th: 112,119,129,131,160,162,163,164,174-75, Kembs: 423,486
177, 178, 242, 244, 245, 257, 276, 278, 313, 318, Kesselring, Field Marshal Albert: 63, 64
324, 326, 328, 341, 342, 383, 452, 460, 476, 478, King, Admiral ErnestJ., 4n, 12-13
480,483,509,520-21 Kluge, Field Marshal Guenther von: 55, 56
179th: 113, 129, 131, 151, 152-53, 174,177, 242,245, Kniess, Lt. Gen. Baptist: 66, 130-31, 136, 142, 153, 155,
257-58, 276, 278, 279, 280, 313, 314, 315, 318, 157, 161, 162, 164,165, 166. See also German units,
324,326,328,341,380,382,476,478,452,508 Corps, LXXXV
180th: 115, 153, 175, 178, 190, 242, 244-45, 257-58, Knobelsdorff, General Otto von: 379,451,467
276, 278, 279-80, 313, 314-14, 318, 324, 328, Koenig, Lt. Gen. Pierre: 41
341-42,476,478,479,480,483,508 Kraft: 458
222d: 518 Krancke, Admiral Theodor: 56
232d: 518 Krueger, Lt. Gen. Walter: 266, 268
242d: 518,519
254th: 541,546,551 La Blette River: 338, 339
274th: 509,515 La Bourgonce: 326,327,328
275th: 509 La Bresse: 307,339, 340, 428
276th: 508,515 La Cote: 235
308th: 330n La Coucourde: 149,159,160,161,163,165
313th: 255, 261, 267, 270, 375, 462, 477, 478, 489, La Forge: 314
508,518 La Houssiere: 344
314th: 200, 255, 261, 26’7, 375, 376, 377, 462, 47’7, La Longine: 235
478,480,508,518 La Mole: 100, 111, 121
315th: 255, 261, 267, 268, 270, 377, 378, 462, 480, La Motte: 120
508,518,519 LaNapoule: 76,79, 114, 115, 122
324th: 368,370,374, 452, 460,468,470,472-73 La Petite-Pierre: 374, 37’7
397th: 392-93, 399,460,468 La Roche: 298
600 RIVIERA T O THE RHINE
La Rochelle: 359 Loriol: 158, 165, 166, 167
La Roquebrussanne: 129 Lorraine: 253
La Trouche: 395 “The Lost Battalion.” See Infantry Battalions, lst, 141st.
La Wantzenau: 499,455,477 Low Vosges: 374, 376, 439, 449n, 454, 459, 460, 461,
Lafrimbolle: 371,374 465, 466, 468, 476, 480, 482, 495, 500, 505, 508,
Lagarde: 362,372 509
Lake Berre: 136 Luettwitz, Lt. Gen. Heinrich Freiherr von: 262, 263,
Langres: 191,223 275
Largue River: 419,421,426 Luftwuffe: 118, 136, 140, 165, 168, 235, 237, 263, 275,
Larkin, Maj. Gen. Thomas B.: 24,49 529
Larminat, Lt. Gen. Edgar de: 137, 138,140, 140n,579 Luneville: 237, 239, 256, 261, 262, 263, 337, 438,501
Lattre de Tassigny, General Jean de: 27-28,41, 80, 123, Lure: 232,239,298,406
132, 133, 134, 137, 140, 141, 171, 172, 182-83, Luxevil: 232
193, 194-95, 225, 231, 239, 255, 297, 298, Luze: 416
299-300, 301, 307n, 308-09, 336, 340, 351, 353, Lyon: 173,174,181,205
355-60, 363, 406, 408, 411, 413, 414, 415, 416,
419, 420, 422, 423, 425, 428, 429, 430, 431-32, McGarr, Col. Lionel C.: 542-44
454, 464, 484, 486, 488, 489, 497, 501, 510, 515, McNair, General LesleyJ.: 225, 225n
517, 522, 533, 534, 535, 547, 548, 549, 551, 555, McNarney, Lt. Gen. Joseph T.: 323
558,559,562,578 Macon: 178, 181
Lauter River: 481,482-83,484,492,514,518 Magdeleine woods: 325, 326,327, 328, 343, 387
Lauterbourg: 482, 483, 492, 499, 500, 504, 507, 509, Maginot Line: 234, 470,471, 479,494, 496, 514,518
518,522,523,527,529 Maison Rouge: 542,543,545,547
Laval: 316, 318 Malmedy Massacre: 521
Layet Point: 120-21 Mannheim: 440
Le Bonhomme Pass: 404,488 Manpower replacement: 209-11
Le Haut Jacques Pass: 327,328-29,313 Manteuffel, Lt. Gen. Hasso von: 234, 262, 266, 268,
Le Hohwald: 436,455 276,278,280
Le Lavandou: 121 Marboz: 178, 179
Le Luc: 107,111,124,126,129 Marckolsheim: 549,551
Le Muy: 77, 79, 80, 101, 114, 118, 120, 121, 123, 126, Marie-aux-Mines:404
129,169 Maritime (Provence) Alps: 73
Le Thillot: 239, 298, 299, 302, 304, 307,338, 409 MARKET-GARDEN,Operation: 228, 238, 253
Le Tholy: 248, 259, 313-14, 316, 340, 344, 406, 408, Marsanne: 149, 151, 160
409,428 Marseille: 21, 51, 62, 66, 67, 71, 130, 131, 134, 136, 137,
Leahy, Admiral William D.: 4n 140,141,151,164,170,201,203-04,219
Lease, Lt. Gen. Sir Oliver W. H.: 24 Marshall, General George C.: 4, 4n, 11-12, 15, 18, 41,
Leclerc, General Jacques: 255, 256, 334, 337, 351, 371, 301,573,574
375, 376, 382, 433, 453, 455, 458, 488, 489, 510, Marshall, S. L. A,: 570-71
517, 534, 551, 579. See also French units, Divisions, Masevaux: 436, 437
Armored, 2d. Massif Central: 59, 71
Lee, 2d Lt. Daniel W.: 179n Massif de 1’Esterel: 73
Lees (RAAF), Group Capt. R. B.: 31 Massif des Maures: 73, 75, 76, 111, 112, 119, 121
Leintrye: 368 Maxonchamp: 249
Lembach: 480,482 Medical Corps support: 209, 211-12
LesArcs: 118,119,120,126,128 Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF): 25, 43,
Les Rouges Eaux: 274,320,324,325,329,330,344 81-82,90,91-92,97,99,207
Lewis, Rear Adm. Spencer S.: 117,122 Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force: 25, 44
Linden, Brig. Gen. Henry H.: 500n Mediterranean Allied Strategic Air Force: 25, 43-44,
Lindquist, Col. Carl F. 331n 213
Lisaine River: 415, 416 Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force (MATAF): 25,
L‘Isle-sur-les-Doubs: 192 31,44,213- 14,216
Livron: 165, 166, 175 Mediterranean Base Section: 47
Lloyd, Air Vice Marshal Sir Hugh P.: 25 Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army
Lodge, Lt. Col. Henry Cabot: 577 (MTOUSA):24n
Loechle: 423 Meigs, Lt. Col. Montgomery C.: 470,470n
Logan, Maj. James W.: 524,525 Melay: 249, 250
Logistics: 4652, 137, 169, 199-202, 205, 219, 256, 270, Melton, PFC Benjamin: 521n
299-301,311,313,322,349,351-52,559,563 Mertzwiller: 461,476, 479
Loisy, 1st Lt. Jean Carrelet de: 419n Merviller: 337, 341
INDEX 601
Meurthe River: 237, 239, 273, 274, 314, 325, 326, 333, Niederbronn: 476, 478
334, 337, 341, 343, 388, 389, 391, 393, 395, 396, Niederhoff: 375
397,402 Niederroedern: 480,481,482
Meximieux: 175, 178,180 Noir Guenx: 246
Milburn, Maj. Gen. Frank W.: 535,547 NORDWIND, Operation: 495, 502-10, 511, 515, 527,
Military command arrangements: 24-34 529,564,571,581
Military GovernorFrance: 56 North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army
Military Railway Service, 1st: 207 (NATOUSA): 7n, 24,46,202,323
Mittersheim: 383 Northern Base Section: 47
Model, Field Marshal Walter: 56 Nothweiller: 484
Moernach: 419 Novosel, Lt. Col. Nicholas: 524, 525
Molsheim: 380, 382, 453 Nyons: 152,156,162
Mondon forest: 261, 262, 264, 337, 368
Monsabert, Maj. Gen. Aime de Goislard de: 137-38, OberbefehlshaberSouthwest (OB Southwest): 54-55, 63-65,
139, 140-42, 182, 239, 297, 298, 299, 301-02, 86, 136
306, 308, 309, 310, 336, 340, 430, 430n, 431, OberbefehlshaberWest (OB West):53-56,57, 58, 63-65,86,
489, 517, 542, 547, 548. See also French units, 87, 106, 135, 173-74, 184, 191, 250, 251, 270, 351,
Corps, II. 377, 378, 379, 434, 435, 436, 437, 457n, 466, 484,
Monswiller: 376 485, 493, 499, 530, 548, 557. See also Rundstedt,
Montbeliard: 183, 198, 416, 423,424 Field Marshal Gerd von.
Montbronn: 468 Oberkommando des Hemes (OKH):58
Montelimar Oberkommando der Knegsmanne (OKM):56
battle: 145, 147-49, 167-70,206,213,215 Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL):56
city: 165 Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW): 53-56, 59, 63,
Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Bernard 13, 14n, 225, 64-65, 87, 134-35, 136, 170, 173, 190, 234, 262,
228, 229, 253, 349, 353, 443, 574, 576, 577. See also 377, 378, 384, 416, 417, 435, 436, 437, 457n, 485,
British units, 21st Army Group. 522,537,550,557,558
Montigny: 370, 371 Oberstinzel: 374
Montrevel: 178, 179, 180 Obstfelder, Lt. Gen. Hans von: 467,509,510,522
Morbieux Pass: 306 O’Daniel, Maj. Gen.John E. “Iron Mike”: 37, 111, 162,
Morgan, Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick E.: 415 189, 192, 249, 250, 259, 298, 341, 343, 395-96,
Morison, Samuel Eliot: 122 400, 541, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 549. See also
Mortagne Infantry Divisions, 3d.
forest: 278 Offenburg: 406
river: 276, 315, 318, 320, 324, 341 Offendorf: 515,524,558
Mortain: 55-56,134 Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and 36th Division
Morvillars: 417, 418, 421 detachment: 42,88-89,104,331
Moselle River: 232, 235,239,244, 248,251,298 Ogeviller: 270, 337
Moselotte River: 240, 306, 339, 340 Ognon River: 191,192
Mouchard: 183 Operations Base 901: 47-48
Mouterhouse: 468,520 Oran: 47
Mulhouse: 422, 426, 427, 429, 431, 433, 436, 437, 454, Orange: 161,162
486,492,538,539 Ordnance Group, 55th: 209
Murphy, 2d. Lt. Audie L.: 111n, 546-47,547n Orgon: 142, 143
Murray, 1st Lt. Charles P., Jr.: 489n Oschmann, Maj. Gen. Hans: 413,414
Mutzig: 401,402 Ost unit: 68
Otterbiel: 474
Nancy: 191, 234, 237 Ottmarsheim: 427
Naples: 33, 47,91 OVERLORD, Operation: 5, 9, 10, 12, 13-14, 18, 19, 23,
Naval bombardment: 110, 112,114, 117, 140 41,54-55, 134,223,573
Navy planners: 8,44 Owens. Col. Charles H.: 331
Nehwiller: 480
Neuenburg: 539,557 Paget, General Sir Bernard C. T.: 24n
Neuf-Brisach: 536,547,548,549,551 Pampelone Bay: 201
Neufmaisons: 393 Parachute units
Neuling, Lt. Gen. Ferdinand: 65, 68,69, 105, 132 Battalions
Neune River: 314,315,320, 327,344 Ist, 517th Infantry: 102
Neunhoffen: 507 2d, 517th Infantry: 102
Nice: 65, 218 3d, 517th Infantry: 102, 119
Nieder Schlettenbach: 484 460th Field Artillery: 39n, 102
602 RIVIERA TO THE RHINE
Parachute units—Continued Provencheres-sur-Fave:402
Battalions—Continued Provisional Reconnaissance Squadron, 3 d 129
463d Field Artillery: 39n, 101 Provisional Troop Carrier Air Division: 39, 51
509th Infantry: 38n, 101,104,111-12,113,118 Puy St. Martin: 149, 150, 154, 158
551st: 38n, 102-03,118
Regiments QUADRANT Conference: 9
517th: 38n, 118 Quinn, Col. William W.: 88-89, 151n,502-03
517th Combat Team: 101-02
Parkman, Col. Henry, Jr.: 216,217 Rahme Pass: 306
Parroy: 261,262,263-69 Railway Grand Division, 703d: 207
Patch, Lt. Gen. Alexander M.: 28,32-34,41, 43,45, 77, Railway Operating Battalion, 713th: 207
80, 82, 87, 123, 125, 131, 132, 133, 134, 142, 143, Rambervillers
144, 146-47, 151, 169-70, 171, 173, 174, 181-83, city: 235, 239, 248, 250, 257, 266, 271, 273, 274, 276,
193, 194-95, 223, 225, 231, 232, 235, 238, 239, 313,314, 318,326,327,341,342
252, 253, 254, 256, 259, 270, 272, 273, 299, 323, forest: 314, 315, 324, 325, 333, 341
334, 336, 353, 363, 365, 372, 379-80, 400, 438, Ramstein: 440,449
442, 444, 452, 454, 457, 459, 497, 534, 537, 547, Raon-aux-Bois:246
559, 562, 563, 564, 569, 570, 577-78. See also Raon-I’Etape: 311, 314, 326, 327, 334, 339, 341, 342,
Armies, Seventh. 362,376,389,391,394,399-400,433
Patton, Lt. Gen. George S., Jr.: 30, 31, 253, 254, 259, Rasp, Lt. Gen. Siegfried 485, 486, 517, 537, 538, 539,
264, 353, 363, 438, 439, 440, 442, 443, 465, 466, 549-50,557
490, 491, 499,563,578. See also Armies, Third. Rastatt: 437,491
Peden, T5g. Forrest E.: 551n Ratzwiller: 468,470
Peninsular Base Section: 47 Rauwiller: 374, 384, 386
Petersen, Lt. Gen. Erich: 65, 150, 150n, 468, 475, 498. Rayol Beach: 99
See also German units,Corps,
IV Luftwaffe Field. Real Martin River: 126, 127,133
Petit, Col.Jean L.: 31 Rear Force 163: 31
Pfetterhouse: 426,427,428 Rechesy: 426,427,428
Phalsbourg: 376,377,501,504 Reconnaissance Troop, 45th: 113
Philippsbourg: 480 Regimental Combat Teams
Pierrefeu: 121 142d: 322
Plaine River: 393,399 143d: 322
Plan de la Tour: 112-13 157th: 160
Plancher-les-Mines:428 191st: 160
Planning 442d:313,315,318,319,320,322,343-44,358
Allied: 3-5, 7-8, 15-16, 23, 30-37, 95-97, 98, 110, Remiremont: 233,235,245,246-47,248,320,406
133-34, 137, 171-73, 181, 183, 219-20, 238-40, Remy, Col.Jean S.: 271n
272-74, 276, 298, 301-04, 311-15, 320, 349, Replacement Depot, 2 d 209-10
351-55, 359-60, 363-64, 365-69, 371-73, 379-80, Rhinau: 486,513,514,517,522
387-89, 392, 394-96, 398,402,412, 417, 420, 422, Rhine-Marne Canal: 256, 261-62, 263, 266, 271, 362,
424-25, 428, 429, 430, 453-55, 456, 457-60, 365,366,367,373,376,389,497
475-76, 477-78, 484, 486, 489-91, 492, 496, Rhine River: 406, 419, 425, 427, 437, 438, 440, 442,
502-05, 527, 533-37, 541, 542, 573-81. See also 480, 486, 488, 489, 492, 499, 500, 501, 513, 514,
ANVIL, planning. 517,518,522,533,538,539,547,550,557,558
German: 53-56, 63-65, 128, 134-36, 171, 173-74, Rhone-Rhine Canal: 417, 418, 419, 420, 425, 426, 429,
175-77,180,183-86,233-34,248,252-54,274-76, 517,547,550-51,557
327, 338-39, 361, 377-79, 386, 391-92, 393, 394, Rhone River: 71,73,96,136,142,147,167, 179, 174
395, 396, 397, 398-400, 402, 403-04, 405, 411, Richeval: 371
435,436,437,451-52,493-95,521,537 Richtere, Brig. Gen. Otto: 166
Plobsheim: 464 Riedseltz: 483
Polish Navy: 47 Riedwihr: 543,544,545,546,547
POL (petroleum, oil, lubricant) supplies: 47,50, 51, 52 Rimling: 505
Pont d’Ain: 175 Rittershoffen: 519, 520, 521, 523
Port Cros: 77,98-99 Rohrbach: 470
Port-de-Bouc: 204,205 Rohrwiller: 558
Portal, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles: 4n Rommel, Field Marshal Erwin: 56, 572. See also German
Porter, Maj. Gen. Ray E. 548 units, Army Groups, B.
Position de Mutzig: 380n, 382n Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 3, 4,9, 20, 26
Pound, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley: 4n Rosenau: 406,419,423
Pozzouli: 90 Ross, PFC Wilburn K.: 328n
INDEX 603
Rothbach Saverne: 366, 371, 376, 377, 386, 433, 452, 465, 561,
city: 461 563
river: 526 Saverne Gap: 266,269,365,366-67,376,377,437, 501,
Rott: 482 510
Roubion River: 147, 148, 149, 154, 156, 158, 164 Schack, Maj. Gen. Friederich-August: 413,414, 538
Rouffach: 551 Schalbach: 384,386
Rougemont-le-Chateau: 429 Scheibenhard/Scheibenhardt: 482, 483
Ruhfus, Rear Adm. Heinrich: 138,140 Schelde Estuary: 228,233,349
Rundstedt, Field Marshal Gerd von: 55, 56, 234, 237, Scherwiller: 458
250, 251, 361, 377, 378, 379, 383, 384, 386, 420, Schirmeck 399,400
435, 436, 466, 467, 468, 475, 484, 493, 494, 495, Schirrhein: 478
505,548,549,557. See also Oberbqehlshaber West (OB Schleithal: 482, 484
West). Schmidt-Hartung, Maj. Gen. Otto: 135
Kupt: 249,259,298 Schulten, Capt. Leo B.: 117
Rupt-sur-Moselle:249 Schutzstaffel (SS): 339-40
Schwalb River: 471,473
Saales Pass: 273 Schweighofen: 484
Saar River: 449,459 Schwerin, Maj. Gen. Richard von: 106-07, 118, 119,
Saarbrucken: 492,499,502,559 130
Sabotage: 96 Selestat: 273, 405, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 486,
Sachs, Lt. Gen. Karl: 135 489,517,538,571
St. Amarin: 486 Seltz: 480, 482
St. Ame: 247, 248,259,307 Seppois: 419,421, 422,426,427,428,434,437
St. Avold: 491 Services of Supply (SOS NATOUSA): 24,46,47,48-49,
St. Aygulf: 113 51,205
Ste. Barbe: 341,342 Sete: 71, 73
St. Benoit: 341 Sewen: 429
St. Blaise-la-Roche:399, 400 SEXTANT Conference: 11
Ste. Croix-aux-Mines:404,453 Sicily: 5, 9, 31, 33
St. Die: 239-40, 273, 274, 311, 325, 342, 343, 362, 389, Siegfried Line: 233
391,401,402,438,439 Siersthal: 468, 470, 471
Ste. Helene: 259, 276, 278 Siewiller: 374
St. Leonard 332,344,345,387,402,403 Signal Corps: 205, 212-13
St. Lo: 55 Silk, 1st Lt. Edward A,: 399n
St. Loup: 232 Simon, General Max: 498,595
Ste. Marie-aux-Mines:403, 404, 436 Sisteron: 124, 132, 134, 144, 145, 151, 152
Ste. Maxime: 73, 78, 113, 201, 207 SIessor, Air Marshal SirJohn C.: 25
St. Maximin: 126, 127, 131 Smith, Brig. Gen. Albert C.: 465
St. Michel-sur-Meurthe:396 Smith, General Walter Bedell: 14n,497, 534
St. Quirin: 375, 398 Soldier, combat life of: 212, 565-72
St. Raphael: 73, 111, 113, 114, 115-16, 119-20, 121, Somerville, General Brehon B.: 225,225n
122,124,206 SONNENWENDE (“Winter Solstice”), Operation: 513,
St. Tropez: 73, 111, 112, 113, 201 517,518,533,538
St. Vit: 189, 190, 191 Soufflenheim: 380,480
Salerno: 90,91 Soultz-sous-Forets:482
Salmbach: 482 Spaatz, Lt. Gen. Carl: 25
Saone River: 71,173,180,183,191 Special Force Headquarters (SFHQ):41
Sapois: 340 Special Projects Operations Center: 41,42
Sardinia: 7, 8, 9 Special Service Force, 1st: 38, 39, 45, 77, 90-91, 92, 98,
Sarraltroff: 373,374 183,357,480n
Sarre Blanche River: 375 Sperrle, Field Marshal Hugo: 56
Sarre River: 373, 374, 384, 386, 439, 440, 492, 495, 498, Spragins, Maj. Gen. Robert L.: 270, 338, 368
501,505,508,509,558 Stack, Brig. Gen. Robert I.: 145, 146-47, 150
Sarre-Union: 451,467 Stalin, Joseph: 11, 12
Sarrebourg: 257,261,365, 373, 374,377,386,417,433, Steele, Col. Clyde E.: 165n
438,501,523n Strasbourg: 239, 240, 366, 378, 380-82, 401, 434, 437,
Saulcy-sur-Meurthe:338, 362, 389,402 438, 453, 454, 455, 465, 475, 488, 492, 497, 498,
Saulieu: 223 500,504,511,513,527,534
Saulxures: 400 Strategic Air Force: 25
Sauzet: 148,149,150,154,156 Strategy. See Planning.
604 RIVlERA TO THE RHINE
Stulpnagel, Lt. Gen. Karl Heinrich von: 56-57 Topography: 71-75,108,110,138,170
Suarce: 421,425,426,434 Toulon: 21, 51, 66, 67, 71, 73, 75, 111, 114, 119-20,
Sudre, Brig. Gen. Aime M.: 41, 132, 308n 121, 122, 124, 130, 131, 134, 136, 138-40, 151,
Supreme Commander Allied Forces 164,170,201,203-04
NO. 114 (SCAF-114): 352-53 Trans-en-Provence:120
No. 118: 353 Transportation: 205-08, 210, 212. See also DUKWs.
No. 119: 359 Travexin: 308
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force Trets: 131
(SHAEF): 13, 193,194,195,198,216,217,223-30, TRIDENT Conference (1943): 5 , 7
254, 325, 358, 359, 419, 439, 488, 490, 496, 497, Trier: 233
500, 502, 504, 522,527, 530,534,547, 559, 579. See Troop Carrier Command, IX 39
also Eisenhower, General Dwight D. Troubridge, Rear Adm. T. H.: 44
Surbourg: 480,481,482 Truscott, Maj. Gen. Lucian: 37, 45, 64, 78, 79, 82, 84,
151, 151n. See also Corps, VI.
Tactical Air Command, XII: 25,44 Twining, Maj. Gen. Nathan F.: 25, 87, 122, 123-25,
Tactical Air Force, XII: 208,470, 472 126-28, 131-32, 133, 142-43, 144, 145, 146-47,
Tactics. See Planning. 151, 153, 157, 160, 162, 163, 168, 170, 174, 175,
Taintrux River: 314,343,344,401 178, 180, 181-83, 188, 192, 193, 194-95, 223-24,
Tanconville:371 231-32, 233, 235, 238, 239, 250, 252, 272, 273,
Tank Battalions 274, 298, 299, 308, 311, 313, 315, 317, 319, 320,
23d: 470,525 321,562,563,580. See also Corps, VI.
43d: 52425,526
48th: 456 ULTRA:85, 87-89, 129, 134, 135, 137, 151, 384n,420n,
191st: 118, 123 457n,496,503,529-30,534,580-81
714th: 515,516
733d: 132 Vacqueville: 338, 339, 389
761st: 570 Valdez, PFC Jose F.: 542n
Tank Destroyer Battalions Valdoie: 406,429
614th: 482,570 Valence: 151, 153,174
636th: 129,132 Vaxoncourt: 244
645th: 119 Vellescot: 421, 424, 425, 426
813th: 253 Vercors: 96
Tanks: 37,62, 63 Verdon River: 132
Task Forces Verdun: 490
1st Airborne: 119,122,183,357 Vesoul: 191, 192
87: 117 Vezouse River: 261, 262, 265, 268, 279, 338, 365, 371,
88: 44 389
Butler: 80, 84, 85, 123, 124, 129, 132-33, 134, 142, Vidauban: 106,107,118, 119,128,129
144-45,149-57,159,166-67,169,170,213 Vienne: 167, 174, 175
Fooks: 399 Vigier, Maj. Gen. du Touzet du: 172, 182n, 297, 298,
Haines: 402 299,415,422,523
Harris: 500-501,505,508,514,541 Villar: 408
Herren: 500-501,508,509,514,522,527 Ville: 402
Hudelson: 501,507 Vimenil: 259
Linden: 500-501,51415,518,523,526,527 Vincent, Col. Stewart T.: 152
Whirlwind: 400 Vittel: 439, 440, 534
Task Group 80.4 (Special Operations Group): 83 Vologne River: 273,274, 315
Taylor, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D.: 526 Vosges Foothill Position: 250, 317-18, 333, 334, 339, 361,
Tehran Conference: 11, 12-13 362, 370,391,394
Tendon: 247,259 Vosges Mountains: 186, 192, 198, 232, 239, 259, 313,
Terrain: 196-97, 240-41, 249, 272, 273-74, 314-15, 314, 339, 341, 351, 366, 429, 431, 433, 436, 453,
392, 420, 424, 433, 438, 456, 466, 480, 496, 518, 455, 457, 461, 480, 484, 533, 538, 549, 557, 558,
536-37,539,565 563,565
Tete des Reclos: 394 Vosges Ridge Position: 379, 391,400,405,417, 436
Theoule-sur-Mer:114, 121 Voyer: 375
Thomas, 1st. Lt. Charles L.: 482n
Thumm, Lt. Gen. Helmut: 275,316,338,517,539,541, WaffenSS: 340n
542,549 Walbourg: 480
Thur River: 486 Waldighofen: 419,422, 425
Tieffenbach: 459 Walker, Col. Edwin A,: 39,91
INDEX 605
Walschied: 375 379, 411, 414, 415, 416, 417, 420, 421, 426, 427,
Ware, Lt. Col. Keith L.: 537n 434, 436, 437,459, 485, 486. See also German units,
Wasselone: 382n, 449,452,455 Armies, Nineteenth.
Weather: 19–20, 102, 196, 241–42, 253, 265, 270, 272, Wietersheim, Maj. Gen. Wend von: 66, 68n, 153–54,
305, 307, 309, 314–15, 317, 331, 337, 344, 368, 155,157,158,160,161,177,179,180
392, 412–13, 424, 433. 438, 456, 470, 481, 505–07, Wietersvillere: 386
508,521,534,539,556,565,567 Wilderness: 394
Wehrmacht: 571–73, 580. See also German units; Williams, Maj. Gen. Paul L.: 39
Oberbefehlshaber Southwest (OB Southwest); Wilson, Maj. Gen. Arthur R.: 47,64,77,84, 193,224, 225
Oberbefehlshaber West (OB West); Oberkommando des Wilson, General Sir Henry Maitland (“Jumbo”):7n,
Heeres (OKH); Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL); 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21–22,
23–24, 25–26, 27–28,
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW). 32,43
Weicht, Sgt. Ellis R.: 459n Wingen: 468,482,515
West Wall: 468,474, 475, 483, 484, 490 Wisembach: 404
Westellung. 234, 237, 250, 267, 316, 317, 339, 340, 361, Wissembourg: 482–84
373,417,418 Wolfsberg Pass: 375, 376
Western Naval Task Force: 24–25, 33, 43, 44, 45, 63, 75, Wolfskirchen: 449,459
78, 79, 83, 90, 92, 97–98,203 Wood, Maj. Gen. John S. (“P”):384
Western Task Force: 43 Wyche, Maj. Gen. Ira T.: 255–56, 264, 265, 266, 267,
Weyer: 372,373, 374,383,384 268, 462, 477, 478, 480–81
Weyersheim: 477, 523
Whiteley, 1st Lt Eli: 537n XAPs:50
Wiese, General Friedrich: 57, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 105,
106, 128, 130, 135, 136, 137, 142–43, 153, 155, ZAHNARZT (“Dentist”),Operation: 494,498,522
157, 161, 164, 170, 174, 175, 177–78, 185, 186, Ziegenberg: 499
188–89, 191, 192, 235, 248, 250, 266, 275, 307, Zintsel du Nord Brook: 476
316, 325, 326, 332, 333, 339, 340, 341, 361, 371, Zorn River: 366,52

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