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UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The European Theater of Operations

T H E ARDENNES:
BATTLE OF THE BULGE

by
Hugh M. Cole

CENTER OF MLITARY HISTORY


UNITEDSTATES ARMY
WASHINGTON,D. C., 1993
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 65-60001

First Printed 1965—CMHPub 7–8–1

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office


Washington, D.C. 20402
UNITED STATES ARMY I N WORLD WAR II

Stetson Conn, General Editor

Advisory Committee
(As of 1 July 1964)

Fred C. Cole Lt. Gen. August Schomburg


Washington and Lee University Industrial College of the Armed Forces

James A. Field, Jr. Maj. Gen. Hugh M. Exton


Swarthmore College U.S. Continental Army Command

Earl Pomeroy Brig. Gen. Ward S. Ryan


University of Oregon U.S. Army War College

Theodore Ropp Brig. Gen. Elias C. Townsend


Duke University U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College

Lt. Col. Thomas E. Griess


United States Military Academy

Office of the Chief of Military History


Brig. Gen. Hal C. Pattison, Chief of Military History
Chief Historian Stetson Conn
Chief, Histories Division Col. Albert W. Jones
Chief, Editorial and Graphics Division Col. Walter B. McKenzie
Editor in Chief Joseph R. Friedman

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. . . to Those Who Served
Foreword
During most of the eleven months between D-day and V–E day in
Europe, the U.S. Army was carrying on highly successful offensive opera-
tions. As a consequence, the American soldier was buoyed with success,
imbued with the idea that his enemy could not strike him a really heavy
counterblow, and sustained by the conviction that the war was nearly won.
Then, unbelievably, and under the goad of Hitler's fanaticism, the German
Army launched its powerful counteroffensive in the Ardennes in December
1944 with the design of knifing through the Allied armies and forcing a
negotiated peace. T h e mettle of the American soldier was tested in the
fires of adversity and the quality of his response earned for him the right
to stand shoulder to shoulder with his forebears of Valley Forge, Fredericks-
burg, and the Marne.
This is the story of how the Germans planned and executed their
offensive. It is the story of how the high command, American and British,
reacted to defeat the German plan once the reality of a German offensive
was accepted. But most of all it is the story of the American fighting man
and the manner in which he fought a myriad of small defensive battles
until the torrent of the German attack was slowed and diverted, its force
dissipated and finally spent. It is the story of squads, platoons, companies,
and even conglomerate scratch groups that fought with courage, with
fortitude, with sheer obstinacy, often without information or communica-
tions or the knowledge of the whereabouts of friends. I n less than a fortnight
the enemy was stopped and the Americans were preparing to resume the
offensive. While Bastogne has become the symbol of this obstinate, gallant,
and successful defense, this work appropriately emphasizes the crucial
significance of early American success in containing the attack by holding
firmly on its northern and southern shoulders and by upsetting the enemy
timetable at St. Vith and a dozen lesser known but important and decisive
battlefields.
T h e hard fighting that preceded the Battle of the Bulge has been re-
counted in two volumes, The Siegfried Line Campaign, and Dr. Cole's
own earlier work, T h e Lorraine Campaign. Events after it will be related
in The Last Offensive, now in preparation. Two other volumes in this
subseries, T h e S u p r e m e C o m m a n d and Logistical Support of the A r m i e s ,
Volume II, are useful supplements to the Ardennes volume.

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In re-creating the Ardennes battle, the author has penetrated “the fog
of war” as well as any historian can hope to do. No other volume of this
series treats as thoroughly or as well the teamwork of the combined arms-
infantry and armor, artillery and air, combat engineer and tank destroyer-
or portrays as vividly the starkness of small unit combat. Every thoughtful
student of military history, but most especially the student of small unit
tactics, should find the reading of Dr. Cole’s work a rewarding experience.

Washington, D.C. HAL C. PATTISON


15 June 1964 Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Military History

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The Author
Hugh M. Cole received his Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota in
1937 in the field of European military history. He taught military history at
the University of Chicago until 1942, when he joined the Army as an intelli-
gence officer. After graduating from the Command and General Staff School
he was assigned to the staff of the Third Army during its operations in
Europe. At the close of hostilities he became Deputy Theater Historian,
European Theater of Operations. From 1946 to 1952 Dr. Cole
directed the work of the European Theater Section, Office of the Chief of
Military History, wrote The Lorraine Campaign, a volume that appeared
in this series in 1950, and undertook much of the work that has culminated
in this volume on the Ardennes Campaign. He joined the Operations
Research Office of T h e Johns Hopkins University in 1952 and has continued
his active interest in military history and his service to the Army both as a
scholar and as colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve.

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Preface
This volume deals with the crucial period of the campaign conducted
in the Belgian Ardennes and Luxembourg, generally known as the Battle
of the Bulge. Although the German planning described herein antedates
the opening gun by several weeks, the story of the combat operations begins
on 16 December 1944. By 3 January 1945 the German counteroffensive
was at an end, and on that date the Allies commenced an attack that would
take them across the Rhine and into Germany. T h e last phase of operations
in the Ardennes, therefore, is properly part and parcel of the final Allied
offensive in Europe, and so the course of battle beginning on 3 January
1945 is described in another and final volume of this subseries.
T h e problem of the level of treatment is always difficult in the organiza-
tion and writing of the general staff type of history, which is the design of
this volume. In describing a war of movement, the solution usually has
been to concentrate on tactical units smaller than those normally treated
when the war of position obtains. Thus the French General Staff history
of the summer offensive in 1918 abruptly descends from the army corps
to the regiment as the appropriate tactical unit to be traced through this
period of mobile operations. T h e story of the Ardennes Campaign is even
more difficult to organize because of the disappearance, in the first hours,
of a homogeneous front. Churchill’s dictum that the historian’s task is “to
allot proportion to human events” applies in this instance, although there
are limits to the amount of expansion or contraction permissible. Thus the
reader is introduced on 16 December 1944 to battles fought by companies
and platoons because they are meaningful and because the relative impor-
tance of these actions is as great as operations conducted by regiments or
even divisions later in the story. As the American front congeals and a
larger measure of tactical control is regained, the narrative follows bat-
talions, then regiments, and then divisions. T h e building blocks, however,
are the battalion and the regiment. In U.S. Army practice during the war
in western Europe, the battalion was in organization and doctrine the basic
unit, with both tactical and administrative functions. T h e regiment, in
turn, when organized as a regimental combat team was the basic maneuver
element combining the arms and having staying power. Also, the regiment
was the lowest infantry unit to have a name and a history with which
the soldier could, and did, identify himself.

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T h e Ardennes battle normally was “fought,” in the sense of exercising
decisive command and directing operations, by the corps commander. T h e
span of tactical control in these widely dispersed actions simply was
beyond the physical grasp of higher commanders. These higher commanders
could “influence” the battle only by outlining (in very general terms) the
scheme of maneuver, allocating reserves, and exercising whatever moral
suasion they personally could bring to bear. In other words, “tactics came
before strategy,” as Ludendorff wrote of the March offensive in 1918.
For the early days of the Ardennes Campaign the narrative opens each
successive stage of the account by a look at the enemy side of the hill. This,
in fact, is mandatory if the story is to have cohesion and meaning because
the Germans possessed the initiative and because the American forces were
simply reacting to the enemy maneuvers. T h e account in later chapters
shifts to the American camp in accordance with the measure to which the
American forces had regained operational freedom.
This volume represents the most exhaustive collection of personal
memoirs by leading participants ever attempted for a general staff history
of a major campaign. T h e memoirs take two forms: interviews with
American participants shortly after the action described, and written ac-
counts prepared immediately after the end of World War II by the German
officers who took part in the Ardennes Campaign. T h e use of the combat
interview in the European Theater of Operations was organized by Col.
William A. Ganoe, theater historian, but the specific initiation of an in-
tensive effort to cover the Ardennes story while the battle itself was in
progress must be credited to Col. S. L. A. Marshall. T h e enlistment of the
German participants in the Ardennes, first as involuntary then as voluntary
historians, was begun by Colonel Marshall and Capt. Kenneth Hechler,
then developed into a fully organized research program by Col. Harold
Potter, who was assisted by a very able group of young officers, notably
Captains Howard Hudson, Frank Mahin, and James Scoggins.
T h e story of the logistics involved in the American operations is treated
at length and in perceptive fashion by Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical
Support of the Armies, in two volumes of this subseries. In the main,
therefore, the present volume confines itself to the logistical problems of
the German armies. Readers interested in following the course of Allied
relationships at high levels of command, and particularly the operations of
Allied intelligence on the eve of the German offensive, are referred to
Forrest C. Pogue’s T h e Supreme C o m m a n d , another volume in this series.
Unfortunately the interest of the United States Air Forces in tactical support
of ground operations was on the wane in the period after World War II
and, as a result, a detailed air force history of air-ground co-operation dur-
ing the battle of the Ardennes remains to be written. To introduce in full
the effects of the tactical role played by Allied air power during the ground
operations here described would require a volume twice the size of this

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one. I have tried, however, to keep the role of the air constantly before the
reader, even though the specific actor often is anonymous.
As in my previous volume in the European subseries an attempt is
made to include all awards of the Medal of Honor and the Distinguished
Service Cross. T h e reader will recognize that deeds of valor do not neces-
sarily coincide with the focal point of a particular action, as this is selectively
seen and described by the historian; so it has been necessary to relegate
to the footnotes and cover in very cursory fashion many of these individual
acts of gallantry.
T h e reader will find no reference to “lessons learned.” This is not
because the history of the Ardennes Campaign is so antique as to lack a
useful application to modern military thought or planning for the future.
On the contrary, the operations in the Ardennes show in real life tactical
forms and formations which (in such things as dispersal, gaps between units,
counterattack doctrine, widths of front, and fluidity of movement) are com-
parable to those taught by current Army doctrine and envisaged for the
future. Nonetheless, the most valuable lessons which might be derived from
the study of this campaign would lead inevitably to a consideration of special
weapons effects and their impact on military operations, which in turn would
result in a restrictive security classification for the volume. I hope, however,
that the Army service schools will find it fruitful to make the extrapolation
that cannot be made here.
T h e maps consulted by the author were those in use at the end of 1944.
They include the U.S. Army reproductions of the maps prepared by the
British Geographical Section, General Staff, in the 1:25,000 series (G.S.,
G.S. 4041), the 1:50,000 series (G.S., G.S. 4040), and the 1:100,000 series
(G.S., G.S. 4336 and 4416). T h e most useful German map proved to be
the 1:200,000 Strussenkurte von Belgien, a copy of the French Michelin
road map, issued to German troops as early as 1940 and, in an English
version, used by American armored units. Some of the terrain in question
is familiar to me, but this personal knowledge has been augmented by an
extensive use of photographs. Shortly after World War II pilots of the
45th Reconnaissance Squadron, USAF, under the supervision of Maj. John
C. Hatlem, flew photographic missions designated by the author, over
terrain in Luxembourg and Belgium. In addition some special ground
photographs were made. T h e total collection numbers two hundred and
sixteen photographs and has proved invaluable in writing this story.
References to clock time are on the twenty-four hour system. Fortu-
nately for the reader (and the writer), the Allies converted to British
summer time on 17 September 1944 and the Germans went back to middle
European time on 2 October 1944; as a result both forces used the same
clock time in the Ardennes. Sunrise on 16 December 1944 came at 0829
and sunset occurred at 1635 (using Bastogne, Belgium, as a reference
point). T h e brevity of daylight is an important tactical feature of this

xiii
history, and the reader should note that dawn and dusk (morning and
evening twilight) each added only thirty-eight minutes to the hours of
light.
A host of participants in the Ardennes battle have answered questions
posed by the author, provided personal papers, and read a part or the whole
of the draft manuscript. Their assistance has been invaluable.
Although this volume took an unconscionably long while to write, my
task was made much easier by the initial efforts of Captains Blair Clark,
Howard Hudson, Robert Merriam, and George Tuttle, who spent several
months at the close of the war in gathering the sources and preparing first
drafts for a history of the Ardennes Campaign. I n the Office of the Chief
of Military History, Mrs. Magna Bauer, Charles V. P. von Luttichau, and
Royce L. Thompson worked over a period of years in gathering data and
writing research papers for use in the volume. T h e reader of the footnotes
will obtain some slight measure of my obligation to these three.
I n preparation for publication, Mr. Joseph R. Friedman, Editor in
Chief, OCMH, has given this volume devoted attention, and Mrs. Loretto
C. Stevens of the Editorial Branch has shepherded it through the final steps
of editing. Mr. Billy C. Mossman prepared the maps, Miss Ruth A. Phillips
selected the photographs, and Miss Margaret L. Emerson compiled the
index.
Finally, I am indebted to my secretary, Mrs. Muriel Southwick, without
whose exhortations and reminders this book might never have been com-
pleted.
For any errors of fact or flaws of interpretation that may occur in this
work, the author alone is responsible.

Washington, D.C. HUGH M. COLE


15 June 1964

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Contents
Chapter Page
1. T H E ORIGINS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Hitler’s Perspective. September 1944 . . . . . . . . . 3
How the Plan Was Born . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

II. PLANNING T H E COUNTEROFFENSIVE . . . . . . . 19


Details of the Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
T h e Big Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
A Double Envelopment? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

III. TROOPS AND TERRAIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33


T h e Order of Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
T h e Allies Return to the Attack . . . . . . . . . . 36
T h e Terrain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

IV . PREPARATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Deception and Camouflage . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
T h e Western Front in Early December . . . . . . . . 51
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
T h e Intelligence Failure 56
T h e German Concentration . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

V . T H E SIXTH PANZER ARMY ATTACK . . . . . . . 75


T h e 99th Division Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
T h e Initial Attack. 16 December . . . . . . . . . . 80
T h e First Attacks in the Monschau-Höfen Sector
Are Repulsed. 16 December . . . . . . . . . . 86
T h e German Effort Continues. 17-18 December . . . . . 90
Losheimergraben Is Lost . . . . . . . . . . . * 92
T h e German Attack Toward Rocherath and Krinkelt.
16-17 December . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
T h e 395th Infantry Conforms to the Withdrawal . . . . 101
T h e 2d Division Gives U p the Wahlerscheid Attack . . . . 103
T h e 394th Infantry Abandons the Mürringen Position . . 105

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Chapter Page
VI . T H E GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 107
T h e 2d Division Withdraws . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
T h e 1st Infantry Division Sends Reinforcements to
Butgenbach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
T h e Defense of the T w i n Villages. 18 December . . . . . 113
The Last Attack at Höfen Fails. 18 December ...... 119
T h e 2d Division Withdraws to the Elsenborn Line.
19 December . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
T h e Enemy Tries the Western Flank. 19-23 December . . 128

VII . BREAKTHROUGH A T T H E SCHNEE EIFEL . . . . . . 136


Introductory Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Dispositions of the 106th Infantry Division . . . . . . 137
Enemy Preparations for Another Cannae . . . . . . . 142
TheAttack in theLosheim Gap . . . . . . . . . . . 145
T h e Attack Hits the 106th Division . . . . . . . . . 151
The 424th Infantry and CCB, 9th Armored . . . . . . . 158
Cannae in the Schnee Eifel . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
T h e Question of Air Resupply . . . . . . . . . . . 171

VIII . T H E FIFTH PANZER A R M Y ATTACKS T H E 28TH


INFANTRY DIVISION . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
T h e 110th Infantry Sector. 26-18 December . . . . . . 176
T h e 212th Infantry Sector. 16-20 December . . . . . . 193
T h e Fall of Wiltz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

IX. T H E ATTACK BY T H E GERMAN LEFT WING: 16-20


DECEMBER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
T h e 109th Infantry Defense on the Sauer and Our
Rivers. 16-20 December . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
Elements of the 9th Armored Division Battle at the
Sauer. 26-20 December . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

X . T H E GERMAN SOUTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED . . 238


T h e German Thrust Begins . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
Southern Flank-A Summing U p . . . . . . . . . . 258

XI . T H E 1ST SS P A N Z E R DIVISION'S DASH WESTWARD. AND


O P E R A T I O N GREIF . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
Kampfgruppe Peiper on the Move . . . . . . . . . . 260
Operation Greif . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

XII . T H E FIRST ATTACKS A T S T. V I T H . . . . . . . . . 272


T h e 7th Armored Division Move to St . Vith . . . . . . . 273
T h e Enemy Strikes a t the St . Vith Perimeter . . . . . . 280

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Chapter Page
XIII . VIII CORPS ATTEMPTS TO DELAY THE ENEMY .... 294
C C R , 9th Armored Division. and the Road to Bastogne . . 294
T h e Advance of the XLVII Panzer Corps . . . . . . . 298
Team Cherry on the Longvilly Road . . . . . . . . . 300
T h e 101st Airborne Division Moves Into Bastogne . . . . 305

.
XIV T H E VIII CORPS BARRIER LINES . . . . . . . . . . 310
Middleton’s First Moves . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
T h e Gap North of Bastogne . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
Defense Southwest of Bastogne . . . . . . . . . . . 322
Renewed Drive Around Bastogne . . . . . . . . . . 323

XV . THE GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS TO THE WEST ... 330


T h e 30th Division Meets Peiper . . . . . . . . . . . 334
T h e West Flank of the XVIII Airborne Corps. 20 December 352
Action in Front of the XVIII Airborne Corps Right Wing.
20 December . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354
T h e Net Closes on Peiper . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359

XVI . ONE T H R E A T SUBSIDES; ANOTHER EMERGES . . . . 368


The Attempt To Relieve Peiper’s Kampfgruppe ..... 368
T h e 3d Armored Division Is Checked. 21-23 December . . 377
T h e Fight at the Baraque de Fraiture Crossroads. 23 December 388

XVII . S T . VITH IS LOST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393


T h e Defenders of St . Vith Pass to the XVIII Airborne Corps 393
T h e Enemy Closes on the St . Vith Salient . . . . . . . 401
T h e Final Withdrawal From the St . Vith Sector . . . . . 407

XVIII . THE VII CORPS MOVES TO BLUNT THE SALIENT . . 423


Division of the Battlefield . . . . . . . . . . . . 423
The VII Corps Assembles .............. 427
German Armor Advances on the VII Corps ....... 435
T h e Main Battle Is Joined. 24 and 25 December . . . . 438

XIX . T H E BATTLE OF BASTOGNE . . . . . . . . . . . 445


T h e Initial Deployment East of Bastogne . . . . . . . 445
Bastogne Is Encircled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459
T h e Enemy Begins a Concentric Attack . . . . . . . . 464
T h e Battle on Christmas Day . . . . . . . . . . . . 478

X X . T H E XII CORPS ATTACKS T H E SOUTHERN SHOULDER 482


T h e End of the Defensive Battle. 22 December . . . . . 482
T h e XII Corps Moves to Luxembourg . . . . . . . . 485
T h e XII Corps’ Counterattack . . . . . . . . . . . 489

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Chapter Page
XXI . T H E III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD
BASTOGNE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 509
Preparations for the Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . 509
T h e 80th Division Advance . . . . . . . . . . . . 515
T h e 26th Infantry Division Attack . . . . . . . . . . 520
T h e 4th Armored Division Attack . . . . . . . . . . 523
T h e 80th Division Battle in the Woods. 25-26 December . . 532
T h e 26th Division Fight for a Bridgehead on the Sure.
24-27 December . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 540
T h e 4th Armored Division Reaches Bastogne . . . . . . 547
XXII . T H E BATTLE BEFORE T H E MEUSE . . . . . . . . . 556
T h e Meuse River Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 556
T h e Meuse Seems Within Reach . . . . . . . . . . 562
T h e Celles Pocket . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 565
T h e Fight at Humain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 570
T h e Fight at Verdenne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 574
XXIII . T H E BATTLE BETWEEN T H E SALM AND THE
O U R T H E : 24 DECEMBER–2 JANUARY . . . . .
578
T h e Battle at the Manhay Crossroads . . . . . . . . . 583
T h e Fight in the Aisne Valley . . . . . . . . . . . 593
T h e 2d SS Panzer Is Halted . . . . . . . . . . . . 595
T h e 82d Airborne Withdraws From the Salm River Line . . 598
“ T h e Sad Sack Affair” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 601
T h e Elsenborn Shoulder . . . . . . . . . . . . . 603
XXIV . THE THIRD ARMY OFFENSIVE . . . . . . . . . . . 606
Widening the Bastogne Corridor . . . . . . . . . . 606
T h e Opposing Grand Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . 610
T h e Sibret-Villeroux Actions . . . . . . . . . . . 615
T h e T w o Attacks Collide . . . . . . . . . . . . . 617
T h e III Corps Joins the Attack . . . . . . . . . . . 627
T h e Lone Battle of the 26th Division . . . . . . . . . 637
T h e VIII Corps’ Attack Continues . . . . . . . . . 643
XXV. EPILOGUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 649
T h e Weather . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 649
T h e Opposing Troop Strengths . . . . . . . . . . . 650
T h e Opposing Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651
T h e Artillery Arm in the Ardennes . . . . . . . . . 656
T h e Air Weapon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 660
Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 663
T h e Turning Point in the Ardennes . . . . . . . . . 668
T h e Place of the Ardennes Offensive in World War II . . 673
Appendix
A . TABLE O F EQUIVALENT RANKS . . . . . . . . . . 677
B. RECIPIENTS OF T H E DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS 678
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Page
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 680

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 682

BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 685

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 689

Maps
No. Page
I. T h e Western Front, 15 December 1944 . . . . . . . . . . 52
2. T h e XVIII Airborne Corps Meets Kampfgruppe Peiper,
20-25 December 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347
3. T h e XVIII Airborne Corps West Flank, 20 December 1944 . . . 355
4. Bastogne, 25-26 December 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . 473
Maps I-X Are in Accompanying Map Envelope
I. T h e Ardennes Counteroffensive: T h e German Plan, December 1944
II. T h e Sixth Panzer Army Attack, 16-19 December 1944
III. T h e LXVI Corps Attacks the 106th Infantry Division,
16-19 December 1944
IV. T h e Fifth Panzer Army Attacks the 28th Infantry Division,
16-19 December 1944
V. T h e Seventh Army Attack, 16-19 December 1944
VI. Bastogne, 19-23 December 1944
VII. T h e XVIII Airborne Corps Sector, 21-23 December 1944
VIII. Between the Salm and the Meuse, 24-27 December 1944
IX. T h e Southern Shoulder, 22-26 December 1944
X. Widening the Bastogne Corridor, 24 December 1944-2 January
1945

Illustrations
Page
Adolf Hitler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Generaloberst Alfred Jodl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Noville and Stolzemberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

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Page
L t . Gen . Omar N . Bradley. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W . Tedder.
General Dwight D . Eisenhower. and Field Marshal Sir Bernard L .
Montgomery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Maj . Gen . Troy H . Middleton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Panzerkumpfwagens V (Panther) o n the Way to the Front . . . . . . 60
Generaloberst der Waffen-SS Josef Dietrich . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Snow Scene Near Krinkelt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Losheimergraben . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Constructing a Winterized Squad H u t . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Camouflaged Pillbox Serving as Command Post . . . . . . . . . 100
Maj . Gen . Leonard T. Gerow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
2d Division Infantrymen on the March . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
26th Infantry Area Near Butgenbach . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Captured German T a n k Crewman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
99th Infantry Division Vehicles Moving Through Wirtzfeld . . . . . 121
Gun Position on Elsenborn Ridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Wrecked German Tank Showing “Bazooka Pants” . . . . . . . . . 127
American Prisoners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel . . . . . . . . 174
General der Panzertruppen Heinrich F. Luettwitz . . . . . . . . . 174
German Troops Passing Abandoned American Equipment . . . . . 183
Clerf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Ouren. Showing Bridges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
Wiltz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Ettelbruck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
Cave Refuge for Civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Wallendorf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
Belgian Woman Salvaging Burned Grain . . . . . . . . . . . 233
Breitweiler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
L t . Gen . Courtney H . Hodges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
Kampfgruppe Peiper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
Massacred American Soldiers Near Malmedy . . . . . . . . . . 263
Traffic Jam in St. Vith Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
Railroad Yards at Gouvy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
Antitank Gunners Guarding a Crossing. Vielsalm . . . . . . . . 288
Brig. Gen . Anthony C . McAuliffe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
Paratroopers of 101st Airborne Near Bastogne . . . . . . . . . . 308
La Roche and the Ourthe River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
Combat Engineer Setting a Charge . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
Amblève River Bridge at Stavelot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338
Maj . Gen . Matthew B. Ridgway and Maj . Gen . James M . Gavin . . . 344
Troops of 325th Glider Infantry Moving Through Fog . . . . . . . 346
Stoumont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
Mined Bridge at Malmédy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360

xx
Page
German T a n k Disguised as an American T a n k . . . . . . . . . 362
105-mm. Howitzers M7 in Action Near La Gleize . . . . . . . . . 375
Baraque de Fraiture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388
St.Vith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394
Chérain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399
Tanks of the 7th Armored Division Near St. Vith . . . . . . . . 408
Car Bearing General Bradley Fords a Belgian River . . . . . . . . 425
Maj . Gen . J . Lawton Collins, Field Marshal Montgomery. and
General Ridgway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426
Hotton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430
MP’s Checking Vehicles Near Marche . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432
Captured German 88-mm. G u n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439
Bastogne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446
Casualties in a n Improvised Emergency Ward . . . . . . . . . . 467
SuppIy by Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469
A Bastogne Street After Luftwaffe Bombardment . . . . . . . . . 476
Maj . Gen . Manton S . Eddy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485
Lt . Gen . George S . Patton. J r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 487
5th Infantry Division Troops Moving Toward the Front . . . . . . 49 1
A White Phosphorus Burst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 496
Scheidgen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 498
White-Clad 11th Infantry Troops Attack Toward Haller . . . . . . 500
Müllerthal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 502
Berdorf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505
Maj . Gen . John Millikin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 510
Heiderscheidergrund Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 519
Watching a Dogfight Between American and Luftwaffe Planes . . . . 527
4th Armored Division Rolling Toward Chaumont . . . . . . . . 528
Esch-sur-Sure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 547
American Troops i n Tintange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 549
German Prisoners Carrying Wounded . . . . . . . . . . . . . 550
British Tank Patrolling the Meuse at Namur . . . . . . . . . . 558
Civilian Refugees at Dinant Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 562
Marche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 563
2d Armored Division Infantrymen Moving to New Positions . . . . . 573
Prime Mover Towing 8-Inch Howitzer . . . . . . . . . . . . 582
Manhay Crossroads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 584
Elements of 3d Armored Division Advancing Near Manhay . . . . . 586
Troops of the 84th Infantry Division Digging In ..... .... 588
Destruction of Grandménil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 597
Supplies Moving Through Bastogne . . . . . . . . . . . . . 608
Massed Half-Tracks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 618
35th Infantry Division Machine Gunners . . . . . . . . . . . . 624

xxi
Page
Bed Sheets Used as Camouflage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 631
6th Armored Division Tanks in Snowstorm . . . . . . . . . . . 634
Medics Removing Casualties. Lutrebois . . . . . . . . . . . . 636
Kaundorf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 639

All illustrations are from Department of Defense files. with the exception of
the photograph on page 76 (General Dietrich) reproduced through the courtesy
of the Central Intelligence Agency. and the one on page 174 (General von
Luettwitz) , taken from captured German records in the National Archives .

xxii
The U.S. Army Center of Military History

The Center of Military History prepares and publishes histories as re-


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maintains liaison with public and private agencies and individuals to stimu-
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at 1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005-3402.

xxiii
T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
CHAPTER I

The Origins
On Saturday, 16 September 1944, the responsible for managing the war on the
daily Fuehrer Conference convened in Western Front, began the briefing.1 In
the Wolf’s Lair, Hitler’s East Prussian a quiet voice and with the usual adroit
headquarters. No special word had use of phrases designed to lessen the
come in from the battle fronts and the impact of information which the Fuehrer
briefing soon ended, the conference dis- might find distasteful, Jodl reviewed the
banding to make way for a session be- relative strength of the opposing forces.
tween Hitler and members of what had The Western Allies possessed 96 divi-
become his household military staff. sions at or near the front; these were
Wilhelm Keitel and Alfred Jodl were faced by 55 German divisions. An
in this second conference. So was Heinz estimated 10 Allied divisions were en
Guderian, who as acting chief of staff route from the United Kingdom to the
for OKH held direct military responsi- battle zone. Allied airborne units still
bility for the conduct of operations on remained in England (some of these
the Russian front. would make a dramatic appearance the
Herman Goering was absent. From very next day at Arnhem and Nijme-
this fact stems the limited knowledge gen). Jodl added a few words about
available of the initial appearance of shortages on the German side, shortages
the idea which would be translated into in tanks, heavy weapons, and ammuni-
historical fact as the Ardennes counter- tion. This was a persistent and unpopu-
offensive or Battle of the Bulge. Goer- lar topic; Jodl must have slid quickly
ing and the Luftwaffe were represented to the next item–a report on the German
by Werner Kreipe, chief of staff for forces withdrawing from southern and
OKL. Perhaps Kreipe had been in- southwestern France.
structed by Goering to report fully on Suddenly Hitler cut Jodl short. There
all that Hitler might say; perhaps Kreipe ensued a few minutes of strained silence.
was a habitual diary-keeper. In any Then Hitler spoke, his words recalled
case he had consistently violated the as faithfully as may be by the listening
Fuehrer ordinance that no notes of the
daily conferences should be retained ex- 1 MS # P–069, T h e Kreipe Diary, 22 July-2
November 1944 (General der Flieger Werner
cept the official transcript made by Kreipe). OKH, OKL, and OKW are the ab-
Hitler’s own stenographic staff. breviated versions, respectively, of Oberkommando
Trenchant, almost cryptic, Kreipe’s des Heeres, the High Command of the German
Army, Oberkommando der Luftwaffe, T h e Luft-
notes outline the scene. Jodl, represent- waffe High Command, and Oberkommando der
ing OKW and thus the headquarters Wehrmacht, the Armed Forces High Command.
2 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

closed, the Rumanians and Bulgarians


had hastened to switch sides and join
the victorious Russians. Finland had
broken with Germany on 2 September.
Hungary and the ephemeral Croat
“state” continued in dubious battle be-
side Germany, held in place by German
divisions in the line and German garri-
sons in their respective capitals. But the
twenty nominal Hungarian divisions and
an equivalent number of Croatian
brigades were in effect canceled by the
two Rumanian armies which had joined
the Russians.
The defection of Rumanian, Bulgar-
ian, and Finnish forces was far less im-
portant than the terrific losses suffered
by the German armies themselves in
the summer of 1944. On the Eastern
and Western Fronts the combined
German losses during June, July, and
ADOLF HITLER August had totaled at least 1,200,000
dead, wounded, and missing. T h e rapid
OKL chief of staff. “I have just made Allied advances in the west had cooped
a momentous decision. I shall go over up an additional 230,000 troops in posi-
to the counter-attack, that is to say”– tions from which they would emerge
and he pointed to the map unrolled on only to surrender. Losses in materiel
the desk before him—“here, out of the were in keeping with those in fighting
Ardennes, with the objective–Antwerp.” manpower.
While his audience sat in stunned si- Room for maneuver had been whit-
lence, the Fuehrer began to outline his tled away at a fantastically rapid rate.
plan. On the Eastern Front the Soviet summer
Historical hindsight may give the im- offensive had carried to the borders of
pression that only a leader finally bereft East Prussia, across the Vistula at a num-
of sanity could, in mid-September of ber of points, and up to the northern
1944, believe Germany physically capa- Carpathians. Only a small slice of
ble of delivering one more powerful Rumania was left to German troops.
and telling blow. Politically the Third By mid-September the German occupa-
Reich stood deserted and friendless. tion forces in southern Greece and the
Fascist Italy and the once powerful Axis Greek islands (except Crete) already
were finished. Japan had politely sug- were withdrawing as the German grasp
gested that Germany should start peace on the Balkans weakened.
negotiations with the Soviets. In south- On the Western Front the Americans
eastern Europe, as the month of August had, in the second week of September,
T H E ORIGINS 3

put troops on the soil of the Third Reich in the summer of 1944 necessarily
Reich, in the Aachen sector, while the implied severe economic losses to a state
British had entered Holland. T h e and a war machine fed and grown strong
German armies in the west faced a on the proceeds of conquest. Rumanian
containing Allied front reaching from oil, Finnish and Norwegian nickel, cop-
the Swiss border to the North Sea. On per, and molybdenum, Swedish high-
14 September the newly appointed grade iron ore, Russian manganese,
German commander in the west, Gen- French bauxite, Yugoslavian copper,
eralfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt, and Spanish mercury were either lost
acknowledged that the “Battle for the to the enemy or denied by the neutrals
West Wall” had begun. who saw the tide of war turning against
On the Italian front Generalfeld- a once powerful customer.
marschall Albert Kesselring’s two armies
retained position astride the Apennines Hitler’s Perspective
and, from the Gothic Line, defended September 1944
northern Italy. Here, of all the active
fronts, the German forces faced the In retrospect, the German position
enemy on something like equal terms- after the summer reverses of 1944 seemed
except in the air. Nonetheless the Allies indeed hopeless and the only rational
were dangerously close to the southern release a quick peace on the best possi-
entrances to the Po Valley. ble terms. But the contemporary scene
In the far north the defection of as viewed from Hitler’s headquarters in
Finland had introduced a bizarre opera- September 1944, while hardly roseate,
tional situation. In northern Finland even to the Fuehrer, was not an un-
and on the Murmansk front nine Ger- relieved picture of despair and gloom.
man divisions held what earlier had In the west what had been an Allied
been the left wing of the 700-mile Finno- advance of astounding speed had de-
German front. Now the Finns no celerated as rapidly, the long Allied
longer were allies, but neither were supply lines, reaching clear back to the
they ready to turn their arms against English Channel and the Côte d’Azur,
Generaloberst Dr. Lothar Rendulic and acting as a tether which could be
his nine German divisions. T h e Soviets stretched only so far. T h e famous West
likewise showed no great interest in Wall fortifications (almost dismantled
conducting a full-scale campaign in the in the years since 1940) had not yet been
subarctic. With Finland out of the war, heavily engaged by the attacker, while
however, the German troops had no to the rear lay the great moat which
worthwhile mission remaining except to historically had separated the German
stand guard over the Petsamo nickel people from their enemies–the Rhine.
mines. Only a month after Mannerheim On the Eastern Front the seasonal surge
took Finland out of the war, Hitler of battle was beginning to ebb, the
would order the evacuation of that Soviet summer offensive seemed to have
country and of northern Norway. run its course, and despite continuing
Political and military reverses so battle on the flanks the center had
severe as those sustained- by the Third relapsed into an uneasy calm.
4 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Even the overwhelming superiority ing which Hitler instituted the far-reach-
which the Western Allies possessed in ing military plans eventuating in the
the air had failed thus far to bring the Ardennes counteroffensive.
Third Reich groveling to its knees as T h e ball-bearing and aircraft in-
so many proponents of the air arm had dustries, major Allied air targets during
predicted, I n September the British and the first half of 1944, had taken heavy
Americans could mount a daily bomber punishment but had come back with
attack of over 5,000 planes, but the amazing speed. By September bearing
German will to resist and the means of production was very nearly what it had
resistance, so far as then could be meas- been just before the dubious honor of
ured, remained quite sufficient for a nomination as top-priority target for the
continuation of the war. Allied bombing effort. T h e production
Great, gaping wounds, where the of single-engine fighters had risen from
Allied bombers had struck, disfigured 1,016 in February to a high point of
most of the larger German cities west 3,031 such aircraft in September. T h e
of the Elbe, but German discipline and Allied strategic attack leveled at the
a reasonably efficient warning and shelter synthetic oil industry, however, showed
system had reduced the daily loss of life more immediate results, as reflected in
to what the German people themselves the charts which Speer put before Hitler.
would reckon as “acceptable.” If any- For aviation gasoline, motor gasoline,
thing, the lesson of London was being and diesel oil, the production curve
repeated, the noncombatant will to re- dipped sharply downward and lingered
sist hardening under the continuous far below monthly consumption figures
blows from the air and forged still despite the radical drop in fuel con-
harder by the Allied announcements of sumption in the summer of 1944. Am-
an unconditional surrender policy. munition production likewise had
The material means available to the declined markedly under the air
armed forces of the Third Reich ap- campaign against the synthetic oil in-
peared relatively unaffected by the dustry, in this case the synthetic nitrogen
ceaseless hammering from the air. It is procedures. In September the German
true that the German war economy was armed forces were firing some 70,000
not geared to meet a long-drawn war tons of explosives, while production
of attrition. But Reich Minister Albert amounted to only half that figure.
Speer and his cohorts had been given Shells and casings were still unaffected
over two years to rationalize, reorganize, except for special items which required
disperse, and expand the German econ- the ferroalloys hitherto procured from
omy before the intense Allied air the Soviet Union, France, and the
effortsof 1944. So successful was Speer’s Balkans.
program and so industrious were the Although in the later summer of 1944
labors of the home front that the race the Allied air forces turned their bombs
between Allied destruction and German against German armored vehicle pro-
construction (or reconstruction) was duction (an appetizing target because
being run neck and neck in the third of the limited number of final assembly
quarter of 1944, the period, that is, dur- plants), an average of 1,500 tanks and
T H E ORIGINS 5

assault guns were being shipped to the launched against the Third Reich. 2 But
battle front every thirty days. During without the means of predicting what
the first ten months of 1944 the Army damage the Allied air effort could and
Ordnance Directorate accepted 45,917 would inflict if extrapolated three or
trucks, but truck losses during the same six months into the future, and certainly
period numbered 117,719. The German without any advisers willing so to pre-
automotive industry had pushed the pro- dict, Hitler might reason that German
duction of trucks up to an average of production and transport, if wisely
9,000 per month, but in September pro- husbanded and rigidly controlled, could
duction began to drop off, a not too support a major attack before the close
important recession in view of the loom- of 1944. Indeed, only a fortnight prior
ing motor fuel crisis. to the briefing of 16 September Minister
The German railway system had been Speer had assured Hitler that German
under sporadic air attacks for years but war stocks could be expected to last
was still viable. Troops could be shut- through 1945. Similarly, in the head-
tled from one fighting front to another quarters of the Western Allies it was
with only very moderate and occasional easy and natural to assume the the
delays; raw materials and finished mili- thousands of tons of bombs dropped on
tary goods had little waste time in rail Germany must inevitably have weakened
transport. In mid-August the weekly car the vital sections of the German war
loadings by the Reichsbahn hit a top economy to a point where collapse was
figure of 899,091 cars. imminent and likely to come before the
In September Hitler had no reason end of 1944.
to doubt, if he bothered to contemplate Hitler’s optimism and miscalculation,
the transport needed for a great counter- then, resulted in the belief that Germany
offensive, that the rich and flexible Ger- had the material means to launch and
man railroad and canal complex would maintain a great counteroffensive, a
prove sufficient to the task ahead and belief nurtured by many of his trusted
could successfully resist even a co-ordi- aides. Conversely, the miscalculation of
nated and systematic air attack-as yet, the Western Allies as to the destruction
of course, untried.
In German war production the third 2 The results of the numerous joint intelligence
quarter of 1944 witnessed an interesting studies undertaken immediately after World War
II on the relation between German production
conjuncture, one readily susceptible to and the Allied air offensive are well summarized
misinterpretation by Hitler and Speer or in the third volume of the official Air Forces
by Allied airmen and intelligence. On series, Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate,
eds., “The Army Air Forces in World War II,”
the one hand German production was vol. III, Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day, Jan-
with e major exceptions of the oil uary 1944 to May 1945 (Chicago: T h e University of
and aircraft industries, at the peak out- Chicago Press. 1951). See also MS # P–059. Tank
Losses (Generalmajor Burkhart Mueller-Hille-
put of the war; on the other hand the brand); K. O. Sauer, Effects of Aerial Warfare
Allied air effort against the German on German Armament Production (T.I. 341, M.I.F.
means of war making was approaching 3); United States Strategic Bombing Survey
(USSBS), Military Analysis Division, T h e Impact
a peak in termsof tons of bombsand Of the Allied Air Effort On German Logistics
the number of planes which could be (Washington, 1947).
6 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

wrought by their bombers contributed Had the Nazi Reich reached a point in
greatly to the pervasive optimism which its career like that which German his-
would make it difficult, if not impossible, tory recorded in the collapse of the
for Allied commanders and intelligence German Empire during the last months
agencies to believe or perceive that Ger- of the 1914–1918 struggle? Hitler,
many still retained the material muscle always prompt to parade his personal
for a mighty blow. experiences as a Frontsoldat in the Great
Assuming that the Third Reich pos- War and to quote this period of his life
sessed the material means for a quick as testimony refuting opinions offered by
transition from the defensive to the his generals, was keenly aware of the
offensive, could Hitler and his entourage moral disintegration of the German
rely on the morale of the German nation people and the armies in 1918. Nazi
and its fighting forces in this sixth year of propaganda had made the “stab in the
the war? T h e five years which had back” (the theory that Germany had not
elapsed since the invasion of Poland had been defeated in 1918 on the battlefield
taken heavy toll of the best physical but had collapsed as a result of treason
specimens of the Reich. T h e irreplace- and weakness on the home front) an
able loss in military manpower (the article of German faith, with the
dead, missing, those demobilized because Fuehrer its leading proponent. What-
of disability or because of extreme family ever soul-searching Hitler may have ex-
hardship) amounted to 3,266,686 men perienced privately as a result of the
and 92,811 officers as of 1 September attempt on his life and the precipitate
1944.3 Even without an accurate measure retreats of his armies, there is no out-
of the cumulative losses suffered by the ward evidence that he saw in these
civilian population, or of the dwellings events any kinship to those of 1918.
destroyed, it is evident that the German He had great faith in the German
home front was suffering directly and people and in their devotion to himself
heavily from enemy action, despite the as Leader, a faith both mystic and cyni-
fact that the Americans and British were cal. T h e noise of street demonstrations
unable to get together on an air cam- directed against himself or his regime
paign designed to destroy the will of the had not once, during the years of war,
German nation. Treason (as the Nazis assailed his ears. German troops had won
saw it) had reared its ugly head in the great victories in the past, why should
abortive Putsch of July 1944, and the they not triumph again? T h e great de-
skeins of this plot against the person of feats had been, so Hitler’s intuition told
the Fuehrer still were unraveling in the him, the fruit of treason among high
torture chambers of the Gestapo. officers or, at the least, the result of in-
sufficient devotion to National Socialism
3German ground force losses are discussed in in the hearts and minds of the defeated
more detail in H. M. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, commanders and the once powerful
United States Army in World War II (Washington,
1950), pp. 29–32. See also OKH, Gen. St. d. H/Organi- General Staff. The assassination
attempt,
zations Abteilung (hereafter cited as OKH/ Org. Abt.) as seen through Hitler’s own eyes, was
KTB, 2 December 1944, which gives the revised proof positive that the suspicisions which
personnel situation as of 1 November 1944.
he had long entertained vis-à-vis the
T H E ORIGINS 7

Army General Staff were correct. Now, dous losses suffered in the summer of
he believed, this malignant growth could 1944. Nonetheless, this was the strength
be cut away; exposure showed that it figuratively paraded before Hitler by his
had no deep roots and had not contami- adjutants. T h e number of units in the
nated either the fighting troops or the Wehrmacht order of battle was impres-
rank and file of the German people. sive (despite such wholesale losses as the
Despite the heavy losses suffered by the twenty-seven divisions engulfed during
Wehrmacht in the past five years, Hitler the Russian summer offensive against
was certain that replacements could be Army Group Center). T h e collective
found and new divisions created. His German ground forces at the beginning
intuition told him that too many officers of September 1944 numbered 327 divi-
and men had gravitated into headquar- sions and brigades, of which 31 divisions
ters staffs, administrative and security and 13 brigades were armored. Again it
services. He was enraged by the growing must be noted that many of these units
disparity in the troop lists between no longer in truth had the combat
“ration strength” and “combat strength” strength of either division or brigade
and, as a military dictator, expected that (some had only their headquarters staff),
the issuance of threatening orders and but again, in Hitler’s eyes, this order of
the appointment of the brutal Heinrich battle represented fighting units capa-
Himmler as chief of the Replacement ble of employment. Such contradiction
Army would eventually reverse this as came from the generals commanding
trend. At the beginning of September the paper-thin formations, some of whom
Hitler was impatiently stamping the privately regarded the once formidable
ground and waiting for the new battal- Wehrmacht as a “paper tiger,” would be
ions to spring forth. T h e months of July brushed angrily aside as evidence of in-
and August had produced eighteen new competence, defeatism–or treason.
divisions, ten panzer brigades and nearly But the maintenance of this formid-
a hundred separate infantry battalions. able array of divisions and brigades re-
Now twenty-five new divisions, about a flected the very real military potential
thousand artillery pieces, and a score of of the Greater Reich, not yet fully ex-
general headquarters brigades of various ploited even at the end of five years of
types were demanded for delivery in what had been called total war. As in
October and November. 1915 the Germans had found that in a
How had Germany solved the man- long conflict the hospitals provided a
power problem? From a population of constant flow of replacements, and that
some eighty million, in the Greater this source could be utilized very effec-
Reich, the Wehrmacht carried a total tively by the simple expedient of progres-
of 10,165,303 officers and men on its sively lowering the physical standards
rosters at the beginning of September required for front-line duty. In addition,
1944. What part of this total was paper each year brought a new class to the
strength is impossible to say; certainly colors as German youth matured. This
the personnel systems in the German source could be further exploited by
armed forces had not been able to keep lowering the age limit at one end of the
an accurate accounting of the tremen- conscription spectrum while increasing it
8 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

at the other. I n 1944, for example, the for service in uniform. I n five years only
age limit for “volunteers” for the ranks a million German men and women had
was dropped to sixteen years and party been mobilized for the labor force. In-
pressure applied conducive to volun- deed, it may be concluded that the bulk
teering. At the same time the older con- of industrial and agrarian replacements
scription classes were combed through for men drafted into the armed services
and, in 1944, registration was carried was supplied by some seven million
back to include males born in 1884. foreign workers and prisoners of war
Another and extremely important slaving for the conqueror.
manpower acquisition, made for the first Hitler hoped to lay his hands on those
time on any scale in the late summer of of his faithful followers who thus far had
1944, came from the Navy and Air escaped the rigors of the soldier life by
Force. Neither of these establishments enfolding themselves in the uniform of
remained in any position, at this stage the party functionary. T h e task of de-
of the war, to justify the relatively large fining the nonessential and making the
numbers still carried on their rosters. new order palatable was given to Reich
While it is true that transferring air Minister Joseph Goebbels, who on 24
force ground crews to rifle companies August 1944 announced the new mobili-
would not change the numerical strength zation scheme: schools and theaters to be
of the armed forces by jot or tittle, such closed down, a 60-hour week to be intro-
practice would produce new infantry or duced and holidays temporarily abol-
armored divisions bearing new and, in ished, most types of publications to be
most cases, high numbers. suspended (with the notable exception
I n spite of party propaganda that the of “standard political works,’’ Mein
Third Reich was full mobilized behind Kampf, for one), small shops of many
the Fuehrer and notwithstanding the types to be closed, the staffs of govern-
constant and slavish mouthing of the mental bureaus to be denuded, and simi-
phrase “total war,” Germany had not, lar belt tightening. By 1 September this
in five years of struggle, completely uti- drastic comb-out was in full swing and
lized its manpower-and equally impor- accompanied within the uniformed
tant, womanpower-in prosecuting the forces by measures designed to reduce
war.4 Approximately four million public the headquarters staffs and shake loose
servants and individuals deferred from the “rear area swine,” in the Fuehrer’s
military service for other reasons consti- contemptuous phrase.5
tuted a reserve as yet hardly touched. This new flow of manpower would
And, despite claims to the contrary, no give Hitler the comforting illusion of
thorough or rational scheme had been combat strength, an illusion risen from
adopted to comb all able-bodied men his indulgence in what may be identified
out of the factories and from the fields to the American reader as “the numbers
4 B. H. Klein in his Germany’s Economic Prep- 5 For a detailed description of the Goebbels
arations for War (Cambridge: Harvard University comb-out see the manuscript study prepared by
Press, 1959) advances the thesis that, contrary to Charles V. P. von Luttichau entitled The Ardennes
Nazi propaganda, the Third Reich never went Offensive, Germany’s Situation in the Fall of
over to an all-out industrial and economic effort 1944, Part II, The Economic Situation (1953).
until the war was lost. OCMH.
T H E ORIGINS 9

racket.” Dozens of German officers who of an army numbered in the millions.


at one time or another had reason to Such was the military, political, eco-
observe the Fuehrer at work have com- nomic, and moral position of the Third
mented on his obsession with numbers Reich in the autumn of 1944 that a
and his implicit faith in statistics no leader who lacked all of the facts and
matter how murky the sources from who by nature clung to a mystic confi-
which they came or how misleading dence in his star might rationally con-
when translated into fact. So Hitler had clude that defeat could be postponed
insisted on the creation of new forma- and perhaps even avoided by some de-
tions with new numbers attached there- cisive stroke. T o this configuration of
to, rather than bringing back to- full circumstances must be added Hitler’s
combat strength those units which had implicit faith in his own military genius,
been bled white in battle. Thus the a faith to all appearance unshaken by
German order of battle distended in the defeat and treason, a faith that accepted
autumn of 1944, bloated by new units the possibility, even the probability, that
while the strength of the German ground the course of conflict might be reversed
forces declined. In the same manner by a military stroke of genius.
Hitler accepted the monthly production There was, after all, a prototype in
goals set for the armored vehicle pro- German history which showed how the
ducers by Speer’s staff as being identical genius and the will of the Feldherr
with the number of tanks and assault might wrest victory from certain defeat.
guns which in fact would reach the front Behind the desk in Hitler’s study hung a
lines. Bemused by numbers on paper and portrait of Frederick the Great. This
surrounded by a staff which had little or man, of all the great military leaders in
no combat experience and by now was world history, was Hitler’s ideal. T h e
perfectly housebroken–never introduc- axioms given by Frederick to his generals
ing unpleasant questions as to what these were on the tip of Hitler’s tongue, ever
numbers really meant—Hitler still saw ready to refute the pessimist or general-
himself as the Feldherr, with the men ize away a sticky fact. When his generals
and the tanks and the guns required to protested the inability of soldier flesh
wrest the initiative from the encircling and blood to meet further demands,
enemy. Hitler simply referred to the harsh de-
mands made of his grenadiers by Fred-
How the Plan W a s Born erick. When the cruelties of the military
punitive code were increased to the
T h e plan for the Ardennes counter- point that even the stomachs of Prussian
offensive was born in the mind and will officers rebelled, Hitler paraded the
of Hitler the Feldherr. Its conception brutal code of Frederick’s army before
and growth from ovum are worthy of them. Even the oath taken by SS officer
study by the historian and the student candidates was based on the Frederician
of the military art as a prime example oath to the flag.
of the role which may be played by the An omnivorous reader of military his-
single man and the single mind in the tory, Hitler was fond of relating episodes
conduct of modern war and the direction therefrom as evidence of his catholic
10 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

military knowledge or as footnotes prov- that he found this in the experience and
ing the soundness of a decision. In a very ultimate triumph of Frederick called the
human way he selected those historical Great.
examples which seemed to support his Although the first announcement of
own views. Napoleon, before the inva- the projected counteroffensive in the
sion of Russia, had forbidden any refer- Ardennes was made by Hitler in the
ence to the ill-fated campaign of Charles meeting on 16 September, the idea had
XII of Sweden because “the circum- been forming for some weeks in the
stances were altered.” Hitler in turn had Fuehrer’s mind. Many of the details in
brushed aside the fate of both these this development can never be known.
predecessors, in planning his Russian T h e initial thought processes were
campaign, because they had lacked tanks buried with Hitler; his closest associates
and planes. In 1944, however, Hitler’s soon followed him to the grave, leaving
mind turned to his example, Frederick only the barest information. T h e gen-
II, and found encouragement and sup- eral outlines of the manner in which
port. Frederick, at the commencement the plan took form can be discerned,
of the Seven Years War, had faced however, of course with a gap here and
superior forces converging on his king- there and a necessary slurring over ex-
dom from all points of the compass. At act dates.6
Rossbach and Leuthen he had taken T h e first and very faint glimmerings
great risk but had defeated armies twice of the idea that a counteroffensive must
the strength of his own. By defeating his be launched in the west are found in a
enemies in detail, Frederick had been long tirade made by Hitler before Gen-
able to hang on until the great alliance eraloberst Alfred Jodl and a few other
formed against Prussia had split as the officers on 31 July 1944. At this moment
result of an unpredictable historical Hitler’s eyes are fixed on the Western
accident. Front where the Allies, held fast for
Three things seemed crystal clear to several weeks in the Normandy hedge-
Hitler as explanation for Frederick’s rows, have finally broken through the
final victory over his great enemies: containing German forces in the neigh-
victory on the battlefield, and not defeat, borhood of Avranches. Still physically
was the necessary preliminary to success- shaken by the bomb blast which so
ful diplomatic negotiations and a peace nearly had cut short his career, the
settlement; the enemy coalition had Fuehrer raves and rambles, boasts,
failed to present a solid front when threatens, and complains. As he mean-
single members had suffered defeat; ders through the “conference,” really a
finally, Prussia had held on until, as solo performance, one idea reappears
Hitler paraphrased Frederick’s own 6 Exact dating for the various phases of the
words, “one of [the] damned enemies Ardennes plan, as these evolved in Hitler’s mind,
now is impossible. Magna E. Bauer has attempted
gets too tired to fight any more.” If to develop a chronology in MS # R–9, T h e Idea
Hitler needed moral support in his de- for the German Ardennes Offensive, 1944. See
cision to prepare for the counteroffensive also MSS # P–069 (Kreipe), and A-862 T h e Prep-
arations for the German Offensive in the
at a time when Germany still was reeling Ardennes, September to 16 December 1944 (Maj.
from enemy blows, it is very probable Percy E. Schramm).
T H E ORIGINS 11

again and again: the final decision must a war on two fronts had been analyzed
come in the west and if necessary the and solutions had been proposed by the
other fronts must suffer so that a con- great German military thinkers, among
centrated, major effort can be made these Moltke the Elder, Schlieffen, and
there. No definite plans can be made as Ludendorff, whose written works, so
yet, says Hitler, but he himself will Hitler boasted, were more familiar to
accept the responsibility for planning him than to those of his entourage who
and for command; the latter he will wore the red stripe of the General Staff.
exercise from a headquarters some place Moltke and Schlieffen, traveling by
in the Black Forest or the Vosges. T o the theoretical route, had arrived at the
guarantee secrecy, nobody will be conclusion that Germany lacked the
allowed to inform the Commander in strength to conduct successful offensive
Chief West or his staff of these far- operations simultaneously in the east
reaching plans; the WFSt, that is, Jodl, and west. Ludendorff (Hitler’s quondam
must form a small operational staff to colleague in the comic opera Beer Hall
aid the Fuehrer by furnishing any Putsch) had seen this theory put to the
needed data.7 test and proven in the 1914–1918 war.
Hitler’s arrogation to himself of all Hitler had been forced to learn the
command and decision vis-à-vis some same lesson the hard way in the summer
major and concerted effort in the west of 1944.
was no more than an embittered re- A fanatical believer in the Clause-
statement, with the assassination attempt witzian doctrine of the offensive as the
in mind, of a fact which had been purest and only decisive form of war,
stuffed down the throats of the General Hitler only had to decide whether his
Staff and the famous field commanders projected counteroffensive should be
since the first gross defeat in Russia and made in the east or the west. I n con-
had been underlined in blood by the trast to the situation that had existed in
executions following the Putsch of 20 the German High Command of World
July. The decision to give priority to War I, there was no sharp cleavage
the Western Front, if one can take between “Easterners” and “Westerners”
Hitler at his own word and waive a with the two groups struggling to gain
possible emotional reaction to the sud- control of the Army High Command and
den Allied plunge through the German so dictate a favored strategy. It is true
line at the base of the Cotentin penin- that OKH (personified at this moment
sula, is something new and worthy of by Guderian) had direct responsibility
notice. for the war on the Eastern Front and
The strategic and operational prob- quite naturally believed that victory or
lem posed by a war in which Germany defeat would be decided there. On the
had to fight an enemy in the east while other hand, OKW, with its chiefs Keitel
at the same time opposing an enemy in and Jodl close to the seat of power, saw
the west was at least as old as the the Western Front as the paramount
unification of Germany. T h e problem of theater of operations. Again, this was a
7 The Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab, or WFSt, was natural result of the direct responsibility
the Armed Forces Operations Staff. assigned this headquarters for the con-
12 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

duct of all operations outside of the against the Ruhr had failed to deliver
Eastern Front. Hitler, however, had any succession of knockout blows, nor
long since ceased to be influenced by was the very real vulnerability of this
his generals save in very minor matters. area yet apparent.
Nor is there any indication that Keitel Politically, if Hitler hoped to lead
or Jodl exercised any influence in turn- from strength and parlay a military
ing the Fuehrer’s attention to the west. victory into a diplomatic coup, the mono-
There is no simple or single explana- lithic USSR was a less susceptible object
tion for Hitler’s choice of the Western than the coalition of powers in the west.
Front as the scene of the great German Whereas Nazi propagandists breathed
counterstroke. T h e problem was com- hatred of the Soviet, the tone toward
plex; so were Hitler’s mental processes. England and the United States more
Some part of his reasoning breaks often was that of contempt and derision,
through in his conferences, speeches, as befitted the “decadent democracies.”
and orders, but much is left to be in- Hitler seems to have partaken of this
ferred. view, and in any case he believed that
As early as 1939 Hitler had gone on the Allies might easily split asunder if
record as to the absolute necessity of one of them was jolted hard enough.
protecting the Ruhr industrial area, the T h e inability of the western leaders to
heart of the entire war-making machine. hold their people together in the face
In November 1943, on the heels of of defeat was an oft-expressed and car-
Eastern Front reverses and before the dinal axiom of the German Fuehrer,
Western Allies had set foot in strength despite the example of the United King-
across the Channel, Hitler repeated his dom to the contrary.
fears for the Ruhr, “. . . but now while From one point of view the decision
the danger in the East remained it was for the west was the result of progressive
outweighed by the threat from the West elimination as to the other fronts. In
where enemy success would strike im- no way could victory in Italy or Finland
mediately at the heart of the German change the course of the war. Russia
war economy . . . .” 8 Even after the likewise offered no hope for any de-
disastrous impact of the 1944 Soviet cisive victory with the forces which Ger-
summer offensive he clung to the belief many might expect to gather in 1944.
that the Ruhr factories were more im- T h e campaigns in the east had finally
portant to Germany than the loss of convinced Hitler, or so it would appear,
territory in the east. He seems to have that the vast distances in the east and
felt that the war production in Silesia the seemingly inexhaustible flow of
was far out of Soviet reach: in any case Soviet divisions created a military prob-
Silesia produced less than the Ruhr. lem whose solution lay beyond the capa-
Then too, in the summer and early bilities of the Third Reich as long as
autumn of 1944 the Allied air attacks the latter was involved in a multifront
8 T h e so-called Hitler Conferences from which war. To put it another way, what Ger-
Hitler’s earlier thinking is derived are found in many now needed was a quick victory
whole or in fragments in Felix Gilbert, ed.,
Hitler Directs His War (New York: Oxford Uni-
capable of bearing immediate diplo-
versity Press, 1950). matic fruit, Between 22 June 1941 and
T H E ORIGINS 13

1 November 1942 the German armies eralfeldmarschall Guenther von Kluge,


in the USSR had swept u p 5,150,000 Commander in Chief West, seems to
prisoners of war (setting aside the Rus- have triggered the next step toward
sians killed or severely wounded) but irrevocable commitment. Coincident
still had failed to bore in deep enough with the appointment of Model to re-
to deliver a paralyzing blow. A quick place the suicide, Hitler met with a few
and decisive success in the second half of his immediate staff on 19 August to
of 1944 against 555 Soviet units of divi- consider the situation in France. During
sion size was out of the question, even this conference he instructed Walter
though Hitler would rave about the Buhle, chief of the Army Staff at OKW,
“Russian bluff” and deride the estimates and Speer, the minister in charge of
prepared by his Intelligence, Fremde military production and distribution, to
Heere Ost. prepare large allotments of men and
Still other factors were involved in materiel for shipment to the Western
Hitler’s decision. For one thing the Front. At the same time Hitler informed
Allied breakout in Normandy was a the conferees that he proposed to take
more pressing danger to the Third the initiative at the beginning of Novem-
Reich than the Soviet advance in the ber when the Allied air forces would be
east. Intuitively, perhaps, Hitler fol- unable to fly. By 19 August, it would
lowed Schlieffen in viewing an enemy appear, Hitler had made up his mind:
on the Rhine as more dangerous than an attack would be made, it would be
an enemy in East Prussia. If this was made on the Western Front, and the
Hitler’s view, then the Allied dash target date would be early November.
across France in the weeks following T h e remaining days of August were a
would give all the verification required. nightmare for the German divisions in
Whether at this particular time Hitler the west and for the German field com-
saw the German West Wall as the best manders. Shattered into bits and pieces
available springboard for a counterof- by the weight of Allied guns and armor,
fensive is uncertain. But it is quite clear hunted and hounded along the roads by
that the possession of a seemingly solid the unopposed Allied air forces, cap-
base for such an operation figured tured and killed in droves, the German
largely in the ensuing development of forces in France were thoroughly beaten.
a Western Front attack. All requests for permission to withdraw
After the announcement of the west to more defensible positions were re-
as the crucial front, in the 31 July con- jected in peremptory fashion by Hitler’s
ference, Hitler seemingly turned his headquarters, with the cold rejoinder
attention, plus such reserves as were “stand and hold” or “fight to the last
available, to the east. Perhaps this was man.” In most cases these orders were
only a passing aberration, perhaps Hitler read on the run by the retreating divi-
had been moved by choler in July and sions.
now was in the grip of indecision. Events At the beginning of September Gen-
on both fronts, however, were moving eralfeldmarschall Walter Model was
so rapidly that a final decision would “put in the big picture” by the Fuehrer.
have to be made. T h e death of Gen- Hitler gave as his “intention” for the
14 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

future conduct of operations that the north from the Mediterranean had not
retreating German armies must hold as yet been made), Hitler ordered
forward of the West Wall, thus allowing Rundstedt to counterattack against this
time needed to repair these defenses. exposed flank and cut the advanced
In general the holding position indi- American armor by seizing Reims. For
cated by Hitler ran from the Dutch this unenviable task the Fifth Panzer
coast, through northern Belgium, along Army, at the moment little more than
the forward edge of the West Wall in an army headquarters and a few army
the sector between Aachen and the troops, would be beefed u p and handed
Moselle River, then via the western over to the new commander in chief. 9
borders of Alsace and Lorraine to some T h e thrust to Reims was not intended
indefinite connection with the Swiss as the grand-scale effort to regain the
frontier. Here, for the first time on the initiative which by this time was fully
Western Front, Hitler relaxed his seem- rooted in Hitler’s mind. T h e Fifth
ingly pigheaded views on the unyielding Panzer Army was to counterattack, that
defense and permitted, even enjoined, is, to be committed with limited forces
a withdrawal. This permission, however, for the attainment of a limited object.
was given for a very definite purpose: T h e scheme visualized for November,
to permit the reorganization of Ger- no matter how vague its shape in the
many’s defense at or forward of the first week of September, was that of a
West Wall, the outer limit of Greater counteroffensive, or a major commit-
Germany. ment of men and materiel designed to
Despite the debacle in France, Hitler wrest the initiative from the enemy in
professed himself as unworried and even pursuance of a major strategic victory.
sanguine. On the first day of September, T h e counterattack was made, but not
Rundstedt was recalled to the position as planned and not toward Reims. T h e
of Commander in Chief West which he base for the proposed operation, west of
had been forced to relinquish at the end the Moselle River, was lost to the Amer-
of June under Hitler’s snide solicitude icans before the attack could be
for his “health.” T h e new commander launched. A watered-down variant on
was told that the enemy in the west the east side of the Moselle was set in
would shortly be brought to a halt by motion on 18 September, with Luné-
logistic failures (in this forecast the ville as the first objective; it degenerated
Fuehrer’s intuition served him well) and into a series of small, piecemeal attacks
that the giant steps being taken toward of only momentary significance. 10 This,
Germany were the work of isolated the single major effort to win time and
“armored spearheads” which had out- space by counterattack and so give
run the main Allied forces and now breathing space to the Reich and footing
could be snipped off by local counter- for a counteroffensive, must be written
attacks, whereupon the front would sta-
bilize. Since the U. S. Third Army under 9 The background of the abortive Fifth Panzer
Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., was Army attack is described in Cole, T h e Lorraine
Campaign, pp. 190–95.
advancing with its right flank open (con-
10The story of this operation is told in Cole,
tact with the U.S. Seventh Army driving T h e Lorraine Campaign, ch. V, passim.
T H E ORIGINS 15

off as a complete failure. Nonetheless, systematically hammered in an effort to


by the second week of September there strangle the German bid for the initia-
were encouraging evidences all along the tive when the day for the counteroffen-
Western Front that the battered German sive came?
troops were beginning to get a toehold As a target date, 1 November now
here and there, and that the enemy who seemed firm. Hitler had tossed it out in
had run so fast and so far was not holding an off-the-cuff gesture; Jodl had evalu-
the pace. Except for a handful of bunk- ated it in terms of the military situation
ers and pillboxes the battle front was as seen in the remote Wolf’s Lair; and
in process of stabilizing forward of the in his first report after assuming com-
West Wall. Meanwhile German efforts mand, Rundstedt unwittingly added his
to reactivate and rearm these fortifica- blessing by estimating that the West
tions were in full swing. Wall defenses would be refurbished and
Despite the somber and often despair- manned sometime around 20 October.
ing reports prepared by Model and his T h e Commander in Chief West, be it
successor, Rundstedt, during late Au- noted, was not yet privy to any attack
gust and early September, Hitler and plans except those for the Fifth Panzer
his intimate staff in the East Prussian Army.
headquarters continued to give thought Since Hitler was convinced that his
to a decisive attack in the west. About western armies would hold before or at
6 September, Jodl gave the Fuehrer an the West Wall position, and by intuition
evaluation of the situation inherited by or self-hypnosis he held to this convic-
Rundstedt. T h e task at hand was to tion, the next step was to amass the
withdraw as many troops from the line forces needed to issue offensively from
as possible, refit and re-form units. On the West Wall base of operations. Dur-
the scale required, this work could not ing July and August eighteen new divi-
be completed before the first day of sions had been organized, fifteen of
November. Since he was probably lis- which were sent to the Eastern Front,
tening to a clearer phrasing of his own one to Norway, and only two to the
cloudy concept, Hitler agreed, but with Western Front. A further Hitler order
the proviso that the battle front must on 2 September commanded the creation
be kept as far to the west as possible. of an “operational reserve” numbering
T h e reason, expressed apparently for twenty-five new divisions. This order
the first time, was that the Allied air lay behind the comb-out program en-
effort had to be kept at a distance from trusted to Goebbels and definitely was
the Rhine bridges or the consequences in preparation for a western counter-
might be disastrous. Did Hitler fear offensive. Early in August the Western
that fighter-bombers operating from Front had been given priority on tanks
fields in France or Belgium might leave coming off the assembly line; this now
the Rhine crossing complex stricken and was made a permanent proviso and
incapable of supporting the line of com- extended to cover all new artillery and
munications to the armies then on the assault gun production.
left bank of the Rhine? Or did he fore- Further additions to the contemplated
see that the Rhine bridges would be reserve would have to come from other
16 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

theaters of war. On 4 September OKW to in the months after the war by all
ordered a general movement of artillery of those major German military figures
units in the Balkans back to the Western in Hitler’s entourage who survived the
Front. T h e southeastern theater now last battles and the final Gotterdam-
was bereft of much of its early signifi- merung purges. It is possible, however,
cance and the German forces therein that Hitler had discussed the operational
stood to lose most of their heavy equip- concept of a counteroffensive through the
ment in the event of a Soviet drive into Ardennes with Jodl–and before the 16
the Balkans. T h e northern theater like- September edict. T h e relationship be-
wise was a potential source of reinforce- tween these two men has bearing on the
ments, particularly following the defec- entire “prehistory” of the Ardennes
tion of Finland in early September and campaign. It is analyzed by the head-
the collapse of a homogeneous front. quarters diary-keeper and historian,
These “side shows” could be levied upon Maj. Percy E. Schramm, as follows:
for the western counteroffensive, and
even the sore-beset German armies in
the east, or so Hitler reasoned, could
contribute armored divisions to the west.
But in the main, the plan still evolving
within the closed confines of the Wolf’s
Lair turned on the withdrawal and re-
habilitation of units which had taken
part in the battle for France. As a first
step the SS panzer divisions in the west
were ordered out of the line (13 Sep-
tember) and turned over to a new army
headquarters, that of the Sixth Panzer
Army.
Having nominated a headquarters to
control the reconstitution of units spe-
cifically named for participation in an
attack to be made in the west, the logical
next step in development of the plan
came in Hitler’s announcement on 16
September: the attack would be de-
livered in the Ardennes and Antwerp GENERALJODL
would be the objective. The function of Genobst Jodl in the
Why the Ardennes? T o answer this Fuehrer’s headquarters consisted of pre-
question in a simple and direct manner paring-on the general staff level-the de-
is merely to say that the Ardennes would cisions the Fuehrer made in his capacity of
be the scene of a great winter battle C-in-C of the Wehrmacht. Jodl also was
because the Fuehrer had placed his responsible for their execution. But these
were not his only duties. Whenever the
finger on a map and made a pronounce- Fuehrer conceived a new military plan it
ment. This simplified version was agreed was Jodl with whom the idea was discussed
T H E ORIGINS 17

and closely examined. It was again Jodl the “argument from silence,”—the fact
who obtained the information necessary to that there is no evidence of other
transmute a vague idea into a workable thought on the Ardennes as the point
plan. It was also he who raised objections of concentration prior to Hitler’s state-
and suggestions which had been voiced by
the immediately subordinate commands. ment on 16 September—has some valid-
These facts were so little known to the out- ity.
side world that the public scarcely knew T h e most impressive argument for
Jodl, and that within the Wehrmacht- ascribing sole authorship of the Arden-
even among those in leading positions-he
was mostly considered only as an executive nes idea to Hitler is found in the simple
tool, by some people even as too willing a fact that every major military decision
tool. The view was widely held that the in the German High Command for
Fuehrer did not accept any opinion other months past had been made by the
than his own. It was not recognized that, Fuehrer, and that these Hitler decisions
although Hitler in the final analysis might
only follow his own trend of thought, he were made in detail, never in principle
acquired the inner assurance necessary for alone.
his actions by constantly discussing his in- T h e major reasons for Hitler’s selec-
tentions within the confines of his inner tion of the Ardennes were stated by
circle. For this reason, the Chief of the himself, although never in a single tabu-
Wehrmacht Operations Staff (Jodl) was lation on a single occasion nor with any
an extremely important figure in all stra-
tegic decisions. . . . In his relationship to ordering of importance:
the Fuehrer, his functions were not merely
executive, but involved a very complex The enemy front in the Ardennes sector
process of giving and taking, altering andwas very thinly manned.
retrenching, warning and stimulating. 11 A blow here would strike the seam be-
tween the British and Americans and lead
T h e evidence is clear that Jodl and to political as well as military disharmony
a few of his juniors from the Wehrmacht between the Allies. Furthermore an en-
Operations Staff did examine the trance along this seam would isolate the
British 21 Army Group and allow the en-
Ardennes concept very closely in the circlement and destruction of the British
period from 25 September, when Hitler and Canadians before the American leader-
gave the first order to start detailed ship (particularly the political leadership)
planning, to 11 October, when Jodl could react.
submitted the initial operations plan. The distance from the jump-off line to a
solid strategic objective (Antwerp) was not
Other but less certain evidence indicates too great and could be covered quickly,
that those present in the select confer- even in bad weather.
ence on 16 September were taken by The configuration of the Ardennes area
surprise when Hitler made his announce- was such that the ground for maneuver was
ment. Jodl definitely ascribes the selec- limited and so would require the use of
relatively few divisions.
tion of the Ardennes to Hitler and Hitler The terrain to the east of the break-
alone, but at the time Jodl expressed through sector selected was very heavily
this view he was about to be tried before wooded and offered cover against Allied air
an international tribunal on the charge observation and attack during the build-up
of preparing aggressive war. Even so, for the assault.
An attack to regain the initiative in this
11MS # B–034, OKW War Diary, 1 April–18 particular area would erase the enemy
December 1944: The West (Schramm). ground threat to the Ruhr.
18 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Although Hitler never referred di- pressed can be regarded as more than
rectly to the lightning thrust made in bombast. He would be prone to believe
1940 through the Ardennes as being in that the Western Allies had learned
any sense a prototype for the operation nothing from the experience of 1940,
in the same area four and a half years that the conservative military tradition
later, there is indication of a more than which had deemed the Ardennes as
casual connection between the two cam- impossible for armor was still in the
paigns in Hitler’s own thinking. For saddle, and that what German arms had
example, during the 16 September ex- accomplished in 1940 might be their
posé he set the attainment of “another portion a second time. Two of the fac-
Dunkirk” as his goal. Then, as detailed tors which had entered into the plans
planning began, Hitler turned again for the 1940 offensive still obtained: a
and again to make operational proposals very thin enemy line and the need for
which had more than chance similarity protecting the Ruhr. T h e German
to those he had made before the 1940 attack could no longer be supported by
offensive. When, in September 1939, an air force which outweighed the op-
Hitler had announced his intention to position, but this would be true wher-
attack in the west, the top-ranking offi- ever the attack was delivered. Weather
cers of the German armed forces had to had favored movement through the
a man shown their disfavor for this Ardennes defiles in the spring of 1940.
daring concept. Despite this opposition This could hardly be expected in the
Hitler had gone ahead and personally month of November, but there is no
selected the general area for the initial indication that Hitler gave any thought
penetration, although perhaps with con- to the relation of weather and terrain
siderable stimulation from Generalfeld- as this might affect ground operations
marschall Fritz Erich von Manstein. T h e in the Ardennes. He tended to look at
lightning campaign through the Nether- the sky rather than the ground, as the
lands, Belgium, and France had been Luftwaffe deteriorated, and bad weath-
the first great victory won by Hitler’s er-bad flying weather–was his desire.
intuition and the Fuehrerprinzip over In sum, Hitler’s selection of the Arden-
the German General Staff, establishing nes may have been motivated in large
a trend which had led almost inevitably part by the hope that the clock could
to the virtual dictatorship in military be turned back to the glorious days of
command exercised by the Fuehrer in 1940.12
1944. Also, the contempt for Allied gen- 12General Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (New
eralship which Hitler continually ex- York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1952, app. 3.
CHAPTER II

Planning the Counteroffensive


Details of the Plan and Canadians would ultimately be
fought north of the line Antwerp-Liege-
About 25 September Jodl was ordered Bastogne; (f) a minimum of thirty divi-
to begin a detailed analysis of the Hit- sions would be available, ten of which
lerian concept, the only function now would be armored; (g) support would
left to the great General Staff. Some be given by an unprecedented concentra-
latitude remained to the individual staff tion of artillery and rocket projector
officers and those favored few in the high units; (h) operational control would be
echelon of command who retained ac- vested in four armies-two panzer armies
cess to the Fuehrer in kneading and abreast in the lead, two armies com-
shaping the very general outline handed posed largely of infantry divisions to
down by Hitler into an operations plan. cover the flanks; (i) the Luftwaffe would
T h e outline as it now had taken shape be prepared to support the operation;
contained these major points: (a) the (j) all planning would aim at securing
attack should be launched sometime tactical surprise and speed; (k) secrecy
between 2 0 and 30 November; (b) it would be maintained at all costs and
should be made through the Ardennes only a very limited number of individ-
in the Monschau-Echternach sector; (c) uals would be made privy to the plan.
the initial object would be the seizure ( M a p I)
of bridgeheads over the Meuse River Theoretically, the chief of OKW,
between Liege and Namur; (d) there- Keitel, should have been the central
after, Antwerp would be the objective; 1 figure as preparations for the Ardennes
(e) a battle to annihilate the British counteroffensive unrolled. Actually he
1 T h e precise reasons for the selection of
was charged with estimating the fuel
Antwerp as the German objective are none too andammunition required. 2 Jodl and the
clear. T h e city represented the main supply base Armed Forces Operations Staff would
for British operations and it might be expected mastermind the great attack. Rundstedt,
that the British public would react adversely to
an Allied command responsible for the loss of an Commander in Chief West, was not
area so close to England which could be em- informed of the impending operation;
ployed for V–2 attacks a t short range. Later, at
Nuremberg Rundstedt would say that the Meuse
indeed at this stage he did not even
bridgeheads and Liege actually were the ultimate know that Hitler envisaged a counter-
objectives. T h e Fifth Panzer Army commander, offensive in the west. So much for the
General der Panzertruppen Hasso-Eccard von
Manteuffel. gives his story in Seymour Freiden 2 T h e remaining records of the German High
and William Richardson, eds., T h e Fatal D e - Command show clearly that Keitel no longer had
cisions (New York: William Sloane Associates, a hand in the actual direction of the war or in
Inc., 1956). Part 6. strategic planning.
20 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

“Rundstedt Offensive,” as this appella- chain what would become a bitter con-
tion was broadcast to the world by the troversy between his views and those of
Allies in December 1944. his major field commanders. When, two
The mechanics of German staff work days later, Jodl produced a draft plan
seem to have deteriorated little during and operation overlay for Hitler’s in-
the years of war despite the disfavor spection, the favored solution seems to
into which the General Staff, as an insti- have been contained in Operation Liège-
tution, had fallen. Methodically, accord- Aachen with emphasis on a main effort
ing to doctrine as old as Moltke the to be made through the Ardennes and
Elder, the young officers with Jodl Eifel. As Schramm soberly puts it: “Sys-
studied variants to the scheme proposed tematic re-examination confirmed that
by Hitler. Ultimately the staff settled the area selected by the Fuehrer actually
on five possible courses of action: was the most promising on the whole
Western Front.”
Operation Holland: a single-thrust at- The scoffer may feel that such a solu-
tack to be launched from the Venlo area,
with Antwerp as the objective. tion by junior officers was predestined.
Operation Liège-Aachen: a two-pronged And, although the planning staffs in
attack with the main effort driving from 1940 had been able to introduce radical
northern Luxembourg in a northwesterly changes into the Hitler scheme of ma-
direction, subsequently turning due north neuver, perhaps such independent staff
to meet the secondary attack which would
be launched from the sector northwest of operation no longer was possible, or at
Aachen. least politic. There was no high-placed
Operation Luxembourg: a two-pronged and unbiased professional testimony,
attack launched simultaneously from cen- however, to negate this decision by the
tral Luxembourg and Metz to seize Longwy. colonels and lieutenant colonels who
Operation Lorraine: also a double en-
velopment, to be launched from Metz and vetted the Hitler concept. Rundstedt,
Baccarat and to converge on Nancy. despite a deep-burning personal desire
Operation Alsace: an envelopment to be to detach his name from the final offen-
executed in two thrusts, one originating sive and a professional contempt for the
east of Epinal and the other east of Mont- failure to recognize the paucity of means
béliard, the juncture to be made in the
Vesoul area. for the mission assigned him, would
later say of the Ardennes Campaign and
Of these five possibilities the plan- Hitler’s share in its formulation: “The
ning staff recommended the first two. operational idea as such can almost be
Operation Holland was recognized as called a stroke of genius.”
risky but, at the same time, the Hitler now accepted both of the rec-
most promising strategically. Operation ommended solutions and ordered prep-
Liège-Aachen was deemed a good ex- aration of a new draft synthesizing the
ercise of the forward double envelop- two. This concept of a double envelop-
ment and the possible payoff very large ment with the two prongs of the attack
–the destruction of the enemy in the originating far apart and casting a wide
Aachen salient. In conversation with net as they moved to a meeting would
Jodl on 9 October, Hitler plumped for be known to the German staffs as the
a two-pronged envelopment, setting in “Grand Slam” (the American command-
PLANNING T H E COUNTEROFFENSIVE 21

ers were not the only military bridge General der Infanterie Hans Krebs,
players) or the “Big Solution.” Although chief of Model’s Army Group B staff,
Jodl and the WFSt often were charged reported at the Wolf’s Lair on the
by subordinate headquarters as having morning of 22 October.3 They hardly
no realization of the difficulties under could have expected a pleasant recep-
which the outnumbered German troops tion: the embattled city of Aachen had
were battling, here appears to be one fallen to the Americans, and they had
case in which the planning staff was the unpleasant task of pressing OKW
thoroughly aware that the means were for a favorable answer to Rundstedt’s
not and could not be adequate to the repeated-and unanswered-requests for
grandiose object of the Big Solution. more divisions to prevent an Allied
Without the support of the field com- breakthrough to the Ruhr.
manders, as yet not involved in the Scarcely had salutes been exchanged
planning, Jodl dared not, or at least pre- when the two generals were asked to
ferred not, to gainsay the Fuehrer’s pro- sign a pledge binding them to secrecy
posal. T h e argument at this point was in regard to a mysterious operation
on the location of the southern boundary Wacht am Rhein (Watch on the Rhine).
of the main attack force. Hitler held If this plan should leak out they would
for the line Wasserbillig, Arlon, and be shot! Westphal and Krebs were in
the north bank of the Semois River. T h e the toils of a security system as care-
staff proposal was more modest in the fully conceived and executed as the com-
area assigned the attack, the southern bined vigilance of the armed forces and
boundary originating near Diekirch, the Gestapo could make it. Wacht am
passing north of Martelange to Neufchâ- Rhein was a cover name, chosen to give
teau, thence turning northwest to Givet. the impression that the plan was for a
T e n days after the initial staff pre- defense at the Rhine. An alternate and
sentation Jodl was back to hand Hitler more commonly used formula, the
the revised outline plan or Aufmarschan- Abwehrschlacht im Westen (Defensive
weisung. T h e Aufmarschanweisung, in Battle in the West) had the same intent
German practice, was a directive con- and the added advantage that it had
taining the basic parts of the plan, the been used to describe the battles
guiding principles to be followed in around Aachen.
developing and implementing the plan, Probably the two generals were greatly
and general instructions as to procedure. heartened—and surprised—when they
From this, more detailed planning nor- were handed a long list of troops sched-
mally was undertaken by the headquar- uled to arrive on the Western Front at
ters assigned to carry out the operation. the end of November and in early
Even before Hitler gave the final nod, December. At noon, for the first time,
the chiefs of staff of the two major field they reported to Hitler who was holding
commands concerned (as yet unaware
that a counteroffensive was in the offing) 3 The German term Oberbefehlshaber West,
were called to the East Prussian head- which may mean either the Commander in Chief
West or his headquarters, has been rendered as
quarters. General der Kavellerie Sieg- OB WEST when it refers to the headquarters and
fried Westphal, from OB West, and as C-in-C West when it refers to the person.
22 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

his daily conference. When the confer- panzer-type divisions from the OKW
ence was finished, Westphal and Krebs strategic reserve. But 3 infantry and 6
found themselves in a second and much panzer divisions would have to be with-
smaller meeting, with Hitler himself drawn by OB WEST from the already
conducting the briefing on an astound- weakened Western Front and re-formed
ing plan for a counteroffensive to be before taking their place in the coming
undertaken in the Army Group B area. offensive. (This was hardly pleasant
This attack, said Hitler, was designed news since OB WEST possessed only 9
to surround and destroy the British and panzer divisions in its entire theater of
American forces north of the line Bas- operations.) Hitler then recapitulated
togne-Brussels-Antwerp. It would be the additional reinforcements which had
carried out in two phases: the first phase been listed in the morning: 5 motorized
to close the attacking force along the antiaircraft (flak) regiments from the
Meuse River and seize bridgeheads; the Luftwaffe, 12 Volks artillery corps, 10
second phase to culminate in the cap- rocket projector (Werfer) brigades, plus
ture of Antwerp. (Neither here nor a host of army troops.
later is there evidence of any detailed It may be that Hitler sensed some
planning as to what should be done once skepticism on the part of the two visi-
Antwerp fell.) Army Group B would tors, and it is probable that he remem-
have three armies for the attack: the bered past promises of reinforcements
Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies would which had never arrived; whatever the
be in the van; the Seventh Army would reason, he added his personal assurance
be echeloned to the rear so as to cover that these units would be forthcoming.
the exposed southern flank of the attack Further, he gave his pledge that the
wedge. Two target dates were fixed, 20 Luftwaffe would support the operation
November for the end of all prepara- with up to fifteen hundred fighters, of
tions, 25 November for the beginning which a hundred would be the new jet
of the offensive. T h e latter date had planes, far superior to anything the
been selected by Dr. Schuster and his Allies could put in the air. As a clincher,
meteorologists in answer to the Fuehrer’s Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel
demand for a period in which at least then gave his word as an officer that
ten days of continuous bad weather and 17,000 cubic meters (4,250,000 gallons)
poor visibility might be expected. Such of motor fuel would be available for the
a stretch of poor flying weather would attack, plus a special fifty-trainload am-
ground the superior Allied air forces. munition reserve, all this in excess of
Furthermore, the target date coincided current consumption. The two silent
with the new moon, a help in reducing generals were dismissed with the injunc-
the effectiveness of Allied night raids. tion that OB WEST must hold its front,
Westphal and Krebs then heard that even at the cost of giving ground, with-
they could count on 18 infantry and 12 out committing a single one of the for-
armored or mechanized divisions “for mations earmarked for Wacht am Rhein,
planning purposes.” This windfall of and told that OB WEST should submit
reinforcements included 13 infantry a draft plan for the first phase of the
divisions, 2 parachute divisions, and 6 attack forthwith.
PLANNING T H E COUNTEROFFENSIVE 23

Back at the Ziegenberg headquarters WEST was to make its views known.
of OB WEST, Westphal recited the in- With the penalty for a security failure
structions he had received, then hastened so immediate, only the operations officer,
on to give Rundstedt his own appraisal Generalleutnant Bodo Zimmermann, the
of the plan and the “politics” involved. chief of Supply and Administration,
The plan to seize Antwerp was far too Generalleutnant Friedrich John, and one
ambitious for the forces available: the aide were let in on the secret. T h e next
time for preparation was far too short. step was to call a conference for 27
Since it was apparent that the whole October (it now was late on the 24th)
scheme was inspired by Hitler, OB at the Army Group B headquarters near
WEST probably would have no voice in Krefeld. In the three nights and two days
determining plans or in directing the remaining, the little group at OB WEST
operation unless it could team up with would prepare an operations plan; to
Jodl who, in Westphal’s opinion, was this the code name Martin was assigned.
T h e part played by Rundstedt dur-
ing the prelude to the Ardennes Cam-
paign and in its denoument needs some
explanation. An aloof, nonpolitical of-
ficer of the old Prussian school, Rund-
stedt by reason of age and prestige stood
at the apex of the German officer caste
system. He had survived Hitler’s dis-
favor, incurred during his first tour as
Commander in Chief West, then had
been brought back from semiretirement
to take over his old post at a time when
the German armies in the west were
everywhere in retreat. Rundstedt’s posi-
tion in the autumn of 1944 was exceed-
ingly difficult. He was treated correctly
by Hitler, Keitel, Jodl, and the others in
the OKW, but was regarded as too old
and too lukewarm toward National
Socialism to merit anything more than
the outer forms of respect. Advice from
Rundstedt was consistently pigeonholed
by Jodl or brushed aside by Hitler, ex-
cept in those rare cases when Jodl found
it expedient to quote Rundstedt, the
FIELDMARSL VON RUNDSTEDT
field commander, in support of a posi-
tion being developed by the WFSt.
wary of the Big Solution proposed by T h e relations between Rundstedt and
Hitler. his chief subordinate, Model, comman-
Rundstedt had to act quickly if OB der of Army Group B , were correct but
24 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

not cordial. After the suicide of Kluge,


both the supreme ground command in
the west, OB WEST, and that of Army
Group B had been united on Model’s
shoulders. Rundstedt’s return to the
Western Front ostensibly was ordered to
relieve this untenable command situa-
tion. However, Hitler and his advisers
intended to keep the old field marshal
officially in leading strings. Model was
well aware of the limitations imposed on
Rundstedt. He himself was an ardent
Nazi, clever, ambitious, and much
younger than Rundstedt. Thus far Mo-
del had retained a high place in the
Fuehrer’s notoriously fickle favor. T h e
upshot seems to have been a kind of
truce between Rundstedt and Model in
which the younger field marshal de-
ferred to the elder, but in which the OB
WEST commander kept his place by
handling two-way communications be-
tween his subordinate headquarters,
Army Group B , and his superior head-
quarters, OKW, without overly much FIELD MARSHAL MODEL
interference or comment. Under such
strained circumstances OB WEST would
more and more assume the properties of ion. Sometime around 21 September
a rubber stamp, this becoming most ap- Rundstedt had advised OKW that the
parent during the actual operations in ultimate objective for all strategy in the
the Ardennes.4 west should be a counteroffensive to in-
Whether or not Rundstedt’s views flict a decisive defeat on the enemy. The
would get an airing before Hitler, the hope of such a strategy seems to have
same sense of duty which compelled the evaporated in the smoke and dust of the
aging field marshal to remain in his Aachen battle; by mid-October Rund-
anomalous post also forced him to an stedt had a single thought, simply to hold
official expression of his military opin- on. It may be that momentarily Rund-
4 The relations between Rundstedt and Model stedt was fired by the plans which his
are described by one of the latter’s staff officers, chief of staff brought back from the
Thuisko von Metzch, in an unpublished report
made for the Office of the Chief of Military
Wolf’s Lair, but the field marshal was
History in 1952. Charles V. P. von Luttichau, too old and too experienced to expect
Report on the Interview With Mr. Thuisko von miracles. Although Rundstedt had rec-
Metzsch [14–19 March 1952] on Operations of
Army Group B and Its Role in the German
ognized the merit of Hitler’s opera-
Ardennes Offensive, 1944. Copy in OCMH. tional plan, from the very first he
PLANNING T H E COUNTEROFFENSIVE 25

realized, as he later testified, that “all, range estimate of Allied intentions pre-
absolutely all conditions for the possible dicted that the Allies first would attempt
success of such an offensive were lack- to clear the Schelde estuary, as a pre-
ing.” 5 liminary to opening the port of Antwerp,
The weaknesses of the plan were di- and follow with a shift to the Venlo-
agnosed by Rundstedt and Westphal as Aachen sector as a base for operations
follows: sufficient force was not available against the Ruhr. Recognizing, there-
to attain the distant goal of Antwerp; the fore, that the Allied north wing with its
German situation on the Western Front four armies was heavily weighted, Plan
was so precarious that it was question- Martin emphasized protection of the
able whether the divisions slated for the north flank of the attack, adding extra
offensive could be kept out of the moil divisions for this purpose and feeding in
of battle prior to D-day; the Allies might a vital secondary attack by six divisions
launch an offensive of their own, “spoil- debouching from the salient south of
ing” the German attack; the northern Roermond.
and southern flanks of the offensive The axis of the advance, as pro-
would be dangerously open, the ex- posed in Martin, would be Butgenbach–
posure increasing with every mile gained Trois Ponts–Werbomont–Ourthe River-
in the advance; finally, there was a better a Meuse crossing north of the line Huy-
than average chance that all the attack Antwerp. The Fifth and Sixth Panzer
could produce would be a salient or Armies, right and left, would attack on
bulge of the Great War variety, consum- a narrow front, the main strength of the
ing too many German divisions in what two armies driving between Simmerath
would be ultimately only a holding op- and Bleialf on a front of only twenty-five
eration. The solution, as seen by Rund- miles. This was the salient feature of the
stedt and Westphal, was to produce an Rundstedt plan: a heavy concentration
operations order which would be less for breakthrough on a narrow front. The
ambitious as to the terrain to be con- area selected for the thrust of this sharp,
quered and which would aim at maxi- narrow wedge offered the best tank go-
mum destruction of Allied forces with ing to be found; no rivers need be
minimum risk. crossed by the main attack until the
The OB WEST appraisal of Allied Ourthe was reached. Flank cover would
strength, as set forth in Martin, ac- be given by the advance of the Fifteenth
corded the Allies a two to one superior- Army in the north and the Seventh
ity. Although the front was relatively Army in the south. T h e secondary attack
quiet, the main Allied effort was recog- from the Roermond sector, heavy with
nized as being directed against the flanks armor, would effect a juncture with the
of the German line (the Fifteenth Army main advance near Liège.
in the north and the Nineteenth Army Plan Martin, then, exemplified Rund-
in the south). But the German long- stedt’s desire to design and cut a coat
matching the amount of cloth he ex-
5 Rundstedt Testimony, Trial of the Major War pected to have. He wanted immediate
Criminals Before the International Military Tri-
bunal (Nuremberg, 12 August 1946) vol. XXXI,
results, to be won by a quick break-
P. 29. through on a narrow front, with the
26 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

entire field of battle reduced consider- achieved between the Hurtgen Forest
ably in size from the maneuver area and Lützkampen with the Fifth and
envisaged in the original Hitler direc- Sixth Panzer Armies leading the attack.
tive. The simultaneous secondary thrust On the left wing the Seventh Army
from the Roermond salient was regarded would not make an immediate advance
by Rundstedt as essential to the O B as in the O B W E S T maneuver, but
W E S T plan. would follow in the track of the Sixth
At Fichtenhain near Krefeld, in a Panzer Army as a second wave. In con-
group of modern buildings which had trast to the wedge formation advocated
been erected as a nursing home for alco- by O B W E S T for the main thrust, in
holics, Field Marshal Model and a small which forces echeloned to the rear would
fragment of his army group staff also develop a kind of snowplow effect roll-
busied themselves with an answer to the ing back the enemy on the flanks, the
Hitler directive. Despite his avowed Army Group B maneuver represented a
loyalty to the party and Fuehrer, Model’s mechanized and motorized version of the
reaction to Krebs’ report had been caus- Napoleonic carré in which the main dis-
tic in the extreme: “This plan hasn’t got position for the rupture of the enemy
a damned leg to stand on.” 6 Antwerp, position was a square with two forma-
in Model’s opinion, was beyond reach tions abreast in the lead and two
without more forces than were available. formations following on the same axis.
As Rundstedt had done, Model pro- T h e weight accorded the main thrust by
ceeded to whittle away at the grandiose the two panzer armies was about the
plan which had come from the Wolf’s same in both plans; both would employ
Lair. Even more than O B W E S T , Model seven armored divisions, but Model pro-
and his staff feared the Allied threat in vided thirteen infantry divisions as com-
the Aachen sector. Sensitive to this and pared with Rundstedt’s ten.
anxious to concentrate as much of the The two plans finally were presented
limited means as possible in the main on 27 October in a joint conference at
punch, Model at once rejected the idea Fichtenhain. On this occasion the gen-
of a two-pronged attack. The Army erals nominated to command the par-
Group B plan, called Herbstnebel (au- ticipating armies (General der Pan-
tumn fog), assigned the armored forma- zertruppen Hasso-Eccard von Man-
tions which Rundstedt intended to teuffel, Generaloberst der Waffen-SS
employ in the secondary thrust from Josef “Sepp” Dietrich, and General der
Roermond to a general reserve in the Panzertruppen Erich Brandenberger)
Düren area; from there this armor could joined the O B W E S T and Army Group
be thrown in as the second wave of the B commanders and their chiefs of staff.
main drive, or, if need be, rushed to In an initial briefing by Rundstedt, the
bolster the defenses in the Aachen sector. problems of cover and deception were
The Herbstnebel plan called for a enumerated with solutions about the
single powerful thrust on a front about same as those employed in the final op-
forty miles wide, the breakthrough to be eration. Cover would be based on the
idea, Defensive Battle in the West.
6Interv, Luttichau with Metzsch, 14–19 Mar 52. Deception would aim at attracting the
PLANNING T H E COUNTEROFFENSIVE 27

attention of the enemy to the sector headquarters. Time, it was obvious to


northwest of Cologne where the assem- all, was running out.
bly of troops and supplies would be made There is only one explanation for this
openly and in daylight, the whole ruse surprising delay and it is supported by
abetted by an increase in radio traffic. what is known of the working relation-
After a meeting that lasted several ship between the Fuehrer and the chief
hours, Model agreed to submit a new of his planning staff. Probably one can-
army group plan incorporating most of not say that the whole of this extended
O B WEST’s Martin study. Actually period was devoted to argument; that
Model and Rundstedt found themselves would have been inadmissible to Hitler
in accord on only one point, that the and not in keeping with Jodl’s character.
Hitler scheme for seizing Antwerp was But it is known that the two men were
too ambitious and that there was no pur- in fundamental disagreement on the ob-
pose to plans carrying beyond the Meuse jective of the planned counteroffensive.
River. Quite independently, or so it Jodl’s technique would have been to
would appear, the two headquarters had postpone the final drafting and dispatch
arrived at the Small Solution, or the en- of the directive while he and Buttlar-
velopment of the enemy east of the Brandenfels tried to “sell” Hitler, push-
Meuse River. The fact that Model was ing a little at a time but withdrawing
violently opposed to the Fuehrer’s solu- when storm warnings appeared.
tion and thus could expect no support This conflict of ideas, for it hardly can
from OKW may have made him more be called a personal controversy, saw the
amenable to Rundstedt’s exercise of the Small Solution opposed to the Big Solu-
command decision. When the revised tion, or Grand Slam. The point of disa-
Model plan arrived at OB WEST head- greement had risen when Hitler com-
quarters on 28 October, it followed the bined into one the two separate plans
general outline of the Martin plan. All favored by the WFSt: the attack from
of this work was preparatory to the re- Venlo to seize Antwerp, and the double
ceipt of further instructions promised by envelopment of Liege by pincers from
Jodl. These arrived at OB WEST head- northern Luxembourg and from the
quarters by special courier during the Aachen area. Jodl and his aides had in-
night of 2 November. tended that the forces available would be
employed in one of the favored plans and
one only. A sweeping enlargement on the
The Big Solution original W F S t concept, such as Hitler
demanded, would require perhaps twice
Jodl’s preliminary plan had gone to as many new divisions on the Western
Hitler on 21 October. T h e directive now Front as the twenty-one that were to be
handed the C-in-C West had been signed provided from the OKW strategic re-
and dispatched from the Wolf’s Lair on serve.
1 November. Why this delay in issuing Jodl seems to have had no hesitation
the directive? Jodl and Hitler met sev- about setting the two alternatives before
eral times a day. There was no need to Hitler. First, he could go ahead with the
wait for information coming from lower Big Solution, aiming at the seizure of
28 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Antwerp and the encirclement and de- the west, the Fuehrer could not bring
struction of the Allied forces north of the himself to take troops from the Eastern
line Bastogne-Brussels-Antwerp. This Front and stake everything on a quick
would require a drastic revision of Ger- decision in the west. Stubbornly, Hitler
man strategy on all fronts. Combat adhered to Antwerp as the goal of the
divisions would have to be stripped from attack and the proposition that it could
the Eastern Front in particular and be achieved with only those thirty divi-
given to OB WEST. Replacements and sions or so which could be raised by
supplies for other fronts than the west OKW or saved out of the ruck by OB
would have to be reduced to a mere WEST.
trickle. Obviously ground would have to By the end of October it must have
be surrendered elsewhere if the great been apparent to Jodl that Hitler could
attack in the west were to be successful; not be moved, nor could the letter
therefore local commanders must be al- of instruction to the C-in-C West be
lowed to make their own decisions as to longer delayed. T h e Fuehrer instruc-
retrograde movement. (Surely Hitler tions signed on 1 November were sent
must have gagged on this item.) This to Rundstedt with a brief covering letter
was not all. Jodl and Buttlar-Brandenfels dictated by Jodl. Two sentences from
recommended extreme measures to Jodl warned Rundstedt that Hitler had
wring the extra divisions which the Big plumped irrevocably for the Big Solu-
Solution required out of the German tion: “The venture for the far-flung
people. The Third Reich would have to objective [Antwerp] is unalterable al-
be turned into a fortress under martial though, from a strictly technical stand-
law, with total mobilization of men, point, it appears to be disproportionate
women, and children-a step which was to our available forces. In our present
not taken in fact until the spring of 1945. situation, however, we must not shrink
If Hitler would not adopt the extreme from staking everything on one card.” 7
measures needed to implement the Big Rundstedt’s answer, sent to Jodl on 3
Solution with an adequate number of November, followed the German mili-
new divisions, then he should accept the tary tradition by which a commander
alternate or Small Solution. In this the was entitled to state his objection to
object would be the seizure of Liège and orders for the record. T h e forces avail-
the envelopment of those enemy forces able for Wacht am Rhein, he wrote,
east of the Meuse in the sector roughly were “extremely weak in comparison to
demarcated by Givet (on the Meuse) in the enemy and the zone of action”; then
the south, and Sittard (twenty miles he voiced his “grave doubts whether it
northeast of Aachen) in the north. would be possible to hold the ground
Hitler ridiculed the Small Solution as won, unless the enemy is completely de-
nothing but a half measure which could stroyed.” 8But these words for the record
produce no real success. At the same time ended Rundstedt’s efforts for a more
he was unwilling to adopt the stern meas-
ures necessary to make the Big Solution 7 Ltr, Jodl to Westphal, 1 Nov 44, OB WEST,
KTB Anlage 50, vol. I, pp. 30–31.
a success. Despite all protestations that 8Ltr, Rundstedt to Jodl, 3 Nov 44, OB WEST,
the final battle would be won or lost in K T B Anlage 50, vol. I, pp. 47–50.
PLANNING T H E COUNTEROFFENSIVE 29

reasonable plan; he refused to appeal to successful execution [of this operation],


Hitler in person, as Westphal urged, on strung forces will be free for deployment
the ground that it was futile to expect a in one of two possible courses of action
favorable hearing from the Fuehrer. depending upon the situation; either in
support of the attack of Army Group
A Double Envelopment? Student, or in a northward thrust via
Maastricht.” 10
Closely linked with the Big Solution Although Model and Army Group B
was the question of the form in which were not consulted in the preparation
the attack should be delivered. T h e Hit- of this answer from Rundstedt to Jodl,
ler concept called for a single thrust on the army group planners made haste to
a wide front; this broad zone of action, repudiate any plan for a simultaneous
so the argument ran, would make it dif- two-pronged attack. T h e force making
ficult for the enemy to concentrate his up the northern arm in Rundstedt’s
forces for a riposte. When the Allies scheme, the XII SS Corps, was too weak
commenced to react, and only then, a to carry through a simultaneous second-
secondary attack would be launched in ary attack; nor would Model agree to
the north from the Venlo area by two further reduction of the main effort as
army corps under Army Group H (Stu- a step in beefing u p the northern thrust.
dent). Rundstedt, on the other hand, The OB WEST chief of staff could do
hoped to deny the enemy the ability to no more than note this disclaimer from
mass for a counterthrust by employing a the subordinate headquarters: “The
double envelopment, the two prongs of simultaneous attack of the XII SS Corps
the attack moving simultaneously from is regarded as essential by Field Mar-
their jump-off positions. His reply, on shal von Rundstedt for the purpose of
3 November, to the OKW instructions tying down [the enemy]. Considering
was phrased most carefully, but despite the weakness of our forces, OKW is of
the protestation that the points of dif- the same opinion as you. We will have to
ference between the OKW and OB await a decision.” 11
WEST plans were “unessential,” Rund- This came four days later in the
stedt made clear his opinion that a con- Fuehrer’s operations directive of 10
centric maneuver was a must: November. Quite obviously Rundstedt’s
plea for the double envelopment had
It is a requisite that a powerful [sec-
ondary] attack be launched from the area gone unheeded. Indeed, Hitler seems to
Susteren-Geilenkirchen simultaneously with have taken upon himself the task of bury-
the [main attack] of Sixth SS Panzer, Fifth ing this idea, for the copy of the opera-
Panzer and Seventh Armies; otherwise the tions directive prepared for his signature
destruction of the strong [Allied] forces has a sentence inserted after the main
already concentrated in the Sittard-Liège-
Monschau triangle cannot be achieved.9 text was typed: “In this sector [reference
is being made to the Fifteenth Army
Rundstedt then politely bowed in the which Hitler had assigned the mission
direction of Hitler’s scheme for the
follow-up attack in Holland: “After 10 Ibid.
11Ltr, Westphal to Krebs, 6 Nov 44, OB WEST,
9 Ibid. K T B Anlage 50, vol. I, pp. 67–70.
30 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

of holding attacks on the northern flank] cans as the Battle of the Hurtgen Forest,
the enemy must not be warned in ad- had been forecast with bitter foreboding
vance by secondary attacks.” 12 T h e in Model’s headquarters. On the very
simultaneous attack in the north thus first day of the new Aachen offensive,
was forbidden, its place to be taken by Model proposed a limited operation
a series of holding attacks at some un- against the northern wing of the U.S.
specified time in the dim and distant First Army using troops which had been
final phases of the projected operation. earmarked for Wacht am Rhein. T h e
It appeared that Rundstedt’s concen- OB WEST and Army Group B com-
tric attack had followed the Small Solu- manders now were able to forget their
tion into limbo. Certainly the OB WEST personal differences and the animosities
commander showed no readiness to de- engendered between their respective
fend his brain-child after the Hitler staffs in pursuit of the common object:
edict. Model, however, stood in a some- the acceptance by Hitler of some type of
what more favored position vis-à-vis Small Solution in which the means were
Jodl and Hitler as befitted a field mar- appropriate to the end. Rundstedt’s for-
shal who was a rabidly loyal Nazi. Cir- warding letter, sent to Jodl on 18 No-
cumstances now were in conspiracy to vember while German losses in the
make Model the ball carrier for the OB Aachen battle were skyrocketing, backed
WEST two-pronged attack, which he Model to the hilt: “A surprise attack
had disavowed, and for the Small Solu- directed against the weakened enemy,
tion, supposedly dead and buried. after the conclusion of his unsuccessful
The plans and preparations prelim- breakthrough attempts in the greater
inary to the Ardennes counteroffensive, Aachen area, offers the greatest chance of
it must be recognized, were not produced success.” 14 T o achieve this, wrote Rund-
in a vacuum. T h e war in the west, some- stedt, he as the OB WEST commander
what somnolent during October, had must be given an absolutely free hand in
flared up again in November with the determining when the attack should be
U.S. Third Army attack in the Metz made. He wrote this at a time when it
sector and the combined offensive which was evident to all that Hitler intended
the U.S. First and Ninth Armies had to keep every such decision in his own
launched on 16 November with the in- hands. Was the old Prussian field mar-
tention of breaking through the German shal encouraged to fly in the face of the
defenses east of Aachen and driving to Fuehrer directive because the young
the Rhine.13 The latter operation, desig- Nazi field marshal was at his side? Or
nated by the Germans as the Third did some sense of obligation to the uni-
Battle of Aachen but known to Ameri- form he had worn for fifty-four years
impel Rundstedt to make a last effort to
12OKW Operation Directive of 10 Nov 44, OB give the German troops who would take
W E S T , K T B Anlage 50, vol I, pp. 95–104.
13On the attacks made by the U.S. First and part in the coming battle the best pos-
Third Armies in November 1944 see Charles B. sible chance of success?
MacDonald, T h e Siegfried L i n e Campaign,
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
(Washington, 1963) and Cole, T h e Lorraine Cam- 14Ltr, Rundstedt to Jodl, 18 Nov 44, OB WEST,
paign. KTB Anlage 50, vol. I, pp. 152–59.
PLANNING T H E COUNTEROFFENSIVE 31

By 20 November, divisions earmarked structions issued by Hitler for the con-


for Wacht am Rhein were in the line duct of operations were in such detail
east of Aachen, and it appeared that still that field commanders of the stature of
others would have to be used against Rundstedt and Model lacked the author-
Patton at Metz. On this date Model ity to move units as small as divisions.
again enlisted Rundstedt’s support to Whenever a field commander appeared
brace Hitler. This time Model specific- at the Wolf’s Lair he found the atmos-
ally asked for an improvised limited phere formal and chilling. T h e
double envelopment to destroy the four- imputation of cowardice and treason
teen Allied divisions in the Aachen sec- was commonplace. Despite all this, the
tor. Model argued that the attack he Fuehrer’s personal dictatorship suffered
proposed would give as much tactical and the limitations and strictures which seem
psychological success as WachtamRhein, to be a part of all modern dictatorships.
and that the destruction of such a large T h e armies under his command had
number of Allied divisions would be a suffered reverses and his personal pres-
necessary prerequisite for success in any tige as war lord had declined. T h e
future attack like Wacht am Rhein. Ap- generals who had been raised to power
parently the two Western Front com- by the Nazi party as Nazis could not be
manders were trying to drive a bargain broken without weakening the dictator-
with the Fuehrer: let us undertake a ship of the party. Finally, the number of
limited double envelopment in the generals with proven ability and public
Aachen area which will put us at the prestige, at this stage of the war, was
Meuse and eat up the enemy reserves; relatively small. Even the Supreme War
thereafter, we will be in a position to Lord would have to listen to men of
regroup, bring fresh forces (not now prestige who had the courage to risk his
available) forward, and undertake the disfavor.
drive to Antwerp. But Hitler would not Jodl visited OB W E S T headquarters
bargain. The answer, relayed by Jodl on on 2 6 November, only to find that Rund-
22 November, was abrupt: “Preparations stedt and Model were determined to
for an improvisation will not be made.”15 cling to the Small Solution and the con-
The workings of a dictatorship in a cept of concentric attack. Once again
large and complex society are devious Hitler handed down his edict: “There
and hard to fathom. Hitler had degraded will be absolutely no change in the
and executed German generals in the present intentions.” But Model was tena-
cruelest fashion while Rundstedt and the cious. Taking advantage of a conference
German Officer Corps stood passively by. which Hitler called in Berlin on 2 De-
A vocal inflection, a doubting word, had cember, Model brought forward his
been enough to break famous field com- heavy artillery: Sepp Dietrich, Hitler’s
manders. The great General Staff was in old crony, and “Little” Manteuffel, the
complete disgrace, suffering constant rid- panzer general with the big reputation,
icule from Hitler in craven silence. In- both supporters of the Small Solution.
Still Hitler refused to budge. One last
15Msg, Jodl to Rundstedt, 22 Nov 44, OB WEST,
K T B Anlage 50, vol. II, p. 12. (Quotation is from attempt to win over the Fuehrer was
Hitler.) made four days later when Rundstedt
32 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

and Model submitted their final draft of order for the counteroffensive, approved
the operations order for Wacht am by Hitler on 9 December, the scope and
Rhein. T h e accompanying map showed ultimate objective were exactly as they
a second prong to the attack, this carried had been conceived by Hitler and pre-
as in the first O B WEST plan by the sented to the OB WEST and Army
XII SS Corps. Again Hitler rejected the Group B chiefs of staff when these offi-
suggestion. cers were initiated in the plan on 22
In the final version of the operations October.
CHAPTER III

Troops and Terrain


T h e Order of Battle eral plan of maneuver and a list of
divisions numbering 29. Hitler had per-
During the long-drawn debate over sonally promised 3 0 divisions, of which
the extent of the counteroffensive, the 12 were to be armored. From this point
objective, and the attack form to be em- forward there would be a constant ques-
ployed, the order of battle for Wacht am tion posed in each draft plan: how many
Rhein took form. This also led to dif- divisions and which divisions? By 1
ferences of opinion and interpretation. November, as planning progressed, the
How should the armies be aligned? What Hitler-Jodl estimate of the divisions
forces, missions, and zones should be which could be employed rose to 39, of
assigned to each particular army? How which 13 would be armored. On the
many divisions, armored and infantry, other hand the estimates fed into the
would be available for use in the attack? successive OB WEST planning papers
T h e answers to these and like questions revolved between 29 and 31 divisions,
turned on the “Solution” adopted and with 12 armored divisions as a constant.
the maneuver employed but will be set It is the one extra panzer unit found in
forth independently in an attempt to the OKW order of battle which fur-
bring some order out of the confused nishes the key to the conundrum as to
interplay between Hitler, Jodl, Rund- the number of divisions. This unit, the
stedt, and Model. 21st Panzer Division, belonged to Army
When the representatives of OB Group G and was committed as a roving
WEST and Army Group B first heard halfback, stiffening those parts of the
of the Defensive Battle in the West, the line where attacks by the Third and
Fuehrer had given Model, as the com- Seventh U.S. Armies threatened to
mander directly charged with the opera- penetrate. Rundstedt knew that the
tion, three armies: the Fifth and Sixth 21st simply could not be stripped from
Panzer Armies and the Seventh Army. the German south flank, already pre-
Subsequently Hitler added the Fifteenth cariously thin. His list of “available”
Army for a special role, although it divisions, therefore did not name those
would appear that he did not intend to divisions already fully committed in
take the Fifteenth away from Army sectors where the Allied threat loomed
Group Student until after the battle was large. Be it noted, then, that the Hitler-
joined. At the time Westphal and Krebs Jodl listing of available divisions did not
rejoined their respective headquarters contain a single new formation (from
they were in possession of a rather gen- the Eastern Front or Italy for example)
34 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

but simply reckoned on withdrawing behind the southern wing of the attack.
more divisions from other sectors of the Correspondingly, the Hitler-Jodl attack
Western Front and throwing them into issued from an attack front sixty-five
the counteroffensive force. miles wide; the Martin attack took off
Fancy footwork in extending the from a forty-mile-wide base. In the first
length of the order of battle at OKW case the southern terminus of the pene-
had a direct correlation with the align- tration would be Grevenmacher; in
ment of forces laid down in Hitler’s Martin this terminus was set at Dasburg.
letter of instructions on 1 November. In Where the Hitler-Jodl attack moved
this the Sixth Panzer Army would be straight through the Belgian Ardennes,
deployed on the right or north flank of that outlined in Martin skimmed the
the attack formation and would make northern edge of the Ardennes. Of the
the main effort. In the center would be thirteen panzer divisions listed by Hitler
the Fifth Panzer Army; on the left the and Jodl, only four would be thrown into
Seventh Army. This disposition was the first wave with six following in the
“unalterable.” The decision to let the second wave. T h e remaining three were
Sixth Panzer Army gather the largest to be held out for later employment in
sheaf of laurel leaves, if any, was politi- the holding attacks planned for Army
cally inspired. Its commander, Sepp Group Student. In Martin, contrariwise,
Dietrich, was high in the party and the Rundstedt put all of the panzer divisions
panzer divisions assigned for the attack he counted as available (twelve in num-
were SS divisions. Hitler’s letter on 1 ber) in the first attack wave. As to
November calls Dietrich’s command the reserves, the Hitler-Jodl order of battle
Sixth SS Panzer Army, a Freudian slip counted four divisions in this category
for this army did not officially bear the but provided for their commitment as
title SS and would not for some time to the third wave of the attack. Rundstedt,
come. The question at issue, however, far more concerned than OKW with the
was the location of the Sixth Panzer potential weakness of the southern flank,
Army. Rundstedt wanted the main effort would assemble the three divisions of his
to be launched in the center and so reserve along the southern boundary of
wished to reverse the position of the two the expanding salient.
panzer armies in the final deployment. When, on 10November, Hitler signed
But this was only one of several points the operation directive Wacht am Rhein,
at which the deployment outlined by it became clear that Rundstedt’s Plan
OB W E S T in the Martin plan (as Martin had been sunk without trace.
finally agreed to by Model) differed This was nowhere more evident than in
from that given by Hitler’s 1 November the order of battle. The revised Hitler-
letter of instructions. (See Map I.) Jodl list gave an impressive total of 4
T h e Hitler-Jodl plan provided for an armies (the Fifteenth had been added),
attack to be carried by the three armies 11 army corps, and 38 divisions (15
of Army Group B advancing abreast. motorized and mechanized and 23 infan-
Plan Martin placed the Seventh Army try), plus 9 Volks artillery corps and 7
to the left and rear of the two assault Volks Werfer brigades. By what sleight
armies with its northern corps advancing of hand had Jodl and the WFSt been able
TROOPS AND TERRAIN 35

to raise divisions for the counteroffensive down the relief because the second divi-
which the Western Front commanders sion was ticketed for Wacht am Rhein.
could not see? The answer is found in a In effect the felony was compounded in-
combination of self-mesmerism at Hit- sofar as the three panzer-type divisions
ler’s headquarters and a kind of double were concerned. Not only was it very un-
entry order of battle. T h e assignment of likely that they could be taken out of
the Fifteenth Army, fighting in the sectors where they already were hotly
Aachen battle, theoretically added six engaged, but each was so weakened by
divisions to the attacking force. The constant fighting-the 21st Panzer Divi-
Fifteenth Army, however, was not to be sion and 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Divi-
employed until the Allies had reacted in sion had been in line without a break
force to the German attack, and in any since the Allied invasion of Normandy-
case could not be expected to launch a that the two together no longer had the
large-scale attack until the Allied front combat value of a single full division.
east of Aachen had been drastically de- T h e chain of events leading to the
nuded of troops. Furthermore, the actual issuance of the questionable Hitler-Jodl
count of divisions in the Fifteenth Army order of battle was vicious in its work-
was deceptive. Two of the divisions (the ing-but the sequence was not ended.
49th Infantry and 246th Yolks Grena- Hitler had determined on a military so-
dier) had been merged, the 49th being lution in which the means were not ade-
deactivated. This merger had been re- quate to the end desired. His comman-
ported to the WFSt but the 49th con- ders at first had attempted to bring the
tinued on the Hitler-Jodl list. Another objective into some proper relation to
organization listed, the 89th Infantry the available means. As a retort to these
Division, amounted to the strength of a efforts, Jodl and the WFSt had sup-
single rifle battalion. Both O B W E S T ported the Fuehrer scheme by an inflated
and Army Group B had asked for its listing of additional available divisions.
disbandment, but this request was re- T h e higher field commanders then
fused at the Fuehrer level. bowed to the inevitable, although they
An error of potentially greater import personally were aware that the troop list
existed in the listing of three panzer-type attached to the final operation directive
divisions supposedly to come from other of 10November was probably phony, or
sectors of the Western Front. Rund- at least highly suspect. T h e troop list
stedt’s protest against the nomination of thereafter would be duplicated in army
the 21st Panzer Division as “available” group, army, corps, and division orders
has already been noted. Also tied down and plans. Commanders and staffs in
by the Allied attacks on the Army Group lower echelons could have little or no
G front was the 17th SS Panzer Grena- knowledge of the questionable basis of
dier Division. In addition, the 10th SS the troop list. Each time the list was re-
Panzer Division, involved in the fight produced it became more of a solid fact.
east of Aachen, had a very limited com- When a corps commander was informed
bat capability. But when Model at- that he would be given one of the divi-
tempted to replace this formation with sions whose availability originally had
a green parachute division, OKW turned been questioned by Rundstedt or Model,
36 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

he accepted this as a fact and made. his Fichtenhain, Rundstedt once again asked
plans accordingly. This was true at the for additional divisions to meet the im-
army level-and eventually even at the pending Allied attack and repeated the
headquarters of Army Group B. Con- warning that an Allied offensive would
stant repetition would turn a hypothesis, cancel the German plans. This time (3
mendacious by origin, into a military November) he specified the areas where
“fact.” There is a lesson here for those the attack would be made: it would be a
who may be called upon to plan large- double thrust, one arm advancing from
scale military operations in the future. the Aachen front in the direction of
Cologne, the other striking from the
T h e Allies Return to the Attack Metz sector toward Saarbrücken. Hit-
ler’s reply, telegraphed two days later,
Rundstedt’s immediate reaction to the was unsympathetic. Rundstedt must hold
outline Fuehrer plan brought back to the with those divisions he had in the line.
OB W E S T headquarters by his chief of Divisions listed for Wacht am Rhein
staff on 2 4 October had been a caveat: could be committed only if they became
the entire project for a German counter- involved in a fight while assembling in
offensive would have to be abandoned if their future attack positions, although an
the Western Allies launched any large- exception could be made in the event
scale attack. Rundstedt was not simply of Allied airborne landings. Otherwise
being cagey. He was worried by the gen- the commitment of any Wacht am Rhein
eral quiet which had fallen over the formation must have the express permis-
Western Front following the American sion of the Fuehrer.
penetration of the West Wall outworks Rundstedt’s prediction of things to
at Aachen. He anticipated that the Allies come was made good when the U.S.
would make new attacks in the Aachen Third Army opened a two-corps attack
and Metz sectors as soon as their divi- on 8 November. Within twenty-four
sions were refitted and resupplied. The hours Hitler was in touch with OB
C-in-C West especially feared a thrust W E S T , reminding Rundstedt that he
from the Aachen salient to the Ruhr and must keep his hands off the Wacht am
had so advised Hitler, asking as was his Rhein divisions even if this meant giving
wont for reserves. Rundstedt’s request ground all along the line. As a reassuring
for nine fresh divisions lay unanswered note OKW expressed the hope that the
in the files of OKW until Westphal Allied attack would burn up divisions
finally brought the news that O B W E S T which might otherwise face the German
would not be given the nine divisions counteroffensive.
requested but instead would have to take Now the C-in-C West was responsible
nine divisions out of the line in the west for two types of Wacht am Rhein divi-
and prepare them for use in the great sions, those in the line which he must
counteroffensive. T o make matters very relieve for rest and refitting, and those
much worse, OB W E S T would lose two- which had been organized or rehabili-
thirds of its armored and mechanized tated in the Reserve Army and dis-
troops during the rehabilitation period. patched to Rundstedt’s command. The
After the meeting with Model at weight of armor in the American attack
TROOPS AND TERRAIN 37

east of Metz and the possibility that this on 16 November, was even more threat-
thrust would rupture the German south ening in the eyes of OB W E S T than the
wing at the joint between the First and Allied drive in Lorraine. Within twenty-
Nineteenth Armies, impelled Rund- four hours the situation was so desperate
stedt to cling to those tanks which were that Model threw in his only tactical
on the Army Group G front. This he did reserve, the XLVIII Panzer Corps. As
in flat disobedience of direct orders the German casualties mounted on the
from OKW. He went a step further on Army Group B front, Rundstedt began
21 November and ordered the Panzer to bleed his north wing, taking one di-
Lehr Division out of its assembly area vision after another from Army Group
and into a counterattack designed to Student. By 20 November the prospect
block the American XV Corps, whose of an Allied breakthrough loomed so
drive toward the Saverne Gap threat- large that the C-in-C West asked OKW
ened to separate the First and Nine- for the four reserve SS panzer divisions
teenth Armies. OKW ultimately agreed which were being readied to carry the
to this use of Panzer Lehr, but then main Ardennes attack by the Sixth
called off the counterattack on 25 No- Panzer Army. His request was denied.
vember. T h e responsible Western Front There ensued a tactical merry-go-
commanders simply stalled the relief of round catching up divisions all the way
the Panzer Lehr until it was clear that from the Netherlands to Strasbourg.
the division had suffered too much dam- Rundstedt would bring in one of the di-
age to allow any further hope of success. visions which had been kept on ice for
The upshot of the Allied offensive in the coming offensive, relieve a battered
Lorraine was that two panzer-type divi- division in the line, then in a few days
sions scheduled for Wacht am Rhein be- shuffle the relieving division back to a
came irretrievably embroiled in the reserve position close behind the line–
losing battle being waged by Army sometimes with OKW approval, but
Group G, while the elite Panzer Lehr more often without. Meanwhile the Ger-
Division limped back to its assembly area man artillery was working desperately to
much reduced in strength and with take the place of tactical air support–so
badly shaken morale. None of the in- marked by its absence. As early as the
fantry divisions engaged in the battles third day of the attack the light and
east of Metz were scheduled for employ- medium howitzers bolstering the Army
ment in the Ardennes, but the redeploy- Group B positions were dipping into the
ment in the south of two divisions from special ammunition stocks which had
the Eifel sector necessitated the prema- been reserved by the Fuehrer for the
ture commitment of two Volks Grena- Ardennes battle and which bore his im-
dier divisions from the Replacement print, Fuehrer Reserve. At the close of
Army as their relief. In addition the the first week of fighting in the Aachen
American attack in Lorraine would cost area the German casualties there had
the Hitler offensive an entire Yolks risen to 12,000. Replacements who had
artillery corps, two panzer brigades, and been sent forward to reflesh the divisions
two heavy antitank battalions. being reorganized for Wacht am Rhein
The Third Battle of Aachen, begun found themselves filling the gaping ranks
38 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

of formations in the line. By the first postponed some sixteen times.1 T h e


week of December the Aachen battle period of planning and preparation had
had resulted in the direct commitment covered six and a half months. In 1939–
or a cessation of training and rehabilita- 40, however, there was no pressing rea-
tion in the case of five panzer-type and son to disturb the quiet of the “phony
seven infantry divisions. An additional war,” nor was the Third Reich seriously
six Volks artillery corps had been threatened on the ground or in the air.
tossed into the fray but, made up of The summer disasters in 1944, on the
over-age reservists, they probably prof- contrary, demanded immediate action to
ited by this enforced training period. recoup German losses and stave off an
It is hardly surprising that the impact immediate threat. There is no question
of the attacks around Aachen and Metz that Hitler’s selection of the target date
should have further shaken Rundstedt’s for the start of the offensive, 25 Novem-
and Model’s already wavering belief in ber 1944, was made with every intention
the possibility of any large measure of that the operation should begin in fact
success for the Ardennes counteroffen- before the end of November. Further-
sive. Model reacted more strongly than more, Rundstedt and Model had ac-
Rundstedt, the latter fatigued by the cepted this date without official question,
constant tug of war with OKW and more despite the fact that it would leave them
and more adopting the resignation of only one month in which to make ready.
the aged. When Model again took up the Rundstedt, however, had added a cau-
cudgels for the Small Solution, stress- tionary note by reminding OKW that the
ing the paucity of forces left for the actual attack date would depend upon
counteroffensive, he sounded a prophetic the arrival of the panzer divisions in
warning: “Should the attack be stopped their forward assembly positions and the
at the Meuse due to the lack of reserves completion of ammunition and fuel
the only result will be a bulge in the stockpiling in the concentration area.
line and not the destruction of sizable There is some evidence that the
enemy forces [italics supplied]. . . . Fuehrer had chosen November not only
The widely stretched flanks, especially for its promise of poor flying weather
in the south, will only invite enemy but also because he hoped to win a vic-
counteractions.” Hitler answered by as- tory in the west and release divisions to
suring OB W E S T that “the number of the Eastern Front before the beginning
units originally projected will be made of the annual Soviet winter offensive. If
available.” This was on 27 November. so, this second desideratum was not con-
The initial target date for Wacht am sidered of really vital importance as
Rhein had come and gone; the Allied planning progressed. The operation di-
November offensive had been a spoiling rective of 10November in which Hitler
attack in the true sense of the term, ordered that the concentration period be
albeit unwittingly so. ended by the 27th clearly referred to
The German attack in the west
launched on 10May 1940, in so many 1 The numerous postponements of the German
1940 offensive in the west were, for the most
respects the prototype for the 1944 coun- part, the result of Hitler’s injunction that the
teroffensive in the Ardennes, had been attack be made in good flying weather.
TROOPS AND TERRAIN 39

the weather and even included provisions straight line between Paris and Berlin
for a stop-order to arrest the concentra- will bisect the Eifel and Ardennes, but
tion in midflight should the weather the movement of armies during the cen-
suddenly turn fair. T h e concentration turies normally had followed the easier
for W a c h t am Rhein, already in progress roads going around this area: in the
when the U.S. Third Army reopened north via Liège-Maubeuge or the Flan-
large-scale fighting on the Western ders plains, in the south via the Metz
Front, continued at a wobbly pace dur- gateway. On occasion the Ardennes and
ing the second and third weeks of No- Eifel had been used by large forces for
vember. Eventually the impossibility of movement without fighting, battle being
relieving the attack divisions as sched- joined at the natural defense lines of
uled and the delays wrought by the the Meuse River west of the Ardennes,
temporary commitment of units like the or the Rhine River east of the Eifel.
Panzer Lehr became so obvious as to In 1914, as part of the Schlieffen Plan,
brook no denial-even by Hitler. His three of the Imperial German armies
postponement of the attack cannot be marched from the Eifel through the
pinpointed, but the word probably came Ardennes. Schlieffen had predicted that
sometime after 2 3 November. On that the French would react to the pressure
date Model reported that of the armor of the heavy German right wing as it
slated for Wacht am Rhein only the four swung through northern Belgium by
SS panzer divisions and the 2 d Panzer counterattacking into the flank via south-
Division had escaped premature com- eastern Belgium. It was an integral part
mitment in the battles then raging. In of the famous plan, therefore, that the
Model's opinion—mark the date—the German right wing would be covered by
other divisions could not be readied be- an extension through southern Belgium
fore 15 December. and Luxembourg, and that the Ardennes
massif would be used, if needed, as a
T h e Terrain bastion from which the French flanking
attack would be repelled. A portion of
The area through which Hitler chose the Second and all of the Third and
to launch his counteroffensive was, with Fourth German Armies did advance
the exception of the Vosges, the most through southern Belgium and Luxem-
difficult terrain on the entire line of the bourg, the march through the main por-
Western Front. It consists of two major tion of the Ardennes being covered by
parts, the Eifel and the Ardennes. Al- the rapid movement of Richthofen's I
though the whole is strewn with the Cavalry Corps. French reaction was slow
relics of castles and fortified churches, and the tiny Belgian Army had been
there had been little military history en- drawn away to defend Liège and Brus-
acted within this area before 1914.2 A sels. As a result the Germans marched
across the main body of the Ardennes
2 T h e older military history of the Ardennes is mass without a fight, the ultimate meet-
narrated on a somewhat antiquarian basis in Revue ing engagements with the French on 22
Historique d e l’Armée, 1955, II Année, Numéro 2.
For the 1940 campaign see L. Menu, Lurnière Sur Bouhon, Mai 1940: L a Bataille de Belgique,
Les Ruines, Paris, 1953; also M. Fouillien and J. Bruxelles, n.d.
40 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

August taking place in the densely through the Ardennes, and more, that
wooded but less rugged segment of the not only was Hitler correct in his insist-
Ardennes (sometimes called the Forest ence on the use of large mechanized
of Ardennes) close to the Belgian-French forces in the Ardennes, but that the pro-
border in the neighborhood of Neufchâ fessionals in OKH who had opposed him
teau and Virton. were wrong. In 1944, as a result, it was
In 1940 the Ardennes once again was known that the terrain in the Eifel and
invaded and crossed by German troops, Ardennes was not so bad but what it
the jangle of Richthofen’s squadrons could be quickly negotiated by modern
giving way to the roar and grind of mechanized armies under conditions of
Kleist’s tanks. This time, at Hitler’s in- good weather and little or no enemy re-
sistence, the German maneuver departed sistance. What history could not demon-
from the classic concept of Schlieffen, strate, for the lessons were lacking, was
the weight of the German attack being whether modern, mechanized armies
thrown south of Liège rather than north, could attack through the Ardennes and
while a narrow thrust replaced the blud- speedily overcome a combination of
geon strokes of a massive wheeling stubborn enemy defense, difficult
movement. This main effort toward a ground, and poor weather. Terrain,
decisive breakthrough was launched then, would play a peculiarly important
through a narrow corridor marked ap- role in the development of the 1944
proximately by Bastogne in the north counteroffensive.
and Arlon in the south; but the bulk of Although the Ardennes has given its
three German armies debouched from name to the campaign under study, this
the Eifel and marched across the Ar- area should be lumped with that of the
dennes. As in 1914 the crossing of the Eifel, the composite of the tablelands to
Ardennes massif was little more than a the east which sheltered the German
route march, impeded ever so slightly concentration during the late autumn of
by brave but tragic and futile attempts 1944. These two areas are extensions of
at resistance by the Belgian Chasseurs the Westerwald, blending almost insensi-
Ardennais. Without detracting from the bly into each other and sharing many of
courage of these few Belgians it is fair to the same characteristics. T h e Eifel is the
say that the Germans did not have to complex of hill ranges–they can hardly
fight before they reached the Meuse be called mountains–lying between the
River, and even there they experienced Rhine, the Moselle, and the Roer Rivers,
little opposition. T h e German advance mostly in Germany. Only the two west-
through southern Belgium and Luxem- ernmost of the Eifel highlands or ranges
bourg in 1914 had demonstrated that a need be mentioned here. East of St. Vith
huge modern force could be concen- and just inside the German border is
trated via rail in the abrupt, broken the Schnee Eifel, a high tree-covered
country of the Eifel, and from thence be ridge or hogback. It extends from the
moved afoot or ahorse through the worst northeast to the southwest, a character-
of the Ardennes mass. istic thrust line in the entire area, and in
The events of 1940 proved that mecha- 1944 was crested on much of its length
nized forces could move speedily by the West Wall fortifications. East of
NOVILLEAND STOLZEMBG. Towns in the Ardennes are small and usually f a l l into one
of two types: a cluster of houses at a crossroads, such as Noville (above), and a river valley
settlement, such as Stolzemburg on the Our ('below).
42 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Liège is the Hohes Venn, a long table- northern edge is a diagonal: Aachen,
land topped with lakes and marshes. T h e Liege, Maubeuge, Landrecis. T h e south-
Hohes Venn is larger than the Schnee ern edge (much debated by geologists)
Eifel. Its northeast-southwest course is is a more pronounced diagonal running
defined by a line through Malmédy and from Aachen southwest to Arlon. T h e
Monschau on the German face and by a base, formed by the Forêt des Ardennes
line through Eupen and Spa on the Bel- or French Ardennes, roughly coincides
gian. In the northeast the Hohes Venn with the Franco-Belgian frontier and the
is prolonged by the Hürtgen Forest. As Semois River. T h e Ardennes has three
the Schnee Eifel forms a barrier covering recognized subdepartments: the High
St. Vith on the east, so the Hohes Venn Ardennes in the south, the Famenne De-
is a large outer bastion for Liege. Al- pression in the middle, and the Low
though the Hohes Venn is geologically Ardennes in the north. T h e Low Ar-
a part of the Eifel it is somewhat re- dennes tends to be open and rolling, but
moved from the other parts of the includes two plateaus: that of Herve, be-
complex and represents the gradual and tween Liège and Aachen, and Condroz,
sometimes indefinable blending of the between the lower Ourthe and the
Eifel and Ardennes. Meuse in the vicinity of Dinant. This
T h e Eifel is thickly covered with sector is more readily traversed than is
forests and provides good cover from air the High Ardennes, but it is relatively
observation even in the fall and winter. narrow, maneuver is constricted by
T h e area has no large towns but rather the flanking line of the Meuse River, and
is marked by numerous small villages, entrance from the east presupposes that
requiring extensive dispersion for any the invader has possession of Aachen and
large forces billeted here. T h e road net the roads circling north or south of the
is adequate for a large military concen- Hohes Venn.
tration. T h e rail net is extensive, having T h e Famenne Depression is only a
been engineered and expanded before thin sliver of the Ardennes wedge. T h e
1914 for the quick deployment of troops Famenne is free from tree cover except
west of the Rhine. T h e railroads feed for the characteristic ,buttes which dot
into the Eifel from Koblenz, Cologne, the depression. Scooped out of the Ar-
and the lesser Rhine bridgeheads be- dennes massif, this long, narrow depres-
tween these two. T h e main rail line, how- sion originates at the upper Ourthe and
ever, does not cross the Eifel but follows extends westward through Marche and
the Moselle valley on the southern Rochefort. It reaches the Meuse between
fringe of the Eifel. Rail and road sys- Givet and Dinant, offering a good cross-
tems throughout the Eifel are marked by ing site which often has been employed
meandering courses and numerous by European armies operating on the
bridge crossings thrown over rivers and Meuse. But an invader from the German
deep ravines. frontier must traverse much difficult
T h e Ardennes, like the Eifel, is not a terrain before debouching into this
single and well-defined bloc. T h e general “march through” depression.
area may be defined as a wedge with the T h e High Ardennes is often called
point between Aachen and Düren. T h e the “True Ardennes.” It is not properly
TROOPS AND TERRAIN 43

mountainous, nor yet a forest; rather it lines or wider valley floors, in many cases
is a wide plateau or high plain out of the roads twisted sharply and turned on
which rise elevations in the form of steep grades down into a deep ravine
ridges or higher plateaus erupting from and out again on the opposite side. T h e
the main mass. These elevations gener- bridges were normally built of stone.
ally are unrelated to one another and There were ten all-weather roads cross-
combine with large forests to form iso- ing from the German frontier into Bel-
lated and independent compartments in gium and Luxembourg in the sector be-
which tactical domination of one hill tween Monschau and Wasserbillig, but
mass seldom provides domination of an- there was not a single main highway
other. T h e mass structure extends on a traversing the Ardennes in a straight
northeast-southwest axis, forming a east-west direction.
watershed which drains away to the There are no cities in the Ardennes,
Meuse in the north and the Moselle in unless the capital of Luxembourg and
the southeast. Perhaps a third of the area Arlon are included in this area. T h e larg-
is covered with forest, much of which is est villages had, in 1944, populations of
coniferous. This timber, however, is 2,500 to 4,000. T h e normal settlement in
scattered all over the High Ardennes the Ardennes was the small village with
and presents a patchwork picture rather stone houses and very narrow, winding
than a series of large forested preserves. streets. These villages often constricted
T h e main mass is cut in zigzag patterns the through road to single-lane traffic.
by winding, deeply eroded rivers and Another military feature was the lone
streams, some flowing parallel to the farmstead or inn which gave its name to
higher ridges, others crossing so as to the crossroads at which it stood.
chop the ridges and the welts on the pla- T h e fact that most of the High Ar-
teau into separate sections. I n some dennes lies inside Belgium leads to some
places the watercourses run through nar- confusion, since one of the administra-
row, almost canyonlike depressions with tive subdivisions of that kingdom is
steep walls rising from a hundred to named “Ardennes” but is not exactly
three hundred feet. Even the wider conterminous with the geographical
valleys are narrow when compared with area. Luxembourg, into which the Ar-
the western European norm. dennes extends, is divided in two parts,
T h e road net in 1944 was far richer roughly along a line from Attert on the
than the population and the economic west to a point midway between
activity of the Ardennes would seem to Vianden and Diekirch on the eastern
warrant. This was not the result of mili- boundary. T h e northern half generally
tary planning, as in the case of the Eifel is considered an extension of the High
rail lines, but rather of Belgian and Ardennes (although one may find as
Luxemburgian recognition of the value many definitions of the south edge of the
of automobile tourisme just prior to Ardennes as there are writers touching
World War II. All of the main roads had the subject) ; in any case it shares the
hard surfaces, generally of macadam. Al- same physical properties. T h e southern
though the road builders tried to follow half of Luxembourg, known appropri-
the more level stretches of the ridge ately as the “Good Land,” is less high,
44 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

has more open space, and its valleys stream. About twenty miles west of the
normally can be traveled. A single frontier, however, comes the first of the
river, the Alzette, bisects this part of rivers descending from the High Ar-
Luxembourg in a north-south course dennes into the Meuse; these are the
which takes it through the capital city. Amblève and the Salm which serve as
But the eastern approach to the Good flankers for the swamp-encrusted table-
Land erases much of its military attrac- land of the Hohes Venn and must be
tiveness. Between Sierck and Wasser- crossed in any movement west from St.
billig the Moselle River forms the Vith, Malmédy, or Spa. Next comes the
boundary between Luxembourg and longest of these rivers, the Ourthe,
Germany. In this sector the left or Lux- which is the most severe military ob-
embourg bank of the river is especially stacle east of the Meuse. It originates
difficult even by comparison with the west of Bastogne as a small creek, then
normal terrain obstacles encountered in meanders north until it meets the Meuse
the High Ardennes. Farther north, at Liège. At Ortheuville the Ourthe be-
where the Sauer River continues the gins to cut through a narrow and wind-
boundary, the river valley is somewhat ing defile with steep, rocky sides fringed
less formidable but is backed up by a by pine trees. Just north of La Roche
broken, gorge-riven area in the neighbor- the Ourthe leaves its tortuous canyons
hood of Echternach known as the “Lux- and enters the Famenne Depression.
embourg Switzerland.” That part of the course between Ortheu-
It is natural, with the Ardennes mass ville and La Roche permits no road ad-
forming a northeast-southwest divide be- jacent to the river bed; all approaches to
tween the tributaries of the Meuse and the east-west crossing sites are difficult.
the Moselle and with rugged geological Just east of the defile through which
patterns twisting and turning these tribu- flows the middle Ourthe lies the Plateau
taries, that the military hydrography of des Tailles, which rises to over 1,800 feet
the Ardennes should be important. T h e at the Baraque de Fraiture. Two
prolongation of the Ardennes in north- rivers are found between the Ourthe
ern Luxembourg is dissected by four and the Meuse: the Lesse and L’Homme
rivers. On the eastern frontier the Our whose confluence is near Rochefort.
River continues the boundary trace be- Neither of these rivers is too difficult of
gun by the Moselle and the Sauer. In negotiation, but the main westward
the interior the Wiltz, the Clerf, and the crossing for movement toward Dinant
Sure divide the country into water- and the Meuse centers at Rochefort.
bound compartments. Their valleys are At the very edge of the Ardennes in the
long and narrow, so narrow and tortuous southwest is the Semois River, which
that they cannot be followed by roads. wends its way westward from Arlon to
They are further complicated by “cups” the Meuse. T h e Semois is deeply sunk
scoured out of the side walls and by cross through much of its course, flowing be-
ravines, deep and narrow. tween steep walls which descend directly
In the Ardennes north of Luxembourg to the water’s edge and so deny space
it is possible to cross from Germany into for road or rail on the valley bottom.
Belgium without traversing a major Although the rivers of the Eifel, as dis-
TROOPS AND TERRAIN 45

tinct from those of the Ardennes, would from Luxembourg to Namur, cuts across
have no tactical significance in the battle the grain of the main mass in a south-
of the Ardennes, they were to be of east-northwest direction. I n the north-
very considerable logistic, or what the east the chief road centers are Monschau,
Germans style “operational,” impor- Malmédy, and St. Vith. T h e southeast-
tance. T h e northernmost, the Ahr, fol- ern nodal points are Ettelbruck, Mersch,
lows an oblique course northeast until it and, of course, Luxembourg. To the
enters the Rhine at Sinzig. From the northwest Bastogne, Marche, and Roche-
Schnee Eifel comes the Kyll, bending fort are the paramount links in the road
southward to meet the Moselle not far system. Arlon, Neufchâteau, and Libra-
from Trier. Paralleling the Kyll in the mont, in the southwest, complete this
west is the Prüm River. It is the last picture. T h e Eifel is rimmed by a main
stream of any importance before the Ger- road system which hugs the west bank of
man frontier is reached. Like the Kyll the Rhine between Bonn and Koblenz,
its sources are in the heights of the then follows the Moselle River until it
Schnee Eifel. T h e beautiful Moselle at- breaks away cross-country via Wittlich
tracts numerous small tributaries rush- to reach Trier. T h e circuit is completed
ing down from the Eifel, but only the by a road which goes north from Trier
Moselle itself deserves attention. Alter- through Bitburg, Prüm, and Euskirchen,
nating between scenes of towering rocks finally bifurcating to reach the Rhine at
and meadow passages, the German Bonn and at Cologne. Inside of this cir-
Moselle winds and turns capriciously cuit the chief communications centers
from its entrance on German soil, past are Mayen, Daun, Kochem, and, at-
Trier and a host of little villages whose tached to the outer ring, Wittlich.
names are known to all lovers of the T h e character of the Eifel-Ardennes
vine, until finally it rushes past the terrain dictates three major bases of op-
“German Corner” at Koblenz and into erations for an attack from the German
the Rhine. Just as the Moselle vineyards frontier. I n the north the Aachen sector
of renown alternate from one bank to is one such base. T h e direction of attack
the other, so the railroad line and the here would be through the Low Ar-
highway crisscross the river throughout dennes via Eupen, Verviers, Marche, and
its middle reaches; but rail and road Rochefort to the Meuse at Givet. T h e
come to a focal point only a few kilome- next base, to the south, lies between
ters from the Luxembourg frontier at Monschau and the Losheim Gap. T h e
the old Roman city of Trier. westward thrust from this base must go
Throughout this whole area military over and between Malmédy and St. Vith.
routes of movement, regardless of the T h e broadest base of operations is in the
weather, are synonymous with the road south between Prüm and Trier. I n this
system. T h e roads of the Ardennes pro- case the attack must be made against the
liferate in accordance with the geological grain of the Ardennes mass except for a
compartments incised in the high pla- penetration from Trier to the French
teau by rivers and streams as they recede frontier at Virton or Longwy which may
downward. T h e main roads tend to fol- bypass the more rugged country to the
low a north-south axis, although one, north by movement through the Good
46 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Land of southern Luxembourg. This neared the Meuse. In 1914 and 1940 the
last route, however, is by far the longest German armies moving across the Ar-
for any attack aimed at reaching the dennes had no reason to anticipate strong
Meuse River. opposition on the ground until the
T h e geography of the Ardennes leads Meuse had been reached and the tortu-
inevitably to the channelization of large ous defiles left behind. I n 1940 the only
troop movements east to west, will tend German concern had been that the
to force larger units to “pile up” on each French air force would catch the ar-
other, and restricts freedom of maneuver mored columns at the crossings of the
once the direction of attack and order of Sauer and Our Rivers. I n both these
battle are fixed. To a marked degree the earlier campaigns the Germans had
military problem posed by the terrain is thrown a protective screen clear to the
that of movement control rather than Meuse within twenty-four hours after
maneuver in the classic sense. For the the advance began; the initial objectives
smaller tactical units, the chopped-up of these screening movements have more
nature of the ground plus the peculiar than historic significance: Bastogne, St.
timber formations in which dense wood Vith, Arlon, Malmédy, La Roche, and
lots are interspersed with natural or man- the bridges over the Ourthe River.
made clearings, indicates the develop- T h e ground offered the defender
ment of a series of small, semi-indepen- three natural defense positions east of
dent engagements once the larger battle the Meuse, although none of these con-
is joined. Movement cross-country is stituted an impassable barrier to the at-
limited, even in good weather; move- tacker: (1) a covering line echeloned
ment along the narrow valley floors may to the southeast between Liège and the
be blocked there or in the villages at Moselle, this pegged on the Hohes Venn,
points of descent and ascent. T h e back- the rugged zone around Malmédy and
bone of the ridges sometimes offers good St. Vith, and the boxed-in course of the
observation in the immediate area for Our and Sauer Rivers; (2) the Ourthe
detecting movement on the roads which River line; and (3) an intermediate po-
climb the hills and plateaus. Locally, sition, shorter in length, based on the
however, the gunner or fighter pilot will plateau at Bastogne and extending along
find many blind spots formed by the a chain of ridges to Neufchâteau.
thick tree cover or the deep draws and There remains a word to be said about
ravines; the ability of high-angle fire to the climate of the Ardennes and Eifel.
beat reverse slopes, which really are This is mountainous country, with much
sheer, steep walls, is limited. rainfall, deep snows in winter, and raw,
What the German planners saw in harsh winds sweeping across the plateaus.
1944 was this: the Ardennes could be T h e heaviest rains come in November
traversed by large forces even when and December. T h e mists are frequent
these were heavily mechanized. An at- and heavy, lasting well into late morning
tack from east to west across the massif before they break. Precise predictions by
would encounter initially the greatest the military meteorologist, however,
obstacles of terrain, but these obstacles are difficult because the Ardennes lies
would decrease in number as an advance directly on the boundary between the
TROOPS AND TERRAIN 47

northwestern and central European cli- in recounting the events of 1944–the


matic regions and thus is affected by the deep snows come late.3
conjuncture of weather moving east
from the British Isles and the Atlantic 3 The best of numerous terrain descriptions of
with that moving westward out of Russia. the Ardennes was prepared by the German General
At Stavelot freezing weather averages Staff in 1940, especially for the offensive in the west.
It is entitled Mililaergeographischer ueberblick
112 daysa year,at Bastogne
145 days. ueber Belgien und angrenzende Gebiete. See also
T h e structure of the soil will permit the British official publication of 1918: A Manual
tank movement when the ground is of Belgium and the Adjoining Territories (ed.
T h e Admiralty). T h e best analysis of German
frozen,but turns readily
to a clayeymire military thought on the problem presented by
in time ofrain. Snowfall often attains a the Ardennes terrain is in a manuscript by Magna
depth of ten to twelve inches in a 24-hour E. Bauer entitled Comparison Between the Plan-
ning for the German Ardennes Offensive in 1944
period. Snow lingersfor a long time in and for the Campaign in the West in 1940 (1951).
the Ardennes but-and this is important OCMH.
CHAPTER IV

Preparations
Deception and Camouflage long enough to complete the massive
preparations therein.
Hitler’s selection of the Ardennes as T h e German military profession had
the sector in which the western counter- a record of some notable achievements in
offensive would be launched was based the attainment of strategic surprise. T h e
in the main on the obvious advantage of Ludendorff March offensive in 1918 had
attacking the Allies where they were been a brilliant example–indeed a
weakest. Even so, although the Western model–of a great offensive whose prepa-
Allies could not be strong everywhere ration had completely escaped detection.
along the line from Switzerland to the T h e meticulous detail employed by
North Sea, they did outnumber the Ludendorff’s planners had achieved such
Germans in men, tanks, guns, and planes, success that the 1918 plans for the cover
they were possessed of greater facility for and movement of artillery simply were
rapid movement of large forces, and copied in the artillery build-up for the
they–not the Germans–had the stra- Ardennes. T h e German offensive in
tegic initiative. At the first word of 1940 likewise had been a marked ex-
German preparations in the Eifel and ample of strategic surprise, despite the
Ardennes the Allies could terminate one forced landing on Belgian soil of a
or both of their major offensives and German plane carrying two liaison offi-
divert large forces into the threatened cers who had been entrusted with the
area. attack plan. T h e chief security tenets
The accepted strategic gambit, prac- adopted in preparation for the 1940 at-
ticed with great success by German com- tack had been personally dictated by
manders in the west during World War Hitler, and the first formal security
I, would be to deliver a series of large- order issued by OKW in preparation for
scale attacks in sectors well removed the Ardennes counteroffensive was a re-
from the area from which the main statement of the Fuehrer Directive of 1 1
counteroffensive was to be launched. But January 1940. (This time, however, liai-
the divisions and the logistic support for son officers party to the plan were ex-
such diversionary attacks did not exist. pressly forbidden to travel by plane.)
T h e German armies in the west could Subsequent security measures would re-
not uncover the enemy’s jaw by a blow flect or rephrase those which had been
in Holland or a kidney punch in Alsace; so successful in 1940.1
instead they had to rely on the adroit Probably the Fuehrer’s personal influ-
misdirection practiced by the conjuror, 1 Bauer, Planning for German Ardennes Offen-
turning Allied eyes away from the Eifel sive in 1944 . . . and 1940, app. 8.
PREPARATIONS 49

ence was felt most directly in limiting penalty for any personal breach of
the circle of those privy to the plan security. Later, division and corps com-
during its conception and initial imple- manders would be compelled to take an
mentation. Hitler, the highest authority oath that during the advance they would
in the German armed forces, personally not trespass in the attack zone assigned
named the officers who were to be ad- neighboring units. T h e death penalty
mitted to the great secret; furthermore, attachedtothisas well.2
he possessed the power to exact the Although the immediate planning
death penalty for violations of security, staffs could be drastically limited, it was
a power he could be expected to exer- obvious that some hundreds of officers
cise on the slightest provocation and would have to be involved in the actual
without regard to the rank or prestige of handling of troops and supplies during
the offender. Even the well-disciplined, the concentration period, that is from
high-ranking officers of the Wehrmacht about 1 0 November, when the major re-
seem to have been apprehensive of the shuffling of headquarters and larger
personal risks which each encountered troop units would commence, until the
the moment he was admitted to the plan. date selected for the jump-off in the Ar-
So strict was the limitation of knowledge dennes. T h e German system of staff
that in those headquarters charged with work, based on the rigid allocation of
the command of the counteroffensive, authority and unquestioning obedience
OB WEST and Army Group B, the only to orders, was well designed to cope with
officers brought into the planning phase this situation. Furthermore, the Allied
were Rundstedt and Model, plus the attacks in November were launched on
chief of staff, the G–3, the quartermaster such a scale and achieved such success as
officer, and one aide in each of their to give real meaning to the Hitler-in-
respective staffs. In OB WEST, for ex- spired cover plan, The Defensive Battle
ample, the daily and most secret war in the West. Until the very last hours
diary contained no reference to the before the counteroffensive the Western
counteroffensive; instead a separate war Front German commanders accepted as
diary was maintained, without benefit of gospel the idea that the massing of ma-
secretary or stenographer, by the few tériel and the progressive withdrawal of
officers working on the plan. The ex- divisions from the line was intended to
change of information between the re- provide fresh troops for the defense of
sponsible headquarters was carried by the Ruhr and the Palatinate. Indeed the
liaison officers whose every movement field commanders were much perplexed
was watched by military and Gestapo in the last days before the Ardennes
security agents. All teletype and tele- counteroffensive by reason of what they
phone lines were monitored the clock regarded as the high command’s caprici-
around and the officers in the know were ousness and folly in refusing to throw
so informed. Hitler had a mania for its reserves into the defensive battles
“oaths.” Everyone admitted to the plan
took not one but ofttimes several oaths
to maintain secrecy, signing at least one 2MS# B–038, 116th Panzer Division, Ardennes
statement which accepted the death (Generalmajor Siegfried von Waldenburg) .
50 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

then reaching a climax in the Aachen about mid-November was only partly
and Saverne Gap sectors. 3 concealed. Much movement was made in
The cover and deception plan, per- daylight. A program of road repair and
sonally devised by Hitler, turned on a civilian evacuation was begun with little
half-truth. A part of the strategic con- attempt at camouflage. Radio traffic was
centration would be made in the Rheydt- increased commensurate with the troop
Jülich-Cologne area east of Aachen. concentration. Additional antiaircraft
Here the preparations for the counter- battalions came into the area and with
offensive would be paraded before the them special allotments of ammunition
Allies. T o the south, at the entry to the to produce a thickening of fire which
chosen path of attack, the Eifel concen- the Allied air forces could not possibly
tration was to be accomplished under fail to notice. T o emphasize further still
conditions of greatest secrecy behind the what was transpiring here in the north, a
thin line manned by the weak Seventh ghost army was brought into being on 20
Army. Then, at the last moment, the November; this, the Twenty-fifth, sup-
troops from the northern concentration posedly had an order of battle of ten di-
area would slip south to join the main visions including some of the panzer
build-up in the Eifel. T h e cover plan, divisions which in fact belonged to the
as propagated through the German com- Sixth Panzer Army.
mands on the Western Front and retailed In contrast to this northern concentra-
to the Allies by neutrals and double- tion, that in the Eifel was the product of
agents, had this scenario: Germany secrecy carried to the limit. T h e Eifel
feared that the U.S. First and Ninth terrain was well adapted to concealment.
Armies would achieve a real break- Thick forest cover cloaked its slopes, its
through and drive to the Rhine in the valleys and plateaus. Small villages,
sector between Cologne and Bonn; in singly not worthy of aerial investigation
preparation for this untoward event the but in sum capable of harboring large
Fuehrer was amassing a major counter- forces, offered excellent dispersal. Cani-
attack force northwest of Cologne; a ouflage had become second nature with
secondary and relatively small force of the German soldier in the west-indeed
burned-out divisions was being gathered since Normandy the art of camouflage
in the Eifel to contain the right flank of had become the science of survival, and
the expected Allied penetration.4 the Eifel made this task relatively easy.
The main actor in this play was the Strict traffic regulation confined all rail
Sixth Panzer Army. Ostensibly its head- movements and road marches to hours
quarters remained northwest of Cologne. of darkness. Special security detachments
Four of the armored divisions actually prowled the Eifel, and woe to the com-
assigned to this headquarters also as- mander who allowed a vehicle park to
sembled in this area. T h e intensification grow beyond normal size. A radio black-
of rail and road traffic which began here out was thrown over the concentration
area except for those units actually fac-
3 Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, pp. 510–12. ing the enemy in the covering positions.
4The detailed deception scenario is given by
Maj. Percy Schramm, then historian at OKW No artillery registration was permitted
headquarters, in MS # A–862. except by guns in the line, and even they
PREPARATIONS 51

were limited to a few rounds per day. German discipline and experience,
Reconnaissance was confined to a hand- backed and enforced by all the security
ful of higher officers; combat patrolling paraphernalia of a police state, might be
on the Ardennes front was almost en- able to divert enemy attention to the
tirely limited to nighttime search for north and prepare a real strategic sur-
American patrols. prise in the Eifel. In the long run success
There were a few potential weaknesses or failure would turn on Allied activity
in the screen thrown around and over in the air. Could the preparations for
the Eifel. At one time the Allies had the counteroffensive be completed be-
flown night reconnaissance missions fore enemy planes spotted the Eifel con-
across the Eifel, using flares for photog- centration of troops and vehicles?
raphy. Even Rundstedt was worried lest
a repetition of these missions disclose the T h e Western Front in Early
German secret. Next was the problem December
of deserters. A quiet sector, particularly
in an area as rugged as the Ardennes T h e Allied attacks in November had
and Eifel, offered numerous chances for as their objective the decisive defeat of
a malcontent to slip over to the enemy. the enemy west of the Rhine and the
The so-called Volksdeutsch (Alsatians, seizure of a foothold on the east bank of
Transylvanians, and the like) had the that river. By the end of November,
worst record in this regard; these were the U.S. First and Ninth Armies, charged
combed out of all forward units and with the main effort, had made some
would not rejoin their outfits until the gains in the direction of Bonn and
battle began. Hitler himself required a Cologne. T h e 2 1 Army Group, in the
special daily report from OB W E S T north, had crossed the Waal River, the
listing all known deserters for the 24- left arm of the lower Rhine. The U.S.
hour period. As it turned out the num- Third Army had put troops on the Saar
ber of deserters was surprisingly small, River. Farther to the south the U.S.
only five on the Western Front during Seventh Army had captured Strasbourg
the first twelve days of December.5 and reached the Rhine. T h e 1st French
There remained the problem of Army, on the extreme south flank, mean-
widening and improving miles of road while had liberated Belfort and en-
in the Eifel without attracting undue trapped sizable German forces in the
enemy attention. Furthermore the road- Colmar pocket. Although Allied losses
blocks and barriers thrown up as part of had been high, those inflicted on the
the West Wall defenses had to be re- enemy had been even greater, probably
moved in those sectors where the initial on the order of two or three to one. But
armored penetration would be made. the Allies had failed to achieve their
Such activity hardly could be concealed. main strategic goals: they had not de-
The answer was to undertake road con- cisively defeated the German armies
struction in both the northern and south- west of the Rhine, nor had they crossed
ern areas of concentration, tying this to the river. ( M a p I)
the cover plan. On 7 December General Dwight D.
5OB WEST K T B , 13 Dec 44. Eisenhower, Air Chief Marshal Sir
D. Holmes,
Jr.
MAP I
PREPARATIONS 53

Arthur W. Tedder, Field Marshal Sir M. Patch’s Seventh Army turned north
Bernard L. Montgomery, and Lt. Gen. into the Saverne Gap.
Omar N. Bradley met at Maastricht to At the opposite end of the long Allied
lay plans for future operations. There line, Montgomery gave orders in early
was general agreement that the Allies December for the British Second Army
should launch an all-out offensive on the to “tidy up” the 2 1 Army Group posi-
Western Front early in 1945 but consid- tion on the Meuse with an attack calcu-
erable variance between the views of lated to erase the Heinsberg salient. This
Eisenhower and Montgomery as to the operation was flooded out, however, and
future scheme of maneuver and disposi- on 16 December advance parties were
tion of forces. Montgomery held, as he moving north as the first step in a major
had since September, for a single strong shift to the left preparatory to the attack
thrust across the Rhine north of the toward Krefeld and the Ruhr, now
Ruhr and the restriction of all other tentatively scheduled for the second
operations to containing actions by week in January. South of 21 Army
limited forces. Eisenhower agreed with Group Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson’s
the proposal for a main attack north of U.S. Ninth Army liquidated the remain-
the Ruhr by Montgomery’s 21 Army ing enemy forces in the Jülich sector and
Group and was prepared to give by 14 December had closed along the
the field marshal the U.S. Ninth Army. Roer River. Lt. Gen. Courtney H.
But he was unwilling to abandon his oft- Hodges’ First Army, to the right of the
expressed concept of the one-two punch Ninth, also had reached the Roer, after
with Patton’s Third Army swinging a the bloody Hurtgen battle, but could
secondary blow toward the Frankfurt not risk a crossing attack while the
Gate.6 Germans held the Urft-Roer dams. A
After the Maastricht meeting, Eisen- series of air attacks was launched early
hower set plans in motion to continue in December to breach the dams and re-
pressure on the enemy and chew up as move the threat of enemy-controlled
many German divisions as possible be- floods, but with so little success that the
fore the main offensive in the north. T o deal passed to the First Army. 7 Bradley
accomplish this the Supreme Com- ordered Hodges to seize the Schwam-
mander gave permission for the Third menauel and the Urftalsperre, the key
Army to mount an offensive along the points in the Roer valley system of dams,
Saar front on 19 December and directed and on 13 December the First Army
Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, the 6th Army commander put the V Corps, his center,
Group commander, to support the drive into an attack toward the dams. His
with elements of the Seventh Army. In northernmost corps, VII Corps, was as-
the meantime these two armies contin- signed a support role in this attack and
ued heavy local attacks, Patton driving would attain its limited objectives by 16
on Saarlautern while Lt. Gen Alexander December.
The mission and deployment of Maj.
Gen. Leonard T. Gerow’s V Corps later
6 Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, United
States Army in World War II (Washington, 1954), 7 See MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign,
p. 316. pp. 597–98.
54 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

GENERAL BRADLEY, AIR CHIEF MARSHAL TEDDER, GENERAL EISENHOWER, AND


FIEMARSHAL MONERY(left to right), during the Maastricht meeting.

had a direct effect in determining the carried by the 78th and 2d Infantry
initial American reaction to the German Divisions, the latter coming up from an
attack. Gerow had four infantry divi- assembly area at Camp Elsenborn and
sions, two armored combat commands, passing through the 99th Division left.
and a cavalry group at his disposal. A The 8th and 99th would confine their
new division, the 78th, was deployed in efforts initially to demonstrations and
the corps center on a front extending line-straightening. T h e first day of the
from Lammersdorf to Monschau. On attack went as planned, but on 14 De-
the left, the 8th Infantry Division cember the enemy stiffened and on the
fronted along the Kyll River line. The 15th counterattacked; the 78th Division
right wing was held by the 99th In- became involved in a rough battle at
fantry Division, whose positions reached Rollesbroich and Kesternich, while the
from Monschau to the V-VIII Corps 2d bogged down in a slow-moving fight
boundary in the Buchholz Forest north- for individual pillboxes in the Monschau
west of the Losheim Gap. T h e first Forest. This was the situation when the
phase of the V Corps attack was to be enemy onslaught hit the 99th Division
PREPARATIONS 55

and its VIII Corps neighbors on the battle casualties the two divisions had
the morning of 16 December. sustained. General Middleton himself
had a fine combat record reaching from
World War I through Sicily, Normandy,
and Brittany. Deliberate and calm but
tenacious, he was regarded by Bradley
and Patton as one of the best tacticians
in the U.S. Army.
As the result of the relief of the 83d
Infantry Division, en route to the VII
Corps, the deployment of the VIII Corps
(as it would meet the German attack)
took final form on the 13th. T h e 4th
Infantry Division abutted on the Third
Army at the Luxembourg-French fron-
tier and followed the Moselle and Sauer
Rivers, marking the German border, as
far north as Bollendorf. A combat com-
mand of the 9th Armored Division, as yet
inexperienced, had taken over a narrow
sector to the left of the 4th on i o De-
cember. The second combat command
of this division, earlier comprising the
GENERALMIDDLETON
corps reserve, was assigned to V Corps
Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton’s VIII and started its march north on 13 De-
Corps on First Army’s right flank had no cember. The veteran 28th Infantry Di-
part in the Allied attacks of early De- vision held the corps center, fronting on
cember. Two of Middleton’s infantry the Our River. The newly arrived and
divisions were weary and casualty-ridden green 106th Infantry Division had com-
from the intense fighting of the Novem- pleted the relief of the 2d Infantry Di-
ber push to the Roer. T h e third was vision in the Schnee Eifel sector on 1 2
newly arrived from the United States. December. Here the German West Wall
The corps mission, then, was to train, turned northeastward following the
rest, re-equip, and observe the enemy. Schnee Eifel crest. In the Losheim Gap,
Nonetheless this was no Blighty, a haven at the northern terminus of the Schnee
for second-rate troops and bumbling Eifel, a light task force of the 14th
commanders. The 28th Infantry Division Cavalry Group maintained a screening
(Maj. Gen. Norman D. Cota) and the position between the 106th and 99th In-
4th Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. Ray- fantry Divisions. It should be noted that
mond O. Barton) had distinguished this was the seam between the VIII and
therhselves in the bloody battles of the V Corps.
Hurtgen Forest. T h e veterans of this Although the VIII Corps forward
fight were well equipped to train and area possessed many terrain features
hearten the replacements for some 9,000 favoring the defender, notably the
56 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE

Schnee Eifel on the left wing and the sector. Losses during November had
river sequence fronting the corps center been high and the reserve of new divi-
and right, there were numerous points sions in the United States was running
of entry for an attack moving east to low (in the United Kingdom such a re-
west. T h e three infantry divisions under serve no longer existed). T h e old mili-
Middleton’s command were responsible tary axiom that the line cannot be strong
for a front of about eighty-five miles, a everywhere applied with full force to
distance approximately three times that the Allied positions reaching from
normally assigned an equivalent defend- Switzerland to the North Sea. Almost
ing force by U.S. service school teaching automatically Allied strength would con-
and tactical doctrine. On the morning centrate in those areas where the offen-
of 16 December the total assigned sive was the order of the day and where
strength of the VIII Corps was 68,822 decision might be reached. T h e Ar-
officers and men. Immediately after the dennes sector seemed no special risk, it
Battle of the Bulge, the tag “a calculated had been quiet for weeks, it offered-or
risk” would be applied to the attenuated so it seemed-no terrain attraction for
VIII Corps front as it existed on 16 De- the enemy, and there was no recogniz-
cember. Middleton was well aware of the able indication that enemy forces oppo-
risk-indeed he had made this clear in site the VIII Corps and 99th Infantry
discussions with his superiors. Somewhat Division outnumbered those deployed
after the event General Eisenhower on the friendly side of the line. If there
wrote General of the Army George C. was a “calculated risk,” therefore, it was
Marshall (on io January 1945) that in no more precise or specific than that
early November he and Bradley had dis- taken wittingly by any commander who
cussed the possibility of a German coun- thins his front to mount an attack while
teroffensive in the Ardennes but had knowing that he has over-all superiority
agreed that such a move would be un- and the ability to retain the initiative.
profitable to the enemy. The line of
reasoning, as set before Marshall, was T h e Intelligence Failure
this: the “Volkssturm” would be no good
in offensive operations, winter in the Ar- In the years that have passed since the
dennes would render continuous logistic close of World War II the Ardennes has
support impossible, and Allied strength ranked close to Pearl Harbor as an epi-
was so great that the Germans could not sode inviting public polemic, personal
push far enough to reach really vital ob- vituperation, and ex parte vindication.
jectives. 8 Sentences, phrases, and punctuation
Whatever thought may have been marks from American intelligence docu-
given to the Ardennes, the Allies were ments of pre-Ardennes origin have been
on the offensive and preparing for yet twisted and turned, quoted in and out
greater offensive operations well to the of context, “interpreted” and misinter-
north and the south of the VIII Corps preted, in arduous efforts to fix blame
and secure absolution. There no longer
8Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 10 Jan 45, in
SHAEF message file, Plans and Operations, folder is point to such intensely personal exam-
27. ination of the failure by American and
PREPARATIONS 57

Allied intelligence to give warning of bilities. It may be phrased this way: the
the Ardennes counteroffensive prepara- enemy can still do something but he
tions. The failure was general and can- can’t do much; he lacks the men, the
not be attributed to any person or group planes, the tanks, the fuel, and the am-
of persons. The intelligence story on the munition.
eve of the Ardennes is not germane in Another aspect of Allied thinking
terms of personal opinions or the men would contribute to the general miscon-
who held them. What counts are the ception of German capabilities and in-
views held at the various American head- tentions. T h e return of Field Marshal
quarters and the gist of enemy informa- von Rundstedt to command in the west
tion which reached those headquarters.9 had been marked with much interest by
In mid-September the Western Allies Allied intelligence staffs. Accepted in
had felt imminent victory in their hands. military circles as one of the best soldiers
Flushed with their own dazzling suc- in the world, Rundstedt’s reputation,
cesses and heartened by news of the even among his opponents, rose to new
bloody defeats which the Soviet armies stature as the result of the stubborn Ger-
were administering to the Germans on man defense in the autumn of 1944.
the Eastern Front, the Allies saw the Here, then, was a commander who
Wehrmacht collapsing and the Third could be expected to act and react ac-
Reich tottering to its knees. T h e per- cording to the rational and accepted
vasive optimism dissipated as the sur- canons of the military art. He would
prisingly revitalized German armies husband his dwindling resources, at an
stood their ground in defense of the West appropriate time he would counterat-
Wall, but it never completely disap- tack in accordance with available means,
peared. When the Allied attack began to and ultimately he would fall back to the
roll again in late November and early Rhine for the major defensive battle.
December, some of this earlier optimism Had Rundstedt actually commanded in
reappeared. A 12th Army Group intelli- the west, as the Allies believed, this
gence summary issued on 1 2 December analysis would have been correct.
echoes the prevailing tone: “It is now (Rundstedt’s effort to delimit the scope
certain that attrition is steadily sapping of the Ardennes counteroffensive in or-
the strength of German forces on the der to achieve a reasonable symbiosis
Western Front and that the crust of de- between the means and the end proves
fenses is thinner, more brittle and more the point.)
vulnerable than it appears on our G–2 But Hitler alone commanded. Intui-
maps or to the troops in the line.” This tion, not conventional professional judg-
optimism, particularly when heightened ment, would determine German action.
by reports that the enemy no longer had Unaware of the true nature of the
fuel for tanks and planes, conditioned all German decision-making process in the
estimates of the enemy’s plans and capa- west, the Allied commanders and staffs
awaited an enemy reaction which would
9 Pogue, The Supreme Command, pp. 361–72. be rational and therefore predictable. If
This is the best treatment of the problem of
personal responsibilities for the various Allied in- thethought ever occurred to an Allied
telligence estimates. intelligence officer that Germany would
58 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

gamble on one last great effort west of One item would cause Allied intelli-
the Rhine, staking everything on a single gence some concern, although it seems
throw of the dice, this idea disappeared that this concern was more academic
in the aura of high professional military than real. Where was Rundstedt’s ar-
competence which attached to Rund- mored counterattack reserve, the S i x t h
stedt. In a way this may have been the Panzer Army? Allied situation maps of
field marshal’s greatest personal contri- early December still carried the head-
bution to the Ardennes counteroffen- quarters of this army in the vicinity of
sive. Cologne, and assigned four or five un-
It is impossible to determine the ex- committed panzer divisions as available
tent to which the Hitler cover plan to this command. But the actual location
deceived the Allies into accepting the of the S i x t h Panzer Army was a matter
area north of the Ardennes as the focal of debate. T h e 12th Army Group
point for the anticipated German reac- thought that it might be concentrated
tion. Here the Allies were making their around Bielefeld, northeast of Cologne.
greatest effort and it was natural to as- T h e U.S. First Army placed it rather
sume that the German reserves remain- indefinitely between the Roer and the
ing would be committed to meet this Rhine. T h e U.S. Third Army plumped
effort. Even the U.S. Third Army, far to for a location between Düsseldorf and
the south, relaxed its normally parochial Cologne. T h e U.S. Ninth Army appar-
view of the front and predicted that the ently did not care to enter this guessing
Sixth Panzer Army would be employed game. SHAEF intelligence summed up
in a spoiling attack in the Aachen- the matter nicely in the report of io
Düren sector. Here, too, lay the direct December: “There is no further news of
route to the Ruhr. It long had been an S i x t h SS Panzer Army beyond vague
article of faith in Allied strategy that rumours.”
Germany would make its greatest efforts There was general agreement that
in defense of what Eisenhower had Rundstedt’s armored reserve would be
called the two hearts of Germany: the thrown against the First and Ninth
Ruhr, the industrial heart, and Berlin, Armies in an effort to blunt their drive
the political heart. Furthermore, the in the Roer area, although the severe
area between the Roer and Rhine German reverses sustained in the south
Rivers represented good tank-going for during the second week of December led
the Allied armored divisions. Duly im- to some thought that divisions might be
pressed with their own armored suc- stripped from the S i x t h Panzer reserve
cesses, the Allies expected that the to shore up the defenses of the Palati-
enemy would throw his reserve armor nate. The two U.S. armies carrying the
into battle here in an attempt to prevent attack in the north were agreed that the
a repetition of the August tank race Sixth Panzer Army would be committed
across France. Perhaps German decep- after their attack had crossed the Roer
tion did make some confirmatory contri- River. The 12th Army Group expected
bution, but regardless of this Allied eyes the same timing and anticipated the
were fixed immovably on the front German reaction would come as a co-
north of the Ardennes. ordinated counterattack. There was less
PREPARATIONS 59

Allied interest in the Fifth Panzer Army north or the south. As a result the
than in the Sixth. T h e former had been Ardennes assumed a kind of neutral hue
sorely handled in the fight on the Roer in American eyes. Important happen-
front and the appearance of the Fif- ings, it seemed, transpired north of the
teenth Army in this sector, identified in Ardennes and south of the Ardennes, but
the second week of December, led to the never at the division point itself. This
assumption that the Fifth and its most mental set offers a partial explanation
badly battered divisions had been with- of why the 99th Division in the V Corps
drawn for rest and necessary overhaul. zone identified only three of the twelve
On 1 2 December the 12th Army Group German divisions assembling to its
reported the Fifth as assembling its front, while the VIII Corps identified
weary divisions between Cologne and only four out of ten divisions before 16
Koblenz. December.
American intelligence summaries, Was there any warning note sounded
periodic reports, and briefing precis, for for the VIII Corps and its troops in the
the month prior to the 16 December as- line during the days just prior to the
sault, gave only fragmentary and skeletal German onslaught? With the advantage
information on the enemy opposite the of hindsight, seven items can be dis-
VIII Corps. German planners had pre- cerned in the corps reports for the period
dicted that the American high com- 13–15December which might have given
manders would accept the theory that the the alarm. Two divisions, the 28th and
rugged terrain in this area, particularly 106th, sent in reports of increased vehic-
in poor weather, effectively precluded ular activity on the nights before the
large-scale mechanized operations. Per- attack. The 28th discounted its own re-
haps there was some subconscious as- port by noting that this was the normal
sumption by American staffs that the accompaniment of an enemy front-line
Ardennes was so nearly impassable as to relief and that the same thing had hap-
be ruled out of consideration. But there pened when a German unit had pulled
were more tangible reasons for the out three weeks before. T h e 106th was
scant attention accorded this sector. It a green division and unlikely to know
had been a quiet sector of the Western what weight could be attached legiti-
Front since the Allied dash across France mately to such activity. In fact one
had halted in September. T h e German regimental commander rebuked his S–2
divisions identified here as fairly perma- for reporting this noise as “enemy move-
nent residents were battle weary, under- ment.” A third incident occurred on 14
strength, and obviously in need of rest December when a woman escapee re-
and refitting. At various times fresh ported to the 28th Infantry Division
divisions had appeared opposite the commander that the woods near Bitburg
VIII Corps, but their stay had been were jammed with German equipment.
brief. By December it had become axio- Her answers to questions posed by the
matic, insofar as U.S. intelligence was division G–2 apparently were impres-
concerned, that any new division identi- sive enough to gain the attention of the
fied on the VIII Corps front was no more VIII Corps G–2 who ordered that she
than a bird of passage en route to the be taken to the First Army headquarters.
60 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

The woman arrived there on 16 Decem- themselves did not take the reported
ber. attack too seriously since, as they told
The four remaining incidents attach their captors, all this had been promised
to the capture of German prisoners on German troops before. T h e other two
15 December, two each by the 4th and were wounded. One seems to have made
106th Infantry Divisions. T h e time of some impression on the interrogators,
capture is important: two at 1830, one but since he was under the influence of
at 1930, and one at an unspecified time morphine his captors decided that fur-
thereafter. All four claimed that fresh ther questioning would be necessary.
troops were arriving in the line, that a Of the seven incidents which in retro-
big attack was in the offing, that it might spect may be considered signposts point-
come on the 16th or 17th but certainly ing to an impending attack on the VIII
would be made before Christmas. Two Corps front, only four were reported to
of the prisoners were deserters; they the corps headquarters. Three of the

PANZERKAMPFWAGENS V (PANTHER) EN ROUTE TO THE FRONT


PREPARATIONS 61

four prisoners seemed to be parroting Group (IX Tactical Air Command),


wild and baseless rumors of a sort which supporting the First Army, flew 361
was fairly common, and these three were missions of which 242 were judged suc-
bundled into prisoner of war cages with- cessful. From the 10th through the 15th
out further ado. The incidents reported of December the group flew 71 missions
to the VIII Corps were forwarded to with varying degrees of success; for ex-
the First Army and duly noted by that ample, on 14 December planes flown
headquarters on 14 and 15 December. over Trier by the 30th Photo Reconnais-
Only one incident was deemed worthy sance Squadron reported the weather
of 12th Army Group attention. This, clear, but two hours later a second mis-
one of the reports of extraordinary traf- sion ran into haze and was able to see
fic, was mentioned in the commanding very little. Only one day, 13 December,
general’s briefing as confirmation of the in the five critical days before the attack
predicted relief of the 326th Infantry found all U.S. air reconnaissance
Division. This briefing began at 0915 on grounded.11
16 December.10 The pilots belonging to the 67th
Perhaps the appearance of these seven Group and the 10th Photo Reconnais-
indicators might have been treated in sance Group, the latter attached to the
combination to uncover the German Third Army’s old partner, the XIX
preparations and allow the VIII Corps TAG, actually constructed an imposing
at least a minimum tactical preparation picture of German build-up west of the
for the attack. Whether any commander Rhine in the month preceding the Ar-
would have been justified in making dennes counteroffensive. In the last week
major alterations in his troop disposition of November the number of enemy
on the basis of this intelligence alone columns on the roads showed a marked
is highly questionable. One might more increase. On 30 November U.S. recon-
reasonably conclude that the American naissance planes reported a drastic
acquisition of only this limited and sus- heightening of rail activity west of the
pect information was a tribute to the Rhine and this was confirmed by the
security measures enacted by the enemy. fighter-bombers flying “armed-recce.”
What of air intelligence, the source of Special indications of forthcoming attack
Rundstedt’s greatest worry? Bad weather were numerous: a large number of hos-
during the first half of December did pital trains on the west bank of the
reduce the number of Allied reconnais- Rhine, several groups of flatcars car-
sance sorties flown east of the First Army rying Tiger tanks, and fifty searchlights
front but by no means produced the kind in one location. Lights representing
of blackout for which the enemy hoped. large-scale night movements were con-
In the month prior to the Ardennes sistently reported, although the two
attack the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance available night fighter squadrons were
10The intelligence sources bearing on the Allied 11Royce L. Thompson has compiled a complete
failure to appreciate the coming German counter- collection of excerpts from pertinent Air Force
offensive have been gathered by Royce L. Thomp- records bearing on the operations of the U.S.
son in a study entitled American Intelligence on Army Air Forces during the Ardennes battle:
the German Counteroffensive, 2 vols. (1949). MS Tactical Air Phase of the Ardennes Campaign, 2
in OCMH files. vols. (1950). MS in OCMH files.
62 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

so badly understrength (averaging no daily mission orders; however, these


more than ten P–61’s operational) that missions were given low priority and
their contribution perforce was limited.12 often were scratched. In the critical
The intelligence problem presented period ( 1 0 through 15 December) the
by the U.S. air effort was not that of a 67th flew only three missions directly
paucity of information but rather one opposite the VIII Corps, on 14 Decem-
of interpretation. Both the Allied ground ber over Trier. Numerous requests for
and air headquarters expected the enemy air reconnaissance were made during
to reinforce those sectors to the north this time by the VIII Corps divisions,
and south of the Ardennes where the but even when accepted by higher
First and Third U.S. Armies were attack- ground echelons and forwarded to air
ing. The main special indicators of headquarters these missions retained so
coming attack were identified in transit low a priority, when contrasted with the
areas on the routes to the Roer and the demands from the Roer and Saar fronts,
Saar. The trainloads of Tiger tanks, for as to fall at the bottom of the missions
example, were seen on the Euskirchen list. In sum, it can be said that the
rail lines. This line ran northwest to reconnaissance flown over the Eifel be-
Düren and the Roer, but a branch line between 16 November and 15 December
led south to the Eifel. The reports of gave much information on enemy activ-
searchlights, turned in on the night of ity, but that this was interpreted as
6–7 December, came from the vicinity routine troop movement through the
of Kaiserslautern, opposite the Third Eifel way-station en route to the north
Army. Kaiserslautern, however, was only and the south. Thus, the SHAEF intel-
a few miles by rail from Trier, one of ligence summary of 10December gives
the chief unloading yards opposite the air reports of “continuing troop move-
VIII Corps. There was considerable ments towards the Eifel sector” and con-
information, then, of the enemy’s grow- cludes that “the procession is not yet
ing strength west of the Rhine. But the ended.”
interpretation of his intentions was pre- Could the proper combination of air
cisely what he desired: reinforcement of and ground intelligence have weakened
the Sixth Panzer Army counterattack the Allied fixation on the Roer and Saar
reserve on the Roer front and piecemeal sectors? Perhaps, but this is extremely
movement to shore up the divisions hypothetical. One thing seems clear.
being battered by the Third and Seventh Although the ground headquarters were
Armies. charged with the final analysis of photos
Was there any special attempt at air and pilot reports secured by the air,
reconnaissance over the Eifel? A large there was little co-operation and liaison
number of missions were flown here in between the air and ground headquar-
November, that is, before the final as- ters as to the initial interpretation placed
sembly for attack began. During the first by the air forces on the data gathered
half of December the 67th Group rather through aerial reconnaissance. T h e offi-
consistently included Eifel targets in its cial U.S. Army Air Forces account of
12Craven and Cate, eds., Europe: ARGUMENT this episode states the case justly: “Per-
to V–E Day, p. 675. haps the chief fault was one of organiza-
PREPARATIONS 63

tion, for there seems to have been a in the west, better versed in logistics,
twilight zone between air and ground recognized from the first that the attack
headquarters in which the responsibility could not be made before the very last
had not been sufficiently pinned of the month. T h e Allied attacks in the
down.” 13 Aachen and Metz sectors made further
On 15 December the Allied air com- postponement unavoidable, pinning
manders’ conference at SHAEF convened German divisions to the front long be-
to review the big picture. Here the yond their planned date of relief and
SHAEF G–3 told the assembled airmen bringing others back into the line when
that the Roer dam operations had failed refitting had only just begun. Inside the
to provoke a move by the main enemy Greater Reich the Replacement Army,
armored reserve; as for the VIII Corps charged with creating and training new
front, “nothing to report.” Then the Volks Grenadier divisions for the offen-
A–2 rose to sketch the activities of the sive, proved Hitler’s optimism ill-
Luftwaffe: it had continued the move- founded. T h e task of building new divi-
ment westward, closer to the battlefield, sions from air force troops, sailors, and
which had been noted in recent days, the products of Goebbel’s raid on the
but all this was “defensive” only. remaining civilian population was im-
T h e prelude to the Ardennes counter- mense, the timing necessarily slow. In
offensive of 16 December can only be early December, when Hitler’s target
reckoned as a gross failure by Allied date had come and gone, another factor
ground and air intelligence. One of the intervened to cause delay. The prelim-
greatest skills in the practice of the mil- inary movement of armored divisions
itary art is the avoidance of the natural and vehicular columns had burned up
tendency to overrate or underestimate far more fuel than German quartermas-
the enemy. Here, the enemy capability ters had reckoned. T h e attack would
for reacting other than to direct Allied have to be delayed until the diminished
pressure had been sadly underestimated. fuel tanks west of the Rhine could be
Americans and British had looked in a replenished.
mirror for the enemy and seen there T h e concentration period, therefore,
only the reflection of their own in- would run until 16 December but even
tentions. these added days gave all too short a
time for such a formidable array of prep-
T h e German Concentration arations. T h e original plans called for
the movement and assembly of 4 armies,
Hitler’s operation directive of 1 0 1 1 corps, 38 divisions, 9 Volks artillery
November set 27 November as the date corps, and 7 Yolks Werfer brigades,
for completion of the huge concentra- plus service and support troops. By the
tion preliminary to the Ardennes coun- beginning of December OKW’s inflated
teroffensive, with a target date two days order of battle had been reduced to
earlier for the’ attack by the divisions in about 3 0 divisions (the Fifteenth Army
the initial thrust. But his commanders now was deleted from the initial attack
order, although still envisioned as the
13Ibid., p. 681. subsidiary attack force) , but the logistics
64 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

problem remained of staggering pro- training and refitting areas, then be


portions. moved across the Rhine again and into
T h e area in which the Army Group B the concentration zone.
would concentrate its forces, equipment, Probably no railway system in the
and supplies was delimited on the south world was better able to handle this
by the Moselle River and had as its base tremendous task than the Reichsbahn
the Rhine crossings stretching from (the German State Railroads). It had
Dusseldorf to Koblenz. On the north been modernized on the eve of the war,
there were actually two limits. That was a model of efficient management,
farthest north ran from the Rhine west and, through a program of systematic
on the axis Munchen-Gladbach and looting, had more than replaced the
Roermond. South of this line Allied rolling stock lost to air attack. T h e cars
intelligence officers watched, as they and the locomotives in large freight
were intended to watch, the daylight, yards, as many American soldiers will
only half-disguised, movement of Ger- remember, read like a European rail-
man troops and supplies. Farther south road gazetteer. Militarization of the
a second and true limit defined the main German railroads was complete. T h e
concentration area. Here the line ex- German Army had been the first in his-
tended from Bonn, through Euskirchen, tory to employ railroads for a great
to the front north of Monschau. T h e strategic concentration, and the suc-
trick, then, would be to effect a large cesses of 1870 had led to a tradition in
and secret concentration south of this General Staff thought and training
second line while at the same time pre- which looked to the rail system as the
paring to sideslip the forces from the primary means of strategic concentra-
north into this sector in the last hours tion. The rail lines along the Rhine and
before the attack. west of the river had been located in
T h e first problem of organization was accordance with military desires, T h e
that of rail transport.14 Troops, tanks, Eifel branches had been constructed in
and guns had to be brought from East preparation for the First World War,
Prussia, Poland, Austria, the Nether- then had been reinforced for the cam-
lands, Denmark, and Norway. Fuel and paign of 1940. But there was more than
ammunition had to be hauled across the the tradition of the great General Staff
exposed Rhine bridges and unloaded to dictate this reliance on rail: Hitler’s
quickly and quietly at the Eifel dumps. scheme for a military superhighway
A number of divisions, in particular system, the Reichsauto bahnen, had been
those assigned to the Sixth Panzer Army, cut short by the war; the Allied attacks
would have to be shuttled from the against motor fuel production had de-
battle front back across the Rhine to pleted German stocks, although hardly
to the extent that Allied intelligence
14The best study on German rail movements
and explanation of pertinent German sources will
estimated in the autumn of 1944.
be found in Charles V. P. von Luttichau’s manu- T h e major threat, of course, was the
script, German Rail Communications in the overwhelming superiority of the Allied
Ardennes Offensive, 1944–45 (1952). OCMH. See
also the OB WEST K T B and Anlage for the sup-
air forces and their ability, no longer
ply build-up prior to the attack. effectively challenged by the Luftwaffe,
PREPARATIONS 65

to look and to strike almost at will. Ger- the RAF actually delivered more bombs
man railway preparations, as a result, against rail than against oil targets. T h e
had to take count of three dangers: Rhine bridges presented a special prob-
Allied air reconnaissance over the Eifel lem. In November the SHAEF G–2
and its rail approaches, bombing attacks asked that the air mount a campaign to
to knock out the Rhine rail bridges, and cut these bridges, but on this the Amer-
rail-cutting attacks stepped up to the ican and British air commanders were
point where repair efforts could no in accord. T h e great Rhine bridges,
longer hold the pace. In the short run, heavily guarded by flak, were tough
decisions on the form of the air war targets for the bombing techniques then
reached in the higher Allied councils current and the Allied air forces suc-
during the autumn of 1944 made the ceeded in staving off this demand.
German task much easier; in the long German records, fairly full for the
run, these same decisions contributed to final quarter of 1944, give this picture
the final failure of the Ardennes counter- of the effects of Allied air attacks. T h e
offensive. Reichsbahn moved troop strength by
British and American air leaders had rail equivalent to sixty-six divisions be-
found themselves consistently at logger- fore the attack. 15 Forces equivalent to
heads on the issue of transportation seven divisions were moved by road.
versus oil targets. T h e American view Twenty-seven of the division-size rail
was that the German rail system con- movements were affected in some way
stituted too complex a target to be by air attack, in most cases before they
demolished in any reasonable time, actually entered the build-up zone. De-
but that enemy oil production was so lays normally were no longer than one
highly concentrated (particularly in the or two days, although from 1 0 December
synthetic oil plants) as to permit a kill- on some divisions were forced to march
ing blow in the time and with the effort an extra fifty to sixty miles on foot. A
available. Before 16 December the number of units lost essential organic
American view held first priority. In- equipment during these attacks, the
deed, during the month of October deprivation inevitably inhibiting their
second place was accorded to attacks- later performance. Very noticeable ef-
subsequently judged as “rather incon- fects of Allied air efforts came on 10and
clusive”-against ordnance depots, tank 11 December. On the first day a noon
assembly plants, and motor vehicle pro- attack over the Koblenz rail yards left
duction. Eventually, at the close of Oc- more than a hundred bomb craters.
tober, the British succeeded in raising Nonetheless, the yards were in full
the priority on rail attacks, although this operation twenty-four hours later. T h e
remained second to those on oil. Novem- main double-track line supporting the
ber was the big month for attacks against Sixth Panzer Army assembly (Cologne-
the latter, the Allied strategic air forces Euskirchen) was hit so severely as to
dropping 37,096 tons aimed at German stop all rail traffic on 11December: but
oil production. In the second half of
the month, however, the rail campaign 15 Detailedtroopmovements have been worked
out in Luttichau, Rail Communications, ch. VII,
stepped up; the Eighth Air Force and passim.
66 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

the line was running again on the 12th. following the fateful decision to gamble
Two Rhine rail bridges took hits in everything on a single stroke in the west,
November and four were under repair was to assure himself that the Rhine
as the result of attacks during October. bridges would be secure and that the
In all cases at least one rail line per Reichsbahn could bear the weight he
bridge remained operable. An Allied intended to impose upon it. Sometime
plane hit one bridge with one bomb during September-an exact date is
during the first half of December. Supply lacking-the OKH Chief of Trans-
shipments generally went unscathed in portation, General der Infanterie
the actual concentration area. About Rudolf Gercke, was admitted to the
five hundred trains were employed to tiny circle of those entrusted with
effect this build-up, of which air attack the Ardennes plans. His initial task was
in October and November destroyed to deal with the Rhine River crossing
only fifteen carloads. sites; this was the priority through Sep-
In sum, the greatest menace to the tember and October. First the pillars
German rail concentration came from and piers supporting the Rhine bridges
attacks by bombers and fighter-bombers were reinforced so that a lucky hit could
against railroad tracks, stations, and not send an entire bridge into the Rhine
yards. Hardly a day passed without one waters. Next, a number of ferries were
or more breaks somewhere in the system modified to carry trains and a few high-
at and west of the Rhine. During the way bridges were strengthened for
first two weeks of December the Allied tracklaying in the event that the regular
air attacks inflicted 125 breaks on the railroad bridges failed. Special heavy
rails feeding the Western Front, 60 of spans of military bridging were floated
which were in the concentration area. into waiting positions along the banks.
German engineers, still working on (At one time plans were made to ex-
November cuts, repaired 150 breaks of pand two mining tunnels which ran
which 100 were in the concentration under the Rhine so that troops could be
area. There was, then, an uneasy equi- marched from one side to the other.)
librium between Allied air attacks and Ruhr industry contributed large stocks
the German rail repair capability. Be of steel girders and plates; these stocks
it remembered, however, that the Allied were then distributed for quick repair
air campaign against the Reichsbahn jobs at the main rail bridges. Early in
thus far was dispersed and a matter of October reinforcement was introduced
second priority. on a number of bridges to permit the
If nuclear weapons do not succeed in passage of trains carrying the 70-ton
entirely removing rail transport from King Tiger tanks. By early December
the logistic systems of future war, the eight railway bridges were ready imme-
German handling of the Ardennes build- diately behind the assembly area, plus
up will stand as a military model. As an equal number of highway bridges
a part of military history, the story of and twelve Rhine ferries capable of
this German success, achieved despite handling locomotives. An additional
Allied dominance in the air, merits some four rail bridges, lower down on the
attention. One of Hitler’s first concerns, Rhine, were scheduled for use if needed.
PREPARATIONS 67

The Allied decision to forgo any inten- plus an unusual number of rail tunnels
sive attacks against the Rhine crossings near the chief supply dumps, gave con-
gave this segment of the German rail siderable chance of concealment. Wher-
system relative immunity during the ever possible the run was made to the
build-up. T h e actual trackage and the unloading point and back to the west
freight yards, particularly those west of bank of the Rhine in one night. On
the Rhine, had no such immunity and double-tracked lines the movement was
would come under increasing attack in restricted to one-way traffic, then re-
late November just when the concentra- versed. A host of small stations were
tion was swinging into full stride. Almost given extra siding so that trains could be
completely bereft of any friendly air stationed serially all along the line and
cover, how did the Germans keep their unloaded simultaneously. This system
rail transport functioning? Recall that also permitted quick distribution to the
the Wehrmacht had been forced to per- many small, concealed dumps. Earlier
fect the art of camouflage, that the tra- it had been discovered that engine crews
ditionally severe German discipline often were killed by Allied strafing
functioned nowhere better than in the while the locomotive remained intact.
rigorous control of troop movement, and Special light armor plate therefore was
that the Reichsbahn was an integral introduced on all cabs. Also, it had been
member of the body military. noticed that fighter-bomber pilots
T h e first measure adopted to protect tended to work on a train at relatively
military trains from Allied observation high altitudes when subjected to anti-
and attack aimed at the utmost use of aircraft fire. All trains, then, would
darkness and bad flying weather. All carry a section of light flak. So success-
rail movement west of the line Bremen- ful were these measures that a number
Kassel-Ulm, a distance of 150–200 miles of divisions actually detrained at rail-
from the fighting front, was confined to heads only eight to twenty miles behind
those times when air reconnaissance the front.
would be stymied. A few exceptions, There were four main double-track
for purposes of deception, were per- lines running into the Eifel. From 4
mitted in the Aachen area. Control was September to i o December all were
decentralized and even the smaller rail under the control of the Seventh Army,
stations were tied in to the main Ger- but on 10 December the two panzer
man weather service so as to wring the armies moved in to take command of
most mileage out of any local change in their own sectors. In the north, two
the weather. Supply trains were organ- lines, Cologne-Duren and Bonn-Euskir-
ized east of the Rhine and there allo- chen, handled the bulk of Sixth Panzer
cated a particular line and army. Every Army traffic. The Ahr River line, fed
effort was made to load down the branch mainly by the Remagen bridge, sup-
lines, particularly when it became ap- ported the Fifth Panzer Army. T h e
parent that the Allies tended to con- Moselle line, following the old Napole-
centrate on the main lines. onic “cannon road,” handled the Sev-
Train movement was very carefully enth Army trains plus some traffic for
controlled. T h e thick forests of the Eifel, the Fifth. Although less rich in rail than
68 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

areas to the north and south, the Eifel of antiaircraft artillery scheduled to sup-
possessed a substantial, crisscross net of port the attack was better off than the
feeder lines. There was one main lateral ground gunners: the III Flak Corps, with
line quite close to the front, that via 66 heavy and 74 medium and light
Euskirchen-Kall-Ehrang-Trier. Until 16 batteries, had 7 basic loads of ammuni-
December the main troop detraining tion. In net, the Army Group B logisti-
points were Schleiden, Stadtkyll, Prum, cians estimated the attack would average
Niederweiss, the west station at Trier, a daily ammunition consumption of
and Konz. In addition there were four about 1,200 tons. Needless to say this
chief areas for unloading supplies: figure was based on a fast-moving ex-
Rheinbach, Mechernich, Muesch (near ploitation once the breakthrough was
Ahrdorf) , and Kall. accomplished.
T h e amount of ammunition and POL Motor fuel, a notorious logistic prob-
required to support the attack imposed lem in German armies at this stage of
a severe load not only upon the dwin- the war, was the greatest headache in
dling German war economy but on the the Western Front headquarters, partic-
Eifel rail system as well. Hitler had ularly in the last days before the attack.
allocated one hundred trains of ammuni- The journals of OB WEST are jammed
tion to nourish the counteroffensive, this during this period with messages
coming from the special Fuehrer Re- attempting to trace promised trainloads
serve. Over and above this special re- of POL. By 16 December, however, the
serve, Generalmajor Alfred Toppe, the quartermaster and rail systems had com-
O berquartermeister, figured on scraping bined to put the promised 4,680,000
together four units of what in German gallons in the hands of O B WEST,
practice was considered a basic load. Of although perhaps half of this was in
these units, one was allocated for the dumps back at .the Rhine.
artillery barrage preparatory to the During the period 9 September–15
attack, one half would be used in break- December the Seventh Army, or main,
ing through the enemy main line of concentration area received 1,502 troop
resistance, and one and a half would be trains and approximately 500 supply
fired to keep the offensive rolling. Toppe trains, most of which were earmarked
had planned to have two basic loads of for the counteroffensive. T h e Eifel rail
ammunition in the hands of troops when net in this time unloaded 144,735 tons
the attack commenced and did deliver of supplies. At some point the Eifel rail
the loads as scheduled. However, he had system would be saturated; this point
not counted on the Allied attacks, fur- was reached on 17 December when OB
nishing only enough extra ammunition W E S T was forced to detrain its incom-
for the normal day-to-day battle in the ing reserve divisions on the west bank
west. By the second week of December of the Rhine, a factor of some signifi-
the two basic loads had been whittled cance in the ensuing history of the Ar-
down to one and a half. Even so, on the dennes battle.
last day reported–13 December–Army With the Allies hammering at the
Group B had 15,099 tons of ammunition Roer, pushing along the Saar, a n dcon-
in its dumps. T h e heavy concentration verging on the Saverne Gap, the Arden-
PREPARATIONS 69

nes target date–25 November-passed intervened the whole operation would


into discard. On that day Hitler re- stop dead in its tracks.16
viewed the situation with his household T h e rail movement of the initial
military staff. The enemy offensive, said attack divisions had nearly ended by 11
he, had fulfilled the major prerequisites December, although the transport of the
for a successful German attack. T h e second phase formations, belonging to
Allies had taken heavy losses and had the OKW reserve, still had a few days
been forced to deploy their reserves to go.17 T h e Seventh Army, quondam
close behind the attack front or feed caretaker on the Ardennes front, had
them into the line. Now, more than ever, most of its divisions in the line but in
the Fuehrer was convinced of the Big the nights just before the attack would
Solution’s feasibility. From somewhere have to shift some of these southward
in lower echelons the idea had been into the final assembly area designated
broached that the Meuse crossing sites for the Seventh on the attack left wing.
should be seized on the first day. This The Fifth Panzer Army, slated to make
brought hearty concurrence. Advance the attack in the center, had begun its
battalions should try for the Meuse concentration in the Remagen-Mayen
bridges in the early morning (Hitler area of the Eifel as early as 26 November,
probably referred here to the end of the but some of its armor was coming from
first 24-hour period). Again Hitler as far north as Munchen-Gladbach–one
stressed the need for penetrations on attack division, the 116th Panzer, would
narrow fronts, but once the break- not complete detraining until 16 Decem-
through was accomplished he foresaw ber. T h e Sixth Panzer Army, which in
considerable maneuver as the two panzer Hitler’s mind and in OKW plans rep-
armies hit the Meuse. T o ensure flexi- resented the main effort and whose
bility in the choice of bridgeheads, he four SS panzer divisions were expected
extended the Sixth Panzer Army zone to pace the entire counteroffensive, by
(on the right) to include the crossings 6 December had closed its armor in a
at Huy, while the Fifth Panzer Army zone stretching from west of Cologne
southern boundary moved down to to southwest of Bonn. The question
Givet. It may be that in this same brief- remained whether the Sixth infantry
ing the Fuehrer set a new D-day. In any divisions, some of which were in the
case Jodl visited Rundstedt on 26 No- Roer battle line, could be pried loose
vember and delivered the news that and moved south in time for H-hour.
Null Tag (D-day) would be 10 Decem- The Fifteenth Army, once intended to
ber. This date finally was scrapped be- cover the north flank of the Sixth Panzer
cause the fuel dumps were not full and 16 The several postponements of the German D-
a number of the assault divisions were day are described in ETHINT–20, Hitler’s Con-
s outeto the c oncentration zone. duct of the War (Rittmeister
Dr. Wilhelm
Scheidt) .
on the 11th Hitler approved further 17The timing at the end of the German con-
postponement until 0530 on 15 Decem- centration is given unit by unit in Luttichau’s
ber, then on 12 December altered the German Rail Communications and in his study
entitled The Ardennes Offensive, Progressive
attack Order to read the 16th, with the Build-up and Operations, 11–19 December 1944.
usual proviso that if good flying weather MS in OCMH files.
70 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Army advance, had its hands full on the Timing was defined by coded days
Roer front. Here there was no immedi- from the alphabet. Since O-Tag or D-
ate assembly problem, although the day was in fact 16 December the calen-
army would have to plug the gaps left dar dates can be given for what in the
as divisions pulled out for the Ardennes. plan was merely an undated sequence
Ultimately, however, the Fifteenth of events. On K-Tag ( 1 2 December)
might be reinforced from the OKW re- troops were alerted for movement. As
serve and join the attack. If the Fif- yet they had no knowledge of the offen-
teenth Army is excluded the German sive; they would receive this information
attack front extended for 143 kilometers the night before the attack jumped off.
(89 miles). T h e main armored con- By L-Tag (13 December) all units were
centration, however, would take place supposed to have their forward detach-
on a frontage of 97 kilometers (61 ments up to the base line; most of them
miles) . did. During the night of 13 December
The timetable for final assembly in the clockwork march to the final attack
attack positions required three days, or positions began. Those infantry divi-
better, three nights, since nearly all sions not already in place moved to the
movement would be confined to hours forward restraining line of their Area I.
of darkness. T o prevent premature dis- This also was the night for the guns and
closure by some unit wandering into howitzers belonging to army and VAK
the assembly area, all formations except batteries to move. Using horses from
those already deployed on the original the neighboring infantry artillery regi-
Seventh Army front or immediately ments, and liberally employing straw to
behind it were banned from crossing muffle the wheels (just as had been done
the Army Group B base line, twelve in 1918), the batteries were dragged
miles behind the front, until the final into positions about five miles to the
assembly was ordered by Hitler. Once rear of the ultimate firing emplacements.
across the base line every movement had T h e rocket projectors, easier to camou-
to follow rigid timing. For further con- flage, were hidden immediately behind
trol the infantry and armored divisions their firing positions.
were each assigned two sectors for as- On the night of the 14th the infantry
sembly. Infantry Area I was marked by divisions not already in place marched
a restraining line six miles from the quietly into Area I I . Motorized artillery
front; Area 11 extended forward to went to assigned firing positions while
points about two and a half to three low-flying German planes zoomed nois-
miles from the front. Armor Area I ily over the American listening posts,
actually was east of the base line which or it was dragged forward by horses. The
served as the forward restraining line; rocket projector crews dug their pieces
Area 11 was defined by a line six to ten into the pits from which the prepara-
miles from the front. T h e armored tion for the attack would be fired. T h e
divisions, of course, would be strung out tracked elements of the panzer division
over greater distances than given here assault groups churned into Armor Area
but their assault echelons would be II over roads which only two days earlier
fitted inside the two armored areas. had been iced completely and along
PREPARATIONS 71

which treacherous stretches remained. armored divisions were ready for the
Wheeled units moved up to the Area I initial assault. Five divisions from the
restraining line. This armored move- OKW reserve were on alert or actually
ment in the dark of night was difficult en route to form the second wave, plus
indeed, but to avoid entanglement each one armored and one mechanized bri-
panzer division had been given a road gade at reinforced strength. Approxi-
of its own and in no cases did the dis- mately five additional divisions were
tance traveled during the two nights listed in the OKW reserve, but their
total more than fifty miles; for most it availability was highly dubious. Some
was less. On the night of 15 December 1,900 artillery pieces-including rocket
all formations marched to the line of projectors-were ready to support the
departure or to forward combat posi- attack.19 The seven armored divisions in
tions. It would appear that nearly all the initial echelon had about 970 tanks
units were in place an hour or two be- and armored assault guns. The armored
fore H-hour, 0530 on the morning of and mechanized elements of the immedi-
16 December. ate OKW reserve had another 450 to
Although the troops knew nothing of swell the armored attack.20 If and when
their mission until the night of the 15th, the Fifteenth Army joined in, the total
save what they could surmise, the com- force could be counted as twenty-nine
manders had been given the picture in infantry and twelve armored divisions.
time to do some individual planning. These divisions and heavy weapons
By the end of the first week in Decem- might or might not suffice for the task
ber all corps and division commanders at hand, but the total represented the
knew what was expected of them. Most best that the Wehrmacht could do. Of
of the division staffs seem to have been the armored complement on the West-
briefed on 10 December. Hitler re- ern Front–2,567 tanks and assault guns
ceived the commanders entrusted with –Army Group B and OKW reserve had
the attack in two groups on the nights been given 2,168. About a third of this
of 11 and 1 2 December. Most of the latter total would have to be left for
visitors seem to have been more im- the time being with the Fifteenth Army
pressed by the Fuehrer’s obvious phys- to shore up the right-wing defenses in
ical deterioration and the grim mien of the Roer sector. Some four hundred
the SS guards than by Hitler’s rambling
recital of his deeds for Germany which 19 On the German artillery preparations see
MSS# B–311, Group B Artillery, Ardennes
constituted this last “briefing.” 18 (General der Artillerie Karl Thoholte); B–347,
T h e forces assembled.for the counter- Sixth SS Panzer Army Artillery (Generalleutnant
Waffen-SS Walter Staudinger); B–759, Sixth Panzer
offensive were the product of an almost Army, 15 December 1944–21 January 1945
psychotic drive by Hitler to put every (Staudinger) .
last man, gun, and tank that could be 20The very difficult task of evaluating and
reconciling the various tank strengths given in
stripped from some part of the declining individual (and fragmentary) German documents
German war establishment into the has been ably done in Charles V. P. von Luttichau’s
attack. Thirteen infantry and seven manuscript, Armor in the Ardennes Offensive
(1952). MH. Cf., MS# P–059 (Mueller-Hille-
18For the Hitler speeches of 11 and 12 Decem- brand) and the OB WEST KTB for 16 December
ber 1944 see Gilbert, Hitler Directs His War, p. 157. 1944
72 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

tanks and assault guns were all that for the 25 divisions certain to be com-
remained to German divisions on the mitted in the Ardennes, Goering could
rest of the long Western Front. T h e promise only a thousand planes. By this
hard-pressed armies on the Eastern time Hitler was chary of Luftwaffe prom-
Front likewise had been denied the ises and watered down this figure to 800-
armored materiel to replace their heavy goo planes when he presented it to O B
autumn losses. At the beginning of De- WEST. Hitler’s estimate would be met
cember the Eastern Front total in opera- -but only for one day and that when
tional tanks and assault guns was roughly the ground battle already had been
1,500.21 Despite Hitler’s personal decided.
emphasis on the power of the artillery In December 1944, Germany was
arm and the very substantial number of fighting a “poor man’s war” on the
tubes allocated for the offensive, the ground as in the air.23 This must be
greatest portion of OB WEST artillery remembered when assessing the actual
had to be left for corsetting where armor military potential of the divisions ar-
and infantry had been pulled out, and, rayed for the western offensive. Motor
because of the scarcity of prime movers, transport was in sorry shape; the best-
a large number of batteries scheduled equipped divisions had about 80 percent
for the attack never got forward at all. of their vehicular tables of equipment,
T h e artillery flak and rocket projector but many had only half the amount spec-
support for the entire Western Front ified in the tables. One of the best mech-
actually numbered 7,822 pieces on 16 anized divisions had sixty different types
December. of automotive transport. Spare parts, a
As proof that the Western Front’s necessity in rough terrain and poor
armored strength in December 1944 weather, hardly existed. There was only
equaled that of the halcyon days at the a handful of prime movers and heavy
beginning of the war, Hitler’s personal tank retrievers. Signal equipment was
staff compiled a special report which antiquated, worn-out, and sparse; the
showed that 2,594 tanks had taken part same held for engineer tools and ve-
in the victorious 1940 campaign in the hicles. Antitank guns were scarce, the
west. Nobody, it would appear, cared to heavy losses in this weapon sustained in
look at comparative figures of air the summer and autumn disasters having
strengths in previous campaigns. In the never been made good. The German
Polish campaign some 50 German divi- infantryman would have to defend him-
sions had been given direct support by self against the enemy tank with bravery
1,800 first-line aircraft. T h e Balkan and the bazooka, or so the field service
campaign had seen 1 , 0 0 0 aircraft sup- regulations read.
porting 17 divisions. T h e victorious ad- German military poverty was nowhere
vance into the Soviet Union had brought more apparent than in the stocks of
123 divisions into the line, with 2,500 ammunition and POL which had been
first-line attack planes in the air.22Now,
secondary sources and are estimates only. Joint
21See Luttichau’s Armor in the Ardennes Of- Intelligence Survey, Some Weaknesses in German
fensive, Table II. Strategy and Organization (1946).
22These figures have been gleaned from various 23MS # P–031b.
PREPARATIONS 73

laboriously amassed to support the postponement of D-day, for on the 15th


attack. The Sixth Panzer Army artillery the picture was rosy. T h e U.S. 4th, 28th,
commander, for example, had pleaded 106th, and 99th Infantry Divisions and
for twelve to fifteen units of artillery their respective boundaries remained un-
ammunition for the first ten days of altered. The enemy “lack of interest”
operations.24 On 16 December there were in this sector was “underlined” by the
only one and a half units with the Army paucity of aerial reconnaissance. T h e
Group B guns and only two additional only new American division to arrive on
units in prospect. Although OB WEST the Western Front, the 75th, had been
appears to have estimated a daily POL identified the day before in the Roer
consumption of 260,000 gallons per day sector. For several days it had been
for the Ardennes force, a number of the recognized that the U.S. 12th Army
higher German quartermasters pre- Group lacked “large operational re-
dicted that Army Group B would burn serves.’’ Agents working in France had
four times that amount on each day of reported on 7 December that the 82d
the operation.25 The armored divisions and 101st Airborne Divisions were as-
had in their vehicles and trains enough sembled at Mourmelon preparing for
fuel for perhaps go to 1 0 0 miles of nor- another airborne operation. These two
mal cruising, but battle in the Ardennes divisions appeared to be the only U.S.
could hardly be considered normal tra- forces uncommitted. T h e “rubber duck”
vel. Though it is a commonplace that operation on the VIII Corps front in
commanders and supply officers at the which Special Troops from the 12th
tactical level always want more shells Army Group simulated an additional
and gasoline than they probably can use, division had been reflected for some days
there is no question but that the Arden- on German situation maps by a question
nes counteroffensive began on a logistical mark. On the 15th, however, OB WEST
shoestring. was satisfied that no new division existed
On 15 December the intelligence and the question mark disappeared.
staff at Rundstedt’s headquarters took The 4th and 28th Infantry Divisions
one last look at the opposite side of the were known to be exhausted and it was
In the days just previous there doubted that they were up to strength.
seems to have been a growing uneasiness There appeared to be relatively little
that the Allies had recognized the im- armor opposite the three assault armies,
pending attack and begun redeployment probably no more than 370 tanks at the
to meet it. Probably this was no more maximum. Although restrictions on
than a nervous reaction to the continued patrolling had limited any recent infor-
24 The general problem of artillery and ammu-
mation on exact tactical locations, there
nition is discussed by General Thoholte, the artil- existed a complete file carefully built
lery representative of Army Group B, in MS #B–311 up since September. New arrivals on the
(Thoholte).
25A contemporary memorandum on the supply
Ardennes front had tended to occupy
and POL status written by a Colonel Poleck is the same positions as their predecessors,
found in Schramm’s Merkbuch under the date of and on this habit the Germans counted.
3 January 1945 The three communications intelligence
26The Germar Intelligence Estimate for 15 Dec-
ember 1944 is given in OB WEST KTB. companies operating under Army Group
74 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

B were pleased to report that American remained in locations north of the


carelessness in the use of radio and com- Eifel. 28
mercial telephone nets was up to par, In the German camp there was one
and that no reinforcements were en last hitch. On 15 December Model asked
route to the Ardennes.27 Rundstedt to postpone the attack, but
Across the line intelligence staffs were the latter ruled that O - T a g would be
equally placid-although with less rea- as scheduled and so informed Fuehrer
son. T h e 12th Army Group G–2 situa- headquarters. At 1530 an officer named
tion map of 15 December showed no Waizenegger telephoned from OKW to
changes. For the sector from the Moselle give Hitler’s confirmation of Rundstedt’s
to Monschau only five German divisions decision; the liaison officers waiting with
appeared, with a sixth apparently with- Rundstedt’s staff departed for their com-
drawing from the Eifel. T h e Sixth Pan- mands at once, bearing the attack orders.
zer Army symbol still crowded the dot And at midnight on the 15th the officer
on the map representing Cologne. All keeping the OB WEST War Diary made
panzer divisions, except the 9th SS and the last entry of that date: “Tomorrow
the 12th SS, which bore question marks, brings the beginning of a new chapter
in the Campaign In the West.”
28This situation map may be found in Thomp-
son’s American Intelligence on the German
27 MS# P–038, German Radio Intelligence (1950). Counteroffensive.
CHAPTER V

The Sixth Panzer Army Attack


On the night of 15 December German holding the line An twerp-Brussels-
company commanders gave their men Namur-Dinant. T h e left wing of the
the watchword which had come from counteroffensive, composed of infantry
the Fuehrer himself: “Forward to and and mechanized divisions belonging to
over the Meuse!” T h e objective was Brandenberger’s Seventh Army, had
Antwerp. Hitler’s concept of the Big orders to push to the Meuse, unwinding
Solution had prevailed; the enemy was a cordon of infantry and artillery facing
not to be beaten east of the Meuse but south and southwest, thereafter anchor-
encircled by a turning movement be- ing the southern German flank on the
yond that river. T h e main effort would angle formed by the Semois and the
be made by Dietrich’s Sixth Panzer Meuse. Also, the Fuehrer had expressed
Army on the north wing, with orders to the wish that the first segment of the
cross the Meuse on both sides of Liége, Seventh Army cordon be pushed as far
wheel north, and strike for the Albert south as Luxembourg City if possible.
Canal, fanning out the while to form a What course operations were to take
front extending from Maastricht to once Antwerp was captured is none too
Antwerp. Meanwhile the infantry divi- clear.1 Indeed no detailed plans existed
sions to the rear of the armored columns for this phase. There are numerous indi-
would form the north shoulder of the cations that the field commanders did
initial advance and a subsequent block- not view the Big Solution too seriously
ing position east of the Meuse along the but fixed their eyes on the seizure of the
Vesdre River. Eventually, or so Hitler Meuse bridgeheads rather than on the
intended, the Fifteenth Army would capture of Antwerp. Probably Hitler
advance to take a station protecting the had good reason for the final admoni-
Sixth Panzer Army right and rear. tion, on 15 December, that the attack was
Manteuffel’s Fifth Panzer Army, ini- not to begin the northward wheel until
tially acting as the center, had the mis- the Meuse was crossed.
sion of crossing the Meuse to the south Dietrich’s Sixth Panzer Army, selected
of the Sixth, but because the river to make the main effort, had a distinct
angled away to the southwest might be political complexion. Its armored divi-
expected to cross a few hours later than sions all belonged to the Waffen SS, its
its armored partner on the right. Once
across the Meuse, Manteuffel had the 1 Jodl, while a prisoner at Nuremberg, said that
once the Antwerp line was reached the subse-
mission of preventing an Allied counter- quent German operations would aim at “neutral-
attack against Dietrich’s left and rear by izing” the Allied armies to the east.
76 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

commander was an old party member, of the aristocratic members of the Ger-
and when regular Wehrmacht officers man General Staff. He had accompanied
were assigned to help in the attack prep- Hitler on the march to the Feldherrn-
arations they were transferred to the SS halle in 1923 and by 1940 had risen to
rolls. Hitler’s early plans speak of the command the Adolf Hitler Division,
Sixth SS Panzer Army, although on 16 raised from Hitler’s bodyguard regi-
December the army still did not bear ment, in the western campaign. After
the SS appellation in any official way, and gaining considerable reputation in
it is clear that the Sixth was accorded Russia, Dietrich was brought to the west
the responsibility and honor of the main in 1944 and there commanded a corps
effort simply because Hitler felt he could in the great tank battles at Caen. He
depend on the SS. managed to hang onto his reputation
during the subsequent retreats and
finally was selected personally by Hitler
to command the Sixth Panzer Army. Un-
couth, despised by most of the higher
officer class, and with no great intelli-
gence, Dietrich had a deserved reputa-
tion for bravery and was known as a
tenacious and driving division and corps
commander. Whether he could com-
mand an army remained to be proven.
T h e attack front assigned the Sixth
Panzer Army, Monschau to Krewinkel,
was narrower than that of its southern
partner because terrain in this sector
was poor at the breakthrough points and
would not offer cross-country tank going
until the Hohes Venn was passed. T h e
initial assault wave consisted of one ar-
mored and one infantry corps. On the
south flank the I SS Panzer Corps
GENERALDIETRICH (Generalleutnant der Waffen-SS Her-
mann Priess) had two armored divisions,
Josef “Sepp” Dietrich had the appro- the 1st SS Panzer and the 12th SS Pan-
priate political qualifications to ensure zer, plus three infantry divisions, the 3d
Hitler’s trust but, on his military record, Parachute, the 12th Volks Grenadier,
hardly those meriting command of the and the 277th Volks Grenadier. On the
main striking force in the great counter- north flank the L X V I I Corps (General
offensive. By profession a butcher, der Infanterie Otto Hitzfeld) had only
Dietrich had learned something of the two infantry divisions, the 326th and
soldier’s trade in World War I, rising to 246th Volks Grenadier, T h e doctrinal
the rank of sergeant, a rank which at- question as to whether tanks or infantry
tached to him perpetually in the minds should take the lead, still moot in Ger-
T H E SIXTH PANZER ARMY 77

man military thinking after all the years reached by the evening of the third day,
of war, had been raised when Dietrich and crossings to be secured by
proposed to make the initial break- the fourth. 2
through with his two tank divisions. He This army was relatively well
was overruled by Model, however, and equipped and trained. Most of its ar-
the three infantry divisions were given mor had been out of combat for some
the mission of punching a hole on either time and the horde of replacements had
side of Udenbreth. Thereafter the in- some degree of training in night move-
fantry was to swing aside, moving north- ment and fighting. The 1st and 2d SS
west to block the three roads which led had not been loaded with Luftwaffe and
south from Verviers and onto the route over-age replacements as had the other
the armor would be taking in its dash divisions. T h e artillery complement of
for Liége. Hitzfeld’s corps had a less the Sixth Panzer Army was very heavy,
ambitious program: to attack on either albeit limited in mobility by the paucity
side of Monschau, get across the Mut- of self-propelled battalions. T h e four
zenich-Elsenborn road, then turn north armored divisions had about 500 tanks
and west to establish a hard flank on the and armored assault guns, including go
line Simmerath-Eupen-Limburg. All Tigers (Mark VI). Lacking were two
five of the Sixth Panzer Army infantry things which would markedly affect the
divisions ultimately would wind up, or operations of the Sixth Panzer Army
so the plan read, forming a shoulder on once battle was joined. There were few
an east-west line from Rötgen (north of trained engineer companies and these
Monschau) to Liége. Under this flank had little power equipment. T h e infan-
cover the armored divisions of the I SS try lacked their full complement of as-
Panzer Corps would roll west, followed sault guns, a weapon on which the
by the second armored wave, the II SS German rifle platoon had learned to lean
Panzer Corps (General der Waffen-SS in the assault; only the 3d Parachute was
Willi Bittrich) composed of the 2d and fully armed with this critical infantry
9th SS Panzer Divisions. weapon. 3
Dietrich’s staff had selected five roads
to carry the westward advance, the armor T h e 99th Division Sector
being assigned priority rights on the four
southernmost. Actually it was expected T h e southern portion of the V Corps
that the 1st SS and 12th SS Panzer Divi- front was occupied by the 99th Infantry
sions would use only one road each. Division (Maj. Gen. Walter E. Lauer) ,
(These two routes ran through the 99th
Infantry Division sector.) Although the 2 MS # A–924, Operations of Sixth Panzer Army,
1944–45 ( S S Generalmajor Fritz Kraemer).
planning principle as regards the ar- Kraemer was chief of staff of Sixth Panzer Army.
mored divisions was to hold the reins 3MSS # B–311 (Thoholte) and P–109a, Ardennes
Follow Up–3d SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment
loose and let them run as far and as fast (Oberstleutant Waffen-SS Guenther Wisliceny) ; see
as they could, the Sixth Panzer did have also ETHINT–21, Sixth Panzer Army in the Ar-
a timetable: one day for penetration and dennes Offensive (Generalmajor (Waffen-SS) Fritz
Kraemer) and ETHINT–61, Tank Maintenance,
breakout, one day to get the armor over Ardennes (General der Panzertruppen Horst
the Hohes Venn, the Meuse to be Stumpff).
78 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

which had arrived on the Continent in thick woods in the sector were tangled
November 1944 and been placed in this with rocky gorges, little streams, and
defensive sector to acquire experience? sharp hills. T h e division supply lines
T h e 99th Division front (left to right) began as fairly substantial all-weather
extended from Monschau and Hofen to roads, then dwindled, as they ap-
the railroad just north of Lanzerath, a proached the forward positions, to
distance of about nineteen miles. T o the muddy ruts following the firebreaks and
east lay the Germans in the West Wall logging trails. Except for the open area
pillbox line. T h e frontage assigned an in the neighborhood of Hofen, visibility
untried division at first thought seems was limited and fields of fire restricted.
excessive, but the V Corps commander Any clearing operation in the deep
wished to free as much of his striking woods would only give away the Ameri-
power as possible for use in the sched- can positions. Although terrain seemed
uled attack to seize the Roer dams; equally difficult for defense or offense,
furthermore the nature of the terrain this balance would exist only so long as
appeared little likely to attract a major the defender could retain control over
German attack. (Map II) his units in the woods and provide some
In the extreme northern portion of sort of cordon to check infiltration. T h e
the sector, around Hofen, the ground nature of the ground and the length of
was studded with open hills, to the east the front made such a cordon impossible;
of which lay a section of the Monschau the 99th could maintain no more than a
Forest. Only a short distance to the series of strongpoints, with unoccupied
south of Hofen the lines of the 99th and undefended gaps between.
entered this forest, continuing to run Three roads were of primary impor-
through a long timber belt until the tance in and east of the division area.
boundary between the V and VIII Corps In the north a main paved road led from
was reached at the Losheim Gap. T h e Hofen through the Monschau Forest,
then divided as it emerged on the east-
ern edge (this fork beyond the forest
4T h e records of the 99th Division, for the would have some tactical importance) . A
battle described in this chapter, are quite com-
plete and detailed. Basic documents are: 99th second road ran laterally behind the
Div AAR and C–3 Jnl; AAR’s and Unit Jnls of division center and right wing, leaving
the 393d. 394th. and 395th Inf Regis; 741st Tank the Hofen road at the tiny village of
Bn AAR; AAR’s of 639th and 413th AAA Bns;
254th Engr Combat Bn AAR and Jnl; 801st Wahlerscheid, continuing south through
Tank Destroyer Bn AAR; 371st FA Bn AAR; the twin hamlets of Rocherath and Krin-
and 799th Ord Co AAR. This operation was the kelt, then intersecting a main east-west
subject of studies by participants while in Classes
Nos. 1 and 2, Advanced Infantry Officers Course, road at Bullingen. This paved highway
Fort Benning, Ga. (see especially those by Majors entered the division zone from the east
Ben W. Legare, J. B. Kemp, and T. J. Gendron at Losheimergraben and ran west to
and Capt. Wesley J. Simmons). T h e then com-
mander of the 99th Division has written the official Malmedy by way of Bullingen and But-
division history; see Major General Walter E. genbach. As a result, despite the poverty
Lauer, Battle Babies: T h e Story of the 99th I n - of roads inside the forest belt where the
fantry Division in World War II (Baton Rouge:
Military Press of Louisiana, Inc., 1951) . American forward positions of the 99th Division
combat interviews are another useful source. lay, the division sector could be entered
T H E SIXTH PANZER ARMY 79

SNOWSCENENEARKRINKELT

from the east along roads tapping either on the northern fork of the Hofen road
flank. beyond the Monschau Forest.
From 8 December on the 99th Divi- T h e dispositions of the 99th Division
sion had been preparing for its first were these: On the north flank-the 3d
commitment in a large-scale operation, Battalion, 395th Infantry, occupied the
repairing roads; laying additional tele- Höfen area, with the 38th Cavalry
phone wire, and shifting its guns for the Squadron on the left and the 99th
V Corps attack toward the Roer dams. Reconnaissance Troop on the right. T h e
In addition a new supply road was con- ground here was open and rolling, the
structed from the Krinkelt area to the 3d Battalion well dug in and possessed
sector held by the 395th Infantry. T h e of good fields of fire. Next in line to the
2d Infantry Division was to pass through south, the 2d Division was making its
the 99th, then the latter would attack to attack on a thrust line running north-
cover the southern flank of the 2d Divi- eastward, its supply route following the
sion advance. As scheduled, the 2d Divi- section of the Hofen road which ran
sion passed through the 99th Division on through the forest to the fork. T h e re-
13 December, beginning its attack on a maining two battalions of the 395th re-
narrow front toward Dreiborn, located sumed the 99th Division front, succeeded
80 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

to the south, in turn, by the 393d Infan- 99th, but that this would be limited in
try and the 394th. Conforming to the nature and probably no more than regi-
wooded contour, the elements of the 99th mental in strength. T h e immediate and
Division south of the 2d Division attack- natural reaction, therefore, to the Ger-
ing column occupied a slight salient man attack launched against the 99th
bellying out from the flanks. Division on the morning of the fourth
Two battalions of the 99th Division day of the V Corps offensive (16 Decem-
(the 1st and 2d of the 395th) took part ber) was that this was no more than the
in the attack begun on 13 December, anticipated riposte.
although other elements of the division
put on demonstrations to create some T h e Initial Attack, 16 December
diversion to their immediate front. T h e
2d Battalion, 395th, on the right of the To the south of the 393d Infantry, the
2d Division jumped off in deep snow and 394th (Col. Don Riley) held a defensive
bitter cold in an attack intended to swing sector marking the right flank terminus
north, wedge through the West Wall for both the 99th Division and V Corps.
bunker line, and seize Harperscheid on The 6,500-yard front ran along the In-
the southern fork of the road beyond the ternational Highway from a point west
forest. The advance on the 13th went of Neuhof, in enemy hands, south to
well; then, as the attack hit the German Losheimergraben. Nearly the entire line
bunkers and enemy guns and mortars lay inside the forest belt. On the right a
ranged in, the pace began to slow. By two-mile gap existed between the regi-
16 December, however, several impor- ment and the forward locations of the
tant positions were in American hands 14th Cavalry Group. T o patrol this gap
and it seemed that a breakthrough was the regimental I and R Platoon held an
in the making despite bad weather, poor outpost on the high ground slightly
visibility, and difficult terrain. northwest of Lanzerath and overlooking
The German troops manning the the road from that village. Thence
West Wall positions in front of the 2d hourly jeep patrols worked across the gap
and 99th Divisions had been identified to meet patrols dispatched by the cavalry
prior to the 13 December attack as on the other side of the corps boundary.
coming from the 277th Volks Grenadier Acutely aware of the sensitive nature of
Division and the 294th Regiment of the this southern flank, General Lauer had
18th Volks Grenadier Division. An addi- stationed his division reserve (3d Bat-
tional unit was identified on the second talion of the 394th) near the Ruchholz
day of the offensive when prisoners were railroad station in echelon behind the
taken who carried the pay books of the right of the two battalions in the line.
326th Volks Grenadier Division. Al- The fateful position of the 394th
though this was the only indication of would bring against it the main effort of
any German reinforcement, American the I SS Panzer Corps and, indeed, that
commanders and intelligence officers of the Sixth Panzer Army. Two roads ran
anticipated that a counterattack shortly obliquely through the regimental area.
would be made against the shoulders of One, a main road, intersected the north-
the 2d Division corridor held by the south International Highway (and the
T H E SIXTH PANZER ARMY 81

forward line held by the 394th) at the I SS Panzer Corps center and south
Losheimergraben and continued north- wing were directly charged with open-
westward through Bullingen and But- ing the chief armored routes. T h e 12th
genbach to Malmédy. T h e other, a Volks Grenadier Division, regarded by
secondary road but generally passable in the Sixth Army staff as the best of the
winter, branched from the International infantry divisions, had as its axis of at-
Highway north of Lanzerath, and curved tack the Bullingen road (route C) ; its
west through Buchholz, Honsfeld, Schop- immediate objective was the crossroads
pen, and Faymonville, roughly parallel- point of departure for the westward
ing the main road to the north. highway at Losheimergraben and the
Of the five westward roads assigned opening beyond the thick Gerolstein
the I SS Panzer Corps the two above were Forest section of the woods belt. T h e ul-
most important. T h e main road to Bul- timate objective for the 12th Division
lingen and Malmedy would be called attack was the attainment of a line at
“C” on the German maps; the secondary Nidrum and Weywertz, eight airline
road would be named “D.” These two miles beyond the American front, at
roads had been selected as routes for the which point the division was to face
main armored columns, first for the north as part of the infantry cordon cov-
panzer elements of the I SS Panzer ering the Sixth Panzer Army flank. T h e
Corps, then to carry the tank groups of 3d Parachute Division, forming the left
the II SS Panzer Corps composing the wing in the initial disposition for the at-
second wave of the Sixth Panzer Army’s tack, had a zone of advance roughly fol-
attack. But since the commitment of ar- lowing the southern shoulder of the
mored spearheads during the battle to Honsfeld or D route. T h e area selected
break through the American main line for the breakthrough attempt comprised
of resistance had been ruled out, the the north half of the U.S. 14th Cavalry
initial German attempt to effect a pene- Group sector and took in most of the gap
tration would turn on the efforts of the between the cavalry and the 99th Divi-
three infantry divisions loaned the I sion. In the first hours of the advance,
SS Panzer Corps for this purpose only. then, the 3d Parachute Division would
The 277th Volks Grenadier Division, be striking against the 14th Cavalry
aligned opposite the American 393d In- Group in the Krewinkel-Berterath area.
fantry, had a mission which would turn But the final objective of the 3d Para-
its attack north of the axis selected for chute attack was ten miles to the north-
the armored advance. Nonetheless, suc- west, the line Schoppen-Eibertingen on
cess or failure by the 277th would deter- route D. T h e 3d Parachute axis thus
mine the extent to which the tank routes extended through the right of the 99th
might be menaced by American inter- Division.
vention from the north. T h e twin towns, The decision as to exactly when the
Rocherath-Krinkelt, for example, com- two panzer divisions would be com-
manded the road which cut across–and mitted in exploitation of the penetra-
thus could be used to block–the tions achieved by the infantry was a
Bullingen road, route C. matter to be decided by the commanders
The two infantry divisions composing of the Sixth Panzer Army and Army
82 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Group B as the attack developed. Ar- hour and five minutes the battalion
mored infantry kampfgruppen from the executive officer reported, “They sure
12th SS Panzer Division and 1st SS worked those horses to death.” But until
Panzer Division were assembled close be- the German infantry were actually
hind the infantry divisions, in part as sighted moving through the trees, the
reinforcements for the breakthrough American reaction to the searchlights
forces, in part because none of the Volks and exploding shells was that the enemy
Grenadier units were used to close co- simply was feinting in answer to the 2d
operation with armor. and 99th attack up north. In common
Considerable reshuffling had been with the rest of the 99th the line troops
needed in the nights prior to 16 Decem- of the 394th had profited by the earlier
ber to bring the I SS Panzer Corps quiet on this front to improve their posi-
toward its line of departure and to feed tions by log roofing; so casualties during
the infantry into the West Wall positions the early morning barrage were few.
formerly occupied by the 277th Division. The German infantry delayed in fol-
All this was completed by 0400 on the lowing up the artillery preparation,
morning set for the attack (except for which ended about 0700. On this part of
the reconnaissance battalion which failed the forest front the enemy line of de-
to arrive in the 3 d Parachute Division parture was inside the woods. T h e prob-
lines), and the bulk of the two artillery lem, then, was to get the attack rolling
corps and two Volks Werfer brigades through the undergrowth, American
furnishing the artillery reinforcement barbed wire, and mine fields immedi-
was in position. None of the three army ately to the German front. T h e groping
assault gun battalions, one for each at- nature of the attack was enhanced by
tacking division, had yet appeared. T h e the heavy mist hanging low in the forest.
German artillery, from the 75-mm. in- T h e 2d Battalion, on the north flank,
fantry accompanying howitzers up to the was more directly exposed since a road
210-mm. heavy battalions, were deployed led into the woods position from Neuhof.
in three groupments, by weight and At this point, close to the regimental
range, charged respectively with direct boundary, the battle was carried by a
support of the attacking infantry, coun- fusilier company attached to the 990th
terbattery, and long-distance fire for Regiment of the 277th Volks Grenadier
destruction. Division. T h e fusiliers succeeded in
The first thunderclap of the massed reaching the 2d Battalion lines about
German guns and Werfers at 0530 on 16 0800 but were driven off by small arms
December was heard by outposts of the fire and artillery.
394th Infantry as “outgoing mail,” fire In midafternoon the 12th SS Panzer
from friendly guns, but in a matter of Division, waiting for the infantry to
minutes the entire regimental area was open the road to the International High-
aware that something most unusual had way, apparently loaned a few tanks to
occurred. Intelligence reports had lo- carry the fusiliers into the attack.5 Be-
cated only two horse-drawn artillery
5The action. in this sector has been covered
pieces opposite one of the American line by General Priess in MS # A–877, Commitment
battalions; after a bombardment of an of the I SS Panzer Corps During the Ardennes
T H E SIXTH PANZER ARMY 83

hind a smoke screen the tanks rolled out branch railroad line which crossed the
of Neuhof. An American sergeant frontier just north of Losheim and then
spotted this move and with a sound- twined back and forth, over and under
powered telephone brought friendly ar- the Bullingen-Malmédy highway west-
tillery into play. High explosive stopped ward. During the autumn retreat the
the tanks in their tracks. A few infantry- Germans themselves had destroyed the
men got through to the forest positions bridge which carried the Bullingen road
occupied by the 2d Battalion. There an over the railroad tracks north of Los-
unknown BAR man atop a log hut heim. T o the west the highway overpass
“raised hell with the Krauts” and the at- on the Lanzerath-Losheimergraben sec.
tack petered out. T h e 2d Battalion, dur- tion of the International Highway had
ing this day, never was really pressed. T h e also been demolished. T h e crossroads
chief enemy thrusts had gone to the at Losheimergraben would have to be
north, where the right flank of the 393d taken if the German tanks were to have
Infantry was hit hard by the 277th Divi- quick and easy access to the Bullingen
sion, and to the south, against the center road, but the approach to Losheimer-
and refused right flank of the 394th. No graben, whether from Losheim or Lan-
word of events elsewhere on the 394th zerath, was denied to all but infantry
front reached the 2d Battalion command until such time as the railroad track
post, but the appearance of German in- could be captured and the highway over-
fantry in the woods along the northern passes restored.
regimental boundary gave a clue to the The line of track also indicated the
penetration developing there, and the axis for the advance of the left wing of
left company of the 2d Battalion was the 12th Volks Grenadier Division and,
pulled back somewhat as flank protec- across the lines, marked a general bound-
tion, ary between the 1st and 3d Battalions of
T h e initial enemy action along the the 394th Infantry. When the barrage
394th Infantry center and south flank lifted, about 0700, the assault regiments
was intended to punch holes through of the 12th Division already were mov-
which the panzer columns might de- ing toward the American positions. T h e
bouch onto the Bullingen and Honsfeld 48th Grenadier Regiment, in the north,
roads. The prominent terrain feature, headed through the woods for the
in the first hours of the fight, was a Losheimergraben crossroads. Fallen
trees, barbed wire, and mines,
Offensive, 16 December 1944–25 January 1945 compounded with an almost complete
(General der Waffen–SS Hermann Priess. Cf. MS ignorance of the forest trails, slowed
# P–109d, Ardennes Follow U p (Oberst der this advance. T h e attack on the left,
Schutzpolizei F. W. Bock), and MS # B–577, I
SS Panzer Corps, 15 October–16 December 1944 by the 27th Fuesilier Regiment, had
(Oberst der Waffen-SS Rudolf Lehman). These easier going, with much open country
are fragments extant of III/ SSPz Gr Regt 25, K T B
Nr. 2. For the story of the 277th Volks Grenadier and a series of draws leading directly
Division, see MS # B–273, 277th Volks Grenadier to the track and the American positions.
Division, November 1944–January 1945 (General- The 3d Battalion (Maj. Norman A.
major Wilhelm Viebig), and MS # B–465, 3d
Panzer Grenadier Division, 16–28 December 1944 Moore), to the south and west of the 1st
(Generalmajor Walter Denkert) . Battalion position at Losheimergraben,
84 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

LOSHEIMERGRABEN

first encountered the enemy. About 0745 A few Germans reached the roundhouse
L Company, at the Buchholz station, had near the station, but Sgt. Savino Trava-
taken advantage of the lull in the shell- lini, leader of the antitank platoon, went
ing and was just lining up for breakfast forward with a bazooka, fired in enough
when figures were seen approaching rounds to flush the fusiliers, then cut
through the fog, marching along the them down with his rifle as they broke
track in a column of two’s. First thought into the open. (Sergeant Travalini was
to be friendly troops, the Germans were awarded a battlefield commission as sec-
almost at the station before recognition ond lieutenant.) K Company, ordered up
brought on a fusilade of American bul- to reinforce the outnumbered defenders
lets. T h e enemy scattered for the box- at the station, arrived in time to take a
cars outside the station or sought shelter hand in the affray. By noon the Germans
in ditches along the right of way and a had been repelled, leaving behind about
close-quarters fire fight began. A 3-inch seventy-five dead; L Company had suf-
tank destroyer systematically worked fered twenty-five or thirty casualties.
over the cars, while the American mor- As a result of the stubborn stand at
tar crews raked the area beside the track. the station, some of the assault platoons
T H E SIXTH PANZER ARMY 85

of the 27th Fuesilier Regiment circled cavalry and with its own regiment. Radio
back to the northeast and onto the left communication with the isolated platoon
of the 1st Battalion (Lt. Col. Robert H. continued for some time, and at 1140
Douglas). Here one of the battalion word was relayed to the 99th Division
antitank guns stopped the lead German command post that the cavalry was pull-
tank and the supporting fusiliers were ing out of Lanzerath–confirmation, if
driven back by 81-mm. mortar fire thick- such were needed, of the German break-
ened by an artillery barrage. T h e major through on the right of the 99th.
threat in the Losheimergraben sector Belatedly, the 106th Infantry Division
came shortly after noon when the 48th reported at 1315 that it could no longer
Grenadier Regiment finally completed maintain contact at the interdivision
its tortuous approach through the woods, boundary. Less than an hour later the
mines, and wire, and struck between B radio connection with the I and R Pla-
and C Companies. B Company lost some toon failed. By this time observers had
sixty men and was forced back about 400 seen strong German forces pouring west
yards; then, with the help of the attached through the Lanzerath area. (These
heavy machine gun platoon, it stiffened were from the 3d Parachute Division.)
and held. During the fight Sgt. Eddie General Lauer’s plans for using the 3d
Dolenc moved his machine gun forward Battalion, 394th Infantry, as a counter-
to a shell hole which gave a better field of attack force were no longer feasible. T h e
fire. When last seen Sergeant Dolenc still 3d Battalion, itself under attack, could
was firing, a heap of gray-coated bodies not be committed elsewhere as a unit and
lying in front of the shell hole. 6 T h e C reverted to its parent regiment. Not long
Company outposts were driven in, but after the final report from the I and R
two platoons held their original positions Platoon, the 3d Battalion was faced to
throughout the day. Company A beat off the southwest in positions along the
the German infantry assault when this railroad.
struck its forward platoon; then the A check made after dark showed a dis-
battalion mortar platoon, raising its couraging situation in the 394th sector.
tubes to an 89-degree angle, rained shells It was true that the 2d Battalion, in the
on the assault group, leaving some eighty north, had not been much affected by
grenadiers dead or wounded. the day's events-but German troops
T h e early morning attack against the were moving deeper on the left and right
right flank of the 394th had given alarm- of the battalion. In the Losheimergraben
ing indication that the very tenuous con- area the 1st Battalion had re-formed in
nection with the 14th Cavalry Group a thin and precarious line; the crossroads
had been severed and that the southern still were denied the enemy. But B
flank of the 99th Division was exposed Company had only twenty men available
to some depth. T h e only connecting link, for combat, while the enemy settled
the 30-man I and R Platoon of the 394th, down in the deserted American foxholes
northwest of Lanzerath, had lost physical only a matter of yards away. Four pla-
contact early in the day both with the toons had been taken from the 3d Battal-
6 Sergeant Dolenc was listed as MIA; he was ion to reinforce the 1st, leaving the
awarded the DSC. former with no more than a hundred
86 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

men along the railroad line. Farther to if necessary, from the Wahlerscheid
the west, however, about 125 men of the sector.
3d Battalion who had been on leave at As early as 1100 word of the German
the rest center in Honsfeld formed a attacks on the V Corps front had pro-
provisional unit extending somewhat the duced results at the command post of the
precarious 394th flank position. northern neighbor, the VII Corps. T h e
Some help was on the way. General 26th Infantry of the uncommitted 1st
Lauer had asked the 2d Division for a Infantry Division, then placed on a 6-
rifle battalion to man a position which hour alert, finally entrucked at midnight
the 99th had prepared before the attack and started the move south to Camp
as a division backstop between Mür- Elsenborn. T h e transfer of this regi-
ringen and Hünningen. At 1600 Colonel mental combat team to the V Corps
Riley was told that the 394th would be would have a most important effect on
reinforced by the 1st Battalion, 23d In- the ensuing American defense.
fantry, of the 2d Division. During the
night this fresh rifle battalion, and a T h e First Attacks in the Monschau-
company each of tanks and tank destroy- Höfen Sector Are Repulsed
ers, under the command of Lt. Col. 16 December
John M. Hightower, moved from Elsen-
born to take up positions south and T h e village of Höfen, the anchor point
southeast of Hünningen. Before sunrise, for the northern flank of the 99th Divi-
17 December, these reinforcements were sion, had considerable importance in
in place. the attack plans of the German Sixth
During the night of 16–17 December Panzer Army. Located on high ground,
the entire infantry reserve in the 99th Höfen overlooked the road center at
Division zone had been committed in the Monschau, just to the north, and thus
line or close behind it, this backup con- barred entry to the road to Eupen–at
sisting of the local reserves of the 99th the moment the headquarters of the V
and the entire 23d Infantry, which had Corps.
been left at Elsenborn while its sister For some reason Field Marshal Model
regiments took part in the 2d Division wished to save the German town of
attack to break out in the Wahlerscheid Monschau from destruction and had for-
sector. T h e 3d Battalion of the 23d had bidden the use of artillery there. 7 T h e
set up a defensive position on a ridge plan handed General Hitzfeld for the
northeast of Rocherath, prepared to sup- employment of his LXVII Corps (Corps
port the 393d Infantry. The 2d Battalion Monschau) called for an attack to the
had assembled in the late afternoon of north and south of Monschau that was
the 16th approximately a mile and a intended to put two divisions astride the
quarter north of Rocherath. T h e 1st Monschau-Eupen road in position to
Battalion would be at Hünningen. check any American reinforcements at-
Troops of the 2d Division had continued tempting a move to the south. The right
the attack on 16 December, but during division of the Corps Monschau, the
the afternoon Maj. Gen. Walter M. 7Among his staff it was rumored that Model
Robertson made plans for a withdrawal, wished to save the historic latticed houses here.
T H E SIXTH PANZER ARMY 87

326th Volks Grenadier Division, had a few indifferent fortress troops on the
been ordered to put all three regiments south flank of the 326th Division. T h e
in the initial attack: one to swing north total assault strength in the Höfen-
of Monschau and seize the village of Monschau area, as a result, was between
Mützenich on the Eupen road; one to three and four battalions. Nonetheless,
crack the American line south of Mon- Hitzfeld and the 326th commander,
schau, then drive northwest to the high Generalmajor Erwin Kaschner, could
ground on the road just beyond count on a heavy weight of artillery fire
Mützenich; the third to join the 246th to give momentum to the attack. Two
Volks Grenadier Division drive through artillery corps (possibly totaling ten bat-
Höfen and Kalterherberg, the latter talions) were in position to give fire
astride the main road from Monschau either north or south of the no-fire zone
south to Butgenbach. If all went accord- at Monschau, plus one or two Volks
ing to plan, the 326th and 246th would Werfer brigades–a considerable group-
continue northwestward along the ment for the support of a division attack
Eupen road until they reached the at this stage of the war.
Vesdre River at the outskirts of Eupen.8 T h e American strength in the Höfen-
T h e force available to Hitzfeld on the Monschau sector consisted of one rifle
morning of 16 December for use in the battalion and a reconnaissance squadron:
Monschau–Höfen sector was consider- the 3d Battalion, 395th Infantry, under
ably weaker than the 2-division attack Lt. Col. McClernand Butler, in Höfen-
planned by the Sixth Panzer Army. In and the 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance
the two nights before the attack the Squadron (Lt. Col. Robert E. O’Brien)
326th Volks Grenadier Division had outposting Monschau and deployed to
moved into the West Wall fortifications the north along the railroad track be-
facing Monschau and Höfen. T h e tween Mützenich and Konzen station.
American attack against the 277th Volks T h e infantry at Höfen lay in a foxhole
Grenadier Division at Kesternich, how- line along a thousand-yard front on the
ever, siphoned off one battalion to rein- eastern side of the village, backed up by
force the latter division; in addition one dug-out support positions on which the
battalion failed to arrive in line by the battalion had labored for some six weeks.
morning of 16 December. Worse, the Two nights prior to the German offen-
246th Volks Grenadier Division, sup- sive, Company A of the 612th Tank De-
posed to come south from the Jülich sec- stroyer Battalion towed its 3-inch guns
tor, had been held there by American into the Höfen sector for the purpose of
attacks. Hitzfeld was thus left with only getting good firing positions against the
village of Rohren, northeast of Höfen,
8 The account of the operations conducted by which lay in the path of the 2d Infantry
this corps is none too precise: MS # B–092, 326th Division attack. T h e appearance of the
Volks Grenadier Division, 16 December 1944–25
January 1945 (Generalmajor Erwin Kaschner),
guns, sited well forward and swathed in
and MS # A–937, T h e Ardennes Offensive, De- sheets for protective coloration in the
cember 1944 (General der Infanterie Otto Hitz- falling snow, gave a lift to the infantry,
feld). T h e AAR’s prepared by the 395th Infantry
and the 38th and 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance
who as yet had to fight their first battle.
Squadrons are quite complete. T o the west the 105-mm. howitzers of
88 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

CONSTRING A WINTERIZED
SQUADHUT NEARTHE FRONTLINES

the 196th Field Artillery Battalion were west of the railroad track. In addition to
emplaced to give the battalion direct the assault gun troop in Mützenick, the
support. squadron was reinforced by a platoon of
The 38th Cavalry Squadron was self-propelled tank destroyers from the
aligned from Monschau north to Konzen 893d Tank Destroyer Battalion, which
station, holding a continuous position was stationed behind the left flank to
with fifty dismounted machine guns dug cover a secondary road which entered
in behind mines, barbed wire, and trip the American position, and the 62d Ar-
flares covering the approaches from the mored Field Artillery Battalion. On the
east. T h e right flank of the squadron, whole the defense in the Monschau-
outposting Monschau, was at some dis- Höfen area was well set when the battal-
advantage because of the deep, rocky ions of the 326th Volks Grenadier Divi-
draws leading into and past the town. sion moved forward to their attack
But to the north the terrain was less cut positions on the morning of 16 Decem-
up and offered good fields of fire for the ber.
American weapons posted on the slopes T h e German guns and Werfers
THE SIXTH PANZER ARMY 89

opened a very heavy barrage at 0525, “counted” in front of Höfen vary from
rolling over the forward lines, then back seventy-five to two hundred. T h e casual-
to the west along the Eupen road, shell- ties suffered by the 3d Battalion in this
ing the American artillery positions and first action were extraordinarily light:
cutting telephone wires. Neither the in- four killed, seven wounded, and four
fantry nor cavalry (gone well to ground) missing.
suffered much from this fire, heavy At Monschau the 1st Battalion of the
though it was; but many buildings were 752d Regiment carried the attack, ap-
set afire in Höfen and some were beaten parently aimed at cutting between the
to the ground. Monschau, as directed by Monschau and Höfen defenses. As the
Model, escaped this artillery pounding. German shellfire lessened, about 0600,
In twenty minutes or so the German fire the cavalry outposts heard troops moving
died away and off to the east the glow of along the Rohren road which entered
searchlights rose as artificial moonlight. Monschau from the southeast. The
About 0600 the German grenadiers came grenadiers were allowed to approach the
walking out of the haze in front of the 3d barbed wire at the roadblock, then illu-
Battalion. The wire to the American minating mortar shell was fired over the
guns was out and during the initial on- Germans and the cavalry opened up with
slaught even radio failed to reach the every weapon at hand–the light tanks
gunners. The riflemen and tank destroy- doing heavy damage with 37-mm. canis-
er gunners, however, had the German ter. Beaten back in this first assault, the
infantry in their sights, without cover German battalion tried again at day-
and at a murderously easy range. light, this time attempting to filter into
T h e result was fantastic. Yet the town along a draw a little farther to the
grenadiers who lived long enough came north. This move was checked quickly.
right up to the firing line–in three No further attack was essayed at Mon-
verified instances the bodies of Germans schau and a half-hearted attempt at
shot at close range toppled into the fox- Höfen, toward noon, was handily re-
holes from which the bullets came. A pelled. As it was, the 326th Volks
few got through and into the village. Grenadier Division lost one-fifth of the
Assault companies of the 1st Battalion, troops put into these attacks.
751st Regiment, and the 1st Battalion, To the south of Höfen and Monschau
753d Regiment, had made this attack. in the 2d Division and 395th Infantry
But the support companies of the two zones, 16 December passed with the
battalions were blocked out by an in- initiative still in American hands. The
tense concentration of well-aimed 81- German attacks delivered north and
mm. mortar fire from the American south of the corridor through which the
heavy weapons company, this curtain Americans were pushing had no immedi-
strengthened within an hour by the sup- ate repercussion, not even in the 395th
porting howitzer battalion. By 0745 the Infantry sector. T h e Sixth Panzer Army
attack was finished, and in another hour drive to make a penetration between
some thirty or forty Germans who had Hollerath and Krewinkel with the 1st
reached the nearest houses were rounded SS Panzer Corps, therefore, had no con-
up. Reports of the German dead tact with the Monschau Corps in the
90 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

north, nor was such contact intended in T h e 12th SS Panzer Division could not
the early stages of the move west. The yet reach the Bullingen road. The 1st
German command would pay scant at- SS Panzer Division stood ready and wait-
tention to the small American salient ing to exploit the opening made by the
projecting between the LXVII Corps 3d Parachute Division by an advance via
and the 1st SS Panzer Corps, counting on Lanzerath onto the Honsfeld road. Dur-
the hard-pressed 272d Volks Grenadier ing the early evening the advance kampf-
Division to hold in the Wahlerscheid- gruppe of the 1st SS Panzer Division, a
Simmerath sector so long as needed. task force built around the 1st SS Panz-
er Regiment (Obersturmbannfuehrer
T h e German Effort Continues Joachim Peiper) , rolled northwest to
17–18 December Lanzerath. At midnight–an exception-
ally dark night–German tanks and in-
Although hard hit and in serious fantry struck suddenly at Buchholz. T h e
trouble at the end of the first day, par- two platoons of Company K, left there
ticularly on the right flank as General when the 3d Battalion stripped its lines
Lauer saw it, the inexperienced 99th to reinforce the Losheimergraben de-
Division had acquitted itself in a manner fenders, were engulfed. One man, the
calculated to win the reluctant admira- company radio operator, escaped. Hid-
tion of the enemy. German losses had den in the cellar of the old battalion
been high. Where the American lines command post near the railroad station,
had been penetrated, in the 393d and he reported the German search on the
394th sectors, the defenders simply had Boor above, then the presence of tanks
been overwhelmed by superior numbers outside the building with swastikas
of the enemy who had been able to work painted on their sides. His almost hourly
close in through the dense woods. Most reports, relayed through the 1st Battal-
important of all, the stanch defense of ion, kept the division headquarters in-
Losheimergraben had denied the wait- formed of the German movements.
ing tank columns of the I SS Panzer About 0500 on 17 December the main
Corps direct and easy entrance to the German column began its march
main Bullingen-Malmédy road. through Buchholz. Still at his post, the
The initial German failure to wedge radio operator counted thirty tanks,
an opening for armor through the 99th, twenty-eight half-tracks filled with Ger-
for failure it must be reckoned, was very man infantry, and long columns of foot
nearly balanced by the clear break- troops marching by the roadside. All of
through achieved in the 14th Cavalry the armored task force of the 1st SS
Group sector. T h e 3d Parachute Divi- Panzer Division and a considerable part
sion, carrying the left wing of the I SS of the 3 d Parachute Division were mov-
Panzer Corps forward, had followed the ing toward Honsfeld.
retreating cavalry through Manderfeld, Honsfeld, well in the rear area of the
swung north, and by dusk had troops in 99th, was occupied by a variety of troops.
Lanzerath—only two kilometers from The provisional unit raised at the divi-
the 3d Battalion, 394th, position at Buch- sion rest camp seems to have been de-
holz. ployed around the town. Two platoons
T H E SIXTH PANZER ARMY 91

of the 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion Engineer Battalion had been attached to
had been sent in by General Lauer to the 99th Division and ordered to Bül-
hold the road, and during the night a lingen, there to prepare positions cover-
few towed guns from the 612th Tank ing the entrances from the south and
Destroyer Battalion were added to the southeast. Twice during the dark hours
defenses. Honsfeld was in the V Corps the engineers beat back German infan-
antiaircraft defense belt and two battal- try attacks; then, a little after 0700,
ions of 90-mm. antiaircraft guns had enemy tanks hove into sight. Falling back
been sited thereabout. I n addition, to the shelter of the buildings, the 254th
Troop A, 32d Cavalry Reconnaissance did what it could to fend off the tanks.
Squadron, had arrived in Honsfeld late in Here, in the town, a reconnaissance pla-
the evening. toon of the 644th Tank Destroyer
T h e stream of American traffic mov- Battalion had just arrived with orders
ing into the village during the night to establish contact with the enemy
probably explains the ease with which column, but only one section managed
the Honsfeld garrison was routed. T h e to evade the panzers. T h e rest of the
leading German tanks simply joined platoon were killed or captured. Upon
this traffic, and, calmly led by a man receipt of orders from the division, the
signaling with a flashlight, rolled down engineers, who had clung stubbornly to
the village streets. With German troops houses in the west edge, withdrew and
pouring in from all sides the Americans dug in on higher ground 1,000 yards to
offered no concrete resistance. Though the northwest so as to block the road to
some made a fight of it, most engaged in Butgenbach. There the two companies
a wild scramble to get out of town. Some of the 254th still intact were joined by
of the tank destroyers were overrun by men hastily assembled from the 99th Di-
infantry attack through the dark. Guns vision headquarters, the antiaircraft
and vehicles, jammed on the exit roads, artillery units in the vicinity, and four
were abandoned; but many of the guns from the 612th Tank Destroyer
Americans, minus their equipment, Battalion.
escaped. T o the surprise of the Americans
T h e predawn seizure of Honsfeld gathered along this last thin line the
opened D route to the spearhead column Germans did not pursue the attack. By
of the 1st SS Panzer Division. Reconnais- 1030 a long line of tanks and vehicles
sance, however, showed that the next were seen streaming through Büllingen,
section of this route, between Honsfeld but they were moving toward the south-
and Schoppen, was in very poor condi- west! Later, the 99th Division com-
tion. Since the 12th SS Panzer Division mander would comment that “the enemy
had not yet reached C route, the had the key to success within his hands,
main Büllingen-Malmédy road, Peiper’s but did not know it.” And so it must
kampfgruppe now turned north in the have seemed to the Americans on 17 De-
direction of Büllingen with the intention cember when a sharp northward thrust
of continuing the westward drive on from Büllingen would have met little
pavement. opposition and probably would have
At 0100 on 17 December the 254th entrapped both the 99th and 2d Divi-
92 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

sions. In fact, Peiper’s column had simply daylight on 17 December the Americans
made a detour north through Büllingen held a fairly continuous but thinly
and, having avoided a bad stretch of manned front with the 1st Battalion
road, now circled back to its prescribed around Losheimergraben, part of the 3d
route. Battalion west of the village, and the 1st
American ground observers, on the Battalion of the 23d Infantry holding the
17th, attributed the change in direction exposed right-flank position in Hünnin-
to intervention by friendly fighter- gen.
bombers, whose attack, so it appeared, T h e 12th Volks Grenadier Division,
“diverted” the German column to the under pressure from higher head-
southwest. Two squadrons of the 366th quarters to take Losheimergraben, con-
Fighter Group, called into the area to aid tinued the attack with both its forward
the 99th Division, made two attacks dur- regiments, now considerably weakened.
ing the morning. T h e 389th Squadron While the 27th Fuesilier Regiment
struck one section of the German col- moved to flank Losheimergraben on the
umn, which promptly scattered into west, the 48th Grenadier Regiment
nearby woods, and claimed a kill of continued its costly frontal attack. T h e
thirty tanks and motor vehicles. It is flanking attack was successful: at least
doubtful that the Germans were crip- a battalion of the 27th drove through
pled to any such extent-certainly the a gap between the 1st and 3d Bat-
move west was little delayed-but the talions. By 1100 the German infantry
American troops must have been greatly were able to bring the Losheim-Büllin-
heartened. T h e 390th Squadron, direct- gen road under small arms fire and the
ed onto the column now estimated to be noose was tightening on the Losheimer-
two hundred vehicles or more, was in- graben defenders. The frontal attack,
tercepted by a squadron of ME-log’s at the latter point, was resumed before
which dropped out of the clouds over dawn by enemy patrols trying to find a
Büllingen. The Americans accounted way around the American firing line
for seven German aircraft, but had to in the woods.
jettison most of their bombs. In a foxhole line 200 yards southeast
of Losheimergraben, 1st Lt. Dewey
Losheimergraben Is Lost Plankers had organized about fifty men.
This small force-men from Companies
T h e lack of highway bridges over the B and C, jeep drivers, and the crew of a
railroad south of Losheimergraben had defunct antiaircraft gun-beat back all
turned the first day’s battle for the of the German patrols. But the game was
Losheimergraben crossroads into an in- nearly up. T h e enemy Pioneers finally
fantry fight in the surrounding woods. threw a bridge over the railroad at the
Both sides had sustained heavy losses. demolished overpass on the Losheim
T h e 48th Grenadier Regiment had road, and about 1100 three panzers, sup-
pushed the 1st Battalion of the 394th ported by a rifle company, appeared in
back, but had failed to break through the woods in front of Plankers’ position.
to the tiny collection of customs build- Lacking ammunition and weapons
ings and houses at the crossroads. By (twenty of the tiny force were armed
T H E SIXTH PANZER ARMY 93

only with pistols), Plankers ordered his Battalion in serious plight when, at 1400,
men back to the customs buildings at the the order came to withdraw west and tie
crossroads and radioed for help. Car- in with the 3d Battalion. Leaving a small
bines, rifles, and ammunition, loaded on covering force behind, the 2d Battalion
the only available jeep (the chaplain’s), started on foot through the woods,
were delivered under fire to the Ameri- carrying its heavy weapons over the
can “blockhouses.” T h e German tankers, rugged and snow-covered trails. T h e
unwilling to chance bazooka fire at close Germans also were moving through the
range, held aloof from the hamlet and forest, and the battalion was unable to
waited for the German gunners and turn toward the 3d as ordered. With-
some ME-log’s to finish the job. T h e drawing deeper into the forest the bat-
garrison held on in the basements until talion bivouacked in the sector known
the tanks finally moved in at dusk. Lieu- as the Honsfelder Wald. T h e covering
tenant Plankers had been informed in force, however, made its way to Mür-
the course of the afternoon that neigh- ringen, where it was set to defend the
boring troops were under orders to with- regimental command post.
draw. He took the men he had left, now T h e 1st Battalion, in the Losheimer-
only about twenty, and broke through graben sector, had been so splintered by
the Germans, rejoining what was left incessant German attack that its with-
of the 394th Infantry at Mürringen late drawal was a piecemeal affair. Isolated
in the evening. groups fought or dodged their way west.
Even before the German penetration Two hundred and sixty officers and men
at the Losheimergraben angle, the 394th made it. 9 Two platoons from Company K
stood in danger of being cut off and which had been attached to the 1st Bat-
destroyed piecemeal by the enemy infil- talion did not receive word of the with-
trating from the east and south. As part drawal and held on under heavy shelling
of a withdrawal plan put in effect during until ammunition was nearly spent. It
the afternoon for the entire division, took these men twenty-four hours to
General Lauer ordered the 394th to wade back through the snow to the regi-
withdraw to a second defensive position mental lines. What was left of the 3d
at Mürringen, about four kilometers in Battalion also fell back toward Mürrin-
the rear of the regiment’s eastern front. gen, harassed by groups of the enemy en
T h e 2d Battalion, holding the north route and uncertain as to what would be
flank, was under pressure from both found at Murringen.
right and left. At dawn of 17 December, T h e survivors of the 394th Infantry
the enemy had attacked along the now assembling at Mürringen were
Neuhof road with tanks in the van. given a brief breathing spell while the
Company E, directly in the path, used its enemy concentrated on the 1st Battalion,
bazookas with such good effect that three 23d Infantry, defending the Hünningen
panzers were crippled. Excellent artil- positions 1,500 meters to the south. T h e
lery support and fine shooting by the 12th Volks Grenadier Division attack
battalion mortars helped discourage any finally had broken through the American
further frontal assault. Infiltration on 9 The 1st Battalion of the 394th was accorded
the flanks, however, had placed the 2d a Presidential Citation for its role in this battle.
94 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

line but now was definitely behind sched- bombers then working over the road. In
ule. T h e 48th Regiment, having been any case they were shooting-gallery
much reduced in strength in the fight targets. One of the towed 3-inch guns
around Losheimergraben, re-formed on which the 801st Tank Destroyer Battal-
the high ground between the forest edge ion had withdrawn during the early
and Murringen. T h e north flank of the morning debacle at Honsfeld knocked
regiment lay exposed to counterattack, out four of the panzers in six shots. T h e
for the 277th Volks Grenadier Division rest withdrew in haste.
on the right had been checked in its at- At 1600 the enemy made his first defi-
tempt to take the twin villages, Krinkelt- nite assault, preceded by six minutes of
Rocherath. T h e fight now devolved on furious shelling. When the artillery
the 27th Regiment, which was ordered ceased, German infantry were seen
to take Hunningen before an attempt to coming forward through a neck of woods
roll up the American south flank. pointing toward the southeastern edge
Colonel Hightower’s 1st Battalion was of Hunningen. A forward observer with
in a difficult and exposed position at Company B, facing the woods, climbed
Hunningen. His main strength, de- into the church steeple and brought
ployed to counter German pressure from down shellfire which kept pace with the
the Buchholz-Honsfeld area, faced south attackers until they were within a hun-
and southeast, but the German columns dred yards of the American foxholes. A
taking the Honsfeld-Büllingen detour number of the enemy did break through,
were moving toward the northwest and but the assault evaporated when nearly
thus behind the Hunningen defenders. fifty were killed by four men manning
Whether any part of this latter enemy automatic weapons from a platoon com-
force would turn against the rear of the mand post just in the rear of the firing
1st Battalion was the question. line. T h e commander of the 27th
Through the morning the 1st Battal- Regiment sent forward seven “distinct
ion watched through breaks in the fog as attacking waves” in the course of the
tanks and vehicles rolled toward Büllin- afternoon and early evening. In one as-
gen. Visibility, poor as it was, made ar- sault the Germans captured two heavy
tillery adjustment on the road difficult machine guns and turned them on Com-
and ineffective. Shortly after noon about pany A, but a light machine gun section
120 men who had been cut off from the wiped out the German crews. At no
2d and 254th Engineer Battalions time, despite numerous penetrations in
arrived at Hightower’s command post the 1st Battalion line, was the enemy
and were dispatched to form a roadblock able to get Hunningen into his hands.10
against a possible attack from Büllingen. Late in the afternoon an indistinct
Somewhat earlier twelve Mark IV radio message was picked up by the 1st
tanks had appeared south of Hunningen Battalion, 23d Infantry. It appeared that
-perhaps by design, perhaps by acci- the battalion now was attached to the
dent. Assembled at the woods edge some 9th Infantry (2d Division) , to the north,
800 yards from the American foxhole and that orders were to pull out of Hün-
line, the panzers may have been seeking 10Colonel Hightower was awarded the DSC for
haven from the American fighter- his conduct of t h e defense.
T H E SIXTH PANZER ARMY 95

ningen. Up to this point, the 394th T h e German Attack Toward Rocherath


Infantry was still in Mürringen, gather- and Krinkelt, 16–17 December
ing its companies and platoons as they
straggled in. Furthermore the 1st Bat- T h e 393d Infantry (Lt. Col. Jean D.
talion was in a fire fight with an enemy Scott) had taken no part in the V Corps
only a few score yards distant in the offensive of 13 December except to put
darkness. Colonel Hightower, therefore, on a “demonstration” in front of the
tried by radio to apprise the 9th Infantry West Wall positions. T h e regiment,
of his predicament and the importance of minus its 2d Battalion (attached to the
holding until the 394th could reorganize. 395th Infantry), was deployed along the
At 2330 Colonel Hirschfelder, the 9th German frontier, a line generally
Infantry commander, reached High- defined by the eastern edge of the long
tower by radio, told him that forest belt in which the bulk of the 99th
Hightower’s battalion and the 394th Division was stationed and the Inter-
Infantry were almost surrounded and national Highway. T h e width of the
that, if the battalion expected to with- front, held by the 3d Battalion on the
draw, it must move at once. Colonel left and the 1st Battalion on the right,
Hightower again explained his situation, was about 5,500 yards. Outposts on the
said that in his opinion he could not pull regimental left lay only a few score yards
out unless and until the 394th withdrew, from the West Wall bunkers, but the
but that he would discuss the situation right was more than half a mile from
with the commander of the 394th. the German lines. About four miles by
Hirschfelder agreed and told Hightower trail behind the 393d, the twin villages
to use his own judgment. of Rocherath and Krinkelt lay astride
At Mürringen Colonel Riley’s 394th the main north-south road through the
had not been hard pressed although the division area. In front of the 393d, across
German artillery had shown no favori- the frontier, were entrances to the two
tism and hammered Mürringen and forest roads which ran through the
Hünningen equally. T h e groups filter- regimental sector, one in the north at
ing back to Mürringen, however, gener- Hollerath, the second in the south at
ally had very little ammunition left, Udenbreth. Both villages were in enemy
even though many detachments came hands. At the western edge of the
back with all their heavy weapons. If the woods the roads converged, funneling
394th was to make a stand at Mürringen along a single track into Rocherath-
it would have to be resupplied. At first Krinkelt. The twin villages, therefore,
Colonel Riley hoped to get ammunition had a tactical importance of the first or-
by air, for it appeared that the German der. Through them passed the main line
drive in the Krinkelt area to the north of communications in the 2d Division
shortly would cut the last remaining corridor, and from them ran the supply
supply road. This was a vain hope for route to the 393d Infantry and the 395th.
aerial supply missions in December were In the West Wall bunkers facing the
far too chancy. The alternative solution 393d lay the 277th Volks Grenadier Di-
was for the 394th to withdraw north to vision (Col. Hans Viebig). Recon-
Krinkelt, using the one route still open. structed in Hungary from the remnants
96 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

of an infantry division of the same num- success in the attack could only be won
ber which had escaped from the Falaise by very strong artillery support. But his
pocket, the 277th arrived in the west orders stood. On the night of 15–16
during early November. In the days be- December the 989th Regiment as-
fore the counteroffensive the division sembled near Hollerath, its objective
screened the entire front behind which Rocherath. T o the south the 990th
the I SS Panzer Corps was assembling, occupied the West Wall pillboxes near
but on the evening of 15 December, Udenbreth, poised for an attack to seize
while two new infantry divisions moved Krinkelt.
into the line, the 277th assembled on the T h e artillery, Werfer, and mortar fire
north flank of the corps zone between crashing into the American positions on
Hollerath and Udenbreth. One rein- the morning of 16 December gave
forced battalion, on the far southern the attacking German infantry the start
flank of the original sector, was unable the 277th commander had requested.
to reach the division line of departure The concentration thoroughly wrecked
in time to join the attack. the American telephone lines which had
The I SS Panzer Corps commander been carefully strung from battalion to
had decided to put the weight of his company command posts; in some cases
armored thrust to the south and thus radio communication failed at the same
avoid entanglement with the American time. This preparatory bombardment
force which, it was thought, could be continued until 0700.
gathered quickly on the Elsenborn ridge The north wing of the 393d, held by
in the northern sector of the zone of ad- the 3d Battalion (Lt. Col. Jack G. Allen),
vance. But the Elsenborn area had to be lay in the woods close to the German
neutralized, if for no other reason than pillboxes from which the assault wave
to erase the American artillery group- of the 989th, guided by searchlights
ment located there. T h e 277th Volks beamed on the American positions,
Grenadier Division had the task of moved in on the Americans before they
making the penetration on the right had recovered from the shelling. In the
wing of the corps and driving obliquely first rush all of Company K, save one
northwest to take the Elsenborn ridge. platoon, were killed or captured. By
As finally prescribed by the corps com- 0855, when telephone lines were re-
mander, the phases of the attack planned stored and the first word of the 3d Bat-
for the 277th were these: to break talion’s plight reached the regimental
through the American line and open the command post, the enemy had advanced
forest roads to Rocherath and Krinkelt; nearly three-quarters of a mile beyond
capture these twin villages; seize the the American lines along the forest road
Elsenborn area and block any American from Hollerath. Colonel Allen stripped
advance from Verviers. The division the reserve platoons from the balance of
commander had received this mission the 3d Battalion line in a futile attempt
with qualms, pointing out that the to block the onrush, but by 0930 the
wooded and broken terrain favored the Germans had reached the battalion
Americans and that without sufficient command post, around which Allen
rifle strength for a quick breakthrough, ordered Companies I and L to gather.
T H E SIXTH PANZER ARMY 97

At this point the 81-mm. mortar crews officers and noncoms herding the assault
laid down such a successful defensive waves forward. By 0830 the Germans
barrage (firing over 1,200 rounds in the had nearly surrounded Company C, on
course of the fight) that the attackers the 1st Battalion right. An hour later,
swerved from this area of danger and the 991st Regiment, attacking southwest
continued to the west. By nightfall the from Ramscheid, knocked out the light
forward companies of the 989th were at machine guns and mortars in the Com-
the Jansbach creek, halfway through the pany B sector (on the left) with bazooka
forest, but had been slowed down by fire and captured or killed all but one
troops switched from the left wing of the platoon. Company A (Capt. Joseph
3d Battalion and had lost many prisoners Jameson) , which had been in reserve,
to the Americans. T h e 3d Battalion counterattacked in support of what was
radio had functioned badly during the left of Company B and by noon had dug
fight and contact with the 370th Field in on a line only 300 yards behind the
Artillery Battalion, supporting the 3d, original line. Here Company A held
was not established till the close of day. for the rest of the day against repeated
Despite the penetration between the 3d enemy attacks and constant artillery
and 1st Battalions and the large number fire with what the regimental after
of enemy now to the rear and across the action report characterized as “heroic
battalion supply road, Colonel Allen re- action on the part of all men.” In this
ported that the 3d could hold on during fight friendly artillery played an impor-
the night. His supply road had been cut tant role. T h e surviving Company B
in midafternoon, but Company I of the platoon had retained an observation
394th had fought its way in with a supply post overlooking the treeless draw along
of ammunition. which reinforcements moved from Uden-
On the south the 1st Battalion (Maj. breth and despite the German fire a
Matthew L. Legler) likewise had been telephone wire was run forward to this
outnumbered and hard hit. Here the command post. T h e American gunners
990th Regiment had assembled in Uden- quickly made this avenue suicidal;
breth during the dark hours and, when through the afternoon cries from the
the barrage fire lifted at 0700, began wounded Germans lying in the draw
an advance toward the 1st Battalion. T h e floated back to the American line.
German assault companies, however, Company C on the 1st Battalion right
failed to get across the half mile of open had slowly succumbed to the weight of
ground before dawn and were checked numbers; by 1015 two of its platoons
short of the woods by mortar and ma- had been engulfed. There was little that
chine gun fire, T h e commander of the the regiment could do in response to
277th Volks Grenadier Division at once Major Legler’s plea for assistance, but
decided to throw in his reserve, the 991st at 1030 the mine-laying platoon from
Regiment, to spring the 990th loose. the regimental antitank company ar-
Sheer weight of numbers now carried rived to give a hand. This small detach-
the German attack across the open space ment (26 riflemen plus 13 runners and
and into the woods–but with high cas- cooks), led by Lt. Harry Parker, made
ualties amongst the riflemen and the a bayonet charge to reach the remaining
98 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Company C platoon and set up a new order to recover its eastern position at
line of defense on the battalion right the wood line it would have to reopen
flank. A gap still remained between the the battalion supply road. At 0800
battalion and the 394th Infantry farther Colonel Allen’s tired and weakened
south. battalion attacked to the west and drove
By the end of the day the 393d Infan- the enemy off the road, but when the
try had restored a front facing the eastward counterattack started it
enemy.11 But the new line could hardly collided with a battalion of German
be called solid, the rifle strength remain- infantry. For half an hour Germans and
ing was too slim for that. T h e 1st Battal- Americans fought for a hundred-yard-
ion had lost over half of its effective wide strip of the woods. Then, about
strength; the 3d Battalion had its right 1000, the German armor took a hand.
bent back for several hundred yards and T h e failure by the 277th Volks Gren-
had lost nearly three hundred men. T h e adier Division to clear the woods and
enemy wandered almost at will through reach Krinkelt-Rocherath on 16 Decem-
the woods, firing into foxholes, shooting ber had led to some change of plan.
off flares, and calling out in English to T h e right flank, roughly opposite the
trap the unwary. But even with the 3d Battalion sector, was reinforced by
German strength apparent on all sides, switching the 990th Regiment to the
the American situation seemed to be north to follow the 989th Regiment.
improving. Reinforcements, requested More important, the 12th SS Panzer
by General Lauer, had arrived from the Division (which now had come up on
2d Division during the late afternoon, the left of the 277th) parceled out some
the supply roads might be restored to of its tanks to give weight to the infantry
traffic when daylight came again, and attack by the right wing of the 277th
the losses inflicted on the attacker were Volks Grenadier Division.
obvious and heartening. The first tank entered the forest road
T h e breakthrough on the south flank from Hollerath, rolled to within ma-
of the 99th Division, during 17 Decem- chine gun range of the Americans,
ber, was paralleled that day by a strong stopped, then for twenty minutes me-
German armored thrust into the division thodically spewed bullet fire. Attempts
center. The 393d, whose left battalion to get a hit by artillery fire were futile,
had been driven back into the deep although the American shelling momen-
woods during the first day’s attack, was tarily dispersed the accompanying infan-
under orders to counterattack and re- try and permitted a bazooka team to
store its original line. T h e 3d Battalion wreck one track. But even when crippled
was close to being surrounded, and in the single tank succeeded in immobiliz-
ing the American infantry. Four more
enemy tanks appeared. One was knocked
11Pfc. R. D. Smith and Pfc. Angelo Cestoni out by a bazooka round, but the rest
were awarded the DSC for bravery in the fight by worked forward along the network of
the 393d Infantry. It should be added that the
forward observers of the 370th Field Artillery two, 1st Lt. G. W. Jackman and 2d Lt. W. D.
Battalion, which was supporting the infantrymen Markin, received the DSC, Lieutenant Markin
of the 393d, also distinguished themselves and posthumously.
T H E SIXTH PANZER ARMY 99

firebreaks and trails.12T h e combination the 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry, by 1400,


of tanks and numerous infantry now the two now forming a narrow front
threatened to erase the entire 3d Battal- east of the twin villages.
ion position. Ammunition had run low The 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry (Lt.
and the 3d Battalion casualties could not Col. Paul V. Tuttle, Jr.) , had been
be evacuated. rushed to the western edge of the woods
About 1030 Colonel Scott ordered the on the afternoon of the 16th for use as
3d Battalion, 393d Infantry, as well as a counterattack force. T h e hard-hitting
its southern neighbor (the 1st), to re- German attack against the 3d Battalion,
move to new positions about one and 393d, on the following morning so dras-
a half miles east of Rocherath. This tically changed the situation that Colo-
would be done by withdrawing the 3d nel Tuttle’s orders were altered to:
Battalion through the 3d Battalion, 23d “hold at all costs.” His battalion was
Infantry (the reinforcements sent by none too well prepared for such defense,
Robertson), which had dug in some having arrived with no mines and very
thousand yards to its rear. All the vehi- little ammunition. Trucks bringing am-
cles available to the forward troops munition forward found the road be-
were filled with wounded. Fifteen tween Büllingen and Krinkelt barred by
wounded men, most too badly hurt to the enemy and never reached the battal-
be moved, were left behind, together ion.
with the 3d Battalion surgeon, Capt. Shortly after the troops from the 393d
Frederick J. McIntyre, and some enlisted passed through the battalion, Company
aid men. By noon the entire battalion I, on the open left flank, heard the clank-
had pulled out (disengaging without ing of tank treads. A few minutes later
much difficulty) ; it passed through the German tanks with marching infantry
3d Battalion, 23d Infantry, and two clustered around them struck the left
hours later was on the new position. platoon of Company I, rolling forward
Allen’s battalion had fought almost con- till their machine guns enfiladed the
tinuously since the early morning of the foxholes in which the American infantry
16th; then at full strength, it now was crouched. Company I held until its am-
reduced to 475 men and all but two munition was nearly gone, then tried
machine guns were gone. to withdraw to a nearby firebreak but
The 1st Battalion of the 393d Infantry went to pieces under fire raking it from
had not been hard pressed during the 13Company K, in line to the
all directions.
morning of 17 December because the south, next was hit. T h e company started
German forces in its area had been con- an orderly withdrawal, except for the
tent to move through the gap on the left platoon which had lost its leader
right, between the 393d and 394th. and never got the order to pull back.
Ordered to withdraw about 1100, the This platoon stayed in its foxholes until
battalion was in position alongside the tanks had ground past, then rose to

12The action at this point devolved on Sgt. 13The gallant attempt by Pfc. Richard E. Cowan
Vernon McGarity and his squad. For outstanding singlehandedly to cover the Company I retreat
heroism McGarity was awarded the Medal of was recognized by the award of the Medal of
Honor. Honor.
100 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

CAMOUFLAGED PILLBOX IN THE FOREST serves as a regimental command post.

engage the German infantry. T h e pla- gunner, was awarded the Medal of
toon was wiped out. Honor. This rear guard action, for the
A medium tank platoon from the company was covering what was left of
741st Tank Battalion, loaned by Robert- the battalion, went on until twilight.
son, had arrived in the 3d Battalion area Then, as the survivors started to cross
during the night. Lt. Victor L. Miller, an open field, they were bracketed by
the platoon leader, took two tanks to artillery and Werfer fire and scattered.
cover a forest crossroads near the Com- (Later the battalion would be given the
pany K position. In a duel at close quar- Distinguished Unit Citation.) Company
ters the American tanks destroyed two L, on the inner flank, had been given
panzers, but in turn were knocked out time for an orderly retreat; eighty or
and Lieutenant Miller was killed. ninety men reached Krinkelt.
Parts of Company K held stubbornly T h e 3d Battalion of the 393d had
together, fighting from tree to tree, with- barely started to dig in behind the 3d
drawing slowly westward. For courage in Battalion, 23d Infantry, when the first
this fight, Pfc. Jose M. Lopez, machine stragglers came back with word of the
T H E SIXTH PANZER ARMY 101

German assault. Colonel Allen moved ported the 2d Infantry Division attack
his spent battalion to a hastily organized in the Wahlerscheid sector, was little
position 500 yards to the northwest and affected on the 16th and the morning
prepared to make another stand. T h e of the 17th by the German power drive
main force of the German attack, how- against the rest of the 99th Division. In-
ever, had angled away while rolling over formation reaching the 395th command
the flank of the forward battalion. About post was sparse and contradictory; both
this time the 3d Battalion, 393d, met a the 2d Division and the 395th still as-
patrol from the 1st Battalion, 9th Infan- sumed that the battle raging to the south
try, which had been rushed to the was an answer to the American threat
Rocherath area to cover the 2d Division at Wahlerscheid, where the 2d Division
withdrawal south from Wahlerscheid, had made a sizable dent in the West
and the two battalions joined forces. Wall by evening of 16 December.15
The retreat of the 3d Battalion, 23d All this time a chain reaction was mov-
Infantry, left its right-flank neighbor, ing slowly from the menaced southern
the 1st Battalion, 393d Infantry, com- flank of the 99th northward. It reached
pletely isolated. 14Telephone lines long the 395th before noon on 17 December
since had been destroyed, and radio with word that the 324th Engineer Bat-
communication had failed. In late after- talion, stationed between that regiment
noon Major Legler decided to withdraw and the 393d, was moving back to the
but hearing that the 2d Battalion of the west. Actually the engineers had not yet
394th was to tie in on his right reversed withdrawn but had moved to make con-
his decision. About dark, however, the tact with and cover the exposed flank
Germans struck in force and the rifle of the 395th, this apparently on General
companies pulled back closer together. Lauer’s orders while the 395th was tak-
Because the battalion supply road was ing orders from Robertson. T h e with-
already in German hands, Legler and drawal of the 2d Infantry Division to
his men struck out across country on the the Rocherath area resulted in the attach-
morning of the 18th, taking a few vehi- ment of the 395th (reinforced by the
cles and those of the wounded who could 2d Battalion of the 393d) to General
be moved. T h e main body reached Robertson’s division. Now the battalions
Wirzfeld but the rear guard became were ordered to blow up all of the pill-
separated, finally joining other Ameri- boxes taken in the advance. Finally, at
cans in the fight raging around Krinkelt. 1600, Col. Alexander J. Mackenzie re-
The 1st Battalion by this time numbered ceived a retirement order given by Gen-
around two hundred men. eral Lauer or General Robertson, which
one is uncertain. The plan was this. The
T h e 395th Infantry Conforms two battalions of the 395th and the at-
to the Withdrawal tached battalion from the 393d would
fall back toward the regimental com-
The 395th Infantry, which had sup- mand post at Rocherath. From this
14Lt. Col. Paul V. Tuttle, Jr., for his able 15For details of the Wahlerscheid attacks, see
handling of the withdrawal by the 3d Battalion, MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, pp.
was awarded the DSC. 606–10.
102 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

point the regiment would deploy to They were checked by machine gun fire,
cover the road leading out of Rocherath but more Germans appeared, extending
to the north and northeast, the road the assault front from the north edge of
which the 2d Infantry Division was Monschau to the hill beyond Mützenich.
using in its march south from the American fire power–artillery, tank de-
Wahlerscheid battlefield. stroyers, tank guns, and the numerous
The 1st Battalion reached Rocherath machine guns—stopped the first attack.
and on General Robertson’s orders en- But by 0900 the enemy had succeeded
trenched on both sides of the road north in gathering a battalion on the north
of the village. Heavy weapons were drag- flank, poised against the Troop B front
ged through the deep mud and were 3,400 yards along the railroad line east
placed to cover the road. The other two of Mützenich Hill. In short rushes the
battalions dug in along a perimeter enemy filtered into the Troop B area.
which faced east from Rocherath and Even the Luftwaffe took a hand; at least
the Wahlerscheid road. So emplaced, the two squadrons made strafing runs over
395th waited for the enemy to come the cavalry positions. Although some
pouring through the woods onto the 2d Germans broke through the thin cavalry
Division route of withdrawal. line, a sharp shelling administered by
On the opposite side of the 2d Divi- the 62d Field Artillery Battalion stopped
sion corridor, in the Höfen area, the the main support troops short of the rail-
enemy made no serious move on 17 road. More Germans could be seen as-
December to repeat the disastrous attack sembling in Imgenbroich, but friendly
of the previous day. The immediate ob- aircraft were on the way to help the
jective of the 326th Volks Grenadier cavalry. Gunners from the 62d marked
Division remained the high ground the village with red smoke and the
northwest of Monschau near Mützenich. fighter-bombers went in bombing and
General Kaschner apparently decided on strafing. This ended the daylight phase
17 December to make his bid for a break- of the fray. Company A of the 47th In-
through directly in this sector and to fantry, which regiment was en route to
abandon momentarily the attempt to the sector from Eupen, had appeared in
force a penetration between Monschau time to help hunt down the Germans
and Höfen. who had got through the cavalry line.
About 0400 on 17 December the 38th Despite prisoner reports that the 326th
Cavalry Squadron outposts north of would throw in a regimental attack
Monschau heard enemy troops moving during the afternoon, quiet reigned.
along the draw running west from Men- The 47th Infantry arrived at Mützenich
zerath. Quick and accurate response by and bivouacked astride the Eupen road
American batteries ended this move. -the immediate threat was ended. T h e
Three hours later the German batteries 38th Squadron could report a count of
opened up, shelling the thin line of two hundred German dead in front of
troopers deployed along the railroad cut its lines. T h e 326th Volks Grenadier
north of Monschau. When the guns and Division was finding its position at the
Werfers ceased, a wave of German in- pivot of the Sixth Panzer Army offensive
fantry headed for the railroad tracks. a costly one.
T H E SIXTH PANZER ARMY 103
T h e 2d Division Gives U p the
Wahlerscheid Attack

On the night of 16–17 December the


enemy counterattacked at Wahlerscheid.
Actually the number of enemy troops
available for use against the 2d Division
was very small, too few for any telling
maneuver out of the West Wall position.
The bulk of the 272d Yolks Grenadier
Division, holding the sector, had been
thrown in to stop the American 78th
Division farther north. T h e 326th
Yolks Grenadier Division was already
engaged in a costly attempt to penetrate
the American lines at Monschau and
Höfen. As a result the defense at the
Wahlerscheid road junction had been
conducted on a catch-as-catch-can basis
by troops farmed out for brief periods GENERAL GEROW
prior to commitment in the counter-
offensive. On 15 December, for example,
elements of the 990th Regiment (277th move the 2d Division to the natural de-
Yolks Grenadier Division) were relieved fensive line offered by the ridge run-
by a reinforced battalion of the 751st ning north and south of Elsenborn. This
Regiment (326th Volks Grenadier Divi- was refused. Late in the evening the
sion), which, during the night of 15–16 deputy corps commander (Maj. Gen.
December, was in the process of being Clarence R. Huebner) cautioned Gen-
relieved by the Replacement Battalion eral Robertson to keep the unengaged
of the 326th. By coincidence the 2d Di- troops of his division in hand for a quick
vision attack on the night prior to the change of plan, despite the order to con-
16th engaged and detained troops which tinue the attack.16By this time the three
both the 277th and 326th expected to use battalions of the 9th Infantry and two
elsewhere on the first day of the counter- of the 38th were committed. On the
offensive.
On the afternoon of 16 December Maj. 16The 2d Division attack and subsequent fight-
Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, commanding ing withdrawal are very well covered in combat
interviews. In this chapter the following after
the V Corps, concluded from the frag- action reports and journals have been used: 2d
mentary reports coming out of the main Div; 9th, 23d, and 38th Infantry Regiments; the
battle area that the 2d Infantry Division 2d Div Hq Commandant. T h e 644th Tank De-
stroyer Bn. A r m y Ground Forces Report No. 559
might soon find itself in a difficult sit- ( 2 6 January 1945) is useful. T h e published ma-
uation. He asked the First Army com- terials, History of t h e Fifteenth Field Artillery
Battalion in the European Theater of Operations
mander, General Hodges, for permission and D plus 106 to V-E: The Story of the 2d
to call off the attack at Wahlerscheid and Division (n.d.n.p.), are of little value.
104 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

morning of the counteroffensive’s second tached to support the 2d Division attack


day, with the American position in the had been held in reserve well to the
99th Division and VIII Corps sector rap- south in order to prevent a jam on
idly deteriorating, Gerow renewed his the single communicating road during
request. T h e First Army commander the infantry phase of the operation and
was unwilling to give orders for a with- so constituted a readily available reserve.
drawal but authorized the V Corps com- But the appearance of German armor
mander to act as he saw fit. Gerow early on 17 December would force some
phoned Robertson; it was now about piecemeal distribution to meet this
0730. threat.
For the first time the 2d Division com- Even before the withdrawal order
mander learned that the enemy had reached the 2d Division command post
broken through the 99th and that his at Wirtzfeld on the morning of the 17th,
own division was in danger of being German tanks had been spotted moving
cut off. Gerow’s order was to set up a on Büllingen the main division supply
defensive position on the Elsenborn point. General Robertson ordered the
ridge—but first the 2d Division had to headquarters commandant to prepare a
withdraw from the exposed Wahler- defense at the division command post
scheid sector. T h e immediate task con- (a few hundred yards north of Büllin-
fronting Robertson was that of gen) and sent his only free rifle battal-
gathering what troops he could to de- ion, the 2d of the 23d Infantry, south
fend the single road back through from the Rocherath area. After the rap-
Krinkelt-Rocherath to Wirtzfeld, while ture of Büllingen the German column
at the same time holding open the one- turned away to the southwest, but a re-
track road between Wirtzfeld and El- connaissance party composed of a tank
senborn.17 Two-thirds of his reserve, the platoon and a few riflemen in half-tracks
23d Infantry, would be attached to the continued in the direction of Wirtzfeld.
99th Division. The rifle strength of the They had been anticipated by only a few
two regiments around Wahlerscheid had minutes with the arrival of a self-pro-
been reduced by nearly 1,200 men. The pelled gun platoon from C Company of
1st Battalion of the 9th Infantry, for the 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion.
example, had begun the Wahlerscheid When the Germans reached the ridge
attack on 13 December with 35 officers south of Wirtzfeld they were momen-
and 678 men; on the morning of 17 tarily profiled against the sky line.
December the active roster was 22 officers Two of the American tank destroyers
and 387 men. All of the original com- and a 57-mm. gun accounted for three
pany commanders and most of the pla- of the panzers and a half-track. For the
toon leaders were casualties. Fortunately, time being the threat to the southern
the tank and tank destroyer strength at- terminus of the 2d Division line of with-
drawal was ended. The 2d Battalion, 23d
Infantry, and additional tank destroyers
from the 644th soon arrived and de-
17 The 2d Division engineers had worked 011
this secondary road until it offered a fairly passable ployed in the deep snow south of Wirtz-
single track. feld on the slope facing Büllingen there
T H E SIXTH PANZER ARMY 105

to watch the 1st SS Panzer Regiment as closing jaws of the German trap by mov-
it filed southwest. ing out through Krinkelt and retiring,
if possible, to Elsenborn. T h e ambulance
T h e 394th Infantry Abandons the driver would join the head of the column
Mürringen Position and Hightower’s trucks would fall in be-
hind the vehicles of the 394th.
East of German-held Büllingen the Shortly after midnight the remnants
American troops in Mürringen faced en- of the 394th Infantry at Mürringen
circlement, occupying as they did a pre- formed in two columns, one composed
carious and jutting angle between the of foot troops, the other made up of the
defense forming on the evening of 17 remaining vehicles. Colonel Riley
December around the twin villages and started the motor column, which in-
the southern shoulder bracing at But- cluded Hightower’s vehicles, along the
genbach. The sole road remaining for road toward Krinkelt at 0215, a road
withdrawal to the Elsenborn assembly beaten by hostile shellfire. Near Krin-
area ran back through Krinkelt, the kelt, whence came the sound of heavy
southernmost of the twin villages, whose firing, the column halted while scouts
tenure by friendly troops was none too moved toward the houses a t the edge of
certain on the night of the 17th. T h e the village. Here German tanks were
chances for a successful withdrawal from seen, and so orders were passed along to
Mürringen were dwindling by the hour. abandon the vehicles and move west on
The 37 1st Field Artillery Battalion, foot to Elsenborn. T h e infantry column
which had been firing in support of the started a quarter of an hour after the
394th from battery positions close by, vehicles, marching quietly toward Krin-
was out of ammunition. Colonel kelt along a tree-covered draw, carrying
Riley, the regimental commander, re- only helmets, overcoats, rifles, and am-
ported this to General Lauer at 0115 munition. Debouching onto the road
on the 18th, adding that he recom- south of Krinkelt, the infantry found it
mended “withdrawal.” The division lined with deserted trucks and jeeps.
commander at once sent a radio message After some indecision the infantry
back: “Withdraw arty. Your order. Your manned a few of the empty vehicles-
time.” Apparently Lauer expected that by this time it had been ascertained that
the 394th Infantry and Hightower’s bat- the 2d Infantry Division had at least
talion from the 23d Infantry would send partial control of Krinkelt–and edged
off the guns and then consolidate with their way through the village and out
the Krinkelt defenders. About this time the Wirtzfeld road. Most of the men
Hightower arrived at Riley’s command from Mürringen reached Elsenborn
post and told him of his conversation during the 18th. T h e 371st Field Ar-
with Colonel Hirschfelder. Hightower tillery Battalion, which had displaced
had just talked with one of his ambu- closer to Krinkelt during the night,
lance drivers who had come back from failed to get its heavy equipment out of
Wirtzfeld via the road through Krinkelt the snow when a second move was
and said he could guide the vehicles out. ordered at daylight, and all but five
Colonel Riley now decided to evade the howitzers were abandoned.
106 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

There remains to account for the ing. Most of the weary, hungry troops
394th’s 2d Battalion, which had been reached Elsenborn during the early
cut off from the regiment while in the hours of 19 December. C a p . Robert
Honsfelder Wald, and the 1st Battalion McGee, S–3 of the 2d Battalion, 394th,
of the 23d, attached to the 394th and had brought out about 570 officers and
holding Hünningen, the southernmost men. The 1st Battalion, 393d, which had
position left to the 2d and 99th Divi- been badly hurt in the first two days of
sions. In the Honsfelder Wald the 2d the fight, was less fortunate. Fewer than
Battalion of the 394th met the 1st Bat- 300 of its officers and men were left.
talion of the 393d; both were out of com- T h e 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, at
munication with their parent regiments HUnningen, it will be recalled, had re-
and neither knew the location of neigh- ceived radio orders late on the 17th
boring units. Jointly deciding to with- which put it under the command of the
draw further to the west, the two units 9th Infantry. Colonel Hightower’s bat-
began their march at daylight on the talion was closely engaged, for the Ger-
18th. Diverted by the sound of intense mans had filtered through at a number
firing in the direction of Krinkelt, they of points, and when the order came to
marched toward Mürringen. withdraw from the village the battalion
Almost in the shadow of the houses had to fight its way free. Company B,
the force got a hostile reception: the most exposed, was under assault even as
Germans had moved in on the heels of the withdrawal began. A platoon leader
the 394th. At this critical juncture radio was wounded in front of the foxhole
contact was made with a friendly unit, line; two aid men tried to reach him and
probably the 2d Division, and in answer were killed. A third reached the side of
to the plea for help American shells be- the fallen officer, then both were killed.
gan exploding in the village. Between The 3d Platoon, whose radio was gone,
the confusion and the morning fog, the had no word as to the time when the
Americans were able to break away, battalion was pulling back. Runners who
turning this time toward Wirtzfeld. They tried to reach the platoon were killed or
carried as many of their wounded as captured, and this part of Company B
they could, but some of the wounded had was lost. Most of the badly depleted 1st
to be left behind in the care of two aid Battalion withdrew in accordance with
men. En route to Wirtzfeld the group an earlier plan along a secondary road
suddenly was brought under fire by the via Mürringen which had been scouted
2d Division artillery, a number of casu- by the battalion medical officer, the ve-
alties resulting. At this point the men hicles following the 394th and the men
nearly panicked, but order was restored on foot marching cross-country to Wirtz-
while a squad leader raced ahead to a feld.
friendly outpost and stopped the shell-
CHAPTER VI

The German Northern Shoulder


Is Jammed
T h e 2d Division Withdraws vehicles. T h e 99th Division had long
since thrown its last reserve into the
General Robertson’s plan for moving battle; therefore the 2d Division (with
his 2d Division south was to “skin the the attached 395th) alone had to provide
cat,” pulling the most advanced bat- for the defense of this endangered sec-
talions in the Wahlerscheid sector back tor of the corridor south.
through the others. In addition to the T h e 2d Division commander assigned
main supply road, a part of the division responsibility to his officers as follows.1
could use the secondary route running Col. Chester J. Hirschfelder, command-
more or less parallel to the Wahler- ing the 9th Infantry, was charged with
scheid road until the two met at a fork the actual withdrawal from Wahler-
about a mile north of Rocherath. (See scheid. T h e assistant division com-
Map 11.) T h e 395th Infantry was in the mander, Col. John H. Stokes, Jr., took
woods east of the northernmost section over the defense of Rocherath. Col.
of the 2d Division withdrawal route and Philip D. Ginder, assigned to the divi-
would provide cover for the first stage sion as a spare regimental commander,
of the tricky move parallel to and close was given the task of establishing a
behind the rapidly deteriorating front. blocking position southeast of Wirtzfeld
Then too the enemy at the Wahlerscheid -the village at which the 2d Division
road junction seemed hardly strong or would have to turn toward Elsenborn.
aggressive enough to make even a day- General Robertson himself would spend
light disengagement difficult. the crucial hours of the 17th working u p
T h e danger zone would be the twin and down the Rocherath road, gathering
villages. Roads from the east led into additional troops where he could, inter-
Rocherath and Krinkelt. And, to the vening to change the disposition of
east, as information from the 99th Divi- battalions and even companies as the
sion rifle battalions warned, the Ger- complexion of the battle altered.
mans had made a deep penetration and T h e men turning south were con-
were liable at any moment to come cerned with a fight for their lives. Some
bursting out of the forest. Rocherath and units of the division would be able to
Krinkelt had to be held if the 2d Divi-
1 General Robertson, however, maintained per-
sion was to reach the Elsenborn position sonal control of the battle and was in the thick
intact and with its heavy weapons and of the fight. H e received the DSC.
108 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

2D DIISION INFRYMEN ON THE MARCH

occupy their assigned positions and en- bringing up the rear of the 9th Infantry
trench before the enemy struck. Others column, did not set out until 1415.
would have to attack in order to take Before the five battalions at Wahler-
their designated place in the new line of scheid commenced to disengage, General
resistance. Meanwhile the rumor that Robertson marched his only reserve, the
American prisoners were being butch- 3d Battalion of the 38th Infantry, south
ered in cold blood by SS troops was through Rocherath and Krinkelt. At this
spreading like wildfire through the 2d time in the morning the imminent Ger-
Division, a partial explanation of the man threat was in the area north of
bitter fight finally made at the twin Büllingen. For this reason Robertson
villages. placed the 3d Battalion (–) at the south-
Robertson’s order, “withdraw at ern edge of Krinkelt, where, by 1130, it
once,” reached the 9th Infantry a little was entrenched. One rifle company, plus
after 1000. By 1100 the 2d Battalion had the antitank and service companies, took
assembled and started south, with the 3d positions around Rocherath guarding the
and 1st Battalions forming in that order roads entering the village from the north
to complete the column. T h e withdrawal and east.
from the front lines, shielded by a heavy T h e redeployment of the 2d Division
barrage laid on the West Wall positions, had a double aim: securing a firm hold
was accomplished readily but of course on Wirtzfeld, essential to the control of
took much time. T h e 1st Battalion, the road net in the final phase of the
T H E GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 109

move to Elsenborn, and defending Krin- Colonel McKinley and told him that he
kelt and Rocherath until such time as had just come from the command post
both the 2d and 99th Divisions could be of the 395th Infantry where he had
withdrawn to the Elsenborn ridge. T h e learned that the Germans had broken
9th Infantry, leading the move, was to through the 393d. Robertson had split
concentrate the bulk of its troops around the preceding battalion of the 9th Infan-
Wirtzfeld; the 38th, to build u p a de- try to send a rifle company and part of
fensive line at Krinkelt-Rocherath as its the headquarters company to bar the
battalions arrived. Before dark the 2d main road from the forest into Roche-
Battalion of the 9th Infantry had tra- rath. Now he ordered McKinley to rush
versed the seven and a half miles of con- his battalion to Rocherath and hold the
gested and shell-torn road, deploying woods road “until ordered to with-
south of Wirtzfeld in line with the 2d draw.” At dusk the 1st Battalion was in
Battalion of the 23d Infantry. T h e 3d position, deployed on a slight rise over-
Battalion, next in the 9th Infantry col- looking a shallow depression from which
umn, arrived after dark and dug in be- a gradual ascent led into the forest.
tween the two battalions already south A thick fog lay close to the snow-cov-
of Wirtzfeld. En route the 2d Division ered ground. Around was a scene of wild
commander had detached Company K confusion, stragglers with and without
and sent it posthaste to the line forming arms hurrying along the road and across
northeast of Rocherath and to the rear the fields, the sound and flash of gun-
of the fragmented 3d Battalion, 393d. fire coming from the woods to the east.
Through the afternoon the prospect of a Company K, now attached to the 1st Bat-
large-scale German armored attack from talion, already was north of the road,
Büllingen had loomed large in the cal- backed up by three guns from the 644th
culations of both General Robertson and Tank Destroyer Battalion. Company C
General Lauer. Fortunately the attack closed beside K; Company B dug in
failed to come. at the road; Company A lay to the south.
In the late afternoon two rifle bat- T h e battalion had not picked up its
talions were on their way to Krinkelt and mines during the disengagement, but
Rocherath: the 1st Battalion of the 9th was able to get a few from the tank
Infantry (Lt. Col. William D. McKin- destroyers for use at the road. There
ley) cleared the Wahlerscheid area at were fifteen extra bazookas on the am-
1415; the 1st Battalion of the 38th Infan- munition vehicles, and these were
try (Lt. Col. Frank T . Mildren) started handed to riflemen earlier trained by
on its way at 1530. T h e road south was McKinley as bazooka men. Forward ob-
now under German shellfire, going was servers from the 15th Field Artillery
slow, and only a short span of daylight Battalion hurriedly set up their com-
remained. T h e danger involved in the munications. In the woods, less than a
movement across the front multiplied thousand yards away, firing continued
with each hour, for the 99th Division as darkness closed over the American po-
center, east of the twin villages, was sition.
collapsing. Friendly infantry and tanks were
On the road General Robertson met known to be coming west. About 1930
110 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

three tanks and a platoon or so of in- American gunners, firing from new em-
fantry came through Company B. They placements near Camp Elsenborn, had
had passed on toward Rocherath before effectively checked further troop moves
anyone realized that this was the first on the road from the forest, seven bat-
of the enemy. Half an hour later more talions finally joining in the shoot. By
tanks came clanking along the road, the midnight all was quiet in front of the
dark shapes of infantrymen following. 1st Battalion except for the distant crash
This time Company B took no chances. of friendly artillery-around the fox-
T h e first two German tanks struck the holes the silence was “frightening.”
American mines. Then two more tried Stubborn determination, mines, ma-
to swing off the road, only to be knocked chine guns, and bazookas had checked
out by bazooka fire. By this time the Ger- this first series of assaults, but the battal-
mans were milling about, apparently ion commander would credit the gun-
completely surprised, while the 15th ners at Elsenborn with saving his
Field Artillery Battalion added to the battalion.2
confusion by beating the road close to It will be recalled that the 1st Bat-
the 1st Battalion foxholes. It took the talion of the 38th Infantry had started
enemy an hour or so to reorganize. Then south shortly after the departure of the
five or six German tanks attacked in last troops of the 9th Infantry. T h e ac-
line, rolling to within a couple of hun- tual withdrawal was screened by the 2d
dred yards of the foxhole line where Battalion of the 38th, the final covering
they halted and fired for nearly half an force of the 2d Division, and was aided
hour. Next the accompanying infantry by fire and smoke laid down by the 37th
rushed in, but were cut down by the Field Artillery Battalion, 81-mm. and 4.
heavy machine guns on the final pro- 2-inch mortars. On the road the regi-
tective line. Finally the enemy tankers mental executive officer met Colonel
and riflemen got together in an assault Mildren and explained the 1st Battalion
that broke through. mission: to go into the line forming at
T h e 1st Battalion refused to panic and the twin villages on the left of the 3d
set to work with bazookas against the Battalion, 38th Infantry, east and north-
flanks of the blinded tanks. One of the east of Krinkelt. Mildren learned in
panzers was crippled, but the crew com- addition that the battalion probably
partment proved impervious to bazooka would have to fight its way to the as-
rounds (perhaps this was a Tiger). So signed position a jarring note that
Cpl. Charles Roberts (Company D) and pleased none this close to nightfall.
Sgt. Otis Bone (Company B) drained About a thousand yards north of
some gasoline from an abandoned ve-
hicle, doused the tank, and lit the whole 2 For ease of description this engagement has
with thermite grenades. When German been treated as a fight by the 1st Battalion; notice,
tanks moved into the Company A area, however, that the 1st deployed alongside Com-
pany K. Pfc. William A. Soderman, of Company
American artillery responded to the ur- K, stopped three enemy tanks with bazooka rounds
gent call for help and within three min- during the night of battle but was badly wounded
by machine gun fire from the last tank he at-
utes dropped in a concentration that tacked. Soderman was awarded the Medal of
stopped the assault. Meanwhile the Honor.
T H E GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 111

Rocherath the battalion column came to hold won more Germans appeared as the
a crossroads which had been picked as a night went on. T h e fight for Krinkelt
profitable target for the enemy artillery surged back and forth, building to build-
and Werfers. Company A at the head of ing, hedgerow to hedgerow. Men on both
the column passed safely, but the rest sides were captured and recaptured as the
came into a gantlet of the most severe tide of battle turned. A German attempt
shelling the veteran battalion ever had to seize the heavy-walled church on the
encountered. Company C, third in the northern edge of the village was beaten
serial, suffered most and became badly off by the reconnaissance company of the
disorganized. German tanks were near 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion, which
the crossroads and might have cut into had lost a platoon at Büllingen during
the American infantry had not T / 4 the morning. T h e communications offi-
Truman Kimbro placed mines across the cer of the 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, 1st
eastern entry. Kimbro was killed, after Lt. Jesse Morrow, knocked out a tank
having been hit innumerable times. He with only a rifle grenade. (Morrow later
was awarded the Medal of Honor post- was awarded the DSC.) T h e situation in
humously. Krinkelt was further confused by re-
T h e leading company, now alone, treating troops from the 99th Division,
entered Rocherath at dusk but found no intermixed as they were with the infil-
guides and marched on through the next trating enemy. One German, using a cap-
village until met by bullet fire. Twice tured American to give the password, got
the company doubled back on its trail past two outposts, but a sentry finally
until finally found by the battalion ex- killed both men. At midnight a column
ecutive and directed to the proper po- of 99th Infantry vehicles started pouring
sition. Company B arriving about 2130, through the town and continued the rest
moved in on the left of Company A but of the night.
was still on the surface (not having had At Rocherath, the Germans who had
time to intrench) when German tanks so boldly entered the village earlier in
and infantry struck from the northeast at the evening destroyed three American
Krinkelt. Company A, well dug in and tanks as these inched their way out of
with all its weapons emplaced, let the the village to help Company K of the
tanks roll past and then took on the in- 38th Infantry. Here too the fight was
fantry. Its neighbor, Company B, ex- bitter and confused. At one time a
posed and without its supporting battalion commander of the 38th was
weapons, was riddled, only one platoon reported to have men from sixteen
managing to escape. T h e Company B different companies fighting under his
survivors, joined by what was left of command. By midnight, however, the
Company C, fell back to the regimental enemy tanks behind the American lines
command post in Rocherath and joined had been accounted for and the German
the antitank company in the street fight infantrymen captured or killed.
raging there. When the wild night of fighting drew
Back at Krinkelt three German tanks to a close, the Americans still were in
with infantry clinging to their decks got control of the two villages and the near
into the eastern streets; with this foot- sector of the Wahlerscheid withdrawal
112 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

route. T h e rear guard 2d Battalion of the in reserve at Elsenborn. Peculiarly


38th had made a highly successful with- enough, the fact that the 2d was attack-
drawal and was assembled a half mile ing through the 99th positions never was
north of Rocherath. T h e 395th Infantry reported to the Sixth Panzer Army head-
had moved back as ordered and, thus quarters. Dietrich expected, therefore, to
far in good shape, held the left flank of break through the 99th and meet the 2d
the 2d Division northeast of Rocherath somewhere to the rear or possibly to
astride the two approaches to the the right rear of the 99th. This may
fork above the village. (It had left explain the German failure to attempt
the 324th Engineer Battalion isolated an end run and drive for Elsenborn.
on Rath Hill, however, and when the
engineers started west on the morning of T h e 1st Infantry Division Sends
the 18th they came under fire from both Reinforcements to Butgenbach
the 395th and the enemy.) Straggler
lines were operating around the twin T h e advance guard of the 1st SS Pan-
villages and a start was being made at zer Division had reached Büllingen on
regrouping the strays and tying to- the early morning of 17 December, by
gether the bits and pieces of the Ameri- its presence threatening the open right
can line. Wirtzfeld, the one good escape flank and the rear of the 99th Division.
hatch to Elsenborn, was ready for a de- Although the German armored column
fense in force. T h e 2d Division artillery veered southwest, under the eyes of the
and its reinforcing battalions had dis- astonished Americans, the presence of
placed to the Elsenborn ridge in positions the enemy this deep within the bare
within range of the entire front. General south flank was a cause of grave concern
Robertson's 2d Division and attached to General Lauer and later to General
troops had carried through a highly com- Robertson. Through the morning only
plex maneuver in the face of the enemy, a handful of engineers and headquarters
disengaging in a fortified zone, withdraw- personnel, backed up with single tank
ing across a crumbling front, then wheel- destroyer and antiaircraft pieces, stood
ing from column to secure and organize in the way of a German dash north across
a defensive line in the dark and under the American rear. But the 1st SS Pan-
attack. Having completed this mission, zer, intent on objectives far to the west,
the 2d Division was under orders to hold failed to make this play.3 A platoon
in place while the remnants of the 99th of Mark IV tanks did scout the Butgen-
Division right wing passed through to bach road but withdrew when three were
Elsenborn; then it was to break away and destroyed by the few guns of Company
re-form for the defense of the Elsenborn
ridge. 3 The history of the fight against the 1st SS
T h e appearance of the 2d Infantry Panzer during the first few days of the advance
was the subject of a special report, based on
Division at the twin villages probably personal interviews in January 1945, by Capt.
came as a complete surprise to the Ger- Franklin Ferriss (in OCMH). Coverage on the
man command. German intelligence had German side is good, notably MSS # A–924
(Kraemer), A–877 (Priess), and B–733, 12th
failed completely as regards the location Volks Grenadier Division, 1–29 December 1944
of this division and believed that it was (Generalleutnant Gerhard Engel) .
T H E GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 113

B, 6 12th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and hit hard, but not until the German
which Capt. John J. Kennedy had plans for shattering the eastern front of
implaced near Dom Butgenbach. the 99th and 2d Divisions had failed.
Reinforcements from the 1st Infantry T h e night of 17 December passed un-
Division, as promised by the VII Corps, eventfully except for the booming of the
arrived at Camp Elsenborn about 0900, guns of the 33d Field Artillery Battalion
reported to the 99th Division, and were and 413th Antiaircraft Gun Battalion
dispatched at once toward Butgenbach. firing from their positions with the 26th
This village lay on high ground belong- Infantry against the hostile traffic stream-
ing to the vital Elsenborn ridge and ing through Büllingen.
would be the point of entry for any Ger- Early the following morning small
man thrust on the road net north of Bull- enemy detachments appeared in the
ingen.4 Dom Butgenbach area but showed no
The 26th Infantry (Col. John F. R. inclination to close with the Americans.
Seitz) , which had been transferred to T h e 26th Infantry had been busy during
V Corps control the previous midnight, the night completing its deployment: the
was the only unit thus far sent south by 3d Battalion now was dug in west of
the 1st Division. At Elsenborn, after Wirtzfeld on the left of the 2d Battalion,
General Lauer had given a quick re- which retained the responsibility for
sumé of the situation, the regimental ex- blocking the Büllingen-Butgenbach
ecutive officer, then in command, put road; the 1st Battalion was in reserve
the 2d Battalion in the lead, sending around Butgenbach; and considerable
it south to occupy two hills midway be- artillery and tank destroyer strength re-
tween Butgenbach and Büllingen which inforced the command. In anticipation
overlooked the main road connecting of an all-out German attack at this
the two villages. By dusk the 2d Battalion critical section of the American front,
(Lt. Col. Derrill M. Daniel) was de- the V Corps truckhead at Butgenbach
ployed on the high ground near the tiny was closed and all rations and gasoline
hamlet of Dom Butgenbach, dug in were evacuated. Farther to the west,
along the reverse slopes on a 2,100-yard where no defense had yet formed, the
front. Both flanks were wide open. T h e Robertville ammunition supply point,
enemy, however, failed to react force- holding six thousand tons, suspended
fully to the American move, although operations and moved to the rear. But
a 2d Battalion patrol found that the through the 18th the enemy showed no
Germans still were in Büllingen. T h e sign of any earnest intent in front of the
26th Infantry ultimately would be hit 26th Infantry.

T h e Defense of the T w i n Villages


4T h e actions fought here by the 26th Infantry 18 December
involved very heavy fighting by attached tanks
and tank destroyers. See especially the AAR’s of
the 741st and 745th Tank Battalions; the 634th, The German attempt to take Krinkelt
703d, and 801st Tank Destroyer Battalions. See and Rocherath during the night of 17–
also Capt. D. E. Rivette, “The Hot Corner at
Dom Butgenbach,” Infantry Journal (October, 18 December had not been well co-
1945), pp. 19–23. ordinated, carried out as it was by the
AREA NEARBUTGENBACH.Above, 1st Battalion en route to the village;
26TH INFANTRY
below, troops positioning antitank gun.
T H E GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 115

advance guards of two divisions Battalion, and a few guns from the 801st
attacking piecemeal in the dark Tank Destroyer Battalion. On Elsen-
over unknown terrain against re- born ridge, but well within supporting
sistance which was completely surprising. range, lay the 2d Division artillery
By the morning of 18 December, how- (which had displaced after firing from
ever, the enemy strength had increased extreme forward positions), the bulk of
substantially despite the miserable state the 99th Division artillery, and some
of the woods roads leading to the twin corps field artillery battalions. T h e flanks
villages. T h e 989th Regiment of the of the 2d Division position at the villages
277th Volks Grenadier Division (prob- were more or less covered by elements of
ably reinforced by a third battalion) had the 9th and 23d Infantry in Wirtzfeld,
reached Rocherath. T h e 12th SS Panzer to the southwest, and the battalions of
Division, whose tanks and armored in- the 393d deployed in blocking positions
fantry carriers made extremely slow to hold the road net north of Rocherath.
progress on the muddy secondary roads- As yet, however, there was no homo-
quickly chewed up by churning tracks- geneous line sealing the 2d Division
was able by dawn to assemble the 25th front, and the men and vehicles of the
Panzer Grenadier Regiment, an assault 99th Division still passing through to the
gun battalion, and one full tank bat- west complicated the problem of co-or-
talion east of the villages. During the dinating the defense and artillery fire.
18th this force was strengthened by one An ominous quiet prevailed around
more tank battalion, the final armored Rocherath during the early, dark hours
commitment being about equally di- of 18 December, but just before first
vided between Panther tanks and the light the enemy resumed the assault, this
heavy Tigers. time employing his tanks and infantry in
T h e American strength at Krinkelt ordered company. T h e 1st Battalion of
and Rocherath was substantial and by the 9th Infantry, deployed east of the
daylight on 18 December was assuming village along the road from the woods,
a cohesive defensive pattern as the bat- took the first blow. Apparently a com-
talions reorganized after the race south pany of tanks had been brought close
and the confused night battle. Most of to the American line during the night
the 38th Infantry (Col. Francis H. Boos) battle, and these now attacked with more
was in and around the two villages, plus than a battalion of infantry. While the
about a battalion and a half of the 9th batteries on Elsenborn ridge furiously
Infantry and a few platoons of the 23d shelled the road, a confused fight spread
Infantry (Col. Jay B. Loveless). Al- all along the foxhole line. T h e morning
though these 2d Division troops had gap- fog was heavy, visibility almost nil. T h e
ing ranks, so had their opponents. For- American infantry let the tanks roll past,
tunately, in view of the number of tanks then tailed them with bazookas or turned
ready in the German camp, the Amer- to meet the oncoming infantry at close
ican infantry had the means of antitank quarters with grenades, and even bay-
defense at hand: the 741st Tank Battal- onets or knives. This first assault was
ion, 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion, a beaten off, while a number of the Ger-
company of the 612th Tank Destroyer man tanks were crippled or destroyed
116 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

by bazooka teams stalking successfully fire and surrounded by German in-


under cover of the fog. fantry, McKinley replied that no with-
When the fog lifted about 0830, three drawal was possible unless friendly tanks
German tanks rolled right along the fox- or tank destroyers arrived. “Miracu-
hole line firing their machine guns while lously,” as the 1st Battalion later re-
the German infantry rushed forward. Lt. ported, a platoon of Sherman tanks came
Stephen P. Truppner of Company A into view. This was a part of A company,
radioed that his company had been over- 741st Tank Battalion, which had been
run and asked for artillery to fire on his patrolling the Wahlerscheid road.
own position. For thirty minutes an When the platoon commander was
American battalion shelled this area. asked if he wanted to do some fighting
Only twelve men escaped. Company K, the reply was profanely affirmative.
which had been attached to the battalion First the tanks joined the infantry in a
the day before, likewise was engulfed. counterattack to reach the positions
Capt. Jack J . Garvey, sending a last which had been held by Companies A
message from the cellar of the house and K. Two of the three German tanks
which was his command post, refused which had been harassing the battalion
to leave because he could not get his were destroyed by the Shermans, but no
company out. T e n men and one officer contact was made with the lost com-
escaped. On the left Companies B and panies. A second counterattack by the
C were able to hold their ground; a tank platoon covered the 1st Battalion
few from Company B broke and ran but withdrawal, but the last riflemen out
were sent back by the battalion com- had the Germans yelling at their heels.
mander. T h e shattered battalion withdrew
T h e German wave carried tanks and through the 2d Battalion of the 38th,
infantry inside Rocherath, the fight fell back to Rocherath, and then
eddying from house to house, wall to marched to Krinkelt, where it billeted in
wall, along streets and down narrow a deserted hotel. Approximately 240 offi-
alleys. Tanks fought tanks; men were cers and men were left of the orig-
captured, then captured again. Mean- inal battalion and its attached units. In
while, Colonel Boos did what he could addition to the nearly total loss of Com-
to form some defense behind what was panies A and K, all of the Company
left of the 1st Battalion of the 9th.5 M machine gunners attached to the 1st
He radioed Colonel McKinley that as Battalion were missing in action. Of the
soon as the 2d Battalion of the 38th group that had been rushed in the pre-
could swing into position, a matter of vious evening from Headquarters Com-
an hour or more, the 1st Battalion pany, 3d Battalion, only thirteen were
should withdraw. With his remaining left. It seems probable that the entire
two companies transfixed by direct tank 989th Regiment had been employed in
wresting the road to Rocherath from the
stubborn 1st Battalion; the fight had
5 Here Sgt. James L. Bayliss manned his machine gone on for nearly six hours and had
gun to cover his men although he had been under
fire by a German tank. Finally he was killed by given the 38th Infantry time to regroup
a tank-gun round. Bayliss was awarded the DSC. to meet the enemy drive. Colonel Boos
T H E GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 117

gratefully acknowledged that this gallant after its retreat from the woods the
stand had saved his regiment. evening before, killed some forty of the
The 3d Battalion of the 393d, after Germans and the panzers decamped. A
hard fighting on the 17th, had with- brief period of quiet followed and dur-
drawn northeast of Rocherath and tied ing this lull the foot detachment of the
in sketchily on the left of the 1st Bat- 394th from Mürringen passed through
talion, 9th Infantry. Colonel Allen’s bat- the American lines en route to Wirtzfeld
talion was about half strength and had and Elsenborn. By 0830, however, the
lost all of its machine guns, mortars, and fight for Krinkelt was on in earnest. A
antitank guns. T h e furious morning number of attacks were checked by
attack against the 1st Battalion, with a shellfire before they could make much
tank platoon in the lead, also struck the headway. Nonetheless, a tank platoon
3d Battalion. Unable to combat the tanks penetrated as far as the 1st Battalion,
although one was hit by a bazooka round, 38th Infantry, command post before it
the battalion fell back a thousand yards was destroyed, and a few German tanks
to the northwest. Good radio communi- got as far as the road south to Wirtzfeld.
cation with the 395th allowed its cannon In this quarter, as at Rocherath, the
company to take a hand effectively, cover- American tanks, tank destroyers, and
ing the retirement and discouraging close bazooka teams left the German tanks
pursuit. About noon Allen’s men were smoking and broken. 6
ordered to Wirtzfeld, then on to the line During the night of 18 December,
forming at Elsenborn. the 2d Division still held the twin vil-
Although enemy tanks and foot troops lages while the last organized units of the
had penetrated as far as the 38th com- 99th Division moved west on their way
mand post inside Rocherath, they to Elsenborn. In the dark, German
were successfully hunted out during the bazooka teams crept along walls and
morning. The Germans continued to hedgerows seeking the hiding places
hammer along the forest road, striving of the American tanks and tank de-
to win free entrance to the village, but stroyers which had done so much to foil
they found the 2d Battalion of the 38th the armored attacks during the day. T h e
(Lt. Col. Jack K. Norris) , now standing panzers again made forays into the vil-
in the way, a tough opponent. T h e most lages, made their kills, and in turn were
successful assault of the afternoon forced destroyed.
the 2d Battalion to retire “one hedge- Although the American hold in this
row.” sector remained firm, some of the con-
The battle for Krinkelt, if it can be fusion and loss of control normally in-
separated from that raging around herent in a tactical situation like that
Rocherath, commenced sometime be- faced by the 2d and 99th Divisions was
fore dawn when five tanks and a body beginning to tell. Orders from the 99th
of infantry moved cautiously up to the Division had been addressed to the 394th
eastern edge of the village. When the
enemy tankers halted to confer with their 6During the fighting. in the twin villages on
the 18th, 1st Lt. R. A. Parker destroyed or
infantry escort, Company L, 23d Infan- immobilized six enemy tanks with a rocket
try, which had been placed in the line launcher. Parker was awarded the DSC.
118 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

CAPTUREDGERMANTANKCREWMAN

Infantry, at 0808, stressing that the reg- iment to withdraw to Elsenborn. T h e


iment was not to withdraw to Elsenborn move began while Colonel Mackenzie
but instead should take position south went on to the 99th Division head-
of Krinkelt beside the 38th Infantry. The quarters at Elsenborn to report. Here
main body of the 394th already had he was informed that no such order
passed through Krinkelt by that hour had been sent (it had been sent but
and probably never received the order was garbled) and General Lauer told
until it arrived at Elsenborn. him that his battalions must be sent
Confused communications also had back to their positions at once. Mac-
an impact in the area held by the 395th kenzie was able to reach two battalions
Infantry on the north flank. General on the road and turn them back, but the
Robertson, about 0200 on the morning 1st Battalion, 395th, had arrived in El-
of the 18th, had radioed the 395th In- senborn before word could reach it. T h e
fantry to maintain contact with the 38th countermarch was made successfully and
but to prepare for a move to Elsenborn. the old positions reoccupied at 0500 on
Thus far the enemy had made no move 19 December. Information that the 395th
to strike the 395th positions in force. had left, denuding the north flank,
A radio message reached the 395th com- reached the 38th Infantry commander
mand post about 1600 ordering the reg- during the night and caused much con-
T H E GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 119

cern. But the 990th Volks Grenadier The first daylight assault came about
Regiment, at the forest edge east of the 0900 preceded by a barrage of artillery,
395th positions, either had failed to rocket, and mortar fire. Advancing
notice the withdrawal or had been un- through a thick haze, ten tanks, seven
willing to make a move with darkness armored cars, and an infantry battalion
settling. made for the village. Once more the de-
fensive gun concentrations made great
T h e Last Attack at Höfen Fails play in the gray ranks. T h e 3-inch tank
18 December destroyers of the 612th Tank Destroyer
Battalion, although frozen in place, held
Ten miles by road north of Krinkelt the German fighting vehicles at bay-
and Rocherath the 3d Battalion, 395th even with the limited traverse. As be-
Infantry, fought an isolated but impor- fore, some of the attackers broke
tant engagement on 18 December. 7 through. Colonel Butler phoned the
Having failed the day before to breach forward observer of the 196th Field Ar-
the American cavalry line at Mon- tillery Battalion, whose little party was
schau, the 326th Volks Grenadier Divi- fighting off Germans around its observa-
sion turned again toward Höfen where tion post (a three-story brick building
it had encountered such a sharp reverse right in the forward line) , and asked for
on the first day of the German counter- three five-minute concentrations on his
offensive. The 2 d Battalion of the 753d own positions.8 T h e shells came in
Regiment finally had rejoined the di- promptly. As the fire finally lifted But-
vision; so General Kaschner put this ler sent his reserve, a single platoon of I
regiment in the van, nourishing his Company, into the counterattack. Pick-
assault waves with companies of the re- ing up strength at the foxhole line, the
maining two regiments as the fight Americans drove the remaining foe back
developed. Some three hours before day- in the direction of Rohren. The German
break the German assault detachments tanks, whose appearance had caused the
moved forward from the hills surround- 3d Battalion to request help “at once,’’
ing Höfen to make a first test of the took a singularly small part in the fray,
American defenses at the northern edge retiring behind a ridge which gave
of the village. Well prepared for such shelter against direct antitank fire. It
an onslaught, concentrated artillery and must be said that the German grena-
mortar fire blanketed the ground over diers were of sterner stuff. The Ameri-
which the grenadiers had to advance. can main line of resistance was not com-
Despite heavy casualties from this fire pletely re-established until 1230. When
the enemy broke through to the village. night came the Germans tried once
There followed a confused battle, but again but to no avail.
when day broke the last Germans were Thus ended the enemy plan to carry
being routed from the houses. the northern pivot of the Sixth Panzer
7T h e 3d Battalion of the 395th Infantry was
given a Presidential Citation for its fight at
Höfen. Sgt. T. E. Piersall and Pfc. Richard Mills 8T h i s was 2d Lt. S. D. Llewellyn, who later re-
fought with such conspicuous courage as to receive ceived the DSC for the defense of the observation
the DSC. post.
120 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Army offensive as far forward as Eupen. spite the fact that the 2d Division was
Kaschner had planned to shift his attack hard pressed, Robertson made good on
later in the day toward Monschau, but his promise to the corps commander that
this attack never was made. T h e bloody he would release the 99th Division ele-
failure at Höfen gives a more than ade- ments which had been placed in the 2d
quate explanation. German dead liter- Division line and send them to Elsen-
ally were piled in front of the 3d born for reorganization within their own
Battalion. T h e disparity in losses suffered division. T h e tactical problem remain-
by the combatants is amazing. T h e Ger- ing was to disengage the 2d Division
man dead counted in and around Höfen and its attached troops, particularly
numbered 554; prisoners numbered 53. those in the twin villages, while at the
The American casualties were five killed same time establishing a new and solid
and seven wounded. From this time defense along the Elsenborn ridge.
on the 326th Volks Grenadier Division The failure to break through at the
abandoned all but minor action in this twin villages on 18 December and so
sector, finally turning south to take a open the way south to the main armored
secondary role in the ensuing battle at route via Büllingen had repercussions all
the Elsenborn ridge. Höfen and Mons- through the successive layers of German
chau remained in American hands command on the Western Front.
through the rest of the Ardennes Cam- Realizing that the road system and the
paign. terrain in front of the Sixth Panzer Army
presented more difficulties than those
T h e 2d Division Withdraws confronting the Fifth, it had been
to the Elsenborn Line agreed to narrow the Sixth Panzer Army
19 December zone of attack and in effect ram through
the American front by placing two pan-
At 1800 on 18 December the V Corps zer corps in column. T h e southern wing
commander attached General Lauer’s of the 1st SS Panzer Corps, in the Sixth
99th Division to Robertson’s 2d Divi- Panzer Army van, had speedily punched
sion. General Gerow’s instructions, a hole between the 106th and 99th
given Robertson late on 17 December American divisions and by 18 December
for a defense of the Rocherath-Krinkelt- the leading tank columns of the 1st SS
Wirtzfeld line until such time as the Panzer Division were deep in the Amer-
isolated American troops to the east ican rear areas. The northern wing,
could be withdrawn, finally were ful- however, had made very slow progress
filled on the night of 18–19 December and thus far had failed to shake any
when the remnants of the 1st Battalion tanks loose in a dash forward on the
of the 393d and the 2d Battalion of the northern routes chosen for armored pen-
394th came back through the 2d Divi- etration. Peremptory telephone messages
sion lines. These were the last organized from the headquarters of OB W E S T har-
units to find their way to safety, although assed Dietrich, the Sixth Panzer Army
small groups and individual stragglers commander, all during the 18th and were
would appear at the Elsenborn rallying repeated–doubtless by progressively
point for some days to come. Then, de- sharpening voices–all the way to the
T H E GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 121

99TH DIVISION VEHICLES MOVING THROUGHH WIRTZFELD en route to Elsenborn.

Krinkelt-Rocherath front. But exhorta- Butgenbach must be cleared to open the


tion had been fruitless. better road net. Eventually Dietrich pre-
Although Dietrich continued to nee- vailed—or some compromise was
dle his subordinates to get the right wing reached–for late on 18 December ar-
of the army rolling forward, he also mored elements of the 12th SS Panzer
sought to remedy the situation by chang- Division began to withdraw from the
ing the I SS Panzer Corps tactics. Diet- twin villages, while the 3d Panzer Gren-
rich suggested to General Priess that the adier Division, which had been sched-
12th SS Panzer Division disengage, uled for the fight at Monschau, marched
swing south, bypass Butgenbach, and get west from reserve to take over the battle
back onto the main route some place with the 2d Division.
west of the thorny American position. T h e German plans for 19 December
The I SS Panzer Corps commander and were these: the 277th Volks Grenadier
his staff politely rejected this idea on the Division and advancing troops of the
grounds that the byroads were impass- 3d Panzer Grenadier Division were to
able and that Krinkelt, Rocherath, and continue the attack at Krinkelt and
122 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Rocherath; the 89th Regiment, 12th were no longer in evidence, however. In


Volks Grenadier Division, which had the meantime the defenders picked up
come up from reserve and initiated an the sounds of extensive vehicular move-
attack from Mürringen against Krinkelt ment (representing the departing ele-
the day before, was to maintain pressure ments of the 12th SS Panzer Division),
in this sector. Meanwhile, the 12th SS and a platoon of tanks appeared north-
Panzer Division was to complete its east of Rocherath but quickly retired
withdrawal from the twin villages and when artillery concentrations and direct
move as quickly as the poor roads would fire were brought to bear.
allow to join a kampfgruppe of the 12th Inside the twin villages’ perimeter
Volks Grenadier Division in a thrust the defenders were aware that a phase
against the American flank position at of the battle was ending. Colonel Stokes,
Butgenbach. T h e direction of the Ger- the assistant division commander, was
man main effort, as a result, would shift, preparing plans for withdrawal to the
substituting an armored thrust against Elsenborn lines. Colonel Boos had the
the flank for the battering-ram frontal 38th Infantry and its attached troops at
attack against the now well-developed work quietly destroying the weapons and
defenses in the area of Krinkelt-Roch- equipment, German and American,
erath. Fresh German infantry were en which could not be evacuated. Finally, at
route to the twin villages, and some 1345, the withdrawal order was issued,
reinforcements would be employed to be put in effect beginning at 1730.
there on the 19th, but the attack would The 395th Infantry was to retire from its
lack the armored weight whose momen- lines north of the villages and move
tum had carried earlier assault waves cross-country (by a single boggy trail)
into the heart of the American positions. west to Elsenborn. T h e 38th Infantry
At dawn, on 19 December, and blank- and its attached units, more closely
eted in thick fog, the German grena- engaged and in actual physical contact
diers advanced on Krinkelt and Roche- with the enemy, would break away from
rath. The batteries back on Elsenborn the villages, fall back west through
ridge once again laid down a defensive Wirtzfeld, then move along the tem-
barrage, ending the attack before it porary road which the 2d Division
could make any headway. Another engineers had constructed between
advance, rolling forward under an in- Wirtzfeld and Berg. Once the 38th
coming fog about 1000, placed enemy had cleared through the Wirtzfeld posi-
snipers and machine gunners close to the tion, now held by elements of the 9th
American positions. Shortly after noon a Infantry and a battalion of the 23d, it
few German tanks churned toward the would occupy a new defensive line west
villages and unloaded machine gunners and northwest of Wirtzfeld, while the
to work the weapons on derelict tanks 9th Infantry in turn evacuated that vil-
which had been abandoned close to the lage.
American foxhole line. Apparently the Company officers commanding troops
enemy infantry were edging in as close facing the enemy had been carefully
as they could in preparation for a final briefed to avoid the word “withdrawal”
night assault. Headlong assault tactics in final instructions to their men. This
T H E GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 123

was to be “a move to new positions”; more difficult than was the lot of most
all were to walk, not run. Col. Leland American infantry divisions in the Eu-
W. Skaggs’ 741st Tank Battalion, tank ropean Theater of Operations, have
destroyers from the 644th Tank De- been compiled only as a total for the
stroyer Battalion, and the 2d Division whole month of December. A careful
engineers would form a covering force check shows that the 99th had few cas-
in the villages, laying mines and beating ualties prior to 16 December or after 19
off any attempt at “pursuit.” Disengage- December; nine-tenths or more of the
ment was made from left to right, following list, therefore, represents the
“stripping” the 2d Division line from cost of four days of battle: 14 officers and
Rocherath to Wirtzfeld. First, the 2d 119 men killed in action; 53 officers and
Battalion of the 38th Infantry pulled out 1,341 men missing in action; 51 of-
of the north edge of Rocherath; the 1st ficers and 864 men wounded in action.
Battalion, deployed in both villages, About 600 officers and men passed
followed; the 3d Battalion tacked on at through the division clearing station be-
Krinkelt. A half hour later, just as the fore 20 December as nonbattle casual-
Germans moved into Rocherath, Com- ties; half were trench foot cases.
pany C of the 644th and Company B of The veteran 2d Division had taken
the 741st hauled out, the tanks carrying considerable punishment from exposure
the engineers. The move through Wirtz- and battle loss beginning on 13 Decem-
feld, now in flames, brought the 38th ber with the start of the Wahlerscheid
under German guns and resulted in operation. It is impossible to determine
some casualties and confusion, but at the ratio between the casualties suffered
0200 on 20 December the rear guard in the first four days of attack and those
tank platoon left Wirtzfeld and half an of the final three days of defense. In-
hour later the 9th Infantry passed deed no total is available for the 2d
through the new lines occupied by the Division during these important seven
38th Infantry a thousand yards west of days. T h e 23d Infantry, in reserve be-
the village. fore 16 December and then committed
T h e four-day battle which had pitted by battalion, sustained these battle
the 2d Infantry Division and the 99th losses: 1st Battalion, 10officers and 221
Infantry Division against the spearheads men; 2d Battalion, 1 officer and 100
of the Sixth Panzer Army had cost both men; 3d Battalion, 10officers and 341
sides heavily in men and materiel. But men. The 9th Infantry, which was en-
in the balance sheet for this desperate gaged both at Wahlerscheid and the
initial phase of the German counteroffen- twin villages, lists 47 officers and men
sive, where lives weighed less than hours killed, 425 wounded, and 192 missing.
won or lost, the reckoning was favorable The regiment likewise had lost nearly
to the Americans. What the fruitless bid 600 officers and men as nonbattle casual-
for a quick decision had cost the Ger- ties (trench foot, respiratory diseases in-
mans in terms of dead and wounded has duced by exposure, fatigue, and related
no accounting. T h e losses of the un- causes) , a figure which tells something
tried 99th Division, fighting its first of the cost of lengthy battle in snow,
major action under circumstances far damp, and mud, but also reflects the
124 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

high incidence of nonbattle cases in a T h e defense of Krinkelt and Roche-


veteran unit whose ranks are filled with rath, so successful that by the second day
troops previously wounded or hospital- many officers and men believed that the
ized-often more than once. T h e bitter sector could be held against all attack,
character of the initial twenty-four is a story of determination and skilled
hours of the 2d Division fight to oc- leadership in a veteran command. But
cupy and hold Krinkelt and Rocherath, more than that, the American battle here
after the march south, is mirrored in the exemplifies a high order of co-ordination
battle losses taken by the 38th Infantry and co-operation (typed though these
in that critical period: 389 officers and terms have become) between the ground
men were missing (many of them killed arms. Although the infantry almost sin-
in action but not so counted since the glehandedly secured the ground and held
Americans subsequently lost the battle- it for the first few hours, the main Ger-
ground) ; 50 wounded were evacuated; man assaults were met and checked by
and 11 were counted as killed in action. infantry, tanks, tank destroyers, and ar-
In the three days at the twin villages tillery. T h e men of the 2d Division had
the 38th Infantry suffered 625 casual- on call and within range ample artillery
ties. support. Communications between the

GUN POSITION ON ELSENBORN RIDGE


T H E GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 125

firing battalions on Elsenborn ridge forests. What the 2d Division actually


and the rifle companies in buildings and had was a little less than a battalion of
foxholes functioned when needed- Sherman tanks mounting the standard
although the losses suffered among the 75-mm. gun, a tank weapon already
artillery forward observers were unu- proven unequal to a duel with Panther
sually high. Artillery throughout this or Tiger in head-to-head encounter. It
fight offered the first line of antitank de- must be said, however, that the 2d Divi-
fense, immobilizing many panzers be- sion tank support came from a seasoned
fore they reached the foxhole line, armored outfit–the 741st Tank Battal-
leaving them with broken tracks and ion-which had landed at OMAHA
sprocket wheels like crippled geese in Beach on 6 June and had been almost
front of the hunter. The 155-mm. bat- constantly in action since. Unable to en-
teries were best at this work. T h e gage the 12th SS Panthers and the GHQ
accuracy and weight of the defensive Tigers on equal terms in the open field,
concentrations laid on from Elsenborn the Shermans were parceled out in and
ridge must also be accounted one of around the villages in two’s and three’s.
the main reasons the American infan- Hidden by walls, houses, and hedgerows,
try were not completely overrun during or making sudden forays into the open,
the night assaults of the 17th and the American tankers stalked the heav-
18th. One battalion of the 2d Division ier, better armed panzers, maneuvering
artillery (the 38th Field Artillery (fired under cover for a clear shot at flank or
more than 5,000 rounds on the 18th. tail, or lying quietly in a lane until a Pan-
But men counted as much as weight of ther or Tiger crossed the sights.
metal. Of the 48 forward observers Since most of the enemy tanks entered
working with the 15th Field Artillery the villages in the dark or in the fog,
Battalion, 32 were evacuated for wounds the defenders generally fought on dis-
or exposure in six days of battle. tinctly advantageous terms and at ranges
Although an experienced outfit, the where–if the heavy frontal protection of
2d Infantry Division made its first fight the German tank could be avoided–a kill
against a large force of tanks in the ac- was certain. The 741st knocked out an
tion at Krinkelt-Rocherath. In the early estimated 27 tanks (nearly all of which
evening of 18 December General Rob- actually were examined) and lost 11
ertson telephoned his assistant division Shermans.9 Even disabled tanks, immo-
commander: “This is a tank battle–if bilized inside the American lines, contin-
there are any tank replacements we ued to have a hand in the fight. Two
could use them as crews are pretty tired. crippled Shermans parked in a Roche-
We could use the tanks mounting a rath lane accounted for five Tigers which
90-mm. [gun].” Robertson’s wish for an incautiously came by broadside. On the
American tank with adequate armament second night the German tanks entered
to cope with the German Panthers and the villages prepared to ferret out the
Tigers was being echoed and would be American armor. Each assault tank was
echoed—prayerfully and profanely— accompanied by foot soldiers armed with
wherever the enemy panzer divisions ap-
peared out of the Ardennes hills and 9 T h e unit was awarded a Presidential Citation.
126 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

bazookas, fires were started to light dark destroyers quickly fell prey to direct
streets and alleys, and many of the Ger- fire or infantry assault. Between 17 and
mans boldly used their searchlights. 19 December the 801st lost 17 guns
These tactics failed; illumination served and 16 half-tracks. Indeed, the greatest
the waiting American tanks as well as combat value of the towed battalion
the enemy. German bazooka teams did came from the mines carried on the
succeed in knocking out a pair of Sher- half-tracks (which were used with effect
mans but generally found the American by adjacent riflemen) and the employ-
infantry, dismounted tankers, and tank ment of the gun crews as infantry. On
destroyer crewmen, waiting to erase the the afternoon of 18 December, with
walking infantry screens. guns and vehicles gone, the bulk of the
T h e American tank destroyers shared battalion was ordered to Elsenborn.
honors with the tanks in this battle, but Even so there were a few instances when
as it often happened in the Ardennes the towed guns were able to fight and
the fight had to be carried by the self- make kills under favorable circum-
propelled guns, the towed guns serving stances. One gun from the 801st had
mostly as convenient targets for the been placed to cover a straggler line
enemy. T h e 644th Tank Destroyer Bat- in the vicinity of Hünningen and here,
talion (minus one company) employed deep inside the American position, sur-
its self-propelled 3-inch guns with such prised and knocked out four Mark IV’s
effect as to destroy 17 tanks, disable 3, before it was destroyed.
and knock out 2 German assault guns. The infantry antitank weapons em-
Two guns of the battalion were damaged ployed in the defense of Krinkelt-Roch-
beyond recovery. Most of these kills were erath varied considerably in effectiveness.
made in or near the villages against The 57-mm. battalion antitank guns-
enemy tanks which had halted and were and their crews–simply were tank fod-
not firing, at ranges from 25 to 1,000 der. T h e mobility of this towed piece,
yards. In some instances one round of which had been a feature of the gun on
high-velocity, armor-piercing ammuni- design boards and in proving ground
tion was sufficient to set a Panther tests, failed in the mud at the forward
aflame; generally two or three rounds positions. Only a very lucky shot could
with base detonating fuzes were needed damage a Panther or Tiger, and at the
and, as the Sherman tanks had found, close of this operation both the 2d and
direct hits on the German frontal armor 99th Divisions recommended the aboli-
or mantlet had the unpleasant habit of tion of the 57-mm. as an infantry anti-
glancing off. tank gun. The rifle battalions which
The experience of the 801st Tank were hurried south from Wahlerscheid
Destroyer Battalion, a towed outfit, was on 17 December had left their mines
markedly different. Emplaced close to in the forest or with the battalion
the infantry line, its 3-inch guns were trains. Even the few antitank mines
brought under intense shelling and on hand could not be put to proper
could be moved only at night. During use during the first night engagement
attack, bogged in mud and unable to when stragglers and vehicular columns
shift firing positions, the towed tank were pouring along the same routes the
T H E GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 127

GERMANTANKSHOWING
WRECKED “BAZOOKA
PANTS,”a defense against rockets.

enemy armor was using. In the first con- mines and high-explosive shellfire. In
tact at the crossroads east of Rocherath the various melees at the villages the
the German tanks were halted by a hasty German tank crews seldom escaped no
mine field, but the rifle company made matter what weapon was used against
its most effective use of this defense by them. Most crewmen were burned as
laying mines to protect the rear of the the tank blew up or they were cut down
American position after the tanks had by bullet fire at close range. T h e 2d
rolled by. The bazooka in the hands of Division, like most veteran divisions,
the defending infantry proved extremely had armed itself beyond the limits of
useful. During the dark hours, bazooka approved tables of equipment. Nearly
teams were able to work close to their every rifle platoon, as a result, had at
prey under the cover provided by walls, least two bazookas, so that team play
houses, and hedgerows. But, as in the case to distract and then destroy the target
of the tank destroyers, most hits were tank was feasible.
scored against tanks which had paused or Although fought mostly as a series of
been stranded by the detonation of close quarter actions, the infantry bat-
128 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

tle in this sector saw little American training of the troops who had been
use of the bayonet. Small arms and light used in the attack. The conclusion
machine guns took over where the reached as to the future conduct of op-
friendly artillery left off, followed by erations on the Sixth Panzer Army
grenades and rifle butts when the en- front was simple enough and in ac-
emy closed. The problem of illuminat- cordance with established German doc-
ing the scene of battle was partially trine: more maneuver room must be se-
solved by burning buildings and tanks. cured so that the attack could “unfold”;
Illuminating shells fired by the 60-mm. the entire Elsenborn area, therefore,
mortars had some local usefulness, but must be won and at once. The right
the precise co-ordination between in- wing must be brought abreast of the
fantry and artillery required for the 1st SS Panzer Division, at this moment
effective use of star shell never was twenty miles to the west of Stoumont.
achieved in this battle. This new plan, probably only a reflec-
tion of conclusions already reached in
On 19 December German General the higher echelons, actually had gone
Staff officers from the high headquarters into effect on 19 December when Ger-
of WFSt and O B W E S T appeared in man tanks and infantry made the first
the battle zone to peer over the shoulders serious attempt to drive northwest from
of the combat commanders and diagnose Büllingen, shoulder the Americans out
the irritating failure to achieve a com- of the Butgenbach position, and open
plete breakthrough. T h e conclusions the Büllingen-Malmédy highway.
they reported (which obviously took
no official account of stubborn Ameri- T h e Enemy Tries the Western Flank
can resistance) were as follows. The 19–23 December
check sustained in this sector could not
be attributed to intervention by Allied In Butgenbach, forty-five hundred
air, an interesting reflection of the im- yards straight west of the 2d Division
portance which Allied air-ground co- anchor point at Wirtzfeld, the 26th In-
operation had assumed in German fantry of the 1st Division covered the 2d
tactical thought by the end of 1944. T h e Division’s flank and rear. T h e area be-
road net opened by the advance on 16 tween the two villages was neutralized,
December had not been put in good re- insofar as any enemy operation was con-
pair. This the observers attributed to a cerned, by a large lake and a series of
breakdown of the para-military Todt Or- streams. T o build a defense in depth
ganization, whose labor groups were along the Büllingen-Butgenbach section
charged with the mission. Since the of the Malmédy road and secure a
whole concept of the Todt Organiza- place on high ground, the 2d Battalion
tion reached high into the realm of Nazi had pushed forward to a ridge near
politics and personalities, this open Dom Butgenbach, a hamlet astride the
animadversion is surprising and un- highway. When the enemy failed to
doubtedly caused some consternation. follow up his earlier sorties from Bül-
The chief source of failure, said the Gen- lingen, American patrols scouted on
eral Staff observers, was the inadequate the 18th in the direction of that village
T H E GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 129

and established that it still belonged to launchers. Fortunately, however, the 2d


the Germans. Battalion had been given ample time to
T h e 26th Infantry held a none too fav- prepare for defense. The rifle platoons
orable position. It was separated from its had dug deep, covering the holes with
own division and could expect little help logs and sandbags; wire was in to the
from the 99th, under which it had occu- 33d Field Artillery Battalion, em-placed
pied Butgenbach, or from the 2d to give support; and the artillery observ-
Division. Isolated action as a regimental ers were dug in well forward.
combat team, however, was not unknown During the night of 18–19 December
in the regiment’s history for it had been the I SS Panzer Corps gathered in Büllin-
so committed in North Africa during the gen the advance striking force designed
Kasserine fight and at Barrafranca in for the attack against Butgenbach. It
Sicily. Although the lake reservoir gave appears too that the forward command
some protection on the left flank the post of the 12th SS Panzer Division
position held by the forward battalion, opened in Büllingen to direct the coming
the 2d, protruded beyond this cover. fight. At least one battalion of the 25th
T h e regimental right flank was bare- SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment had
at least no infantry had been brought arrived, plus a few tanks. T h e bulk of the
in to solidify this section of the line- division kampfgruppe which had fought
and in theory the 26th Infantry was at the twin villages was coming up by
responsible for the defense of the four way of Losheimergraben. The tanks had
miles to the west between Butgenbach an especially hard time on the road,
and the town of Weismes. which had been reduced to a river of
Colonel Daniel’s 2d Battalion, sticking mud (German officers later reported
out like a sore thumb ahead of the rest tanks along the route which had churned
of the regiment, had arrived from the down nearly to their decks) . In addition
north in a depleted state, a condition en- to the advance detachment and recon-
demic throughout the 26th as a result of naissance units of the 12th SS Panzer Di-
the very heavy losses sustained during the vision, the Büllingen force was swelled
1st Division attack toward the Roer during the night by the 27th Fuesilier
River early in December. There, on Regiment and 12th Fuesilier Battalion,
the fringe of the Hürtgen Forest, Com- both of the 12th Volks Grenadier Divi-
panies E and F had been virtually sion, but the ranks of the latter units had
annihilated, Company G shattered. Now been severely reduced during the fight
the 2d Battalion rifle companies were for Losheimergraben.
nine-tenths replacements and num- About 0225 on the 19th some twenty
bered not more than a hundred men truckloads of German infantry dismount-
apiece. All told there were only seven ed just west of Büllingen, deployed be-
officers in the battalion who had been hind a dozen tanks, and moved against
on the roster at the beginning of the 2d Battalion. T h e 33d Field Artillery
December. Two of the heavy ma- Battalion opened up at once with illu-
chine gun platoons were manned by minating shell, then poured in white
inexperienced gunners. There was a phosphorus and high explosive. Some of
shortage of BAR’S and grenade the enemy tanks mired down before they
130 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

could reach the American line; others American reinforcements arrived in the
were discouraged by bazooka and battal- Weismes area on 19 December before the
ion antitank gunfire. Three tanks, how- enemy struck.
ever, kept on along the road leading into T h e 16th Infantry (Col. Frederick W.
Dom Butgenbach until the 155-mm. Gibb) was the second regimental combat
howitzers of the 5th Field Artillery Bat- team of the 1st Division to take its place
talion began to lob HE uncomfortably in the barrier being erected on the north-
close. Possibly crippled by concussion, ern shoulder of the expanding German
the tanks were abandoned but the crews salient. The 2d Battalion, leading the
got away. south-moving column, was well set in
The next German attack, at 1010,con- Weismes when, in the late afternoon of
sisted of attempts in company strength to 19 December, the 3d Parachute Division
find weak points in the 1,800-yard line commenced desultory jabs at the village.
occupied by the 2d Battalion. One of At the same time the balance of the 16th
these, against Company G, was broken Infantry detrucked and swelled out the
up by shells fired in by four battalions of Weismes front, making contact to the
field artillery. A Panther and an armored west with troops of the veteran 30th In-
scout car got through. Then a 57-mm. fantry Division which had just come into
antitank gun crew crippled both, but the the Malmédy sector. By the evening of
scout car got off one round that killed the 19 December, then, the 1st Infantry Di-
crew, Cpl. Hale Williams and Pvt. Rich- vision had neighbors on either flank and
ard Wollenberg. However, the armored its 26th Infantry, although still out in
threat was ended at this point. On the front, could concentrate on the enemy
east flank two of the battalion’s antitank force building up at Büllingen.
guns got the two leading tanks, and ma- During the night of 19–20 December
chine gun and mortar fire drove off the the advance kampfgruppe of the 12th
accompanying infantry. This action SS Panzer Division and the bulk of one
ended the first German attempt at crack- regiment from the 12th Volks Grenadier
ing the Butgenbach block. The next Division completed their assembly.
would wait upon the assembly of the About 0600 twenty German tanks and a
troops and vehicles slowly gathering at rifle battalion converged on Dom But-
Büllingen, where the II SS Panzer Corps genbach in the early morning fog and
had taken over direction of the battle. mist from south and east. T h e front lit
On 18 and 19 December the 3 d Para- up as the American mortars and artil-
chute Division, which had been follow- lery shot illuminating shell over the
ing in the wake of the 1st SS Panzer roads leading to the village. Concen-
Division westward, began to concentrate tration after concentration then plunged
south of Weismes. It may be that the 3d down, three battalions of field artillery
Parachute Division thus far had received and a 90-mm. battery of antiaircraft
no orders as to the projected widening artillery firing as fast as the pieces
of the Sixth Panzer Army corridor of ad- could be worked. The enemy infantry,
vance and was content with holding a punished by this fire and the stream
blocking position along the German of bullets from the American foxhole
flank as originally planned. As it was, line, wavered but a handful of tanks
T H E GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 131

rolled off the roads and into Dom enemy make another try until dusk, and
Butgenbach. (They had shot down three then only with combat patrols.
bazooka teams and a Company H ma- T h e hardest blows dealt the 2d Bat-
chine gun section.) Here, in the dark, talion defenders at Dom Butgenbach
battalion antitank guns placed to defend came on 21 December. After repeated
the 2d Battalion command post went to pleas from the 12th SS Panzer the guns
work firing point-blank at the exhaust and Werfers which had been used at
flashes as the German vehicles passed. Krinkelt-Rocherath were committed, and
Two enemy tanks were holed and the the entire 25th Panzer Grenadier Regi-
rest fled the village, although the anti- ment was also made available, as well as
tank gun crews suffered at the hands of one battalion or more of the 12th SS
the German bazooka teams that had fil- Panzer Regiment. About three hours be-
tered in with the tanks. fore dawn guns, mortars, tanks, and
A second try came just before dawn, Werfers began pounding the American
this time straight down the road from foxhole line, which was outlined by a
Büllingen. Ten German tanks in single double row of trees, and the few houses
file were sighted as they came over a in Dom Butgenbach. This fire continued
slight ridge to the front of Company F. unremittingly until the first light in the
Two tank destroyers and three antitank east, inflicting many casualties, destroy-
guns drove the tanks off or at least ing weapons by direct hits, and tearing
caused them to turn west in search of a large gaps in the main line of resistance.
weaker spot in the 2d Battalion defenses. American counterbattery fire was intense
In the next thrust a platoon of Company but failed to still the enemy shelling.
G was badly cut up before friendly artil- Now, as the Germans crossed the fields
lery finally checked the attack. Fifteen in assault formation, the American for-
minutes later, apparently still seeking a ward observers called for a defensive bar-
hole, the Germans hit Company E, next rage to box their own front lines. At
in line to the west. The 60-mm. mortars least ten field artillery battalions ulti-
illuminated the ground in front of the mately joined the fight (for this batteries
company at just the right moment and of the 2d and 99th Divisions were tied
two of three tanks heading the assault into the 1st Division fire control system)
were knocked out by bazooka and 57- and succeeded in discouraging the Ger-
mm. fire from the flank. T h e third tank man infantry.
commander stuck his head out of the Some panzers and assault guns did
escape hatch to take a look around and make their way through the storm of ex-
was promptly pistoled by an American ploding shells and against the 2d Battal-
corporal. 10By this time shellfire had scat- ion right. During the previous night two
tered the German infantry. Nor did the platoons of the regimental antitank com-
pany had taken station here right on the
10This was Cpl. Henry F. Warner, one of the
57-mm. antitank gunners. He fought the Ger-
foxhole line and surprised the panzers
man tanks for two days, often by himself, and with fire at no more than 100 yards.
destroyed three panzers, but finally was killed Two or three kills were inflicted by the
by a machine gun burst from one of the panzers
he was stalking. Warner was awarded the Medal
1st Platoon, but other tanks quickly shot
of Honor. down the 57-mm. crews and then over-
132 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE

ran the guns of the 2d Platoon.11 At this dwindling, the 2d Battalion commander
segment of the 2d Battalion main line of paid the infantryman’s heartfelt compli-
resistance the foxhole line followed a ment to the guns. “The artillery did a
long hedgerow. Having broken through great job. I don’t know where they got
and destroyed the American antitank the ammo or when they took time out to
guns, the German tankers drove along flush the guns but we wouldn’t be here
the hedgerows searching out the auto- now if it wasn’t for them. . . . A hun-
matic weapons which earlier had helped dred [Germans] . . . came at one platoon
check the infantry assault. Undefended and not one of them got through.”12
against moving steel, the BAR and ma- T h e regimental cannon company, the 1st
chine gun crews were wiped out. Division Artillery, the 406th Field Artil-
Through this gaping hole on the 2d lery Group, and reinforcing batteries
Battalion right more tanks appeared as from the 2d and 99th Divisions fired over
the morning progressed and moved down ten thousand rounds in support of the
the slope toward Dom Butgenbach. A Dom Butgenbach defenders during an
self-propelled tank destroyer belonging eight-hour shoot on the 21st,plastering
to the 634th Tank Destroyer Battalion enemy assembly areas and the road net
accounted for seven tanks in succession and plowing up the fields across which
as these, in column, hove in sight over the German attack came. For one period
the ridge line. Two Sherman tanks, ly- of three hours all communication be-
ing close to a barn, got two of the Ger- tween the hard-pressed rifle battalion
mans before they, in turn, were knocked and the artillery broke under German
out. Three of the enemy reached the fire, but the American shells continued
cluster of buildings and fired point- to arrive with devastating effect. A patrol
blank into the houses and barns Colo- sent into the woods from which had come
nel Daniel and the 2d Battalion com- the final assault against the riddled bat-
mand post group were defending. Every talion flank reported a count of three
device was used to reach the tanks but hundred dead enemy infantry-the rea-
with no success until, finding it warm, son, perhaps, why the tanks that pene-
two made a break for the open and trated to the 2d Battalion command post
were stopped by a section of 90-mm. came alone. At any rate the 12th Volks
tank destroyers which had just come Grenadier Division had had enough.
up. The last tank was flushed out The division commander told his supe-
from behind a barn by 91-mm. mortar riors that no more attacks could be made
fire but got away. unless a promised assault gun battalion
The battalion mortars had played an arrived to ramrod the infantry. T h e total
important role all along the line (one German casualty list must have been
section firing 750 rounds before its posi- high, and after these three days of battle
tion was blasted by close-range tank fire) , heavy inroads had been made in the tank
and so had every American weapon that strength of the 12th SS Panzer Regi-
could be brought to bear. But in late ment.
afternoon, when the German assault was T h e 2d Battalion, understrength
11Sgt. I. R. Schwartz received the DSC for gal-
lantry in this action, 12 Colonel Daniel himself received the DSC.
T H E GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 133

when it arrived to face the Germans, had 18th and 26th to close the gap, and by
been reduced by perhaps one quarter. the end of the day the situation was well
Indeed, in midafternoon of the 21st, the in hand. Again the American gunners
battalion commander had planned with- had taken over a large share of the
drawing a thousand yards to the rear to burden, firing over 300 missions. T h e
compensate for the dwindling strength in co-operation between the artillery and
the firing line. But when the 2d reorgan- infantry arms, it must be said, was re-
ized that evening its position was some- ciprocal. The fact that the 26th Infantry
what strengthened. Company C, with had continued to hold its position on
extra bazookas, had come up to man the ground overlooking the German routes
denuded right flank, the 1st Engineer west had allowed the observers a grand-
Combat Battalion laid a hasty field of stand seat and had caused the German
about a thousand mines in front of the columns taking the 1st SS Panzer Divi-
lines, and the regiment had attached the sion detour through Schoppen to run a
4.2-inch mortars of the 2d Division gantlet of accurate and continuous fire.
chemical battalion to Daniel’s com- The successful withdrawal from the
mand. Krinkelt-Rocherath sector to the more
Meanwhile the enemy regrouped to favorable terrain of the Elsenborn ridge
continue the attack with new forces. T h e had resulted, by 20 December, in a fairly
armored infantry reserve of the 12th SS homogeneous and well-constructed de-
Panzer Division, the 26th Panzer Grena- fense with the 2d Division on the right
dier Regiment, finally had negotiated the and the 99th Division on the left. On the
poor roads and traffic jams along the Ger- morning of this same day the 9th Infan-
man line of communications and arrived try Division took over the Monschau-
in Büllingen, ready for its first commit- Höfen sector (its 47th Infantry had
ment in the offensive. Shortly after day moved earlier into supporting position
broke on 22 December patrols from the west of these two towns) and so covered
26th commenced to probe at the 2d Bat- the northern flank of the 99th.
talion lines. The fresh enemy regiment, The German attempt to crack the
however, set out to vary the unsuccessful newly formed north-south line was han-
headlong tactics previously employed by dled in catch-as-catch-canand piecemeal
striking at the flanks of the Dom Butgen- fashion, for the primary mission was the
bach position. The first assault, shortly flanking maneuver in the Butgenbach
before 1000, carried an undetermined area. T h e 3d Panzer Grenadier Division,
number of panzer grenadiers through a which had relieved the 12th SS Panzer
gap between Companies A and K, on the Division at the twin villages, went to
right of the 2d Battalion. Here there work at once against the 99th Division
were about twenty Mark V’s and tank portion of the Elsenborn line although
destroyers, but the 90-mm. tank de- the bulk of its rifle strength was not yet
stroyers from the 613th Tank Destroyer in hand. On the morning of 20 Decem-
Battalion rushed in on the flank and ber German tanks and infantry made
stopped the enemy. T h e continued the first of three assaults. But the 99th,
threat, though serious, was countered on a forward slope with perfect visibility
by shifting local reserves from the and good fields of fire, checked this and
134 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

the subsequent attempts with heavy During the night of 22 December an


losses to the attacker. On the following artillery bombardment prepared the way
day, the 3d Panzer Grenadier was caught for German infiltration elsewhere on the
by artillery fire just as its assault waves 9th Division front. But when day broke
were forming. Confused and disorgan- the Americans drove the enemy back
ized, the German infantry were unable after a series of short fire fights and re-
to make another bid. stored the line in its entirety. T h e 277th
Farther north, on 22 December, the Yolks Grenadier Division no longer
277th Volks Grenadier Division returned possessed the strength to make a real
to the fray after licking the wounds it effort against the north wing of the
had suffered at Krinkelt-Rocherath and Elsenborn line. The 326th Volks Gren-
adding some companies of the 29th Pan- adier Division, its northern neighbor,
zer Grenadier Regiment (3d Panzer had given no hand in this fight-not
Grenadier Division). Early in the morn- surprising in view of the punishment
ing two companies from the 277th made taken at Höfen and Monschau. Both
a sharp attack to gain the high ground divisions now fell out of the drive to
east of Kalterherberg occupied by the widen the way west. T h e surest signal
99th Reconnaissance Troop. No friendly of the failure on the right wing of the
artillery was ranged in and the German Sixth Panzer Army was the ignominious
infantry marched through a mine field, end of the attack in the Butgenbach sec-
crossed a stream under direct bullet fire, tor, On the morning of 23 December the
and drove through the extended cavalry 18th Infantry barred the gap which had
line. Two of the cavalry platoons were opened the day before on the right of
encircled and the attack carried for a the 26th Infantry-and the 12th SS Pan-
thousand yards before Company E of the zer Division threw in the sponge.
47th Infantry and the remaining troop- Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow's V
ers were able to halt it. Apparently Corps now had four infantry divisions,
intent on driving as deeply to the Amer- the 9th, 99th, 2d, and 1st,standing firmly
ican rear as possible, the grenadiers gave on well-organized ground from Mon-
the encircled platoons a breathing spell schau to Weismes. T h e barrier so pre-
and with nightfall the Americans suc- sented would restrict and straitjacket the
ceeded in escaping. T h e fight spread to northern shoulder of the German salient,
the 39th Infantry during the afternoon at this moment still expanding to the
when small groups of the enemy began west. The question remained as to
to infiltrate. Reinforcements brought whether, at a later date, the Sixth Pan-
forward under a smoke screen nourished zer Army would or could shake this
the German assault, which by nightfall shoulder free. As it stood, the 1st and 9th
had won a foothold inside the American Divisions were given time to concentrate
main line of resistance. 13 and regroup their hastily committed reg-
iments, while the 2d and 99th set about
13During the German assault Sgt. Peter J. Dales- the business of acquiring replacements
sandro of Company E saved his company from for lost men and weapons, gaining a
complete rout by a last-ditch stand with grenades
and an abandoned machine gun. When he could barrage right on his own position. He was awarded
hold no longer, the sergeant called for a mortar the Medal of Honor.
T H E GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 135

breather after days of savage and costly Fuehrer so relied would continue to play
conflict. On the enemy side the LXVII a major role in the Ardennes counter-
Corps took over control of the line Mon- offensive but no longer would be charged
schau-Weismeswith the 3d Panzer Gren- with the main effort; this had passed on
adier, 12th Volks Grenadier, 3d Para- 20 December to Manteuffel and the
chute, 277th, and 326th. 14 Fifth Panzer Army. 15And if, as Manteuf-
T h e American troops who had fel later suggested, the Fuehrer wanted
jammed the right shoulder of the Sixth to see an SS and a regular panzer army
Panzer Army knew they had made a fight competing, it could be said that he had
of it. They could hardly know that they his answer.
had knocked a part of Hitler's personal
operations plan into a cocked hat. T h e 15This decision was made about noon on the
elite SS panzer formations on which the 20th, probably by Model supported by Rundstedt,
but this is not certain. OB WEST KTB, 20 Dec
14See below, pp. 579–80. 44.
CHAPTER VII

Breakthrough at the Schnee Eifel


Introductory Note and can be applied as a corrective in
most of the major areas of controversy
T h e story of the 106th Infantry Divi- and contradiction. *
sion and the attached 14th Cavalry
Group is tragic. It is also highly contro-
versial. Since the major part of the * The records and reports of the 106th Division
division was eliminated from combined and the 424th Infantry are intact although rather
scanty in content. The records of the 422d and
operations with other American forces 423d were destroyed before the capture of these
on the second day of the German coun- regiments, but the Historical Division, ETO, did
teroffensive, information from contem- interview a large number of officers and men from
porary records is scanty and, as these regiments when they were released from
German prisons. First Army conducted Inspector
to particulars, often completely lacking. General investigations of the actions of the 106th
T h e historian, as a result, must tread Division, the 820th Tank Destroyer Battalion, the
warily through the maze of recrimina- 106th Reconnaissance Troop, and the 14th Cavalry
Group. Most of the records of the 14th Cavalry
tion and highly personalized recollection Group were destroyed but the commanding offi-
which surrounds this story. It should not cer, Col. Mark Devine, provided the author with
be concluded that reminiscence by those some personal papers. The VIII Corps after ac-
caught u p in this disaster is consciously tion report and G–2 and G–3 journals are very
useful for the relations between corps and division.
tendentious. But the officers and men of Participants in this battle made special reports
the 106th Division who so narrowly es- for the Advanced Infantry Officers Course No. 1
caped the German trap or who spent (Maj. William P. Moon, Maj. J. C. Hollinger,
months in German prisons would be less and Capt. Alan W. Jones, Jr.) See also, the 275th
Armored Field Artillery Battalion journal and
than human if they did not seek to dis- S–2 report. Col. R. Ernest Dupuy has written a
cover the cause of this debacle in either very good semiofficial history entitled, S t . Vith:
human error or frailty. Since the author Lion in the Way, the 106th Infantry Division in
World W a r II (Washington: Infantry Journal
has been forced to depend in so great Press, 1949). Dupuy’s work has been heavily
degree on the human memory, unaided drawn on, but the reader will find several points
or unchallenged by the written record, at which Dupuy and the present account differ.
the scholar’s old rule “one witness, no The German manuscripts are very detailed and
useful; see particularly MSS # B–026, Effects of
witness” has been generally applied. Ardennes Offensive on Army Group G (SS Gen-
Even so, some relaxation of the rule is eraloberst Waffen-SS Paul Hauser); B–688 (incor-
necessary if a sustained and sequential porating B–734), 18th Volks Grenadier Division, 1
narrative is to be presented. Fortunately, September 1944–25January 1945 (Lt. Col. Dietrich
Moll) ; A–924 (Kraemer); B–333, L X V I Corps,
the picture as seen from the German side October–23 December 1944 (General der Artillerie
of the Schnee Eifel is fairly complete Walter Lucht) .
BREAKTHROUGH A T T H E SCHNEE EIFEL 137

Dispositions of the deep into the German lines. Although


106th Infantry Division such a salient was exposed, the possession
of at least a wedge in the West Wall
From the Eifel plateau protrude three seemed to compensate for the risk in-
distinct ridges or ranges, the central be- volved. It should be noticed that the
ing called the Schnee Eifel. This middle Schnee Eifel range is terminated in the
ridge, so important in the action that south by a cross corridor, running against
developed in the 106th Division sector, the usual north to south grain of the
inclines northeast-southwest. At the west- Eifel plateau. This is the valley of the
ern foot of the Schnee Eifel there runs a Alf, a small creek which makes a long
long narrow valley incised in the high horse-shoe bend around the Schnee Eifel
plain, the so-called Losheim Gap. On the east to the village of Pronsfeld.
western side of the gap the Our River Three main roads run through this
meanders along, and beyond the river to area. From the crossroads village of Hall-
the west the plateau appears once more schlag the northernmost descends into
in heavily wooded form. T h e Losheim the Our valley, crossing and recrossing
Gap is no pleasant, pastoral valley but is the river until it reaches St. Vith. T h e
cluttered by abrupt hills, some bare, center road, secondary in construction,
others covered by fir trees and thick traverses the Losheim Gap from Roth
undergrowth. Most of the little villages southwestward. T h e southernmost road
here are found in the draws and potholes follows the valley of the Alf from Prüm,
which further scoop out the main valley. but eventually turns through Winter-
T h e Losheim Gap was occupied on 16 spelt toward the northwest and St. Vith.
December by a reinforced squadron of Thus two main roads, of macadam con-
the 14th Cavalry Group. ( M a p III) struction and some twenty-two feet wide,
T h e fate of the 106th Infantry Divi- ran through the American positions
sion and the 14th Cavalry Group was directly to St. Vith. These roads were
bound together on that day by official characteristic of the eastern Ardennes,
orders attaching the cavalry to the infan- winding, with many blind turns,
try, by circumstances of terrain, and by squeezing through narrow village streets,
the German plan of attack. T o the dipping abruptly, and rising suddenly
left of the cavalry group ran the bound- across the ravines. But each of the roads
ary between the VIII Corps and V to St. Vith circles around the Schnee
Corps, its northern neighbor being the Eifel at one of its termini.
99th Infantry Division. To the right The width of the sector held by the
of the 106th lay the 28th Division, con- 106th Infantry Division and the attached
stituting the center of General Middle- 14th Cavalry Group was approximately
ton's corps. T h e 106th itself occupied the eighteen air-line miles. When traced on
central and southern sections of the the ground, the line these forces were
heavily forested Schnee Eifel. responsible for defending was actually
American successes some weeks earlier more than twenty-one miles in length.
had driven the enemy from a part of the T h e 14th Cavalry Group (Col. Mark
West Wall positions along the Schnee Devine) was charged with a 9,000-yard
Eifel, creating a salient which jutted front in the 106th Division sector along
138 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

the line Lanzerath-Krewinkel-Roth- by streams and knotted by hills as is


Kobscheid. This disposition placed the common on the Ardennes plateau. In
cavalry to the north of the Schnee Eifel contrast to the ridge lines the floor of the
and across the northeastern entrance to gap had a few trees. T h e infantry posi-
the Losheim Gap. The section of the tions inherited by the cavalry were in
West Wall which barred egress from the the little villages, most of which had
gap lay beyond the cavalry positions. been built in depressions offering some
T h e dispositions of the 106th Infantry protection against the raw winds which
Division (Maj. Gen. Alan W. Jones) sweep the Ardennes. There were eight
followed an irregular line which in gen- garrison points; a homogeneous defense
eral trended from northeast to southwest. line, of course, was out of the question.
T h e 422d Infantry (Col. George L. In addition, there existed substantial
Descheneaux, Jr.) occupied the forward gaps on both flanks of the cavalry. In
positions of the West Wall on the crest the north the gap between the 14th
and western slopes of the midsection of Cavalry Group and the 99th Infantry
the Schnee Eifel. This regiment and the Division was approximately two miles
cavalry, therefore, combined as defend- across. A small party from the attached
ers of a salient protruding beyond the tank destroyer outfit (Company A,
neighbors to the north and south. The 820th Tank Destroyer Battalion)
line occupied by the 423d Infantry (Col. patrolled this opening at two-hour inter-
Charles C. Cavender) continued briefly vals in conjunction with an I and R Pla-
on the Schnee Eifel, then as this range toon from the 99th Division. There was
dropped away swung back into the west- an unoccupied strip between the right
ern portion of the Alf valley. Thence of the cavalry and the left of the 422d In-
followed a gap screened by the division fantry about one and a half miles across;
reconnaissance troop. The 424th Infan- the responsibility for patrolling here was
try (Col. Alexander D. Reid) continued given to the infantry.
the bend to the west at Grosslangenfeld At best the cavalry positions could only
and joined the 28th Infantry Division, be described as small islands of resist-
at least by periodic patrols, north of ance, manned usually in platoon
Lützkampen. strength and depending on automatic
On 19 October the 18th Cavalry Re- weapons dismounted from the cavalry
connaissance Squadron had taken over vehicles or on the towed 3-inch guns
the positions in the Losheim Gap from of the tank destroyer company. Some
another cavalry squadron attached to the barbed wire had been strung around
2d Infantry Division with instructions to the garrison villages. Mine fields, both
occupy the infantry positions then exist- German and American, were known to
ing. The 14th Cavalry Group took over be in the area, but neither the 14th
the sector on 11 December, using the Cavalry Group nor the 2d Infantry
18th and a company of 3-inch towed Division before it could chart their
tank destroyers much as they had been location. On 14 December Colonel De-
deployed.' earlier. The ground occupied vine had asked corps for engineers and
by the cavalry was relatively flat here at more mines.
the mouth of the gap, although broken Contrary to the doctrine and training
BREAKTHROUGH A T T H E SCHNEE EIFEL 139

of mechanized cavalry, the 14th Cavalry for approximately 200 prearranged con-
Group was committed to a positional centrations to be fired on call in the gap.
defense. Since the cavalry squadron There is no evidence that this plan was
does not have the staying power for taken over by the 106th Division artil-
defense in depth, and since the width of lery (which would have had to shift its
this front made an interlocking linear battalions), but the cavalry did have one
defense impossible, the 14th–if hit hard battalion of 105-mm. howitzers, the
–was at best capable only of delaying 275th Armored (Lt. Col. Roy Udell
action. Lacking the freedom of maneuver Clay), in support about two and a half
usually accorded cavalry, the 14th Cav- miles west of Manderfeld.
alry Group would have little hope of Much of the subsequent story of events
winning time by counterattack. T h e 32d in the Losheim Gap and the Schnee
Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, re- Eifel turns on the relations between the
fitting near Vielsalm, Belgium, was avail- 106th Division and the 14th Cavalry
able on short notice to reinforce the rest Group. T h e brief span of their acquaint-
of the cavalry group; its officers had ance is therefore pertinent. On 20 Octo-
reconnoitered forward positions and ber the 106th Division shipped from the
telephone wire had been laid in at a few United States. On 11 December it as-
points. There seems to have been no sumed its first combat role, taking over
specific plan for the employment of the the quiet sector on the left of the VIII
32d Squadron. Colonel Devine and his Corps where the veteran 2d Infantry
staff, during the few days available, had Division had been resting. T h e relief
worked out a general defensive plan was completed a day later. T h e 18th
giving specific routes of withdrawal and Cavalry Squadron had been in the gap
successive defense lines. Apparently this positions since 19 October, less B Troop
plan was finished on the night of 15 De- which was deployed on the south flank
cember but was never circulated. of the 2d Division and which remained
T h e staff of the cavalry group was in that area when the 106th arrived. Gen-
evidently familiar with the defensive eral Robertson, the 2d Division com-
plan worked out earlier by the 2d Divi- mander, had long regarded the single
sion which, in the Losheim area, called cavalry squadron as insufficient to cover
for an initial withdrawal to the Mander- the Losheim Gap and had centered his
feld ridge and an American counter- sole divisional reserve, a reinforced in-
attack by forces taken from the Schnee fantry battalion, in the vicinity of Auw
Eifel. During the brief attachment of the so as to support either the cavalry or
14th Cavalry Group to the 106th Divi- infantry. Robertson’s recommendations
sion no comparable plan to support the finally were noticed and on 11 December
forces on the low ground in the gap by the 106th Division had attached to it a
withdrawing troops from the more full cavalry reconnaissance group instead
readily defended line on the Schnee of only the one squadron. But time to
Eifel was ever issued, although Colonel organize the defense of the individual
Devine had made several trips to the sectors of the 106th Division, much less
106th on this matter. T h e 2d Division to co-ordinate over-all defensive plans
also had an artillery plan which provided and preparations, was short.
140 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

T h e 106th Infantry Division had been west to a shortened line along the Auw-
activated in March 1943. Early in 1944 Bleialf ridge road, thus freeing one
the division took part in the Tennessee combat team for counterattack in the
maneuvers, but its training program (as north. Local counterattack plans pre-
in the case of many new divisions) was pared by regiments and battalions like-
more or less vitiated when some 60 per- wise were handed over. From 12 through
cent of the enlisted strength was drained 15 December the 106th Division com-
off to meet the heavy demands for mander and staff reconnoitered the new
trained infantry before and after D-day. area; then, after a conference with the
When the 106th Division relieved the 2d VIII Corps commander, they began
Division on 11–12 December, freeing study on detailed recommendations for
the latter for use in the proposed V a more adequate defense. These were
Corps attack to seize the Roer River never completed or submitted although
dams, it moved into well-prepared posi- General Jones did make oral requests to
tions and a fairly quiet front. T h e alter his deployment.
veteran 2d Division had protected its In the circumstances then existing,
front-line units against the bitter Ar- adequate measures to cope with the
dennes weather with log dugouts for the problem of such an extended front
rifle and weapon squads. Stoves were in would have required one of two things:
the squad huts and the kitchen ranges substantial reinforcement or withdrawal
were up front in covered dugouts. Heavy to a shorter line. Some five weeks earlier
weapons were exchanged, the 106th General Middleton had acted to reduce
taking over the .50-caliber machine guns, the Schnee Eifel salient by withdrawing
mortars, and other weapons where they the 23d Infantry (2d Division) from its
had been emplaced in order to conceal forward positions in the West Wall. It
the relief from the enemy. T h e extensive was into this new westward sector on the
communications net prepared by the 2d right flank of the salient that the 424th
Division, with wire to almost every squad Infantry moved–even so, the regiment
and outpost, was left to the 106th, but took over a front of nearly six miles.
unlike its predecessor the 106th had few Middleton was under compulsion from
sound-powered telephones. higher headquarters to retain the Schnee
Before his departure the 2d Division Eifel salient and the existing dispositions
commander handed over his defensive of the two regiments therein. There
scheme and briefed the incoming com- were plans afoot for an attack toward
mander and staff. Because General Bonn, as part of the forthcoming Allied
Robertson had looked upon the Losheim offensive, and the gap in the West Wall
Gap as particularly sensitive, the 2d Di- represented by this salient would be ex-
vision defensive and counterattack plans tremely useful in any sortie against
laid special emphasis on support for Bonn.
troops in that sector. In brief, the 2d Besides the 14th Cavalry Group the
Division planned to pull the forces in 106th Division possessed the conven-
the gap back to the Manderfeld ridge tional attached units: a tank destroyer
while the two regimental combat teams battalion (the 820th) and an antiair-
on the Schnee Eifel would withdraw craft battalion (the 634th Automatic
BREAKTHROUGH A T T H E SCHNEE EIFEL 141

Weapons). In addition to the 275th Ar- Division had been acclimatized to its new
mored Field Artillery Battalion, sup- surroundings by the morning of 16 De-
porting the cavalry, eight battalions of cember is impossible to determine. T h e
corps artillery were in position to rein- arduous truck journey across France and
force the 106th Division artillery by fire Belgium, through bitter cold and cling-
when called.1 These battalions repre- ing damp, must have been dispiriting to
sented the bulk of the VIII Corps untried troops. T h e front-line shelters in
artillery. which the veterans of the 2d Infantry
The road net within the division area Division had made themselves relatively
and to its front was limited and in poor comfortable probably did little more
condition, but this was an endemic con- than take the raw edge off the miserable
dition in the Ardennes, particularly dur- weather prevalent when the 106th
ing winter months. T h e macadam marched to the bunkers, foxholes, and
stretches required constant mending dugouts. By 15 December a number of
and the dirt roads quickly sank away trench foot cases already had occurred,
where not shored up with logs and particularly in the 422d Infantry, which
stone. But though transit by heavy vehic- had been the last regiment to draw over-
ular columns was difficult it was by no shoes.
means impossible-as the event proved. T h e extent to which the division was
Four avenues of penetration were open armed to defend itself is also a matter
to a road-bound enemy. All four would of debate. All units had the normal basic
be used. Following from north to south, load of ammunition on hand, although
they were: (1) Hallschlag, southwest there seems to have been a shortage of
through Manderfeld (the 14th Cavalry carbine and bazooka rounds. T h e near-
Group command post) and Schönberg est ammunition supply point was at
(at this point crossing the Our River), Noville, over forty miles southwest of
thence to St. Vith; (2) a secondary road St. Vith, making resupply slow and diffi-
from Roth, west through Auw, then to cult. Jones had requested antitank mines
Schönberg or Bleialf; (3) Prüm (a large but these were not delivered in time. A
German communications center) north- thin, linear defense such as that inherited
west to Bleialf and on to Schönberg; (4) in the Schnee Eifel required an extraor-
Pronsfeld, directly northwest through dinary number of automatic weapons.
Habscheid and Winterspelt to the Our Although by this time the veteran E T 0
River bridges at Steinebrück, then on to divisions were carrying BAR’Sand light
St. Vith. These roads, following the machine guns far in excess of authorized
natural channels around and west of the allowances, the 106th Division possessed
Schnee Eifel, extend across the Our only the regulation number and type of
River by way of bridges at Andler, issue weapons-fewer than were needed
Schönberg, and Steinebrück. St Vith is to organize a twenty-one mile front. On
the funnel through which the roads the whole, however, the 106th seems to
coming from the Our pass to the west. have entered the line with a high state
The degree to which the green 106th of morale; had it not exchanged the
1 These were the 770th 965th, 333d, 771st. 559th, tedium of training and “show-down” in-
561st, 578th, and 740th Field Artillery Battalions. spections for the excitement of an active
142 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

theater of operations where victory was ing Lucht and his chief of staff at the
always the American portion? planning table. T h e Luftwaffe could
furnish no terrain photos, but detailed
Enemy Preparations for Another maps and terrain appreciations for this
Cannae area were on file. T h e final terrain esti-
mate concluded that the sector north of
Late in November 1944 General the Schnee Eifel offered fewer natural
Lucht, commander of the L X V I Corps obstacles than that to the south. Further-
was called to the headquarters of the more, the Losheim Gap appeared to have
Fifth Panzer Army. Here Manteuffel the weakest defending force. T h e Our
told him of the coming offensive in the River was an obstacle, but known cross-
Ardennes and said that his corps would ing sites existed at Andler, Schönberg,
form the army right wing. T h e corps’ and Steinebrück. St. Vith was nearly
mission, in brief, would be to bypass the equidistant from the planned attack
Schnee Eifel on either side, seize the positions north or south of the Schnee
road net at St. Vith, and thrust in Eifel, twelve to fourteen straight-line
columnar formation to and across the miles.
Meuse River. Lucht would be given only T h e final plan of maneuver, largely
two infantry divisions, one of which, the dictated by Manteuffel, made the 18th
18th Volks Grenadier Division, was Volks Grenadier Division responsible for
holding the section of the West Wall a concentric attack moving north and
along the northern reaches of the Schnee south of the Schnee Eifel. T h e division
Eifel. T h e second division, unnamed, would place its strongest kampfgruppe
would not be designated or available in the north, however, and make the
until shortly before the attack. T h e main corps effort there. Lucht reasoned
LXVI Corps commander apparently that the 18th knew the ground and
was not unduly concerned by the lack would make the quickest progress; but
of weight allotted; after all, the main he also wished to retain close control
army effort turned on its two panzer over the drive when it reached St. Vith,
corps. But like all veteran German and such control could best be exercised
field commanders on the Western by a single command. Furthermore the
Front, Lucht was vitally concerned with second division would have no time to
the problem of air support. T h e first learn the ground and, set to make a
question he put to Manteuffel phrased single envelopment in the southern part
this concern. Manteuffel parried with of the corps sector, would face extensive
the stock answer: OKW had promised field fortifications on broken, wooded
adequate air support; but in any case it terrain. T h e fact that Lucht did not ex-
was hoped that bad flying weather during pect the thin American line to his front
December would drastically curtail the to offer strong resistance may be one of
enemy effectiveness in the air. the reasons he risked splitting the 18th
About 1 December the commander of Volks Grenadier Division, rather than
the 18th Volks Grenadier Division, committing one division at each end of
Generalmajor Hoffmann-Schönborn, was the Schnee Eifel. Since none of the
let in on the closely guarded secret, join- German planners expected an American
BREAKTHROUGH A T T H E SCHNEE EIFEL 143

counterthrust across the Schnee Eifel group was heavily weighted, consisting
range, a very small force from the 18th of two regiments, most of the division
Volks Grenadier Replacement Battalion artillery, and the assault gun brigade. In
was reckoned a sufficient screen on the reserve, for exploitation of any success
heights. T h e corps lacked a tank battal- on the right wing, was a mobile battal-
ion and was assigned an assault gun lion, made up of the division tank de-
brigade in its place. The corps artillery stroyer battalion, a reconnaissance com-
was deemed too weak to engage the pany, and an engineer company. T h e
Americans in a counterbattery duel at main breakthrough was to be attempted
the outset of the attack, and in addition in the vicinity of Roth. T h e left attack
the Germans hoped to make early and group, one regiment and a battalion of
deep penetrations by surprise; concerted self-propelled artillery, was directed to
artillery preparations prior to H-hour, make its penetration through Bleialf,
then, were ruled out. Neither Fifth where the Americans probably would
Panzer Army nor L X V I Corps seems to be encountered in force. Nevertheless,
have fixed a definite timetable; the 18th this kampfgruppe had the mission of
Volks Grenadier Division is said not to seizing the Schönberg bridge. T h e divi-
have expected to reach St. Vith earlier sion replacement battalion, two hun-
than 18 December. dred strong, would be left to man the
Both the divisions which subsequently division center along the Schnee Eifel.
took part in the Schnee Eifel operation Early in December the 62d Volks
were newly organized and inexperi- Grenadier Division, Lucht’s second di-
enced. The 18th had been formed dur- vision, detrained at Prüm, but did not
ing September on the ruins of the 18th go immediately into the forward corps
Air Force Field Division, earlier de- sector. T h e 62d bore the number of an
stroyed in the Mons pocket. Recon- infantry division which had been de-
structed from Luftwaffe and Navy units, stroyed on the Eastern Front, but it had
plus a strong admixture of Volks- been rebuilt from the ground up. Never
deutsche and workers drawn in by the before in action, the 62d was commanded
new draft laws, the 18th lacked trained by a general who likewise lacked combat
noncoms and officers. But the unit was experience, Generalmajor Frederich
more fortunate than many another in Kittel. T h e division was at full strength
that its occupation of the northern sec- for its class: like the 18th it num-
tor in the Schnee Eifel did not bring on bered three regiments of two-battalion
many losses prior to the counteroffensive strength. Equipment was new and
and permitted its troops to be rotated complete. The mission now handed the
through training areas in the rear. newly arrived division was to effect a
T h e division commander seems to break-through on the left of the 18th
have sold General Lucht on the idea of Volks Grenadier Division in the Gross-
making the main thrust toward St. Vith langenfeld-Heckhuscheid sector, advance
from north of the Schnee Eifel–although northwest on a broad front (clearing
both were certain that the double en- the Pronsfeld–St. Vith road), and
velopment envisaged would cut off a very seize the Our River crossings at Steine-
large American force. T h e right attack brück. T h e 62d Volks Grenadier Divi-
144 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

sion was to leave to its northern neigh- inclined ramps was built over the dra-
bor the task of capturing St. Vith, but gon’s teeth during the nights before the
was expected to block the western and attack. All that remained was to fasten
southern exits. on the planking (and this job was later
T h e L X V I Corps staff was acutely done, the assault guns climbing over
conscious that the American observation with ease). Meanwhile a special field
posts on the Schnee Eifel overlooked the artillery observation battalion was at
German positions. Everything possible work, spotting the American gun posi-
was done to avoid exciting American tions and reporting minor changes in
suspicion or arousing American interest. the opposing battery alignment. T h e
All patrolling was banned from 10De- L X V I Corps staff, it may be added, were
cember on, but the arrival of the 106th very much concerned over the artillery
Division (which the Germans immedi- weight known to be available to the
ately spotted as new and inexperienced) American defenders in the zone of pro-
led to a limited relaxation of this order. jected advance.
Patrols working at night about 12 or 13 On the night of 14 December it
December did discover something of seemed for a moment that all the care-
interest-but in the 14th Cavalry Group ful precautions the L X V I Corps had
sector. Here it was found that the two taken to mask its intentions might go
thousand yards separating Roth and for nought. T h e 2d Panzer Division
Weckerath (on the south flank of the tanks, which had detrained at Stadtkyll,
cavalry position) was unoccupied, and moved along the roads behind the corps’
that the two villages were weakly held. left flank en route to the south. Through
Plans were made at once to exploit this the clear, cold air the noise of tracks
weak spot-an explanation, perhaps, of and motors could be heard for miles.
the decision to make the main penetra- But much to General Lucht’s relief no
tion by the northern attack group in the American reconnaissance planes ap-
Roth area. peared the following day. Apparently
From 5 to 12 December the German the secret preparations for attack still
artillery moved forward to carefully were secret. 2
camouflaged positions from which the T h e 18th Volks Grenadier Division
attack could be supported. T h e artillery sector narrowed somewhat on 15 De-
regiment of the 18th Volks Grenadier cember when the northern neighbor,
Division occupied old emplacements in I SS Panzer Corps, extended its left
the West Wall area behind the corps wing to include Neuhof and Ormont;
right flank. Corps artillery formed a the division sector at the commencement
groupment southwest of Prüm to give of the attack now would be about ten
general support to the southern attack miles wide. T h e night of 15 December
group of the 18th and the green 62d. was frosty and clear, offering good visi-
On the north wing the assault gun bri- bility for the last moves to the line of
gade would have to move to its attack departure. On the right the forty guns
positions through the West Wall anti- of the assault gun brigade took station
tank line. Because demolition might 21t will be recalled that the 106th had noticed
alert the Americans, underpinning for unusual vehicular noise. See above, p. 59.
BREAKTHROUGH A T T H E SCHNEE EIFEL 145

near the dragon's teeth. On the left the that the neighboring corps south of the
two assault regiments of the 62d Volks L X V I made progress, one of its regi-
Grenadier Division moved for the first ments, the 60th Regiment (116th Pan-
time into the positions held earlier by zer Division), would be brought against
the 26th Volks Grenadier Division. Also the right flank of the 424th Infantry.
for the first time, the assault company T h e compilation of opposing forces,
commanders heard officially of the great above, will show that the odds against
counteroffensive and were given instruc- the defender in the Schnee Eifel area
tions as to their own particular roles. were not inordinate-except in the cav-
With assembly completed, the juxta- alry sector. T h e Germans would have to
position of German and American for- make the utmost use of surprise, con-
mations on the morning of 16 December centration of effort, and ground favor-
was as follows. T h e boundary between able to attack, if they were to achieve
the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies bi- any large measure of success. Fully aware
sected the 14th Cavalry Group area by that the American line had numerous
an extension south of Krewinkel and weak spots and that no substantial re-
Manderfeld. North of the line elements serves were near, General Lucht and his
of the 3d Parachute Division, reinforced division commanders saw three factors
by tanks, faced two platoons of Troop that might limit success: the weakness
C, 18th Cavalry Squadron, two recon- of the 18th Volks Grenadier Division
naissance platoons and one gun company center, enemy superiority in the artil-
of the 820th Tank Destroyer Battalion, lery arm, and strong intervention by
plus the squadron and group head- unfriendly air. All evidence of the play
quarters at Manderfeld. South of the of these factors, particularly the last two,
boundary the 294th and 295th Regi- would be carefully observed as D-day
ments of the 18th Volks Grenadier Divi- came.
sion, forty assault guns, and a reinforced Although the L X V I advance on 16
tank destroyer battalion faced Troop A December was planned and effected as
and one platoon of Troop C, 18th Cav- the co-ordinated effort of two divisions,
alry Squadron. On no other part of the the story must begin with the 18th Volks
American front would the enemy so out- Grenadier Division attack. This in turn
number the defenders at the start of the will follow the German scheme of ma-
Ardennes counteroffensive. neuver, the right wing first, then the
On the Schnee Eifel the 422d Infan- left. T h e fight in the zone of the 424th
try, composing the left wing of the 106th Infantry quickly becomes an independ-
Division, had only minute screening ent action and will be so considered?
elements opposite. T h e 423d Infantry,
with one flank on the Schnee Eifel range T h e Attack in the Losheim Gap
and the other in the Bleialf depression,
was in the path of the 293d Regiment T h e shock companies of the 18th be-
(18th Volks Grenadier Division). The gan to move toward the American cav-
424th Infantry, in positions running to alry positions about. 0400 on 16
the southwest, stood opposite the 62d
Volks Grenadier Division. In the event 3See also ch. XVII.
146 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

December. An hour later the main mand post was “belting us with direct
strength of the two attacking regiments fire.” Light tanks, dispatched from Man-
followed, the 294th advancing toward derfeld, hurried to give aid but were
Weckerath and the Our valley, the 295th stopped cold by fire from Auw, some
heading for Roth and Kobscheid. Sup- 3,500 yards to the west, which was occu-
porting artillery, mortars, and Werfers pied by the Germans. Nothing more was
opened fire over the heads of the Ger- heard from Roth. T h e remainder of
man infantry shortly after 0830. (Actu- Troop A, in Kobscheid, also was cut off;
ally the first concentrations to arouse the by 0900 the attackers had established a
Americans were fired as part of the hold inside the village. Weckerath,
Sixth Panzer Army artillery preparation which lay to one side of the German
prior to H-hour and landed in the north- advance on Auw, was hit by elements
ern part of the 14th Cavalry zone) . Roth of the 294th. Here the 3d Platoon of
and Kobscheid, closest to the enemy Troop C was located east of the village
jump-off positions, received only one in a small patch of woods on the road to
battery salvo; apparently the German Krewinkel, well dug in and protected
infantry were already around the vil- by barbed wire on all sides. T h e first
lages. When day broke, cloudy and German assault was checked by mortars
drizzling, the assault force moving be- and machine guns, reinforced by accu-
tween Weckerath and Roth was well on rate artillery fire. Two enemy com-
its way to the commanding crossroads panies, however, swept around the wood
village of Auw. Visibility was so poor, and converged on the village, where
the American village positions so dis- some twenty men of Troop C headquar-
persed, that the cavalrymen for some ters held them at bay with bullet fire.
time did not detect nor engage the infan- A platoon of American light tanks ar-
try moving past. (The Germans, having rived from Manderfeld shortly after
received no fire, first suspected that the 0930, appearing just in time to engage
main American line had been moved groups of enemy infantry infiltrating the
back to the Our River.) Furthermore, eastern edge of the village. At 1100
predawn attacks on Roth and Kobscheid observers at Weckerath saw an enemy
had occupied the attention of the column moving from Roth in the direc-
troopers. At Roth a company of grena- tion of Auw. They counted fifteen
diers was checked by shellfire. T h e “tanks”–probably a battalion of assault
attackers at Kobscheid actually got in- guns–and at least one battalion of foot
side the cavalry defense, but nearly forty troops, marching intermixed with the
were captured. assault guns. Artillery fire was directed
Before dawn none of the village gar- onto the column, with but little effect.
risons in the southern sector had been T h e Germans pressed on to the west.
seriously menaced. T h e effects of the In the northern sector of the 14th
enemy penetrations, however, became Cavalry Group fortune had treated the
apparent soon after daylight. At 0830 defenders with mixed favor during the
a message from Roth reported that the morning. T h e German force committed
Germans were inside the village, that here consisted of a reinforced regiment
a tank seventy-five yards from the com- of the 3 d Parachute Division (it will be
BREAKTHROUGH A T T H E SCHNEE EIFEL 147

recalled that the boundary between the the costliness of the German tactics. At
Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies ran just the neighboring village of Afst, the 1st
south of Krewinkel and Manderfeld) Platoon of Troop C was similarly
attacking initially without the support of attacked. T h e platoon beat off two
heavy weapons. T h e 3 d Parachute Divi- enemy companies, with heavy loss to the
sion axis cut straight through the north- Germans.
ern cavalry sector, then angled northwest T h e American left wing was composed
in the direction of Faymonville, the divi- of Company A and two reconnaissance
sion advancing as the left flank of the I platoons of the 820th Tank Destroyer
SS Panzer Corps. At Krewinkel, the most Battalion, occupying the villages of Ber-
advanced American post in the area, terath, Merlscheid, and Lanzerath. The
the 2d Platoon of Troop C and a 3-inch towed guns, sited to cover the
reconnaissance platoon of Company A, roads and eastern approaches, had no
820th Tank Destroyer Battalion, occu- protection whatever. The gun sections
pied a position from which excellent were unable to put up more than short
observation and fields of fire covered all resistance to the German infantry, nor
approaches to the village from the east. could most of the pieces be hooked up
An hour before dawn a German shock and towed out with the enemy already
company boldly approached the village in the position. Here as elsewhere dur-
in column of fours. T h e troopers held ing the Ardennes fighting the towed tank
their fire until the enemy infantry were destroyer lacked the maneuverability to
within twenty yards of the outer strands deal with infiltration or to displace when
of wire–then cut loose. T h e column dis- in danger. Three tank destroyers were
integrated, but the assault was quickly pulled back toward Manderfeld and bet-
resumed in more open order and shortly ter firing positions; the rest, with one
the Germans were in the village streets. exception, were destroyed on orders.
At one point half the village was in Ger- Most of the company reached the cavalry
man hands, but eventually the defenders group headquarters at Manderfeld and
got the upper hand and the enemy with- continued the fight as infantry.
drew. Colonel Devine and the staffs of the
One of the last to leave shouted in 14th Cavalry Group and 18th Cavalry
English, “Take a ten minute break. Squadron had been alerted by the first
We’ll be back.” An exasperated trooper shells of the opening predawn concen-
hastened to assure him profanely, tration dropping on Manderfeld. Tele-
“–– –,we’ll still be here.” With the full phone wires went out during the bar-
morning light the enemy returned, as rage, and radio communication was
promised, after his artillery had tried made difficult by the cacaphony of pho-
unsuccessfully to jar the Americans loose. nograph records introduced by the Ger-
Head-on assault from the east by fresh mans along the American wave lengths.
troops made no progress. By noon, but About 0600 the 14th Cavalry Group ex-
two of the defenders had been wounded. ecutive officer talked by phone to the
The troopers estimated that the German 106th Division command post and asked
dead now totaled 375—doubtless an exag- for wire teams to restore the lines.
gerated figure but still an indication of Whether he asked for permission to
148 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

move up the 32d Cavalry Squadron stations near Andler; at this village, just
is uncertain. In any event the orders west of the German spearhead in Auw,
from the division were to alert the re- the Our bridge remained an intact and
serve squadron, but not to move it. important prize. T h e remainder of
At 0640 another call from Manderfeld Troop A was dispatched to Holzheim,
reached the command post at St. Vith, there to cover the group’s left and rear.
this time with a request to move the Shortly before the arrival of the 32d
32d forward to a position halfway Cavalry Squadron, Devine had asked
between the division and group com- General Jones to make a counterattack
mand posts. Twenty-five minutes north from the 106th Division area. He
later the G–3 journal of the 106th Divi- was told that no infantry support could
sion records a telephone order to the be given “at this time.” When Devine
cavalry: “Move 32 Cavalry Squadron as answered that he would have to with-
soon as you like.” This squadron had draw in the south to a line from Mander-
been resting and refitting, indeed some feld through Verschneid, Jones made no
of its vehicles were partially disassem- comment. Thus far, it must be said, there
bled when the alert order arrived. About was little or no inclination at the 106th
0930 the squadron was on the road, Division headquarters to regard the sit-
minus Company F, which took another uation in the cavalry sector as unduly
hour and a half to ready its light tanks serious. Devine’s final comment during
for movement. this telephone conversation–that he in-
Colonel Devine, realizing that the for- tended to counterattack with the 32d
ward platoons of the 18th Cavalry Cavalry Squadron on its arrival and
Squadron were in danger of destruction attempt to restore the Krewinkel-Roth-
and could make no more futile efforts, Kobscheid line–may have helped con-
cut off and isolated as they were, planned firm the somewhat optimistic view held
to make a stand along the Manderfeld at the division headquarters.
ridge. This ridge line was some 3,000 At noon Colonel Devine finally issued
yards in the rear of the original cavalry withdrawal orders to the 18th Cavalry
line and about twice that distance from Squadron. Troop C alone was able to
the West Wall positions out of which the comply. T h e 3d Platoon, which had held
German attack had erupted. Devine in- its own in the fight east of Weckerath,
tended to defend along the ridge with mounted two armored cars and a few
the 32d Squadron and thus cover the jeeps, then made its way with guns
withdrawal of his forward troops. Short- blazing into the village. Here the com-
ly after 1100 the fresh squadron reached mand post group and light tanks joined,
Manderfeld, Troop E moving its as- the column moving west along roads
sault guns into previously reconnoitered lined with German riflemen, but this
positions at Manderfeld, Troop C de- was no headlong dash because cold
ploying northwest of the town to cover motors and congealed transmission
the road from Lanzerath, and two dis- grease slowed the column to fifteen
mounted platoons of Troop A digging miles per hour. Meanwhile the village it
in southwest of Manderfeld. While this had just left was blasted by a terrific
area defense was forming, Troop B took shelling–apparently the Germans had
BREAKTHROUGH A T T H E SCHNEE EIFEL 149

been preparing for a final assault. T h e snow cross-country in a westerly direc-


garrisons at Krewinkel and Afst moved tion. They returned to the American
back at 1240 without incident. As Kre- lines at St. Vith on 19 December.5
winkel was lost to view the troopers Early in the afternoon it was apparent
could see German infantry swarming in to the force at Manderfeld that the Ger-
from the east.4 When Troop C and the mans were pushing west around both
light tanks reached Manderfeld, the flanks. A patrol sent in the direction of
assault gun troop, which had been de- Auw reported that the entrance to the
ployed along the ridge north and south Our valley was wide open, contact with
of the town, poured direct fire on the the 99th Division in the north had been
enemy now streaming southwest through lost, and the 106th Division reported
the draws at the source of the Our River. that it lacked the troops to counterattack
The morning fog had lifted and the toward the cavalry. Colonel Devine
gunners were able to inflict considerable therefore organized a task force about
damage with their 75-mm. howitzers. 1400 to retake the ground around Lan-
The story of the garrisons in Roth and zerath and thus cover his northern flank.
Kobscheid is difficult to reconstruct, al- The task force, commanded by Maj.
though the troopers held on for some J. L. Mayes, consisted of Troop C
hours after being surrounded. In the and the assault gun troop of the 18th
early part of the fight, forward obser- Cavalry Squadron. Moving north the
vers in Kobscheid were in contact with task force reached a road junction 1,600
the 275th Armored Field Artillery Bat- yards north of Manderfeld, where it was
talion; this artillery support unquestion- beset from three sides by infantry and
ably was of signal aid to the troopers, self-propelled guns. T h e cavalry self-
as were the quad‘ mounts of the 413th propelled howitzers were able to maneu-
Antiaircraft Battalion which were sent ver and do considerable execution in this
to help the Roth defenders. About 1100 close-range fire fight, but the counter-
the Roth command post radioed Kob- attack was checked. By this time the
scheid that the troops of the 106th Divi- situation on the opposite flank was
sion farther south were moving back, precarious; the Germans already had
that the Roth garrison would try to with- passed through Wischeid, southwest of
draw, and that the Kobscheid group Manderfeld, and were moving toward
should do likewise. Apparently the the Our bridge at Andler.
German grip on Roth was too firm; Shortly after four o’clock the 14th
sometime during the afternoon the Cavalry Group executive officer tele-
troopers there surrendered. Kobscheid phoned the 106th Division command
held out until about 1630. Then, as dusk post and asked permission to withdraw
settled, sixty-one men led by 1st Lt. to the line Andler-Holzheim, a position
Lorenz Herdrick started through the

5 Three members of the 18th Cavalry Recon-


naissance Squadron were. awarded the DSC for
4These troops were armored infantry from the gallantry in the battle at the villages: 1st Lt.
1st SS Panzer Division whose commander finally A. L. Mills, S. Sgt. Woodrow W. Reeves, and Cpl.
had thrown them in to get the attack rolling. C. E. Statler.
150 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

represented by a series of ridges covered T h e German attack in the Losheim


on the east by a tributary of the Our. Gap during 16 December had gone ac-
T h e division headquarters authorized cording to schedule. T h e northern arm
the withdrawal. Devine ordered Task of the 18th Volks Grenadier Division
Force Mayes to fight a delaying action envelopment had penetrated as far as
southwest along the road from Losheim, Auw and overrun most of the American
while the Manderfeld defenders with- artillery positions. As daylight ended the
drew to the west. This movement was 294th Regiment assembled around Auw
carried through successfully, the 32d and the 295th regrouped in the Roth-
Cavalry howitzers on the Manderfeld Kobscheid area, both awaiting the
ridge ably supporting the task force. T h e arrival of their heavy weapons. Now
last troops left Manderfeld about 1700, General Lucht told the division com-
setting the town afire in an attempt to mander to call forward his armored mo-
destroy records of value to the enemy. bile battalion and send it to join the
Troops E and C of the 18th reached 294th and elements of the assault gun
Holzheim at twilight, joining Troop A brigade the next morning in a drive
of the 32d which already was in position on Andler. In the north the 3d Para-
as the anchor of the 14th Cavalry north chute Division continued its advance
flank. Troop B of the 32d had remained during the night, marching through
at Andler since its morning arrival; it the rough, heavily forested area north-
now screened the southern flank with west of Manderfeld and Lanzerath.
reconnaissance teams pushing out on the Along the roads to the east the armored
roads to south, east, and north. T h e light formations of the 1st SS Panzer Divi-
tank company of the 32d Squadron was sion toiled forward in the dark, ready
disposed to the southwest of the cavalry to push through the opening between
line at Heuem, covering the road from the American 99th Division and the
Schönberg to St. Vith and worrying 14th Cavalry Group. As things stood,
about the absence of communications. therefore, the 14th Cavalry was deploy-
T h e remainder of the 32d Squadron was ed in the gap which was opening as
at Herresbach and that of the 18th the 18th Volks Grenadier Division con-
Squadron near Wereth, both villages be- tinued westward and the 3d Parachute
hind the Holzheim-Andler line. By early Division angled toward the northwest.
evening the 14th Cavalry Group was in T h e cavalry flanks, however, rested on
its defensive positions, except for such roads which would be essential to the
regrouping as would be needed to sort enemy–roads along which the German
out elements of the two squadrons. Its armor was moving for commitment on
supporting artillery battalion (the the second day of the offensive. In the
275th) was in the process of moving to meantime the 14th Cavalry Group com-
new positions near St. Vith. As yet there mander had gone to St. Vith to explain
were no signs of an enemy pursuit. T h e to the 106th Division staff his situation
forward artillery observers were active and the arrangements he had made. Gen-
“along the deserted front” until 1900 but eral Jones, busy with plans for a counter-
found nothing to report. Contact with attack by armored reinforcements which
the Germans had been lost. the corps commander had promised for
BREAKTHROUGH A T T H E SCHNEE ElFEL 151

the next morning, had no comment to A company of engineers occupied Auw,


offer and merely asked Colonel Devine the most important road center in the
to wait at the command post. 422d sector. The forward positions of
the 422d in the West Wall were based on
T h e Attack Hits the a series of heavily wooded ridges running
106th Division north and south. However a number of
ravines, densely screened by trees, led
T h e 14th Cavalry Group withdrawal directly back into the regimental area;
to the Holzheim-Andler line in the late one such ran straight down to Schlausen-
afternoon of 16 December had no prac- bach.
tical adverse effect on its southern neigh- T h e 423d Infantry–in the division
bor, the 422d Infantry. By this time the center–was deployed on a curving line
enemy thrust had driven so deep and a little more than 8,000 yards long, with
with such force between the cavalry and one battalion in the West Wall, the
the 422d that the northern flank of the other bending around the southern nose
106th Infantry Division was exposed re- of the Schnee Eifel and back to the west.
gardless of movements undertaken by A gap existed between the rifle battalion
the cavalry. Ominous events had tran- positions and the village of Bleialf. T h e
spired in the zone of the 106th. regimental right wing was fleshed out by
Seven of the nine rifle battalions under a provisional battalion (the antitank
General Jones’ command were in the line company, one platoon of the cannon
on the morning of 16 December. The 2d company, a rifle platoon, and Troop B,
Battalion, 423d Infantry, was in division 18th Cavalry Squadron) . This scratch
reserve near Born, 5,000 yards north of force, acting as riflemen, was reinforced
St. Vith. The 1st Battalion, 424th Infan- by Company C, 820th Tank Destroyer
try, was located at Steinebruck on the Battalion. The 590th Field Artillery Bat-
road to Winterspelt and also was in talion supported the regiment from posi-
division reserve. The 422d Infantry had tions northwest of Oberlascheid, and the
its three battalions in the West Wall regimental cannon company was close to
positions on the Schnee Eifel, defending that village.
a front of eight to nine thousand yards. The 424th Infantry held a six-mile
Attached was Company A, 8 1st Engineer line angled slightly from the Ihren
Combat Battalion; direct support was Creek southwestward to the vicinity of
given by the 589th Field Artillery Battal- Grosskampenberg. The gap between it
ion whose batteries were emplaced and the 423d, a distance of 4,000 yards,
southwest of Auw. Located west of Auw was screened thinly by the 106th Recon-
were the 155-mm. howitzers of the 592d naissance Troop and the cannon com-
Field Artillery Battalion. The regimen- pany. T h e 591st Field Artillery
tal command post was in the crossroads Battalion was situated behind the regi-
village of Schlausenbach, with the can- mental center with two battalions for-
non company to the west on Hill 612. ward and one in the rear to cover any
All of these locations lay in the northern displacement.
section of the regimental area not far During the evening of 15 December
from the 14th Cavalry Group boundary. enemy aircraft droned through the air
152 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

over the 106th Division lines attempting 0500 were not immediately detected.
to divert attention from the noise created German pressure would first be felt in
by the German ground columns moving these areas within the regimental sec-
forward to the line of departure. Their tors: the Heckhuscheid and Winterspelt
efforts were wasted. T h e vehicular activ- areas (424th Infantry) ; the Bleialf area
ity behind the German front was heard (423d Infantry); and on the Auw-
and duly recorded, but it caused no Schonberg road (422d Infantry). In the
alarm. Enemy patrols also were unusu- last case, the northern assault wing of
ally active during the night–except at the 18th Volks Grenadier Division con-
the Schnee Eifel positions of the 422d centric attack would strike the Ameri-
Infantry which did not figure in the can cavalry before turning on the north
German attack plans. Again there was no flank of the 106th Division.
particular reaction among the Ameri- At dusk on 15 December the 62d Volks
cans. No one anticipated a German at- Grenadier Division, forming the left of
tack, although with the advantage of the LXVI Corps, had come into the lines
hindsight all these warning signs and opposite the left and center of the 424th
others would be resurrected and given Infantry. This new division would have
an importance never accorded them on no opportunity to reconnoiter the bro-
the night of 15 December. ken and heavily wooded ground over
At 0530, 16 December, the guns, which it was to advance the next morn-
Werfers, and mortars of the LX VI Corps ing-a fact which had direct bearing on
opened fire, marking the commence- the subsequent story of the 424th In-
ment of the advance against the 106th fantry-but its scheme of maneuver
Division. T h e artillery available to the had been given detailed study. T h e
LXVI was limited, by comparison with attack would open with two regiments
most other parts of the front, but was abreast attempting a breakthrough on
well served by its forward observers and a wide front. T h e main effort would
did much damage to telephone wire, be made in the vicinity of Winterspelt,
ammunition dumps, and other supply breaching the American switch line
points. T h e first word from a specific southeast of that village and thus gaining
target reached the division headquar- entrance to the main macadam road
ters at St. Vith about 0550, a report to St. Vith. Once in position astride
that the 423d Antitank Company had the road, the mobile reserve of the
been shelled since 0530. The 423d In- 62d would be committed for the pene-
fantry was in fact bearing the brunt of tration, while the two regiments ex-
the enemy barrage and most of its tele- tended their hold on either side of
phone lines to the forward units went the road. On the left, therefore, the
out in the first few minutes. Within the 183d Regiment had as its objective the
hour messages from the 28th Division northern side of the plateau on which
and the 99th Division told of heavy shell- lay the village of Heckhuscheid. Pos-
ing to the south and the north of the session of this high ground was deemed
106th. But the German assault troops essential to the German plan. On the
who had been moving forward in the right the 190th Regiment aimed at the
darkness onto the 106th positions since wooded heights at Eigelscheid around
BREAKTHROUGH A T T H E SCHNEE EIFEL 153

which twisted the road to Winterspelt, prisoners. A four-man patrol from


two thousand yards westward. Company K rounded up another forty
The 3d Battalion of the 424th Infan- prisoners in the woods nearby, By noon
try received the first German blow in the 424th had driven the enemy back
its positions north of Heckhuscheid. Af- along the whole of its front.
ter a 20-minute concentration of artil- Coincidentally and without realizing
lery and mortar fire a shock company what had been accomplished, the south-
of the 183d drove in on Companies K and ern elements of the 424th put a crimp
L about 0645. Although the defenders in the plans of the Germans attacking
got word back to their own artillery, to outflank the neighboring 112th In-
when daylight came the enemy had pen- fantry. Men of the 2d Battalion, sup-
etrated well into the position. T h e 3d ported by the 3d Platoon of Company
Battalion, however, was on ground B, 820th Tank Destroyer Battalion,
which favored the defender and not un- caught the assault company leading the
duly extended. T h e most serious threat 60th Panzer Grenadier Regiment attack
developed to the north on the weak flank in a wood west of Grosskampenberg.
screening the switch position. Here the German reports say that the company
regimental cannon company (Capt. was “nearly destroyed.” This sharp set-
Joseph Freesland) , armed only with rifles back so discouraged the 116th Panzer
and machine guns, was deployed at Division commander that before the day
the Weissenhof crossroads blocking the ended he switched the 60th Panzer Gren-
main road to Winterspelt. Guided by adier Regiment to the south. Although
flashlights and flares the Germans made this attempt to drive a wedge between
their attack in column, advancing erect, the 112th and 424th was not renewed,
shouting and screaming. The cannon- the latter was able to give its neighbors
eers, nothing daunted, did well in their a helping hand later in the day. During
infantry role, holding for several hours the afternoon a gunner from the tank
against assault from front and flank. destroyer platoon, Pfc. Paul C. Rosen-
Colonel Reid, the regimental command- thal, sighted five German tanks and a
er, ordered his 1st Battalion, in reserve truck moving north of Lützkampen. Fir-
at Steinebruck, to the support of the ing his 3-inch gun at 2,000 yards range
threatened north flank. Company C he destroyed all, tanks and truck; he
arrived to reinforce the cannon com- had used only eighteen rounds of high-
pany and the rest of the reserve bat- explosive and armor-piercing-capped
talion hurriedly established defensive ammunition.
positions to the rear at Winterspelt. About noon a report reached the 62d
In the 3d Battalion zone Company I Volks Grenadier Division command post
came in to help restore the line. A se- that troops of the 190th Regiment (the
ries of counterattacks, well supported by Germans who had broken through north
fire from the 591st Field Artillery Bat- of the cannon company positions)
talion, erased the dents in the Ameri- were on high ground north of Eigel-
can position, and a sortie led by the scheid overlooking the road to Winter-
battalion S–3, Capt. Lee Berwick, spelt. General Kittel ordered his mobile
entered Heckhuscheid and took 107 battalion up from the 164th Regiment
154 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

reserve at Pronsfeld and into the attack tion (over 2,600 rounds), and the en-
along the Winterspelt road. This battal- emy had made a dent toward Winter-
ion, “mobile” in the sense that it was spelt. Contact with the 112th Infantry,
mounted on bicycles and reinforced by on the south flank, had been lost. But
a company of self-propelled assault guns, fortunately the enemy had given over
was forced to stick to the macadam road. the idea of a penetration here.
As a result it came up against the Amer- T h e intense fire laid on the 423d In-
ican cannon company at the Weissenhof fantry on the morning of 16 December
crossroads. Outnumbered and in dan- had disrupted telephone lines, but the
ger of encirclement the cannoneers radio net seems to have functioned well.
and their rifle support from Company By 0600 the regimental commander had
C made a deliberate and fighting with- word that his antitank company was
drawal toward Winterspelt, platoon. under small arms fire at Bleialf, the key
by platoon. When the 2d Platoon was to the southern route around the Schnee
ordered back, its commander (Lt. Craw- Eifel and the Alf Creek depression. A-
ford Wheeler) stayed behind with a ba- long this depression extended the 423d’s
zooka to meet the leading assault gun weak wing, echeloned to the right and
and was killed by point-blank fire. rear of the two rifle battalions, one on
By dark the German mobile battal- the Schnee Eifel and one curving along
ion and infantry from the 190th Regi- the southern nose of the range. T h e
ment were closing in on Winterspelt, heterogeneous units screening along
where the 1st Battalion and remnants the wing had been grouped as a pro-
of the cannon company stood ready to visional battalion, but they formed no
meet them. T h e fight raged through cohesive front and were charged with
the evening and by midnight at least a defending the least defensible ground
company of Germans was inside the on the regimental front. When shock
village, with more coming in by the troops of the 293d Regiment (18th Volks
hour. In the 3d Battalion sector the en- Grenadier Division) struck the antitank
emy had got nowhere with his frontal company in Bleialf, one group filtered
attacks around Heckhuscheid, the vil- into the village and another, marching
lage remaining under American control along the railroad, cut between Bleialf
at the close of the day. Casualties in the and Troop B (18th Cavalry Squadron),
62d Volks Grenadier Division had been blocking out the latter and destroying
substantial, particularly, as might be ex- the right platoon of the antitank com-
pected in the case of a green division pany.
in its first attack, among the officers. Although radio reception was poor in
Losses in the 424th had not been high. this area the commander of the 423d
But the position of the regiment on the Infantry and the regimental executive
night of the 16th was potentially a se- (Lt. Col. Frederick W. Nagle) were
rious one–despite the rough body check able to alert and move reserves
given the enemy. T h e battalion and promptly, but Colonel Cavender’s re-
regimental reserves all had been com- quest for the release of his 2d Battalion,
mitted, the 591st Field Artillery Bat- then in division reserve, was refused.
talion had fired nearly all its ammuni- About 0930 the service company and
BREAKTHROUGH A T T H E SCHNEE EIFEL 155

cannon company were at Bleialf, where plan to engage the 422d by frontal as-
they found most of the village held by sault, the enemy penetration between
the Germans. Later Company B, 81st En- Roth and Weckerath, during the dark
gineer Combat Battalion, and the head- hours, quickly brought the assault troops
quarters company were thrown into the of the 294th Regiment down the road
fight. By 1500 these units had ejected to Auw and onto the American regi-
the enemy from Bleialf after a series of ment’s flank and rear. Company A of
hand-to-hand fights in the streets and the 81st Engineer Combat Battalion was
houses. T h e cavalry troop on the ex- billeted at Auw, and despite the enemy
treme regimental right remained cut shelling in the early morning the engi-
off from the friendly troops to the north. neers had turned out as usual to work
Finally getting permission by radio to on the roads. As the enemy approached
withdraw, the troopers pulled back in Auw the bulk of the company hurried
the early afternoon to Winterscheid, back to the village, set up their machine
2,500 yards southwest of Bleialf. While guns, and engaged the German column.
the enemy was attacking around Bleialf, This column (at least a battalion of the
a few small patrols tried to get into the 294th) was reinforced by self-propelled
positions of the 1st and 3d Battalions guns, which shelled the engineers out of
to the north–but no real attack was their positions. When the 1st Platoon,
attempted during the 16th. the last to leave, finally essayed a dash
The 293d had failed to carry out its from the village to the protection of a
part as the southern jaw of the 18th nearby wood lot, Cpl. Edward S. Withee
Volks Grenadier Division pincers, for remained behind to cover his comrades,
without Bleialf the road to Steinebrück with only his submachine gun as a
was barred. T h e Americans had recov- weapon against the enemy armor. 6 By
ered their balance quickly after the in- this time the American batteries south-
itial shock at Bleialf. T h e battalions west of the village were blasting the
on the Schnee Eifel had brought the Germans there, for a time halting fur-
German flank under accurate and pun- ther advance. At daylight small groups
ishing fire at the first light of day, in- began pressure against the forward bat-
terdicting all reinforcement by the heavy talions of the 422d, but this seems to
weapons needed to reduce the village. have been no more than an attempt to
On the whole the situation in the 423d fix American attention to the front.
sector seemed satisfactory, although two Company L, however, had to be rushed
items remained for a final accounting. to the defense of the regimental com-
T h e southern flank of the regiment now mand post at Schlausenbach.
was in the air, and its 2d Battalion, as About noon the enemy in Auw be-
division reserve, had been sent forward came active, moving south against the
to aid the endangered 422d Infantry on artillery groupment composed of the
the north. 589th Field Artillery Battalion (astride
High on the center of the Schnee the Auw-Bleialf road) and the 592d, a
Eifel the 422d Infantry missed the
first rude shock of a predawn attack. 6 Withee was captured after his lone fight. He
Although it was no part of the German was given the DSC.
156 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

155-mm. howitzer battalion, close by. stroy the artillery was resumed, flares
T h e German 294th was acting under and searchlights marking the German
orders to clear the way into the Our val- movements. Earlier, General Jones had
ley, but to do so it had to neutralize or taken steps to block the gap between
destroy the American artillery, whose the 14th Cavalry Group and the 422d,
positions had been plotted earlier by the ordering his reserve, the 2d Battalion,
corps observation battalion. Stealing for- 423d Infantry (Lt. Col. Joseph F. Puett),
ward by squads and platoons, the gren- to move through St. Vith to Schönberg.
adiers brought the battery positions By 1730 Puett’s battalion had detrucked
under crossfire from their machine pistols and set up defenses to cover the road
while mortar crews and gunners worked net at the latter point. Three hours
to knock out the American field pieces. later General Jones telephoned Colonel
Colonel Descheneaux, intent on eas- Puett, ordering an immediate attack to
ing the increasing pressure, dispatched cover the open left flank of the 422d
a task force about 1300 to recapture and permit the two hard-pressed artil-
Auw and cut off the enemy to the south. lery battalions to displace southward.
This counterattack, employing Company Apparently General Jones intended that
L, the cannon company, and part of the battalion should turn north to And-
the antitank company, was based on a ler and push aside the enemy along
plan taken over from the 2d Infantry the Auw-Andler-Schönberg road. Puett,
Division. T h e task force started its ad- however, got on the wrong road and
vance in the midst of a sudden snow- turned south–leaving the northern ap-
storm, made contact with the Germans proach to Schönberg open. (About the
near Auw, then suddenly received or- same time, the cavalry troop at Andler
ders to return to the regimental com- pulled out.) Ultimately the 2d Battal-
mand post at Schlausenbach, which was ion found its way through the dark across
now threatened by infantry advancing country and reached the 589th Field
along the draw from the east. Even while Artillery Battalion. Meanwhile the
the task force was approaching Auw 422d commander had swung his left
the enemy had stepped up the drive to battalion (the 2d) around to face north,
overrun the artillery, sending assault expecting to link up with the reserve
guns in to do the job. But the Ameri- battalion.
can cannoneers stayed with their how- This, then, was the situation. T h e
itzers, firing with the shortest fuze 106th Division had lost relatively little
possible, while others of the artillery ground during the daylight hours of the
worked their way to within bazooka 16th. Still, the enemy had succeeded in
range of enemy assault guns. T h e attack creating a shallow salient in the Win-
was stopped, after three assault guns terspelt sector, had penetrated between
had been knocked out. T h e Germans the 424th and 423d, and had uncovered
returned to the softening-up process and the left flank and rear of the 422d In-
waited for night to fall; artillery and fantry. Through the night of 16–17
mortar fire accounted for 36 men in Bat- December, therefore, the German LXVI
tery A of the 592d in the late afternoon. Corps continued to push its tired infan-
When day closed, the attempt to de- try into these sectors, while fresh troops
BREAKTHROUGH A T T H E SCHNEE EIFEL 157

moved up with heavy weapons and Americans would counterattack on 17


motor vehicles for commitment on the December but that their reaction would
morrow. There was no longer any doubt come too late and the encirclements
as to the German maneuver. The in- would be completed according to plan.
telligence section of the 106th Division His own plans for the second day were
staff analyzed the enemy plan correctly simple. On the right the mobile battal-
in its report on the night of 16 Decem- ion of the 18th Volks Grenadier Division
ber. “The enemy is capable of pinching was already moving on Andler en route
off the Schnee Eifel area by employing to seize the Schonberg bridge and the
one VG Division plus armor from road to St. Vith. T h e left kampfgruppe
the 14th Cavalry Group sector and one of the 18th also would make way for a
VG Division plus armor from the 423d mobile thrust. Finally, the 62d Volks
Infantry sector at any time.” This esti- Grenadier Division had orders to break
mate hardly is vitiated by the fact that loose at Heckhuscheid and drive for the
only one German division, the 18th Our valley “at all costs.”
Volks Grenadier, formed the pincers By the night of 16 December Gen-
poised to grip the 106th Division. After eral Jones had committed all the re-
all, the entire 62d Volks Grenadier Divi- serves available to the 106th Division
sion stood poised to break through in except a battalion of engineers at St.
the Winterspelt area and to strengthen Vith. But reinforcements, hastily gath-
or lengthen the southern jaw of the ered by the VIII Corps, First Army, and
pincers. 12th Army Group, were on the way.
General Lucht, leading the LXVI When the 2d Infantry Division turned
Corps, could look with some compla- over its area to the 106th it had taken
cency at the events of this first day, even its armored support, Combat Command
though his left wing had failed to break B, 9th Armored Division, north to the
through the American main line of re- V Corps sector. Replacement was made
sistance. Not a single one of the much by the 9th Armored’s Combat Com-
feared Jabo’s had appeared in the sky, mand R, which assembled at Trois Vier-
the superior weight of metal available ges–some twenty road miles south of
to the American artillery had not been St. Vith–in position to reinforce the
utilized in the early and crucial hours 106th if need should arise. This small
of the assault, and the defenders on the armored group represented the only mo-
Schnee Eifel had made not a single bile counterattack force available in the
move to threaten the weak and grossly VIII Corps. The extent of the German
extended center of the 18th Volks Gren- threat on 16 December, slowly compre-
adier Division. This inactivity by the hended though it was, obviously re-
106th Division on the first day, com- quired more drastic countermeasures
bined with the failure to counter- than the limited resources of the VIII
attack against the weak center on the Corps could provide. At 1025, therefore,
Schnee Eifel or the flanks of the Ger- the First Army released CCB, 9th Ar-
man salients, was inexplicable to the mored, to the VIII Corps, thus per-
German commanders but also a matter mitting Middleton to move his armored
of relief. Lucht anticipated that the reserve (CCR) as a backstop for the 28th
158 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Division. CCB, 9th Armored (Brig. Gen. the counterattack on the north flank
William M. Hoge), was assembled and that Hoge’s command should march
around Faymonville, about 12 miles at once to a position near Steinebrück,
north of St. Vith, awaiting orders to re- there ready to attack toward Winterspelt
inforce the 2d Infantry Division attack where incoming reports showed a rap-
toward the Roer River dams. idly deteriorating situation. It would
The attachment of CCB to the 106th appear that this decision to employ
Division, as ordered by Middleton, was CCB, 9th Armored, on the south flank
logical; Hoge’s troops would be return- reflected either General Middleton’s in-
ing to old and familiar terrain. During tention to restore the connection be-
the day CCB remained at Faymonville tween the 106th and 28th Divisions or
“attached in place,” as the military a direct order from the corps to that
verbalism runs. T h e 106th Division com- effect. Also, the corps commander did
mander could not move CCB without not want to pass both armored com-
corps approval and was not too con- mands through St. Vith. Subsequently,
cerned with the enemy advance in his however, both commands did move
northern sector. He made no move to put through the city.
CCB on the road, merely ordering a
platoon of its tank destroyers to St. Vith. The 424th Infantry and C C B ,
Shortly after dark General Hoge and his 9th Armored
staff arrived at St. Vith to confer with
General Jones. There a plan was made On the morning of 17 December
for CCB to counterattack and retake the precarious situation of the 424th In-
Schonberg. This plan shortly was dis- fantry gave Colonel Reid reason to fear
carded for during the evening the corps encirclement. His extended left flank
commander telephoned Jones that he was in the air. Because communications
now could have additional armored had failed, Reid did not know that his
help, that CCB, 7th Armored Division, right flank was still covered by the
was on its way from the Ninth Army and 112th Infantry. In any case, the enemy
would reach St. Vith by 0700 the next in this sector had brought up tanks
morning. and was attacking in considerable force.
As events would show, this estimate T h e 424th had its back to the Our Riv-
of the 7th Armored combat command’s er and if the enemy seized the bridge
availability was far too sanguine. Why at Steinebrück and spread along the
it was made is not clear. Lt. Col. far bank it would be hard put to with-
W. M. Slayden of the VIII Corps staff draw westward. Communications with
was with General Jones at the time of the division command post at St. Vith
this call. He later said that he should was limited to the exchange of liaison
have warned Jones that the corps com- officers traveling along a road now be-
mander was “over optimistic” because ing shelled by the German guns.
he knew that the combat command Through the early, dark hours of the
was so far distant. In any case, Jones 17th the enemy laid mortar and artil-
decided at midnight that the 7th Ar- lery fire on the front-line positions of
mored combat command should make the 424th. Opposite the right battalion,
BREAKTHROUGH A T T H E SCHNEE EIFEL 159

which thus far had held its ground, Ger- proaches to Steinebrück. T h e left wing
man patrols wormed forward to cut the of the 424th was pushed out of the way,
barbed wire and lob hand grenades to- folding back toward the south and west,
ward the American foxholes. An hour or but finally was pegged down by a scratch
so before dawn the German searchlights task force led by 1st Lt. Jarrett M. Hud-
flickered on, followed by a storm of dleston, Jr. T o hold this flank and ex-
shells from guns and Werfers. T h e fus- tend it as the enemy moved into the gap,
illade actually was directed against the Colonel Reid kept adding whatever
juncture between the 424th and 112th, troops he could find to this junior offi-
but Company G, 424th, came under cer’s command. Steinebruck bridge re-
this fire and suffered many dead as day mained in American hands.
came and the pounding continued. T h e General Hoge’s CCB, 9th Armored
main German thrust, however, was made Division, diverted to the Winterspelt
farther north, at Winterspelt. A com- area on the night of the 16th, arrived in
pany or more of the 62d Volks Grenadier St. Vith before dawn on the 17th and
Division had taken possession of the received its final orders. T h e armored
eastern half of the village during the infantry (27th Armored Infantry Bat-
night and at daybreak reinforcements talion) would move at once to seize
finally drove the 1st Battalion from the series of hills near Winterspelt; the
Winterspelt . tanks (14th Tank Battalion) would as-
Even so, the 424th still blocked the semble west of the Our River and
road to the Our River and Steinebrück. thence be committed as the situation
T o speed up the attack, the German unrolled. About this time the 106th
corps commander, General Lucht, him- Division commander borrowed a platoon
self hurried to Winterspelt to get the of the 811th Tank Destroyer Battalion
62d moving toward the Our. Ap- from CCB, sending it to Schonberg to
parently the 62d had become somewhat relieve the forward command post of the
disorganized, its losses had been high, 106th (the platoon did reach the 423d
and its left regiment had made little Infantry). T h e situation in front of St.
headway in the Heckhuscheid sector. Vith was changing so rapidly that a pla-
Furthermore, the division on its left, toon of the reconnaissance troop leading
which had been pushing toward the CCB had to be sent to defend the road
south flank of the 424th, now pulled out of St. Vith to the east, while a com-
out and left the 62d to go it alone, seri- pany of tanks and another of tank de-
ously hampering Lucht’s ability to stroyers were diverted to screen the
exploit the dent hammered into the entry of the 7th Armored Division.
American lines at Winterspelt. But the Word that Winterspelt was no longer
right regiment of the 62d advanced al- in friendly hands reached CCB just as
most unopposed north of Winterspelt its two leading rifle companies started
while the division center, now composed moving to the Our. By 0930 one com-
of the 2d Battalion, 164th Regiment, pany was across the river and had run
reinforced by assault guns and engineers, into German infantry dug in along the
continued beyond Winterspelt to occupy high ground overlooking the village of
the saddle which overlooked the ap- Elcherath, fifteen hundred yards from
160 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Steinebrück. T h e terrain and general In the early afternoon Colonel Reid


uncertainty as to the enemy strength had gathered the staff of the 424th to
and dispositions dictated a co-ordinated review the regimental position. Nothing
attack. By noon the 16th Armored Field was known of friendly units to the right
Artillery Battalion was in position west and left; no information was getting
of the river to support the attack. At through from the division headquar-
this time General Hoge had in hand ters; the enemy appeared to be work-
three companies of armored infantry ing his way around the left flank of the
and the 14th Tank Battalion, a force 424th and had penetrated into the regi-
deemed sufficient to drive the Germans mental service area. If a withdrawal was
back from Elcherath. But the enemy to be made starting in the early evening,
also was bringing u p reinforcements, for preparations would have to begin at
at noon an American spotter plane re- once. Reid decided to hold where he was
ported a column of vehicles entering for he had no orders releasing his regi-
Winterspelt (perhaps this was the 2d ment from the “hold at all costs” mis-
Battalion of the 164th Regiment). sion. Finally, at 1730, the regimental
Two companies of the 27th Armored liaison officer arrived with orders from
Infantry Battalion (Lt. Col. George W. Jones that the 424th should withdraw
Seeley) advanced to clear the hills flank- immediately. During the night of 17–18
ing Elcherath while Company B moved December both CCB, 9th Armored,
along the main road. Threshed by and the 424th Infantry made a success-
small arms fire from the grenadiers on ful move across the river, although in
the wooded slopes Company B suffered the hurried withdrawal the latter was
about forty casualties, but the surprise forced to leave much equipment be-
appearance of a tank platoon shook the hind. T h e line now occupied by these
enemy infantry somewhat. About ninety two units stretched a distance of seven
Germans, hands high, came forward to thousand yards, from Weppler (north-
surrender. A little after 1500 General east of Steinebrück) south to Burg Reu-
Hoge ordered his infantry to halt and land.
dig in; he had decided to throw in the The intervention of the 9th Armored
less vulnerable tank battalion and combat command had not achieved
thrust for the high ground east of Win- the results which had been hoped for,
terspelt. The 14th Tank Battalion was but had contributed indirectly to the
on its way to the Steinebrück bridge successful withdrawal of the 424th In-
when the assistant division commander fantry and had delayed the drive by
of the 106th arrived with word from the 62d Volks Grenadier Division toward
General Jones that Hoge might make the Our crossings–and St. Vith. T h e
the attack if he wished, but that CCB German division commander later
must withdraw behind the Our that wrote of the “serious crisis” caused by
night. Since there was little or no point the American counterattacks around El-
to further effort in the direction of Win- cherath. The heavy concentration of
terspelt, Hoge told his infantry to dig American artillery supporting CCB al-
in and wait for nightfall, then with- so gave the Germans pause. It seems
drew the tanks to their assembly area. probable that the failure of the 183d
BREAKTHROUGH A T T H E SCHNEE EIFEL 161

Regiment to make any headway pecting Jones to withdraw. 7 Perhaps


against the American right wing in the General Jones’s opinion was altered by
Heckhuscheid sector on 16 and 17 De- the knowledge that armored support
cember was largely caused by the sharp was on its way, perhaps by the VIII Corps
tactics in progressive displacement and order, received somewhat later, that no
the excellent defensive fires of the 591st troops were to be withdrawn unless
Field Artillery Battalion (Lt. Col. their positions became completely un-
Phillip F. Hoover) and its reinforcing tenable. (However, the “hold at all
battalions from the corps artillery. T h e costs” line drawn to accompany this or-
8-inch howitzers of the 578th Field Ar- der was fixed as the west bank of the
tillery Battalion, for example, fired 108 Our and all nine rifle battalions of the
tons of shells between the beginning of 106th Division were east of that river.)
the German attack and 1030 on 17 De- Perhaps Jones felt that the corps com-
cember against the enemy attack posi- mander was passing the buck and would
tions opposite the 424th Infantry. But leave him in the lurch if a withdrawal
only in the Heckhuscheid-Winterspelt order was issued. In any case Jones de-
sector had the prearranged and sizable cided not to withdraw the two regi-
groupment of VIII Corps artillery be- ments.
hind the corps left wing played any de- T h e fateful day for the 106th Division
cisive role on 16 and 17 December. would be 17 December. On both sides
of the battle line reinforcements were
Cannae in the Schnee Eifel moving, the Germans to close the trap
on the Schnee Eifel troops, the Amer-
During a telephone conversation ear- icans to wedge its jaws apart. T h e bat-
ly in the evening of 16 December the tle had continued all through the night
corps commander had apprised Gen- of 16–17 December, with results whose
eral Jones of his concern over the se- impact would be fully appreciated only
curity of the 422d and 423d Regiments. after daylight on the 17th.
General Middleton stressed the impor- Colonel Devine, the 14th Cavalry
tance of retaining the Schnee Eifel posi- group commander, left the 106th Divi-
tion but told Jones that it was unten- sion command post about 0800 on the
able unless the north flank could be morning of 17 December, still, insofar as
“heavily protected.” Later, when re- it can be ascertained, without instruc-
ports coming into the corps headquar- tions. The previous evening V Corps had
ters at Bastogne indicated that enemy asked VIII Corps to re-establish contact
pressure along the corps front was not between the 99th Division and the 14th
only continuing but increasing, Middle- Cavalry. This call had been routed to
ton got a call from Jones in which the Colonel Devine, at St. Vith, who spoke
106th commander made a tentative sug- on the phone to the 99th Division head-
gestion to pull the two regiments back quarters and agreed to regain contact at
to less exposed positions. Middleton Wereth. T h e conversation took place
answered in the sense of the time-hon-
ored Army rule of decision by “the man 7 Combat Interv with Middleton and Evans;
also Ltr, Middleton to Theater Historian ETO,
on the ground” and left the phone ex- 30 Jul 45.
162 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

about 2130. But in the ensuing hours was decided that this trail would be used
the situation of Devine’s command had if the elements in Herresbach had to
altered radically. withdraw any farther.
It will be recalled that the 14th Cav- As a result of the reshuffling during
alry Group had withdrawn to the Holz- the night the cavalry position extended
heim-Andler line, breaking contact with obliquely southeast from Wereth
the enemy. About 1830 on 16 December through Herresbach to Andler. Troop
the units of the 18th Reconnaissance B at Andler, then, lay close to the enemy,
Squadron which had moved to Holzheim directly astride the main approach to
on the lefts of the line withdrew to Schonberg and St. Vith. At daybreak
Wereth, farther west, with the consent two of the troop’s reconnaissance teams
of the group commander. This move -about twenty men–were suddenly en-
left Troop A of the 32d by itself at gulfed by Tiger tanks and infantry.
Holzheim. T h e troop commander was ‘This apparition was the 506th Panzer
concerned with his exposed left flank Battalion which had been thrown in by
and requested permission to move to the Sixth Panzer Army to reinforce its
Honsfeld, in the 99th Division zone, advance toward Vielsalm, and which had
somewhat over two miles to the north. detoured south of the interarmy bound-
Group headquarters was loath to ap- ary in search of a passable road. Con-
prove such a move and asked for a report tact was momentary. Troop B hastily
by liaison officer. Finally the commander withdrew south to Schonberg while the
of Troop A decided to act on his own Tigers went lumbering off to the
initiative; the troop reached Honsfeld northwest. Now that Andler was in en-
at 2100 and was incorporated in the emy hands the 32d Cavalry Squadron at
defense of that village. Its subsequent Herresbach was isolated. The squadron
story belongs with that of the 99th executive officer requested permission to
Division. withdraw via the woods trail, which had
During the evening German troops been surveyed earlier, and the 14th Cav-
had been reported on the road south alry Group commander–who had ar-
of Holzheim. The executive officer of rived at his command post in Meyerode
the 32d Squadron received this report -gave consent. About 0830 the 32d
at Herresbach, where the squadron Squadron and the numerous strays and
headquarters and Troops E and C were stragglers who had congregated in Her-
assembled. Although no Germans had resbach began the difficult move. All ve-
yet appeared, the executive officer was hicles finally emerged from the woods
apprehensive lest Herresbach become a and joined group headquarters at Meye-
cul-de-sac. The road southeast to Andler rode.
might be ambushed. T h e poor secondary Thus far only Troop B had actually
road northwest to Wereth was blocked seen and engaged the Germans. Troop
by fallen trees, probably felled by the B was hit again at Schonberg, this time
Belgians. Reconnaissance showed one by elements of the 294th Regiment led
way out of the village, a poor dirt trail, in person by the 18th Volks Grenadier
which led westward for about four miles Division commander, and headed west
and there joined a fairly good road. It along the St. Vith road, looking for a
BREAKTHROUGH A T T H E SCHNEE EIFEL 163

defile or cut which would afford an main road from Büllingen in the north
effective delaying position. T h e aban- to St. Vith. Colonel Devine informed the
donment of Schonberg proved to be headquarters at St. Vith that he had
decisive. The northern kampfgruppe withdrawn to a “final delaying position,”
of the 18th Volks Grenadier Division and sent an overlay to the 106th com-
would shortly be joined by the south- mand post showing the new position.
ern, which had just broken through the Furthermore, Devine advised that he
American lines at Bleialf, thus closing would “have [a] counterattack force
the trap on the American forces within available your orders.” It seems that
the triangle Auw-Schönberg-Bleialf. General Jones did not question this
Troop B finally reached a favorable latest retrograde movement, for it was
point at a sharp bend in the road near reported to the VIII Corps forthwith
Heuem, about 2,000 yards west of Schön- and without comment. At 1220 the G–3
berg. Here, while other American troops journal of the 106th Division records a
streamed through from the east, the telephone message from the 14th Cav-
cavalry deployed its six armored cars and alry Group asking for “the general plan”
ten machine gun and mortar jeeps. When (this was an hour after the withdrawal
the first German vehicle, a tank or as- message arrived at St. Vith) . T h e reply
sault gun, rounded the bend two of the was “stay on the line where you are. Ln
armored cars opened up with 37-mm. O coming to you.”
guns which did no damage but induced Although the 106th Division had not
it to withdraw. Then, for nearly two ordered the group to withdraw in the
hours, the troopers’ light machine guns first instance to the Wallerode-Born posi-
and mortars repelled every attempt that tion, a cavalry screen in this area would
the advance guard of the 294th made to be very useful as outpost cover for the
move forward. Finally at 1050 the 14th 7th Armored Division elements still
Cavalry Group sent radio orders for moving south to St. Vith. Certainly a
Troop B to withdraw through St. Vith roadblock here to the north of the city
and rejoin the 32d Squadron northeast was essential.
of that city. This move was part of a But once more the group commander
general withdrawal which Colonel De- gave the order to withdraw, this about
vine had ordered on his own initiative 1530. There never has been a clear
after scouts sent out by the 18th Squad- explanation for this order; the group had
ron at Wereth reported seeing German no contact with the enemy and had re-
troops to the west (probably the advance ported the Wallerode-Born line as a
guard of the 3d Parachute Division “final delaying position.” A liaison offi-
moving in the direction of Malmédy) . cer from the 106th Division was at the
By noontime, or shortly thereafter, group command post, but it is impossible
the 32d Squadron was in position at to say whether Colonel Devine received
Wallerode and the 18th Squadron was any definite order to hold this position.
on the high ground at Born, northwest of Liaison officers carried the new orders to
Wallerode. On the whole this repre- the two squadrons: the 18th to occupy
sented a favorable defensive line and the village of Recht and the 32d to de-
placed the group in position to block the ploy along the Recht River astride the
164 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

St. Vith-Vielsalm road. Again there was the 592d Field Artillery Battalion had
confusion, either in the orders issued or been less close-pressed by the German
their execution. Instead of moving back infantry; during the early morning of 17
by separate roads both squadrons moved December the battalion, with only one
onto the main highway leading west howitzer missing, withdrew to St. Vith.
from St. Vith to Vielsalm. Darkness T h e two remaining batteries of the 589th
found the group caught up in the traffic were less fortunate. While en route to
jam, three columns wide, crawling slowly St. Vith the column was surprised on the
out of or into St. Vith. road about a mile south of Schonberg;
Before dawn, on 17 December, the three of the remaining pieces were lost
enemy renewed his attack to envelop the there (two had been lost at firing posi-
major part of the 106th Division. At tions). The three howitzers left to the
0725 a radio message from the 423d In- battalion were emplaced in support of
fantry reported that the Germans had the hasty defenses being reared around
overrun Bleialf and requested the divi- St. Vith. T h e 590th Field Artillery Bat-
sion to send help at once to prevent a talion, having moved north from the
thrust in force to the north. In the 14th 423d Infantry zone during the night, also
Cavalry Group sector, the enemy was in was en route to the west when suddenly
Andler and driving toward Schonberg. its escape was blocked by the tanks which
Finally, at 0905, the news reached the had struck the 589th. Reconnaissance
106th Division command post in St. Vith showed that the other exit routes were
that the enemy forces striking north from held by the enemy or were mired to the
Bleialf had pushed the 423d Infantry extent of being impassable. The bat-
back to the northeast and had joined talion therefore rejoined the forces in
hands with the forces at Schonberg. The the pocket and took up firing positions
German plan of envelopment had suc- in the Halenfelder Wald. This one
ceeded-the 422d and 423d Regiments battalion of the division artillery
were encircled. The only question re- could be of little help, for its service
maining was whether the two units battery, sent west for ammunition, would
could break out or be released by an be unable to return.
American counterthrust from the west. While the artillery was attempting es-
The answer lies in the state and disposi- cape, with varying degrees of success, the
ticns of the trapped regiments. 2d Battalion, 423d, repelled two enemy
The 2d Battalion, 423d, committed attempts to advance south of Auw.
the previous evening, had organized a Meanwhile patrols had discovered some
defensive position astride the Auw- German troops at Laudesfeld, about a
Bleialf road close behind the belea- thousand yards west of the battalion
guered 589th Field Artillery Battalion. positions. The 2d Battalion commander,
Most of the 589th reached the infantry now out of contact with the command
lines, but Battery C had become mired post at St. Vith, decided to fall back and
in an area which was under defend Schonberg. When the battalion
constant fire and toward dawn the finally turned to follow the artillery out
bogged howitzers were destroyed of the trap, it found the way effectively
where they lay. The medium pieces of blocked by German tanks. Although the
BREAKTHROUGH A T T H E SCHNEE EIFEL 165

battalion antitank guns did well in the forces, had been accomplished by the
unequal contest with the panzers–de- southern jaw of the German vise only
stroying three at one point–neither they after strong exhortation and admonition
nor the attached platoon of tank de- of the 293d Regiment by its parent divi-
stroyers could hope to force the entry to sion and corps. At the close of 16 Decem-
the Schonberg road. Puett’s battalion ber the provisional battalion of the 423d
could now move only in one direction- Infantry still held Bleialf, from which the
to the east. At noontime the 2d Battalion enemy had been ejected earlier in the
joined the 423d Infantry near Radscheid. day. During the night the 293d Regi-
Communication with the division having ment re-formed for the attack, urged on
failed, Puett placed himself and his bat- by its higher headquarters, and at 0530
talion at the disposal of the commander the next morning struck Bleialf in force.
of the 423d and was ordered into the Within an hour the attackers had driven
perimeter defense slowly forming. the provisional battalion from the vil-
It is probable that both the 423d and lage (the Germans later reported a stiff
422d were aware of their plight by 0900; fight) and were on the march north to
at least radio reports of the unsuccessful Schonberg. Nothing stood in the way, al-
attempt by the 590th to run the Schon- though the enemy vanguard ran into the
berg gantlet had been received. The American artillery withdrawal and was
106th Division took cognizance of the slightly delayed, and about 0900 the lead-
situation in which the regiments now ing troops of the 293d met their division
found themselves by a radio order sent commander and his battalion from the
out at 0945: “Withdraw from present 294th near Schonberg.
positions if they become untenable.” Most of the Bleialf garrison succeeded
The message added that the division ex- in joining the two rifle battalions of the
pected to clear out the area “west of you” 423d. But on the extreme right flank of
with reinforcements during the after- the regiment, south of Bleialf, elements
noon. This communication, unfortu- of Company B, 8 1st Engineer Battalion,
nately, was delayed in transit. Actually were overrun and Troop B, 18th Cavalry
neither regiment made any move except Squadron, was left isolated. Unable to
to bring some troops out of the Schnee reach the 423d, the troop was given per-
Eifel and sketch in perimeter defenses. mission to try the Schonberg exit. About
T h e only contact between the 422d and dark Troop B started north, followed by
423d was by radio and patrols. During a part of the 106th Reconnaissance
the afternoon the enemy constricted Troop which had become separated
their hold, albeit loosely by deployment from the 424th Infantry. Keeping to the
along the Bleialf-Auw road, but on the west of the enemy-occupied Bleialf-
whole the Americans were left to their Schonberg road, the cavalry column
own devices while German infantry, reached the edge of Schonberg. (By this
guns, and vehicles poured past on their time the situation was so confused that
way to the west. a Volkswagen full of grenadiers moved
The early morning breakthrough in into the column just ahead of an armored
the Bleialf sector, necessary to the Ger- car–whose gunner promptly destroyed
man encirclement of the Schnee Eifel the intruding vehicle and its occupants.)
166 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Because Schonberg was known to be erations included all or part of the


in German hands, the 3d Platoon moved following:
in to determine the situation. T h e pla- 589th Field Artillery Battalion (-)
toon had crossed the Our bridge and was 590th Field Artillery Battalion
at the north end of the village when Company B, 81st Engineer Battal-
there appeared a column of American ion
trucks, but filled with Germans carrying Battery D, 634th Antiaircraft Auto-
arms. The three armored cars, forming matic Weapons Battalion
the point of the platoon, wheeled over Company C, 820th Tank Destroyer
to the side of the road and raced toward Battalion
the head of the column, firing their ma- Company B, 331st Medical Battal-
chine guns and 37-mm. cannon as they ion
passed the yelling Germans. Suddenly a 106th Reconnaissance Troop
Mark IV tank slipped out of a side road. Troop B, 18th Cavalry Reconnais-
Only one of the American armored cars sance Squadron (-)
got away. When informed by radio of
this engagement the 423d Infantry in- The 422d Infantry on that night was
structed Troop B to “make your own forming a perimeter defense, its center
decision.” Unsuccessful in finding any south of Schlausenbach. T o the south-
passable secondary road, the troopers west the 423d Infantry was assuming a
destroyed their vehicles and broke up similar stance on the high ground around
into small groups for the journey toward Oberlascheid and Buchet. At the mo-
St. Vith. Hiding by day and traveling by ment there was no shortage of rifle
night some fifty reached the St. Vith ammunition, there was a basic load for
lines. The 106th Reconnaissance Troop the mortars (but the 590th Field Artil-
had become completely disorganized lery Battalion had only about 300 rounds
while following Troop B, and one pla- for its 105-mm. howitzers) , approxi-
toon was left in Grosslangenfeld with mately one day’s extra K rations were at
neither orders nor word of the with- hand, and surgical supplies were very
drawal. Most of the officers and men sur- short. Most of the regimental vehicles
rendered the next morning without a had been saved–although the service
fight.8 company of the 422d had been cut off
When darkness came on 17 December, near Auw and some kitchen trucks had
some eight or nine thousand Americans been lost. Casualties were not high in
were effectively bottled up west of the either regiment; the 422d, for example,
Schnee Eifel. Their story henceforth has reported only forty wounded for evacua-
little connection with events outside the tion.
pocket. In addition to the 422d and 423d Both regimental commanders had
Infantry Regiments the list of attached been assured by radio that reinforce-
and supporting units that were severed ments from the west would attempt to
from the main thread of American op- break through sometime after daylight
on 18 December and, further, that sup-
8This according to the FUSA Inspector General
plies would be dropped by air. A divi-
report. sion order to withdraw to the Our River,
BREAKTHROUGH A T T H E SCHNEE EIFEL 167

sent out at 1445, was followed six hours and excess equipment, left the wounded
later by the question: “When do you with medical aid men in the regimental
plan to move?” These orders, relayed collecting station, and started off on the
through the artillery radio net, took a road through Oberlascheid and Rad-
long time and much repetition before scheid.10 About 1130 Puett’s 2d Battal-
they could reach the entrapped regi- ion, leading, met the Germans near the
ments. The initial order to withdraw Schonberg-Bleialf road. With the aid of
to the Our River line was not received its heavy weapons company, whose mor-
until about midnight of the 17th. T h e tars did yeoman service, the battalion
two regimental commanders agreed that began to push the enemy back toward
this order now was out of date because Bleialf. Meanwhile Colonel Cavender
messages, signed later in the day, had had gone forward to see what the situa-
promised resupply by air. tion was, but en route he received a radio
Late in the evening of the 17th Gen- message from General Jones telling him
eral Jones consulted the VIII Corps that the relief attack by the American
commander and at 0215the next morn- armor would not take place and ordering
ing sent out an order: “Panzer regtl C T the two regiments to shift their move to
on Elmerscheid9 –Schonberg–St. Vith Schonberg. Cavender passed word of
Rd, head near St. Vith. Our mission is to this new mission to Colonel Descheneaux
destroy by fire from dug in positions S and ordered his own 3d Battalion to
of Schonberg–St. Vith Rd. Am, food and come up on Puett’s right. At noon Puett
water will be dropped. When mission sent an urgent plea for help, but none
accomplished, move to area St. Vith- arrived at this critical point in the fire
Wallerode-Weppler. Organize and move fight and the attack finally lost momen-
to W.” This message reached the 423d tum. The 3d Battalion had advanced
Infantry, which alone had some sporadic across the Ihren Creek and dug in per-
radio link with the division, about 0730; haps 1,000 to 1,500 yards from the edge
it reached the 422d Infantry about half of Schonberg, but in doing so lost touch
an hour later. T h e regimental com- with both its own regiment and the 422d
manders decided to begin the move to Infantry. About dusk the 1st Battalion
the west at 1000, with their regiments was put in on the left of the 2d to help
abreast (although the only contact was clear the German infantry from the
by patrol) and in column of battalions. woods astride the Bleialf-Schönberg
As understood, the mission was to ad- road, but the psychological moment had
vance across the Bleialf-Schönberg road passed. 11
and attack from the south side of the T h e last message from the division
road between Schonberg and St. Vith, (actually dispatched at 1445 the day be-
that is, bypassing Schonberg. fore) was heard an hour or so before
From the time of this joint decision
10Lt. Col. William Craig, commanding officer of
there was little contact between the regi- the 1st Battalion, died of wounds on this day.
ments. T h e 423d destroyed its kitchens 111st Lt. R. H. Thompson personally destroyed
two enemy machine guns and their crews in this
9Probably this message referred to the Amel- series of actions; he then made a lone attack on
scheid “cut-off’ through which the Americans had a n enemy assault gun and was seriously wounded.
been attempting to evade the enemy. He received the DSC.
168 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

midnight, “It is imperative that Schon- which had been moving in the rear of
berg be taken.” Colonel Cavender al- the rifle battalions. Despite this blow
ready had decided to disengage his two Lt. Col. Earl F. Klinck’s 3d Battalion
left battalions, in light of the next mis- jumped off in good order at 1000. One
sion, and shift northward to support a company was cut off and captured, but
dawn attack by the 3d Battalion. By this two rifle companies reached the environs
time the 423d was going it alone, for all of Schonberg, then had to retire in a
attempts to reach the sister regiment had storm of antiaircraft fire. T h e 1st Battal-
failed. During the night the regiment ion was able to put one company in the
pulled itself together in some semblance advance, but by midafternoon it was
of order along Ridge 536, just southeast eliminated. When brought forward on
of Schonberg. Losses had been high- the right the 2d Battalion became sepa-
some 300 casualties (including 16 offi- rated and was subjected to fire from the
cers). No more rounds were left for the 422d Infantry, then about 400 yards to
81-mm. mortars, most of the machine the north. At last, with tactical control
guns were gone, there was little bazooka gone, only five to ten rifle rounds per
ammunition, and rifle clips were low. man, no supporting weapons, and an in-
The surrounding enemy forces were creasing number of wounded untended
surprised that the American regiments (despite yeoman effort by the regimental
made no move to counterattack during surgeon, Maj. Gaylord D. Fridline, and
the night of 18–19December; one report his staff), the commander of the 423d
says: “In the Kessel absolute quiet Infantry surrendered his regiment. T h e
reigned.” The troops actually ringing the time was about 1630.
pocket were relatively few: the 293d I n - T h e experience of the 422d Infantry
fantry Regiment, the 18th Volks Grena- was very similar to that of its sister regi-
dier Division Replacement Battalion ment. Largely quiescent during the 17th,
(which had come over the Schnee Eifel) , the 422d acted as promptly as possible
and the newly arrived 669th Ost Battal- when the division order was received on
ion. Since the roads at the Schonberg the following morning. Colonel Desche-
bottleneck were jammed, the LX VI neaux, acting in concert with the 423d,
Corps commander could bring only one ordered an advance in column of battal-
battalion of field guns that far forward; ions, the axis to the northwest in the
therefore the corps artillery was in- direction of Schonberg. Excess equip-
structed to concentrate fire on the ment was destroyed, the wounded were
pocket during the 19th. left with an aid man, the regimental can-
The 423d still was attempting to form non company fired its last smoke rounds
for the attack, when, an hour or so after into Auw (as a slight deterrent to enemy
dawn on 19 December, German field observers), then spiked the pieces. In two
pieces along the Bleialf-Schönberg road columns–one made up of foot troops
opened fire, sweeping the southeastern lugging all portable weapons, the other
slope of Ridge 536. Soon the shelling made up of regimental vehicles–the
ceased and the enemy infantry closed in, movement encountered nothing but
overrunning the 590th Field Artillery small groups of the enemy. Reconnais-
Battalion and other heterogeneous units sance had been confined to the map, al-
BREAKTHROUGH A T T H E SCHNEE EIFEL 169

though the I and K Platoon was used sounded off to the west and northwest
as point during the march, and when the rifle battalions marched through the
the two columns reassembled at dusk the darkness to three smaller woods, prepara-
422d was lost. A wood had been selected tory for an attack at daylight on the 19th.
on the map as a suitable assembly area The dispositions now taken were farther
from which to launch a co-ordinated to the north, facing the Bleialf-Auw
attack against Schonberg, this about one road, with the battalions deployed so that
and a half miles from the village. In fact, the 1st Battalion was farthest north, the
however, the regiment had bivouacked 2d Battalion in the center, and the 3d
northeast of Oberlascheid in a wood Battalion on the south. At daybreak the
about three miles from its objective- three battalions moved out abreast, ad-
nor apparently was anyone the wiser. vancing in approach march formation
During the early evening the I and R toward the objective–Schönberg–be–
Platoon reported that contact had been lieved to be little more than a mile
made with the neighboring regiment, distant. T h e leading troops were just
which intended to attack Schonberg. No crossing the Bleialf-Auw road when they
further liaison was made. While gunfire were hit by machine gun and tank fire

AMERICAN The tank is a German Tiger.


PRISONERS.
170 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

coming from the north. At this point the After negotiations to determine that the
road curved to the east, and the enemy Germans would feed the Americans and
apparently had taken a position in woods provide care for the wounded, the sur-
north of the bend which allowed him to render was completed about 1600.
enfilade the straightway. The 1st Battal- A group of about 400, however, were
ion commander ordered his men to turn reorganized by the 2d Battalion execu-
back from the road and move southward. tive officer (Maj. Albert A. Ouellette)
In the meantime the 2d and 3d Battal- in the woods which had been the 2d
ions had jumped off, but at the road Battalion assembly area. This group at-
their lead companies also came under tempted to move southwest the follow-
severe frontal and flanking fire. ing day, but it too was surrounded. After
It will be recalled that the 422d and destroying weapons and equipment Oue-
its sister regiment to the south had no llette’s people surrendered on the morn-
contact. While the right wing battalion ing of 2 1 December. Another band,
of the 423d was attempting to advance representing most of the vehicular col-
northwestward, it was discerned by the umn, had attempted to break out
left flank troops of the 422d who, mis- through Bleialf on the late afternoon of
taking this movement for a German 19 December but was halted by a mine
flanking attack, poured bullet fire into field at the edge of the village, sur-
the draw where the men of the 423d rounded, and forced to capitulate. Not
were moving. In the brief exchange of more than 150 men of the 422d Infantry
fire which followed both these inner succeeded in escaping to the American
flank units became considerably disor- lines.
ganized. T h e number of officers and men taken
But finally it was fire superiority in prisoner on the capitulation of the two
the hands of the enemy which checked regiments and their attached troops can-
further movement. About 1400, tanks not be accurately ascertained. At least
were heard approaching from the north. seven thousand were lost here and the
In a last desperate flare of optimism the figure probably is closer to eight or nine
Americans thought that these were thousand. T h e amount lost in arms and
friendly tanks–but they were not. By a equipment, of course, was very substan-
stroke of ill fortune the Fuehrer Begleit tial. T h e Schnee Eifel battle, therefore,
Brigade had been ordered forward to represents the most serious reverse suf-
support the L X V I Corps attack on St. fered by American arms during the
Vith. En route from Auw to Schonberg, operations of 1944–45 in the European
the panzers arrived at the fork where theater. T h e Americans would regard
the road split toward Schonberg and this defeat as a blow to Allied prestige.
Bleialf just in time to give the coup-de- T h e Germans would see in this victory,
grâce. The tanks rolled through the bat- won without great superiority in num-
talions on the right while the German bers, a dramatic reaffirmation of the
infantry poured in from the woods. At Schlieffen-Cannae concept.
1430 the regimental commander decided The fate of the two regiments was not
to surrender that part of his regiment immediately known to the 106th Divi-
which was disorganized and entrapped. sion and the VIII Corps. T h e last mes-
BREAKTHROUGH A T T H E SCHNEE EIFEL 171

sage radioed out of the pocket had been At 1051 on 17 December the com-
dispatched at 1535 on 18 December, mander of the 423d Infantry radioed a
simply saying that the regiments had request for an airdrop. Relayed through
started to comply with the orders for an the division artillery net, this request
attack to the northwest; it was received at was logged in at the 106th Division head-
St. Vith on the morning of the 19th. By quarters at 1500. In the meantime Jones
the night of the 20th the division must apparently decided to act on his own and
have given up hope, what with the Ger- asked the VIII Corps air officer to ar-
man reinforcements from the east con- range a resupply mission. T h e time of
gregating in front of St. Vith, but one this conversation cannot be fixed, but by
last attempt to reach the 423d Infantry 1345 a message was en route from St.
by radio was made two days later. Vith to the 423d Infantry promising a
drop in the vicinity of Buchet “tonight.”
T h e Question of Air Resupply Within a quarter of an hour a second
message was on the air for the 422d. T h e
One question mark still dangles over VIII Corps air officer (Lt. Col. Josiah T.
the fate of the two regiments captured Towne) meanwhile had relayed Jones’s
in the Schnee Eifel. Why were they not request through the IX Fighter Com-
resupplied by airdrop? General Jones mand to the IX Tactical Air Com-
and the two regimental commanders mand.13At this point the chain of events
made their wants known as early as the and the chain of responsibility both be-
17th and evidently had some reason to come unclear.
believe that ammunition, medical sup- T h e IX Tactical Air Command nor-
plies, and other necessities would be mally would have referred the request
delivered to the encircled regiments be- to First Army for clearance. T h e report
fore they essayed the final attempt at of the G–4 at the latter headquarters
escape. Although most of the processing simply says that on the afternoon of 17
involved in handling the 106th Division December the plight of the two regi-
requests was by telephone and without ments was made known by telephone
record, two facts are certain: General calls and that preparations for supply by
Jones did all in his power to secure air air “were promptly set in motion.” 14
resupply; the weather did permit planes Since carrier planes would have to come
to fly on 18 December when resupply from the United Kingdom it was neces-
was most needed.12 sary at some stage to bring CATOR
(Combined Air Transport Operations
12 Much effort has been made to trace this story
Room) at SHAEF into the picture. How
through the numerous headquarters which were
involved, but there are great gaps in the journal many telephone calls were made before
files. Interviews with officers concerned have only the First Army request reached CATOR
compounded confusion, yielding bits and pieces of
information, which, lacking in written record, 13Dupuy (St. Vith: Lion in the W a y , page
cannot be p u t together in sequence. Royce L. 134f.), goes no further than the First Army head-
Thompson made an exhaustive search of the rec- quarters to find a culprit, following in this the
ords and conducted a number of personal inter- combat interview with Colonel Towne, 16 January
views with officers involved in staffing the 106th 1945.
requests. See his Air Supply to Isolated Units: 14First United States Army, Report of Opera-
Ardennes Campaign. OCMH, 1951. tions, an. 2, G–4 Sec, p. 120f.
172 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

and how many headquarters were in- T h e entire mission was canceled on 2 2
volved cannot be determined. December in order to support the 101st
T h e IX Troop Carrier Command, Airborne Division at Bastogne.15
whose planes would fly the mission, got Two melancholy facts emerge from
the word from CATOR sometime dur- this story: fixed responsibility and co-
ing the early morning of the 18th with ordination were lacking; supplies pre-
orders to prepare forty planeloads of pared for airdropping had to come from
ammunition and medical supplies. The the United Kingdom, despite the fact
435th Troop Carrier Group, at Welford, that Allied ground troops were at the
drew this assignment and loaded up with German border. Attempts to prevent a
parapacks and door bundles. Orders similar fiasco were initiated in a matter
were precise. T h e group was to fly to the of days, but too late to help the dispirited
airfield at Florennes, Belgium, and there Americans marching into German cap-
be briefed on the mission and meet its tivity. On 2 1 December the 12th Army
fighter cover. T h e Welford base was Group issued an order “confirming” the
closing in when-at an unspecified time procedure for airdrops to ground troops.
-the first serial took off. Nonetheless This of course could be only a palliative
twenty-three C–47’s arrived in the air so long as air and ground co-ordination
over Florennes. This field, it is reported, remained in abeyance. A day later the
was “too busy to take care of the 435th commanding officer of the Communica-
formation,” which was ordered to an- tions Zone, Lt. Gen. John C. H. Lee,
other field near Liége. T h e commander requested SHAEF to set up stocks of
and his wingman landed at Florennes, ready-packed supplies, capable of air
however, only to find that there was no delivery, at airfields strategically located
information for a briefing, nobody had on the Continent. This proposal was
the map co-ordinates for the scheduled accepted.
drop, and no fighter escort had been Perhaps the co-ordination of separate
arranged. During this time the 435th had services and the proper application of
been diverted again, finally landing at new military techniques must always be
Dreux in France. Here the planes would learned the hard way. If so, the cost is
stay until 23 December, their original very dear and the prospect in future
mission on-again, off-again daily. Some- wars depressing.
where along the line additional requests
from the 106th Division had swelled the 15Headquarters, IX Troop Carrier Command,
mission to 138 planeloads and ultimately Operation Repulse, Resupply by Air, Belgium,
December 1944 (January 1945); 435th Troop Car-
it was decided to make this larger drop rier Group Unit History, MS dated 1 January
with planes from the United Kingdom. 1945.
CHAPTER VIII

The Fifth Panzer Army Attacks


the 28th Infantry Division
T h e battle plans and tactics of the in a forthright appeal that carried the
Fifth Panzer Army, more than those of day on a series of tactical decisions al-
any other German army that took part though it failed to sway the Fuehrer
in the Ardennes counteroffensive, bore from his strategic decision for the Big
the very strong personal imprint of its Solution. T h e Fifth Panzer Army com-
commander, General Manteuffel. As a mander was bitterly opposed to that part
junior officer in the prewar panzer of the plan which called for a tremen-
troops, Manteuffel had made a mark as dous opening barrage at 0800 and a two-
an armored specialist. His record in hour artillery preparation before the
North Africa and Russia, where he attack jumped off. He argued that the
achieved a reputation for energetic enemy literally must not be awakened
leadership and personal bravery, and that the assault forces should move
brought him to Hitler’s attention and forward the moment the guns sounded.
promotion directly from a division to an This point was conceded when Hitler
army command. Despite the failure of ruled that the artillery fires along the
his Fifth Panzer Army in the Lorraine entire front would begin at 0530. Man-
campaign against Patton’s Third Army, teuffel also held strongly for infiltration
Manteuffel was listed by Hitler for com- tactics by small detachments, such as
mand in the Ardennes. His staff, care- were conventionally employed by both
fully selected and personally devoted to opponents on the Eastern Front. Hitler
the little general, was probably the best himself seems to have favored this con-
German staff on the Western Front. cept (it is found in the first Fuehrer
Manteuffel had found himself in al- operations order), but only in the Fifth
most complete disagreement with the Panzer attack would assault detachments
original operations plan handed down by be found inside the American positions
Jodl in November. He was able to con- when the initial barrage opened up.
vince the Army Group B commander Manteuffel likewise opposed the con-
that a stand should be taken on a number cept proposed by Jodl in which the
of tactical points which, in Manteuffel’s attack would be carried by two panzer
judgment, were essential to success in the corps advancing in column. He wanted
forthcoming attack. In the last planning an attack on a broad front with both
conference held at Hitler’s headquarters, tank corps in the line at the opening
Model and Manteuffel combined forces gun–this point Hitler conceded. View-
174 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

VON MANTEUFFEL
GENERAL GENERAL
VON LUETTWITZ

ing the ground in front of his right ar- via Clerf, seize the vital road center at
mored corps as especially difficult, Man- Bastogne, form in a deep column eche-
teuffel would give Generaloberst Walter loned to the left and rear, then race for
Krueger’s LVIII Panzer Corps a fairly the Meuse River crossings south of Na-
narrow front for the initial assault. Be- mur. Manteuffel had two armored forma-
lieving that once across the Our River, tions in reserve, the Panzer Lehr
his left armored attack force, General Division and the Fuehrer Begleit Bri-
der Panzertruppen Heinrich Freiherr gade.1 These he intended to throw in be-
von Luettwitz’ XLVII Panzer Corps, hind the armored corps which made the
would find the going better than on the first bridgehead at the Our.
right, he assigned Luettwitz a rather Although success or failure would turn
wide front. In final form, the LVIII Pan-
zer Corps’ mission was to cross the Our
River on both sides of Ouren, drive west 1The Panzer Lehr Division carried the same
on the Houffalize axis, and create a organization as other German armored divisions.
Its name reflected the division’s original status as
bridgehead over the Meuse River in the a tank training unit. The Fuehrer Begleit Bri-
neighborhood of Namur and Andenne. gade originally had been a special escort battalion
At the same time the X L V I I Panzer for Hitler. It was expanded. for commitment in
the Ardennes to three panzer grenadier battalions,
Corps would cross the Our in the vicin- a panzer regiment, an artillery battalion, an anti-
ity of Dasburg and Gemünd, push west aircraft battalion, and lesser units.
F I F T H PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 175

on the operations of the two armored win a quick penetration and get rolling.
corps, the Fifth Panzer Army had been His first concern would be to gain the
given a small infantry corps of two divi- ridge west of the Our and thus cover the
sions to flesh out its right shoulder. This armor crossings, for he recognized that
was General der Artillerie Walther it would be a difficult stream to bridge.
Lucht’s LXVI Corps. In early planning H e expected that the tactics of predawn
there had been some question as to infiltration would pay off and that his
whether the Americans i n the Schnee assault detachments would have reached
Eifel should be left to the Fifth or the the crest line, Lascheid-Heinerscheid-
Sixth. Unhappy about this thorn in his Roder-Hosingen, before noon on D-day.
side, Manteuffel won the assignment of He hoped that the armored debouch-
the Schnee Eifel heights to his army and ment into the bridgehead would com-
personally developed a scheme to mence during the early afternoon. Man-
mop up resistance in this sector teuffel had no precise schedule for his
at the earliest possible moment. right wing but after the war was over
Despite the general dictum that would say that he had hoped for the
defended towns would be bypassed, Man- seizure of St. Vith on the first day of the
teuffel wanted St. Vith as a blocking attack. One thing clearly worried him:
position and so ordered Lucht to capture would the Seventh A r m y keep pace and
it. Once through St. Vith the LXVI cover his left flank to Bastogne? His
would follow Krueger to Andenne, but appeal for a mechanized division to be
if things grew rough on the left wing given the neighboring Seventh the Fueh-
Manteuffel intended to switch Lucht’s rer personally denied. 2
corps to the south.
T h e Fifth Panzer commander seems to
have been fairly optimistic, although he
gave little ear to Hitler’s promise of air 2T h e memoirs of the leading personalities in
the F i f t h Panzer Army, as collected in the German
support. He personally rated four of his manuscript histories are detailed and uninhibited.
armored divisions as good attack forma- They square in a remarkable manner with the
tions (the 116th, 2d, Panzer Lehr, and recital of events in the American records. See
especially MSS # B-151a, sequel t o B–151, Fifth
Fuehrer Begleit) , and his panzer corps Panzer Army, Ardennes Offensive (General der
commanders were of his own choosing. Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel); B–321,
Krueger and Luettwitz were old hands L V I I I Panzer Corps in the Ardennes Offensive,
16 December 1944–11 January 1945 (General der
at mechanized warfare, had learned their Panzertruppen Walter Krueger) ; A-939, The As-
business as commanders of the 1st and 2d signment of the XLVII Panzer Corps in the
Panzer Divisions, respectively, and had Ardennes, 1944–45 (General der Panzertruppen
Heinrich von Luettwitz) ; B–040, 26th Volks Gren-
fought side by side in Lorraine. Krueger adier Division in the Ardennes Offensive (Gen-
was the elder of the two and lacked eralmajor Heinz Kokott). See also MSS # A-955,
something of Luettwitz’ dash. T h e latter Report on the Campaign in Northern France, the
Rhineland, and the Ardennes (Oberst i. G. Hans-
was a hard-driving commander, daring Juergen Dingler); B–506, LVIII Panzer Corps
and tenacious, and had a reputation of Artillery, 1 November 1944–1 February 1945
giving help to neighboring formations (Generalmajor Gerhard Triepel) ; A–941, Panzer
Lehr Division, 1 December 1944–26 January 1945
without debate. (Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein) ; A-942, Panzer
With this team Manteuffel hoped to L e h r Division, 15–22 December 1944 (Bayerlein) .
176 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

T h e 110th Infantry Sector Luettwitz could not allow any slackening


16–18 December to an infantry pace by frontal attacks
against strongly defended American
On the second day of December, a positions. Second, he had to disregard
staff officer from General Luettwitz’ his own flanks, particularly on the south,
X L V I I Panzer Corps arrived at the head- and resolutely refuse to detach any force
quarters of the Fifth Panzer Army to re- for flank protection until the main body
ceive the highly secret word of a great was west of the Meuse. The only security
counteroffensive in the Ardennes sector. for the southern flank would have to
At the moment Luettwitz’ corps was come from an advance in echelon and
fighting in the bogs and swamps of such protection as the less mobile divi-
southwest Holland, where the 30 sions of the Seventh Army could offer
British Corps and the U.S. 84th on the left.
Division had essayed an attack in the Intelligence reports indicated that the
sector around Geilenkirchen intended to elements of the U.S. 28th Infantry Divi-
erase the salient retained by the Ger- sion likely to be encountered during the
mans on the left flank of the U.S. Ninth first hours of the attack were battle-
Army. Earlier the X L V I I Panzer Corps weary, small in number, and widely dis-
headquarters had taken part in the Fifth persed. The problem then, as seen by
Panzer Army counterattack against the Manteuffel and Luettwitz, was not how
U.S. Third’ Army in September, to achieve the initial breakthrough at the
had been given new divisions to spear- Our and Clerf Rivers, but rather how to
head the brief spoiling attack in late employ the armor once these two rivers
October against the British and lay behind. T h e roads in the corps zone
American advance in southwest Hol- of attack were narrow, twisting, and cer-
land, and had returned to the line in tain to be muddy; they were particularly
this sector in mid-November to bolster bad on the axis assigned to Luettwitz’
the failing German defenses. Luettwitz southern columns. Just east of Bastogne
turned the Geilenkirchen sector over to the roads straightened somewhat, but
the X V I I SS Corps on 6 December and good tank-going could not be expected
moved with his staff to Kyllburg, close to until the Marche-Rochefort line was
the Fifth Panzer Army headquarters, reached midway between Bastogne and
where a few trusted officers set feverishly the Meuse. T h e road center at Bastogne
to work on plans for Christrose, the code presented a special problem, a problem
name for the coming offensive. recognized in the first German plans.
The mission given Luettwitz con- Luettwitz and the army commander ran
formed to his reputation for drive and at least two map exercises to arrive at a
audacity. T h e X L V I I Panzer Corps, if all solution, but Bastogne lay nineteen air-
went well, would cross the Our and Clerf miles west of the German jump-off
Rivers, make a dash “over Bastogne” to positions on the Our River and the final
the Meuse, seize the Meuse River cross- orders to Luettwitz’ divisions were
ings near Namur by surprise, and drive couched in very general terms. One thing
on through Brussels to Antwerp. Two was agreed upon: Bastogne had to be
things were necessary to success. First, taken before the bulk of the X L V I I Pan-
FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 177

zer Corps moved beyond it to the west. 3 whipped into shape by the “Old 26th,”
(Map IV) and first-rate equipment replaced that
The sector at the Our River in which lost in the east. T h e division com-
Luettwitz’ corps would begin the attack mander, officers, and noncoms were
was a little over seven miles wide, the veterans; training throughout the
villages of Dahnen on the north and Stol- division was reported as adequate.
zembourg on the south serving as bound- Ration strength was more than 17,000,
ary markers. This initial zone was and forty-two 75-mm. antitank guns
roughly equivalent to the American de- supplemented the weapons organic
fensive position manned west of the Our to the conventional Volks Grena-
by the 110th Infantry, the center regi- dier division. Like all such units, how-
ment of the 28th Infantry Division, al- ever, the 26th was geared to foot power
though the width of the 110th front was and horsepower; there were 5,000 horses
about two miles greater than the front in the division, including a few of the
assigned the panzer corps. T h e latter tough “winterized” Russian breed. T h e
consisted of three divisions. The 26th new mission given General Kokott was
Volks Grenadier Division (General- this: the 26th would force the crossings
major Heinz Kokott) already was de- at the Our and Clerf Rivers on the left
ployed in the Eifel sector of the West of the corps, hold open for the armor,
Wall adjacent to the Our where it cov- then follow the more mobile panzer
ered not only the X L V I I Panzer Corps units to Bastogne. At that crucial point
zone but a wide frontage beyond. An old the infantry had to take Bastogne as
line division, the 26th had fought on the quickly as possible, with or without the
Eastern Front from July 1941 to the last help of the armored divisions. Once this
days of September 1944, winning many barrier was passed the 26th would be
decorations but little rest. Finally, after responsible for covering the left flank of
a grueling battle in the Baranôw-War- the corps while the armored divisions
saw sector the division was relieved for made the Meuse crossings.
the first time since the beginning of the The initial penetration by the corps’
Russian campaign and brought back to right was charged to the armored infan-
Poznan, there receiving the title of try of the famous 2d Panzer Division
Volks Grenadier (regarded as somewhat (Colonel Meinrad von Lauchert) , a unit
less than an honor by the survivors of the that had fought the Allies all the way
old regular army 26th Infantry Divi- from Normandy back to the German
sion) . frontier. When the 2d Panzer Division
T o the surprise of the division staff was relieved at the end of September its
the task of re-equipping and replenishing tanks were gone, but there remained a
the 26th went amazingly fast for the be- large cadre of veterans who had escaped
ginning of the sixth year of the war. Re- to the West Wall on foot. In the weeks
placements, mostly from the Navy, were that followed, the division rested and
re-formed in the Bitburg-Wittlich area,
3MSS # A–939 (Luettwitz); A–940, X L V I I its units moving constantly to escape
Panzer Corps in the Ardennes Offensive (Luett-
witz); A–941 (Bayerlein); A–942 (Bayerlein). For Allied observation. Replacements, gen-
the corps plans, see K T B : Christrose. erally better than the average, were
178 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

brought in from Austria (the home sta- December Bayerlein’s command was
tion for the 2d Panzer Division was brought north to the Eifel district for an
Vienna) , and new-model Panther tanks, emergency attempt at refitting. Losses in
equipped for night fighting with the new equipment had been particularly heavy.
infrared sighting apparatus, arrived fresh Tanks, tank destroyers, and guns were
from assembly plants near Breslau. On rushed up from the depots at Mayen, but
the eve of commitment the two tank bat- on 15 December the two panzer grena-
talions were about full strength, with 27 dier regiments were still missing 60 per-
Mark IV’s, 58 Panthers, and 48 armored cent of their regular rifle strength and
assault guns in the division tank parks. the panzer regiment had ready only one
Sufficient trucks were available to motor- of its two battalions (with 27 Mark IV’s
ize most of the division, but there was a and 30 Panthers). T o compensate for
shortage of tracked cross-country vehi- the armored weakness of the battered
cles. One battalion of armored infantry division, two battalions of armored tank
was given bicycles, and would move so destroyers and an assault gun brigade
slowly through the mud and over the were given Bayerlein just before the
hills that its function during the drive attack to the west began. T h e best troops
to the west was simply that of a replace- and newest equipment were placed in
ment battalion, feeding into the more the division reconnaissance battalion,
mobile units up ahead. heavily reinforced, which was slated to
Once the 2d Panzer Division had join the reconnaissance battalion of the
thrown a bridge across the Our at Das- 26th Volks Grenadier Division in spear-
burg and the 26th Volks Grenadier Divi- heading the advance once the Clerf
sion had put a bridge in at Gemund, River had been crossed.
the well-known Panzer Lehr Division With three divisions, and added corps
would be ready to roll, advancing behind troops, the X L V I I Panzer Corps pos-
the two forward divisions until the corps sessed a considerable amount of shock
had cleared the Clerf River, then push- and fire power. Manteuffel allotted
ing ahead of the infantry on the corps Luettwitz the 15th Volks Werfer Bri-
left in the race to Bastogne. The Panzer gade (108 pieces) , the 766th Volks Artil-
Lehr (Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein) lery Corps (76 pieces), the 600th Army
was one of the divisions earmarked in Engineer Battalion, and the 182d Flak
November for use in the Ardennes coun- Regiment, all motorized. Each division
teroffensive, but the American offensive was reinforced with additional self-pro-
in Lorraine and Alsace had forced OKW pelled assault guns or tank destroyers and
to release the Panzer Lehr from its posi- each had a full complement of divisional
tion in the strategic reserve. Hitler had artillery (four battalions for the infantry
committed Bayerlein’s tanks in an abor- division and three motorized battalions
tive counterattack designed to roll up the in the armored divisions) . Finally Luett-
exposed flank of the American Third witz was promised two 60-ton bridges
Army on the Saar.4 This Panzer Lehr -capable of carrying his Panthers–and
thrust failed, and at the beginning of very considerable support from the
Luftwaffe. Both Luettwitz and Manteu-
4 Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, pp. 464–71. ffel had been “promised” air support
FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 179

on numerous occasions before; so it is about rifle company strength–was set up


questionable whether either of them ex- on the ridge line separating the Our and
pected the Luftwaffe to make good. Clerf Rivers, which here is traced by the
Luettwitz, at least, pinned his faith on excellent north-south highway connect-
bad flying weather, night operations, and ing St. Vith and Diekirch. This high-
the large number of flak guns dispersed way (known to the Americans as the
through his columns. Skyline Drive) and the garrison line
The sector designated for the X L V I I paralleled the Our at a distance of one
Panzer Corps breakthrough was held by and a half to two and a half miles. Each
the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 110th battalion was responsible for five out-
Infantry (28th Infantry Division), com- posts along the west bank of the Our,
manded by Col. Hurley E. Fuller. This but these vantage points were occupied
regiment formed the division center, only during daylight hours and then in
with the 112th Infantry on the north and squad strength. At night the strip be-
the 109th Infantry aligned to the south. tween the ridge and the river became
Battered and fatigued by weary, bloody a no man’s land where German and
fighting in the Hürtgen Forest, the 28th American patrols stalked one another.
Division came into the quiet front on Even in daytime it was possible for Ger-
the Our during mid-November.5 During man patrols to move about on the west
the division attack of 2–15 November bank, using the cover provided by the
in the Schmidt-Vossenack sector the 28th deep, wooded draws.
had taken 6,184 casualties. The task of T h e Our, in many places, was no more
rebuilding the rifle companies, repair- than forty feet wide and easily fordable,
ing battle damage, and training replace- but the roads leading to the river made
ments was of necessity a slow one. But circuitous and abrupt descent as they
by the middle of December the 110th neared its banks. In the 110thzone four
Infantry had almost a full roster–a roster roads ran from the German border at
numbering many men and some officers the Our, up and over the Skyline
who yet had to see their first action. Drive, and down to the Clerf. The
The 109th and 112th were in like status. American strongpoints were therefore
Fuller had only two battalions at his located with an eye to blocking these
disposal because the 2d Battalion, lo- entry ways while at the same time de-
cated at Donnange, constituted the di- fending the lateral ridge road which con-
vision reserve. Anything even remotely nected the 110th with its neighboring
resembling a continuous line across the regiments and provided the main artery
9- to 10-mile regimental front was be- sustaining the entire division front. T h e
yond the strength of the 1st and northernmost of the four roads had a
3d Battalions. As a substitute, a system of good all-weather surface, was the only
village strongpoints–each manned in main through road running east to west
through the area, and gave direct access
5The official U.S. Army history describes this to Clerf and Bastogne. T h e Germans
fighting by the 28th Infantry Division as “one of planned to connect this route to their
the most costly division actions in the whole of
World War 11.” MacDonald, The Siegfried Line
own supply lines by bridging the Our
Campaign, p. 373. at Dasburg. T h e remaining roads
180 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

through the 1 10th sector normally were for final instructions and introduction to
poor but were made worse by the rains the new commander of the 2d Panzer
prior to 16 December; the 26th Volks Division, Colonel von Lauchert, who had
Grenadier Division intended to enter been selected at the last moment by the
the two southernmost roads by throwing Fifth Panzer Army leader to replace an
a bridge across at Gemünd.6 incumbent who was not an experienced
T h e Americans had identified the tanker. Lauchert arrived too late to
26th long since as the unit garrisoning meet all of his regimental commanders,
the West Wall bunkers on the German but the 2d Panzer, like the rest of the
bank. T h e presence of two panzer units corps, was already in position to move
on the 110th Infantry front was not sus- the moment darkness came. Apprehen-
pected. General Cota and the 28th Divi- sive lest the Americans be prematurely
sion Staff were prepared for some kind of warned, Army Group B had for-
German effort west of the Our, but the bidden the movement of any troops
intelligence coming down from higher across the Our in advance of the opening
headquarters pointed only to the possi- barrage set for 0530 on 16 December.
bility of a limited German attack against Conforming to these instructions
the 109th Infantry and the American the 2d Panzer Division moved its assault
communications running north from columns to Dasburg during the night
Luxembourg City. There was no hint of 15–16 December but halted in as-
from any source that the enemy was sembly areas east of the river.
about to strike squarely into the center On the corps left, however, General
of the 28th Division and in over- Kokott and the 26th Yolks Grenadier
whelming array. Division jumped the gun. Kokott’s
In the late afternoon of 15 December screening regiment, the 78th, had been
General Luettwitz gathered his division in the habit of throwing out an outpost
commanders in the XLVII Panzer Corps line west of the Our from nightfall till
forward headquarters at Ringhuscheid dawn. On the evening of 15 December
the outpost troops, considerably rein-
6The American sources for the initial phase of forced, crossed to the west bank as usual
the defense in this sector are unusually complete. and moved cautiously forward. About
The 28th Division after action report shows the
lines of withdrawal and is supplemented in detail 0300 engineers manning pneumatic rub-
by the 28th Division G–3 journal and telephone ber boats began ferrying the So-man
file. The 109th Infantry after action report and assault companies and heavy infantry
journal are intact and useful. (See also The Old
Gray Mare of the 109th Infantry Regiment (Augs- weapons across the river. As each com-
burg. 1953.)) The 110 Infantry has not only a pany debarked it marched inland to the
regimental after action report but one for each line of departure which the outpost force
of its battalions; however the 110th journal is
missing for the period prior to 24 December 1944. now held close to the American gar-
The 112th Infantry S–2 and S–3 journals have rison points. The 77th Regiment formed
numerous overlays showing the action. Combat
interviews provide good coverage for most of the
on the right near Hosingen and the 39th,
major actions by the 28th Division. For the echeloned to the left and rear, assembled
German sources see note 2, above. See also The in the woods north of Wahlhausen.
Rise and Fall of the 2d Panzer Division (MS)
edited by TUSA, 1 PW, May 1945; MS # P-032d
With surprise almost certainly assured
(Generalmajor Hans Kokott) . and the knowledge that the Americans
FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 181

had no cohesive line of defense, General the Skyline Drive overlooking two of
Kokott had ordered the 77th Regiment the four roads which wound from the
to circle north of Hosingen and head Our up over the ridge. To the south
straight for the Clerf bridges at Drauf- Company I held Weiler-les-Putscheid, a
felt, while the 39th cut cross-country, hamlet in a knot of trails and byroads
avoiding the villages on the western side on the forward slopes of the ridge line.
of the ridge line, and seized the road T h e 110th Antitank Company was in
junction and bridges at Wilwerwiltz on Hoscheid just to the west. Both of these
the Clerf. The eye of the division com- positions lay adjacent to the prospective
mander would be on the assault echelons boundary between the XL VII and
of his right wing regiment, for they LXXXV Corps. West of the ridge,
would make the main effort to reach Company L in Holzthum and the head-
the Clerf. T h e timetable for the 26th quarters company and Company M in
Volks Grenadier Division advance called Consthum barred a direct approach to
for both its attacking regiments to the Clerf crossing site at Wilwerwiltz.
reach the Clerf River by nightfall of Behind the Clerf River and to the west
the first day. Adherence to this schedule of the regimental command post in the
meant that the villages garrisoned by town of Clerf the 2d Battalion (Lt. Col.
the American companies would have Ross C. Henbest) lay in divisional re-
to be avoided or captured quickly. serve. Separated of necessity by the width
The units of the 110th Infantry were of the front and the requirements of
disposed as follows to face three full some depth in the defenses athwart the
German divisions. On the left of the east-west roads, the units of the 110th
regimental zone, the 1st Battalion (Lt. could offer little reciprocal support a-
Col. Donald Paul) held the intersection gainst an enemy attacking in any force.
of the Skyline Drive and the Dasburg- The massed guns and Werfers of
Bastogne main highway at Marnach, em- the XLVII Panzer Corps which roared
ploying Company B and a platoon from out at 0530 on 16 December gave the
the 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion. T o Americans their first warning. But the
the southwest, Company C and the reg- tactical effect of this artillery prepara-
imental cannon company were deployed tion was considerably less than the
in and around Munshausen, guarding German planners had anticipated. T h e
the side road which cut cross-country telephone wires connecting the Amer-
from Marnach to Drauffelt. Company A, ican-held villages were shot out in the
at Heinerscheid, was on the extreme left first few minutes and Fuller could not
flank of the 110th and so lay outside reach any of his battalions; artillery
the path of the XLVII Panzer Corps radios, however, continued to function.
attack, as did Company D at Grind- The German barrage, with a limited
hausen. The 3d Battalion (Maj. Harold number of rounds at the guns, dwindled
F. Milton) formed the regimental right, away after about half an hour to sporadic
with its companies on both sides of the salvos and stray single shots, leaving the
ridge line. Company K, reinforced by advancing infantry without cover while
Company B, 103d Engineer Combat Bat- they were still short of the American
talion, garrisoned Hosingen, a village on positions.
182 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

The first word of the approaching man infantry out of the Battery C area.
enemy reached the 110thInfantry head- The 26th Volks Grenadier Division
quarters at Clerf shortly after 0615. Com- poured more troops into the 3d Bat-
pany L, on the western side of the ridge talion sector, compressing the American
at Holzthum, reported figures in the companies in the village positions. At
half-light but, peering through the the crossroads village of Hosingen atop
ground fog, which clung all along the the Skyline Drive, the leading detach-
division front, could not be sure whether ments of the 77th swung to the north,
they were American troops passing cutting the road but moving on in the
through the area or the enemy. In fact, direction of the Clerf. T h e 2d Buttlion
detachments of the 39th Regiment had of the 77th, under the cover provided
crossed the Skyline Drive unobserved by German artillery, drove in to the
and were moving in to surprise Holz- south edge of Hosingen, contrary to
thum. T o some extent, then, Kokott’s orders, and there grappled in house-to-
decision in favor of premature assembly house fighting with Company D and
west of the Our had gained ground for Company B, 103d Engineer Battalion.
the 26th. Fuller, however, was able to Meanwhile the 39th Regiment, eche-
get a warning message through to the loned to the left of the 77th, ran into
28th Division command post about 0900. a snag. T h e 1st Platoon of Company
As the morning passed the small Ger- I had been deployed along the Wahl-
man detachments west of the ridge in- hausen road on the forward slope of the
creased in strength. Before noon five ridge, covering an observation post.
separate assaults had been made at Cons- From this point the American artil-
thum, but all were beaten off by small lery observers could see the enemy as-
arms, .50-caliber, and artillery fire. Fin- sembling in the woods just to the
ally the Germans took the village, only north. Accurately adjusted fire held the
to be driven out again. A German at- enemy battalion at bay and forced it
tempt to cut the road between Cons- to call on neighboring battalions, at-
thum and Holzthum failed when Capt. tacking Weiler, to help outflank the
Norman G. Maurer, S–3 of the 3d Bat- thin infantry line on the Wahlhausen
talion, leading a sortie of twenty men, road.
surprised the enemy and drove him T h e defenders at Weiler would not
back with very heavy casualties. Be- be easily pushed aside. Company I (mi-
tween Holzthum and Buchholz, Battery nus the platoon at Wahlhausen) , a sec-
C of the 109th Field Artillery was hit tion of 81-mm. mortars, and an antitank
hard but held its positions, firing the platoon repelled wave after wave of at-
105-mm. howitzers with one- and two- tacking German infantry. When the mor-
second fuzes. The battery commander tar crews and antitank platoon had used
and fifteen gunners were casualties of all their ammunition they joined the
the close-range fight before help arrived. infantry in the center of the village and
This came late in the morning, after the fought as riflemen. Twice during the
28th Division commander, General Cota, morning the attackers were allowed to
ordered a tank platoon from the 707th send in aid men and remove their
Tank Battalion forward to clear the Ger- wounded. At 1330 the enemy ceased
FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 183

TROOPS
GERMAN ADVANCING
PASTABANDONED
AMERICAN
EQUIPMENT

fire and sent forward a white flag, with bridging equipment down to the river,
an offer for the Americans to surrender. the 28th Panzer Engineer Battalion and
When this was refused the Germans sys- the 2d Battalion, 304th Panzer Gren-
tematically set to work to surround the adier Regiment, crossed the Our in rub-
village; by dark they had ringed Weiler. ber boats and moved west through the
In the 1st Battalion zone to the north predawn darkness. T h e advance was de-
the advance detachments of the 2d Pan- layed somewhat when the grenadiers
zer Division moved straight for Marnach, marched into an American mine field,
attempting with one quick blow to clear but by 0800 the leading Germans had
the Americans obstructing the through reached Marnach. Company B and a pla-
road from Dasburg to Clerf.7 While the toon of the 630th Tank Destroyer Bat-
German engineers labored at the Das- talion were well entrenched there and
burg site to bring their heavy tank gave the Germans a warm reception, al-
though themselves under fire from bat-
7T h e road from Dasburg through Clerf is
marked on the OB WEST operations map by a teries east of the Our. Minus his heavy
purple penciled line as far as Bastogne. weapons, the enemy failed to knock the
184 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Marnach garrison out of the way, but morning it was apparent that the VIII
an hour later Company B radioed that Corps was under attack all along the
three hundred Germans were northwest front and that the 28th Division would
and southwest of Marnach. T h e 1st Bat- have to make out with what it had.
talion commander had already ordered Radio communication, which was
Company A, located three miles farther functioning fairly well, showed that the
north on the Skyline Drive at Heiner- division center was most endangered.
scheid, to send a patrol south and make About 1000, therefore, General Cota
contact with Company B. In midmorn- ordered Companies A and B of the 707th
ing Paul ordered Company C to march Tank Battalion to reinforce the 110th
north from Munshausen, leaving the can- Infantry, with the intention of clearing
non company there, and counterattack up the deepest enemy penetrations and
the Germans in the Company B area. sweeping the ridge road clear. Although
By this time, however, the advance Fuller pled for the return of the 2d Bat-
infantry detachments of the 2d Panzer talion to his regiment, Cota refused to
Division were not only involved in a release this last division reserve.
battle to knock out Marnach but were Shortly before noon a platoon of Com-
pushing past the village en route to pany B’s tanks reached the hard-pressed
Clerf. The 24-man patrol from Com- field artillery battery near Buchholz and
pany A ran into the German flank at reported the situation in hand.8 But the
Fishbach, about 1120, and had to with- enemy here represented only the
draw under intense fire. Two hours later probing forefinger of the main attack.
the enemy struck at Company A, ap- Company B moved east to aid the 3d
parently an attempt to clear the north- Battalion, and Company A, less a platoon
south Skyline Drive, but artillery fire in mobile reserve at Clerf, moved to the
beat him off. In the meantime the Com- northern sector. At nearly every point
pany C advance north toward Marnach the American tanks would have to fight
also ran into trouble: persistent small their way down the roads to reach the
arms fire forced the infantry to leave infantry holding the villages. T o the
the road and move slowly across country. east, at Dasburg, the German engineers
Tanks, ordered up from the division re- were straining to finish the tank bridge
serve, had not yet arrived. In Marnach which would bring the German armor
the hard-beset garrison fought on, now into play. Time was running out for
under the command of the battalion ex- the American companies: ammunition
ecutive officer, Capt. J. H. Burns, who
had taken over when the company com- 8An M16 half-track from the 447th Antiaircraft
Artillery (Automatic Weapons) Battalion was re-
mander was wounded. sponsible for the fact that this battery was still
Back to the west, in the 28th Division in position. Early that morning a German com-
command post at Wiltz, General Cota pany had marched u p to a crossroads where the
half-track was standing, apparently intending to
took what steps he could to help the deploy for an attack against the battery. Seeing
110th Infantry. The bulk of his very the vehicle, the enemy column paused. One of
limited reserve consisted of the 2d Bat- the crew thought fast and waved the Germans
forward in friendly fashion. When the .50-caliber
talion, 110th Infantry, and the 707th machine guns on the half-tracks ceased fire nearly
Tank Battalion. By the middle of the one hundred German dead were counted.
FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 185

was low and the short winter day was D and Company B were fighting Ger-
drawing to a close–with the likelihood man infantry hand to hand inside the
that the small garrisons would be over- village. In response to their call for re-
whelmed in the darkness by sheer weight inforcement and ammunition four tanks
of numbers. fought their way through the German
On the Wahlhausen road the 3d Bat- infantry along the Skyline Drive, arriv-
talion observation post, defended by the ing in Hosingen about 2200–but with no
Company I platoon, called for ammuni- rifle ammunition.
tion and was told that tanks were being In the 1st Battalion sector, late in the
sent with resupply. At Weiler the rest afternoon, two tank platoons arrived in
of the company and the antitank platoon, Munshausen to support Company C, al-
their supply of ammunition dwindling, ready on its way north to relieve Com-
also awaited the tanks. For some reason pany B in Marnach. Company C had
the tank platoon sent from the 707th been driven off the road, and the tanks,
had not reached the Company I area missing the infantry entirely, rolled into
when night fell. About 1830 troops at Marnach. One tank platoon remained
the battalion observation post reported there to bolster the defense, while the
that enemy vehicles were attacking other turned back to the south, picked
with multiple 20-mm. guns and asked up Company C, and, on orders,
for American artillery fire on their own returned with the infantry to Mun-
positions. This was the end. Only one shausen. About dusk the Marnach gar-
man escaped. At Weiler the Americans, rison radioed that half-tracks could be
with only a few rounds left, were com- heard moving toward the village. This
pletely surrounded and decided to fight was the last word from Marnach. Late
their way out. They divided into two in the afternoon, Colonel Fuller had
groups and headed west through the ordered Company D, a platoon of heavy
enemy lines. machine guns, and a provisional rifle
On the west slopes of the ridge a pla- company hastily assembled from men on
toon of medium tanks was committed pass in Clerf, to move to Reuler and
early in the afternoon to drive the Ger- protect Battery B of the 109th Field Ar-
mans off the side road linking Holzthum tillery Battalion, then firing in support
and Consthum. Co-ordination between of the troops in Marnach and very hard
small packets of infantry and armor, pressed by the enemy. These reinforce-
hard at best, was made most difficult by ments arrived at Reuler in time to take
this kind of piecemeal commitment. T h e a hand against the Germans pouring
tankers had been told that there were past Marnach toward Clerf and its
no friendly troops on the road and just bridges. But Battery A of the battalion
outside Holzthum knocked out an anti- was swept up by the Germans who had
tank gun placed there by Company I. bypassed the left wing anchor of the
After some delay, while the tank platoon regiment at Heinerscheid.
and the infantry identified themselves, During most of this first day of at-
the tanks rolled south to the 3d Bat- tack the German infantry had fought
talion headquarters at Consthum. At west of the Our without heavy weapons,
Hosingen, on the ridge road, Company although the bulk of two regiments from
186 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

both the 26th Volks Grenadier Di- exit road from the Gemund bridge was
vision and the 2d Panzer Division had hopelessly blocked; through Hosingen
crossed the river and taken some part ran the main divisional supply route to
in the fight. Shortly before dark the 60- the Clerf. Just before dark, therefore,
ton bridges were completed at Gemund Kokott threw a part of his replacement
and Dasburg (inexperienced engineers training battalion into the action; these
and the difficulties attendant on moving fresh troops succeeded in forcing their
the heavy structures down to the river way into the north edge of the village, al-
bed had slowed construction markedly) , though with heavy losses.
and the German tanks and assault guns A whole series of monkey wrenches
moved across to give the coup de grâce had been thrown into the well-oiled
to the villages still defended by the 110th machinery of the 26th Volks Grena-
Infantry. On the left the 26th Volks dier Division. The American infantry
Grenadier Division finally achieved con- had made excellent use of the ground
tact with the 5th Parachute Division, and had held their positions, refusing
which had been advancing cautiously to buckle under the weight of numbers.
along the boundary between the 109th T h e 39th Regiment had got involved in
and 110th Infantry and had done noth- local actions and been diverted from
ing to help Kokott’s southern regi- the westward axis-sustaining high los-
ment, the 39th. With an open left flank ses in the bargain. T h e 77th had been
and under artillery fire called down by unable to win a quick decision at Ho-
the American observation post on the singen. Now, at the end of the day, the
Wahlhausen road, the 39th swerved from armored reconnaissance battalion of the
the westward axis of attack and became Panzer Lehr Division found itself craw-
involved at Weiler, contrary to orders. ling rather than racing west from the
There the American tank platoon from Gemund bridge. T h e road to Hosingen
Company B, 707th Tank Battalion, hit was muddy and winding; but worse,
into the German flank while attempt- at the western exit of the bridge an
ing to reach Weiler and, it would appear, American abatis and a series of bomb
caused disorganization and confusion. craters blocked the flow of traffic. A
Kokott’s right, the 77th Regiment, few light tanks and self-propelled guns
pushed elements beyond Hosingen (ac- got forward late in the evening, but the
tually moving between the 1st and 3d bulk of the Panzer Lehr reconnaissance
Battalions of the 110th Infantry), but battalion remained backed up at the
these detachments, stopped by the bridge.
American 105-mm. howitzers and the Kokott’s infantry would have to carry
tank platoon near Buchholz, again had the battle through the night. T h e 39th
to side-step in the drive to the Clerf. regrouped and turned to assault Holz-
Back at Hosingen the attempt to break thum and Consthum in force. T h e 77th
American resistance had won an early marched toward Drauffelt on the Clerf
lodgment in the south edge of the vil- River, leaving the replacement training
lage, but had achieved no more. T h e battalion to continue the fight at Hosin-
26th Volks Grenadier Division needed gen. Kokott’s reserve regiment, the 78th,
Hosingen badly. Without it the western crossed the Our at dusk and moved for-
FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 187

ward between the two assault regiments. Infantry could continue to delay the
On the right its 1st Battalion marched German attack at the 28th Division cen-
on Hosingen, bringing flame throwers ter as it had this first day. But at dark
and self-propelled guns to blast the he ordered his regimental commanders
Americans from the village; the 2d Bat- to hold their positions “at all costs” and
talion moved straight for the Clerf River, began preparations to commit his re-
aiming at control of the crossings and maining reserves to restore the situation
road net at Wilwerwiltz. T h e 26th Volks in the Marnach sector and block the
Grenadier Division was across the Our road to Clerf. This seemed to be the
River in force but had failed to gain most endangered sector of the whole
its first-day objective, control of the Clerf division front, for here the 2d Panzer
River crossings. T h e German infantry Division had been identified and here
would have to fight step by step; the was the main hard-surface road to
hope of a quick breakthrough had Bastogne. As yet, however, the Americans
proven illusory. had no way of knowing that the bulk
The story in the 2 d Panzer Division of the 2d Panzer Division actually was
zone was the same. There the infantry moving down the road to Clerf or that
driving toward the town of Clerf had a counterattack would collide with any
been stopped short of their objective. such German force.
Marnach remained in American hands, Meanwhile, General Middleton, the
even after the Dasburg bridge was com- VIII Corps commander, issued a hold-
pleted and the leading tanks of the 3d fast order to all his troops. All VIII Corps
Panzer Regiment entered the fight. T h e units were to hold their positions until
304th Regiment had suffered severely at they were “completely untenable,” and
American hands: the regimental com- in no event would they fall back beyond
mander was a casualty and one battalion a specified final defense line. I n the
had been badly scattered during the 110th Infantry sector this line ran
piecemeal counterattacks by the Ameri- through Lieler and Buchholz to Lellin-
can tank platoons. gen. It was breached at midnight when
General Luettwitz was none too tanks and self-propelled guns of the
pleased with the progress made by his 3d Panzer Regiment entered Marnach.
two attack divisions on this first day. General Cota still had in hand a re-
But the credit side of the ledger showed serve on the night of the 16th, but it
a few entries. The two heavy tank bridges was the last reserve of the 28th Division.
were in, the Americans obviously were It consisted of the 2d Battalion, 110th
weakening, and the 2d Panzer Divi- Infantry, at Donnange and the light tank
sion had been able to move its tanks company of the 707th Tank Battalion,
forward on the relatively good road in which was located at Weiswampach be-
the northern part of the corps zone. hind the division north flank in support
Luettwitz concluded that the Clerf River of the 112th Infantry. By the late
now would be crossed not later than evening the picture as seen at the
the evening of the second day. division command post had cleared
Across the lines General Cota had to this extent: the two flank regiments,
little reason to expect that the 110th the 109th and 112th, had lost rela-
188 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

tively little ground; the 110th was very wing of the 110th, had been overrun or
hard pressed; and German tanks were forced to displace. Only one battery of
moving along the main road to Bastogne the 109th Field Artillery Battalion was
by way of Marnach. At 2100, therefore, firing during the morning and it ran
General Cota turned the reserve rifle bat- low on ammunition. This battery was
talion back to the 110th Infantry, minus driven from Buchholz with the loss of
Company G which was moved to Wiltz to half its howitzers. By noon the 2d Bat-
defend the division command post, and talion, helpless against massed tanks and
agreed with Colonel Fuller’s proposal without artillery support, was held in
that the battalion be used in an attack check along the ridge running southwest
eastward to restore American control at from Urspelt to the Clerf road, only a
Marnach. At the same time the light tank thousand yards from its line of depar-
company in the 112th area was alerted by ture.
division headquarters for an attack south The southern prong of the three-
along the Skyline Drive, also directed to- pronged counterattack to shut off the
ward Marnach, as soon as daylight came. German armored drive moving through
To complete the concentration against Marnach toward Clerf also was out-
the enemy in or around Marnach, Col- gunned and outnumbered but did reach
onel Fuller ordered the medium tank Marnach, only to report that no friendly
platoon in Munshausen to attack to the infantry could be found. About 1000 the
northeast with a rifle platoon from Com- small tank-infantry team was allowed to
pany C. When Fuller heard of the light return to its original position at Muns-
tanks, he ordered Colonel Henbest to hausen, and Fuller then ordered the
delay the 2d Battalion attack next morn- tank platoon to fight its way to Clerf
ing until the incoming tank detachment and help defend the town. These two
was ready to attack on the Skyline Drive. attacks from west and south had made no
There was still hope on the morning headway but were not too costly.
of 17 December that at least one platoon T h e attack by the light tank company
from Company B was holding on in of the 707th along the Skyline Drive was
Marnach. About 0730 the two rifle com- disastrous. About 0720 the company
panies of the 2d Battalion jumped off crossed into the 110th Infantry zone,
at the ridge east of Clerf. In a matter where the ground rose away from the
of minutes the left company ran into a highway and forced the tanks to advance
strong German skirmish line, deployed in column on the road. As the column
at the edge of a wood, which was sup- emerged from the village of Heiner-
ported by tanks and self-propelled artil- scheid, concealed high-velocity guns
lery firing from around Marnach. The opened on the skimpily armored light
battalion commander ordered his right tanks, picking them off like clay pipes
company down to block the paved road in a shooting gallery. Eight tanks were
from Marnach to Clerf, but this road knocked out by the enemy gunners and
was in the hands of the 2d Panzer Divi- in the confusion three more fell prey to
sion, whose tanks were rolling toward bazooka fire. T h e entire action lasted
the Clerf bridges. T h e American artil- ten minutes. Two of the American tanks
lery, earlier emplaced behind the left turned back to Heinerscheid, only to be
FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 189

destroyed during the German assault quarters of the 110th Infantry. T h e town
later in the day. T h e company com- itself lies in a horseshoe bend of the
mander withdrew the remaining five river. From town and river rise wooded
tanks on a side road and reached Urspelt, and precipitous slopes, particularly sharp
taking position near the 2d Battalion and difficult to the east. Descent to
command post.9 the town and its bridges is made on
T h e American pincers action had this side by two winding roads. T h e
failed to constrict at Marnach. Yet there main paved road from Marnach ap-
was still an opportunity to retard the proaches Clerf through a shallow draw,
2d Panzer march along the road to passing just to the south of the little
Bastogne. Less than two miles west of village of Reder, which perches on
Marnach lay the Clerf River and the the high ground overlooking the river
town of Clerf, the latter the head- bend. This road makes a twisted and
tortuous descent to the valley floor,
9 MS # A-940 (Luettwitz). The 707th Tank finally crossing the river at the south-
Battalion has a detailed unit journal in narrative
form. eastern edge of the town and pro-

CLERF
190 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

ceeding through narrow streets until it road, but it was already dominated
emerges on the north. A secondary road, by the German armor. About 0930 the
on the right of the through highway to 2d Platoon of Company A, 707th Tank
Bastogne, approaches Clerf from the Battalion, climbed out of Clerf to meet
hamlet of Urspelt. A sharp hairpin turn the German Mark IV’s. At the top of
breaks the descent; then the road crosses the ascent the tanks met: four German
the river into the northern edge of Clerf tanks were knocked out, three American
near the railroad station and enters the tanks destroyed. The 1st Platoon of Com-
main highway. In sum, the way through pany A, which had returned to Muns-
Clerf would be none too easy for an hausen after the unsuccessful attempt
armored division.10 to reach Marnach, moved north mean-
Colonel Fuller’s command post was in while to help the 2d Platoon. A radio
a hotel only a few yards from the north message alerted the commander to the
bridge. Across town the regimental head- danger of a direct approach; so the pla-
quarters company was billeted in an toon and some accompanying infantry
ancient chateau, now partially modern- entered Clerf by a secondary road along
ized but retaining the heavy stone walls the river. German tanks opened fire
behind which, since the twelfth century, on them, but a direct hit stopped the
fighting men had dominated the river leading Mark IV, for the moment effec-
bend and controlled the main bridge tively blocking the serpentine approach
site. In the late evening of 16 December from Marnach. At the chateau, however,
German artillery began to range into headquarters company still was hard
Clerf, apparently covering the advance pressed by riflemen and machine gun-
of patrols from Marnach. About 0345 ners in the houses nearby. And German
the German artillery quieted. Small de- tanks still fired from the eastern height.
tachments with burp guns now crept Shortly before noon German pressure
down through the dark and engaged the noticeably relaxed. East of Clerf the left
troops i n and around the chateau. At flank of the 2d Battalion started to move
dawn a single tank or self-propelled gun forward against an enemy assembly
began firing from the curving road to point in a woods northeast of Reuler.
the south; more enemy infantry joined This threat north of the Marnach road
the fire fight near the chateau as the seems to have caused the German com-
morning advanced. mander some concern. Then too, some
Then rolling down the Marnach road welcome tank support had arrived on
came the German advance guard, per- the scene. On General Middleton’s order,
haps two platoons of Mark IV tanks and CCR, 9th Armored Division, had put a
as many as thirty half-tracks filled with task force backstop position behind the
armored grenadiers. Colonel Fuller had threatened center of the 28th Division.
ordered a platoon of the 2d Battal- Company B of the 2d Tank Battalion,
lion to swing south and bar the en route to set up a roadblock north-
east of Clerf, was appropriated by Gen-
10The 110th Infantry action here is described in eral Cota and sent to support the 110th
History of the 110th Infantry of the 28th Division,
United States Army, World War II, 1941–1945 Infantry. It arrived in Clerf with nine-
(Atlanta, Ga.: Albert Love Enterprises, 1945). teen medium tanks. Colonel Fuller set
FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 191

one platoon to clearing the Germans column to a poorer road in the event
out of the south end of town, sent one that Clerf continued to hold. But now
platoon to Reuler to help the 2d Bat- the north road into the town was open.
talion, and sent one to the 1st Battalion A small tank-infantry team blasted the
at Heinerscheid where the light tanks of single 57-mm. antitank gun in the path
the 707th Tank Battalion had been and crossed the bridge at the rail-
smashed earlier in the day. The appear- road station. At the same time a tank
ance of the Shermans in Clerf cooled the platoon, shrouded in darkness and with
ardor of the German infantry. no American tanks left to contest the
T h e 2d Panzer Division advance passage, wound its way into the south
guard had taken a bloody nose on the end of Clerf. At 1825 Colonel Fuller
Marnach road, but more tanks and in- phoned the 28th Division chief of staff
fantry were arriving hourly and maneu- that his command post was under fire
ver was possible. During the afternoon and that enemy tanks occupied the town.
the Germans pressed the 2d Battalion Fuller and some of his staff made their
back through Reuler, the Americans escape, hoping to join Company G,
fighting stubbornly with the aid of the which had been released at division
dwindling tank force from the 9th headquarters and was supposed to be
Armored Division and the few remain- coming in from the west. Later Colonel
ing towed tank destroyers of Company Fuller was captured, with a group of
B, 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion. A stragglers he commanded, while at-
platoon of self-propelled tank destroyers tempting to break through to the west.
had arrived early in the afternoon but At 1839 the sergeant at the regimen-
left precipitately, losing one gun as it tal switchboard called the division to
careened down the road back through report that he was alone–only the
Clerf. Shortly before dusk Companies E switchboard was left.
and F dug in on a ridge north of This was not quite the end in Clerf.
Reuler under a rain of German shells. At the château by the south bridge 102
On their left German tanks were wip- officers and men of the regimental head-
ing out the last posts of the 1st Bat- quarters company still were in action.
talion. At Heinerscheid, Company A had Around them Clerf was crawling with
been overrun in midafternoon, leaving tanks, for most of the Mark I V Bat-
open an avenue into the 2d Battalion talion of the 3d Panzer Regiment had
left flank. Then the enemy grenadiers assembled in the town during the night.
encircled the American roadblock at Perhaps the tankers were too busy loot-
Urspelt, whereupon the light tank pla- ing the American freight cars and supply
toon destroyed its single remaining tank dumps to bother with the little force in
and withdrew on foot to Wiltz–the 2d the château. Perhaps they did not care
Battalion flanks were wide open. to risk bazooka fire in the dark. In any
Colonel Lauchert was worried about case the defenders made radio contact
the slow rate of the 2d Panzer advance. (their last) with the 28th Division as
He even dispatched a kampfgruppe to late as 0528 on the morning of 18 De-
seize a bridge considerably south of Clerf cember. The final word on the defense
apparently intending to swing his attack of Clerf would come from the enemy.
192 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

At dawn the Panther Battalion of the at Munshausen, with the 110th Cannon
3 d Panzer Regiment came clanking Company and a section of tank de-
into Clerf, after a night move from the stroyers, all through the 17th. 12T h e rifle-
Our River, and found tanks from the men and cannoneers made a fight of
Mark I V Battalion playing cat and mouse it, barricading the village streets with
with the Americans in the château. Bul- overturned trucks, fighting from house
let fire from the old stone walls was no to house. After the Germans captured
menace to armored vehicles, bazooka the howitzers, a bazooka team of a com-
teams sent down from the château were pany officer and a sergeant held the
killed or captured, and the German tank enemy tanks at bay, destroying two
battalions moved on, north and west which ventured into the village. Before
toward Bastogne. But the German in- daybreak on 18 December the survivors,
fantry were more vulnerable and their now only a handful, started west.
march was delayed for several hours be- Remnants of the 3d Battalion had
fore engineers and self-propelled 88's assembled at Consthum, the battalion
finally set the riddled château afire headquarters. The garrison of a hundred
and forced the Americans to surrender. or so was reinforced by Company L,
It is impossible to assess in hours the ordered back from Holzthum to avoid
violence done the 2d Panzer Division entrapment. After dark on 17 December
timetable at Clerf, but it is clear that a captain led in about twenty-five men
the race by this division to Bastogne was of Company I from Weiler, after a des-
lost as the result of the gallant action perate march, narrow escapes, and an
by the 110th Infantry in front of and at ambuscade. Only Company K in
the Clerf crossings. Hosingen was yet to be heard from. For
On 18 December what was left of the two days and nights Company K and
110th Infantry was wiped out or with- Company B of the 103d Engineer Com-
drew to the west.11 Survivors in the north bat Battalion fought off all enemy at-
headed toward Donnange and, with tempts to eradicate this block on the
Company G, joined elements of the 9th Skyline Drive. On the morning of the
Armored Division to make a stand. 17th German tanks had set the town
Those in the south fell back toward ablaze, but the few American Shermans
Wiltz, the division command post. The had held them at bay. By that night
2d Battalion, surrounded on the ridge the defenders were without ammunition,
east of Clerf, attempted to filter through but they continued the battle with hand
the enemy lines in the early morning grenades, withdrawing slowly and stub-
hours. Seven officers and fifty to sixty bornly from house to house. T h e Ameri-
men did reach Donnange. Of the 1st 12Events of this day are very obscure. Late in
Battalion, only a part of Company C the afternoon an American tank platoon came to
retained its organization. It had held on the edge of the village but retired, the commander
reported, when no Americans could be found.
This withdrawal was hastened by bazooka fire
11There is no official record of the losses taken which crippled two of the tanks. The troops bar-
by the 110th Infantry during this phase of the ricaded in the houses later reported that they had
battle. Estimates furnished the author by mem- seen no American tanks but had hit two German
bers of the regimental staff set the figure at about tanks with bazooka shots. See MS by Maj. I. D.
2,750 officers and men. Warden and 28th Div G–3 Jnl.
FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 193

can artillery by this time had displaced ordered the battalion to Wiltz, where
to the west and was out of range. Finally, it would take part in the defense of the
on the morning of 18 December, the division headquarters.
surviving members of the garrison sent
out a last radio message; they had no The 112th Infantry Sector
choice but surrender. 16–20 December
After the fall of Hosingen the 3d Bat-
talion elements in Consthum offered the T h e German attack to penetrate the
last organized resistance in the 28th front lines of the 28th Division succeeded
Infantry Division center east of the Clerf on the first day of the offensive in split-
River. Col. Daniel Strickler, the ting the 112th Infantry from the rest of
regimental executive officer, who now the division. For this reason the fight
had assumed command at Consthum, or- put up by the 112th Infantry on the
ganized a perimeter defense of the town, north flank of the division had little or
set out mines along the approaches, and no effect on the operations of its sister
disposed his three effective tanks and regiment east of Bastogne. Futhermore,
three armored cars to watch for the lack of communication between the 28th
enemy armor known to be on the road Division and its northern regiment
from Holzthum. Some artillery support would ultimately force the regimental
was still available from a battery of the commander, Col. Gustin M. Nelson, to
687th Field Artillery Battalion, whose act on his own. T h e action of the 112th
shells swept the open fields between the Infantry in this part of the 28th Divi-
two villages. A half hour before dawn sion story stands therefore as an episode
on 18 December German guns and mor- in itself until, after four days’ fighting,
tars opened heavy fire. With daylight the regiment joins the forces arrayed in
the fire lifted and the enemy infantry defense of St. Vith.13
advanced, attacking in one wave after When the 28th Division arrived on the
another as the morning progressed but VIII Corps front in mid-November its
making no headway. About 1300 a thick, regiments were in pitiable condition.
soupy December fog rolled in on the The fight in the Schmidt area had cost
village. Under this natural smoke screen the 112th Infantry alone about 2,000
German tanks and grenadiers poured killed, wounded, missing, and nonbattle
into Consthum. While tanks dueled in casualties. In a month’s time the flow
the street like gunmen of the Old West of replacements had brought the regi-
the 3d Battalion made its orderly way ment to full strength. T h e regimental
out the west side of the town, reorgan- commander believed that morale had
ized, and as night descended marched to been restored to a high degree and that
Nocher. There it dug in to defend the the new officers and men now were fair-
battery which had given aid during the ly well trained.
battle. T h e Bofors crews belonging to The sector held by the 112th Infantry
the 447th Antiaircraft Artillery lingered was approximately six miles wide. Most
on near Consthum as a rear guard, dis- of the positions occupied lay on the east
couraging all pursuit with their fast, ac-
curate fire. T h e next day General Cota 13See below, pp. 393–95.
194 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

or German bank of the Our River. In of these works were “blind” the final
the north, contact was maintained with protective line turned on foxholes and
the 106th Infantry Division at a point extensive patches of barbed wire which
northwest of Lützkampen The regimen- the battalion itself had constructed. Be-
tal position, really a series of squad and cause the West Wall angled away to the
platoon posts, followed a ridge line east near Lützkampen the 1st Battalion
south through Harspelt and Sevenig, was denied pillbox protection but, at
then bent back across the Our and the insistence of the regimental com-
followed the western slopes of the river mander, had constructed a foxhole line
nearly to Kalborn. Here in the south day- with great care.
light patrols also operated to maintain Aside from patrol activity (generally
control of the eastern bank, although the small raids against individual pillboxes)
main positions were around Lieler and the 112th Infantry sector had been quiet.
Lausdorn. Men in the observation posts watched
The 229th Field Artillery Battalion the enemy move about his daily chores
was emplaced behind the north flank and reported flares and occasional rounds
near Welchenhausen on the German side of mortar or artillery fire. Early in the
of the river. Two rifle battalions month the Germans had undertaken
manned the main battle positions east what appeared to be a routine relief in
of the Our: the 1st facing Lützkampen their forward positions. On the nights
the 3d occupying and flanking Sevenig. of 14 and 15 December, sounds of horse-
T h e 2d Battalion manned observation drawn vehicles and motors moving in
posts and operated patrols across the slow gear drifted to the American out-
river but was deployed in a refused po- posts; but since the same commotion had
sition west of the Our. It was accounted attended an earlier relief in the German
the regimental reserve, having fixed lines, it was reported and perfunctorily
schemes of employment for support of dismissed.
the two battalions in the north by T h e stir and movement in the enemy
counterattack either northeast or south- lines during the two nights prior to 16
east. December was occasioned by troops
Hills intersected by wooded draws moving in and troops moving out. T h e
marked the terrain in this sector. Ex- 26th Volks Grenadier Division, which
tensive pine forests covered much of the had allowed the 112th to go about its
area, making observation difficult. In training program with only very minor
general the ground on the east bank interruption, marched south to join the
commanded. The road net was ade- XLVII Panzer Corps and take part in
quate, although mired by constant rain, the attack for Bastogne. Its pillboxes and
but the two forward battalions had to supporting positions were occupied in
be supplied at night because of German greater strength as the LVIII Panzer
fire. The 3d Battalion positions on the Corps (Krueger) moved in. In the
German bank were built around cap- first German blueprint for the Ardennes
tured pillboxes, for here earlier Ameri- counteroffensive the latter corps had
can advances had pierced the first line been assigned four divisions and the
of the German West Wall. Since most mission of driving to and across the
FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 195

Meuse River on the right of its old com- ped somewhat the sectors of the 106th
rade, the X L V I I Panzer Corps. T h e mis- Infantry Division in the north and the
sion remained, but the troops available 110th Infantry in the south. Krueger
on 16 December were less than half the had based his plan of attack on the in-
number promised: one armored division, telligence reports dealing with the Our
the 116th Panzer Division, and two- bridges. Since the American troops east
thirds of an infantry division, the 560th of the Our were deployed in the Lütz-
Volks Grenadier Division. kampen-Sevenig area, Krueger deter-
The 116th had fought itself out in mined that his main effort should be
almost continuous battles during the made there. Roads and bridges, he reck-
withdrawal across France and the de- oned, must be in shape to support the
fense of the West Wall but had a fine American troops east of the river. These
reputation and was fairly well refitted. roads and bridges he intended to seize
It had ninety-two Panthers and forty- by surprise.
seven Mark IV tanks; perhaps 40 per- On the corps right, then, the 116th
cent of its organic vehicles were missing. Panzer Division (Generalmajor Sieg-
The 560th, activated from inexperi- fried von Waldenburg) had orders to
enced garrison units in Norway and attack north of Lützkampen; at least two
Denmark, had been tagged for the Rus- or more bridges crossed the Our in this
sian front. Directed to the west by Hit- sector. T h e 560th Volks Grenadier Divi-
ler’s orders, the division would see its sion (Generalmajor Rudolf Langhaeu-
first action in the Ardennes. One rifle ser) was assigned two specific bridges
regiment and part of the division engi- as targets, one just north of Ouren, the
neers were still in Denmark. T h e artil- other a stone arch a little to the south
lery supporting the L V I I I Panzer Corps of the village. Because surprise was es-
consisted of five battalions plus two Wer- sential in this stroke for the bridges,
fer battalions, and a few batteries of artillery fire on the American forward
heavy guns. It appears that the corps had positions in the first moments of the
only moderate support in the way of assault was forbidden.
engineers and bridge trains. The heavy barrage and the pyrotech-
T h e immediate mission of Krueger’s nic display which opened elsewhere on
corps, like that of the X L V I I Panzer the 28th Division front on 16 December
Corps on its left, was to seize crossings was viewed at first with some detachment
at the Our River. T h e areas selected by by the men at the 112th observation
the two corps for their main efforts were posts. They heard, and duly reported,
some six to seven air-line miles apart- heavy artillery to the south, they saw
an indication of the weight to be thrown searchlights and flames lighting up the
against the American 28th Infantry Divi- sky, but again in the south. About 0620,
sion. T h e line of departure for Krueger’s however, the 1st Battalion phoned to
corps began across the Our from Kalborn say that shells were coming over the bat-
and extended north to a point east of talion command post. The German guns
Burg Reuland. T h e bulk of his two divi- and Werfers had finally opened fire
sions, as a consequence, faced the 112th to neutralize or destroy the rearward
Infantry, albeit the corps zone overlap- artillery and reserve positions in the
196 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

112th sector. As the enemy gun layers fully green”-as indeed they were. T h e
dropped their range back to the river enemy attempt to capture or destroy the
and then to the American positions, the American command posts, kitchens, and
searchlights blinked on, searching out observation posts was only partially suc-
pillboxes and bunkers. When daylight cessful, although the grenadier assault
came, the German infantry already were parties were well inside the 3d Battalion
stealing through the draws behind and positions when day broke. Two company
around the forward platoons, aiming to kitchens were captured and one or two
assemble in the wooded areas to the observation posts cut off, but the artil-
rear. 14 lery observer inside Sevenig was able to
The 3d Battalion (Maj. Walden F. direct the 229th Field Artillery how-
Woodward), in the regimental center, itzers onto the Germans in the draw.
was hit by the 1130th Regiment of the Meanwhile the mortar crews took a hand
560th Volks Grenadier Division. This from their foxholes on the hill behind
German blow fell on either side of Sevenig, dropping mortar shells into the
Sevenig, held by Company L. The Amer- hollows where the Germans congregated
ican barbed wire line had not been com- or picking them off with carbines.
pleted across the draws to the north and Early morning reports of considerable
south of the village; through these gaps German penetration and the threat to
the shock companies advanced. The com- the Our bridges in the 3d Battalion
pany leading the left battalion surprised area led the regimental commander to
a platoon of Company L at breakfast, put one of his counterattack plans into
overran the company kitchen (which operation. At 0930 two companies of
was only 800 to 900 yards behind the the 2d Battalion (Lt. Col. J. L. Mac-
rifle line) and killed the platoon com- Salka) assembled in a draw between
mander. Leaderless, the platoon broke. Ouren and Lieler (west of the river),
A part of the German company, perhaps crossed the bridges–the German pa-
a platoon in strength, succeeded in reach- trol at the stone bridge had evapo-
ing the stone bridge over the Our south rated under machine gun fire–and
of Ouren, but was dispersed. moved toward Sevenig. T h e Germans
T h e bulk of the 3d Battalion held in the way quickly withdrew to the
their positions despite surprise, defend- east. By nightfall the 3d Battalion
ing from pillboxes and foxholes. Later line on the Sevenig ridge had been
the Americans in this sector reported restored while the commander of the
that the attackers must have been “aw- 1130th reported that his regiment, de-
spite many attempts, had not been able
14MSS # B–321 (Krueger); A–873, Commit-
ment of the 116th Panzer Division in the Ardennes,
“to get going.”
16–26 December 1944 (Generalmajor Siegfried T h e main effort launched by the
von Waldenburg) ; A–874, Commitment of the LVIII Panzer Corps on 16 December
116th Panzer Division in the Ardennes, 1944–45
(Waldenburg) : B–027, 560th Yolks Grenadzer
was assigned the 116th Panzer Division.
Division, 15–29 December 1944, and 12th Yolks This attack aimed at the bridges near
Grenadier Division, 1–28 January 1945 (General- Burg Reuland (in the 106th Division
major Rudolf Langhaeuser). The Germans sited
their searchlights five to eight kilometers from
sector) and Oberhausen, in the rear
the American main line of resistance. of the positions manned by the left
FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 197

battalion of the 112th. General Walden- ground overlooking Lützkampen, mean-


burg committed his infantry here, in the while commenced mopping up the ene-
predawn hours, hoping that the 60th my who had filtered between the compa-
Regiment would break through on the nies on the line. By noon Company D
right or that the 156th Regiment would had so many prisoners that it “couldn’t
reach the river on the left and so secure handle them all!” Nonetheless some part
a bridgehead through which his tank of the assault wave had broken through
regiment could be passed. T h e lay of as far as the battery positions near Wel-
the ground and defenses in the area chenhausen, where they were repelled
north of Lützkampen were such that by the .50-caliber quadruple mounts of
Waldenburg’s right regiment had to the antiaircraft artillery.
move northwestward at an oblique to Shortly before noon the advance guard
the axis of his left wing advance. of the 60th Panzer Regiment, rolling
In common with the German assault along the Lützkampen-Leidenborn road,
tactics employed all along the front on appeared on the knoll west of Lützkam-
16 December, both regiments led off pen. T h e seven tanks counted here
with a predawn advance by shock com- strangely enough made no effort to at-
panies eighty men strong. T h e company tack (perhaps the rough terrain and
from the 60th ran into trouble almost dragon’s teeth along the American bun-
immediately when it was immobilized ker line did not appear too promising).
in some woods northwest of Berg by After a brief pause they wheeled back
flanking fire from Heckhuscheid, in the into Lützkampen.15 About dark infantry
424th Infantry sector. Later reports in- from Lützkampen attacked in close or-
dicate that this group was almost wiped der formation against Company B.
out. The assault company from the 156th Maps picked up from dead Germans
was initially more fortunate in its ad- showed that the American machine gun
vance west of Lützkampen. By 0630 the positions had been exactly plotted–but
grenadiers were behind the command as they had existed up to a change made
post of the 1st Battalion (Lt. Col. Wil- just before the 16th. The enemy made
liam H. Allen) in Harspelt; the first three attacks in the same close forma-
sign of their presence was a kitchen truck tion over the same ground before they
ambushed while journeying to the rear. discovered the error of their ways. Com-
The advance party of grenadiers had pany B, however, had been badly shot
moved along the wooded draw between up during the engagement and proba-
the two companies holding the 1st Bat- bly somewhat shaken by the presence of
talion line. two or three flame-throwing tanks–a new
When day came the Americans caught experience to most American troops on
the troops following the advance party the Western Front. Nevertheless by
of the assault company out in the open. midnight the 1st Battalion front had
Interlocking machine gun and rifle fire
blocked off the German reinforcements, 15 It is quite possible that the German tank ac-
some sixty were captured and the rest tivity here was discouraged during daylight by
dug in where they could. Company D, the sharp-shooting Private Rosenthal, manning
his tank destroyer in the 424th Infantry sector.
in its support position on the high See above, ch. VII, p. 153.
198 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

quieted down, although there still were German commander ordered the corps
small groups of the enemy crawling to continue the attack for the bridges
about in the gap breached that morn- at Ouren. Meanwhile he dispatched the
ing. Lützkampen would continue as a Reconnaissance Battalion of the 116th
sally port for sorties against the 1st Bat- Panzer Division to cross the XLVIIPan-
talion and the best efforts by the Amer- zer Corps bridge at Dasburg and com-
ican field pieces to flatten the village mence a sweep along the western bank
failed to still the men and vehicles mov- calculated to take the Ouren crossings
ing in its streets. from the rear.
The German plans had been altered At the close of this first day the 112th
during the day, but of course some Infantry remained in its positions east
time was needed for orders to reach of the Our.16 T h e 2d Battalion had not
the front-line troops. Bad tank-going in yet been seriously engaged, although
the West Wall maze north of Lützkam- one company had been detached to
pen and the initial reverse suffered by reinforce the 3d. Both flanks of the
the assault company of the 60th Regi- regiment, however, were in process of
ment led the corps commander to or- being uncovered by enemy thrusts
der the 116th Panzer Division to pivot against the neighboring units-although
its weight on Lützkampen in a drive this effect may not have been immedi-
southwestward toward Ouren. Leav- ately apparent. A gap remained in the
ing only a screening force behind, the center of the 1st Battalion line and small
60th Regiment started a march intend- groups of the enemy were wandering
ed to bring it east of Sevenig on the along the Our River.
left of the 156th Regiment. Although Considerable damage had been done
the left division (the 560th Volks the German assault forces. Although the
Grenadier Division) had not fared too 116th Panzer Division losses were moder-
well in the attack on Sevenig, farther ate, the inexperienced 560th Volks
to the south its 1128th Regiment had Grenadier Division had suffered an esti-
seized a blasted bridge three kilometers mated 1,000 casualties-a figure, how-
east of Heinerscheid and established a ever, that included the reinforced fusi-
bridgehead over the Our at the bound- lier company which got lost in the woods
ary between the 112th Infantry and the southwest of Sevenig and was not seen
110th Infantry. This had been accom- again for two days. Perhaps the Ameri-
plished by noon on the first day-as usu- cans had some reason for elation on the
al a boundary line had proved a point night of 16 December, but all knew that
of little resistance-and the German en- harder blows would be dealt on the
gineers moved in. The approach road morrow. Wrote one in his diary: “No-
on the east bank was blocked with trees body able to sleep and no hot meals
and mines, the bridge debris would
have taken much effort to clear, and to 16During the fighting on 16 December Pfc.
Krueger’s disappointment there was no W. S. Rush stayed in the line a t an exposed
assurance that a bridge could be in be- point, hurling grenades and firing his rifle al-
though he was badly wounded. Rush refused to
fore the night of 17 December. On the leave his post and died there of his wounds. He
evening of 16 December, therefore, the was awarded the DSC.
FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 199

today. This place is not healthy any- morning, particularly since a number of
more.” forward observers had wormed into the
The presence of enemy tanks in Lütz- American positions. First the Werfers
kampen constituted a distinct threat, and guns pounded the front line, par-
even to infantry in pillboxes. Colonel ticularly the 1st Battalion positions.
Nelson’s antitank reserve, Company C, Then as the attack got moving they were
630th Tank Destroyer Battalion, was de- raised to lay heavy counterbattery fire
ployed on the ridge west of the river, on the 229th Field Artillery Battalion
but these were towed guns, dug in and (Lt. Col. John C. Fairchild). With
relatively immobile. Even so, the unit the first light some eighteen Mark V
accounted for six tanks on the 16th and tanks started down the ridge spur point-
broke up two panzer assaults of com- ing toward Ouren; at the same time the
pany size. On the afternoon of the 16th 1130th Regiment and the 156th Regi-
the division commander had loaned ment resumed the attack to cut off and
Neslon the light tank company of the destroy the forward American compa-
707th Tank Battalion, but after a sweep nies. Company A, directly in the way,
through the 1st Battalion area in which lost a platoon to tanks rolling and firing
not a shot was fired the tanks recrossed methodically along the foxhole line.
the river. Subsequently General Cota Through this gap the panzers moved in
ordered them to go to the aid of the on the support positions held by Com-
hard-pressed 110th Infantry. This move pany D.
was made early in the morning with Earlier a German infantry company
disastrous results recorded earlier. Some in close order had been caught in the
additional help for the 112th did arrive glare of its own headlights atop a hill
before daybreak on 17 December, four and been massacred by Company D
self-propelled tank destroyers out of the sections lying on the reverse slope, but
811th Tank Destroyer Battalion bor- at 0755 Company D was forced to send
rowed from Combat Command Reserve, out an urgent plea for help “and damn
9th Armored Division, at Trois Vierges. quick.” West of Harspelt the self-pro-
Finally, the regimental antitank and can- pelled tank destroyer platoon from the
non companies were disposed around 811th arrived in time to destroy four
Ouren guarding the bridges, the roads, of the panzers, but at the cost of all
and the regimental command post. but one of its own guns. Colonel Nel-
Through the early hours of 17 De- son sent back request after request for
cember American outposts reported air support. T h e first American planes
sounds of tank movement in Lützkam- arrived at 0935, immobilizing the Ger-
pen. This was the Mark V Battalion of man tanks momentarily. Company D
the 116th Panzer Division assembling to positions had been taken by assault only
lead the attack toward the Ouren a few minutes earlier. About this time
bridges. About an hour before dawn a German tank platoon appeared on
eleven searchlights flicked on, their rays the ridge less than a thousand yards
glancing dully from the low clouds back from the regimental command post in
onto the Lützkampen-Sevenig ridge. T h e Ouren. Five hundred yards from the
German artillery could take a hand this Germans, on the far side of a draw, the
OUREN, BRIDGES
SHOWING
202 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE

cannon company gunners quickly bore- Colonel Fairchild moved the battalion
sighted their pieces, loaded reduced across the river without losing a piece
charge, and with direct fire knocked out and immediately resumed firing.
four of the panzers. A scratch platoon Throughout this entire action the
of less than fifty men collected from the 229th gave the 112th Infantry such sup-
regimental headquarters and Ouren port as to elicit from the regimental com-
held the supporting German infantry mander the opinion that “it was the best
at bay along the ridge east of the vil- artillery in the army,” an expression
lage. which would be used by other infantry
The tank thrust through the 1st Bat- commanders about other artillery units
talion center pushed parts of compa- during these trying days. In this case, as
nies C (a platoon of which had joined in many others during the American
the battalion from training), A, and D withdrawal, the full story is that of
back through the woods toward Wel- the co-operation of the combined arms.
chenhausen. Here about ten o’clock, Bat- The field artillery commander in his
tery C of the 229th came under direct turn would credit the ably served .50-
tank fire but stopped the tanks with how- caliber machine guns and 40-mm.
itzer fire at close range while Company Bofors of the protecting antiaircraft com-
C of the 447th Antiaircraft Artillery pany with saving his howitzers.
Battalion used its quad mount machine News of the battle on the right and
guns to chop down the infantry follow- left of the 112th Infantry sector had
ing behind. been sparse. During the afternoon Gen-
About noon the 2d Battalion coun- eral Cota radioed Colonel Nelson to be
terattacked and German pressure along especially watchful of his northern flank,
the 112th front began to wane. The but added that if his own position be-
229th Field Artillery Battalion pounded came untenable he should withdraw at
the German assembly point at Lützkam- dark behind the Our. About 1515 Nel-
pen as hard as limited stock of shells son sent his executive officer, Lt. Col.
permitted and fighter-bombers plastered William F. Train, to the 28th Divi-
the village: “air tremendously effective” sion command post with orders to report
reported the expectant ground observ- personally on the regiment’s position.
ers. But there were too few guns and Cota, as it turned out, already had
too few air sorties to keep the enemy phoned the corps commander and asked
immobilized for long. Probably by this permission to bring the 112th back to
time a good share of the 116th tanks had the high ground west of the river. Gen-
been committed. Certainly the enemy eral Middleton agreed, but with the pro-
infantry were spreading rapidly through viso that the regiment should remain
the woods and draws between the Amer- close enough to the river to deny an en-
ican front line and the Our River. By emy crossing.
1315 the howitzers around Welchenhau- Although this final word seems to
sen again were firing at their minimum have reached Ouren about 1600, Colonel
range. Three-quarters of an hour later Nelson did not act immediately on the
the regimental commander ordered the order because he still had hopes that
artillery to displace behind the river; the entrapped 1st Battalion could be
FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 203

reached. T h e 3d Battalion, fighting most- mand post, still holding on at Harspelt,


ly against infantry, had held its own failed to get through. Fortunately radio
through the day, aided greatly by the contact was re-established from Weis-
possession of the pillbox line, far wampach shortly after midnight and
stronger than the defensive positions in the 1st Battalion was given orders to
the 1st Battalion sector. Then, too, the withdraw through the former 3d Bat-
2d Battalion had once again used the talion positions. Company B, on the ex-
stone bridge south of Ouren to launch a treme north flank, had been forced
counterattack across the river and, dur- back into the 424th Infantry area, but
ing the afternoon, materially restored about 235 men withdrew cross-country
the 3d Battalion positions. But the Ger- toward Ouren.
man tanks were fanning out as the day Near the village a patrol found that
drew to a close, turning attention to the the stone bridge was guarded by only
south as well as the west. Patrols could a half squad of Germans. The Ameri-
not reach the 1st Battalion and at dusk cans lined up in German formation and,
the 3d Battalion reported that the pan- while an officer shouted commands in
zers finally were in position to rake German, marched boldly across the
its ridge defenses with fire from the bridge. T h e next morning Colonel Nel-
north–the pillbox line no longer was son was able to tell General Cota, “Very
tenable. Colonel Nelson gave the order good news. 1st Battalion has worked [its]
to withdraw behind the river under way back.” T h e little group from regi-
cover of darkness. mental headquarters which had been de-
The regimental command post staff ployed on the ridge line at Ouren was
left Ouren even while the enemy was less successful. Completely surrounded
filtering into the village and moved to by the enemy, it had hoped to join the
Weiswampach. T h e speed of the Ger- withdrawal of the line companies. T h e
man attack caught most of the regimen- group never established contact, how-
tal medical company and troops from ever, and most of its members were cap-
the headquarters and cannon com- tured when they attempted to break
panies. The 3d Battalion commenced away the following morning.
its withdrawal at 2 2 0 0 under orders to Although the enemy had seized all
pull back through Ouren. Fortunately of the ground which the 112th Infantry
Major Woodward, the battalion com- was occupying east of the Our and final-
manding officer, was suspicious of this ly had secured a bridgehead at Ouren,
route. His suspicions were confirmed the cost to him on 17 December had
when a patrol sent into the town failed been high. At least fifteen tanks had
to return. The 3d Battalion then crossed been disabled or destroyed on the first
the river farther to the south, circled and day and German sources indicate that
finally dug in along the Ouren-Weis- this figure may have doubled on the
wampach road, where its flank would be 17th. The Americans had taken 186
covered by the refused line of the 2d Bat- prisoners and killed or wounded two
talion. A patrol which had been sent or three times that number; the losses
from the 3d Battalion to carry the with- in the 1130th Regiment were “very
drawal order to the 1st Battalion com- high,” said the enemy reports. It is im-
204 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

possible to give an accurate count of neighboring corps. Although delayed


losses in the 112th Infantry, but they by inadequate deliveries of POL and
seem to have been moderate. Most mem- the traffic jam on the damaged Dasburg-
bers of the 1st Battalion, for example, Marnach road the entire division, in-
eventually found their way back to the cluding its tank regiment, assembled
regiment. on the west bank around Heinerscheid
The degree of tactical success achieved during the night of 17–18 December.
by the 112th Infantry and the fact that The main body of the 560th Volks Gren-
it was able to hold intact as a regi- adier Division also had detoured around
ment may be explained by a number the stubborn men and difficult ground
of factors. The ground east of the river in the 112th Infantry area, extending
was favorable to the defender, who was the bridgehead which the 1128th Regi-
well entrenched as the result of careful ment had seized east of Heinerscheid on
planning and inspection by Nelson and 17 December. Only the weakened
his staff, and whose guns covered the 1130th Regiment and the division fusi-
few routes of mechanized advance. T h e lier company, once again in touch with
numerous pillboxes provided a substan- its fellows, were left behind to extend
tial amount of cover; the 3d Battalion, the bridgehead formed at Ouren.
for example, was not seriously endan- All this gave the 112th Infantry a
gered until the attacking tanks maneu- chance to get its breath on 18 December.
vered close enough for direct fire. T h e A few attacks were started against the
refused positions of the 2d Battalion new American line, which now covered
allowed fairly free use of a regimental Beiler, Lieler, and Lausdorn, but none
reserve during both days and good were energetic. Throughout the day the
counterattack plans were ready. Equal- American outposts watched masses of
ly important, the green 1130th Regiment foot troops and vehicles defile westward
(incorporated into the 116th Panzer Di- through Heinerscheid, only some two
vision attack on the second day) had thousand yards to the south. The regi-
failed to follow closely in the path of mental cannon company also provided
the tanks and so gave American rifle- some interested spectators, who trained
men and machine gunners time to get their howitzers on Heinerscheid with
set after the tanks rolled past. such good effect that enemy records take
Even before the seizure of Ouren the rueful note of this harassing fire from
LVIII Panzer Corps had shifted its in- the north.
terest to the south. By the second day Communication between the 112th
it was apparent that the combination and division headquarters had been
of stubborn resistance and poor ap- sketchy since 16 December, depending
proach roads would delay the projected on artillery radio nets and liaison of-
crossing at Ouren. T h e orders given ficers. Early in the afternoon of 18 De-
the 116th Panzer Division on the night of cember a radio message finally arrived
16 December to switch to the left were at the division command post asking
altered on the 17th to start its infantry that the regiment be given instructions.
regiments marching still farther south General Cota had been trying through
to the Dasburg bridgehead held by the most of the morning to reach Nelson
FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 205

with an order to hold in essentially the this story of difficulties in command and
positions which the regiment now oc- communication is none too clear, but
cupied . 17 But the situation east of Bas- the VIII Corps commander approved the
togne was growing more precarious and attachment. On the morning of the 20th
the division commander decided to Jones ordered the regiment to sideslip
bring the 112th back to join in the de- back to the east, reoccupy Beiler, and
fense of Bastogne. About 1700 he ra- dig in along the east-west ridge line,
dioed new orders: the 112thInfantry Leithum-Beiler-Malscheid. Thus de-
was to fight a stiff delaying action along ployed on the right of the 424th Infan-
the line Weiswampach–Trois Vierges, try, the 112th was another piece filling
and thence toward Bastogne. Two hours out the fast developing “island defense”
later the 112th Infantry acknowledged of St. Vith.
receipt of these instructions.
Colonel Nelson decided to pull back The Fall of Wiltz
through Huldange since enemy tanks
were known to be in Trois Vierges. The total impact of the severe Ger-
Early on 19 December the 112th In- man blows dealt the 110th Infantry in
fantry and 229th Field Artillery Bat- the late afternoon and evening of 17
talion moved under cover of a heavy December was not felt at the division
fog and assembled without hindrance and corps headquarters for several hours.
around Huldange, the defensive front Information on the hard-pressed battal-
now facing south. Here Nelson received ions and their companies was sketchy
a message from the 28th Division which and secondhand. At 2013 General Cota
ordered the regiment to hold the line phoned the VIII Corps commander to
Lausdorn-Weiswampach-Beiler, which say that the situation was critical, that
the 112th Infantry had just abandoned. routes were open for the German tanks
Colonel Nelson at this moment had to come through, and that “there is
two contradictory orders and would some question in regard to the 110th
have to risk his regiment if he car- Infantry CP.” He added, however, that
ried out either. he had “three battalions now trying
Through the roundabout artillery to counterattack from Clerf to Mar-
channels he asked permission to join nach.” (By this hour, of course, the
the 106th Infantry Division, only a lit- story was quite different: the 1st Bat-
tle distance away to the north. Nelson talion was cut to pieces, most of the
also reported to General Jones at Viel- 2d Battalion was surrounded, and the
salm and set the problem before him. 3d Battalion was holding at Consthum
Jones attached the 112th Infantry to and Hosingen only by the skin of its
his own division on the spot, assuring teeth.)
Nelson that he would assume full re- The corps commander was loath to
sponsibility. T h e sequence of events in yield ground to the enemy. Nonethe-
less he advised Cota to withdraw the
17 Cota was acting on orders from the VIII 110th back of the Clerf, that “under the
Corps commander who wished to deny the enemy
the use of Highway N 26, the main paved road circumstances it was necessary.” Further-
from the south into St. Vith. more, Middleton instructed Cota to use
206 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

his tanks and tank destroyers to block Wiltz and the bridges there were only
the roads west of the river. about twelve miles from Bastogne. It
The 28th Division commander agreed would be natural, therefore, for the
to pull back where he could, but by Germans debouching from the Wilwer-
the morning of the 18th it was apparent wiltz bridgehead to defile through the
that to re-establish any sort of front be- Wiltz valley.
hind the Clerf was impossible. T h e About 1000 on 18 December, Gen-
bridges at Clerf and Wilwerwiltz were eral Cota received the welcome word
in German hands (no preparations had that a combat command of the 10th Ar-
been made to destroy them); most of mored Division was moving forward to
the sixty tanks committed in the central his assistance, probably to be in position
sector were destroyed. No help could to give support by the late afternoon.
be expected from either the right or left Middleton had ordered the 44th Engi-
wing regiments in shoring up the divi- neer Combat Battalion (Lt. Col.
sion center. T h e 109th Infantry was Clarion J. Kjeldseth) to Wiltz on the
losing ground on its north flank and soon previous evening with about six hundred
would be forced back fanwise into the men (it had been operating sawmills
9th Armored Division zone. T h e 112th and rock crushers, working on roads,
Infantry south wing was giving way un- and the like). This unit now relieved
der heavy attack, and during the day all the provisional battalion, hastily formed
communications between the regiment from the 28th Division headquarters,
and division were lost. by setting up positions north and east
Miscellaneous troops of the 110th In- of the town. There were also avail-
fantry had joined with units of Com- able some tanks and guns to help the
bat Command R of the 9th Armored engineers, bandsmen, telephone line-
Division (briefly under operational con- men, and paymasters who composed the
trol of the 28th Infantry Division) to defense. All that remained of the 707th
defend along the main road to Bastogne Tank Battalion-some six crippled tanks
in the area west of Clerf. T h e respon- and five assault guns–was gathered
sibility for command here was assumed in Wiltz after a rear guard action in
directly by the VIII Corps. General Wilwerwiltz. Six three-inch towed tank
Cota, as a result, decided to concen- destroyers from the 630th Tank De-
trate what was left to him-headquar- stroyer Battalion, weapons of the 447th
ters troops, engineers, stragglers, and Antiaircraft Battalion, and light ar-
the handful of organized units moving mored cars of the 28th Reconnaissance
back from across the Clerf–in defense Troop reinforced the perimeter.
of Wiltz, the 28th Division command Southeast of the town the undergunned
post. This sizable town lay in a bend of batteries of the 687th Field Artillery
the Wiltz River valley, southwest of Battalion held firing positions along the
Clerf and some three miles away from road, sited to cover the Wiltz perimeter
the enemy-held crossings at Wilwerwiltz. or support the 3d Battalion, 110th In-
Next to the paved through highway via fantry, fighting at Consthum.
Clerf, the Wiltz valley offered the best It will be recalled that the troops at
avenue westward. T h e road center at Consthum held the 901st Panzer Grena-
FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 207

dier Regiment at bay until the after- mobile German tanks, but the engineers
noon of 18 December and, even as they held their fire for the German infantry
withdrew, continued to block the road on the heels of the panzers and then
to Wiltz. The northern regiment of the cut loose, with satisfying results. T h e
Panzer Lehr Division, the 902d, made American howitzers, south of Wiltz, al-
better progress. The capitulation of the so took a hand in slowing the German
gallant garrison at Hosingen, during attack. But the enemy armor weight was
the morning, removed this threat to too heavy, nor could it be checked by
the 902d supply road. T h e 26th Vollzs the handful of tanks and light assault
Grenadier Division, having completed its guns remaining to the 707th Tank Bat-
initial mission by seizing an undamaged talion. By dusk the American line had
bridge across the Clerf at Drauffelt dur- been pushed back nearly to Wei-
ing the night, made way for the Panzer dingen when orders came to withdraw
Lehr Division to strike for Bastogne. behind the Wiltz River and destroy
The Panzer Lehr Reconnaissance Bat- the bridge at Weidingen. For some rea-
talion, earlier withdrawn from the fight son the bridge was not blown. But the
at Holzthum, reverted to its parent pressure on the Wiltz perimeter relaxed
command and crossed the river first. briefly as the Panzer Lehr Reconnais-
The 902d, advancing by way of Muns- sance Battalion turned back toward
hausen, now cleared of Americans, fol- the north to rejoin its division in the
lowed. Despite harassing fire from race for Bastogne. Infantry of the 26th
American guns and mortars the Ger- Volks Grenadier Division took over the
mans moved swiftly. At the crossroads attack on the northeast (probably the
east of Eschweiler the Reconnaissance 39th Volks Grenadier Regiment) .
Battalion turned to the left and bore On German operations maps Wiltz
down on Wiltz. T h e 902d, led in person lay athwart the boundary which divided
by the division commander, continued the attack zones of the XLVII Panzer
toward the west, although briefly de- Corps and the LXXXV Corps. On
layed in a fight with a few towed anti- 19 December the right wing division
tank guns and armored cars near Esch- of the latter, the 5th Parachute Divi-
weiler. 18 sion, took over the attack on Wiltz, or
German field guns, by this time west perhaps more accurately, drifted into a
of the Clerf, opened fire on Wiltz at fight for the town. On the evening of
noon. Two hours later tanks and self- the 18th Col. Ludwig Heilmann, com-
propelled guns struck the 44th Engi- mander of the 5th Parachute Division,
neers, which was outposting the little knew that the divisions on his right
hamlets northeast of Wiltz. A section and left were well ahead of his
of tank destroyers, supporting the for- own. In fact the troops of the 26th
ward outpost, was overrun by the more Volks Grenadier Division sent against
Wiltz from the northeast were acting
18 T h e Americans lost four tank destroyers and under orders to protect the flank and
eight armored cars. It would appear they were rear of Panzer Lehr against possible
surprised by the speed of the German advance;
the enemy assault was being made by bicycle
American counterattack from the Wiltz
troops. valley. Heilmann, therefore, had decid-
208 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

ed to bypass Wiltz on 19 December with the northeastern approach to the bridge


his entire division but now found that and the engineer outposts. Four of
he could not get his regiments back in the 707th tanks that had been crippled
hand. The 5th Parachute Division com- the previous day were drawn up on the
mander had already experienced great ridge east of Wiltz to give what help
difficulty in maintaining control of his they might as more or less stationary
units in action. His staff and regimental artillery. The Americans were not too
commanders, appointees of General- worried by the flanking move because
oberst Kurt Student, had formed a tanks of the 10th Armored Division
clique against the previous commander were expected momentarily.
and were hostile to Heilmann.19 Further- T h e German infantry on the north
more, troops and troop leaders were side of town aligned for the assault
poorly trained, coming as they had only about 1400. A sharp attack drove a pro-
recently from Luftwaffe ground units. visional platoon, made up from the 28th
Even on the first day of the offensive Division band, off the high ground to
one of Heilmann’s regiments had been the northwest, thus exposing the engi-
lost for several hours. This experience, neer line. T h e 44th was hit from the
events would show, had borne little northeast and east by infantry armed
fruit. with machine pistols charging in along-
On the morning of 19 December the side single tanks. As American riflemen
headquarters of the 28th Infantry and machine gunners cut down the Ger-
Division transferred from Wiltz to Sib- man assault teams, they saw their own
ret, southwest of Bastogne. T h e pro- ranks thinning. In this fight the cross-
visional battalion which had been re- roads near Erpeldange changed hands
cruited from the headquarters staff re- four times. T h e assault gun platoon
mained in Wiltz. Meanwhile General gave good support wherever the line
Cota had ordered Colonel Strickler to was threatened, but by the end of the
move in the 3d Battalion, 110th Infan- afternoon its fuel and ammunition
try, from Nocher. T h e battalion, per- were nearly gone and the gunners, after
haps 2 0 0 strong, arrived in Wiltz about four days of nearly continuous action,
noon and Strickler assumed command were approaching complete exhaustion.
of the forces in the town. During the When darkness finally came, the 44th
morning the 26th Volks Grenadier Di- withdrew with the assault guns into
vision engaged in desultory action, mov- Wiltz, having lost four officers and 150
ing troops around to the north. Since the men. This time the bridge was blown.
Wiltz bridge had not been destroyed, On orders, the three remaining assault
the American assault gun platoon was guns went back to cover the wrecked
ordered back to Erpeldange, covering structure. Their fate is unknown.
While elements of the 26th Volks
19The so-called Parachute Army had developed
originally as a partisan and personal creation of Grenadier Division were attacking on
Goering. As a result it was ridden with politics. the north side of the Wiltz, detachments
The account of Heilmann’s difficulties is in MS of the 5th Parachute Division struck the
# B–023, 5th Parachute Division, 1 December
1944–12 January 1945 (Generalmajor Ludwig American perimeter on the south and
Heilmann) . southeast. This timing might seem to
FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 209

indicate a co-ordinated attack. In fact ters at Sibret were abortive; the roads
it represented Heilmann’s failure to east to Wiltz now were blocked every
gain control of his division, for the or- few kilometers by enemy infantry and
ders were to bypass Wiltz. T h e division self-propelled guns.
advance guard from the 15th Parachute On the ridges which look down over
Regiment (supposedly on its way to Wiltz more Germans appeared in the
capture Sibret) somehow became con- early evening, apparently eager to be
fused, wandered away northward, and in at the kill. The 14th Parachute Regi-
about 1500 struck the 687th Field Artil- ment, which had been moving slowly
lery Battalion, whose batteries had dis- westward (the 5th Parachute Division
placed to a road angling southeast from commander ascribed its dilatory move-
the town.20 Battery A met the tanks ment to the habit of attacking small
leading the German column with direct villages in order to have billets for the
fire, disabled or destroyed them, and cold December nights), entered the
briefly slowed the advance toward Wiltz. fight via a climb onto the eastern ridge
But menaced as they were, the artil- overlooking the town. At least a third
lery commander could not risk his how- of the 5th Parachute Division was finally
itzers further. Battery B fired its few engaged at Wiltz contrary to Heilmann’s
remaining rounds to cover the other bat- orders.
teries, the battalion assembling during Colonel Strickler decided to evacuate
the evening at a crossroad southeast Wiltz by infiltration and regroup at
of Harlange. Sibret, but with the Germans pressing
By nightfall the American perimeter in from all sides and no means of reach-
had been pierced at many points and ing his units except by runner the actual
the defenders pushed back into the cen- withdrawal would be difficult to control.
ter of Wiltz. Most of the tanks and It was his intention, however, to move
assault guns were out of action, there the provisional battalion first, leaving
were insufficient machine guns to cover the 3d Battalion to keep the escape
the final protective line, radio commun- exits open while the 44th Engineers
ication between the desperate units was acted as rear guard. T h e 687th Field Ar-
practically nonexistent, searchlight rays tillery Battalion pulled out to the south-
glancing from the low clouds lighted west and the 3d Battalion also started
the path of the attackers, and ammuni- to move, under the impression that this
tion was running very low. was the plan. When orders finally ar-
Attempts during the evening to send a rived to hold in place, the 3d Battalion
task force of stragglers and trains for- had reached a trident crossroad south-
ward from the 28th Division headquar- west of the town. After a long wait the
battalion commanding officer, Major
Milton, went back into Wiltz to get fur-
20The American infantry gave high praise to ther orders; when he returned most of
the 687th for its part in this fight. Colonel Strick- his battalion had disappeared. With the
ler later said of the gunners, “a magnificent job few troops remaining, Milton succes-
by some magnificent men.” Recognized as out-
standing even in this band was S/Sgt. William J. fully made his way cross-country to the
Bennett of Battery C, who was awarded the DSC. west.
210 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

WILTZ

The bulk of the provisional battalion, exploded and the covering infantry
inside Wiltz, started southwest an hour cleared away.
or so before midnight, some on foot, the As the column turned northwest on
rest riding on trucks, half-tracks, and the main Bastogne highway enemy fire
tank destroyers. A few hundred yards increased; some in the column turned
had been traversed when, at the first back from the gantlet in hopes of finding
crossroad, the leading half-track ran into another escape route by retracing their
a patch of mines laid in front of a Ger- steps through Wiltz. About four and a
man roadblock and exploded. An un- half miles west of the town, a second
identified crew of a 447th Antiaircraft block was encountered and a German
Artillery half-track drove straight onto self-propelled gun lashed out at the lead
the mines, its .50-caliber fire searching vehicles while machine gunners blazed
out the enemy riflemen. The half-track away from positions around it. A platoon
was demolished, but the field had been of Negro troops came to the head of the
FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 211

column and, attacking through the dark 18 officers and 160 men during the final
with grenades and bayonets, cleared the withdrawal.
position. T h e fall of Wiltz ended the 28th Divi-
Only a short distance beyond, at sion's delaying action before Bastogne.
a third block, fire swept into the col- Other American troops now had to take
umn from all sides. This was the end: over the actual defense of that all-im-
shots, blazing vehicles, and screaming portant road center, but without the
wounded. Those who could left the road, gallant bargain struck by the 110th In-
scattering in small parties into the dark. fantry and its allied units–men for
In the darkness and confusion many time–the German plans for a coup-de-
stragglers made their way into Bastogne main at Bastogne would have turned to
and Vaux-lez-Rosières. (Strickler made accomplished fact.21 T h e cost had been
it to the latter point where General Cota high, much higher than American units
placed him in charge of the defense.) expected to pay at this stage of the war:
Farther to the south the 687th Field the 110th Infantry virtually destroyed,
Artillery Battalion was surrounded at a the men and fighting vehicles of five
crossroad about seven miles from Wiltz. tank companies lost, the equivalent of
T h e gunners and their attached antiair- three combat engineer companies dead
craft artillery unit made a stand with or missing, and tank destroyer, artillery,
their carbines, Colts, and a few .50-cali- and miscellaneous units engulfed in this
ber machine guns. For nearly two hours battle. In the last analysis the losses in-
enemy flares methodically picked out flicted on the enemy may have equaled
targets for mortar and bullet fire, while those sustained by the Americans–cer-
the Americans were so closely beset that tainly the Germans paid dearly for their
the Bofors and murderous quad mounts hurried frontal attacks against stone-
could not retaliate without cutting down walled villages and towns–but the final
their own people. Only three of the measure of success and failure would be
howitzers left could be withdrawn and in terms of hours and minutes won by
losses among the cannoneers and drivers the Americans and lost to the enemy.
were high. T h e 44th Combat Engineers, 21This gallant feat was recognized fully at the
time by General Middleton and its importance
the rear guard unit at Wiltz, probably later emphasized in the VIII Corps after action
suffered most, the enemy accounting for report for December 1944.
CHAPTER IX

The Attack by the German Left Wing


16-20 December
Hitler’s hope of victory rode with his Hitler likewise attempted to intervene
two panzer armies. He was confident in the initial assault plans of the Seventh
that the Allies would not be able to re- Army by directing that the attack would
act in a forceful way until these armies start as a pincers move in which one
were across the Meuse and it would prong shot west out of Trier and the
appear that he expected this reaction to other penetrated northwest of Echter-
take the form of a counterattack some- nach. Jodl and Model again acted as a
where on the west bank of that river. team in killing this idea, pointing out
Under no circumstances was he pre- that the Seventh Army had neither the
pared to diminish the main striking troops nor the guns to support two
force in order to build up strong pro- separate attacks. It is clear that through-
tection for the German flanks during the out the planning phase Jodl took a
advance east of the Meuse. T h e assign- realistic view of the limited capability
ment of four infantry divisions to cover of Brandenberger’s army. After the war
the southern flank of the assault armies he admitted that the Wehrmachtfueh-
was as far as he would go, nor could the rungsstab would have been satisfied to
numerous pleas advanced by his field see the Seventh Army advance only half
commanders for additional strength in the distance between Echternach and
the south alter his decision one whit. Luxembourg City.1
Despite the poverty of forces allotted When Brandenberger and his chief of
Brandenberger’s Seventh Army, the staff, Generalmajor Rudolf Freiherr von
Fuehrer was prepared, as always, to ex- Gersdorff, finally were allowed to map
pect the impossible. At one point in the their own scheme of maneuver they
planning period Hitler envisaged these settled on a containing mission for the
four divisions as forming a blocking line two infantry divisions in the left corps
all the way from the German frontier to (General der Infanterie Franz Beyer’s
Charleville on the Meuse. Both Jodl and LXXX Corps), and an advance by the
Model resisted this idea, but when the two infantry divisions on the right which
counteroffensive began there were still comprised General der Infanterie Bap-
rather vague plans afoot for employing tist Kniess’s LXXXV Corps. Beyer’s
the Seventh Army in a push west and troops, in this final plan, had the mission
south to form a position based on Lux- 1 ETHINT–51, OKW, Ardennes Offensive (Gen-
embourg City, Arlon, and Neufchâteau. eraloberst Alfred Jodl) .
ATTACK BY GERMAN LEFT WING: 16–20 DECEMBER 213

of establishing a bridgehead at Echter- coincided with the north boundary of


nach on the Sauer River, then undertak- the 109th Infantry Regiment (28th In-
ing a limited advance to the southwest. fantry Division) near Stolzembourg; its
The L X X X V Corps was given orders to southern limit was roughly the same as
cross the Our River, north of its juncture the southern boundary of the 12th In-
with the Sauer, and advance on a west- fantry Regiment (4th Infantry Division)
ward axis parallel to that of the Fifth near the confluence of the Sauer and
Panzer Army. If all went well one of the Moselle Rivers.
two divisions would come to a halt in a Along this winding front, a distance
blocking position around Arlon, south of of some thirty miles, the opponents
Bastogne. would be matched at the first shock
Brandenberger would have to rely in approximately as follows. On the north
the main on his artillery if the Seventh wing of the Seventh Army the 5th Para-
Army was to hold its position at the chute Division would cross the Our and
shoulder of the counteroffensive against strike the 2d Battalion of the 109th In-
any strong attack from the south. One of fantry. The boundary between the 109th
the first objectives, therefore, would be and 110th ran obliquely, however, and
to neutralize or destroy the American in consequence the 5th Parachute
artillery groupments, and for this pur- would shortly engage troops of the latter
pose the army was given a few batteries regiment. Next in line on the Our the
of the new, long-range 120-mm. guns. 352d Volks Grenadier Division would
T h e total artillery strength available in cross into the zone held by the 3d Bat-
the army was 319 guns and 108 rocket talion of the 109th. South of the village
projectors. When it came to close and of Wallendorf, where the Our flows into
mobile support for the assault Branden- the Sauer, the 276th Volks Grenadier
berger’s divisions would be in a bad way; Division would push into the narrow
there were only thirty assault guns in segment of the Sauer front held by the
the army and half of these were with 60th Armored Infantry Battalion of the
the 5th Parachute Division on the right 9th Armored Division (-), then fan out
wing. against the left flank of the 12th Infantry.
At 0530 on the morning of 16 Decem- T h e 212th Volks Grenadier Division,
ber the guns and rocket projectors of the acting as the southern pivot for the entire
German Seventh Army opened fire, sig- German counteroffensive, would cross
naling the attack across the Our and the Sauer in the Echternach sector and
Sauer Rivers. The sector in which the drive head on against the 12th Infantry.2
Seventh Army would advance, as flank (Map V )
guard for the two panzer armies carrying 2The chief German source for the Seventh Army
the weight of the main counteroffensive, operations is MS # A–876, Ardennes Offensive of
was weakly held. Only small local re- Seventh Army, 16 December 1944–25 January 1945
(General der Panzertruppen Erich Branden-
serves were at hand to reinforce the berger). The corps accounts are in MSS #
vastly outnumbered American troops B–030, LXXXV Corps, 1 December 1944–10 Janu-
facing the four divisions under General ary 1945 (General der Infanterie Baptist Kniess)
and B–081, LXXX Corps, 13 September 1944–23
Brandenberger’s command. The north- March 1945, Part Two (General der Infanterie
ern limit of the Seventh Army attack Dr. Franz Beyer). The individual divisions are
214 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

T h e 109th Infantry Defense on the and the Our River, the other at Führen
Sauer and Our Rivers about a mile from the river. These
16–20 December strongpoints were nearly two miles
apart; behind them the third rifle com-
The 109th Infantry, led by Lt. Col. pany was located in reserve at Branden-
James E. Rudder, a former Ranger com- burg with one howitzer battery to give
mander, was close to full strength, al- support. Some distance back from the
though, like the rest of the 28th Divi- river the 2d Battalion (Maj. William J.
sion, its rifle companies were filled by Maroney) maintained a series of seven
replacements with limited experience outposts watching the German fortifica-
and training. The division commander tions on the eastern bank.
had considered that the enemy might During the two nights prior to 16
make a “distracting” attack toward Die- December the 5th Parachute Division
kirch and Ettelbruck, in an attempt to moved its regiments into these east bank
cut the road and rail lines running north fortifications and the extensive woods
from the city of Luxembourg, and had which lay just to the rear. T h e 5th Para-
disposed the 109th accordingly. On the chute Division had its full complement
division south flank, the 3d Battalion of officers and men, but lacked its anti-
(Lt. Col. Jim H. McCoy) was allotted tank battalion (which had lost much
a four-mile front, but had concentrated equipment to air attack en route from
men and weapons in an almost contin- Holland) and its mortar battalion. Colo-
uous 3,000-yard defense line along the nel Heilmann, who had recently taken
heights in the triangle formed by the over the division, was not too sanguine as
Our and Sauer Rivers which overlooked to its ability or state of training as a unit.
the valley road west to Ettelbruck. On He relied on the 15th Parachute Regi-
this road the 1st Battalion (Lt. Col. ment, the 5th Parachute Engineer Bat-
H. R. Williams) lay in reserve at Die- talion, and the attached 11th Assault
kirch, with two field artillery battalions, Gun Brigade, which were well trained
the 107th and 108th, emplaced close to and motorized, to furnish the main
that town. The 2d Battalion sector to striking force. The division artillery
the north was over five miles in width. lacked the motors to accompany a rapid
In this weak portion of the line, defense advance, and fire support would be given
was based on two strongpoints of rifle by the assault guns and a regiment of
company strength, one on a ridge road Volks artillery. T h e latter was horse-
about a mile and a half west of Vianden drawn but expected to motorize with
captured American vehicles.
covered in MSS # A–930, A–931, 212th Volks
Grenadier Division–Ardennes, 16 December 1944–25 Only a few days before the attack
January 1945 (Generalleutnant Franz Sensfuss) ; Heilmann warned Model that the 5th
B–023 (Heilmann) ; B–067, 352d Volks Grenadier Parachute Division was only a Class IV
Division, 16 December 1944–25 January 1945 (Gen-
eralmajor Erich Schmidt) ; B–073 212th Volks outfit, but Model, who by now must have
Grenadier Division, Ardennes (Generalleutnant been surfeited with complaints on lack
Franz Sensfuss) ; and P–032f, Ardennes Project of equipment and insufficient training,
(Generalmajor Hugo Dempwolff). LIII Corps’ K T B
covers the first hours of action but ends with 17 merely replied that success would be won
December. by the paratroopers’ “usual audacity.”
ATTACK BY GERMAN LEFT WING: 16–20 DECEMBER 215

Perhaps Model did not care to recognize attack with only two battalions, spear-
that the paratroopers in this once elite headed by single shock companies, the
division had been replaced by meagerly initial transfer to the far bank of the Our
trained Luftwaffe ground troops and would be a gradual process (and would,
Navy battalions. Lacking experienced as it proved, lead the Americans to be-
fighting men and the heavy weapons lieve that the first Germans across were
requisite for close support, Heilmann in- only patrols) . Nonetheless, Heilmann
structed his line officers to avoid pitched hoped that the vehicles of the 13th
battles for defended positions. After all, Parachute Regiment and the self-
the goal to be reached by the night of propelled 75-mm. guns of the 11th As-
16 December was near the town of Wiltz sault Gun Brigade would be across the
some ten miles west of the Our. There- Our River before the close of the first
fore the 5th Parachute Division plan day, for he counted on these two units
called for a quick and unopposed cross- to lead the advance to the division ob-
ing at the Our; a bridge to be in at Roth jective south of Bastogne.
by midafternoon of the first day; a rapid The second German division assem-
advance past the villages where the weak bled opposite the 109th Infantry was the
American forces were located; and a 352d Volks Grenadier Division (Col.
lightning stroke to force the crossing sites Erich Schmidt) . T h e boundary point be-
near Wiltz. tween the latter and its northern neigh-
If this plan were successful the 5th bor was fixed about a half-mile south of
Parachute Engineer Battalion would Roth, but for some reason the precise
ferry the assault companies across the extension of the boundary line west of
Our, then join the advance and reach the the Our had not been settled. As a result
Wiltz sector with ferrying equipment by complications would arise once the 5th
the end of the first day. The 14th Para- Parachute Division and the 352d Volks
chute Regiment had orders to cross the Grenadier Division advanced beyond the
Our in the north near Stolzembourg, river. T h e 352d had full ranks, mostly
drive past Putscheid and seize a crossing from the Luftwaffe and Navy, but lacked
point on the Wiltz someplace west of training and veteran noncoms. Its artil-
Hoscheid. T o the south the 15th Para- lery regiment contained four battalions,
chute Regiment was intended to cross but was mostly horse-drawn and woefully
the Our at Roth (named as the main short of radio equipment. There were
divisional bridge site), seize the high only six assault guns in the divisional
ground near Vianden, then establish a company. On the night of 1 2 December
bridgehead over the Sure at Bourscheid. the 352d pulled out of the long line be-
The task of erasing such American units tween Stolzembourg and Bollendorf
as might be left in the towns and villages which then comprised the division front
was given the 13th Parachute Regiment, and re-formed in the woods east of the
which had no transport and would be Our, leaving only a small security force
brought forward with the bulk of the to screen the movements of the divisions
heavy weapons once the Our bridge was moving up on the right and left. When
in. Since the Seventh Army had ordered the 109th Infantry sent a large combat
each of its divisions to commence the patrol across at Vianden on the morning
216 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

of the 14th, the Americans therefore bridges into position over the shallow
found no enemy. but turbulent river.
T h e night before the attack the 352d T h e 109th outposts on the far bank
marched back to the new and narrow of the Our could see little in the half-
sector on the river from which the jump- light of the foggy morning. Some were
off would be made: the 915th Regiment quietly bypassed as the German shock
on the right, the 916th on the left, and companies moved quickly inland.
the 914th, which had furnished the cov- Others, closer to the crossing sites, were
ering force, in reserve. Thus poised, the assaulted by small detachments. Thus
assault regiments would cross the Our on the 5th Parachute Division engineers
either side of Gentingen, with orders to wiped out the 2d Battalion outpost in
bypass defended villages, seize the dom- the château ruins at Vianden before any
inant heights in the Sauer-Our triangle, warning could be sent out. T h e Amer-
and drive as far as the Sauer bridges at icans fired flares onto the east bank in an
Ettelbruck–all this on the first day of the attempt to discover the purpose be-
attack. In total, then, two German divi- hind the heavy concentration of
sions and the metal of the LXXXV German artillery, but no certain
Corps’ artillery were to be thrown word of enemy troops reached the
against the 109th Infantry and neighbor- 109th command post at Ettelbruck
ing troops of the 110th Infantry in the until about 0900 when Company B re-
first hours of the great counteroffensive. ported that a 20-man patrol had as-
There were nearly three hundred saulted the outpost near Hosdorf. This
tubes and projectors in the LXXXV advance detachment of the 916th Regi-
Corps groupment which opened fire at ment had hit head on into the contin-
0530 on 16 December. These pieces were uous and strongly defended right flank
laid on targets deep in the 109th In- position of the 109th Infantry on the
fantry zone: notably Diekirch, Basten- heights at the Sauer-Our triangle. By
dorf, the ridge road running north from this time, however, the German advance
Ettelbruck across the rear of the 28th parties farther north had passed through
Division, and the command posts of the the weak outpost line and were gathering
two artillery battalions. It would seem strength and momentum.
that the German gunners were firing by T h e situation in the 109th area devel-
the map (there had been numerous oped as follows. T h e 14th Regiment,
changes of position in this area which composing the right of the 5th Parachute
were unknown to German intelligence) Division advance, was moving along the
and the opening barrage shortly dwin- boundary between the 110th and the
dled away to occasional salvos without 109th without much opposition. In ac-
inflicting much damage or disrupting tual fact this regiment would “lean” on
communications. ‘With the first sound of the neighboring X L V I I Panzer Corps,
gunfire the assault companies pushed which had struck into the center of the
their rubber boats into the Our, only 28th Division, and through most of the
some fifty feet wide, and the engineers day lagged while the Panzer Corps
began swinging the portable infantry opened the way. To the south the 15th
ATTACK BY GERMAN LEFT WING: 16–20 DECEMBER 217

Regiment took advantage of the wide detachments from the 15th Regiment in
gap between the two strongpoints the north turned and brought Fuhren
manned by Companies E and F of the under small arms fire. Radio communi-
109th, its leading battalion marching cation with the menaced company was
without a fight to Walsdorf, an unoccu- lost three hours later, but direct assault
pied village about two miles from the failed to dislodge the Americans.
river. This move particularly threatened Company E was further isolated by the
Company F, which was on the ridge road interposition of the 915th Regiment be-
three miles north of Bastendorf (the 2d tween Fuhren and the 3d Battalion. T h e
Battalion command post), and which 915th had crossed the Our near Bettel
represented the northern linchpin of the and moved swiftly and unopposed u p
regiment. At 1 0 0 0 Company G came up the draws through the 2,000-yard gap be-
from reserve at Brandenburg and was tween Rudder’s 2d and 3d Battalions.
put on the right of Company F. Shortly after 1000 the German advance
For some reason the German force at guard was firing its burp guns into Bat-
Walsdorf did not press its advantage. tery A, 108th Field Artillery, east of
The forward units of the 15th Regiment Diekirch. An hour or so before, the
were out of contact with the rest of the American gunners had seen figures mov-
5th Parachute Division, and the regi- ing through the fog but mistook them
mental commander had difficulty in for Americans. By noon the 915th Regi-
holding his outfit together. At dusk, how- ment held Longsdorf and Tandel, the
ever, a second German battalion had latter two miles from the Our, and had
arrived at Walsdorf and was committed patrols to the south only two thousand
to the southwest in a drive toward Bran- yards from the main supply road linking
denburg, slipping through a wooded de- Diekirch and Bettendorf on which the
pression between Companies F and G. 3d Battalion, deployed facing the Our,
Colonel Rudder dispatched Company C depended.
from the reserve battalion at Diekirch to Colonel Rudder called on the meager
check this penetration. But the company armored reserve allotted him by Cota
reached Brandenburg shortly before (the 1st Platoon of Company C, 707th
midnight without encountering the Ger- Tank Battalion), sending it north from
mans. Diekirch about 1300 to check the 915th
T h e 15th Regiment drive through thrust. With the tanks went Company A,
Walsdorf marked the most extensive shortly followed by Company B, the last
penetration of the 109th Infantry posi- of the reserve battalion. T h e fight
tions on this first day. Farther south bat- through the afternoon was hard and the
tle had been joined in bitter but incon- Americans made little progress, but
clusive fighting. Company E, in Fuhren, shortly before nightfall the counter-
was bypassed by the German first thrust attack forged ahead; Company A and the
to Walsdorf. This crossroads village lay medium tanks came to the edge of Longs-
athwart the main road leading west from dorf and Company B occupied the high
the Roth bridgehead and furnished ob- ground between that village and Tan-
servation for the American batteries del.3
firing on the crossing site. About 1100, 3During the advance by Company A, ad Lt.
218 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

While the American counterattack talion, but the latter still blocked the
pushed in against the south flank of the Sauer valley road and the direct ap-
915th that regiment continued to work proach to Diekirch and the Ettelbruck
its way southwest through the darkness, bridges.
establishing an advance position on the The 109th Infantry had held its posi-
ridge overlooking Bastendorf. The ex- tions in this first day, and Rudder saw no
sailors who comprised this regiment had cause for alarm since he occupied good
moved fast and gained ground, but their terrain. The hard fact remained that the
commander had been wounded, their German infantry, masked by the acci-
flanks were open, and communications dents of the rugged Our country, had
with the rest of the 352d were uncertain. achieved considerable success in exploit-
In fact this leading contingent of the ing the gaps between the village strong-
915th had shot its bolt and for the next points. Also, the German armored ve-
couple of days would take little part in hicles and heavy weapons, which had
the battle. Nonetheless the Seventh been observed just at dark assembling
Army commander was well pleased with across the river facing Führen, had yet to
the advance made by his right wing. be encountered. T h e 109th commander,
T h e 916th Regiment found the going under orders from General Cota that
much more difficult than its northern sis- “nobody comes back,” now had to re-
ter regiment. Its opponent, the 3d Bat- store contact between his companies and
talion, was deployed on what for this get his regiment in position to meet the
sector was a narrow front, well dug in on next enemy move. T h e regiment could
the heights overlooking the Our and expect little aid, for most of the slim
with its right flank protected by the reserves of the 28th Division would go
Sauer. The initial German assault near to the hard-pressed 110th Infantry in the
Hosdorf had provided the 109th with the center. But the 109th had one paramount
first confirmation of an enemy advance advantage in that the solid anchoring of
west of the Our, but accomplished little its right flank on the natural barrier pro-
else. From excellent observation on the vided by the Sauer permitted some free-
heights the 107th and 108th Field Artil- dom to concentrate on restoring the situ-
lery Battalions brought the howitzers ation to the left. Colonel Rudder’s
positioned near Diekirch into play, pin- reserves consisted of Company A, 103d
ning the German shock troops to the Engineer Battalion; Company C, 707th
river bank where they remained for the Tank Battalion; the towed 3-inch guns
rest of the day. True, one arm of the of Company A, 630th Tank Destroyer
352d was reaching north of the 3d Bat- Battalion; and his regimental antitank
company. By midnight a platoon of en-
gineers and some tank destroyers were
Samuel Leo silenced two enemy machine guns moving up to reinforce the attack
with grenades and killed five Germans with his
rifle. He was given the DSC. On this day Pvt. through Longsdorf to relieve the com-
J. W. Jones made a lone attack upon a machine pany at Führen. An additional tank
gun which was firing directly at him; he destroyed platoon was ready to add weight to a
the weapon and its crew but then was cut down
by a second machine gun. Jones was awarded the second thrust toward Fuhren by way of
DSC. Tandel.
ATTACK BY GERMAN LEFT WING: 16–20 DECEMBER 219

At 0240 on the morning of 17 Decem- fenders held on against infantry attack


ber the division commander phoned from the west and German assault
Colonel Rudder and made an unex- guns attacking from the north on the
pected demand on his reserves. What Skyline Drive. Finally, about 1530, the
had happened was this. On the pre- Hoscheid garrison received orders to
vious evening the force from the 5th fight its way out and join the relief
Parachute Division which had been mov- force. These orders came too late, for
ing along the boundary between the an hour and a half earlier this task force
109th and 110th reached the primary had been ordered to the aid of a bat-
ridge road (known to the Americans as tery of the 107th Field Artillery north
the Skyline Drive) which extended lat- of Diekirch. In Hoscheid the tanks were
erally across the 28th Division sector running low on ammunition. When
from Weiswampach to Ettelbruck. T h e night fell they loaded on the foot soldiers
5th Parachute had rafted some light field and made a dash south to the 687th
pieces and vehicles over the Our and a Field Artillery command post at Lipper-
few self-propelled guns that had negoti- scheid, where they found that the bat-
ated a way across on top of a weir near teries were in process of displacing
Vianden were sent down the road to across the Wiltz River. T h e Hoscheid de-
Hoscheid. Meanwhile the left battalion fenders joined the withdrawal westward
of the 14th Regiment had been ordered and subsequently reached the town of
to take Hoscheid. This movement in the Wiltz, there taking part in the defense
dark appeared to pose a threat to cut of the 28th Division command post. T h e
off the 109th with an attack straight fight at Hoscheid, German prisoners
south to Ettelbruck. later reported, had cost the assaulting
General Cota ordered the 109th com- battalion at least a hundred dead but,
mander to get a platoon of tanks, mount more, it had helped delay the 14th Para-
an infantry platoon on them, and “help chute Regiment advance to the Wiltz
out up north where things are getting River.
hot.” Rudder immediately dispatched In the 109th sector proper the battle
this force, plus a few engineers, north- during 17 December turned on attempts
ward on the Skyline Drive. In the mean- to relieve Company E (Capt. R. W.
time, however, the 2d Battalion of the Cureton) at the crossroads in Führen.
14th Parachute Regiment had cut the T h e enemy was determined to take this
road south of Hoscheid and the relief village, located as it was on the bound-
force was checked within a thousand ary between the 5th Parachute Division
yards of the village by enemy fire con- and the 352d Volks Grenadier Division.
centrated on a sharp bend in the road. Führen was attacked during the day by
Hoscheid was garrisoned by part of the troops of the 15th Parachute Regiment,
110th Infantry Antitank Company, six the 915th Regiment, and the 914th Reg-
medium tanks mounting 105-mm. iment. As might be expected there was
howitzers (which the 707th Tank Bat- little co-ordination in this assault; fur-
talion had organized as an assault gun thermore the Germans were forced to
platoon) and three regular mediums. divert much strength to meet the twin-
Through most of the 17th the de- pronged American counterattack mov-
220 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

ing on Fuhren from the south. At day- this while Company E had been under
break Company A and its tank platoon attack in Fuhren, but with its own fire
resumed attempts 10 break through greatly thickened by accurate artillery
Longsdorf and open the road to Fuhren, concentrations the company held the en-
but by 0845 mortar and machine gun emy at bay. Late in the day Company
fire had pinned down the infantry five E radioed for ammunition and rations.
hundred yards short of Longsdorf. Com- Colonel Rudder ordered a patrol sent
pany B, now missing the platoon sent from Tandel under cover of night to
with the Moscheid task force, moved a bring ammunition, but it failed to reach
short distance along the road between Fuhren.
Tandel and Fuhren but likewise was At other points the enemy strength
checked. The commander of Company increased as the day wore on. T h e 352d
C, 707th Tank Battalion, took two of his Volks Grenadier Division succeeded in
tanks from Longsdorf to aid the infantry crossing a few tanks and assault guns,
beyond Tandel, but a strong German as well as more light artillery. With
patrol slipped through a draw lying be- these heavy weapons the advance guard
tween Companies A and B and am- of the reserve regiment, the 914th, ap-
bushed the tanks. peared on the west bank to take a hand
This German force, finally amounting in the fight. On the north flank of the
to a battalion of infantry and two tanks, 109th Infantry a tank platoon attack east
moved south during the morning until of Brandenburg had restored the con-
it met the 109th Antitank Company, nection between Companies F and G
which was dug in with a few engineers early in the morning. But as the day
and a single 40-mm. Bofors where the wore on German infantry and assault
Tandel and Longsdorf roads met. T h e guns poured into the Our bridgehead
American 57-mm. antitank guns scored and across the open flanks of the two
“many hits” on the German tanks, but companies. Company F knocked out two
as usual without effect, and two of the assault guns in a 5th Parachute column
guns were lost. T h e enemy infantry with bazooka fire. Near Brandenburg
proved more vulnerable, twenty-five be- the American tank platoon destroyed
ing captured and a large number killed. four assault guns belonging to the 352d.
Although the penetration was But the German march to the west con-
checked, the dual attempt to relieve tinued.
Fuhren made no headway. On the east In the 3d Battalion sector, on the ex-
road Company A dwindled under bitter treme right flank, the enemy achieved
fire. By midafternoon it numbered only little success during the day and Ger-
twenty-five men and an artillery ob- man reports speak of “bloody fighting.”
server commander as the single officer Having failed to take the heights by
left. Company B again started up the frontal assault, the 916th Regiment
Tandel-Fuhren road, but the Germans started a flanking attack along the south
swept the road with bazooka and burp bank of the Sauer, moving for this pur-
gun fire from the ridges on either side pose into the zone of the 276th Volks
forcing the company to withdraw to Grenadier Division, which thus far had
Tandel and ask for more infantry. All been held in check around Reisdorf and
ATTACK BY GERMAN LEFT WING: 16–20 DECEMBER 221

Bigelbach. Although there were no but the other fought its way north to
American troops in the Sauer valley, the beleaguered batteries. Lt. Col. James
observers on the heights were able to C. Rosborough, commanding officer of
follow every move of the 916th. One the 107th Field Artillery, meanwhile
infantry officer, 1st Lt. E. L. Peer, gathered a scratch force and with it
Company L, adjusted the fire of the sup- fought through to the howitzer posi-
porting howitzers “so effectively that an tions. (Rosborough was awarded the Dis-
estimated enemy infantry battalion was tinguished Service Cross for gallantry in
destroyed.” With good wire and radio this action.) About the same time the
communication, excellent observation tanks which had been in the Hoscheid
and a wealth of targets, the two artillery task force were ordered into the fight
battalions were able to fire 3,123 rounds and rolled from the north in on the
on 17 December, contributing particular- enemy. T h e batteries were saved, but
ly to the defense of Fuhren and the the positions from which the gunners
checkmate of the flanking movement by had given such heartening support to
the 916th. the 109th were no longer tenable.
As the day progressed, however, the At the close of the second day the
enemy spread through the rear areas 109th still was holding tenaciously but
of the 109th and menaced the gun posi- against increasingly heavy attack. All its
tions west of the Diekirch-Hoscheid reserves were committed, and the larger
road. Battery A, 107th Field Artillery, part of the attached company from the
for example, had been harassed by fire 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion had
from small groups of Germans since been called away to defend the 28th Di-
the previous midnight. By midafternoon vision command post at Wiltz. T h e gap
the 2d Battalion of the 915th Regiment, between the 2d and 3d Battalions in the
which had bypassed Bastendorf earlier, Longsdorf-Fuhren area had been
was pressing in on that battery and Bat- widened while the enemy column in the
tery A, 108th Field Artillery, em- north had driven deep between the
placed nearby. T h e gunners, fighting as 109th and 110th.
infantry, first beat off the approaching T h e German attacks suddenly gained
Germans while a neighboring battery strength on the night of 17 December.
blasted the woods east of the road in For two days the 5th Parachute Divi-
which the enemy assembled. sion had operated with only such
Hard pressed as the day wore on, the heavy weapons as could be ferried
gunners were relieved by a series of across the Our or maneuvered over the
friendly sorties. Two motor carriages Vianden wier, because for two days trou-
mounting quadruple .50-caliber machine ble had dogged the bridge builders at
guns (the M16) from the 447th Anti- Roth. T h e selection of this particular
aircraft Artillery Battalion were put on site had been forced upon the German
the Diekirch-Hoscheid road. One was commander because it was the only point
crippled by enemy fire, its driver and at which the river had moderate banks
loader wounded by a rifle grenade when that could be reached by a passable ap-
it drove squarely into the files of Ger- proach road. On the east side of the
man infantry on the road, guns blazing: river. however, American bombers had
222 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

left a large bomb crater in the road bridge, but the labor brigade never ap-
close to the Our. N o work could be done peared. A wooden support bridge was
to fill the crater until the attack actually finished at Gentingen late on 17 De-
began on 16 December. Bridging equip- cember, but the transfer of artillery and
ment promised by the Seventh Army motor vehicles would be very slow and
had arrived late and inexperienced en- only a portion of the division’s heavy
gineers had further delayed the con- weapons were west of the river by the
struction. American artillery and mortar next morning.
fire also played its part in harassing the Troops of the 914th Regiment had
bridge builders. arrived in the bridgehead late in the
Finally, in the early evening of 17 day with orders to form a link between
December, the bridge was completed, the 915th and 916th, now widely sep-
and the bulk of the assault gun brigade, arated, and to mop up the pockets of
the antitank battalion, and the vehicles American resistance wherever found.
of the 15th Parachute Regiment began But there was no contact between the
to roll, the division artillery and trains three German regiments when daylight
lining up to await their turn. T h e 14th ended. T h e chief problem, however, was
Parachute Regiment, badly disorganized not so much that of establishing a homo-
in the series of village fights at Hoscheid geneous front as of jarring the Americans
and elsewhere, was pulled together and loose from the heights at the Sauer-Our
sent marching to the Clerf River. Here, triangle. T h e defenders at this point
during the night, the 14th made a cross- not only had stopped the left regiment
ing near Kautenbach, opening the way of the 352d Volks Grenadier Division
to Wiltz and the west for the main forces but also had helped check the right reg-
of the division. T h e higher German iment of the neighboring 276th Volks
headquarters no longer expected any Grenadier Division by laying fire across
concerted resistance in front of the 5th the Sauer valley.
Parachute Division and attached its im- Resupply and evacuation were the
mediate reserve, the 13th Parachute chief concern of the 109th Infantry on
Regiment, to the neighboring division the night of 17–18 December, particu-
on the south. larly the problem of getting ammuni-
This division, the 352d Volks Gren- tion to the tanks and Companies E and
adier, also had met obstacles at the Our F. Carrying parties were used and tanks
River. Bridge work at Gentingen went employed to bring up supplies and evac-
badly on the first day. Men and matériel uate the wounded. T h e 2d Platoon of
were lost when American howitzers and the 707th’s Company C, supporting
mortars found the range. Handling Companies F and G of the 109th, was
bridge sections in the swift current and refueled and resupplied during the
on the muddy river bottom was difficult night. But the 1st and 3d Platoons could
enough without this steady fire. T h e not be reached because of enemy patrol
approach roads on both sides of the river activity.
were steep, curved, and mud slick. T h e When day broke on 18 December the
352d had been promised a Todt Bri- 109th Infantry was no longer in contact
gade for work on the roads and at the with its northern foe, the 5th Parachute
ATTACK BY GERMAN LEFT WING: 16–20 DECEMBER 223

Division, because this division, under indirect fire by a forward observer from
peremptory orders from its commander, the 107th Field Artillery Battalion. T h e
had continued the westward advance remnants of Company A joined the reg-
through the night, the forward troops imental antitank company at road junc-
defiling into the Kautenbach bridge- tion 206, the avenue by which enemy
head. The 352d Volks Grenadier Divi- vehicles had to move to cut the supply
sion was still on hand; it was approach- road to the 3d Battalion, with orders
ing full strength west of the Our and for to “hold that road.” But in the north
the first time could employ a number there was no longer any question that
of its heavier supporting weapons in Companies F and G could hold on, iso-
the attack. At dawn the 916th Regiment lated as they were, along the road be-
launched the strongest assault yet lev- yond Bastendorf. About 0900 the divi-
eled at the 3d Battalion position on the sion chief of staff gave Colonel Rudder
109th right flank, striking hard under permission to withdraw the two com-
cover of smoke to break through at the panies for use as a reserve. Under cover
left of the battalion northwest of Hos- of the attached tank platoon roadblock
dorf. Early in the assault a platoon from at Bastendorf the companies fell back
Company K was captured when its am- to Diekirch.
munition gave out. Company E, which During the afternoon the situation of
had served to deflect some pressure from the 109th Infantry rapidly deteriorated.
the 3d Battalion by its stubborn defense At 1300 two Mark VI tanks appeared
at Führen, was no longer in the fight. on the Longsdorf road and with infantry
No word had come from Führen since assistance attacked the vital road junc-
2300 the previous evening. Company B, tion 206. In the fight that followed the
sent up the Tandel road to reach Führen, antitank company lost all six of its re-
had paused at about the same hour maining 57-mm. guns, one of the three
only a short distance from the village.4 tanks left with Company A was knocked
T h e next morning a patrol with a tank out by a direct hit, and a breakthrough
and a jeep reached the edge of Fuhren, threatened momentarily. At 1410, while
but found the company command post the fight was in progress Colonel Rudder
burned and no sign of American troops. asked for and received permission to pull
T h e loss of Company E and the pla- his regiment together on the high ground
toon from Company K made the 3d Bat- around Diekirch; this withdrawal, how-
talion position precarious. Meanwhile ever, already was in progress. Forty tons
the twenty-five men left in Company A of supplies and the hospital units were
had withdrawn from the Longsdorf road moved first. At 1300 the tank platoon
under cover of indirect fire laid down at the battery positions on the Hoscheid
by two tanks which formed a rear guard. road hooked up the artillery pieces and
T h e tankers were shown how to give started south. By then the 2d Battalion
was moving from Bastendorf, under
4T h e 109th Infantry AAR says of this incident: small arms fire “from all directions.”
“It is believed that if Company B had been more The 3d Battalion, last out, made its way
aggressive in their attack to Fouhren [Fuhren],
they could have relieved the pressure on Company
west along the Bettendorf road, which
E, permitting them to conduct a withdrawal.” already was under fire. During the late
224 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

evening the assembly of the regiment at tenance. But in these three days the reg-
Diekirch was completed, the 3d Battal- iment had held the enemy short of
ion and engineers blowing the bridges the Ettelbruck crossing and prevented
at Bettendorf over which the enemy the planned concentration of the 352d
might pass to the south bank of the Volks Grenadier Division south of the
Sauer. With the river momentarily se- Sauer. That the 109th had used every
cure at its back the regiment dug in weapon at its disposal is shown by the
along an arc facing out from Diekirch. ammunition expenditure for these days:
But the 109th was no longer strong 280,000 rounds of small arms ammuni-
enough to man a continuous defensive tion, 5,000 rounds of mortar, 3,000 gre-
line. Five hundred officers and men had nades, and 300 bazooka rounds. That
been lost in the three-day battle; of the the 109th had disrupted the German
heavy infantry weapons only one section plans is witnessed by the fact that the
of 81-mm. mortars and four sections of commander of the 352d was unable to
heavy machine guns were left; the anti- get his division in hand until 19 De-
tank company had no pieces; the tank cember, while the attack in force could
company badly needed fuel and main- not be resumed until 20 December.

ETTELBRUCK
ATTACK BY GERMAN LEFT WING: 16–20 DECEMBER 225

The 109th Infantry, however, had cut off and surrounded, and suggested
been forced back fanwise away from the that he should pull his regiment back
rest of the 28th Division. Its closest to the southwest across the Sauer to cover
friendly forces were those of CCA, 9th the left flank of the 9th Armored Divi-
Armored Division, now south and east sion. General Cota agreed that a further
of the 109th across the Sauer. Colonel withdrawal could be made but in-
Rudder, still under orders to fight for structed Rudder to stay in his own zone
time and space, was enjoined by General of action, that is, to make a withdrawal
Cota on the morning of 19 December to the west.
“not to recoil any further than the Sure Fifteen minutes later the 28th Divi-
[Sauer] River.” The 109th, fortunately, sion commander got in touch with
was given a few hours to rest and better General Middleton, the VIII Corps com-
its defenses before the enemy continued mander, and presented the alternatives
the advance to wipe out the Diekirch- now facing the 109th Infantry. T h e
Ettelbruck bridgehead. 109th “could fight it out . . . and that
Early in the afternoon German guns would be the end”; the regiment could
opened up on the Diekirch positions tie in closely with the 9th Armored force
(the artillery regiment of the 352d had and withdraw to the south; or the 109th
just come into position west of the Our), and the 9th Armored force could be
and those elements of the 915th and pulled back toward Bastogne. General
916th Regiments which the 352d com- Middleton had just finished speaking
mander could personally gather were to Maj. Gen. John W. Leonard, the 9th
thrown into a series of piecemeal as- Armored commander, and had promised
saults. For two hours the fight went back a battalion from the incoming 80th In-
and forth,5 involving the 2d Battalion fantry Division to fill the gap between
on the Diekirch-Hoscheid road and Leonard and Rudder. (General Brad-
the 3d Battalion aligned on the ridge ley or Maj. Gen. William H. H. Morris,
east of Diekirch. Schmidt, the German Jr., the provisional corps commander,
division commander, tried to lead later canceled this move so as to keep
his troops forward and was seriously the 80th together.) Middleton therefore
wounded. When night came the fight told Cota that the 109th was to hold,
flared up once more, small groups of but if forced back it should retire to the
the enemy probing for weak points while west behind the Alzette, a stream line
artillery fire and searchlights were em- directly south of Ettelbruck. These
ployed to guide the attack and distract orders were passed on to the 109th. How-
the defenders. Colonel Rudder phoned ever the final instructions to Rudder rec-
the 28th Division chief of staff about ognized the need for reliance on the
2 0 0 0 , told him that the 109th might be commander on the ground; he was to
“act according to the situation.” In point
5 When the antitank company was forced to pull
back to a new position, Capt. Paul F. Gaynor re- of fact the 109th already was on the
mained alone to cover the withdrawal. He killed march west through Ettelbruck.
eight Germans with his carbine, wounded several General Leonard still expected that the
ochers, then made a dash under fire across open
ground and rejoined his company. He was awarded 109th would fall back to the south and
the DSC. join the 9th Armored (the 109th was
226 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

not yet under his command), but Rud- the 19th brought the people of Die-
der was in contact with the enemy and kirch out of their cellars and into the
could not risk the disorganization at- streets. They were particularly apprehen-
tendant on a change in plans at this sive because members of the local gen-
point. darmerie had fought alongside the
T h e withdrawal itself was a success, Americans and taken a score of German
despite the intense interdiction fire laid prisoners who now were housed in the
down by the Germans, fire that cost local jail. Finally it was agreed that the
thirty-four casualties from shelling alone. civil population would evacuate the town
T h e 107th and 108th Field Artillery Bat- at midnight on the 19th following the
talions, emplaced near Bissen, answered main troop movement. So, in freezing
the enemy guns and gave what protec- cold, some three thousand men, women,
tion they could to the marching infantry. and children set out on the road to
Engineer parties laid mines on the main Mersch, leaving behind four hundred
roads and blew the last bridges at Die- of the townspeople who refused to aban-
kirch. The rear guard, formed from don aged relatives or property. 6
the attached tank company, stayed on in All during the day of the 20th the
Diekirch, where the first platoon cap- 109th Infantry was out of touch with the
tured 107 prisoners. By midnight the 1st enemy. T h e 352d Volks Grenadier Divi-
and 3d Battalions were west of the Al- sion had assembled two of its regiments
zette, strung along the west-reaching west of Bastendorf during the previous
line of hills which began just south of night, leaving the 916th Regiment to
Ettelbruck and anchored near Grosbous. occupy Diekirch as the Americans left.
Here the 109th faced north, forming the Strict orders had arrived from the Sev-
westernmost segment of the still firm enth Army headquarters, located at In-
south shoulder of the VIII Corps line. gendorf (a little village southwest of
General Leonard ordered the 2d Bat- Bitburg), that the 352d must start the
talion, reduced to half strength, over to attack rolling once more and take posses-
the east side of the Alzette to offer some sion of the vital crossings at Ettelbruck.
infantry protection for the 9th Armored T o make success certain, General
tanks in the Stegen-Ermsdorf area. In Brandenberger, the Seventh Army com-
Ettelbruck demolition parties remained mander, sent army artillery and rocket
at work until the morning of 20 Decem- projectors to join the 352d artillery bat-
ber; then they withdrew, blowing the talions in creating an “artillery center
bridges behind them. of gravity” at Bastendorf. T h e short-
The troop withdrawal from Diekirch age of bridging equipment continued to
was followed by a mass exodus of the plague the Seventh Army, but Branden-
civilian population. When the Germans berger’s staff scraped together an im-
first shelled the town on 16 December, promptu bridge train and started it to-
the citizenry had started to leave Die-
kirch but had been halted by American 6This story is given in Rapport sur L’activité
officers and local officials so as to keep de la Gendarmerie Grand-Ducale lors d u bom-
bardment et de L’evacuation de la ville de Die-
the supply roads open to the 109th. kirch, provided the author by the Luxembourg
Rumors of the American withdrawal on liaison officer at Headquarters, SHAPE.
ATTACK BY GERMAN LEFT WING: 16–20 DECEMBER 227

CAVEREFUGEFOR CIVILIANS

ward Ettelbruck. Fortunately for the envelop the open American flank from
Seventh Army drivers, gunners, and pon- the left.
toneers, the skies remained overcast and
the columns moved freely along the Elements of the 9th Armored
roads. At Diekirch the 916th Regiment Division Battle at the Sauer
found that one bridge had escaped com- 16–20 December
plete destruction and could bear infantry
and single heavy weapons; so the regi- Only six days prior to the German
ment moved across the Sauer, its inten- attack, troops of the 9th Armored Divi-
tion to take Ettelbruck from the rear. sion (General Leonard) had been as-
The German center, and the bridge signed a 3-mile sector on the VIII Corps
train, converged on Ettelbruck. Mean- front between the 28th Infantry Divi-
while part of the 352d Volks Granadier sion and the 4th Infantry Division. This
Division crossed the north-south branch sector fronted on the Sauer River south
of the Sauer and marched west to the of the junction with the Our and earlier
Wark Creek, apparently intending to had been held by a battalion of the 109th
228 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Infantry. T h e bulk of the 9th Armored talion secure no combat experience what-
Division, a unit with no prior battle ever. He need not have worried.
experience, was held in the west as the Across the river a fresh German Divi-
VIII Corps reserve, but just before the sion, the 276th Volks Grenadier (Gen-
German attack CCB was transferred to eralleutnant Kurt Moehring) , had just
V Corps. The new sector was manned come in from Poland and was dispersed
by the 60th Armored Infantry Battalion in the little Eifel villages between Ech-
(Lt. Col. Kenneth W. Collins), sup- ternach and Bitburg. Units of the 276th
ported by the 3d Armored Field Artil- were moved frequently in the week be-
lery Battalión at Haller. As was custom- fore the attack, companies exchanging
ary the armored infantry had been billets to mislead both the local pop-
placed in line in this quiet sector for ulace and the American intelligence.
combat indoctrination, and in the first Finally, in two night marches the divi-
few days the Germans on the opposite sion concentrated on the east bank of
bank of the Sauer showed so little in- the Sauer, its zone of attack defined in
clination to disturb the prevailing quiet the north by Wallendorf (at the junction
that Collins was concerned lest his bat- of the Our and the Sauer) and in the

WALLENDORF,
VIEWED
FROMREISDORF
on the western side of the Sauer River.
ATTACK BY GERMAN LEFT WING: 16–20 DECEMBER 229

south by Bollendorf. T h e 276th Volks as Mersch and the area north of Luxem-
Grenadier Division, then, generally bourg. This last maneuver, however,
faced the 60th Armored Infantry Bat- was not a mandatory part of the Seventh
talion, but it should be noticed that the Army plan.
tortuous gorge of the Schwarz Erntz lay On the morning of the attack the
in the zone of the 276th and would be LXXX Corps artillery broke the long
used to gain entry to the left flank and quiet on the Sauer River as six bat-
rear of the 4th Infantry Division. talions and a rocket projector brigade
Moehring’s division had been recon- divided their fire to reinforce the divi-
stituted during the autumn following sional artillery of the 276th and 212th.
almost complete destruction in Nor- T h e initial concentration in the 9th
mandy and the retreat across France. Armored Division (-) sector, estimated
Rebuilt around wounded veterans who by the Americans at about a thousand
had returned from the hospitals, the rounds, was aimed principally at Beau-
division was fairly young in terms of the fort, the largest town in this area, and
conscription classes it represented and the batteries around Haller. Damage
was at full strength when it moved west was not extensive but the forward tele-
from Poland. T h e 276th, however, phone lines were shot out. T h e thick
could not count on accompanying gun fog and early morning darkness must
support for its infantry since no assault have been as much a problem to the
guns had been supplied. In addition the German assault units as to the American
divisional artillery and train were horse- observers looking out toward the river.
drawn. In the Seventh Army plan this In any case there was considerable con-
division formed the right wing of the fusion and delay on the east bank, and
LXXX Corps. The 276th Volks Gren- few or none of the rubber assault boats
adier Division, which with the 212th landed on the American side before 0630.
Volks Grenadier Division constituted Once across, the German assault troops
this corps, had no distant objective such moved rapidly u p the draws, masked
as those assigned the Fifth Panzer Army from view by the fog and the heavy
formations on its right. T h e only definite woods.
mission given the 276th was to gain the T h e main crossing was made by the
high ground across the Sauer, dislocate 986th Regiment near Wallendorf. Part
the American artillery positions around of one battalion circled into the sharp
Haller, and form the western extension valley where the Our and Sauer meet,
of the blocking line which the LXXX intending to seize Hill 402 (southwest
Corps was to present to any American of Bigelbach) , which offered the best
thrust aimed at the southern pivot of observation in the vicinity. These troops
the great counteroffensive. Once the succeeded in wiping out a squad of
western Sauer heights between Wallen- armored infantry that had been sta-
dorf and Bollendorf were in hand, the tioned to watch the valley, but soon
advance of the 276th would turn toward mortar and machine gun fire from the
the southwest, moving alongside the 3d Battalion, 109th Infantry, watching
212th. In case the opportunity offered, from the heights north of the Our,
advance contingents might push as far stopped the Germans in their tracks.
230 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE

T h e second battalion of the 986th moved combat command, Leonard’s reserves


cautiously up the draws and ravines to- consisted of one tank battalion (the
ward Bigelbach. This village lay on a 19th) , a company from the divisional
slope and had not been occupied, al- engineers, a battery from the 482d Air-
though American patrols moved in now craft Artillery Battalion, most of the
and then at night to check suspicious 89th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron,
lights. As a result the 986th was able to a company of self-propelled tank de-
report that it had made gains on its left stroyers, and two reconnaissance pla-
and “taken” Bigelbach. For some reason toons belonging to the 811th Tank De-
the Germans did not push on and Com- stroyer Battalion. These units would
pany C, holding the hills and crests fight as a combat command, although
south of Bigelbach, engaged them in a the sector was not turned over to Col.
desultory, long-range fire fight for the ‘Thomas L. Harrold and CCA head-
rest of the day. quarters until the next morning. One
T h e center German regiment, 988th, troop was taken from the cavalry and
made its crossings near Dillingen, aim- given to the 60th Armored Infantry Bat-
ing in the direction of Beaufort and talion; the armored cars moved forward
Haller. Here Company A was deployed and spent the night of 16–17 December
in the woods above the Sauer with ob- outposting Beaufort and patrolling the
servation on the river but with insuffi- road which ran from the town into the
cient strength to block the numerous Schwarz Erntz gorge.
ravines running up the wooded heights. This deep, thickly wooded gorge
By noon the attack threatened to over- posed a constant threat to both CCA
run the company and infiltration had and the 4th Infantry Division. As yet
taken place at several points, the German the enemy made no attempt to utilize
movements hidden by the dense pine. the natural sally port, but in the 4th
Colonel Collins committed Company B, Division sector German infantry sur-
in reserve at Beaufort, to attack through rounded Berdorf, which controlled a
Company A in an effort to restore the lateral road descending into the gorge.
position and drive the Germans back In the 9th Armored sector three lateral
over the Sauer. T h e reserve company draws debouched west from the gorge
ran up against units of the 988th which toward Haller, Waldbillig, and Christ-
had penetrated between the two forward nach. In the late afternoon Company A,
companies but moved fast and reached 19th Tank Battalion, joined the 12th
a position abreast of A and C. All this Infantry (4th Division) as a mobile
while the batteries around Haller had reserve in this area. Troop B, 89th
been shelling the enemy crossing points; Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, came
the cost to the Germans must have up to reinforce Company B, 811th Tank
been high, but they kept coming. Destroyer Battalion, whose 76-mm. self-
In midafternoon General Leonard propelled guns covered the Waldbillig
dipped into his reserves to support the and Christnach draws. T h e right flank
60th Armored Infantry Battalion. Since of the 9th Armored, although none too
the 9th Armored Division was in this secure, at least was outposted. During
sector with a force equivalent only to a the late afternoon the enemy, who ear-
ATTACK BY GERMAN LEFT WING: 16–20 DECEMBER 231

lier had been stopped on the left flank, mored cars counterattacked and cleared
worked closer in toward Reisdorf using the high ground north of Beaufort but
the cover of the woods. This threat as were unable to drive the Germans from
yet was not too serious, but the light the woods behind the isolated compa-
tank company of the 19th Tank Bat- nies. T h e enemy meanwhile bore in on
talion was dispatched north of Ermsdorf both flanks. On the south the 987th Reg-
to watch the road which angled from iment, thus far missing in American
Reisdorf behind the left flank of the identifications of the 276th Volks Gren-
position occupied by the 60th Armored adier Division, appeared during the
Infantry Battalion. morning. One of its battalions marched
T h e 276th Volks Grenadier Division unopposed through the Schwarz Erntz
had failed to seize control of the Sauer gorge and occupied Mullerthal, the
heights. Although assault parties had point at which narrow, wooded defiles
made successful penetrations in unde- led out to Waldbillig and Christnach in
fended sectors, some as deep as one and the 9th Armored (-) zone, and to Cons-
a half miles, stubbornly defended strong- dorf in the 4th Division rear.
points had checked any co-ordinated ad- About 1330 Troop B, 89th Cavalry
vance. T h e deeply incised terrain had Reconnaissance Squadron, and four tank
given tactical advantage, but this had destroyers from the 811th Tank De-
been canceled by communications fail- stroyer Battalion, launched a counter-
ures brought on by the poor perform- attack from Waldbillig to regain Muller-
ance of the German radio sets on the thal. T h e leading tank destroyer was set
deep-pocketed ground. Futhermore, the afire by a German Panzerfaust, effec-
276th lacked the artillery so necessary tively blocking the narrow road. T h e
for close infantry support in this type dismounted cavalry encountered accu-
of terrain and had been forced to parcel rate small arms fire as they attempted
its two howitzer battalions in small sec- to work ahead and the acting command-
tions along the east bank. On the whole er of Troop B was killed. T h e unseen
the Seventh A r m y command was far from enemy, firing behind the cover of huge
pleased by the day’s performance, press- boulders and trees, had the upper hand:
ing General Moehring to continue the at dark a platoon of cavalry assault guns
attack through the night. laid down a protective barrage and the
Infiltration tactics began to bear fruit American task force withdrew to the
as day came on 17 December. In the hills flanking the exit from the Wald-
center of the 9th Armored sector the billig-Müllerthal defile.
60th Armored Infantry Battalion head- German efforts to achieve a real pene-
quarters at Beaufort discovered that the tration on the left flank were less success-
enemy had cut in between the head- ful than on the right. Advance troops
quarters and the three companies of of the 2d Battalion, 986th Regiment,
armored infantry in the line.7 Six ar- worked their way through the crossfire
coming from the 109th Infantry and the
7 Companies A and C had no communications
with the battalion. During the night of the 16th
the two company commanders, Capt. John W. half-track loaded with rations and ammunition
Schalles and Capt. Roger L. Shinn, each got a and ran it through to the rifle line.
232 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

60th Armored Infantry Battalion and mained behind to block any German
briefly occupied Eppeldorf, only to be penetration through the cross-corridor of
run out by the light tanks based on the Schwarz Erntz which led past Haller
Ermsdorf. back into the Savelborn position. By
The chief German success on 17 De- midnight, then, the 9th Armored line
cember came at the close of day, with was re-forming, from Waldbillig (still
an attack by the 1st Battalion, 988th held by cavalry and tank destroyers) to
Regiment, on Beaufort. Here, during Ermsdorf, where the light tanks con-
daylight hours, the attackers had literal- tinued to patrol. Contact with the three
ly been “blown all over” (as American line companies was lost, but they fought
observers reported) by the howitzers fir- on in their original positions, under
ing from Savelborn and the guns on orders from the battalion commander to
three headquarters tanks. But at dark hold their ground. With company fronts
Germans seeped into the town from as- a mile wide, the fight became a series of
sembly points in the woods, only some squad actions as the enemy infantry
fifteen hundred yards distant, and am- filtered through and behind the Ameri-
bushed an 81-mm. mortar platoon when can “line.” Each attempt to re-lay a
this shifted to meet the assault. Colonel telephone wire or carry forward an am-
Collins ordered the headquarters of the munition case became a major tactical
60th Armored Infantry Battalion back effort.
to the motor park near Savelborn and Although the 276th Volks Grenadier
committed Troop A, 89th Cavalry Re- Division had driven a number of wedges
connaissance Squadron, to fight a rear into the 9th Armored sector during 17
guard action in Beaufort. The cavalry December, the Seventh Army command-
unit, led by Capt. Victor C. Leiker, held er was very dissatisfied with the divi-
on until 2030, by which time the Ger- sion performance. T h e 276th was still
man infantry controlled all the street hung up on the Sauer River. A part
corners, then fought its way south to of its infantry and nearly all supporting
Waldbillig. This rear guard stand cost heavy weapons remained on the east
Troop A 16 jeeps and 7 of its 12 armored bank waiting for a bridge to be com-
cars as well as 43 casualties. pleted at Wallendorf, where American
While the 60th Armored Infantry Bat- shells had smashed much equipment and
talion headquarters withdrew to Savel- killed many engineers. Brandenberger
born, the 3d Armored Field Artillery sent word to O B W E S T that a new
Battalion moved its batteries west from commander was needed for the 276th
Haller to the Savelborn-Medernach Division. But General Moehring did not
road. Despite continuous counterbattery live to greet his successor: en route in
fire, the gunners had given steady and his staff car from Beaufort to Muller-
effective support whenever called upon, thal he was killed by machine gun fire.
expending about 4,000 rounds during The fighting armored infantry had so
the two-day action. When the batteries successfully contained the German main
displaced, forty artillerymen, with four forces on 16 and 17 December that the
half-tracks, and Battery A of the 482d infiltrating units which first made head-
Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion re- way in the Beaufort area were relatively
ATTACK BY GERMAN LEFT WING: 16–20 DECEMBER 233

small. T h e 9th Armored intelligence mored Engineer Battalion (a part of


estimates set the enemy strength to be which was loaded in half-tracks) .
encountered here at approximately three T h e counterattack was to be made by
companies. Against this supposedly lim- two task forces. Task Force Hall (Capt.
ited force the CCA commander mustered John W. Hall) would lead from the
his remaining men, assault guns, and Savelborn assembly area north to Berens
armored vehicles for a counterattack to and then drive north to Company C
re-establish contact with the three iso- while the second task force, Task Force
lated companies “and drive the enemy Philbeck (Maj. Tommie M. Philbeck),
into the river.” Colonel Harrold’s avail- attacked to the east and northeast to
able force now included only Company reach the other two companies. Before
B, 19th Tank Battalion; a platoon of dawn on 18 December the I and R pla-
Company D’s light tanks; a cavalry as- toon started in its jeeps along the narrow
sault gun platoon; the I and R platoon road to Berens, reconnoitering in ad-
from the 60th; and Company A, 9th Ar- vance of the main column. Fire sud-

BELGIAN
WOMANSALVAGING
GRAINI N GUTTEDBARN
234 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

denly poured in from all sides, killing the light tanks beat off the Germans but
platoon commander and cutting the unit were forced to give u p their screening
to pieces in a matter of minutes. Task activities in this area. On the right flank
Force Hall, continuing the advance in Troop C of the cavalry made a dismount-
daylight, reached the thick Eselbour ed assault from Haller with the intention
woods, but there took the wrong turning of retaking Beaufort. T h e troopers were
at a crossroad. T h e light tanks, forming supported by six half-tracks from Com-
the advance guard, had moved only a few pany A, 482d Antiaircraft Artillery Bat-
hundred yards when the Germans talion, mounting the deadly quadruple
opened fire with bazookas, knocking out .50-caliber machine guns, but the half-
the lead tank and blocking the road. tracks found it impossible to maneuver
Captain Hall, the leader of this task in the heavy woods. T h e Germans ahead
force, was wounded but manned an as- laid down mortar fire; the cavalry were
sault gun and cleared the enemy from hard hit and could not maneuver, the
the road. He was awarded the Distin- half-tracks could not close with the Ger-
guished Service Cross. Shortly after noon man mortar crews, and the attack was
Task Force Philbeck passed through abandoned.8
Hall’s position, only to lose more tanks. In fact the American force was too
T h e Americans lost seven tanks before slight to hold the original position on
the order finally came to withdraw. the high ground north of Haller, and
T h e American setback had stemmed it withdrew to the new defensive po-
from the last act of General Moehring sition being formed by CCA as an after-
as commander of the 276th. Moehring math to the reverses suffered during the
had collected a battalion of the 986th day. In the course of this withdrawal
Regiment and an antitank company the armored field artillery batteries were
armed with fifty-four Panzerfausts for an hard beset and had to beat off the enemy
attack across the Savelborn-Ermsdorf at four hundred yards range. Two bat-
road to seize Medernach. During the teries actually took new firing positions
night of 17–18 December this force as- in front of the rifle line. After dark CCA
sembled in the cover of the Eselbour reorganized on a line running roughly
woods, waiting to jump off at dawn. northwest from Waldbillig to Ermsdorf,
There it lay, with perfect cover for close- thence west to the high ground around
in work with the bazooka, when the Stegen, the latter about two and a half
American advance began. Lacking suffi- miles south of Diekirch where the
cient infantry to clear the woods or de- 109th Infantry was in the process of
fend the tanks, the Americans had been assembly. T h e Germans finally had
unable to profit by their superority in opened the western Sauer valley and
heavy weapons. driven an entering wedge between the
T h e situation on the flanks in the CCA 9th Armored Division and the 109th In-
sector also was unfavorable to the Ameri- fantry. T h e gap between Stegen and
cans. At Ermsdorf, which had been the Diekirch could be closed to the enemy
linchpin on the northern flank, elements
8 Pfc. T. J. Zimmerer, an aid man, stayed be-
of the 1st Battalion, 986th Regiment, hind enemy lines for eleven days with a severely
brought up mortars and attacked. T h e wounded soldier. He was awarded the DSC.
ATTACK BY GERMAN LEFT WING: 16–20 DECEMBER 235

only by roadblocks and roving patrols, On the night of 18–19 December, the
but the Germans failed to follow up divisions on the right and left of the
their advantage on the night of 18–19 276th permitted artillery, some rocket
December. projectors, and supplies to move across
There was no longer thought of re- their bridges to the 276th. As yet the
lieving the three armored infantry com- company of assault guns which the
panies still behind the enemy lines. Colo- Seventh Army had promised was no-
nel Collins sent word to withdraw, via where in sight.
a radio which a forward observer from Colonel Dempwolff, taking stock of
the 3d Field Artillery Battalion had re- conditions in his new command, found
paired and by officers from the isolated that losses had been high (ascribed by
companies who previously had made the unit commanders to the continued
daring dashes by jeep through the Ger- absence of assault gun support) and that
mans to bring out wounded and carry spirits were low. He determined to con-
forward ammunition. During the next tinue the attack, nevertheless, this time
three days volunteers led back nearly using the newly arrived supporting
60 percent of the armored infantry, weapons to bring his left and center reg-
but the three-day fight had cost the 60th iments together in a co-ordinated thrust
an estimated 231 casualties.9 against Waldbillig, the anchor position
Across the lines the psychological lift for the south flank of the 9th Armored
which might have been given by the Division. On 19December, then, Demp-
appearance of the new commander, Col. wolff reorganized his regiments, moved
Hugo Dempwolff, and the successful at- artillery and rocket projectors forward,
tack against the 109th Infantry by the and gave his troops food and rest. At
352d Volks Grenadier Division, which Bollendorf his engineers finally com-
had finally shaken the 276th north flank pleted a bridge over the 40-yard-wide
loose, was offset by General Moehring’s river, lessening somewhat the pinch on
death and the failure to provide a bridge the 276th.
in the division bridgehead. So short was CCA took this much needed breath-
bridging equipment in the Seventh ing spell to prepare roadblocks and dem-
Army that the initial losses at Wallen- olitions in front of its new 7-mile-long
dorf could not be immediately replaced. main line of resistance. At best this posi-
tion amounted to a thin screen with nu-
9The 9th Armored Division never fought as a
merous gaps; so a slim reserve was creat-
complete division during the period covered by ed consisting of two engineer platoons
the present volume. As a result the 9th Armored and a dozen assault guns. During the
after action report and files are of little value in
tracing the action of one of its combat commands.
morning, contact with the Germans was
For the series of events described in this section lost. Patrols that went out to the front
the main sources are the combat interviews; the and flanks found nothing in the danger-
60th Armored Infantry Battalion AAR; the 9th
Armored Engineer Battalion AAR, which tells the
ous gap between Ermsdorf and Diekirch
very detailed story, by companies; the CCA AAR but drove off a German patrol which
and S–3 Jnl; the separate troop histories in the was moving south from Eppeldorf, not
89th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron AAR; and
the useful AAR of the 811th Tank Destroyer
west into the gap. At the right end of
Battalion. the American line patrols discovered a
236 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

large group of Germans in a farmhouse. Dempwolff was plagued by the thought


After a platoon of tank destroyers shelled of the widening gap between the 276th
the house, a volunteer squad of seven Volks Grenadier Division and the 352d
noncoms from Battery A, 48rd Antiair- Volks Grenadier Division. But he had a
craft Artillery Battalion, made the as- clear order from General Brandenber-
sault with Tommy guns and hand gre- ger: the 276th must contain as many
nades. A corporal killed three Germans American troops as possible. This mis-
with a blast from his Tommy gun, after sion in Dempwolff’s judgment required
he himself had been shot in the stomach, a continuation of the attack southwest-
and fifty-nine Germans gave up the fight. ward toward Waldbillig and Christnach
T h e 9th Armored Division could re- where American reinforcements already
port on the night of the 19th that the had arrived to help the 4th Infantry
situation on its right flank was satisfac- Division.
tory, and on the left flank too as far as Late on 19 December word reached
Stegen; beyond Stegen the situation was the 276th that its missing assault gun
“obscure.” General Leonard borrowed company had detrained at Trier. T h e
the 90th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squad- planned attack against the 9th Armored
ron (less three troops) from the 4th right flank was therefore postponed un-
Infantry Division zone, where a part of til the guns could reach the988th Regi-
its parent organization, the 10th Ar- ment, which had been assigned the main
mored Division, had initiated counterat- role. In midafternom on 2 0 December
tacks the previous day. But the gap be- the weapons remaining to the company,
tween the 9th Armored Division and the apparently not more than three or four,
109th Infantry was too large to be COY- joined the 988th at Haller and the at-
ered by a minimal cavalry screen. Worse, tack against Waldbillig commenced.
the gap widened during the evening as Twice the American 76-mm. tank de-
the 109th withdrew from Diekirch en stroyers and supporting batteries of the
route to the Ettelbruck-Grosbous line. 3d Field Artillery Battalion drove off
T h e compromise solution that moved the Germans. But when night fell Demp-
one much depleted battalion of the wolff brought the 987th Regiment
109th southeast to make contact at Ste- through Mullerthal and into the gorge
gen gave General Leonard’s tanks some running west to Waldbillig. Menaced
badly needed infantry protection but from two sides by superior strength, the
could hardly deflect any determined en- American tank destroyers and cavalry
emy thrust around the left flank of the were ordered to withdraw to the ridge
9th Armored Division. In this instance, south of the village.
however, the military axiom that a com- T h e capture of Waldbillig on 20 De-
mander who is worried about the enemy cember marked the high-water mark of
may reflect on the worries besetting the the 276th Volks Grenadier Division ad-
enemy commander, was proven by the vance. T h e division now had a bridge
event. While General Leonard voiced at Bollendorf, its weapons were west of
concern to his corps commander over the the Sauer, the division command post
gap between the 9th Armored Division had been moved across to Beaufort, and
(-) and the 109th Infantry, Colonel the center and left regiments had made
ATTACK BY GERMAN LEFT WING: 16–20 DECEMBER 237

contact at Waldbillig. T h e 276th, how- success more limited than that gained
ever, had paid heavily for the restricted by any other division in the Seventh
success achieved in the five days’ attack, Army.
CHAPTER X

The German Southern Shoulder


Is Jammed
In the first week of December the 4th Moselle until it touched the First and
Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. Raymond Third Army boundary just beyond the
O. Barton) left the VII Corpsafter a Luxembourg border. Of the three regi-
month of bloody operations in the Hurt- ments only the 12th Infantry (Col. Rob-
gen Forest. Having lost over 5,000 battle ert H. Chance) lay in the path of the
casualties and 2,500 nonbattle casualties projected German counteroffensive.1
from trench foot and exposure, the divi- (See M a p V.)
sion now had to be rebuilt to something As soon as it reached the quiet VIII
approaching its former combat effective- Corps area, the 4th Infantry Division
ness. It moved south to Luxembourg, began to send groups of its veterans on
“the quiet paradise for weary troops,” leave-to Paris, to Arlon in Belgium,
as one report names it, taking over the even a fortunate few to the United
83d Infantry Division positions on the States. Rotation in the line allowed
right flank of the VIII Corps (and First
Army) while the 83d occupied the old 1 Histories have been published for three of the
4th Division sector in the north. T h e units involved in the defense described in this
35-mile front assigned to the 4th Divi- section: Col. Gerden F. Johnson, History of the
Twelfth Infantry Regiment in World War II
sion conformed to the west bank of (Boston: National Fourth (Ivy) Division Associ-
the Sauer and Moselle Rivers. Across ation, 1947); History of the Eleventh Infantry
these rivers lay a heterogeneous collec- Regiment, Fifth Infantry Division (Baton Rouge:
Army and Navy Publishing Company, 1946); and
tion of German units whose lack of ac- Lester M. Nichols, Impact, The Battle Story of
tivity in past weeks promised the rest the the Tenth Armored Division (New York: Brad-
4th Division needed so badly. The divi- bury, Sales, O’Neill, 1954). The combat interviews
are excellent for the 4th Division, less useful for
sion completed its concentration within the 10th Armored. The 4th Division AAR pro-
the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg on the vides a good narrative but the division journals
are scanty. Of the regiments only the 12th In-
13th, its three regiments deployed as fantry has much information in its AAR and unit
they would be when the German attack journal. The AAR of the 70th Tank Battalion
came. T h e 12th Infantry was on the left can be used to flesh out much of the story. For
the participation of the 10th Armored troops, see
(next to the 9th Armored Division) the 10th Armored G–3 journal and the CCA
and fronting on the Sauer; the 8th In- AAR. An interesting account by a participant
fantry was in the center, deployed on will be found in Maj. Glenn W. Zarger’s manu-
script, Defense of Little Switzerland, prepared for
both the Sauer and Moselle; the 22d In- the Advanced Officers Class No. I, Armored
fantry reached to the right along the School, Fort Knox, Ky., 1 May 1948.
T H E GERMAN SOUTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 239

others a few hours in Luxembourg City, talion as a mobile reserve, capable of


ice cream in several flavors, well-watered moving on four-hour notice. Each regi-
beer, and the dubious pleasure of hear- ment, by standard practice on such a
ing accordionists squeeze out German wide front, had one of the division’s
waltzes and Yankee marching songs of 105-mm. howitzer battalions in direct
World War I vintage. Replacements, support. General support was provided
now by order named “reinforcements,” by the division’s own 155-mm. howitzer
joined the division, but by mid-Decem- battalion and two additional medium
ber the regiments still averaged five to battalions belonging to the 422d Field
six hundred men understrength. Infan- Artillery Group, but even this added
try replacements were particularly hard firepower did not permit the 4th Di-
to obtain and many rifle companies re- vision massed fire at any point on the
mained at no better than half strength. extended front. Mobile support was pro-
Equipment, which had been in use since vided by those tanks of the 70th Tank
the Normandy landings, was in poor con- Battalion which were operational, the
dition. A number of the divisional ve- self-propelled tank destroyers of the 803d
hicles had broken down en route to Tank Destroyer Battalion, and the
Luxembourg: a part of the artillery was towed tank destroyers of the 802d T h e
in divisional ordnance shops for repair. plans to utilize these positions were
When the Germans attacked, the 70th briefed by General Barton to his com-
Tank Battalion, attached to the 4th Di- manders on the 13th. Barton was appre-
vision, had only eleven of its fifty-four hensive that the enemy would attempt
medium tanks in running condition. a raid in force to seize Luxembourg City,
Neither the 83d Division, which the and in the battle beginning on the 16th
4th had relieved, nor any higher head- he would view Luxembourg City as the
quarters considered the Germans in this main German objective.
sector to be capable of making more Intelligence reports indicated that the
than local attacks or raids, and patrols 4th Division was confronted by the 212th
from the 4th Division found nothing to Volks Grenadier Division and miscella-
change this estimate. Even so General neous “fortress” units, deployed on a
Barton made careful disposition of his front equal to that held by the 4th. Un-
understrength and weary division, even til the night of 14 December this estimate
ordering the divisional rest camps, orig- was correct. As yet no American troops
inally back as far as Arlon, to be moved had had opportunity to try the mettle of
to sites forward of the regimental com- the 212th (Generalmajor Franz Sens-
mand posts. Since any static linear de- fuss) . After three years of campaigning
fense was out of the question because of on the Eastern Front the division had
the length of the front and the meander- been so badly shattered during with-
ing course of the two rivers, Barton in- drawals in the Lithuanian sector that
structed his regimental commanders to it was taken from the line and sent to
maintain only small forces at the river Poland, in September 1944, for over-
outpost line, holding the main strength, hauling. The replacements received,
generally separate companies, in the vil- mostly from upper Bavaria, were judged
lages nearby. Each regiment had one bat- better than the average although there
240 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

were many seventeen-year-olds. Unit regiments assembled behind a single bat-


commanders and noncommissioned offi- talion which acted as a screen along the
cers were good and experienced; morale Sauer between Bollendorf and Ralingen,
was high. Although the 212th was at the prospective zone of attack. On the
full strength it shared the endemic weak- final night (15-16 December) the divi-
nesses of the volks grenadier division: sion moved into the position for the
insufficient communications and fewer jump-off: the 423d on the right, north of
assault guns than provided by regulation Echternach; the 320th on the left, where
(only four were with the division on 16 the Sauer turned east of Echternach; and
December). the 316th in army reserve northeast of
Brandenberger rated the 212th as his the city. The long southern flank of the
best division. For this reason the 212th old 212th Volks Grenadier Division sec-
was assigned the mission of protecting tor had been drastically weakened to
the flank of the Seventh Army, just as permit the concentration at Echternach.
the latter was responsible for guarding Only two Festung battalions were left to
the flank of the forces in the main cover the twelve miles south to the
counteroffensive. More specifically, the boundary between the Seventh and
Seventh Army plans called for the 212th First Armies, but in this denuded sector
to attack over the Sauer on either side the Sauer and Moselle Rivers afforded
of Echternach, reach and hold the line a considerable natural defense.
of the Schlammbach, thus eliminating T h e Germans had excellent intelli-
the American artillery on the plateau gence of the 4th Infantry Division
in the Alttrier-Herborn-Mompach area, strength and positions. T h e Luxem-
and finally to contain as many additional bourg-German border was easily crossed,
American troops as possible by a thrust and despite the best efforts of the Amer-
toward Junglinster. Radio Luxembourg, ican Counter Intelligence Corps and the
the powerful station used for Allied local police the bars and restaurants in
propaganda broadcasts, was situated Luxembourg City provided valuable
near Junglinster. As in the case of the listening posts for German agents. It is
276th Volks Grenadier Division, there is likely that the enemy had spotted all the
no indication that the LXXX Corps ex- American outpost and artillery positions;
pected to send the 212th into Luxem- it is certain he knew that the 212th Volks
bourg City, although the Germans knew Grenadier Division would be opposed
that the 12th Army Group Headquarters only by the 12th Infantry during the
and the advance command post of the first assault phase.
Ninth Air Force were located there.
On the night of 13–14 December the T h e German Thrust Begins
212th commenced to strip its extended
front in concentration for its part in the When the German artillery opened up
counteroffensive. The 423d Regiment on the 12th Infantry at H-hour for the
made a forced march from the sector counteroffensive, the concentration fired
southwest of Trier and by daylight had on the company and battalion command
bivouacked on the right wing of the posts was accurate and effective. By day-
212th. T h e following night all three break all wire communication forward of
T H E GERMAN SOUTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 241

the battalions was severed. Many radios Regiment. T h e latter crossed east of
were in the repair shops, and those at Echternach, its first objective being the
outposts had a very limited range over series of hills north of Dickweiler and
the abrupt and broken terrain around Osweiler. Once in possession of these
Echternach and Berdorf, Luxembourg’s hills the 320th was to seize the two vil-
“Little Switzerland.” Throughout this lages, then drive on to join the 423d.
first day the 12th Infantry would fight General Barton had warned his regi-
with very poor communication. The ments at 0929 to be on the alert because
problem of regimental control and co- of activity reported to the north in the
ordination was heightened by the wide 28th Division area, intelligence con-
but necessary dispersion of its units on firmed by a phone call from General
an extended front and the tactical isola- Middleton. But the first word that the
tion in an area of wooded heights Germans were across the river reached
chopped by gorges and huge crevasses. the 12th Infantry command post in Jung-
In accordance with the division orders to linster at 1015, with a report from
hold back maximum reserves, the 12th Company F, in Berdorf, that a 15-man
Infantry had only five companies in the patrol had been seen approaching the
line, located in villages athwart the main village a half-hour earlier. At Berdorf
and secondary roads leading southwest most of Company F (1st Lt. John L.
from the Sauer River crossings to the in- Leake) had been on outpost duty at the
terior of the Grand Duchy. These vil- four observation posts fronting the river.
lages, at which the crucial engagements The company radio was back for repair
would be fought, were Berdorf, Echter- but each of the artillery observers, for-
nach, Lauterborn, Osweiler, and Dick- ward, had a radio. Either these sets failed
weiler. Actually, only a few men were to function or the outposts were sur-
stationed with the company command prised before a message could get out.
post in each village; the rifle platoons The 1st Battalion, 423d Regiment, over-
and weapon sections were dispersed in ran three of the outpost positions, cap-
outposts overlooking the Sauer, some of tured the company mortars, machine
them as far as 2 , 0 0 0 yards from their guns, and antitank guns sited in support
company headquarters. of the forward detachments, and moved
The leading companies of the two in on Berdorf. Outpost 2 at Birkelt
German assault regiments began crossing Farm, a mile and a half east of Berdorf,
the Sauer before dawn. Apparently the somehow escaped surprise. Here the 2d
crews manning the rubber boats had Platoon (with twenty-one men and two
trouble with the swift current, and artillery observers) held out in the stone
there were too few craft to accommodate farm buildings for four days and from
large detachments. The immediate ob- this position harassed the Germans mov-
jective of the northern regiment, the ing up the ravine road to Berdorf. Direct
423d, was the plateau on which stood assault failed to dislodge these Ameri-
the village of Berdorf; beyond this the cans, and the attempt was abandoned
regiment had orders to cut the road pending the arrival of heavy weapons
running west from Lauterborn and Ech- from across the river.
ternach and link forces with the 320th At Berdorf itself, Lieutenant Leake
242 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

gathered about sixty men in the Parc light, and almost all of the American
Hotel as the enemy closed in. The Parc outposts were able to fall back on the
was a three-storied reinforced concrete villages intact. Late in the morning two
resort hotel (indicated in the guide- enemy companies attacked Dickweiler,
books as having “confort moderne”) sur- defended by Company I, but were
rounded by open ground. Leake’s force beaten off by mortar fire, small arms,
had only one .50-caliber machine gun and a .50-caliber machine gun taken
and a BAR to reinforce the rifles in the from a half-track. T h e Germans with-
hands of the defenders, but the Germans drew to some woods about 800 yards to
were so discouraged by the reception the north, ending the action; apparently
given their initial sorties that their suc- the 320th was more concerned with get-
ceeding attempts to take the building ting its incoming troops through Echter-
were markedly half hearted. nach. Osweiler, west of Dickweiler, thus
Meanwhile the 7th Company, 423d far had seen no enemy.
Regiment, pushed forward to cut the With wire shot out, radios failing, and
Echternach-Lüxembourg road, the one outposts overrun, only a confused and
first-class highway in the 12th Infantry fragmentary picture of the scope and in-
sector. This company struck Lauterborn, tent of the attack was available in the
on the road a mile and a half southwest 4th Infantry Division headquarters. By
of Echternach, and cut off the Company noon, however, with Berdorf and Ech-
G outposts. By 1130 the remainder of ternach known to be under attack, Dick-
Company G, armed with rifles and one weiler hit in force, and Lauterborn re-
BAR, was surrounded but still fighting ported to be surrounded, it was clear that
at a mill just north of the village, while the Germans at the very least were en-
a platoon of the 2d Battalion weapons gaged in an extensive “reconnaissance in
company held on in a few buildings at force,” thus far confined to the 12th In-
the west edge of Lauterborn. Company fantry sector. Artillery, normally the
E, in Echternach, likewise was surprised first supporting weapon to be brought
but many of the outpost troops worked into play by the division, had very
their way back to a hat factory, on the limited effect at this stage. The field ar-
southwestern edge of the city, which had tillery battalions were widely dispersed
been organized as a strongpoint. The behind the various sections of the long
first German assault here did not strike 4th Division front; only fifteen pieces
until about 1100, although Echternach from the 42d Field Artillery Battalion
lay on low ground directly at the edge of and the regimental cannon company
the river. Attempts by the 320th Infan- were in range to help the 12th Infantry.
try to make a predawn crossing at Ech- The one liaison plane flying observation
ternach had been frustrated by the swift for the gunners (the other was shot up
current, and finally all the assault com- early on 16 December) reported that
panies were put over the Sauer at Edin- “the area was as full of targets as a pin-
gen, more than three miles downstream. ball machine,” but little could be done
This delay brought the advance troops about it. Radio communication, poor as
of the 320th onto the hills above Os- it was, had to serve, with the artillery
weiler and Dickweiler well after day- network handling most of the infantry
T H E GERMAN SOUTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 243

and command messages in addition to its wish to close with the tanks), but the
own calls for fire. T h e gunners neverthe- decision was made to dig in for the night
less began to get on the targets, and the alongside Company G rather than risk a
German infantry reported very punish- drive toward Echternach in the dark.
ing artillery fire during the afternoon. Companies A and G together now
At noon the picture of battle had totaled about a hundred officers and
sharper definition; so General Barton men.
authorized the 12th Infantry to commit Early in the afternoon Company B
the 1st Battalion (Lt. Col. Oma R. mounted five light and five medium
Bates), the regimental reserve. At the tanks and set out to reach Company F.
same time he gave Colonel Chance eight At the southern entrance to Berdorf,
medium tanks and ten light tanks, which is strung out along the plateau
leaving the 70th Tank Battalion (Lt. road for three-quarters of a mile, the re-
Col. Henry E. Davidson, Jr.) with only lief force ran into a part of the 1st Bat-
three mediums and a platoon of light talion, 423d Regiment, which opened
tanks in running order. Small tank-infan- bazooka fire from the houses. When
try teams quickly formed and went for- darkness fell the Americans still were
ward to relieve or reinforce the hard- held in check, and the infantry drew
pressed companies. Unfortunately rain back, with two tanks in support, and dug
and snow, during the days just past, had in for the night. T h e rest of the tanks
turned the countryside to mud, and the returned to Consdorf for gasoline and
tanks were bound to the roads. Later ammunition.
Barton phoned the corps commander to The morning situation in the sector
ask for reinforcements. Middleton had held by the 3d Battalion (Maj. Herman
nothing to offer but the 159th Engineer R. Rice, Jr.) had not seemed too press-
(Combat) Battalion, which was working ing. The 320th had not reached Osweiler
on the roads. He told Barton that if he and the first assault at Dickweiler had
could find the engineers he could use been repulsed handily. But Colonel
them. Chance sent out all of the usable tanks
Company A, mounted on a platoon of in Company B, 70th Tank battalion–a
light tanks, was ordered to open the total of three–to pick up a rifle squad
main road to Lauterborn and Echter- at the 3d Battalion command post (lo-
nach which supplied the 2d Battalion cated at Herborn) and clear the road to
(Maj. John W. Gorn) . This team fought Osweiler. When this little force reached
through some scattered opposition south- Osweiler, word had just come in that
west of Lauterborn, dropped off a rifle Dickweiler was threatened by another
platoon to hold Hill 313 (which com- assault. The tanks and riflemen pro-
manded the southern approach), and ceeded to run a 2,000-yard gauntlet of
moved through the village to the Com- bursting shells along the high, exposed
pany G command post, freeing twenty- road to Dickweiler (probably the enemy
five men who had been taken prisoner guns beyond the Sauer were firing inter-
in the morning. By nightfall the Ger- diction by the map).
mans had been driven back some dis- T h e little column came in on the flank
tance from Lauterborn (they showed no of the 2d Battalion, 320th Regiment,
244 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

which was in the process of moving two opposite the 12th Infantry and the ap-
companies forward in attack formation parent absence of enemy activity else-
across the open ground northwest of where on the division front, General
Dickweiler. The tanks opened fire on Barton began the process of regrouping
the German flank and rear, while all the to meet the attack. There was no guaran-
infantry weapons in the village blazed tee, however, that the enemy had com-
away. Thirty-five of the enemy, including mitted all his forces; the situation would
one company commander, surrendered; have to develop further before the 4th
the commander of the second company Division commander could draw heavily
was killed, as were at least fifty soldiers. on the two regiments not yet engaged.
Later the 4th Infantry Division historian The 2d Battalion of the 22d Infantry,
was able to write: “This German battal- in regimental reserve, was alerted to
ion is clearly traceable through the rest move by truck at daylight on 17 Decem-
of the operation, a beaten and ineffective ber to the 12th Infantry command post
unit.” at Junglinster, there to be joined by two
But the 320th Regiment, although tank platoons. T h e 9th Armored Divi-
badly shaken in its first attempts to take sion loaned a medium tank company
Dickweiler, was rapidly increasing the from the 19th Tank Battalion, also to
number of its troops in this area, spread- report to the 12th Infantry on the fol-
ing across the main road and encircling lowing morning. Three battalions of
the two villages. About an hour after 155’s and two batteries of 105-mm. how-
dark a message from the 3d Battalion itzers began the shift north to reinforce
reached the 12th Infantry command the fifteen howitzers supporting the 12th
post: “Situation desperate. L and I com- Infantry. And the division reserve, the
pletely surrounded.” Colonel Chance 4th Engineer Combat Battalion and
took Company C, the last troops of the 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop,
12th Infantry, and sent them to the 3d concentrated behind the 12th Infantry
Battalion command post for use on the lines. Most important, just before mid-
morrow. night the corps commander telephoned
The 12th Infantry had rigidly obeyed General Barton that a part of the 10th
the division commander’s order that Armored Division would leave Thion-
there should be “no retrograde move- ville, in the Third Army area, at day-
ment,” despite the fact that nine days break on 17 December. T h e prospect
earlier it had been rated “a badly deci- must have brightened considerably at
mated and weary regiment” and that on the 4th Division headquarters when the
16 December its rifle companies still promise of this reinforcement arrived.
were much understrength. The 42d T h e 4th Division would not be left to
Field Artillery Battalion in direct sup- fight it out alone.
port of the 12th, though forced to dis- On the second day of the battle both
place several times during the day be- sides committed more troops. As yet the
cause of accurate counterbattery fire, had 212th had no bridge, for the American
given the German infantry a severe artillery had shot out. the structure
jolting. erected on the 16th before it could be
In the face of the German build-up used. The 4th Division switched all local
T H E GERMAN SOUTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 245

reserves to the threatened left flank to the Osweiler-Dickweiler sector.


block further penetrations and to rein- About three hours before dawn, Gen-
force and relieve the garrison villages eral Barton, concerned over his left
in the north. T h e 212th Volks Grena- flank, dispatched the 4th Engineer Com-
dier Division took a shock company from bat Battalion and 4th Cavalry Recon-
the 316th Regiment, which was still held naissance Troop to Breitweiler, a small
in reserve under Seventh Army orders, village overlooking the wishbone ter-
and moved it into the fight. T h e division minus of the Schwarz Erntz gorge and
fusilier battalion was committed against the ganglia ravine roads which branched
the 12th Infantry center in an attempt thence into the 12th Infantry flank and
to drive a wedge through at Scheidgen rear. The Schwarz Erntz gorge lay with-
while a part of the 23d Festung Battal- in the 4th Infantry Division zone but in
ion crossed the Sauer near Girst to ex- fact provided a natural cleavage between
tend the left flank of the German attack. the 4th Division and the 9th Armored
During the night of 16 December Division. Both units would therefore be
searchlights had been brought down to involved in guarding the cross-corridors
the river opposite Echternach to aid the and ravines which stemmed from the
German engineers attempting to lay gorge itself. The advance of the 423d
spans on the six stone piers, sole relic Regiment across the Berdorf plateau on
of the ancient bridge from whose exit 16 December had reached the winding
the people of Echternach moved yearly defile leading down into the gorge west
in the “dancing procession” on the feast of Berdorf village, there wiping out a
of St. Willibrord. American shellfire squad of infantry and one 57-mm. anti-
finally drove the enemy away from the tank gun which had been placed here to
bank, necessitating a new effort in broad block the gorge road. When the 4th Divi-
daylight farther to the north. T h e enemy sion reserves arrived in Breitweiler on
infantry would outnumber the Ameri- the morning of 17 December the threat
cans opposing them in the combat area, of a flanking move through the gorge
but on 17 December the Germans in the was very real but the Americans had
bridgehead would meet a far greater time to dig in.
weight of artillery fire than they could At 0936 American observers reported
direct against the Americans and would a very large force moving along the
find it difficult to deal with American bottom of the gorge, and at 1044, “5
tanks. T h e superiority in tanks main- companies counted and still coming.”
tained by the 4th Infantry Division What had been seen were troops of the
throughout this operation would effec- 987th Regiment, the reserve regiment
tively checkmate the larger numbers of of the 276th Volks Grenadier Division,
the German infantry. then attacking in the 9th Armored Divi-
Fighting on 17 December took place sion sector. Company C, 70th Tank Bat-
along the axes of three principal German talion, now had eight tanks in running
penetrations: on the American left flank condition and these were hurried to
at Berdorf, Consdorf, and Mullerthal; in Breitweiler to reinforce the cavalry and
the center along the Echternach-Lauter- engineers. Two platoons from Company
born-Scheidgen road; and on the right in A, 19th Tank Battalion, which had just
246 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

BREITWEILER

arrived from the 9th Armored, the as- Müllerthal. Consdorf, the command post
sault gun and mortar platoons of the of the 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry, was
70th Tank Battalion, a battery of 105- left open to an attack from Müllerthal
mm. howitzers, the reconnaissance com- up the Hertgrund ravine. Major Gorn
pany of the 803d Tank Destroyer Battal- organized a hasty defense with a few
ion, and the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, cooks, MP’s, stragglers, and one tank, but
were hastily assembled in Colbet, a mile the blow did not fall. T h e 987th Regi-
and a half south of Müllerthal, and ment failed to emerge from the gorge
organized at 1104 as Task Force Luckett and even may have withdrawn from
(Col. James S. Luckett) . Mullerthal, after beating off the counter-
An hour earlier the tank destroyer attack launched there in the afternoon
reconnaissance company had begun a by elements of the 9th Armored Divi-
long-range fire fight but the German ad- sion.
vance guard, despite heavy shelling from The failure on the part of the 987th
three field artillery battalions and every to push past Mullerthal on 17 December
self-propelled piece which could be or to overflow from the gorge onto the
brought to bear, drove straight on to flanks of the two American units remains
T H E GERMAN SOUTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 247

a mystery. Possibly this failure is ex- the river.2


plained by the lack of heavy weapons In the central sector Companies A and
needed to blast a way up from the gorge G, with five light tanks, started from
bottom. Possibly the American artillery Lauterborn along the road to Echter-
and self-propelled guns had disorganized nach. T h e enemy here was in consider-
and disheartened the German infantry; able strength and had established
prisoners later reported that shell frag- observation posts on the ridges ringing
ments from the tree bursts in the bottom Lauterborn and bordering the road.
of the wooded gorge “sounded like fall- Heavy and accurate shellfire followed
ing apples” and caused heavy casualties. each American move. When the day
Whatever the reason, this enemy pene- ended the relief force had accomplished
tration went no further than Müllerthal. no more than consolidating a defensive
By early afternoon, however, a new position in Lauterborn. In Echternach
threat was looming in the Consdorf area, Company E, 12th Infantry, had occupied
this time from an enemy penetration on a two-block strongpoint from which it
the right along the Scheidgen section of harassed the German troops trying to
the main highroad to Echternach. This move through the town. N o large-scale
turned out to be only a patrol action and assault was attempted this day, appar-
the enemy was quickly beaten off. ently because the enemy was still wait-
Early in the day Company B and ten ing for guns to cross the river. Troops
tanks from the 70th Tank Battalion re- from the 320th Regiment and fusilier
newed the attack at Berdorf in an at- battalion circled around Echternach and
tempt to break through to Company F, Lauterborn meanwhile in an attempt to
still encircled at the opposite end of the cut the main road at Scheidgen. T h e
village. This time the tanks deployed on platoon from Company A, 12th Infantry,
the roads and trails south of Berdorf and which had been posted on Hill 313 the
moved in with five riflemen on each tank day before, fell back to Scheidgen and
deck. The five medium tanks drove there was overwhelmed after a last mes-
through to the northeastern edge and sage pleading for tank destroyers. At the
just before noon began shelling the Parc day’s end only the regimental antitank
Hotel in the mistaken belief that it was company, numbering some sixty men,
held by the enemy. One of the Company stood between the enemy and the 2d
F men had been rummaging about and Battalion command post at Consdorf.
had found an American flag. This was Although the German penetrations on
unfurled on the shattered roof. Contact the left and in the center of the 12th
thus established, an assault was launched Infantry sector deepened during the day,
to clear Berdorf. But the Germans de- the situation on the right was relatively
fending the houses were heavily armed encouraging. At the break of day on 17
with bazookas and the tanks made little December Company C, the 12th Infantry
progress. At dark the Americans drew reserve, moved out of Herborn en route
back to the hotel, while the Germans
plastered the area with rockets, artillery, 2 1st Sgt. Gervis Willis later was awarded the
and mortar shells, lobbed in from across DSC for his conduct in the defense of Berdorf.
248 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

to join the two companies beleaguered above the village. T h e three tanks which
in Osweiler. As Company C worked its had come up the evening before, and
way through the woods south of Osweiler very effective fire by American batteries,
the left platoon ran head on into the put an end to these German efforts. Thus
2d Battalion. 320th Infantry; all the both Osweiler and Dickweiler remained
platoon members were killed or cap- tight in American hands. Toward the
tured. By some chance the two platoons close of day Company C of the 12th In-
on the right missed the German hive. In fantry took position on some high
the meantime the 2d Battalion, 22d In- ground between and slightly south of the
fantry (Lt. Col. Thomas A. Kenan), had two villages, thus extending the line
arrived in the 12th Infantry zone. Com- here on the right.
pany F was mounted on tanks from the General Barton’s headquarters saw
19th Tank Battalion, which had just the situation on the evening of 17 De-
come in from the 9th Armored Division, cember as follows. The 3d Battalion and
and also set out for Osweiler. This force its reinforcements had “a semblance of
arrived on the scene shortly after the a line” to meet further penetration in
enactment of the German ambush, the vicinity of Osweiler and Dickweiler.
fought a short sharp engagement, res- On the opposite flank things were tem-
cued some of the prisoners from Com- porarily under control, with Task Force
pany C, and pushed on into Osweiler. Luckett not yet seriously engaged and
With this reinforcement a new de- the enemy advance thus far checked at
fensive line was organized on the hills Mullerthal. However, there was a pres-
just east of the village. The original de- ent danger that the large German force
fenders had taken a large bag of prison- might turn the 4th Division flank by a
ers the previous day; these were sent successful attack through the 9th Ar-
back to Herborn with a tank platoon. In mored Division blocking position at
midafternoon the remaining companies Waldbillig. All that could be said of the
of the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry, started 12th Infantry center was that the situa-
for Osweiler, advancing in column tion was fluid, for here the road junction
through the woods which topped a ridge at Scheidgen was in enemy hands and
line running southwest of the village. German detachments were on the loose.
While the American column moved in Across the river at the headquarters
a northeasterly direction, a German col- of the 212th Volks Grenadier Division
umn, probably a battalion in strength, there was little realization of the extent
suddenly intersected the 2d Battalion to which the American center had been
line of march. In the fire fight which dented. General Sensfuss told his supe-
followed the 2d Battalion companies be- riors that the 212th had made little
came separated, but the early winter progress beyond completing the encircle-
darkness soon ended the skirmish. The ment of Echternach. Despite the com-
Americans dug in for the night, and the plete surprise won by the 212th on 16
Germans passed on toward Scheidgen. December, it had been unable to effect
In Dickweiler the troops of the 3d either a really deep penetration or ex-
Battalion, 12th Infantry, had been har- tensive disorganization in the 12th In-
assed by small forays from the woods fantry zone. With the close of the second
T H E GERMAN SOUTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 249

day it may be said that the German run from Thionville, but the leading
opportunity to exploit the initial sur- armor did not arrive in the 12th In-
prise and attendant tactical gains com- fantry area until late in the afternoon
menced to fade. of 17 December. Apparently some troops
On the morning of 17 December went at once into the line, but the ac-
the 10th Armored Division (General tual counterattack was postponed until
Morris) had moved out of Thionville the next morning. Then, so the plan
for Luxembourg, the first step (al- read, CCA would advance in three task
though at the time not realized) which forces: one through the Schwarz Erntz
General Patton’s Third Army would gorge; one on the Consdorf-Berdorf
make to intervene in the battle of the road; and the third through Scheidgen
Ardennes. General Morris drove ahead to Echternach. T h e infantry to the front
of his troops and reported to General were alerted for their role in the com-
Middleton at Bastogne. T h e VIII Corps bined attack and half-tracks with radios
commander originally had intended to were moved close to the line of depar-
use a part of the 10th Armored in direct ture as relay stations in the tank-infantry
support of the 28th Division, but now he communications net.
instructed Morris to send one combat T h e counterattack moved off on the
command to the Bastogne area and to morning of 18 December in a thick
commit the remainder of the 10th Ar- winter fog. On the left, Task Force
mored with the 4th Infantry Division in Chamberlain (Lt. Col. Thomas C .
a counterattack to drive the Germans Chamberlain) dispatched a small tank-
back over the Sauer. General Middleton infantry team from Breitweiler into the
regarded the German advance against gorge. T h e Schwarz Erntz, taking its
the southern shoulder of his corps as name from the rushing stream twisting
potentially dangerous, both to the corps along its bottom, is a depression lying
and to the command and communica- from three to five hundred feet be-
tions center at Luxembourg City. There low the surrounding tableland. At sev-
was, of course, no means by which the eral points canyonlike cliffs rise sheer
VIII Corps commander could know that for a hundred feet. T h e floor of the
the Seventh Army scheme of maneuver gorge is strewn with great boulders;
was limited to a swing only as far as dense patches of woods line the depres-
Mersch, eight miles north of the city. sion and push down to the edge of the
General Morris left Bastogne and stream. In time of peace the gorge
met the 4th Infantry Division com- of the Schwarz Erntz offered a pictur-
mander in Luxembourg. The two esque “promenade” for holiday visitors
were of one mind on the need for coun- in the resort hotels at Berdorf and Beau-
terattack tactics and arranged that CCA fort, with “bancs de repos” at conven-
(Brig. Gen. Edwin W. Piburn), the ient intervals. In December, 1944, the
leading combat command, should make gorge represented a formidable military
an immediate drive to the north be- obstacle, difficultof traverse for both foot
tween the Schwarz Erntz gorge and the troops and vehicles, capable of defense
main Echternach-Luxembourg road. by only a few.
CCA made good speed on the 75-mile T h e entrance to the gorge was SO
250 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

narrow that the tanks had to advance in assault gained only seventy-five yards
single file, and only the lead tank could before darkness intervened. Meanwhile
fire. T h e accompanying infantry were the sixty-some members of Company
under constant bullet fire; and when the F remained in the Parc Hotel, whose
lead tank was immobilized by an anti- roof and upper story had been smashed
tank projectile some time was required in by German shelling. Pole charges
to maneuver the rest of the column or bazooka rounds had blasted a gaping
around it. With every yard forward, ba- hole in one side of the hotel, but thus
zooka, bullet, and mortar fire increased, far only one man had been wounded.
but the enemy remained hidden. Finally, Morale was good, bolstered superbly
the Americans halted near the T in the by the company cook who did his best
gorge road just south of Müllerthal. to emulate the “cuisine soignée” prom-
It was clear that to capture Müllerthal, ised in the hotel brochures by pre-
or even to block the southern exit from paring hot meals in the basement and
the gorge, the surrounding hills and serving the men at their firing posts.
tableland had to be won. T h e infan- While part of Task Force Standish
try and engineers belonging to Task was engaged in Berdorf, another team
Force Luckett were given this mission, attacked through heavy underbrush to-
advancing in the afternoon to bypass ward Hill 329, east of Berdorf, which
Müllerthal on the west and seize the overlooked the road to Echternach.
wooded bluff standing above the gorge Despite the presence of the tanks, which
road north of Müllerthal. Tanks here could maneuver off the road, the
pumped seven hundred rounds into the infantry were checked halfway to their
woods to shake the Germans there, but objective by cross fire from machine
little time was left in the short winter guns flanking the slope and artillery
day and the foot soldiers only got across fire from beyond the Sauer. About forty
the Müllerthal-Waldbillig road. men were wounded, creating a problem
T h e center task force (Lt. Col. Miles for evacuation by this small force.
L. Standish), which had been assigned T h e third task force from CCA, 10th
to help the 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry, Armored (led by Lt. Col J. R.
clear the enemy from Berdorf, had lit- Riley), made good progress in its attack
tle better success. Elements of Task along the Scheidgen-Lauterborn axis.
Force Standish were strafed by a pair Scheidgen was retaken early in the after-
of German planes but moved into Ber- noon virtually without a fight (the Ger-
dorf against only desultory opposition man battalion which had seized the
and before noon made contact with the village had already moved on toward the
two companies and six tanks already in south). Five tanks and two companies
the village. Then the German gunners of the 159th Engineer Combat Battalion,
laid down smoke and a bitter three-hour which Barton had located on the road
barrage, disabled some tanks and half- job as promised by Middleton, then
tracks, and drove the Americans to cover, launched a surprise attack against the
When the fire lifted the attack was re- Germans on Hill 313, overlooking the
sumed, but the enemy fought stubborn- road to Lauterborn. The tanks rolled
ly for each house. This house-to-house down the road from Scheidgen with
T H E GERMAN SOUTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 251

their motors cut and caught the enemy attack in the woods; when the battalion
on the slopes while the engineers moved neared the village the American tanks
in with marching fire. But a thick win- there opened fire, under suspicion that
ter fog rolled in before the Americans this was a German force. After two
could occupy the hill. Other elements hours, and some casualties, a patrol
of Task Force Riley meanwhile had ad- bearing a white flag worked its way in
vanced to the mill beyond Lauterborn close enough for recognition. Osweiler
where the command post of Company now had a garrison of one tank company
G was located. Two tanks and two and four understrength rifle companies.
squads of riflemen continued along As the American reinforcements
the main road to the hat factory stiffened the right flank and the ar-
at the southwestern edge of Ech- mored task forces grappled to wrest the
ternach where Company E, 12th In- initiative from the enemy on the left,
fantry, had established itself. Here the German troops widened and deepened
company was found to be in good spirits, the dent in the 12th Infantry center,
supplied with plenty of food and wine, shouldering their way southward
and holding its own to the tune of over between Scheidgen and Osweiler. T h e
a hundred of the enemy killed. T h e burden of this advance was carried by
tank commander offered to cover the battalions of the 320th Regiment (which
withdrawal of Company E from the explains the relaxing of pressure in the
city, but Capt. Paul H. Dupuis, the sen- Osweiler-Dickweiler area) , and the ad-
ior officer in Echternach, refused on vance guard of the 316th Regiment
the ground that General Barton’s “110 which General Sensfuss had pried from
retrograde movement” order of 16 De- the Seventh Army reserve by reporting
cember was still in effect.3 As darkness the arrival of the 10th Armored Division.
settled in, the small relief force turned The first appearance of any enemy
back to the mill north of Lauterborn, force deep in the center occurred near
promising to return on the morrow Maisons Lelligen, a collection of two
with more troops. or three houses on the edge of a large
While CCA, 10th Armored, gave wood northwest of Herborn. T h e 12th
weight to the 4th Division counterattack, Infantry cannon company was just mov-
General Barton tried to strengthen the ing up to a new position when fire
12th Infantry right flank in the Osweiler- opened from the wood. The drivers and
Dickweiler sector. T h e 2d Battalion, 22d gunners dived for cover and returned
Infantry, which had met the German fire. After a few minutes of this ex-
column in the woods west of Osweiler change Sgt. J. C. Kolinski got up, ran
the day before, headed for the village back to a truck, fixed a round, and fired
on the morning of 18 December. The it from a howitzer still coupled to the
last word to reach Osweiler had been truck. This idea caught on and other
that the 2d Battalion was under serious men started to serve the howitzers,
3 General Barton says that he told the tank awkward as the technique was, some
commander to inform Captain Dupuis that his firing at ranges as short as sixty yards.
order to hold in Echternach was revoked, but
apparently this message was not delivered. Ltr, Ammunition at the pieces ultimately
G m Barton to author, 17 Nov 59. gave out, but a volunteer raced to the
252 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

rear of the column and drove an am- permitted and succeeded in destroying
munition truck, its canvas smouldering a ponton bridge at the Echternach site
from German bullets, up to the gun before it could be put in use. Both sides
crews. T h e action lasted for over three were forced to rely largely upon radio
hours. At last two howitzers were man- communication, but it would appear
handled into a position from which that the Germans had particular dif-
they could cover the company; guns and ficulty: prisoners reported that “nobody
vehicles were laboriously turned around seems to know where anybody else is.”
in the mud, and the company withdrew. American intelligence officers esti-
Farther to the west another part of mated on 17 December that the enemy
the German force which had come from had a superiority in numbers of three
Scheidgen surrounded the rear head- to one; by the end of 18 December the
quarters of the 2d Battalion, 22d In- balance was somewhat restored. Losses
fantry, and a platoon of towed tank de- and stragglers, however, had reduced
stroyers in Geyershof. Tanks en route the American infantry companies, al-
to Osweiler got word of this situation, ready understrength at the opening of
picked up twenty-five cannoneers from the battle. The two companies in Berdorf
the 176th Field Artillery Battalion, and reported a combined strength of sev-
intervened in the fight. Covered by this enty-nine men, while the 2d Battalion of
counterattack the battalion headquar- the 22d Infantry listed an average of on-
ters withdrew to Herborn. ly sixty in each company. T h e Amer-
T h e engagements at Geyershof and ican makeweight would have to be its
Maisons Lelligen were comparatively armor. Lacking tanks and self-propelled
minor affairs, involving only small artillery, the 212th Volks Grenadier
forces, but German prisoners later re- Division had to rely on the infantry.
ported that their losses had been severe Accordingly, the 316th Infantry began to
at both these points. This fact, com- cross the Sauer, moving up behind the
bined with the American pressure on center of the parent division.
either shoulder of the penetration area, During the night of 18–19 December
may explain why the enemy failed to the 9th Armored Division (–) withdrew
continue the push in the center as 18 to a new line of defense on the left of the
December ended. 4th Infantry Division. Actually the 9th
T h e net day’s operations amounted Armored (–) did not abandon the right
to a stand-off. T h e Americans had flank anchor at Waldbillig and so contin-
strengthened the Osweiler-Dickweiler ued direct contact with the friendly
position, but the Germans had extended forces deployed near the Waldbillig-
their penetration in the 12th Infantry Mullerthal road. T h e problem of dealing
center. Elsewhere neither side clearly with the 987th Regiment and clearing
held the field. Enemy artillery had the enemy out of the Schwarz Erntz
interdicted many of the roads in the gorge, or containing him there, was left
area and had been very effective at to the 4th Division and CCA, 10th Ar-
Berdorf. American artillery, now in- mored. As a result, these two units faced
creased in the 12th Infantry zone, gave four German regiments in the 12th In-
as good support as communications fantry sector. Of the 4th Division, it must
T H E GERMAN SOUTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 253

be remembered, four rifle battalions still southwest of the Müllerthal-Waldbillig


were retained on guard along the twenty road, and a log abatis wired with mines
miles of the division front south of the and covered by machine guns was
battle area. erected to block the valley road south of
When the Americans resumed the Müllerthal. Task Force Chamberlain,
counterattack early on 19 December whose tanks had given fire support to
Task Force Luckett made another at- Task Force Luckett, moved during the
tempt to bring forward the extreme left afternoon to a backstop position near
flank in the gorge sector. As before, the Consdorf.
maneuver was a. flanking movement The tank-infantry counterattack by
designed to seize the high ground over- Task Forces Standish and Riley in the
looking Müllerthal. Troops of the 2d Berdorf and Echternach areas also re-
Battalion, 8th Infantry (Lt. Col. George sumed. T h e enemy resisted wherever en-
Mabry), with tanks and armored field countered, but spent most of the daylight
artillery firing in support, first attacked hours regrouping in wooded draws and
east from Waldbillig to take the wooded hollows and bringing reinforcements
nose around which looped the Wald- across the river, stepping up his artillery
billig-Müllerthal road. This advance fire the while. Intense fog shielded all
was made across open fields and was this activity. Apparently the assembly of
checked by extremely heavy shellfire. the 316th Regiment behind the 212th
Next Mabry shifted his attack to the Volks Grenadier Division center was
right so as to bring the infantry through completed during the day. A few rocket
the draw which circled the nose. Com- projectors and guns were ferried over at
pany E, which had about seventy men the civilian ferry site above Echternach,
and was the strongest in the battalion, led and about the middle of the afternoon a
off. By now the German artillery was bridge was finished at Edingen, where
ranged inaccurately. The casualties suf- the 320th Regiment had crossed on 16
fered by Company E cannot be num- December. The American counterattack
bered, but have been reported as the most on the 19th, then, first would be opposed
severe sustained by any company of the by infantry and infantry weapons, but
4th Division in the battle of the Ar- would meet heavier metal and some ar-
dennes. Casualties among the officers left mor as the day ended.
a lieutenant who had just joined the com- At Berdorf a team from Task Force
pany in command. Despite its losses Standish and a platoon of armored en-
Company E drove on, clearing the Ger- gineers set to work mopping up the en-
mans from the lower slopes before the emy infantry who had holed up in
recall order was given. houses on the north side of the village.
The division commander now called This proved to be slow work. First a
off the attack and assigned Task Force ten-pound pole charge would be ex-
Luckett the mission of denying the en- ploded against a wall or house; then a
emy the use of the road net at Müller- tank would clank up to the gap and blast
thal, a task which could be accomplished away; finally the infantry would go to
in less costly fashion. Colonel Luckett work with grenades and their shoulder
deployed his troops along the ridge weapons. At dark the Germans had lost
254 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

a few houses, but were in the process of gun. Two volunteers were dispatched in
being reinforced by Nebelwerfers and a jeep to make a run for Lauterbarn,
armored vehicles. carrying word that enemy tanks were
Other troops of Task Force Standish moving into the city and asking for
returned to the attack at Hill 329, on the “help and armor.” T h e two, last of the
Berdorf-Echternach road, where they Americans to come out of Echternach,
had been checked by flanking fire the made the run safely despite direct fire
previous day. Sharp assault destroyed aimed by the German assault gun. At
the German machine gun positions and Lauterborn, however, they were told
the attack reached the ridge leading to that the tanks could not be risked in
Hill 329. Then the advance had to be Echternach after dark. American artil-
halted short of the objective in order to lery observers by the failing light saw
free the tanks and half-tracks for use “troops pouring into Echternach.” Or-
in evacuating the large number of ders were radioed to Company E (a
wounded. This ambulance convoy was fresh battery for its radio had been
en route to Consdorf, in the late after- brought in by the tanks) to fight its way
noon, when a radio message reported out during the night. It was too late.
that the Germans had cut the road north T h e defenders had been split up by the
of Consdorf and bazooka’d two tanks on German assault and the company com-
their way back from Berdorf for am- mander had to report that he could not
munition. T h e wounded were left in organize a withdrawal. Through the
Berdorf and the task force tanks, ham- night of 19–20 December Riley’s tanks
pered by milling civilian refugees, began waited on the road just north of Lauter-
a nightlong fire fight with the 2d Bat- born, under orders from the Command-
talion, 423d Regiment, which had con- ing General, CCA, not to attempt a
centrated to capture Consdorf. return through the dark to Echternach.
Task Force Riley sent tanks carrying Although the fighting on 19December
infantry into the edge of Echternach on had been severe on the American left,
the morning of 19 December. There they a general lull prevailed along the rest of
re-established contact with Company E the line. T h e enemy made no move to
and covered the withdrawal of outlying push deeper in the center. T h e combat
detachments to the hat factory. T h e 12th engineers in Scheidgen returned to Hill
Infantry commander already had given 313 and occupied it without a fight. A
permission for Company E to evacuate few small affrays occurred in the Os-
Echternach, but communications were weiler-Dickweiler sector, but that was
poor–indeed word that the tanks all. By nightfall the situation seemed
had reached Company E did not arrive much improved–despite the increased
at the 12th Infantry command post until pressure on the 4th Division companies
four hours after the event–and the relief closely invested in the north. Both flanks
force turned back to Lauterborn alone. were nailed down, and the German at-
The tanks were hardly out of sight be- tack seemed to have lost momentum.
fore the Germans began an assault on Elsewhere on the VIII Corps front the
the hat factory with bazookas, demoli- enemy advance was picking up speed
tion charges, and an armored assault and reinforcements were rolling forward
T H E GERMAN SOUTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 255

to widen the avenues of penetration be- Division for it would take General Bar-
hind the panzers. Reports that two new ton’s division a few hours to reorganize
German divisions were en route to attack on a new line and plug the gaps left
the 109th Infantry and 9th Armored by the outgoing armored units.
Division had reached General Morris, While General Morris made plans to
coming by way of the 12th Army Group hold the ground needed as a springboard
intelligence agencies. If this additional for the projected counterattack, General
weight should be thrown against the thin Beyer, commanding the German LXXX
American line immediately to the north Corps, prepared to meet an American
of the 4th Infantry Division, there was riposte. Higher German headquarters
every likelihood that the line would had anticipated the appearance of some
break. American reinforcements opposite the
It was imperative that the line be LXXX Corps as early as the third day
held. Troops of the Third Army were al- of the operation. Intervention by ele-
ready on the move north, there to form ments of the 10th Armored Division on
the cutting edge of a powerful thrust in- 18 December, as a result, was viewed
to the southern flank of the German only as the prelude to a sustained and
advance. The 109th Infantry, the 9th forceful American attempt to regain the
Armored Division, the 4th Infantry Divi- initiative. It cannot now be determined
sion, and CCA, 10th Armored Division, whether the German agents (V-Leute) ,
had to win both the time and the space who undoubtedly were operating be-
required for the assembly of the Ameri- hind American lines, had correctly diag-
can counterattack forces. General Patton, nosed the beginning of the Third Army
commanding the Third Army, to which shift toward Luxembourg and Belgium,
the VIII Corps was now assigned, gave or, if so, whether they had been able to
General Morris a provisional corps on communicate with the German field
19 December, composed of the 10th Ar- headquarters.
mored Division (–) , the 9th Armored, In any event the LXXX Corps com-
the 109th Infantry, and the 4th Infantry mander decided on the night of 19 De-
Division. Morris, now charged with uni- cember to place his corps on the defen-
fying defensive measures while the sive, his estimate of the situation being
Third Army counterattack forces gath- as follows. His two divisions generally
ered behind this cover, alerted CCA, had reached the line designated as the
10th Armored Division, early on the LXXX Corps objective. The force avail-
morning of 20 December, for employ- able was insufficient to continue the
ment as a mobile reserve. Morris had attack. On the north flank there was a
already dispatched one of his armored dangerous and widening gap between
infantry battalions to help the 9th Ar- the LXXX Corps and the LXXXV
mored in an attack intended to retake Corps. T h e supply situation was poor
Waldbillig. Task Force Chamberlain and could become critical, in part be-
had been placed in reserve the previous cause of the Allied air attacks at the
day, but it was not immediately feasible Rhine crossings, in part because of the
to withdraw the two task forces that Allied success-even during poor flying
were still engaged alongside the 4th weather–in knocking out transportation
256 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

and forward supply dumps in the Trier- lition charge that exploded early in the
Bitburg area. A large-scale American morning of the 20th and blew in part of
counterattack against the LXXX Corps one wall. After a short melee in the
could be predicted, but lacking aerial darkness American hand grenades dis-
reconnaissance German intelligence couraged the assault at this breach and
could not expect to determine the time the enemy withdrew to a line of foxholes
or strength of such an attack with any which had been dug during the night
accuracy. General Beyer’s orders for 20 close to the hotel. When the fight died
December, therefore, called upon the down one of the defenders found that
212th and 276th Volks Grenadier Divi- the blast had opened a sealed annex in
sions to crush the small points of resist- the basement, the hiding place of several
ance where American troops still con- score bottles of fine liquor and a full
tended behind the German main forces, barrel of beer. Lieutenant Leake re-
continue local attacks and counterattacks fused permission to sample this cache, a
in order to secure more favorable decision he would regret when, after
ground for future defense, and close up withdrawal from Berdorf, he and
along a co-ordinated corps front in prep- twenty-one of his men were returned to
aration for the coming American on- the foxhole line with neither their coats
slaught. nor blankets.
On 20 December there was savage At daylight on 20 December the 1st
fighting in the 4th Infantry Division Battalion, 423d Regiment, which had
zone despite the fact that both of the been brought in from the Lauterborn
combatants were in the process of going area, initiated a counterattack against
over to the defensive. T h e 4th Division the team from Task Force Standish at
and 10th Armored sought to disengage the edge of Berdorf and recovered all
their advance elements and regroup the ground lost during the previous two
along a stronger main line of resistance, days. The American artillery forward
and the enemy fought to dislodge the observer’s tank was crippled by a ba-
American foothold in Berdorf and Ech- zooka and the radio put out of commis-
ternach. At the same time elements of sion, but eventually word reached the
the 276th Volks Grenadier Division supporting artillery, which quickly
struck through Waldbillig, the point of drove the enemy to cover. Although the
contact between the 4th Division and evacuation of Berdorf was part of the
the 9th Armored, in an attempt to push 4th Division plan for redressing its line,
the right wing of the LXXX Corps for- the actual withdrawal was none too easy.
ward to a point where the road net lead- The Germans had cut the road back to
ing east to the Sauer might be more Consdorf; so the right team of Task
easily denied the gathering American Force Standish was withdrawn from the
forces. attack on Hill 329 and spent most of the
T h e team from Task Force Standish afternoon clearing an exit for the men
had made little progress in its house-to- and vehicles in Berdorf. Finally, a little
house battle in Berdorf. Company F, after dark, Companies B and F (12th
12th Infantry, retained its position in Infantry), ten engineers, and four
the Parc Hotel, despite a German demo- squads of armored infantry loaded onto
T H E GERMAN SOUTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 257

eleven tanks and six half-tracks and drew to the new main line of resistance.
made their way past burning buildings It is probable that the Americans in
to the new 4th Division line north and Echternach were forced to surrender
east of Consdorf. late on 20 December. General Sensfuss
T h e elements of Task Force Riley, had determined to erase the stubborn
which had waited outside of Lauterborn garrison and led the 212th Fusilier Bat-
through the night of 19–20 December in talion and some assault guns (or tanks)
vain expectation that Company E would in person to blast the Americans loose.
attempt to break out of Echternach, re- T h e commander of the 212th Volks
ceived a radio message at 0823 that Grenadier Division received a slight
Company E was surrounded by tanks and wound but had the satisfaction of taking
could not get out. Through the morning the surrender of the troublesome Amer-
rumors and more rumors poured over icans, about 111 officers and men from
the American radio nets, but there was Company E, plus 21 men belonging to
no sign of Company E. About noon Colo- Company H. On this same day the Com-
nel Riley agreed to send a few tanks in pany F outpost which had held out at
one final effort to reach the infantry in Birkelt Farm since 16 December capitu-
Echternach, provided that the 12th In- lated.
fantry would give his tanks some pro- Finally the enemy had control of most
tection. Company G, therefore, was of the northern section of the road net
assigned this task. At 1330 a report between the Sauer River and Luxem-
reached the 12th Infantry that Company bourg-but it was too late. The new
E had gotten out. Half an hour later American line, running from Dickweiler
this report was denied; now a message through Osweiler, Hill 313, Consdorf, to
said the company was coming out in south of Müllerthal, was somewhat weak
small groups. Finally, in the late after- in the center but solidly anchored at the
noon, Colonel Chance sent a call over flanks. The German attack through the
the radio relay system: “Where is 9th Armored sector beyond Waldbillig
Riley?” Thirty minutes later the answer had been checked. At the opposite end of
came back from CCA: a section of tanks the line enemy guns and mortars worked
and some riflemen were fighting at the feverishly to bring down Dickweiler
outskirts of Echternach. around the ears of the defenders, but the
This was the last effort. Night had Americans could not be shelled out.
come, Echternach was swarming with (When one blast threw a commode and
Germans, and the 10th Armored Divi- sink from a second story down on the
sion headquarters had ordered all its rear deck of a tank the crew simply com-
teams to reassemble behind the 4th plained that no bathing facilities had
Division lines preparatory to moving “in been provided.) At Bech, behind the
any direction.” Since most of Task Force American center, General Barton now
Riley by this time had reverted to the had the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, in
reserve, Lauterborn, the base for opera- reserve, having further stripped the 4th
tions against Echternach, was aban- Division right. And in and around Eisen-
doned. Company G, now some forty born, CCA, 10th Armored Division, was
men, and the last of Riley’s tanks with- assembling to counter any German at-
258 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

tack. Barton’s troops and Morris’ tanks to meet the American tanks with tanks
had brought the 212th and the 276th or heavy antimechanized means gave the
Volks Grenadier Division to a halt, had American rifleman an appreciable moral
then withdrawn most of their advance superiority (particularly toward the end
detachments successfully, and now held of the battle) over his German counter-
a stronger position on a shortened line. part.
The southern shoulder of the German It should be added that Seventh Army
counteroffensive had jammed. divisions suffered as the stepchild of the
Ardennes offensive, not only when
Southern Flank–A Summing U p bridge trains failed to arrive or proved
The Seventh Army had thrown three inadequate but also in the niggardly
of its four divisions into the surprise at- issue of heavy weapons and artillery
tack at the Sauer River on 16 December. ammunition , particularly chemical
The Americans had met this onslaught shells. Perhaps these German divisions
with two infantry regiments (the 12th faced from the onset the insoluble tacti-
and 109th) , an armored infantry battal- cal dilemma, insoluble at least if the out-
ion (the 60th), and an understrength numbered defenders staunchly held
tank battalion (the 70th), these units their ground when cut off and sur-
and others attached making the total rounded. Strength sufficient to achieve a
approximately division strength. The quick, limited penetration the German
stubborn and successful defense of divisions possessed, so long as the assault
towns and villages close to the Sauer had forces did not stop to clean out the vil-
blocked the road net, so essential to lage centers of resistance. Strength to ex-
movement in this rugged country, and ploit these points of penetration failed
barred a quick sweep into the American when the village centers of resistance
rear areas. were bypassed.
In like manner the enemy had failed Successful the American defense in the
in the quick accomplishment of one of Sauer sector had been, but costly too.
his major tasks, that is, overrunning the In six days (through 2 1 December, after
American artillery positions or at the which the Americans would begin their
least forcing the guns to withdraw to counterattack) the units here on the
positions from which they could no southern shoulder lost over 2,000 killed,
longer interdict the German bridge sites. wounded, or missing. German casualties
General Barton, it may be added, had probably ran somewhat higher, but
refused absolutely to permit the artillery whether substantially so is questionable.
to move rearward. T h e failure to open In any case, about 800 German prisoners
the divisional bridges over the Sauer were taken and nonbattle casualties must
within the first twenty-four hours had have been severe, for German com-
forced the German infantry to continue manders later reported that the number
to fight without their accustomed heavy of exposure and trench foot cases had
weapons support even while American been unusually high, the result of the
reinforcements were steadily reducing village fighting in which the defender
the numerical edge possessed by the had the greater protection from cold
attacker. Further, the German inability and damp.
CHAPTER XI

The 1st SS Panzer Division's Dash


Westward, and Operation Greif
T h e bulk of the fourteen divisions of a series of tributaries flowing south
under First U.S. Army command on 16 from the springs and swamps of the
December were deployed north of the rugged Hohes Venn. T h e Amblève,
Belgian Ardennes. Behind them, roughly bending westward, is joined by the Salm,
in the triangle formed by the cities of
Liège, Verviers, and Spa, lay the supply
installations built up through the au-
tumn to support the advance toward the
Rhine. At Spa, which had served the
German Emperor as headquarters in
World War I, the First Army had estab-
lished its command post surrounded on
every side by service installations, supply
dumps, and depots. Liège, twenty miles
northwest of Spa, was one of the great-
est American supply centers on the Con-
tinent. Verviers, an important and dense-
ly stocked railhead lay eleven miles
north of Spa. (See M a p I . )
General Hodges’ First Army head-
quarters, set up in the déclassé resort
hotels and casinos of the once fashion-
able watering place, was remote from
sound of battle on the morning of 16
December, but in a matter of hours the GENERAL HODGES
slashing thrust of the 1st SS Panzer Divi-
sion roughly altered its ordered exist- a north-flowing tributary, at the town of
ence. The nature of the ground along Trois Ponts, then angles northwest until
which the Americans would attempt to it meets the Ourthe River and finally the
defend the myriad headquarters and Meuse at Liège. T h e Amblève and the
service installations, railheads, and Salm are narrow. and rather minor
depots, must be explained. Southeast of streams; the valleys through which they
Spa runs the Amblève River, the creation course are deep-cut, with long stretches
260 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

of steep and rocky walls. A line on the Kampfgrupfe Peiper on the Move
map tracing the course of the Ambèke
River and its initial tributaries will pass On the morning of 16 December Colo-
from northeast to southwest through nel Peiper journeyed to the advance
three important bridgeheads and road command post of the 12th Volks Grena-
centers, Malmédy, Stavelot, and Trois dier Division, whose troops were sup-
Ponts. From the first two, roads led north posed to make the gap in the lines of
to Spa, Verviers, and Liège. Although the American 99th Infantry Division
both Malmédy and Stavelot were admin- north of the Schnee Eifel through which
istrative centers of importance (Stavelot his armor would be committed.1 T o
contained the First Army map depot Peiper’s disgust the infantry failed in
with some 2,500,000 maps), the most their assigned task and the day wore on
important item hereabouts was the great with Peiper’s column still waiting on the
store of gasoline, over two million gal- roads to the rear. T h e blown bridge
lons, in dumps just north of the two northwest of Losheim increased the de-
towns. lay; for some reason the engineers failed
T h e 1st SS Panzer Division (SS Ober- to start repair work here until noon or
fuehrer Wilhelm Mohnke) was the later. This was not the end. In midafter-
strongest fighting unit in the Sixth Pan- noon the horse-drawn artillery regiment
zer Army. Undiluted by any large influx of the 12th Volks Grenadier Division
of untrained Luftwaffe or Navy replace- was ordered up to support the infantry,
ments, possessed of most of its T / O&E hopelessly clogging the approaches to
equipment, it had an available armored the bridge. Peiper himself took over the
strength on 16 December of about a job of trying to straighten out this traffic
hundred tanks, equally divided between jam but more time was lost. It was not
the Mark IV and the Panther, plus forty- until 1930 that the armored advance
two Tiger tanks belonging to the 501st guard was able to reach Losheim, the
SS Panzer Detachment. T h e road net in village which gave its name to the gap
the Sixth Panzer Army would not per- at the northern terminus of the Schnee
mit the commitment of the 1st SS Pan- Eifel. At this time Peiper received a
zer as a division, even if two of the five radio message saying that the next rail-
roads allocated the army were employed. road overpass was out, that the engineers
The division was therefore divided into would not get up in time to make repairs,
four columns or march groups: the first, and that he must turn west to Lanzerath
commanded by Colonel Peiper, con- 2 T h e records of Peiper’s unit were destroyed
tained the bulk of the 1st Panzer Regi- just before his capture. In 1945, however, Peiper
was interviewed by members of the E T O His-
ment and thus represented the armored torical Section. (See Ferriss, R p t Based on Intervs
spearhead of the division; the second was in January 1945. passim.) Much of the tactical
made up from the division’s Reconnais- detail used herein comes from the 3,268-page
trial transcript of the so-called Malmédy Case
sance Battalion; the third and fourth tried before the U.S. General Military Government
each comprised armored infantry and Court in 1946. A good summary of the latter is
attached heavy weapons; the heavy Ti- found in a manuscript by Royce L. Thompson
entitled T h e ETO Ardennes Campaign: Opera-
ger detachment was left to be fed into tions of the Combat Group Peiper, 16–26 December
the advance as occasion warranted. 1944 (1952), in OCMH files.
T H E ENEMY DASH WESTWARD AND OPERATION GREIF 261

in the 3d Parachute Division sector. It was between noon and one o’clock
This move was completed by midnight, of 17 December, on the road between
although a number of tanks and other Modersheid and Ligneuville, that the
vehicles were lost to mines and anti- German advance guard ran into an
tank fire while making the turnabout at American truck convoy moving south
Losheim. At Lanzerath Colonel Peiper from Malmédy. This was ill-fated Bat-
discovered that the 3d Parachute also had tery B of the 285th Field Artillery Ob-
failed to punch any sizable hole through servation Battalion. T h e convoy was shot
the American line, although the 1st SS up and the advance guard rolled on,
Panzer Division had taken Krewinkel leaving the troops to the rear to deal
and so helped the 3 d Parachute forward. with the Americans who had taken to
Irritated by the hours frittered away, the woods and ditches. About two hours
Peiper took an infantry battalion, put after, or so the dazed survivors later re-
two of his Panther tanks at the point of called, the Americans who had been
the column, and at 0400 attacked toward rounded up were marched into a field
Honsfeld. Opposition had evaporated. where, at a signal, they were shot down
Honsfeld was surprised and taken with by machine gun and pistol fire. A few
ease. 2 escaped by feigning death, but the
T h e original route assigned Peiper’s wounded who moved or screamed were
kampfgruppe ran west to Schoppen. This sought out and shot through the head.
was a poor road, bogged with mud from At least eighty-six Americans were mas-
the winter rains, and since the 12th SS sacred here. This was not the first killing
Panzer Division had not yet come up of unarmed prisoners chargeable to
Peiper pre-empted the latter’s paved Kampfgruppe Peiper on 17 December.
route through Büllingen. Also he had Irrefutable evidence shows that nineteen
been told that there were gasoline stores unarmed Americans were shot down at
in Büllingen, and a great deal of fuel Honsfeld and fifty at Büllingen.3
had been burned during the jockeying T h e Malmédy massacre would have
around Losheim. Sure enough, the gaso- repercussions reaching far wider than
line was found as predicted. Using one might expect of a single battlefield
American prisoners as labor, the Ger- atrocity in a long and bitter war. This
mans refueled their tanks. They scooped “incident” undoubtedly stiffened the
up much other booty here and destroyed will of the American combatants (al-
a number of artillery planes on a near- though a quantitative assessment of this
by field. When American gunners com- fact is impossible) ; it would be featured
menced to shell the village the in the war crimes trials as an outstanding
column was already moving on, although
3 T h e massacres perpetrated by Peiper’s troops
it suffered some casualties. By this time were the subject of a special Congressional in-
Peiper and his staff believed that the vestigation: 81st Cong., 1st sess., Report of t h e
breakthrough was complete; no Amer- Subcommittee o n Armed Services, United States
Senate, Malmédy Massacre Investigation (dated 13
ican troops appeared on the sensitive October 1949). 3 Records of the War Crimes
north flank, and only an occasional jeep Branch, USFET, 1946. T h e postwar S S view of
scuttled away to the west of the column. the Malmédy incident is given in Paul Hausser’s
Waflen–SS i m Einsatz (Goettingen, 1953), pp.
2 Ch. VIII. 242–57.
262 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

PEIPER’S TROOPS ON THE ROADTO MALMÉDY

example of Nazi contempt for the ac- either side during the Ardennes battle.4
cepted rules of war; and it would serve The commander of the Sixth SS Panzer
a United States Senator as a stepping- Army took oath in the trials of 1946 that,
stone toward a meteoric career. But the acting on Hitler’s orders, he issued a
Malmédy massacre and the other mur- directive stating that the German troops
ders of 17 December did not complete should be preceded “by a wave of terror
the list chargeable to Peiper and the and fright and that no human inhibi-
troops of the 1st SS Panzer Division. By tions should be shown.” There is con-
20 December Peiper’s command had flicting testimony as to whether the or-
murdered approximately 350 American ders finally reaching Peiper specifically
prisoners of war and at least 100 un- enjoined the shooting of prisoners.
armed Belgian civilians, this total de- There is no question, however, that
rived from killings at twelve different 4Hitler’s order to take no prisoners probably
locations along Peiper’s line of march. had wide circulation. Lt. Col. George Mabry,
So far as can be determined the Peiper commander of the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, has
stated that his unit captured a German colonel
killings represent the only organized and from the Seventh Army who had such a n order.
directed murder of prisoners of war by Ltr, Gen Barton to author, 17 Nov 59.
T H E ENEMY DASH WESTWARD AND OPERATION GREIF 263

MASSACRED AMERICAN SOLDIERS NEAR MALMÉDY

some of Peiper’s subordinates accepted mation was well in the van of the Ger-
the killing of prisoners as a command man attack and was thus in position to
and that on at least one occasion Peiper carry out the orders for the “wave of
himself gave such an order. Why Peiper’s terror” tactic—which might be excused,
command gained the bestial distinction or so Peiper claimed, by the rapid move-
of being the only unit to kill prisoners in ment of his kampfgruppe and its in-
the course of the Ardennes is a subject ability to retain prisoners under guard.
of surmise. Peiper had been an adjutant T h e speed with which the news of the
to Heinrich Himmler and as a battalion Malmédy massacre reached the Ameri-
commander in Russia is alleged to have can front-line troops is amazing but, in
burned two villages and killed all the the perfervid emotional climate of 17
inhabitants. The veteran SS troops he December, quite understandable. The
led in the Ardennes had long experience first survivors of the massacre were
on the Eastern Front where brutality picked up by a patrol from the 291st
toward prisoners of war was a common- Engineer Combat Battalion about 1430
place. On the other hand Peiper’s for- on that date. T h e inspector general of
264 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

the First Army learned of the shootings Americans thus far had shown no disposi-
three or four hours later. Yet by the late tion to throw punches at his north flank.
evening of the 17th the rumor that the Furthermore, the 3 d Parachute Division
enemy was killing prisoners had reached had a clear field to follow up and protect
as far as the forward American divisions. his line of communications, while the 2d
There were American commanders who Panzer Division-so Peiper understood-
orally expressed the opinion that all SS was moving fast in the south and roughly
troops should be killed on sight and abreast of his own advance.
there is some indication that in isolated Peiper had a precisely defined mis-
cases express orders for this were given.5 sion: his kampfgruppe was to seize the
It is probable that Germans who at- Meuse River crossings at Huy, making
tempted to surrender in the days imme- full use of the element of surprise and
diately after the 17th ran a greater risk driving west without regard to any flank
than would have been the case during protection. The importance of this mis-
the autumn campaign. There is no evi- sion had been underlined during the
dence, however, that American troops initial briefing at the command post of
took advantage of orders, implicit or ex- the 1st SS Panzer Division on 14 Decem-
plicit, to kill their SS prisoners. ber when Peiper had been assured that
his command would play the decisive
The point of Peiper’s column reached role in the coming counteroffensive.
Ligneuville sometime before 1300, in There seems to have been some hope ex-
time to eat the lunch which had been pressed among the higher German staffs
prepared for an American detachment that the advance guard elements of both
stationed in the village. Here the road the 1st SS Panzer Division and the Fifth
divided, the north fork going to Mal- Panzer Army’s 2d Panzer Division would
médy, the western leading on to Stavelot. reach the Meuse within twenty-four
Although it was agreed that the armored hours of the time of commitment. T h e
columns should have considerable lee- distance by road, on the 1st SS Panzer
way in choosing the exact routes they Division axis, was between 125 and 150
would follow, a general boundary line kilometers (about 75 to 95 miles). Pei-
gave the 1st SS Panzer Division the per himself had made a test run on 11
southern part of the zone assigned the December to prove that it was possible
I SS Panzer, while the 12th SS Panzer for single tanks to travel 80 kilometers
Division advanced in the northern sector. (50 miles) in one night. Whether an
T h e 12th SS Panzer Division, of course, entire tank column could maintain this
was still back at the line of scrimmage, rate of progress for a day and a night
nor would it break into the clear for in enemy country and on the sharp turns
many hours to come, but all this was un- and grades of the Ardennes road net was
known to Peiper. He did know that the a matter of guesswork. 6
Whatever schedule Peiper was using,
5T h u s Fragmentary Order 27, issued by Head-
quarters, 328th Infantry, on 21 December for the
attack scheduled the following day says: “No SS 6 Peiper later said that if the German infantry
troops or paratroopers will be taken prisoners but had made a penetration by 0700 on 16 December
will be shot on sight.” he could have reached the Meuse the same day.
T H E ENEMY DASH WESTWARD AND OPERATION GREIF 265

if indeed he had any precise timetable of the 7th Armored Division also were
in mind, the kampfgruppe of the 1st SS moving through Stavelot en route to
Panzer Division was making good prog- Vielsalm.
ress and the element of surprise, as T h e small town of Stavelot (popula-
shown by the lack of any formal resist- tion 5,000) lies in the Amblève River
ance, was working to German advantage. valley surrounded by high, sparsely
His path lay straight ahead, through wooded bluffs. Most of the town is built
Stavelot, Trois Ponts, Werbomont, Ouf- on the north bank of the river or on the
fet, Seny, Huy–a distance of some 50 slopes above. There are a few scattered
miles, from where the head of the 1st SS buildings on the south bank. Like most
Panzer Division column stood in Ligneu- of the water courses in this part of the
ville, to Huy and the Meuse. Only Ardennes, the Amblève was no particular
a few short miles to the north lay Mal- obstacle to infantry but the deeply in-
médy and the road to Spa and Liège. cised valley at this point offered hard
Malmédy and the Meuse crossing sites in going to tanks, while the river, by reason
the vicinity of Liège, however, were in of the difficult approaches, was a tougher
the zone assigned the 12th SS Panzer than average tank barrier. Only one
Division. Peiper stuck to his knitting. vehicular bridge spanned the river at
About 1400 the column resumed the Stavelot. T h e sole approach to this
march, taking some time to negotiate the bridge was by the main highway; here
sharp turns and narrow streets in Ligneu- the ground to the left fell away sharply
ville. At the western exit the point and to the right a steep bank rose above
of the column ran onto the trains be- the road.
longing to CCB, 9th Armored Division, Stavelot and its bridge were open for
which was preparing to move east in sup- the taking. The only combat troops in
port of the combat command then en- the town at this time were a squad from
gaged in the St. Vith sector. A couple of the 291st Engineer Combat Battalion
Sherman tanks and a tank destroyer which had been sent from Malmédy to
made a fight for it, demolishing the construct a roadblock on the road lead-
leading Panther and a few other armored ing to the bridge. For some reason Pei-
vehicles. Peiper’s column was delayed for per’s advance guard halted on the south
about an hour. side of the river, one of those quirks in
Advancing along the south bank of the the conduct of military operations which
Amblève, the advance guard reached have critical import but which can never
Stavelot, the point where the river must be explained. Months after the event
be crossed, at dusk. Looking down on the Peiper told interrogators that his force
town the Germans saw hundreds of had been checked by American antitank
trucks, while on the opposite bank the weapons covering the narrow approach
road from Stavelot to Malmédy was to the bridge, that Stavelot was “heavily
jammed with vehicles. Although the defended.” But his detailed description
Germans did not know it, many of these of what happened when the Germans
trucks were moving to help evacuate the attacked to take town and bridge shows
great First Army gasoline dumps north that he was confused in his chronology
of Stavelot and Malmédy. March serials and was thinking of events which tran-
266 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE

spired on 18 December. It is true that tank destroyers in reserve around the


during the early evening of the 17th town square north of the river.
three German tanks made a rush for the Before the riflemen could organize a
bridge, but when the leader hit a hasty defense the German infantry attacked,
mine field, laid by American engineers, captured the tank destroyers south of the
the others turned back–nor were they river, and drove the two platoons back
seen for the rest of the night. across the bridge. Taken by surprise, the
Perhaps the sight of the numerous Americans failed to destroy the bridge
American vehicles parked in the streets structure, and a Panther made a dash
led Peiper to believe that the town was about 0800 which carried it onto the
held in force and that a night attack north bank. More tanks followed. For
held the only chance of taking the bridge some while the Germans were held in
intact. If so, the single effort made by the houses next to the river; an antiair-
the German point is out of keeping with craft artillery battery from the 7th Ar-
Peiper’s usual ruthless drive and daring. mored Division wandered into the fire
Perhaps Peiper accepted the word of his fight and did considerable damage be-
leading troops and failed to establish the fore it went on its way. A company from
true situation for himself. Perhaps he the 202d Engineer Combat Battalion
was interested at this moment only in entered the town and joined in the fray.
closing up his third column, which in By the end of the morning, however, the
march formation extended for fifteen German firing line had been built up to
miles. Perhaps, as he says, Peiper was the point where the Americans could no
waiting for his infantry. Whatever the longer hold inside the village proper,
reason–and it never will be known–the particularly since the hostile tanks were
German kampfgruppe came to a halt on roving at will in the streets.
the night of 17–18 December at the Solis ordered his detachment to retire
Stavelot bridge, forty-two miles from the to the top of the hill above Stavelot, but
Meuse. in the confusion of disengagement the
During the night the First Army fed remaining antitank weapons and all but
reinforcements into Malmédy, for it one of the rifle platoons fell back along
seemed impossible that the Germans the Malmédy road. With German tanks
could forfeit the opportunity to seize the climbing behind the lone platoon and
town. As part of the defense being or- without any means of antitank defense,
ganized here a company of the 526th Solis seized some of the gasoline from the
Armored Infantry Battalion and a pla- Francorchamps dump, had his men pour
toon of 3-inch towed tank destroyers it out in a deep road cut, where there
were ordered to outpost Stavelot. Maj. was no turn-out, and set it ablaze. T h e
Paul J. Solis, commanding this detach- result was a perfect antitank barrier.
ment, began moving his troops into posi- T h e German tanks turned back to
tion just before daybreak: two platoons Stavelot–this was the closest that Kampf-
on the south bank of the river (with a gruppe Peiper ever came to the great
section of tank destroyers at the old road- stores of gasoline which might have
block) ; one platoon with three 57-mm. taken the 1st SS Panzer Division to the
antitank guns and the second section of Meuse River. Solis had burned 124,000
T H E ENEMY DASH WESTWARD AND OPERATION GREIF 267

gallons for his improvised roadblock, but through the deep recesses of the Salm
this was the only part of the First Army’s and Amblève valleys to reach Trois
POL reserve lost during the entire Ar- Ponts, hidden among the cliffs and hills.
dennes operation. Most, however, wind for some distance
While the engagement in Stavelot was through the gorges and along the tor-
still in progress, Peiper turned some of tuous valley floors. One road, a con-
his tanks toward Trois Ponts, the im- tinuation of the paved highway from
portant bridgehead at the confluence of Stavelot, leads immediately from Trois
the Salm and the Amblève. As Peiper Ponts and the valley to the west. This
puts it: “We proceeded at top speed road, via Werbomont, was Peiper’s ob-
towards Trois Ponts in an effort to seize jective.
the bridge there. . . . If we had cap- Company C, 51st Engineer Combat
tured the bridge at Trois Ponts intact Battalion, occupied Trois Ponts, so im-
and had had enough fuel, it would have portant in the itinerary of the kampf-
been a simple matter to drive through gruppe. Quite unaware of the impor-
to the Meuse River early that day.” One tance of its mission, the company had
company of Mark IV tanks tried to reach been ordered out of the sawmills it had
Trois Ponts by following a narrow side been operating as part of the First
road on the near bank of the Amblève. Army’s Winterization and Bridge Tim-
T h e road was almost impassable, and ber Cutting Program, and dispatched
when the column came under American to Trois Ponts where it detrucked
fire this approach was abandoned. T h e about midnight on 17 December. Num-
main part of the kampfgruppe swung bering around 140 men, the company
through Stavelot and advanced on Trois was armed with eight bazookas and ten
Ponts by the highway which followed the machine guns. Maj. Robert B. Yates,
north bank of the river. Things were commanding the force, knew only that
looking up and it seemed that the only the 1111th Engineer Group was prepar-
cause for worry was the lowering level in ing a barrier line along the Salm River
the panzer fuel tanks. Missing in Peiper’s from Trois Ponts south to Bovigny and
calculations was an American gun, the that he was to construct roadblocks at
puny 57-mm. antitank weapon which the approaches to Trois Ponts according
had proven such an impuissant answer to to the group plans. During the night
German tanks. Yates deployed the company at road-
Trois Ponts gains its name from three blocks covering the bridge across the
highway bridges, two over the Salm and Amblève and at the vulnerable highway
one across the Amblève. The road from underpass at the railroad tracks north of
Stavelot passes under railroad tracks as the river. On the morning of 18 Decem-
it nears Trois Ponts, then veers sharply ber a part of the artillery column of the
to the south, crosses the Amblève, con- 7th Armored Division passed through
tinues through the narrow valley for a Trois Ponts, after a detour to avoid the
few hundred yards, and finally turns German armor south of Malmédy; then
west at right angles to cross the Salm and appeared one 57-mm. antitank gun and
enter the main section of the small vil- crew which had become lost during the
lage. A number of roads find their way move of the 526th Armored Infantry
268 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Battalion. Yates commandeered the crew tanks and seven half-tracks, blocking the
and placed the gun on the Stavelot road narrow road for a considerable period.
to the east of the first underpass where When night came the armored point was
a daisy chain of mines had been laid. within some three miles of Werbomont,
A quarter of an hour before noon the an important road center on the main
advance guard of Peiper’s main column, highway linking Liège and Bastogne.
nineteen or twenty tanks, came rolling Then, as the Germans neared a creek
along the road. A shot from the lone (the Lienne) a squad of Company A,
antitank gun crippled or in somewise 291st Engineer Combat Battalion, blew
stopped the foremost German tank, but up the only bridge. Reconnaissance
after a brief skirmish the enemy knocked north and south discovered other
out the gun, killed four of the crew, and bridges, but all were too fragile to sup-
drove back the engineers. The hit on port the Tiger tanks which had come
the lead tank checked the German col- forward with the advance guard. Dur-
umn just long enough to give warning ing the evening one detachment with
to the bridge guards, only a few score half-tracks and assault guns did cross on
yards farther on. They blew the Am- a bridge to the north and swung south-
blève bridge, then the Salm bridge, and west toward Werbomont. Near Chevron
fell back to the houses in the main part this force ran into an ambush, set by a
of town. In the meantime one of the battalion of the 30th Division which had
engineer platoons had discouraged the been sent to head off Peiper, and was cut
German tank company from further to pieces. Few of the Germans escaped.
advance along the side road and it had Since there was nothing left but to dou-
turned back to Stavelot 7. ble back on his tracks, Peiper left a
Frustrated by a battalion antitank gun guard on the bridge at Cheneux and
and a handful of engineers, Kampf- moved his advance guard through the
gruppe Peiper now had no quick exit dark toward the town of Stoumont, situ-
from the valley of the Amblève. With ated on the Amblève River road from
but one avenue remaining the column which the abortive detour had been
turned northward toward La Gleize, made during the afternoon. Scouts
moving through the canyons of the Am- brought in word that Stoumont was
blève on the east side of the river. At strongly held and that more American
La Gleize there was a western exit from troops were moving in from Spa. There
the valley, although by a mediocre, was nothing left but to fight for the town.
twisting road. Nearby, at the hamlet of All through the afternoon of the
Cheneux, the Germans found a bridge 18th, liaison planes from the First Army
intact over the Amblève. This stroke of airstrip at Spa had been skidding under
good luck was countered by bad when the clouds to take a look at Peiper’s
the weather cleared and American fight- tanks and half-tracks. One of these light
er-bombers knocked out two or three planes picked up the advance at Cheneux
and called the Ninth Air Force in to
7 T h e ubiquitous 51st Engineer Combat Bat- work over this force. By the evening of
talion will crop up at many points in this narra-
tive. T h e battalion was awarded a Presidential
18 December Peiper’s entire column,
Citation. now spread over many miles of road,
T H E ENEMY DASH WESTWARD AND OPERATION GREIF 269

had been located and the word flashed troops were being stripped from the
back to First Army headquarters. The Roer front for intervention in the south.
element of surprise, vital to the German The first two divisions to leave the Ninth
plan of a coup .de main at the Meuse, Army area, the 30th Infantry and 7th
was gone. American forces from the 30th Armored, actually were in reserve and
Infantry Division were racing in on out of contact, but when the two started
Peiper from the north, and the 82d Air- moving on 17 December the word was
borne Division was moving with all pos- flashed back to OB WEST almost at
sible speed to the threatened area. once. Again American radio security had
It is doubtful that Peiper realized how failed.
the American net was being spread for
a cast from the north, but he had Operation Greif
experienced enough reverses on 18 De-
cember to feel the stiffening of opposi- During the last days before the great
tion in his path. Radio contact between offensive which would send the German
Peiper and the higher German head- armored spearheads plunging west,
quarters had broken down, the armored Hitler belatedly set about replicating
sending apparatus failing to carry over the winning combination of rapid and
the Ardennes terrain, and the Sixth deep armored penetration, paratroop
Panzer Army was forced to follow attacks in the enemy rear, and in-
Peiper’s progress through intercepted filtration by disguised ground troops
American radio messages. Peiper, on which had functioned so effectively in
the other hand, had little or no in- the western campaign of 1940 and the
formation as to what was happening be- Greek campaign of 1941. T o flesh out
hind him and where the following this combination, a special operation
kampfgruppen of his own division were named Greif (or Condor) was hurriedly
located. A Luftwaffe ultrahigh-fre- organized as an adjunct to the armored
quency radio set was rushed to Peiper operation assigned the 1st SS Panzer
by liaison officer late this day, but its Division. 8
possession did not alter the relative T h e plans for the ground phase of
independence and isolation of Peiper’s Greif consisted of three parts: the seizure
command. intact of at least two bridges across the
Sometime during the night of 18– Meuse by disguised raiding parties, the
19 December the radio link with the prompt reinforcement of any such coup
headquarters of the 1st Panzer Division de main by an armored commando for-
was restored. By this means Peiper may mation; and an organized attempt to
have learned what he already must create confusion in the Allied rear areas
have suspected, that the 30th Infantry through sabotage carried out by jeep
Division was on the move south from parties clad in American uniforms. Later
the American Ninth Army sector. Ger- it would be rumored that a feature of
man reconnaissance and intelligence 8 The origins of this scheme are described by
agencies opposite the U.S. Ninth Army Manteuffel in Frieden and Richardson, eds., T h e
Decisions, p p 272–74. See also B. H. Liddell
had been alert from the first hours of Fatal
Hart, T h e Other Side of the Hill (London:
the counteroffensive for any sign that Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1951).
270 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Operation Greif was the planned as- higher German commanders, had lost
sassination of Allied leaders, notably confidence in airdrop tactics after the
General Eisenhower, but there is no many casualties suffered by the German
evidence of such plotting in the plan. paratroopers in the Crete jump. Then
The idea for the ground operation too, in late 1944 the necessarily lengthy
was probably Hitler’s and the leader, training for paratroop units was a lux-
Lt. Col. Otto Skorzeny, was selected per- ury denied by the huge drain of battle-
sonally by Hitler. Skorzeny had achieved field losses. Apparently it was Model
a considerable reputation as a daring who suggested that paratroop tactics be
commando leader, had rescued Musso- tried once again, but undoubtedly Hitler
lini from the Italians, and had seized seized upon the proposal with alacrity
the Hungarian Regent, Admiral Miklós although there was no longer a single
von Nagybánya Horthy, when the Hun- regular paratroop regiment active in the
garian regime began to waver in its Wehrmacht. Model wanted the jump
loyalties. For Operation Greif, Skorzeny to be made in the Krinkelt area, and
formed the special Panzer Brigade 150 one may wonder what effect such a ver-
(or Brandenburger) numbering about tical attack might have had on the fight
two thousand men, of whom one hun- put up at the twin villages by the Ameri-
dred and fifty could speak English.9 can 2d and 99th Infantry Divisions.
Captured Allied equipment (particu- Hitler, however, had one of his intuitive
larly tanks and jeeps), uniforms, identi- strokes and ordered the jump to be made
fication papers, and the like were hastily north of Malmédy.
collected at the front and sent to Skor- His choice for commander devolved
zeny’s headquarters. The disguised jeep on Col. Friedrich A. Freiherr von der
parties did go into action with varying Heydte, a distinguished and experienced
degrees of success on 16 December, but paratroop officer then commanding the
the Brandenburger Brigade would be Fallschirm Armee Waffen school where
engaged as a unit only in a single and the nominal parachute regiments were
abortive skirmish near Malmédy five being trained as ground troops. Colonel
days later. von der Heydte was ordered to organize
T h e airborne phase of Operation a thousand-man parachute formation for
Greif, whose code name was Hohes immediate use. Four days later von der
Venn, seems to have been completely an Heydte received his tactical mission
afterthought, for the orders setting up from the Sixth SS Panzer Army com-
the operation were not issued until 8 mander during an uncomfortable session
December.10 Hitler, like most of the in which Dietrich was under the in-
fluence of alcohol. T h e paratroopers
9 T h e original Brandenburg Division seems to were to jump at dawn on D-day, first
have been none too happy that Skorzeny’s group opening the roads in the Hohes Venn
was given the name of the Brandenburgers. H.
Kriegsheim, Getarnt, Getauescht und doch Getreu: leading from the Elsenborn-Malmédy
Die Division “Brandenburg” (Berlin, 1958), p. 305. area toward Eupen for the armored
10The story of the Hohes Venn operation is spearhead units, then blocking Allied
given by its leader in MS # P–051, Airborne
Operations: A German Appraisal (Generalmajor documents S.I.R. 1377 (n.d.) and G.R.G.G. 359
Hellmuth Reinhardt) . Cf., the C.S.D.I.C. (U.K.) (c) 24 Sep 45.
T H E ENEMY DASH WESTWARD AND OPERATION GREIF 271

forces if these attempted to intervene. schau, and the bulk of the command and
Colonel von der Heydte was told that the weapons packages were scattered al-
the German armor would reach him most at random. Despite this bad be-
within twenty-four hours. ginning about one hundred paratroopers
T h e preparations for Operation reached the rendezvous at the fork in
Hohes Venn were rushed to completion. the Eupen road north of Mont Rigi.
T h e troops received their equipment Since this group was obviously too weak
and a little jump training (many had for open action, Colonel von der Heydte
never attended jump school) ; 112 war- formed camp in the woods and sent out
weary, Junkers troop-carrier planes were patrols to pick up information and harass
gathered with an ill-assorted group of the Americans in the vicinity. These pa-
pilots, half of whom had never flown trols gathered in stragglers until some
combat missions; 300 dummy figures three hundred paratroopers had as-
were loaded for drops north of Camp sembled, but it was now too late to carry
Elsenborn to confuse the Americans out the planned operation. On the night
(this turned out to be about the most of the 21st the paratroopers were or-
successful feature of the entire oper- dered to find their way back to the Ger-
ation) ; and the pilots and jump-masters man lines believed to be at Monschau.
were given instructions-but no joint Von der Heydte was taken prisoner two
training. It must be said that these prep- days later. T h e tactical effect of this hast-
arations for what would be the first ily conceived and ill-executed operation
German paratroop assault at night and proved to be almost nil although Ameri-
into woods left much to be desired. can commanders did dispatch troops on
On the evening of 15 December Colo- wild-goose chases which netted little but
nel von der Heydte formed his compa- a few paratroopers, empty parachutes,
nies to entruck for the move to Pader- and dummies .11
born, where the planes were assembled.
T h e trucks never arrived-they had no
fuel. Now the jump was ordered for 11 T h erepor ts of enemy paratroopers did result
in numerous troop alerts in the American rear
0300 on the 17th. This time the jump areas. For example, the 1102d, 1107th, and 1128th
was made on schedule, although not Engineer Groups were alerted. (VIII Corps, G–3
quite as planned and into very bad cross Jnl, 16 Dec 44.) T h e German soldiery, surprisingly,
were told of Colonel von der Heydte’s failure in
winds. One rifle company was dropped an article entitled “Operation Mass Murder”
behind the German lines fifty kilo- which appeared in the Nachrichten Fur Die
meters away from the drop zone, most Truppe (the German equivalent of T h e Stars and
Stripes) on 22 December 1944. This article, as the
of the signal platoon fell just in front of title implies, is extremely bitter over the lack of
the German positions south of Mon- troop training and preparation.
CHAPTER XII

The First Attacks at St.Vith


St. Vith lay approximately twelve threefold: to insure the complete iso-
miles behind the front lines on 16 De- lation of the troops that might be
cember. This was an average Belgian trapped on the Schnee Eifel, to cover
town, with a population of a little over the German supply lines unraveling be-
2,000 and sufficient billets to house a hind the armored corps to the north
division headquarters. It was and south, and to feed reinforcements
important,
however, as the knot which tied the roads laterally into the main thrusts by using
running around the importantEifel bar- the St. Vith road net. The closest of
rier to the net which fanned out toward the northern armored routes, as these
the north, south, and west. Six paved appeared on the German operations
or macadam roads entered St. Vith. maps, ran through Recht, about five
None of these were considered by the miles northwest of St. Vith. T h e closest
German planners to be major military of the primary armored routes in the
trunk lines, although in the late sum- south ran through Burg Reuland, some
mer of 1944 work had been started to five miles south.
recondition the road running east from St. Vith is built on a low hill sur-
St. Vith to Stadtkyll as a branch of the rounded on all sides by slightly higher
main military system, because normally rises. On the south the Braunlauf Creek
the Schnee Eifel range served as a break- swings past St. Vith and from the stream
water diverting heavy highway traffic so a draw extends to the west edge of the
that it passed to the north or south of town. About a mile and a half to the
St. Vith. (See Map III.) east a large wooded hill mass rises as
In German plans the hub at St. Vith a screen. This is crossed by the road to
was important, but it was not on the axis Schönberg, which then dips into the Our
of any of the main armored thrusts. The valley and follows the north bank of the
German armored corps advancing river until the Schönberg bridge is
through the northeastern Ardennes were reached, approximately six miles from
slated to swing wide of the Schnee Eifel St. Vith.
and St. Vith, the I SS Panzer Corps On the morning of 16 December the
passing north, the L V I I I Panzer Corps messages reporting the initial German
passing south. But despite admonitions attacks in the 106th Division positions
from the German High Command that were punctuated for the division staff
the armored spearheads should race for- by occasional large-caliber shells falling
ward without regard to their flanks it in St. Vith. This fire was quite ineffectual
was obvious that St. Vith had to be and there was little comprehension in
taken early in the game. T h e reason was these early hours of the serious nature
T H E FIRST ATTACKS A T ST. VITH 273

of the German attack. T h e attachment wire to ask for artillery interdiction of


of CCB, 9th Armored Division, to the highway. The combat engineer bat-
the 106th Division late in the morning talion deployed about two miles east
promised such aid as then seemed neces- of St. Vith along the outer edge of a
sary, but Hoge’s command post was at pine forest fringing the ridge mask over
Monschau and he would not receive his which climbs the road from Schönberg.
orders from Jones until about 1800. As Here forty men or so of the 81st Engineer
a result CCB began its move for St. Vith Combat Battalion (106th Division)
about 2000 on the 16th. joined the 168th. CCB, 9th Armored Di-
As the size and direction of the first vision, had passed St. Vith en route to
enemy effort began to assume some aid the 424th Infantry, and a platoon of
shadowy form on the situation maps Troop C, 89th Cavalry Squadron, was
in the corps and division headquarters, commandeered to reinforce the watch
General Middleton advised the 106th east of the town.1 This little force was
Division commander that he could use digging in when, at noon, the first
the 168th Engineer Combat Battalion, enemy patrols were sighted.
which was engaged in routine duties
around St. Vith and Vielsalm. This bat- T h e 7th Armored Division
talion (Lt. Col. W. L. Nungesser) Move to St. Vith
was at about half strength–attendance
at schools or special assignments account- When the counteroffensive began, the
ed for the rest. T h e men had not been 7th Armored Division (Brig. Gen. Rob-
given any recent training in the use ert W. Hasbrouck) was in the XIII
of bazookas or machine guns; a large Corps reserve, planning for possible
percentage of the machine gunners commitment in the Ninth Army Oper-
would therefore be killed in the fight ation DAGGER intended to clear the Ger-
for St. Vith. At 1030 on 17 December, mans from the west bank of the Roer
reports of the German penetration from River once the dams were destroyed. 2
the east led General Jones to send the 1 T h e subsequent story of these units is threaded
168th out the St. Vith–Schönberg road together from the VIII Corps G–2 and G–3 jour-
with orders to defend astride the road nals; combat interviews with the VIII Corps staff
and the 168th Engineer Battalion; the separate
at the village of Heuem. While en route, troop histories in the 89th Cavalry Reconnais-
the engineers met troopers of the 32d sance Squadron, AAR; the 168th Engineer Combat
Cavalry who had been involved in a run- Battalion AAR; and the journals of CCB, 9th
Armored. (The AAR of the latter is worthless
ning fight along the road west of Schön- and the journals are very confused; they do,
berg. Heuem, they reported, was in however, have many map overlays from which the
enemy hands and a German column was action can be traced.)
2T h e history of the 7th Armored in the battle
heading straight for St. Vith. of St. Vith is better documented than any part
On the morning of the 17th Colonel of the Ardennes story, with the sole exception of
the defense of Bastogne. All of the units organic
Slayden, VIII Corps’ assistant G–2, and to this command prepared AAR’s, including the
Lt. Col. Earle Williams, the 106th division trains and artillery. T h e unit journals,
Division signal officer, while doing in- as is common in an armored division, are rather
slim, although, in this case, fairly accurate. A
dependent scouting east of St. Vith, had quite complete and accurate account was prepared
seen the enemy and tapped the signal by one of the participants, Maj. Donald P. Boyer,
274 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

The division, assembled about fifteen General Middleton outlined the mission:
miles north of Aachen, had taken no one combat command would be pre-
part as a unit in the November pared to assist the 106th Division, a
drive toward the Roer, although com- second could be used if needed, but
panies and battalions on occasion had under no circumstances was the third to
been attached to attacking infantry di- be committed. T h e decision was left to
visions. The period of rest and refitting, General Hasbrouck, who first was to con-
after heavy fighting at Metz and in Hol- sult with the 106th Division as to how
land, had put the 7th Armored in good and when his leading combat command
condition. When General Bradley and would be employed. Even at this hour
the 12th Army Group staff met in the the scope of the German counteroffen-
afternoon of the 16th to make a tenta- sive was but dimly seen and the 7th Ar-
tive selection of divisions which could be mored Division advance party was in-
taken from other fronts to reinforce the formed that it would not be necessary
Ardennes sector, the choice in the north to have the artillery accompany the com-
fell on Hasbrouck’s command. Actually bat command columns–in other words
there were armored divisions in the this would not be a tactical march from
First Army closer to the scene, but they Heerlen to Vielsalm.
had been alerted for use in the first The movement plans prepared by the
phases of the attacks planned to seize First Army staff assigned General Has-
the Roer River dams (a design not brouck two routes of march: an east
abandoned until 17 December) and as route, through Aachen, Eupen, Mal-
yet little sense of urgency attached to médy, and Recht, on which CCR would
reinforcements in the VIII Corps area. move; a west route, through Maastricht,
General Hasbrouck received a tele- Verviers, and Stavelot, which would be
phone call at 1730 alerting his division used by the main body of the division.
for movement to the south (it took five The division artillery, which had been
more hours for the 7th Armored G–2 firing in support of the XIII Corps, was
to learn that “three or four German di- not to displace until the late morning of
visions were attacking”) . Two hours 17 December, when it would move on
later while the division assembled the eastern route. Shortly after midnight
and made ready, an advance party left the Ninth Army was informed that the
the division command post at Heerlen, two columns would depart at 0330 and
Holland, for Bastogne where it was to 0800; actually the western column moved
receive instructions from the VIII Corps. out at 0430. T h e estimated time of ar-
Vielsalm, fourteen miles west of St. Vith rival was 1400, 17 December, and of
by road, had already been designated as closure 0200, 18 December. A couple of
the new assembly area. At Bastogne hours earlier the First Army headquar-
ters had told General Middleton that
Jr., in 1947 and was published as S t . Vith: T h e 7th
Armored Division in the Battle of the Bulge, 17– the west column would arrive at 0700
23 December 1944. (I have used Major Boyer’s and close at 1900 on the 17th, and that
original typescript which is written in greater the combat command on the east road
detail.) T h e combat interviews (particularly
those compiled by Robert Merriam) are very in-
would arrive at 1100 and close at 1700.
formative. It was on this estimate that General
T H E FIRST ATTACKS A T ST. VITH 275

Middleton and the 106th Division com- agreed with Jones’s recommendation that
mander based their plans for a counter- his combat command be organized
attack by a combat command of the 7th upon arrival into two task forces and
Armored east of St. Vith early on 17 committed in an attack to clear the St.
December. Vith–Schönberg road. At Schönberg the
Although this failure to make an ac- 7th Armored task forces would turn
curate estimate of the time of arrival south to join CCB of the 9th Armored
in the battle area bore on the fate of Division, already engaged along the road
the two regiments on the Schnee Eifel, to Winterspelt. If successful, the attack
it was merely a single event in the by the two combat commands would pro-
sequence leading to the final encircle- vide escape corridors for the beleaguered
ment and lacked any decisive import. regiments of the 106th.
The business of computing the lateral CCB of the 7th Armored had mean-
movement of an armored division close while been making good progress and
to a front through which the enemy was arrived at Vielsalm about 1100, halting
breaking could hardly attain the exact- just to the east to gas up. Although Viel-
ness of a Leavenworth solution com- salm was only fourteen miles by road
plete with march graphs and tables. from St. Vith, it would be literally a
None of the charts on traffic density com- matter of hours before even the lightly
monly used in general staff or armored armored advance guard could reach St.
school training could give a formula for Vith. The mass of artillery, cavalry, and
establishing the coefficient of “friction” supply vehicles moving painfully
in war, in this case the mass of jeeps, through St. Vith to the west–with and
prime movers, guns, and trucks which without orders–formed a current al-
jammed the roads along which the 7th most impossible to breast. Although the
Armored columns had to move to St. mounted military police platoon in St.
Vith. Also, the transmittal of the 7th Vith had orders to sidetrack the with-
Armored Division’s own estimate of its drawing corps artillery when the armor
possible progress was subject to “fric- appeared, the traffic jam had reached the
tion.” This estimate was received at the point where the efforts of a few MP’s
headquarters of the VIII Corps at 0500 were futile.
on 17 December, the first indication, it General Jones, beset by messages re-
would appear, that the leading armored porting the German advance along the
elements would arrive at 1400 instead Schönberg road, sent urgent requests for
of 0700 as planned. Thus far the Ninth the armor to hurry. At 1300 German
Army had given Hasbrouck no informa- vehicles were seen in Setz, four and a
tion on the seriousness of the situation half miles from the eastern edge of St.
on the VIII Corps front. Vith. Half an hour later three enemy
The advance party sent by General tanks and some infantry appeared be-
Hasbrouck reached St. Vith about fore the 168th Engineer Battalion posi-
0800 on 17 December, reporting to tion astride the St. Vith road. Care-
General Jones, who expected to find lessly dismounting, one tank crew was
the armored columns right behind. Brig. riddled by machine gun fire; a second
Gen. Bruce Clarke, in advance of CCB, tank received a direct and killing blast
276 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

TRAFFIC JAM IN THE ST. VITH AREA

from a bazooka; the third tank and the reinforce the engineers, but the main
infantry withdrew. Another small Ger- body of the reconnaissance battalion de-
man detachment deployed in front of the ployed to screen the northeastern ap-
engineers an hour later was engaged proaches to the Wallerode area. By this
and was finally put to flight by Ameri- time it was obvious to Jones and Clarke
can fighter planes in one of' their few that the main forces of the 7th Armored
appearances over the battlefield on this could not reach St. Vith in time to
day. make a daylight attack. General Has-
About the same time the 87th Cavalry brouck reached St. Vith at 1600–
Reconnaissance Squadron, temporarily it had taken him all of five hours to
under the command of Maj. Charles A. thread his way through the traffic jam
Cannon, Jr., reported to General Clarke between Vielsalm and St. Vith. He found
in St. Vith, the first unit of the 7th that General Jones already had turned
Armored to reach the 106th Division. the defense of St. Vith over to Clarke
Troop B was sent out the east road to and the 7th Armored Division. After a
T H E FIRST ATTACKS A T ST. VITH 277

hasty conference the counterattack was the day may have delayed the arrival of
postponed until the following morning. reinforcements, and air attack certainly
It was just turning dark when the helped to scatter the most advanced Ger-
assistant G–2 of the 7th Armored led man troops. T h e stand made by Troop
a company of tanks and another of B, 32d Cavalry Squadron, near Heuem
armored infantry into St. Vith. This de- and the later fight by the engineers gave
tachment had literally forced its way, the German point an excuse to report-
at pistol point and by threatening to run as it did–the presence of “stubborn re-
down the vehicles barring the road, from sistance” east of St. Vith.
Vielsalm to St. Vith. About this time It seems likely, however, that only
the Germans made another attempt, small German detachments actually
covered by artillery fire, to thrust a few reached the Schönberg–St. Vith road
tanks along the east road. Three Ameri- during the daylight hours of 17 De-
can tank destroyers which had been dug cember. T h e German corps commander,
in at a bend in the road were abandoned General Lucht, had ordered the Mobile
-their crews shelled out by accurate Battalion of the 28th Volks Gren-
enemy concentrations–but the attack adier Division up from reserve during
made no further headway and perhaps the previous night with orders to ad-
was intended only as a patrol action. vance via Andler. (It will be remem-
T h e 106th Division now could report, bered that the 18th Volks Grenadier
“We have superior force in front of St. Division was charged with the encircle-
Vith.” ment and capture of St. Vith.) T h e
Why did the L X V I Corps fail Mobile Battalion (comprising three
to make a determined push toward St. platoons of assault guns, a company of
Vith on 17 December? German assault engineers, and another of fusiliers) did
guns or tanks had been spotted west of not arrive at Schönberg until after noon.
Schönberg as early as 0850. By noon During the morning the division com-
German infantry were in Setz, with at mander had led a battalion of the 294th
least five hours of daylight remaining Regiment to Schönberg, but seems to
and less than five miles to go, much of have halted there (perhaps to secure the
that distance being uncontested. By mid- Schönberg bridge against recapture) ,
afternoon the enemy had reached the sending only small detachments against
168th Engineer positions less than two Troop B at Heuem. With the arrival
miles from St. Vith. Yet at no time dur- of the assault guns some attempt was
ing the day did the Germans use more made to probe the American defenses
than three assault guns and one or two east of St. Vith. This, however, was not
platoons of infantry in the piecemeal the main mission assigned the advance
attacks west of Schönberg. The succes- guard of the 18th Volks Grenadier Divi-
sive concentrations laid by the Ameri- sion, for the original plan of advance
can artillery on Schönberg and both sides had called on the Mobile Battalion to
of the road west–from 9 o’clock on- seize the high ground at Wallerode,
must have affected enemy movement northeast of St. Vith, which overlooked
considerably. T h e bombs dropped on the valley road from Schönberg. T h e
Schönberg and its narrow streets late in bulk of the German advance guard, as
278 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

a result, toiled through the woods to- bound traffic.


ward Wallerode, arriving there in the T h e division artillery, finally released
early evening. in the north, took the east route, its
An opportunity had been missed. Per- three battalions and the 203d Antiair-
haps the German command did not craft Battalion moving as a single col-
realize the full extent of the gains won umn. Early on the afternoon of the 17th
in the St. Vith area and was wedded the 440th Armored Field Artillery, lead-
too closely to its prior plans. In any case ing the column, entered Malmédy, only
the German armored reserve was not to be greeted with the sign THIS ROAD
available. Tanks of the Fuehrer Begleit UNDERENEMY FIRE. T h e town square
Brigade, theoretically attached to the was a scene of utter confusion. Trucks
LXVI Corps but subject to commitment loaded with soldiers and nurses from a
only on army orders, would not be re- nearby hospital, supply vehicles, and
leased for use at St. Vith until too late civilians of military age on bicycles ed-
for a successful coup de main. died around the square in an attempt
On the movement of the main body to get on the road leading out to the
of the 7th Armored Division on 17 De- west; a battalion from a replacement
cember hung the fate of St. Vith. Behind depot threaded its way on foot between
the reconnaissance and advance elements the vehicles, also en route to the west.
the bulk of the division moved slowly All that the artillery could learn was
southward along the east and west lines that a German tank column was south
of march, forty-seven and sixty-seven of Malmédy. This, of course, was the
miles long, respectively. T h e division panzer detachment of the 1st SS Panzer
staff knew little of the tactical situation Division.
and nothing of the extent to which the T h e 440th Armored Field Artillery
German armored columns had penetrat- Battalion, unable to reverse itself,
ed westward. It is probable that night- turned west to Stavelot and subsequently
flying German planes spotted the Ameri- joined the western group on its way to
can columns in the early hours of the Vielsalm. Alerted by radio from the
17th, but it is doubtful that the tank 440th, Maj. W. J. Scott (acting in
columns of the Sixth Panzer Army travel- the absence of the artillery commander
ing west on roads cutting across the 7th who had gone ahead to report at the
Armored routes were aware of this division headquarters) turned the col-
American movement. Actually CCR of umn around in the square and to avoid
the 7th Armored, on the eastern route, the narrow and congested road led it
came very close to colliding with the back toward Eupen, cutting in to the
leading tank column of the 1st SS western divisional route at Verviers.
Panzer Division south of Malmédy but This roundabout move consumed the
cleared the road before the Germans daylight hours and through the night
crossed on their way west. T h e western the gun carriages streamed along the
column made its march without coming Verviers-Vielsalm road. The main artil-
in proximity to the west-moving German lery column again missed the 1st SS Pan-
spearheads, its main problem being to zer Division by only a hair’s breadth.
negotiate roads jammed with west- As Battery D, 203d Antiaircraft (AW)
THE FIRST ATTACKS A T ST. VITH 279

Battalion, at the tail of the column, northern and northeastern approaches


rolled through Stavelot about 0800 on to St. Vith. T o the right of the cavalry
the morning of 18 December, it found the most advanced units of CCB had
itself in the middle of a fire fight be- reinforced the 168th Engineer Combat
tween the advance guard of the 1st SS Battalion on the Schönberg road and
Panzer Division and a small American pushed out to either side for some dis-
force of armored infantry, engineers, tance as flank protection. During the
and tank destroyers. T h e battery swung night, CCB, 9th Armored Division, and
its quadruple machine guns around for the 424th Infantry withdrew across the
ground laying and moved into the fight, Our River and established a defensive
firing at the enemy assembling along the line along the hill chain running from
banks of the Amblève River, which northeast of Steinebrück south to Burg
here ran through the south edge Reuland; these troops eventually made
of the town. After an hour or so the contact with the advance elements of
battery turned once again and, taking CCB, 7th Armored Division. Some six
no chances, circled wide to the west. It or seven miles west of Burg Reuland,
finally arrived in the division assembly CCA of the 7th Armored had assembled
area east of Vielsalm late in the after- near Beho.
noon. T h e bulk of the artillery column West of St. Vith, in position to give
closed at Vielsalm during the morning, close support, were located the 275th
although the last few miles had to be Armored Field Artillery Battalion (Lt.
made against the flow of vehicles surg- Col. Roy Udell Clay) and the remainder
ing from the threatened area around St. of CCB. T h e 275th, reinforced by the
Vith. 16th Armored Field Artillery Battalion,
While the 7th Armored Division artil- and three batteries of corps artillery,
lery was working its way onto the west fired through the night to interdict the
road during the evening of 17 December, eastern approaches to St. Vith; this was
most of the division assembled in the St. all the artillery support remaining to the
Vith area along positions roughly indic- American troops in this sector. T h e
ative of an unconsciously forming per- 112th Infantry, now beginning to fold
imeter defense. From Recht, five miles back to the north as the center of the
northwest of St. Vith, to Beho, seven 28th Division gave way, was no longer
miles to the southwest of the 106th Divi- in contact with the 424th Infantry, its
sion headquarters, the clockwise dis- erstwhile left flank neighbor, but the
position of the American units was as axis of withdrawal ultimately would
follows. At Recht were located the com- bring the 112th Infantry to piece out
mand post of CCR and the rear head- the southern sector of the defense slowly
quarters of CCB, with the 17th Tank forming around St. Vith.
Battalion assembled to the southeast. While it is true that an outline or
The disorganized 14th Cavalry Group trace of the subsequent St. Vith perim-
was dispersed through the area between eter was unraveling on the night of
Recht and Poteau. East of Hunningen the 17–18 December, this was strictly fortui-
87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron tous. General Jones and General Has-
(–) had formed roadblocks to bar the brouck still expected that CCB would
280 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

make its delayed drive east of St. Vith The headquarters of CCR, 7th Ar-
on the morning of the 18th. T h e strengthmored, opened in Recht in midafter-
of the German forces thrusting west was noon of the 17th. At that time the com-
not yet fully appreciated. Information bat command retained only the 17th
on the location of the enemy or the Tank Battalion (assembled to the south-
routes he was using was extremely vague east) because its armored infantry bat-
and generally several hours out of date. talion had been diverted to St. Vith.
Communication between the higher About 2045 CCR got its first word of the
American headquarters and their sub- Germans it had so narrowly missed when
ordinate units was sporadic and, for long the driver for the division chief of staff,
periods, nonexistent. Late in the evening Col. Church M. Matthews, appeared at
of the 17th and during the morning of the command post with the report that
the 18th, however, the scope and direc- during the afternoon he had run afoul
tion of the German drive thrusting past of a large tank column near Pont and
St. Vith in the north became more clear- that the colonel was missing.3 These Ger-
ly discernible as the enemy struck in a mans, of course, were part of the north-
series of attacks against Recht, Poteau, ern column. Lt. Col. Fred M. Warren,
and Hünningen. acting commanding officer, sent the
driver on to division headquarters to tell
T h e Enemy Strikes at the his story, and at the same time he asked
St. Vith Perimeter for a company of infantry. He then or-
dered the 17th Tank Battalion (Lt. Col.
The 1st SS Panzer Division, forming John P. Wemple) to send a tank com-
the left of the I SS Panzer Corps advance pany into Recht. Warren and Wemple
in the zone north of St. Vith, had studied the road net as shown on the
driven forward on two routes. The map and agreed to try to hold Recht
northern route, through Stavelot and the through the night. Stragglers came pour-
Amblève River valley, carried the main ing through Recht in the meantime with
strength of the division, led by its pan- rumors and reports of the enemy just
zer regiment. It was the first group in behind them. T h e headquarters and
this northern column which CCR had tank company had little time to get set,
unwittingly eluded and from which the for about 0200 the advance guard of
tail of the 7th Armored artillery column the southern German column hit the
had glanced at Stavelot. The southern village from the east and northeast. Un-
route, through Recht and Vielsalm, willing to risk his tanks without infantry
was assigned to a kampfgruppe of the protection in a night fight through nar-
1st SS Panzer Division made up of a row streets, and uncertain of the
reinforced panzer grenadier regiment enemy strength, Warren ordered a with-
and a battalion of assault guns. This drawal after a sharp 45-minute engage-
group had been delayed by poor roads ment. CCR headquarters started down
and American mine fields west of Man-
derfeld, and by the end of 17 December 3 Colonel Matthews’ body. was discovered about a
month later. Col. John L . Ryan, Jr.. who had
it was some hours behind the north col- commanded CCR, became the 7th Armored chief
umn. of staff.
T H E FIRST ATTACKS A T ST. VITH 281

the road southwest toward Vielsalm, and mand group was ambushed near Recht
the tanks rejoined Wemple. (Colonel Devine and two of his officers
Made cautious by the collision at escaped on foot).
Recht, the German column moved slow- Early on the 18th, Lt. Col. Augustine
ly, putting out feelers to the southeast Duggan, senior of the remaining staff,
before the main force resumed the intercepted elements of the 18th Squad-
march southwest along the Vielsalm ron, part of Troop C, 32d Squad-
road. Wemple and his tankers were able ron, and the one remaining platoon of
to repel these probing attempts without towed 3-inch guns from the 820th Tank
difficulty. CCR headquarters had mean- Destroyer. These were placed under the
while become ensnarled with the rem- command of Maj. J. L. Mayes as
nants of the 14th Cavalry Group and the a task force to comply with the orders
residue of the corps artillery columns from division. With great difficulty the
at the little village of Poteau, where the task force vehicles were sorted out, lined
roads from Recht and St. Vith join en the road, and then turned about and
route to Vielsalm. This crossroads ham- faced toward Recht. Mayes’s group
let had been the worst bottleneck in moved out from the crossroads at first
the traffic jam on 17 December; indeed light on 18 December but had gone only
the situation seems to have been com- some two hundred yards when flame shot
pletely out of hand when the CCR head- up from the leading light tank and an
quarters arrived in the early morning armored car, the two struck almost si-
hours and succeeded in restoring some multaneously by German bazooka fire.
order. The glare thrown over the snow sil-
On the afternoon of 17 December the houetted the figures of enemy infantry-
14th Cavalry Group commander had men advancing toward the Poteau cross-
ordered the remnants of his two squad- roads. The task force pulled back into
rons to fall back to Recht. Through the village and hastily prepared a de-
some confusion in orders both squadrons fense around the dozen or so houses
got onto the St. Vith–Poteau highway, there, while to the north a small cavalry
although three reconnaissance teams did patrol dug in on a hill overlooking the
reach Recht and took part in the action hamlet and made a fight of it. By this
there. About midnight orders from the time the last of the milling traffic was
106th Division arrived at the group head- leaving Poteau; eight 8-inch howitzers
quarters which had been set u p in Po- of the 740th Field Artillery Battalion
teau: the cavalry were to return to Born, were abandoned here as the German
which they had just evacuated, and fire increased, ostensibly because they
occupy the high ground. By this time could not be hauled out of the mud
most of the 32d Squadron had threaded onto the road.
their way south through Poteau, appar- All through the morning the enemy
ently unaware that the group had es- pressed in on Poteau, moving his ma-
tablished a command post there. Short- chine guns, mortars, and assault guns
ly after dark Colonel Devine departed closer and closer. At noon the situation
with most of his staff for the 106th was critical, the village was raked by
Division command post, but this com- fire, and the task force was no longer
282 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

in communication with any other Ameri- CCB. This was risky business at best.
cans. Colonel Duggan finally gave the The divisional artillery would not be in
order to retire down the road to Viel- position to support the attack. T h e
salm. Three armored cars, two jeeps, and similar effort by CCB, 9th Armored Divi-
one light tank were able to disengage sion, had been called off and the Ameri-
and carried the wounded out; apparent- can forces south of the 422d Infantry
ly a major part of the force was able and 423d Infantry had withdrawn be-
to make its way to Vielsalm on foot. hind the Our. That the German strength
During the early morning Headquar- was increasing was made apparent by
ters, CCR, set out from Poteau, head- the events during the night of 17–18
ing down the valley road toward Viel- December, but the 7th Armored light
salm. At the small village of Petit Thier observation planes were not available
it was discovered that a lieutenant from for scouting the enemy dispositions or
the 23d Armored Infantry Battalion, movements east of St. Vith. General
separated from his column on the march Clarke was well aware of the chancy
south, had heard the firing at Poteau nature of this enterprise and, at 0645,
and had rounded up a collection of when reporting to Colonel Ryan, the
stray tanks, infantry, cavalry, and engi- division chief of staff, pointed out that
neers to block the way to Vielsalm.4 T h e General Hasbrouck still had the option
CCR commander took over this road- of canceling the attack.
block and, as the force swelled through It would be the enemy, however, and
the day with incoming stragglers and not a command decision that forced the
lost detachments, extended the position abandonment of the proposed effort.
west of the village. T h e German column About 0800 the Germans launched a re-
at Poteau, however, made no attempt to connaissance in force northeast of St.
drive on to Vielsalm. The main body Vith, advancing from Wallerode to-
of the 1st SS Panzer Division needed ward Hünningen. Here, only two thou-
reinforcements. T h e panzer grenadier sand yards from St. Vith, two troops of
regiment and the assault guns therefore the 87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squad-
were ordered off their assigned route and ron and a few antiaircraft half-tracks
turned northeast to follow the column offered the sole barrier to a thrust into
through Stavelot. the city. Who made up the enemy force
T h e 7th Armored counterattack from and its strength is uncertain–probably
St. Vith to relieve the two trapped regi- this was the Mobile Battalion of the 18th
ments of the 106th Division had been Yolks Grenadier Division, making the
postponed on the 17th, not canceled. preliminary move in the scheme to en-
During the early morning hours of 18 circle St. Vith. In any event enough
December preparation was completed pressure was exerted during the morn-
for the attack on Schönberg by the 31st ing to drive the small American screen-
Tank Battalion and the 23d Armored ing force back toward St. Vith.
Infantry Battalion, now brigaded under As the cavalry commenced its delay-
ing action a hurried call went out to
4T h i s outfit was called Task Force Navaho, so CCB, 9th Armored, for tanks and anti-
named because its leader had worked his way
through college selling Indian blankets. tank guns. Moving through St. Vith,
T H E FIRST ATTACKS A T ST. VITH 283

two companies from the 14th Tank Bat- too, the artillery belonging to the divi-
talion (Maj. Leonard E. Engeman) and sion had been turned inward against the
one from the 811th Tank Destroyer Bat- Schnee Eifel pocket on 18 December;
talion took over the fight. One company only one battalion got up to the Schön-
of Shermans circled in the direction of berg-St. Vith road. 5
Wallerode, falling on the enemy flank T h e attacks made east of St. Vith on
while the tank destroyers contained the 18 December were carried by a part
head of the German column on the Hün- of the 294th Infantry, whose patrols had
nange road. Both American units were been checked by the 168th Engineers the
able to drive forward and the Shermans previous day. Three times the grenadiers
knocked out six light panzers or as- tried to rush their way through the fox-
sault guns. By this time the 7th Armored hole line held by the 38th Armored
plans for the Schönberg attack were Infantry Battalion (Lt. Col. William
definitely off and a company from the H. G. Fuller) and B Troop of the 87th
31st Tank Battalion joined in the affair. astride the Schönberg road. The second
American losses were small, the Ger- attempt, just before noon, was made
man foray was checked, and before the under cover of a creeping barrage laid
day closed the Hiinningen position was down by the German artillery battalion
restored, but it was clear that the enemy near Schönberg and momentarily shook
now was concentrating to the north as the American firing line. But the ar-
well as to the east of St. Vith. mored infantry, rallied by their officers
Like the probing thrust at Hünnange, and aided by Nungesser’s engineers,
the German efforts on the road east drove back the attackers. T h e last Ger-
of St. Vith during 18 December were man assault, begun after a two-hour fire
advance guard actions fought while the fight, made a dent in the center of the
main German force assembled. T h e 18th 38th Armored Infantry line. Again the
Volks Grenadier Division, charged with 168th Engineers gave a hand, the bulk of
the initial attack against St. Vith, actually the 23d Armored Infantry Battalion
was riding two horses at the same time, appeared to reinforce the line east of
attempting to close up for a decisive St. Vith, and by dark all lost ground had
blow at St. Vith while maintaining the been retaken. During this entire action
northern arc of the circle around the the 275th Armored Field Artillery Bat-
Americans on the Schnee Eifel. This talion, emplaced along the Recht road
tactical problem was made more diffi- northwest of St. Vith, fired concentration
cult for the 18th Volks Grenadier Divi- after concentration against the enemy
sion and the L X V I Corps by the traffic thrusting against the 38th and the engi-
situation on the roads east and north neers. Observation was poor–the 18th
of Schönberg where columns belonging was a day of low-hanging fog–but the
to the Sixth SS Panzer Army were swing- nine hundred rounds plunging onto the
ing out of their proper zone. Although Schönberg road did much to check the
the corps commander, General Lucht, grenadiers,
personally intervened to “rank” the in-
truders out of the area he seems to have 5 T h e German operations are discussed in MSS
# B–333 (Lucht). and B–688 (Moll). See also
been only moderately successful. Then, ETHINT #21.
284 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Although the 18th Volks Grenadier eral Hoge, CCB commander, was or-
Division was able, on this third day of dered to hurry to the 106th headquarters
the counteroffensive, to push some of its where he was told of the threat develop-
troops close in toward St. Vith, the 62d ing north of St. Vith. When he sent
Volks Grenadier Division on the left back orders for the emergency task force
had moved more slowly. Despite the from CCB to hasten north, the cavalry
American withdrawal from the Winter- troop was included. Covered by one re-
spelt-Heckhuscheid area and the connaissance platoon and the cavalry as-
promptings of the impatient commander sault guns, sited near the bridge, the
of the L X V I Corps, the 62d only remaining platoons of Troop D had left
tardily brought itself into conformity their positions and started filing toward
with the forward kampfgruppen of the the. Steinebrück–St. Vith road when
18th Volks Grenadier Division. T h e suddenly the movement order was can-
164th Regiment, reinforced by engineers celed. T h e cavalry had been under fire
and assault guns, apparently took some since daybreak, and when the 2d Pla-
time to re-form after its fight with toon attempted to return to its position
the 9th Armored Division counterattack on a commanding hill between Steine-
force on 17 December. Although Ger- brück and Weppler it was forced to move
man patrols continued up the road to dismounted in a rain of bullets and
Steinebrück, attempting in vain to seize shells. At the Steinebrück bridge the en-
the bridge during the night, the attack emy increased in number as the morning
was not pressed until after daylight on progressed, slipping into positions on the
the following morning. Two of the south bank under cover given by ex-
three Our bridges chosen for capture in ploding smoke shells. To counter this
the L X V I Corps’ plan now were in Ger- threat the light tank platoon moved in-
man hands, but the bridge at Steine- to Steinebrück, leaving the American
brück still had to be taken. left uncovered. About the same time the
The bend in the Our River near provisional rifle company west of Steine-
Steinebrück necessitated a switch in the brück took off and one of the cavalry
new American positions on the far bank; platoons had to be switched hastily to
thus while the main frontage held by cover this gap.
the 424th and CCB, 9th Armored, faced Thus far the all-important bridge had
east, the line at Steinebrück faced south, been left intact, for there was still some
then swung back until it again faced hope that the 423d Infantry, at the least,
east. In this sector Troop D, 89th might free itself from the Schnee Eifel
Cavalry Reconnaissance Battalion, plus trap. By noon the situation was such that
a light tank platoon and an assault gun the little group of troopers dared delay
platoon, was deployed along the 3,000- no longer. On General Hoge’s order a
yard stretch between Steinebrück and platoon of armored engineers went down
Weppler, its left flank in the air at the and blew the bridge–almost in the teeth
latter village, its right more or less se- of the grenadiers on the opposite bank.
cured by a provisional company from the An hour later the platoon west of the
424th Infantry west of Steinebrück. village saw an enemy column of horse-
On the morning of 18 December Gen- drawn artillery driving into position.
T H E FIRST ATTACKS A T ST. VITH 285

The American gunners in the group- and the two decided that the combat
ment west of Lommersweiler immedi- command should withdraw from the
ately answered the cavalry call for aid, river northwest to slightly higher ground.
apparently with some effect: yet within Commencing at dark, the move was
the hour at least a part of the twenty- made without trouble and CCB settled
two enemy guns counted here were in along an arc whose center was about
action, firing in preparation for an as- two and a half miles southeast of St.
sault across the river. It would seem that Vith. In this position the combat com-
a German rifle company first crossed mand blocked the main Winterspelt–
into Weppler, now unoccupied, then St. Vith highway and the valley of the
wheeled and encircled the 2d Platoon Braunlauf Creek, a second natural cor-
on the hill. Only five Americans es- ridor leading to St. Vith. T h e gap be-
caped.6 Two or more companies crossed tween Hoge’s command and CCB, 7th
near the blasted bridge and by 1530, Armored, which at dark had been 3,000
despite the continual pounding admin- yards across, closed during the night
istered by the 16th Armored Field Artil- when a light tank company and an anti-
lery Battalion and the rapid fire from the aircraft battery came in. Later, liaison
cavalry tank, assault, and machine guns, was established with the 424th Infantry
had nearly encircled Troop D. A cavalry on the right, which had been out of
request for medium tanks perforce was contact with the enemy during the day
denied; the tank companies sent north and remained in its river line position.
to Hünningen had not yet returned and Although the 62d Volks Grenadier Divi-
General Hoge had no reserve. A com- sion was quick to occupy the ground
pany of the 27th Armored Infantry Bat- vacated by CCB, no attempt was made
talion, however, was put in to cover the to follow into the new American posi-
cavalry left flank. With the enemy infan- tion.
try inside Steinebrück and excellent During the afternoon of 18 December
direct laying by the German gunners while the combat commands of the 7th
picking off the American vehicles one and 9th Armored Divisions were fight-
by one, the cavalry withdrew along the ing holding actions along the eastern
St. Vith road. front of the St. Vith area, General Has-
The CCB position at the Our (where brouck engaged in an attempt to restore
two companies of armored infantry, a the northern flank of the 7th Armored
company each of light and medium in the Poteau sector. The opportunity
tanks, plus the reconnaissance company, for a decisive American counterattack to-
were deployed on a front over 4,000 ward Schönberg was past, if indeed it
yards) was no longer tenable. There had had ever existed, and Hasbrouck’s im-
been no contact whatever with the 424th mediate concern was to establish his divi-
Infantry to the south. General Hoge con- sion north flank in a posture of defense
ferred with General Jones at St. Vith in the St. Vith–Vielsalm area. T h e loss
6 2d Lt. R. L. Westbrook commanded this pla- of the vital road junction at Poteau,
toon. Although severely wounded he led the sur- earlier in the day, made the connection
vivors to safety, then went back to his platoon’s between the forces of the division at
position to search for stragglers. He was given
the DSC. St. Vith, around Recht, and in the Viel-
286 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

salm assembly area, more difficult and less in the hands of the 7th Armored,
tenuous. Then too, it appeared that the with a defensive arc forming north, east,
enemy was concentrating in Recht and and southeast of St. Vith, and with the
might try an attack through Poteau to Vielsalm–Petit Thier area under con-
Vielsalm. CCA (Col. Dwight A. Rose- trol in the west, the next step was to
baum) , watching the southern flank of block the possible routes of approach
the 7th Armored around Beho, had not from the south and southwest. Nearly
yet met the Germans (who were in fact all the American units in the St. Vith
driving past to the west, but on roads area were already committed; all that
south of Beho) . General Hasbrouck de- General Hasbrouck could do was to
cided to leave a small force as observers station a light tank company, a company
around Beho and commit CCA to re- of armored engineers, the headquarters
cover Poteau. battery of an antiaircraft battalion, and
At noon the 48th Armored Infantry a reconnaissance troop piecemeal in a
Battalion and the 40th Tank Battalion series of small villages south and west
(–) , representing the bulk of CCA, of Beho. At best these isolated detach-
rolled through St. Vith and out along the ments could serve only as pickets for the
Vielsalm road. As the leading tank pla- 7th Armored, but fortunately the Ger-
toon hove in sight of Poteau it came man columns continued marching west.
immediately under small arms and as- One brief engagement was fought on
sault gun fire. The few houses here were the 18th at Gouvy, a rail and road junc-
separated by an abandoned railroad cut, tion southwest of Beho. T h e headquar-
just south of the crossroads, which ran ters battery, 440th Antiaircraft (AW)
east and west. Colonel Rosebaum sent Battalion (Lt. Col. Robert O. Stone),
the tank platoon and an armored in- and a light tank platoon had been sent
fantry company to clear the houses south to set up an outpost at the village. As
of the cut. This action continued they approached Gouvy station, a rail-
through the afternoon, while tanks and road stop south of the village, they ran
assault guns played a dangerous game afoul of three German tanks which were
of hide-and-seek from behind the houses just coming in from the south. T h e Ger-
and the American infantry tried to knock mans started a dash to sweep the column
out the German machine guns enfilading broadside, but the first shot knocked out
the railroad cut. Toward dark the Amer- an air-compressor truck whose unwieldy
icans crossed the northern embankment hulk effectively blocked the road. After
and reached the road junction. Rose- firing their last rounds at the town and
baum posted the infantry company- the column, the German tanks with-
now supported by an entire tank com- drew. When Stone took a look around
pany–to hold the village, cheek by jowl he found himself in charge of a rail-
with the Germans in the northernmost head stock of 80,000 rations-which had
houses. Thus far CCA had no contact been set ablaze by the depot guards-
with CCR headquarters and its scratch an engineer vehicle park, and 350 Ger-
force to the west at Petit Thier because mans in a POW cage. Fortunately the
the road from Poteau was under fire. fire could be checked without too much
With the Poteau crossroad more or damage. Stone then organized a defense
T H E FIRST ATTACKS A T ST. VITH 287

RAILROAD
YARDSAT GOUVY

with the engineers, ordnance, and quar- aid to CCB, east of St. Vith, but there
termaster people on the spot. Unwit- the 275th Armored Field Artillery Bat-
tingly, in the process of “freezing” this talion was in range and already had giv-
heterogeneous command, Stone stopped en a fine demonstration of effective
the westward withdrawal of badly need- support. The 7th Armored trains, which
ed engineer vehicles (carrying earth had reached Salmchâteau by the west-
augers, air compressors, and similar ern route on the morning of the 18th,
equipment) which the VIII Corps com- were sent twenty-two miles west of La
mander was attempting to gather for Roche, partly to keep them out of enemy
work on a barrier line being constructed reach but also because of the possibility
by the corps engineers farther to the that the division might soon have to re-
west. tire behind the Ourthe River. T h e re-
T h e artillery battalions of the 7th Ar- serve available to General Hasbrouck
mored Division were in firing positions was scant for such wide-flung positions:
north and east of Vielsalm at the close some 90-mm. guns from the 814th Tank
of 18 December. They could not give Destroyer Battalion and the provisional
288 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

squadron being formed from the re- Hasbrouck had no doubt that General
mains of the 14th Cavalry Group. Middleton counted on the continued de-
Late in the day General Jones moved fense of the St. Vith road center—this
the 106th command post to Vielsalm, part of the mission needed no reiteration.
setting up near General Hasbrouck’s Since the VIII Corps itself was in posses-
headquarters. T h e orders given the 7th sion of only fragmentary information
Armored Division still held—to assist on the German strength and locations
the 106th Division. In fact, however, there was little to be passed on to the
there was little left of the 106th; so re- division commanders.
sponsibility tended to devolve on the Liaison and staff officers coming
junior commander, Hasbrouck. from Bastogne brought word of only
T h e two generals had only a vague meager American reinforcements any-
idea of what was happening beyond their where in the neighborhood of St. Vith.
own sphere. Telephone service to the One regiment of the 30th Infantry Divi-
VIII Corps headquarters at Bastogne sion was in Malmédy, thirteen or four-
ended on 18 December when that head- teen miles to the north, but the
quarters moved to Neufchâteau. But intervening countryside was swamped

ANTITANK
GUNNERS
GUARDING
A CROSSING
near Vielsalm in the 7th Armored Division
area.
T H E FIRST ATTACKS A T ST. VITH 289

by German columns heading west. The lescing perimeter, the local commanders
82d Airborne Division, it was estimated, acted with considerable freedom and
would reach Werbomont (about the initiative.
same distance northwest of Vielsalm) Although all intention of attempting
on the morning of 19 December, but it to breach the German ring around the
was apparent that in this area also the two regiments of the 106th Division had
enemy barred any solid contact with the been abandoned on 18 December and
St. Vith defenders. At Bastogne the 101st the mission no longer was counterat-
Airborne Division was arriving to take tack, but rather defense in place, there
over the fight at that critical road junc- still was a faint hope that the 422d and
tion, but there were no additional rein- 423d somehow might be able to fight
forcements which General Middleton their way out through Schönberg as Gen-
could employ in plugging the gap be- eral Jones had ordered. During the
tween St. Vith and Bastogne. early morning hours of 19 December
The problem of maintaining control messages from the 423d Infantry (dis-
over the heterogeneous formations in patched at noon on the previous day)
the St. Vith–Vielsalm area or of giv- finally reached Vielsalm. From these
ing complete tactical unity to the de- Jones learned that both regiments had
fense was very difficult. Under sustained begun the attack westward, but no word
German pressure a wholly satisfactory on the progress of the attack followed-
solution never would be achieved. T h e nor did the American outposts on the
piecemeal employment of lower units, Schönberg road catch any sound of fir-
made unavoidable by the march of ing moving west. Finally, late in the
events, resulted in most involved meth- evening, a radio message arrived from
ods of communication. A tank company, the VII Corps: bad weather had inter-
for example, might have to report by vened; the supplies promised the en-
radio through its own battalion head- trapped troops had not been dropped.
quarters, some distance away, which By this time the last bit of hope for
then relayed the message on other chan- the lost regiments must have gone.
nels until it reached the infantry battal- There was one fortunate but unex-
ion to which the tank company was pected event on the 19th. T h e exact
attached. T h e homogeneity of the bat- location and strength of the 112th In-
talion, in American practice the basic fantry, somewhere south of the 424th,
tactical unit, largely ceased to exist, nor were unknown. 7 That a gap existed on
did time and the enemy ever permit any the right of the 424th was known. Early
substantial regrouping to restore this on 19 December word reached General
unity. It is surprising that under the Jones by way of liaison officer that, as
circumstances control and communica- of the previous evening, the 112th In-
tion functioned as well as they did. But fantry was cut off from the 28th Divi-
the 7th Armored Division was a veteran sion and had fallen back from the Our
organization; the general officers in the to the neighborhood of Weiswampach.
area dealt with one another on a very A few hours later more information fil-
co-operative basis; and within the sub-
commands, established around the coa- 7 See above, pp. 204–05.
290 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

tered back to Vielsalm: the 112th had these facts made known. He is extended
withdrawn to Huldange, thus coming and cannot protect the right flank of the
closer to the 7th Armored and 106th. zone between Recht and Poteau. He
Finally, in midafternoon, Colonel Nel- cannot protect Poteau. He needed two
son (commanding the 112th) appeared companies of infantry deployed and one
at the 106th Division command post and in reserve. He is getting infiltration in
reported his situation, and the regiment his rear from the vicinity of Recht. T h e
was taken over by General Jones—a so- woods are so thick that he needs almost
lution subsequently approved by Gen- an infantry platoon to protect three
eral Middleton. Colonel Nelson brought tanks sitting out there. Dismounted in-
a welcome addition to the St. Vith forces. fantry in foxholes control the intersec-
His regiment had lost most of its vehi- tion at Poteau but [it is] covered by
cles, radios, and crew-served weapons enemy fire.” Nevertheless the Poteau
but had suffered relatively light casual- road junction was denied the enemy, and
ties and lost but few stragglers. It was by the close of day patrols had estab-
well in the hand of its commander and lished contact between CCR, to the west,
ready to fight. Jones ordered the 112th and CCA.
Infantry to draw northward on the night At St. Vith enemy pressure failed to
of 19–20December and make a firm con- increase during the 19th, and the Amer-
nection with the southern flank of the ican commanders took advantage of the
424th. breathing spell to reassess their disposi-
Throughout the 19th there were spo- tions for defense. T h e two CCB com-
radic clashes with the enemy around the manders, Clarke and Hoge, given a free
perimeter. T h e threatened sector re- hand by General Jones and General
mained the line from Poteau to St. Vith, Hasbrouck, agreed that in the event of
and from St. Vith along the eastern front any future withdrawal CCB, 9th Ar-
covered by CCB, 7th Armored, and mored Division, might be trapped as
CCB, 9th Armored. At Poteau CCA it then stood because Hoge’s combat
brought more troops into and around command, deployed southeast of St. Vith,
the village, while the enemy fired in had no roads for a direct move west-
from the hill to the north rising along- ward and would be forced to retire
side the Recht road. T h e southern col- through St. Vith. Clarke would hold as
umn of the 1st SS Panzer Division, which long as possible east of the town, but
first had captured the town, was long with both combat commands in its
since gone, hurrying west. But the newly streets St. Vith was an obvious trap. It
committed 9th SS Panzer Division, fol- was decided, therefore, that Hoge should
lowing in its wake via Recht, threw a pull his command back during the com-
large detachment of panzer grenadiers ing night to a new line along the
into the woods around Poteau, either to hills west of the railroad running out
retake the crossroad or to pin the of St. Vith, thus conforming on its left
Americans there. T h e resulting state of with CCB, 7th Armored.
affairs was summed up when the execu- T h e withdrawal was carried out as
tive officer of CCA reported to the divi- planned. A small German attack hit the
sion G–3: “The CO of CCA wanted right flank just as the move was being
T H E FIRST ATTACKS A T ST. VITH 291

made but was checked by fire from the structed by west-moving friendly traffic.
American tank guns and mortars. T h e Having set up installations west of La
armored infantry were now disposed in Roche, the trains’ commander (Col.
the center with the medium tank com- Andrew J. Adams) used his own peo-
panies, which had circled through St. ple and all the stragglers he could find
Vith, at either flank. T h e draw extend- to man roadblocks around the train area.
ing from the south to the west edge of About 1700 two German tanks and a rifle
town served as a boundary between the platoon suddenly struck at one of these
two CCB’s. Because this piece of the positions south of La Roche manned by
front was regarded by both commanders Company C, 129th Ordnance Main-
as potentially dangerous, a tank com- tenance Battalion. T h e ordnance com-
pany and a platoon of tank destroyers pany beat off the Germans, but the ap-
were placed to back up the troops at pearance this far west of enemy troops
the junction point. As part of the re- (probably from the 116th Panzer Divi-
organization on the 19th, CCB, 7th Ar- sion) indicated that not only the 7th
mored, took over the 17th Tank Bat- Armored Division trains but the entire
talion, which had been holding the road division stood in danger of being cut
southeast of Recht. This fleshed out a off from the American force gathering
more or less connected but thin line around Bastogne.
running as a semicircle from south of At the forward command post of the
Recht to a point about a thousand yards 7th Armored in Vielsalm, the Division
east of St. Vith, then curving back to G–4 (Lt. Col. Reginald H. Hodgson)
the southwest where the 424th Infantry sent a message back to Colonel Adams,
and CCB, 9th Armored, met near Gruf- depicting the view of the situation tak-
flange. en by the St. Vith commanders and their
During the 19th the two CCB’s had staffs as the 19th came to a close:
been operating with very limited artil-
lery support, although the 275th Ar- All division units holding firm. Units to
south have apparently been by-passed by
mored Field Artillery Battalion and the some Boche. Army dump at Gouvy was
16th Armored Field Artillery Battalion abandoned by Army but D/40th Tank Bat-
had done yeoman service for their re- talion took the town over. . . . 82 Parachut-
spective combat commands. The arrival ists (82d Airborne Division) now coming
of an additional field artillery battalion up so we can probably get some ammo. . . .
I have no contact with Corps . . . but Corps
belonging to the 7th Armored and two has ordered us to hold and situation well in
155-mm. howitzer batteries of the 965th hand. . . . Hope to see you soon: have sent
Field Artillery Battalion (the only corps you copy of all messages sent you. Hope you
artillery still in the sector) put more don’t think I’m crazy. CG was well pleased
firepower at the disposal of the St. Vith with everything you have done. Congrats.
Don’t move ’til you hear from me.
defenders just at a time when the Ger-
mans were bringing their guns into posi- T h e defense of the St. Vith–Vielsalm
tion east of town. area had taken form by the night of 19
Supply routes to the 7th Armored December. T h e troops within the per-
Division trains were still open, although imeter occupied an “island” with a Ger-
menaced by the roving enemy and ob- man tide rushing past on the north and
292 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

south and rising against its eastern face. Schönberg road. T h e 293d Regiment,
The liquidation of the Schnee Eifel having aided in the capture of the
pocket had freed the last elements of the Schnee Eifel regiments, filed into Schön-
LXVI Corps for use at St. Vith; General berg during the night. T h e division ar-
Lucht now could concentrate on the re- tillery might be in firing position by the
duction of that town. morning of the 20th. T h e 62d Volks
During the day the commanders of Grenadier Division, to the south, finally
Army Group B and the Fifth Panzer brought its inner flank into echelon with
Army joined General Lucht at the com- the left of the 18th near Setz by pivoting
mand post of the 18th Volks Grenadier the 190th Regiment west. T h e division
Division near Wallerode Mill. T h e left wing was formed by the 164th Regi-
LXVI Corps commander left this con- ment, which had occupied Lommers-
ference with orders to encircle St. Vith, weiler and Hemmeres following the
putting his main weight in enveloping withdrawal of CCB, 9th Armored. T h e
moves north and south of the town. Bad main body of the 183d remained in re-
road conditions, the blown bridge at serve at Winterspelt. During the night of
Steinebrück, and continued attempts by 19–20 December the Germans com-
Sixth Panzer Army columns to usurp the pleted a division bridge at Steinebrück
corps main supply road at Schönberg near that destroyed by the American
combined to delay Lucht’s concentra- armored engineers, and division artil-
tion. Lucht ordered a barrier erected at lery and heavy vehicles began their
Schönberg to sift out the interlopers move north and west.
(Lucht and his chief of staff personally T h e real punch in the forthcoming at-
helped make arrests), but this was of tack would be delivered by the tanks
little assistance. Corps and division artil- belonging to the Fuehrer Begleit Bri-
lery was brought forward piece by piece gade. This armored brigade, com-
whenever a break in a traffic jam oc- manded by Col. Otto Remer, had been
curred, but the appearance of these hastily thrown together around a cadre
horse-drawn guns in the motorized col- composed of Hitler’s former headquar-
umns only succeeded in further disrupt- ters guard. 8 When the Fuehrer’s com-
ing the march order. Like the Americans mand post on the Eastern Front was
on 17 December, jammed on the St. closed by Hitler’s return to Berlin, in
Vith–Vielsalm road, the Germans lacked November, Remer was given some addi-
adequate military police to handle the tional troops and shipped to the west.
situation. The final composition of the brigade was
Even so, by the evening of 19 De- roughly equivalent to a reinforced Amer-
cember the two infantry divisions of the ican combat command: three grenadier
LXVI Corps were in position to launch battalions, a battalion of Mark IV tanks
piecemeal attacks at or around St. Vith. from the Grossdeutschland Panzer Di-
The 18th Volks Grenadier Division, on vision (a unit that caused Allied in-
the right, had fed the foot troops of its telligence no end of trouble since Gross-
295th Regiment in between the Mobile
Battalion, deployed around Wallerode, 8 Remer had come to Hitler’s attention by his
prompt actions designed to protect the Fuehrer
and the 294th, astride the St. Vith- during the July Putsch.
T H E FIRST ATTACKS A T ST. VITH 293

deutschland was known to be on the from Daun via Prüm to St. Vith would
Eastern Front), a battalion each of take considerable time. T h e orders he
assault and field guns, and eight batteries received from General Lucht were
of flak which had formed the antiair- these: the Fuehrer Begleit Brigade
craft guard for Hitler. Despite repeated would take part in the St. Vith attack
requests by General Lucht, this brigade but would not get too involved in the
was not released to reinforce the LXVI fight; once the town fell the brigade
Corps until late afternoon on 18 De- must drive posthaste for the Meuse
cember? Colonel Remer reached the River. After a personal reconnaissance
corps headquarters that same night, but east of St. Vith on 19 December Remer
the movement of his complete brigade concluded that a frontal attack in this
sector was out of the question. He
9 Manteuffel tells how he met Model on foot out- decided, therefore, to flank the St. Vith
side St. Vith and persuaded the latter to commit defenses from the north as soon as his
Remer’s brigade so as to speed up the Sixth SS brigade, scheduled to arrive on 20 De-
Panzer Army and thus shake the Fifth loose. Freiden
and Richardson, eds., T h e Fatal Decisions, Part 6. cember, was in hand.
CHAPTER XIII

VIII Corps Attempts To Delay the Enemy


C C R , 9th Armored Division, and This order came at 2140, ten minutes
the Road to Bastogne after word that the enemy had crossed
the Clerf reached the VIII Corps com-
CCR, 9th Armored Division, the ar- mand post.
mored reserve of the VIII Corps, had T h e two roadblock positions selected
been stationed at Trois Vierges on 13 by the corps commander lay on High-
December in position to support the way N 12, which extended diagonally
corps left and center. It consisted of the from St. Vith and the German border
52d Armored Infantry Battalion, 2d southwestward to Bastogne. Both posi-
Tank Battalion, 73d Armored Field Ar- tions were on the line which General
tillery Battalion, and the conventional Middleton would order held “at all
task force attachments. By the afternoon costs.” Earlier, Middleton had directed
of 17 December German armored gains the commander of the 106th Division to
at the expense of the 28th Division, watch the northern entrance to this
forming the center of the corps front, road, but the immediate threat on the
caused General Middleton to start gath- night of the 17th was that the mobile
ering what antimechanized means he spearheads of the German attack would
could find for commitment; this in- gain access to this road much closer to
cluded the platoon of self-propelled tank Bastogne. One of the blocking positions
destroyers from CCR which, as described was the intersection near the village of
earlier, he dispatched toward Clerf. Lullange where the hard-surfaced road
When the second day of the battle from Clerf entered that leading to Bas-
came to a close, it had become apparent togne. Clerf and its bridges were only
that the German columns advancing in five miles away from this junction and,
the central sector were aiming at the on the evening of 17 December, already
road system leading to Bastogne. De- under German fire. T h e second position,
layed reports from the 28th Division in- three miles to the southwest on Highway
dicated that an enemy breakthrough N12 near the village of Allerborn,
was imminent. The 9th Armored Divi- backed up the Lullange block. More
sion commander already had sent CCR important, the Allerborn road junction
south to Oberwampach, behind the 28th was the point at which a continuation
Division center, when General Middle- of Highway N12 turned off to the
ton ordered the combat command to set southeast and down into the Wiltz valley
up two strong roadblocks on the main where advance patrols of the main Ger-
paved road to Bastogne “without delay.” man forces, albeit still on the far bank
VIII CORPS ATTEMPTS T O DELAY T H E ENEMY 295

of the Clerf, had appeared. T h e Aller- were beaten back with the help of a
born block was only nine miles from battery from the 73d Armored Field
Bastogne. Artillery Battalion whose howitzers
A little after midnight CCR had were close enough to give direct fire at
manned these two important positions, both American roadblocks. About 1100
under orders to report to the VIII Corps the first Mark IV’s of the 2d Battalion,
command post the moment they were 3d Panzer Regiment, appeared and un-
brought under assault. Off to the east, der cover of an effective smoke screen
however, the 110th Infantry continued advanced to within 800 yards of the
the unequal contest with an enemy Shermans belonging to Company A,
whose strength was growing by the hour. 2d Tank Battalion. The Germans dal-
The force in the hands of the CCR com- lied, probably waiting for the Panzer
mander, Col. Joseph H. Gilbreth, was Battalion, which finally arrived in the
small. Now split into two task forces and early afternoon, then deployed on the
the supporting CCR headquarters left of the Mark IV’s. Taken under
group, the whole was spread thin indeed. direct fire by the enemy tank guns, the
Task Force Rose (Capt. L. K. Rose), American infantry withdrew in the
at the northern roadblock, consisted direction of the southern roadblock
of a company of Sherman tanks, and Rose’s tanks now were surrounded
one armored infantry company, and a on three sides.
platoon of armored engineers. T h e Colonel Gilbreth, whose combat com-
southern roadblock was manned by Task mand was directly attached to VIII Corps
Force Harper (Lt. Col. Ralph S. Har- and who was charged with the defense
per), which consisted of the 2d Tank of the entry to the Bastogne highway,
Battalion (–) and two companies of the could not commit his tiny reserve with-
52d Armored Infantry Battalion. out the approval of the corps command-
In midmorning the troops peering out er. A telephone message from Gilbreth
from the ridge where the northern road- to the VIII Corps command post, at
block had been set up saw figures in 1405, shows the dilemma in all tactical
field gray entering a patch of woods decisions made during these hours when
to the east on the Clerf road, the first in- a few troops, tanks, and tank destroyers
dication that the enemy had broken represented the only forces available to
through the Clerf defenses. These back up the splintering American line.
Germans belonged to the Reconnais-
sance Battalion of Lauchert’s 2d Panzer TF Rose . . . is as good as surrounded.
Division, whose infantry elements at . . . have counted 16 German tanks there.
the moment were eradicating the last . . . TF is being hit from 3 sides. Recom-
ment that they fight their way out. They
American defenders in Clerf. Lauchert’s could use 2 platoons of A/52d Armd Inf
two tank battalions, unaffected by the Bn [the last rifle reserve in CCR]–every-
small arms fire sweeping the Clerf thing else is committed. . . . Did not com-
streets, were close behind the armored mit any of the TDs, will wait until the
cars and half-tracks of the advance guard. over-all plan is known.. Plan to push TF
Rose toward the other road block. If the
Two attempts by the Reconnaissance decision is to stay, some units will be sent
Battalion to feel out Task Force Rose there to help them out.
296 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

T h e corps commander refused to let from the Shermans, had no better for-
Rose move; and even if adequate rein- tune. T h e panzers set the American
forcement for Task Force Rose had been vehicles afire with tracer bullets, then
at hand the hour was too late. A flanking picked out their targets silhouetted by
move had driven back the American the flames. During this action Colonel
howitzers, German assault guns satu- Harper was killed. What was left of
rated the crest position with white phos- Task Force Harper and stragglers from
phorus, and when the Shermans pulled Task Force Rose headed west toward
back to the rear slope the panzers Longvilly, where CCR headquarters had
simply ringed Rose’s company. CCR been set up.
headquarters got the word at 1430 that Longvilly, five and a half miles from
the northern roadblock and its defend- Bastogne, was the scene of considerable
ers had been overrun, but despite the confusion. Stragglers were marching
loss of seven Shermans Company A con- and riding through the village, and the
tinued to hold. It had been forced back location of the enemy was uncertain, al-
from the road junction, however, and though rumor placed him on all sides.
the bulk of the 3d Panzer Regiment was About 2000 an officer appeared at Gil-
moving out onto the Bastogne highway. breth’s command post and, to the de-
T h e early winter night gave the Amer- light of the CCR staff, reported that a
icans a chance. Captain Rose broke out task force from the 10th Armored Divi-
cross-country with five tanks and his sion (Team Cherry) was down the
assault gun platoon, rolling fast with- Bastogne road. T h e task force command-
out lights through little villages to- er, Lt. Col. Henry T. Cherry, he then
ward Houffalize, near which the detach- announced, had orders not to advance
ment was ambushed. A few vehicles and east of Longvilly. This word abrupt-
crews broke free and reached Bastogne. ly altered the atmosphere in the com-
The southern roadblock came under mand post.
German fire in the late afternoon, light Two armored field artillery battal-
enemy elements seeping past the be- ions (the 73d and 58th) still were fir-
leaguered block at the northern junc- ing from positions close to Longvilly,
tion. T h e Mark IV’s and Panthers ac- pouring shells onto the Allerborn road
tually did not reach Task Force Har- junction from which Task Force Har-
per until after dark. Sweeping the area per had been driven. A handful of rifle-
with machine gun fire to clear out any men from the 110th Infantry, including
infantry who might be protecting the Company G which had been ordered to
American tanks, the panzers overran Clerf and the remnants of the 110th
and destroyed two tank platoons of headquarters which had been driven
Company C , 2d Tank Battalion. Per- out of Allerborn, were still in action.
haps the weight of this night attack had These troops, together with four tank
caught the American tankers off guard: destroyers from the 630th Tank De-
the enemy later reported that only three stroyer Battalion ( – ) , had formed a
Shermans at the Allerborn block were skirmish line. to protect the firing bat-
able to maneuver into a fighting stance. teries of the 58th south of the village.
The armored infantry, about 500 yards Late in the evening firing was heard
VIII CORPS ATTEMPTS T O DELAY THE ENEMY 297

behind the CCR position. This came thin American line in front of the bat-
from Mageret, next on the Bastogne teries. About 0800 the fog swirled away,
road, where German troops had infil- disclosing a pair of enemy tanks almost
trated and cut off the fire direction cen- on the howitzers. In a sudden exchange
ter of the 73d Field Artillery Battalion. of fire the tanks were destroyed.
T h e firing batteries nevertheless con- About this time CCR started along the
tinued to shell the road east of Longvilly, Bastogne road, although a rear guard
tying in with the 58th Field Artillery action continued in Longvilly until
Battalion. Both battalions were firing noon. The 58th Field Artillery Battal-
with shorter and shorter fuzes; by 2315 ion, with cannoneers and drivers the
the gunners were aiming at enemy in- only rifle protection, joined the move,
fantry and vehicles only two hundred Battery B forming a rear guard and
yards to the front. Somehow the batter- firing point-blank at pursuing German
ies held on. A little before midnight armor. T h e head of the main column
Colonel Gilbreth ordered what was left formed by CCR was close to Mageret
of CCR and its attached troops to begin when, at a halt caused by a roadblock,
a withdrawal via Mageret. A few vehi- hostile fire erupted on the flanks of the
cles made a run for it but were am- column. There was no turning back, nor
bushed by the Germans now in posses- could the vehicles be extricated from the
sion of Mageret. When a disorderly jam along the road. T h e melee lasted
vehicle column jammed the exit from for several hours. Company C of the
Longvilly, Gilbreth saw that some order 482d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion
must be restored and stopped all move- (Capt. Denny J. Lovio) used its mobile
ment until morning light.1 quadruple machine guns with effect,
Under orders, the 73d Armored Field working “heroically,” as CCR later ac-
Artillery Battalion displaced westward, knowledged, to hold the Germans at bay.
starting about 0400, one battery cover- T h e two batteries of the 58th Armored
ing another until the three were west of Field Artillery Battalion that had been
Longvilly firing against enemy seen to able to bring off their self-propelled
the east, north, and south, but giving howitzers went into action, but the fog
some cover for the CCR withdrawal. T h e had thickened and observed fire was
58th Field Artillery Battalion and its well-nigh impossible. At long last the
scratch covering force were hit early in dismounted and disorganized column
the morning by a mortar barrage, and was brought into some order “by several
very shortly two German half-tracks ap- unknown officers who . . . brought
peared through the half-light. These leadership and confidence to our troops.”
were blasted with shellfire but enemy in- ( M a p VI)
fantry had wormed close in, under cover In midafternoon CCR headquarters,
of the morning fog, and drove back the the remnants of the 58th, and the strag-
1 Gilbreth was convinced that he must “freeze” glers who had been accumulated in the
the vehicles in place after he had talked to the Longvilly defense made their way
commander of the 58th Field Artillery Battalion, around to the north of Mageret, thence
who had witnessed such precipitate withdrawals
during the North African campaign. Ltr, Col to Foy, and finally to Bastogne, this move
Joseph H. Gilbreth to author, 6 Sep 58. being made under cover of fire laid down
298 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

by paratroopers from the 101st who dropped off early in the march to fight a
seemed to materialize out of nowhere. rear guard action against the enemy who
T h e losses sustained by CCR cannot be was closing in on the column and to pro-
accurately determined, for a part of those tect a number of half-tracks which had
listed in the final December report were bogged down. Hard pressed and unable
incurred later in the defense of Bas- to disengage its vehicles, the rear guard
togne. 2 The 58th Armored Field Ar- finally escaped on foot. T h e main col-
tillery Battalion had lost eight of its umn dodged and detoured in a series of
howitzers; the 73d Armored Field Artil- small brushes with the Germans, who by
lery Battalion had lost four. That these this time seemed to be everywhere, until
battalions were self-propelled accounts it reached Hardigny, three miles north-
for the fact that so many pieces, closely west of the starting point. German
engaged as the batteries had been, were tanks and infantry were waiting here,
saved to fire another day. and in the ensuing fight the column was
While the battle for the roadblocks smashed. About 225 officers and men es-
and Longvilly was going on, a third task caped into the nearby woods and after
force from CCR (Lt. Col. Robert M. devious wanderings behind the German
Booth) had been separately engaged. As lines, some for as long as six days, finally
a guard against tank attack from the reached Bastogne.
north, the CCR commander sent Booth
with the headquarters and headquarters T h e Advance of the XLVII
company of the 52d Armored Infantry Panzer Corps
Battalion, plus a platoon from the 811th
Tank Destroyer Battalion, and a platoon Luettwitz’ X L V I I Panzer Corps was
of light tanks to occupy the high ground coming within striking distance of Bas-
north of the Allerborn-Longvilly section togne by the evening of 18 December.
of the main highway. During the night of T h e 2d Panzer Division, particularly,
18–19 December Booth’s position re- had picked up speed on the north wing
ceived some enemy fire but did not come after the surprising delay at Clerf. Luett-
under direct assault. Communications witz’ mission remained as originally
with CCR had broken down, however, planned, that is, to cross the Meuse in
and German tanks had been identified the Namur sector, and the capture of
passing to the rear along the Bourcy Bastogne remained incidental–although
road. none the less important–to this goal.
Booth decided that the best chance of Having erased the two roadblocks
escaping encirclement lay in moving out defended by CCR, General Lauchert
to the northwest. At daylight on the turned his 2d Panzer Division to the
19th the column started, picking up northwest so as to swing past the Bas-
stragglers from the original roadblocks togne road nexus and maintain the
as it moved. T h e light tank platoon momentum of the westward drive. This
2T h e total losses for December 1944 (which in- maneuver was according to plan for
clude those sustained later in the defense of there was no intention to use the 2d Pan-
Bastogne) are reported in the AAR as being about zer Division in a coup de main at
800 killed and missing; the 2d Tank Battalion
lost 45 medium tanks and 14 light tanks. Bastogne. Lauchert’s column followed
VIII CORPS ATTEM PTS T O DELAY T H E ENEMY 299

the remnants of Task Force Harper fact the foot troops of the 26th were
from the Allerborn roadblock, then making nearly as much speed as the ar-
turned off the Bastogne highway mor. Horse-drawn artillery was mixed
near the hamlet of Chifontaine and up with armored vehicles, the roads had
headed toward Bourcy and Noville. It been pounded to sloughs, and the Ger-
was the 2d Panzer tanks which Task man timetable for advance in this sector
Force Booth had heard rolling in its rear had gone out the window.
on the night of 18–19 December and In the early evening Bayerlein him-
with which its rear guard collided on the self led the advance guard of the Panzer
19th. Although Task Force Booth and Lehr (four companies of the 902d Pan-
the Germans at first missed each other, zer Grenadier Regiment and some fif-
the subsequent American attempt to teen tanks) into Niederwampach. On the
circle around the northwest and thus march the advance guard had heard the
attain Bastogne threw Booth’s column sounds of battle and seen gunfire flaming
straight into the German path. Lauch- to the north, “an impressive sight,”
ert’s advance guard had hit Noville but Bayerlein later recalled. This was the
found it strongly held and was forced to 2d Panzer Division destroying the Aller-
withdraw. As a result a strong detach- born roadblock defense. Bayerlein had
ment moved north to Hardigny, before two choices at this point. He could direct
a flanking attempt against the Noville his division south to the hard-surfaced
garrison, and here encountered and cut road linking Bras, Marvie, and Bastogne,
to pieces Booth’s column. or he could risk an unpaved and muddy
The American troops defending in side road via Benonchamps which would
and around Longvilly were given a put the Panzer Lehr onto the main Bas-
period of grace by Lauchert’s decision to togne highway at Mageret, three miles
turn off on the Bourcy road. A second east of Bastogne. Bayerlein decided on
on-the-spot decision by another German the side road because it was shorter and
commander added a few hours’ breath- he believed that it probably was un-
ing space. Bayerlein’s Panzer Lehr guarded.
Division was slowly climbing out of the A kampfgruppe (a dozen tanks, a bat-
Wiltz valley on the afternoon and talion of armored infantry, and one
evening of 18 December, en route to an battery) was sent on to seize Mageret
assembly point at Niederwampach. T h e and arrived there an hour or so before
division had met little resistance but the midnight. T h e Americans occupied the
roads were poor (the corps commander village, but only with a small detach-
had caviled against the zone assigned the ment of the 158th Engineer Combat
Panzer Lehr even during the planning Battalion, which had been ordered in to
period), and march control was further block the road, and a few of the service
burdened by the fact that the 26th Volks troops belonging to CCR. Fighting here
Grenadier Division was marching two of continued sporadically for an hour or
its rifle regiments toward the same as- two as Americans and Germans stumbled
sembly area. Theoretically the mobile upon each other in the dark. By 0100 on
columns of Panzer Lehr now should have 19 December the enemy had set up his
been ahead of the infantry division. In own roadblock east of the village, for
300 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

about that time ambulances evacuating quarters company was established in


wounded from Longvilly were checked Neffe, just east of Bastogne; his
by bullet fire.3 Thus far the Panzer Lehr trains, fortunately as it turned out,
advance guard had run into no serious remained in Bastogne. T h e VIII
trouble, but a friendly civilian reported Corps commander had designated Long-
that American tanks had gone through villy as one of the three positions which
Mageret earlier, en route to Longvilly.4 CCB was to hold at all costs. Cherry
These tanks belonged to Team Cherry knew that CCR, 9th Armored Division,
from CCB of the 10th Armored Division. was supposed to be around Longvilly,
but beyond that he was totally in the
Team Cherry on the Longvilly Road dark. Even the maps at hand were nearly
useless. T h e I: 100,000 sheets were accu-
On the evening of 18 December Team rate enough for a road march but told
Cherry moved out of Bastogne on the little of the terrain where the team would
road to Longvilly.5 Since he had the deploy.
leading team in the CCB, 10th Armored, About 1900, after an uneventful move,
column, Cherry had been assigned this 1st Lt. Edward P. Hyduke, commanding
mission by Colonel Roberts because of the advance guard, reached the western
the immediate and obvious enemy threat edge of Longvilly. Seeing that the village
to the east. Cherry had Company A and was jammed with vehicles, he halted on
two light tank platoons of his own 3d the road. An hour later Cherry and his
Tank Battalion, Company C of the 20th S–3 arrived at the headquarters of CCR
Armored Infantry Battalion, the 2d Pla- where they learned that the situation was
toon of Company D, 90th Cavalry Recon- “vague.” CCR had no plans except to
naissance, and a few medics and armored carry out the “hold at all costs” order,
engineers. His headquarters and head- and at the moment its southern road-
block had not yet been overrun. Cherry
3Sgt. M. N. Shay was awarded the DSC for or- went back to Bastogne to tell the CCB
ganizing a group of soldiers to man machine guns commander, 10th Armored Division,
and defend the village. When the defenders at- how things were going, leaving orders
tempted to break out, Sergeant Shay stayed behind
to cover the withdrawal and there was killed. for the advance guard to scout and estab-
4T h e German sources for the Longvilly fight lish a position just west of Longvilly
are MSS # A–939 (Luettwitz); A–942 (Bayer- while the main force (Capt. William F.
lein) ; and B–040 (Kokott) .
5h e useful records of the early and confused Ryerson) closed up along the road with
American reaction east of Bastogne are for the its head about a thousand yards west of
most part those compiled in the combat inter- the town. Hyduke’s reconnaissance in
views, shortly after the event, with personnel of
the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions. T h e journals the meantime had convinced him that
of the 2d Tank Battalion, for example, were the main gap in the defenses around
destroyed. Most units lost their records and then Longvilly was in the south, and there he
attempted to compile an AAR from memory. T h e
interviews mentioned above have served as the stationed the cavalry platoon, four Sher-
basis for the description of the Longvilly action in man tanks, and seven light tanks.
three publications: T h e Armored School, Armor Just before midnight Lieutenant Hy-
at Bastogne (1949); Marshall, Bastogne: T h e Story
of the First Eight Days; and Nichols, Impact: The duke learned that CCR intended to fall
Battle Story of the T e n t h Armored Division. back toward Bastogne (although, in fact,
VIII CORPS ATTEMPTS T O DELAY T H E ENEMY 301

the CCR commander later curtailed this wampach, its orders to advance at day-
move) and radioed Colonel Cherry to break through Longvilly and head for
this effect. When Cherry got the message, Foy. Its left neighbor, the 78th, was to
about two hours later, he also learned make the main effort, swinging around
that Mageret had been seized by the Ger- to the north of Mageret and attacking
mans and that his headquarters at Neffe to gain the high ground beyond Luzery.
now was cut off from the team at Long- This plan failed to recognize the lim-
villy. Team Hyduke was in the process itations of physical stamina and supply.
of shifting in the dark to cover Long- With the dawn, the two regimental com-
villy on the east, north, and south. Ryer- manders reported that their troops must
son had sent a half-track load of infantry be rested and resupplied before the ad-
to feel out the situation at Mageret, vance could resume. Shortly after 1000
while independently CCR headquarters the 77th was ready to start its advance
(9th Armored Division) had dispatched guard through Longvilly, believing that
a self-propelled tank destroyer from its the town was in German hands. In light
platoon of the 811th Tank Destroyer Bat- of the way in which troops of the 26th
talion on the same mission. After appre- Volks Grenadier Division, Panzer Lehr,
hensive and belated recognition the two and 2d Panzer Division had poured into
crews agreed that the road through Mag- the area east of Bastogne during the
eret could be opened only by force. This night, crossing and recrossing boundary
word ultimately reached Cherry who lines which now existed mostly on paper,
sent back orders, received at 0830, that it is not surprising that General Kokott
Ryerson should fight his way through and his commanders were a little vague
Mageret while the erstwhile advance as to whose troops held Longvilly.
guard conducted a rear guard defense of T h e 77th was close to the town, ad-
Longvilly. vancing in route column when patrols
During the night small German forces suddenly signaled that the Americans
had tried, rather halfheartedly, to get in- were ahead. It was too late to bypass
to Longvilly or at least to pick off the the town; so the German regimental
weapons and vehicles crowded in the commander hastily organized an attack
streets by the light of flares and search- behind a screen of machine guns which
lights directed on the town. As yet the he rushed forward, at the same time
German artillery and heavy mortars had borrowing some tanks from the 2d Pan-
not come forward in any number and zer Division for a turning movement
Longvilly was shelled only in desultory northeast of Longvilly. T h e division
fashion. T h e two right-wing regiments commander, however, ordered the attack
of the 26th Volks Grenadier Division held up until it could be organized and
were reoriented to the northwest in a supported, made arrangements with the
move to reach the Noville-Bastogne road Panzer Lehr Division to join by a thrust
and place the division in position for a from the southwest, and hurried guns
flanking attack aimed at penetrating the and Werfers up to aid the infantry. Gen-
Bastogne perimeter from the north. On eral Luettwitz, the corps commander,
the extreme right the 77th Grenadier also took a hand in the game, without
Regiment had bivouacked near Ober- reference to Kokott, by ordering the 78th
302 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Grenadier Regiment to turn back toward thing happened to the three tank de-
the east in support of the 77th. When stroyers. At least eight panzers had been
Kokott heard what had been done with destroyed in the melee, but Longvilly
his left regiment the 78th already was on was taken.
the road, and it took until early after- Lieutenant Hyduke’s team, acting un-
noon to get the regiment turned around der orders to rejoin Captain Ryerson’s
and moving west. An hour or so after main party, threaded a way west on foot
noon the reinforced 77th was ready to and in small groups through the broken
jump off from the attack positions south, and burning column now in the last
east, and northeast of Longvilly. throes of dissolution, in the woods along
By this time the bulk of CCR (9th the road, under a rain of shells and bul-
Armored Division) and the mass of lets. Ryerson’s team, which Colonel
stragglers who had attached themselves Cherry had instructed early in the morn-
to CCR were jammed in an immobile ing to withdraw to the west, had been
crowd along the road to Mageret, but a hard put to reverse itself and negotiate
few riflemen were still holed up in the the cluttered road leading to Mageret.
houses at Longvilly and the third platoon T h e leading American tank had reached
of Company C, 811th Tank Destroyer a road cut some three hundred yards east
Battalion, was manfully working its guns of Mageret when a hidden tank or anti-
to cover the rear of the CCR column. tank gun suddenly opened fire, put a
T h e main action, however, devolved on round into the Sherman, and set it
the tanks and armored infantry which aflame. T h e road into Mageret was
Hyduke had shifted during the night to closed and all possibility of a dash
form a close perimeter at Longvilly. through the village ended.
T h e first indication of the nearing Protected somewhat by the banks
assault was a storm of Werfer and artil- rising on either side of the road the
lery shells. Then came the German tanks Americans spent the day trying to inch
borrowed from the 2d Panzer Division, forward to the north and south of the
ramming forward from the north and village. Some of the gunners and infantry
east. In the confused action which fol- from the CCR (9th Armored Division)
lowed the American tankers conducted column attempted to take a hand in the
themselves so well that Lauchert later fight and help push forward a bit, but
reported a “counterattack” from Long- constant and accurate shelling (probably
villy against the 2d Panzer flank. But the from Panzer Lehr tanks which had been
Shermans and the American light tanks diverted northward from Benonchamps
were not only outnumbered but out- to aid the 26th Volks Grenadier Divi-
gunned by the Panthers and the 88’s of sion) checked every move. At dark a
a flak battalion. T h e foregone conclusion small detachment from Ryerson’s team
was reached a little before 1400 when the and CCR reached the houses on the edge
last of the light tanks, all that remained, of Mageret. T h e village was held in some
were destroyed by their crews who found strength by detachments of the 26th
it impossible to maneuver into the clear. Reconnaissance Battalion and Panzer
The armored infantry were forced to Lehr. Ryerson had to report: “Having
abandon their half-tracks. T h e same tough time. [The Germans] are shooting
VIII CORPS ATTEMPTS T O DELAY T H E ENEMY 303

flares and knocking out our vehicles with and the covering fire of other troops be-
direct fire.” But the Americans held onto hind them jarred the Germans enough to
their little chunk of the village through allow Cherry and his men to break free.
the night. Before pulling out for Mont, the next
While the bulk of Team Cherry was village west, Colonel Cherry radioed the
engaged at Longvilly and Mageret, the CCB commander this message: “We are
team commander and his headquarters pulling out. We’re not driven out but
troops were having a fight of their own burned out.”
at Neffe, a mile and a quarter southwest Through the afternoon and evening of
of Mageret. Here, cut off from his main 19 December Captain Ryerson and the
force, Colonel Cherry had waited little force clutching at the edge of Mag-
through the small hours of 19 December eret waited for reinforcements to appear
with the comforting assurance that over the ridges to the south, for CCB
troops of the 101st Airborne Division had radioed that help (from the 101st
were moving through Bastogne and Airborne Division) was on the way.
would debouch to the east sometime that Finally, after midnight, new word came
day. At first light a detachment of tanks from CCB. Ryerson was to withdraw
and infantry from the Panzer Lehr hit northwest to Bizory at dawn and join the
the Reconnaissance Platoon, 3d Tank 501st Parachute Infantry there. A little
Battalion, outposting the Neffe cross- after daybreak Team Ryerson took its re-
roads. T h e platoon stopped one tank maining vehicles, its wounded, and the
with a bazooka round, but then broke stragglers who had paused to take part
under heavy fire and headed down the in the fight and pulled away from Mag-
Bastogne road. One of the two American eret. Forty minutes across country and it
headquarters tanks in support of the entered the paratrooper lines. T h e total
roadblock got away, as did a handful of cost to Team Cherry of the engagements
troopers, and fell back to Cherry’s com- on 19 December had been 175 officers
mand post, a stone château three hun- and men, one-quarter of the command.
dred yards to the south. Materiel losses had included seventeen
T h e enemy took his time about follow- armored half-tracks and an equal num-
ing up, but just before noon moved in to ber of tanks. Team Cherry records fif-
clear the château. For four hours the 3d teen German tanks destroyed in this day
Tank Battalion command post group of catch-as-catch-can fighting, a likely
held on behind the heavy walls, working figure since the 2d Panzer Division
the automatic weapons lifted from its counted eight of its own tanks knocked
vehicles and checking every rush in a out in one spot north of Longvilly.
blast of bullets. Finally a few hardy Ger- The story here set down has been one
mans made it, close enough at least to of mischance and confusion. But regard
pitch incendiary grenades through the the manner in which CCR, 9th Armored
window. Fire, leaping through the Division, and Team Cherry altered the
rooms, closed this episode. Reinforce- course of the German drive on Bastogne.
ments, a platoon of the 501st Parachute Through the night of 18–19 December
Infantry, arrived just in time to take part General Luettwitz hourly expected word
in the withdrawal. But their appearance that the advance guard of the XLVII
304 T H E AR DENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Panzer Corps had reached Bastogne and man trap whose jaws were in plain view.
the road there from north to Houffalize. Further resistance by either CCR or
This good news failed to arrive. While Team Cherry was intended strictly as a
it was true that the resistance in the sec- rear guard action. Yet the mere physical
tor held by the American 110th Infantry presence of these troops in the Longvilly
had finally crumbled, the cost to the Ger- area caused a confusion in German plans
mans had been dear in men, matériel, and a diversion of the German main
and tactical disorganization, but most of effort on 19 December out of all pro-
all in time. Fatigue too was beginning to portion to the tactical strength or im-
tell. Yet Luettwitz had some reason to portance of the American units involved.
expect, as he did, that the road to the T h e “discovery,” on the morning of 19
west at last was clear and that the lost December, that American troops were in
momentum would shortly be restored. and around Longvilly cost the 26th Volks
Instead, as the record shows, the X L V I I Grenadier Division at least four hours
Panzer Corps continued to encounter of precious daylight, first in setting up
irritating delays, delays compounded by an attack for the 77th Grenadier Reg-
American resistance, fatigue among the iment and then in straightening out the
attacking troops, disintegrating roads, a 78th. As a result when night came the
general loss of control on the part of the right wing of the 26th Volks Grenadier
German commanders, and, most telling Division was only a little over two miles
of all, a momentary thickening of the beyond Longvilly, and the left, which
“fog of war.” On the right wing of the had crossed to the north side of the Bas-
corps the fight waged at the Lullange togne road in the late afternoon, reached
road junction by Task Force Rose Bizory too late for a full-scale daylight
cheated the 2d Panzer Division of vital assault.
daylight hours. More time was lost in Although the main advance guard of
reducing the Allerborn roadblock, and the Panzer Lehr Division continued to
Lauchert’s advance guard found itself on the west on 19 December, where it ran
the Bourcy-Noville road in the middle of afoul of Cherry’s headquarters group at
the night. It is not surprising that the Neffe, a considerable part of the Panzer
.German advance was cautious and fur- Lehr armored strength was diverted
ther attack to the northwest delayed. north from Benonchamps to use its tank
T h e whole affair added up to several gun fire against the Americans seen along
extra hours that allowed the American the road east of Mageret and later to
defenders at the Noville outpost of Bas- attack that village. Troops of both the
togne until midmorning on the 19th to 901st and 902d were thrown in to mop
get set. up the woods where the CCR column
The story of events at Longvilly and attempted to make a stand and they did
on the Longvilly-Mageret road merits not complete this job until midafter-
particular attention by the student of noon. So, although the Panzer Lehr
tactics. Here was a confused and hetero- elements had helped free the Longvilly-
geneous force whose main concern on the Mageret road for the belated advance
night of 18–19 December and the follow- by the 26th Volks Grenadier Division
ing day was to find a way out of the Ger- to the northwest, the Panzer Lehr ad-
VIII CORPS ATTEMPTS T O DELAY T H E ENEMY 305

vance west of Bastogne was not the full- airborne divisions would be sent imme-
bodied affair necessary at this critical diately to the VIII Corps area. Orders
moment. T h e sudden blow at Bastogne for the move reached the chief of staff of
which the commander of the X L V I I Pan- the XVIII Airborne Corps during the
zer Corps had hoped to deliver failed to early evening of 17 December and the
come off on 19 December. Some Amer- latter promptly relayed the alert to the
ican outposts had been driven in, but 82d and 101st. There seems to have been
with such loss of time and uneconomical some delay in reaching the corps com-
use of means that the remaining outposts mander in England, where he was ob-
in front of Bastogne now were manned serving the training of a new division
and ready. (the 17th Airborne), but a couple of
hours after midnight he too had his
T h e 101st Airborne Division orders and began hurried preparations
Moves Into Bastogne for the flight to France.
T h e two divisions had little organic
After the long, bitter battle in Hol- transportation-after all they were
land the 82d and 101st Airborne Divi- equipped to fly or parachute into battle-
sions lay in camp near Reims, resting, but in a matter of hours the Oise Section
refitting, and preparing for the next air- of the Communications Zone gathered
borne operation. General Ridgway’s enough io-ton open trucks and trailers
XVIII Airborne Corps, to which these plus the work horse 2½-tonners to
divisions belonged, constituted the strate- mount all the airborne infantry. Because
gic reserve for the Allied forces in west- the 82d had been given a little more rest
ern Europe. Although the Supreme than the 101st and would take less time
Allied Commander had in the past to draw its battle gear and get on the
attempted to create a SHAEF Reserve of road, it was selected to lead the motor
a size commensurate with the expedition- march into Belgium. Ridgway would be
ary forces under his command, he had delayed for some hours; so General
been continually thwarted by the de- Gavin, commanding the 82d, assumed
mands of a battle front extending from the role of acting corps commander,
the North Sea to Switzerland. On 16 setting out at once for the First Army
December, therefore, the SHAEF Re- headquarters where he arrived in mid-
serve consisted solely of the two airborne morning on the 18th. Since Maj. Gen.
divisions in France. Maxwell D. Taylor was on leave in the
Less than thirty-six hours after the United States, Brig. Gen. Anthony C.
start of the German counteroffensive, McAuliffe, artillery commander of the
General Hodges, seeing the VIII Corps 101st, prepared to lead this division into
center give way under massive blows and battle.
having thrown his own First Army T o alert and dispatch the two veteran
reserves into the fray plus whatever airborne divisions was a methodical busi-
Simpson’s Ninth could spare, turned to ness, although both moved to the front
Bradley with a request for the SHAEF minus some equipment and with less
Reserve. Eisenhower listened to Bradley than the prescribed load of ammunition.
and acceded, albeit reluctantly; the two This initial deployment in Belgium pre-
306 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

sents a less ordered picture, blurred by


the fact that headquarters journals fail
to square with one another and the
memories of the commanders involved
are at variance, particularly as regards
the critical decision (or decisions) which
brought the 101st to Bastogne and its
encounter with history.6
General Middleton, the VIII Corps
commander, had his headquarters in
Bastogne when the storm broke in the
east. T h e city quite literally commanded
the highway system lacing the southern
section of the Belgian Ardennes. Middle-
ton, having done all he could on the 16th
and 17th to assemble his meager reserve
of tanks and engineers in last-ditch posi-
tions on the roads entering Bastogne
from the east, read the pattern of the
enemy advance in these terms on the GENERALMCAULIFFE
17th. T h e number of German divisions
and the speed at which they were moving while the two airborne divisions-which
would require the acquisition of a much Hodges had assured him would be forth-
larger road net than the Germans had coming-took over Bastogne and Houff-
thus far used. If St. Vith held and the alize. Middleton reasoned that a strong
V Corps shoulder did not give way, the American concentration in the Bastogne-
enemy would attempt to seize the excel- Houffalize sector would force the enemy
lent highway net at Bastogne. Middle- to come to him, and that in any case he
ton therefore planned to hold the orig- would be in strength on the German
inal VIII Corps positions as long as flank and rear. At midnight on the 17th
possible (in accordance with orders from the VIII Corps commander had a tele-
General Hodges) , and at the same time phone call from Hodges’ headquarters
to build strong defenses in front of St. and heard the welcome word that he
Vith, Houffalize, Bastogne, and Luxem- probably would get the 82d and 101st
bourg City. Airborne Divisions “immediately.”
For the second stage of his plan he Middleton’s plan, it seemed, could be
counted on prompt assistance from the put in effectby the morning of the 19th.
First and Third Armies to create the Eisenhower’s order to commit the two
defenses for St. Vith and Luxembourg, airborne divisions did not specify exactly
how they would be employed. Bradley
and Hodges were agreed that they would
be thrown in to block the German spear-
6Combat interviews; VIII Corps AAR and G–3
Jnl; XVIII Airborne Corps AAR and G–3 Jnl;
head columns, but Lt. Gen. Walter Be-
101st Airborne Div AAR and G–3 Jnl. dell Smith, the SHAEF chief of staff,
VIII CORPS ATTEMPTS T O DELAY T H E ENEMY 307

seems to have selected Bastogne as the the 101st might be forced to fight it out
initial rendezvous point in Belgium alone.
without any knowledge of the First Turning the motor columns of the
Army and VIII Corps plans. In any event 101st was catch-as-catch-can.At the vil-
Smith expected both of the airborne lage of Herbomont two main roads ex-
divisions to assemble around Bastogne. tend southeast to Bastogne and northeast
T h e subsequent order of events is of Houffalize (en route to Werbomont) .
rather uncertain. When Gavin reported When the leader of the 101st column,
at Spa on the morning of the 18th, he Col. Thomas L. Sherburne, Jr., reached
found the First Army staff gravely con- Herbomont about 2 0 0 0 he found two
cerned by Peiper’s armored thrust to- military police posts some two hundred
ward Werbomont and he was ordered yards apart, one busily engaged in direct-
to divert the incoming bad, then en route ing all airborne traffic to the northeast,
to Bastogne, toward Werbomont. Initi- the other directing it to the southeast.
ally both Gavin and McAuliffe were un- This confusion was soon straightened
der the impression that the 101st was to out; the last trucks of the 82d roared
go to Werbomont; actually McAuliffe away in the direction of Werbomont and
started with his advance party to report Sherburne turned the head of the 101st
to Gavin at that point but detoured with column toward Bastogne. T h e story now
the intention of first getting Middleton’s becomes that of the 101st Airborne Divi-
view of the situation. Middleton, on the sion and of those units which would join
other hand, expected that the 82d Air- it in the fight to bar the way west through
borne would be put in at Houffalize to Bastogne.
seal the gap opening on the north flank The 501st Parachute Infantry Regi-
of the VIII Corps. McAuliffe reached ment (Lt. Col. Julian J. Ewell) headed
Bastogne about 1600. the 101st Division columns rolling into
T h e VIII Corps roadblocks east of Belgium, followed by the 506th Para-
Bastogne had meanwhile begun to give chute Infantry (Col. Robert F. Sink),
way. Middleton got Bradley’s permission the 502d Parachute Infantry (Lt. Col.
to divert the 101st to the defense of Bas- Steve A. Chappuis) , and the 327th Gli-
togne, whereupon Hodges turned the der Infantry Regiment (Col. Joseph H.
101stover to Middleton and ordered him Harper) to which was attached the 1st
to withdraw his corps headquarters from Battalion of the 401s Glider Infantry.
the threatened city. Middleton, however. (The 1st Battalion from the 401st is
remained with a few of his staff to brief carried as the “3d Battalion” in the
Ridgway, who reached Bastogne in the journals of the 327th and this designa-
early evening, and to help McAuliffe tion will be used throughout the narra-
make his initial dispositons, the latter tive.)
selecting an assembly area around T h e division was smaller than a con-
Mande-St. Etienne, some four miles west ventional infantry division (it numbered
of Bastogne. The VIII Corps commander 805 officers and 11,035 men), but the
telephoned Bradley that he had ordered organization into four regiments was
the 101st to defend Bastogne, that there better adapted to an all-round or four-
was no longer a corps reserve, and that sided defense than the triangular forma-
308 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

PARATROOPERS
OFTHE 101STAIRBORNE
MOVING
UP TO BASTOGNE

tion common to the regular division. coalesce to provide a “balanced” combat


The 101st had three battalions of light force in the defense of Bastogne.
field pieces, the modified pack howitzer Three of these ancillary units retained
with a maximum effective range of about their tactical identity throughout the
8,000 yards. In place of the medium ar- fight at Bastogne. T h e 705th Tank De-
tillery battalions normally organic or stroyer Battalion (Lt. Col. Clifford Tem-
attached to the infantry division, the air- pleton) was in Germany with the Ninth
borne carried one battalion of 105-mm. Army when it received orders on the
howitzers. Also the airborne division had evening of the 18th to go south to Bas-
no armor attached, whereas in practice togne. By the time the column reached
at least one tank battalion accompanied the Ourthe River, German tanks were
every regular division. The odd bits and so close at hand that Templeton had to
pieces of armored, artillery, and tank detour to the west. T o protect his trains
destroyer units which were en route to he dropped off two platoons to hold the
Bastogne or would be absorbed on the Ortheuville bridge, one of those acci-
ground by the 101st would ultimately dents of war which have fateful conse-
VIII CORPS ATTEMPTS T O DELAY T H E ENEMY 309

quences. On the night of the 19th the positions at Villeroux near the 755th
battalion reached Bastogne. T h e 705th and the 420th Armored Field Artillery
was equipped with the new self-pro- Battalions. These three battalions to-
pelled long-barreled 76-mm. gun which gether would form a groupment firing
would permit a duel on equal terms with from the west around the entire sweep
most of the German tank guns. of the Bastogne perimeter.7
T h e 755th Armored Field Artillery T h e 101st move from Camp Mour-
Battalion (Lt. Col. William F. Hartman) melon to Bastogne was made in rain and
was sent from Germany on the eve- snow flurries; for the later serials most of
ning of the 18th with equally vague the 107-mile trip was in darkness. All
orders to proceed to Bastogne. T h e bat- parts of the column were forced to buck
talion reached its destination the follow- the mass of vehicles streaming back to
ing morning to find Bastogne jammed the west. But the move was made in good
with vehicles. Middleton ordered Colo- time, the 501st in the van taking only
nel Hartman to keep his bulky prime eight hours before it detrucked at mid-
movers and 155-mm.howitzers out of the night. By 0900 on 19 December McAu-
city until, in the evening, some traffic liffe had all four regiments in hand.
order had been restored. There could be no prolonged pause
T h e 969th Field Artillery Battalion for an integrated division deployment,
(Lt. Col. Hubert D. Barnes), also for all through the night messages of
equipped with medium howitzers, apprehension, defeat, and disaster-
joined the Bastogne defense more or less none too precise-came into Bastogne.
by chance. Originally assigned to sup- Middleton counted on CCB of the 10th
port the 28th Division artillery, the bat- Armored Division (Col. William
talion had been ordered to displace west Roberts) to heal the breach–for a time
as the enemy broke into the open. Sent at least-opened on the main road east
hither and yon by liaison officers who of Bastogne. He expected McAuliffe to
apparently knew no more of the situa- support this force, but as yet the enemy
tion than did the cannoneers, the battal- dispositions and intentions were too un-
ion was moving out of the Bastogne certain to permit any wholesale commit-
sector when orders came to emplace and ment of the 101st.
fire by map on German troops along the
road entering Noville from the north. 7The 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion AAR,
Thus the 969th joined the Bastogne bat- 755th Armored Field Artillery Battalion Unit His-
tory, and 969th Field Artillery Battalion AAR are
tle. Ordered by McAuliffe into the must reading for anyone attempting to reconstruct
slowly forming perimeter, it took firing the Bastogne defense.
CHAPTER XIV

The VIII Corps Barrier Lines


On the morning of 16 December Gen- A handful of ordnance mechanics
eral Middleton’s VIII Corps had a for- manning a Sherman tank fresh from the
mal corps reserve consisting of one repair shop are seen at a bridge. By their
armored combat command and four mere presence they check an enemy col-
engineer combat battalions. In dire cir- umn long enough for the bridge to be
cumstances Middleton might count on demolished. The tank and its crew dis-
three additional engineer combat battal- appear. They have affected the course of
ions which, under First Army command, the Ardennes battle, even though min-
were engaged as the 1128th Engineer utely, but history does not record from
Group in direct support of the normal whence they came or whither they
engineer operations on foot in the VIII went. A signal officer checking his wire
Corps area. In exceptionally adverse along a byroad encounters a German
circumstances, that is under conditions column; he wheels his jeep and races
then so remote as to be hardly worth a back to alert a section of tank destroyers
thought, the VIII Corps would have a standing at a crossroad. Both he and the
last combat residue-poorly armed and gunners are and remain anonymous. Yet
ill-trained for combat-made up of rear the tank destroyers with a few shots rob
echelon headquarters, supply, and tech- the enemy of precious minutes, even
nical service troops, plus the increment hours. A platoon of engineers appears in
of stragglers who might, in the course of one terse sentence of a German com-
battle, stray back from the front lines. mander’s report. They have fought
General Middleton would be called up- bravely, says the foe, and forced him to
on to use all of these “reserves.” Their waste a couple of hours in deployment
total effect in the fight to delay the Ger- and maneuver. In this brief emergence
man forces hammering through the VIII from the fog of war the engineer platoon
Corps center would be extremely im-
Surprisingly, many of the ordnance and antiair-
portant but at the same time generally craft units provided records which helped con-
incalculable, nor would many of these siderably in unwinding the involved tactical
troops enter the pages of history.1 situation in their particular area. Any reader
wishing to delve further into the story should
1 The author has made an exhaustive (and ex- begin with the following records: the VIII Corps
hausting) effort to read all the documents, jour- G–3 Journal and Artillery AAR; First U.S. Army,
nals, and reports belonging to each of the units G–3 Journal; the 51st Engineer Combat Battalion
mentioned-no matter how cursorily-in this chap- S–3 Operations Journal (a model of what such a
ter. Of course a great number of records were record should be); the very complete 158th En-
destroyed; this is particularly true of the artillery gineer Combat Battalion S–3 Journal; and the
battalions. The journals of most of the engineer brief but graphic AAR of the 58th Armored Field
units are extant, but these vary greatly in value. Artillery Battalion (whose records were destroyed) .
T H E VIII CORPS BARRIER LINES 311

makes its bid for recognition in history. companies assembled in or close to the
That is all. A small group of stragglers villages which formed the strongpoints
suddenly become tired of what seems to of the screen. Under the circumstances
be eternally retreating. Miles back they there could be no thought of an elastic
ceased to be part of an organized combat defense with strong formations eche-
formation, and recorded history, at that loned in any depth behind the forward
point, lost them. T h e sound of firing is positions. In the event of a general attack
heard for fifteen minutes, an hour, com- in great strength delivered against all
ing from a patch of woods, a tiny village, parts of the corps front simultaneously,
the opposite side of a hill. T h e enemy Middleton had little choice but to carry
has been delayed; the enemy resumes out the general directive to “defend in
the march westward. Weeks later a place.” With four engineer battalions
graves registration team uncovers mute and one small armored combat command
evidence of a last-ditch stand at woods, as the only corps reserve behind an elon-
village, or hill. gated and brittle linear defense Middle-
The story of the units that were re- ton’s commitment of this last reserve
tained under tactical control and em- would turn on the attempt to plug a few
ployed directly by General Middleton of the gaps in the forward line, slow the
in the attempt to form some defense in enemy columns on a few main roads, and
depth in the VIII Corps center has been strengthen by human means two or three
partially recorded and therefore can be of the natural physical barriers deep in
narrated. T h e effect that these units had the corps rear area.
in retarding the German advances, a
course of action evolving extemporane- Middleton’s First Moves
ously, must be considered along with
the role played by the un-co-ordinated During the daylight hours of 16 De-
front-line formations in the haphazard cember the direction of the German
sequence of their delaying actions from main effort and the weight of the forces
east to west. For convenience sake the involved was only vaguely perceived by
VIII Corps action is recounted here in the VIII Corps and higher commands.
independent detail. In the front lines the troops actually
With the very limited forces at his dis- grappling with the enemy initially re-
posal prior to 16 December the VIII ported piecemeal and seemingly local-
Corps commander found it physically ized attacks. As the day progressed and
impossible to erect any of the standard the attackers appeared in greater num-
defenses taught in the higher army bers the changing situation duly was re-
schools or prescribed in the field service ported through the chain of command.
regulations. The best he could do to de- By this time, however, communications
fend the extended front was to deploy had been so disrupted that the time lag
his troops as a screen, retaining local as represented on the situation maps in
reserves for local counterattack at poten- corps and army headquarters was a
tially dangerous points. In effect, there- matter of several hours. As a result CCR,
fore, the main part of Middleton’s re- 9th Armored Division, and the four en-
serve consisted of the battalions and gineer combat battalions received alert
312 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

orders and carried out assembly, but carrying out the existing First Army
only the 168th Engineer Combat Battal- directive; second, to deny the enemy full
ion was committed and it had a string and free use of the Ardennes road net
attached that restricted its free employ- by building the strongest possible de-
ment by the 106th Infantry Division. Of fense, with the limited force at hand, in
the three army engineer battalions in the front of the key communications centers,
VIII Corps zone under the 1128th En- St. Vith, Houffalize, Bastogne, and Lux-
gineer Group, one, the 299th Engineer embourg City. Although General Mid-
Combat Battalion, already was in the dleton counted on reinforcements from
battle area. During the day its sawmills outside his own command to garrison
at Diekirch received a part in a First these four key points, it would fall to the
Army security plan, prepared a fortnight VIII Corps to deny the enemy access
earlier. About one o’clock on the morn- thereto during the hours or days which
ing of the 16th the 299th was put on would pass before reinforcements could
alert status with other units in the army take over.
rear area to meet expected landings of St. Vith and Bastogne appeared to be
German paratroops. Through the first in the greatest immediate danger as
day of the counteroffensive, therefore, cracks commenced in the linear defense
the 1128th had most of its men reinforc- on the 17th. Friendly armor was hurry-
ing the guards at rear area headquarters ing down from the north to bolster the
and installations or manning observation 106th Division and St. Vith; so, having
points. turned one of his engineer battalions
During the night of 16 December over to General Jones, the corps com-
communications deteriorated still fur- mander directed his attention to the ap-
ther, particularly from regimental com- proaches to Bastogne, a natural thing in
mand posts forward. The outline of the view of the dangerous condition of the
German attack began to emerge, and the VIII Corps center. Thus a pattern was
pattern tentatively pointed to Liège as forming in which the meager resources
the enemy objective and made the size of at Middleton’s disposal would be com-
the German effort more or less apparent. mitted to delaying actions in the south-
But the growing hiatus in time between western part of the corps area while a
the initial contact with enemy troops at vacuum formed south of St. Vith and to
a given point and the ultimate “fix” in the rear of that sector. (See M a p IV.)
grease pencil on the acetate overlays in By the afternoon German advances at
the higher American headquarters made the expense of the 28th Division center
any true and timely picture of the extent forced Middleton to deploy the bulk of
of the German penetrations impossible. his reserve along the road net east of
Enough information filtered into the Bastogne. The presence of enemy recon-
VIII Corps command post at Bastogne, naissance at the Clerf River indicated
nevertheless, to enable Middleton to that the main crossings would be made
formulate his countermoves. The defen- near Clerf and Wilwerwiltz. From the
sive pIan he adopted consisted of two Clerf bridgehead a main, hard-surfaced
phases: first, to defend in place along the highway led into Bastogne. T h e Wil-
corps front as long as possible, thus werwiltz bridgehead gave entry to the
T H E VIII CORPS BARRIER LINES 313

Wiltz valley and a complex of secondary units were on the move. Ponton and
roads wending toward Bastogne. CCR, light equipment companies pulled onto
9th Armored (which earlier had sent the roads leading west with orders to
some tank destroyers to Clerf) , drew the take their bridges, air compressors,
assignment of blocking the Clerf-Bas- graders, and other paraphernalia out
togne highway. One engineer battalion, of enemy reach. Some of these units, like
the 44th, was ordered to reinforce the the 626th Engineer Light Equipment
headquarters force of the 707th Tank Company, would find themselves di-
Battalion for the defense of Wilwerwiltz, rectly in the path of the German ad-
but events were moving too fast and the vance. At Diekirch the 299th Engineer
battalion was diverted to the 28th Divi- Combat Battalion, under orders to rejoin
sion command post at Wiltz. There re- its group in the west, shut down the saw-
mained the problem of barring the way mills and entrucked under artillery fire.
to Luxembourg City, east of which the As yet no large numbers of foot strag-
4th Infantry Division was having a hard glers had come from the front lines, but
time. Already in the area, the 159th En- the roads to the rear were crowded with
gineer Combat Battalion was attached to supply vehicles, medium and heavy ar-
Barton’s division in the late afternoon tillery, service and headquarters trucks,
and headed for Consdorf. jeeps, and command cars. Around the
Of what might be considered the for- headquarters and installations farther to
mal reserve of the VIII Corps, General the west, clerks, mechanics, truck driv-
Middleton had left, b y 1600 of 17 De- ers, and the like stripped the canvas from
cember, only the 35th Engineer Combat truck-mounted machine guns, filled the
Battalion; he retained in addition a ammunition racks on deadlined tanks,
partial voice in the disposition of the listened to hurried explanations of ba-
1148th Engineer Group. T h e corps en- zooka mechanisms, or passed in inspec-
gineer officer, meanwhile, had proposed tion before sergeants who for the first
1 plan for defending a line from Foy to time in weeks were seriously concerned
Neffe which would screen the eastern with the appearance of each carbine and
entries to Bastogne. T o form this screen pistol.
the 35th and the 158th Engineer Combat At daylight on 18 December the 158th
Battalion, the latter taken from the Engineer Combat Battalion commenced
1128th Group, assembled their com- digging on its designated position north-
panies, vehicles, and equipment. Both east of Bastogne between Foy and Neffe.
battalions had been dispersed in num- In addition barriers manned in platoon
erous working parties; their trucks were strength were set up at Neffe, Mageret,
hauling road-building stores, timber, and Longvilly on the Clerf highway. By
and the like. Weapons long in disuse had dint of borrowing right and left 950 anti-
to be collected and checked; land mines tank mines could be used to strengthen
and explosives had to be gathered. Fur- the 158th position. At Bizory, northwest
thermore the 55th had the responsibility of Mageret, a part of Company C, 9th
of guarding the VIII Corps headquarters Armored Engineer Battalion, had been
and could not be released immediately. loaned by CCR and during the morn-
At the close of day other engineer ing dug in on the high ground facing
314 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

toward the Bastogne road. ning to Arlon. At the moment, however,


Help was on the way to the VIII this sector gave no cause for immediate
Corps, two airborne divisions and one concern, for the southern flank of the
armored. Of these reinforcements the corps still was holding.
101st Airborne Division and the 10th North of Bastogne a German threat
Armored Division were expected to as- was beginning to take shape. During the
semble in the neighborhood of Bastogne. morning word reached the VIII Corps
T h e problem then, during the 18th, was command post that the 740th Field Ar-
to extend the slim screen already in tillery Battalion had been overrun by
position east of Bastogne so as to provide the 1st SS Panzer Division at Poteau,
cover north and south of the city against west of St. Vith. Also, the left wing of
any enemy interruption of the assembly the 28th Infantry Division had been
process. On the south side the 1102d En- forced back across the Our River and it
gineer Group gathered ordnance, quar- appeared that a penetration was in prog-
termaster, signal, and engineer units, ress south of St. Vith. T o head off any
placing them east of the highway run- roaming German reconnaissance units

LA ROCHEAND THE OURTHE


RIVER
T H E VIII CORPS BARRIER LINES 315

north of Bastogne, a collection of anti- proposed line. T h e project was dropped.


aircraft, tank destroyer, ordnance, and As ordered by General Hodges,
engineer units moved to intersections most of the VIII Corps headquarters
and bridges along the Bastogne-La moved during the day to Neufchateau,
Roche road. In the latter bridgehead about eighteen miles southwest of
town the 7th Armored Division trains Bastogne, but General Middleton and
took over responsibility for blocking the a small staff remained in the city to
roads which there united to cross the brief the incoming airborne and ar-
Ourthe River. East of this line lay HOUff- mored commander and to maintain
alize, one of the four key road centers what little control still could be exer-
designated by Middleton for defense, cised over the course of battle. T h e 35th
but the 82d Airborne Division was en Engineer Combat Battalion, headquar-
route to the battle and the VIII Corps ters guard, was more urgently needed
commander expected that it would be east of Bastogne; at 1800 Middleton or-
deployed in the Houffalize sector. T h e dered the battalion to move in on the
Germans were moving too fast. At 1400 right of the 158th. With two battalions
on the eighteenth a radio message in line there was a screen, albeit very
reached Bastogne that the enemy had thin, extending from the Houffalize-Bas-
overrun the rear command post of an togne road to the Arlon-Bastogne road.
engineer company at Steinbach, just east Then, since the center of gravity for the
of Houffalize. corps was rapidly shifting to the south-
There remained the very real threat west, Middleton took his last two engi-
of a coup de main against Bastogne from neer battalions, the 1278th and 299th, to
the east. In the afternoon bad news from establish a screen facing generally north
this sector came thick and fast: at 1405 between Libramont and Martelange. Be-
a telephone call from the commander hind this screen, southwest of Bastogne,
of CCR, 9th Armored Division, reported he hoped to assemble the stragglers and
that his most advanced roadblock force broken units of his corps.
(Task Force Rose) was “as good as sur- T h e situation as seen by Middleton
rounded”; at 1430 the Germans were and his staff on the night of the 18th
reported advancing on the second road- was this. CCB of the 10th Armored had
block; at 1525 came confirmation that arrived from the Third Army and taken
Task Force Rose had been overrun. On positions between Bastogne and Wiltz.
the Clerf highway, then, the enemy was Some part of CCR, 9th Armored, re-
less than nine miles from Bastogne. mained intact at Longvilly astride the
Troops of the 28th Division continued Clerf road. T h e 101st Airborne Division
to hold the town of Wiltz, but they could was detrucking in its concentration area
not bar the valley corridor to the Ger- west of Bastogne. T h e Germans had
mans. An officer patrol, in armored cars achieved a clear penetration in the corps
taken out of ordnance workshops, made center and for all practical purposes
an attempt to reconnoiter a proposed the American forces in the St. Vith sector
barrier line between CCR and Wiltz. were separated from those under Middle-
Toward evening their report reached ton’s immediate control. T h e deep and
Bastogne: the Germans were west of the dangerous penetration made by the
316 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

armored columns of the 1st SS Panzer opening. And closer to the vague and
Division in the V Corps sector north and fragmentary front line, roads, trails, and
west of St. Vith had forced the First paths carried stragglers singly or in large
Army and 12th Army Group command- herds, toiling painfully on foot or cling-
ers to choose between an attempt to re- ing tenaciously to some vehicle, back
store the breach between Bastogne and to Bastogne or beyond to the west.
St. Vith and one to stop the 1st SS Panzer
Division. T h e Cap North of Bastogne
T h e decision, made during the after-
noon, was to assemble the 82d airborne T h e action east of Bastogne during
Division at Werbomont, instead of the night of 18 December, the absorption
Houffalize as Middleton had intended. of the engineer screen into the larger
Houffalize would have to go and with- defending forces, and the final fate of
out a fight. Rumors in the early evening CCR, 9th Armored, has already been
already placed it in German hands. Since described. Here the focus is on the at-
there was no force at hand to close the tempt to impede the probing advance
Houffalize gap the most that could be guards and reconnaissance parties of the
done was to vulcanize the edges of the Fifth Panzer Army pushing into the gap
tear by holding on at St. Vith and north of Bastogne.
Bastogne. Perhaps, too, the enemy rush- Construction of a really tough bar-
ing through the gap might be caused rier line along the Ourthe River hardly
some difficulty and delay by the creation could be expected. T h e stream itself,
of a barrier line along the Ourthe River even when swollen by the winter snows,
and its tributaries. Plans for such a was narrow. At some points the ap-
barrier line already were in execution proaches to the crossing sites were diffi-
in heterogeneous units hurrying to out- cult to negotiate and lent themselves to
post bridges, villages, and road inter- blocks and barriers, but there were many
sections between La Roche and Bas- bridges and numerous fords which an
togne. enemy could use to bypass a barred cross-
T h e night of 18 December was rife ing site. At best only a very few compa-
with rumor. By the quarter hour new nies of engineers could be found for the
reports came in from excited truck business of preparing bridge demolition
drivers, jeep patrols, or lonely clerks on charges, erecting barriers, laying anti-
unfamiliar outpost duty, placing the Ger- tank mines, and blasting craters in the
mans in some village or on some road roads. Some engineer tools and equip-
actuaIly well to the west of the real ment had been lost to the enemy, but
locations of the most advanced enemy there was probably as much available
spearheads. T h e rear areas of the corps as the small number of engineers could
-if one could continue to speak of any properly use. It was one thing to
“rear” area–was crawling with vehicles. strengthen the physical barriers in the
Supply points, truckheads, and medical path of the oncoming enemy; it was
installations were moving to the west- quite another to defend at these barriers
some for the third time in as many days. with sufficient rifle strength and antitank
New collecting points for the dead were weapons. T h e men and weapons re-
THE VIII CORPS BARRIER LINES 317

quired for a continuous defensive line Houffalize-Bastogne road until darkness


along the Ourthe simply were not avail- had fallen. On the German right the
able. On the other hand the German col- reconnaissance battalion of the 116th
umns would not hit the Ourthe line in a Panzer Division moved along the south
co-ordinated and general attack; further- side of the Ourthe swinging wide to
more their initial appearance could be avoid Houffalize (this before noon),
predicted along the well-defined and then turning to the northwest with the
major routes westward. intention of crossing the Ourthe and
On the morning of 19 December re- seizing the La Roche bridges from the
connaissance troops of two German rear. This advance, though unopposed,
armored divisions, the 2d Panzer Divi- was slow. Shortly after noon a few light
sion and the 116th Panzer Division, fun- reconnaissance vehicles reached Ber-
neled through a narrow corridor, only togne, from which a secondary road led
two miles in width, between Noville and across the Ourthe and on to La Roche.
Houffalize. T h e southern wall of this General Middleton had spotted
corridor was formed by the American Bertogne as one of the chief approaches
troops who had pushed the rapidly form- to the Ourthe and La Roche. Having
ing Bastogne perimeter as far out as been promised the 705th Tank Destroyer
Noville. In the-north where the town Battalion, en route south from the Ninth
of Houffalize had been abandoned the Army, he ordered the battalion to erect
corridor wall was formed by nature, for roadblocks at both Bertogne and La
Houffalize was a bridgehead on the east- Roche. T h e 705th, coming by way of
west channel of the Ourthe River. The Liège, was a few hours distant when the
two corps whose armored divisions were German scouts entered Bertogne. Across
leading the Fifth Panzer Army pack in the river the commander of the 7th Ar-
the race for the Meuse were strung mored Division trains had taken inde-
out for miles behind the foremost re- pendent action to protect his trucks and
connaissance forces. T h e main forces of supplies gathered in the neighborhood
the two armored divisions, although rela- of La Roche by installing outpost detach-
tively close to the reconnaissance teams, ments and roadblocks to the south and
were still a few hours behind. east. Someone (who is not clear) had
On the German left the 2d Panzer Di- blown the Ourthe bridge northwest of
vision, leading the XL VII Panzer Corps, Bertogne. T o prevent the reconstruction
collided with the Noville defenses early of this bridge Colonel Adams sent Com-
on the 19th. Partly by chance and partly pany C, 129th Ordnance Maintenance
by design, for General Lauchert needed Battalion, and a couple of antiaircraft
more road room in which to pass his half-tracks mounting 37-mm. guns to
division around Bastogne, the 2d Panzer form a block on the near bank about a
Division column became involved in a half mile from the village of Ortho.
fight which extended from Noville east It was midafternoon when the enemy
to Longvilly and lasted all through the reached the far bank. A self-propelled
day and following night. Caught up in gun at the head of the small German col-
this fight the advance elements of the umn got in the first blow, its shells knock-
division did not push beyond the ing out the half-track crews. Capt.
318 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Robert E. Spriggs withdrew his com- during that day engineers from the VIII
pany to a ridge overlooking the river Corps and First Army had toiled to
and radioed for reinforcements. T h e make a barrier line of the two arms west
enemy would not risk a daylight cross- of Houffalize, blowing bridges which
ing, nor could the German engineers were not on the main American supply
repair the damaged span while under lines, fixing charges for future destruc-
direct fire. In the early evening five tion of others, planting antitank mines
more half-tracks from the 203d Antiair- at possible fording sites, erecting and
craft Battalion and a pair of self-pro- manning roadblocks on roads and in the
pelled tank destroyers from the 705th villages along the main approaches to
Tank Destroyer Battalion came up. the river. On the north branch, that is
It must have been about this time that the line Durbuy-Hotton-La Roche, the
the 116th Panzer Division command- 51st Engineer Combat Battalion (Lt.
er received the unwelcome news that Col. Harvey R. Fraser) was hard at
he had no bridge on which to cross the work.2 Only three companies were on
western branch of the Ourthe. The hand to prepare this twelve-mile stretch
forward combat teams of the division of the river barrier, for Company C had
were west of the Houffalize-Bastogne been hurried northeast to Trois Ponts
road but not yet up to the river. They where it would administer a severe set-
had defiled with difficulty on the limited back to Kampfgruppe Peiper of the 1st
road net north of the Bastogne outworks, SS Panzer Division. South of La Roche,
and a part of the tank regiment had whose important bridges were outposted
stopped by the way to aid the 2d Panzer by the 7th Armored trains, the 9th
Division at Noville. In the twilight re- Canadian Forestry Company had left
connaissance troops who had pushed sawmills and logging tracts to prepare
west along the Ourthe after the setback demolitions and guard the crossing sites
at the Bertogne crossing discovered a on a tributary of the Ourthe. T h e steps
Bailey bridge, still standing, at Ortheu- taken to bar the western branch of
ville. Whether the bridge could be cap- the Ourthe northwest of Bertogne and
tured in usable condition was yet to be the initial reverse imposed on the enemy
seen, but as soon as this find was radioed reconnaissance there have already been
to the 116th Panzer Division command- noted. Strung across the land neck be-
er he directed the advance guard of the tween La Roche and the bridgehead at
division toward Ortheuville. Ortheuville were a few platoons of the
The Ourthe River resembles a mis- 1278th Engineer Combat Battalion.
shapen Y in which the down stroke runs At Ortheuville one of the main VIII
east to west and the open arms extend Corps supply roads (Bastogne-Marche-
toward the northwest and southwest. Namur) crossed the western branch of
The bifurcation in this Y comes about
3T h e 51st held its main position for five days
five miles west of Houffalize. T h e west and was given a Presidential Citation. T h e Ca-
branch of the Ourthe, as Belgian hydrog- nadian Forestry Company which worked with the
raphers name it, was the obstacle con- 51st pays high tribute to the battalion and its
commander. See No. 1 Coy, Canadian Forestry
fronting the German armored spear- Corps, Report of Operations, 16–21 December
heads on the night of 19 December. All 1944.
T H E VIII CORPS BARRIER LINES 319

the river by means of a heavy Bailey it was known that German armor was
bridge. Shortly after noon on the 19th close at hand. T h e 705th Tank Destroyer
a platoon or less of the 299th Engineer Battalion, which Middleton had attached
Combat Battalion arrived in Ortheuville to the 101st Airborne Division, was on
to prepare this important span for de- the move to Bastogne. Originally ordered
struction. Although the VIII Corps staff to use the road through Bertogne, the
had given priority to defense at this battalion had been forced to detour
bridge, there was little enough that when the battalion commander found
could be put in the effort. Three com- the enemy there. T h e 705th, following
panies of the 299th and a small portion the near bank of the Ourthe west to St.
of the 1278th Engineer Combat Battal- Hubert, dropped off eight tank destroy-
ions comprised all the troops available ers to bar an enemy crossing while its
for a barrier line now being constructed trains passed through Ortheuville. These
from Martelange northwest along High- guns, as it turned out, would not reach
way N46 to the Ourthe River, thence Bastogne for a number of days.
on both banks of the river to Ortheu- So things stood as the evening ad-
ville–a distance of about twenty-seven vanced: the engineers and tank destroy-
miles. er crews waiting for some enemy move
In the meantime the 158th Engineer to take the bridge; the German self-
Combat Battalion (Lt. Col. Sam Tabets) propelled guns and tanks lobbing in a
which, as part of the screen east of shell now and again to keep the Ameri-
Bastogne, had been in a fire fight cans away from the bridge and perhaps
throughout the morning,3 was relieved with hopes of cutting the wires on the
by the 501st Parachute Infantry, the bat- demolition charges. Back to the east the
talion leaving the sector about 1430. T h e advance guard of the 116th Panzer Divi-
companies of the 158th were returning sion was marching toward Ortheuville.
to their separate and original bivouacs At this point General Krueger, the
when corps orders suddenly arrived dis- L VIII Panzer Corps commander, made
patching the battalion to the Ourthe his fateful decision. The bridge north-
line. It would take some while to reas- west of Bertogne was gone, the bridge
semble the battalion but Company C was at Ortheuville probably would be blown
reached and diverted to Ortheuville. in any attack, and furthermore it would
Here it closed about 1900. T o his sur- be difficult to squeeze the entire corps
prise and relief the engineer company through the small opening between the
commander found that he would have east-west channel of the Ourthe and
some antitank support-desultory shell- Noville. Late in the evening he ordered
fire already was falling on the village and the 116th Panzer Division advance
guard, then at Salle three miles south-
3When the first German assault hit the 158th, east of the Ortheuville bridge, to a halt.
Pvt. Bernard Michin took on an enemy tank with
a bazooka at a range of ten yards, was badly
Then he sent orders to the division com-
burned by the explosion but destroyed the tank. manders and corps troops which would
Unable to see because of his wounds he located countermarch the forces west of the
an enemy machine gun by sound, threw a hand
grenade, and wiped out the crew. He was awarded
Houffalize-Bastogne road and turn the
the DSC. entire LVIII Panzer Corps to the north,
320 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

through the Houffalize bridgehead, and east led Luettwitz to conclude that hard-
away from the western branch of the hitting tactics in the coming day might
Ourthe. break the will of the defenders, loosen
A flurry of enemy activity a little be- their grip on the Bastogne road net,
fore midnight on the roads northwest and give the armor of the 2d Panzer
of Bastogne masked the withdrawal of Division and Panzer Lehr a clear high-
the LVIII Panzer Corps. Armored cars way west. Luettwitz put a time limit on
and half-tracks raced up and down the the attack prepared for the 20th, in-
roads shooting u p small convoys, sparring structing his armored divisions to be
with American outposts, and engender- ready to bypass Bastogne. His recon-
ing a flock of rumors which placed naissance pushed around the city, mean-
German spearheads in a half dozen spots while, both north and south, and tangled
beyond the Ourthe. In truth the only with the defenders of the makeshift,
serious efforts to cross the west branch attenuated barrier lines.
in the late evening were those made by At Ortheuville a lull developed short-
roving reconnaissance elements of the ly after midnight as the light armor
2d Panzer Division, whose main combat screening the 116th Panzer Division final-
strength remained tied down in the fight ly pulled away. T h e engineers patrolled
for Noville. An hour before midnight across the river along the Bastogne road
these scouts did appear in front of a but found no one except American
bridge at Sprimont, which crossed a wounded whose trucks had been shot
tributary of the Ourthe south of Ortheu- u p by German raiders earlier in the
ville; for their pains the American en- night. Just before dawn, light tanks
gineers blew the bridge in their faces. and armored infantry from the 2d Pan-
A few engineers, ordnance troops, and zer Division arrived to take their turn
antiaircraft and tank destroyer crews on at the bridge. After some time spent
19 December had contributed mightily probing the bridge defenses by fire, the
to the German decision which turned an German infantry rushed forward behind
entire armored corps from the road west a careening scout car. As much to their
and plunged it into profitless adventures surprise as to that of the American
in a side alley. Of all the disappoint- engineers the bridge remained intact.
ments suffered by the Fifth Panzer For some reason, perhaps the enemy
Army on this day, and there were many, shelling a few hours earlier, the demo-
perhaps the greatest stemmed from the lition charges on the span failed to ex-
reverses suffered in fact at the bridge plode when the plunger went home. At
beyond Bertogne and in anticipation at the first shock the defenders had fallen
the Bailey span in Ortheuville. back across the bridge to the houses by
While Krueger’s corps turned in its the river bank and started firing. They
tracks during the night of 19 December, had only a few minutes to wait before
General Luettwitz issued commands to a column of German vehicles led by a
his XL VII Panzer Corps, whose forward light tank appeared on the opposite
column was bunching up around bank. When the leader started across
Bastogne. Reports from the troops press- the span, one of the two American tank
ing onto the city from the north and destroyers which had been run down
T H E VIII CORPS BARRIER LINES 321

close to the bridge got a direct hit, thus mans crossed into the village, this time
blocking the span. Peculiarly enough by way of the bridge. Earlier the Ameri-
the enemy made no further attempt to cans had rewired demolition charges and
win a way across. In the afternoon, when installed the detonator in a foxhole close
the troops of the 158th and the 9th to the span, but for some reason there
Canadian Forestry Company undertook again was no explosion.
a counterattack across the river they T h e bridge defenders were in con-
found no trace of the enemy. So confused tact with the 1128th Engineer Group
was the location of friend and foe that headquarters through the Belgian tele-
for a few hours two-way traffic between phone system (which continued in oper-
Marche and Bastogne was resumed. ation although its wire ran through the
T h e capture of Noville during the German lines). A request for infantry
afternoon freed the 2d Panzer Division support could not be filled and the com-
to continue the advance toward the manding officer of the 1128th ordered
Meuse. On the other hand, Luettwitz’ the defenders to fall back southwest to
corps was having trouble bringing gaso- St. Hubert. Most of the 158th Engineer
line forward on the crowded, winding Combat Battalion reached St. Hubert.
supply roads in its sector; furthermore, As a parting gesture the tank destroyers,
the 2d Panzer Division would take some which had seen no tank targets, laid
time to reassemble for the move on indirect fire on the bridge. A muffled
Marche.4 explosion led the engineers to report
It remained for the division recon- that the span was at least severely dam-
naissance battalion, reinforced by artil- aged.
lery and engineers, to make the next If so, the German engineers were
foray against the Ortheuville crossing quick to make repairs, for the advance
site. T h e reconnaissance troops got there guard of the 2d Panzer Division began
about 2200. For two hours German to roll almost immediately on this and
howitzers, mortars, and machine guns other temporary bridges thrown across
pummeled the American defenses on the east of Ortheuville. When daylight came
far bank, setting buildings aflame and the 2d Panzer Division was bunched u p
tying the engineers and tank destroyers in assembly area with its head across
to their positions. At midnight the en- the river near Tenneville and its rear
emy infantry forded the river, attacking guard, arrayed to meet a counterattack
from out of the darkness against defen- from Bastogne, near Salle. Inexplicably,
ders whose movements were etched by so far as the American patrols were con-
the light of flares and burning houses. cerned, the 2d Panzer Division did not
While those who had waded the river bestir itself during the 21st to employ
circled to the engineer flanks, more Ger- its victory at Ortheuville for a move on
Marche, in which the advance regimental
combat team of the 84th Infantry Divi-
4T h e difficulties which beset the 2d Panzer are sion was assembling. T h e answer here
well described in MSS # A–939 (Luettwitz) and was logistical, not tactical: Lauchert’s
B–456, 2d Panzer Division, 21–26 December 1944 armor would have to waste the entire
(Oberstleutnant Ruediger Weiz) and also in the
Third U.S. Army interrogation of Lauchert. day waiting for gasoline.
322 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Defense Southwest of Bastogne General Middleton asked his troops, at


1600, to hold the barrier line in front
Throughout the 21st the VIII Corps of Neufchâteau and Arlon for forty
had worked hard to strengthen the hours, or until help could come, and he
engineer barrier line in front of Neuf- specifically named Martelange. Here a
château and Arlon, centers around which branch of the Sure River provided a
the corps was re-forming, because the natural hindrance to troops advancing
presence of German patrols south and from the north; but here also an enemy
southwest of Bastogne gave ample warn- penetration would endanger the assem-
ing of imminent attack. Actually it is bly of reinforcements coming up through
incorrect to consider these defenses in Luxembourg and Arlon and would lay
the sense of a line. There was no contin- bare the right flank of the VIII Corps
uous natural barrier on which to build. screen.
T h e defense of this sector, as a result, At dusk a platoon from Company B,
consisted of erecting obstacles at impor- 299th Engineer Combat Battalion,
tant road crossings, bridge demolitions, which was holding Martelange, came
cratering concrete and macadam road under attack by tanks and infantry. T h e
surfaces, and mining fords and narrow platoon blew the two bridges in the cen-
stretches of roads. The troop detach- ter of the town and withdrew. In great
ments to cover these barriers remained confusion the corps hastily gathered
small and heterogeneous, their weapons more engineers to defend the road to
usually no more than carbines, rifles, Arlon by a counterattack, but the Ger-
machine guns, and bazookas. Heavy mans remained quietly in the town and
antitank weapons–a handful of tank de- made no attempt to repair the bridges.
stroyers, headquarters tanks, and how- An advance in force south on Arlon was
itzers-would be found in ones and twos no part of the XL VII Panzer Corps plan.
at the most important points. In general T h e foray at Martelange had been made
these defensive positions were organized by column from the assault gun bri-
with an eye to barring the roads which gade attached to the 5th Parachute Divi-
approached Neufchâteau ( (the VIII sion, the division itself being strung out
Corps headquarters) and Arlon (the around Wiltz, which it had taken earlier.
western gateway to Luxembourg City) Poor communications, by this time as
from the north. baneful an influence on the operations
Strongpoints–the term is relative- of the XLVII Panzer Corps as on those
had been created at St. Hubert, Libra- of the American VIII Corps, gave the
mont, Sibret, and Martelange, of which 5th Parachute Division commander an
the last two were in the most imminent extremely muddled picture of what had
danger. Sibret, where remnants of the happened at Martelange. Heilmann did
28th Infantry Division had reorganized not know for sure who had the town
as Task Force Caraway, lay only four until the next afternoon and in the
miles southwest of Bastogne. Martelange, interim became gravely worried about
on the highway to Arlon, was thirteen his exposed south flank, which at this
miles due south of Bastogne. Possession moment was the left anchor of both the
of this town was of pressing importance. corps and army. In a postwar account
THE VIII CORPS BARRIER LINES 323

Heilmann concluded that in the Marte- the assistant division commander,


lange action “quite a few things had gone Brig. Gen. George A. Davis; ordered
wrong,” a conclusion which General held “in reserve.” Sibret, then, was a
Middleton could have shared. “strongpoint” in the VIII Corps screen
T h e next engagement in the new VIII but could be so considered only in re-
Corps sector took place at Sibret. As lation to the surrounding roadblocks
the enemy closed on Wiltz General Cota manned by squads and sections.
had withdrawn the 28th Division com-
mand post, setting it up in Sibret on Renewed Drive Around Bastogne
the night of 19 December. A straggler
line established around Neufchateau Around the eastern arc of the Bastogne
brought in some troops, and these were perimeter the events of the 20th had
placed at roadblocks between Bastogne convinced the Fifth Panzer Army that
and Sibret. T h e 630th Tank Destroyer no more time should be wasted here
Battalion, having supported the 28th In- and that the westward momentum of
fantry Division from 16 December on, the X L V I I Panzer Corps must be re-
took station at a road junction south of vived. T h e command solution to the
Sibret. T h e battalion, be it said, con- Bastogne problem called for the 2d Pan-
sisted of parts of Company B and the zer Division to shake loose and hurry
headquarters–but without their guns. past the city in the north. This move,
North and west of Sibret a number of highlighted by the seizure of the Ortheu-
artillery outfits belonging to the 333d ville bridge, began late on the 20th.
Field Artillery Group and the 28th Di- Luettwitz divided the armor of the Pan-
vision had gone into firing positions zer Lehr Division, one kampfgruppe to
from which to support the 101st Air- swing south of Bastogne and on to the
borne troops around Bastogne. Some west, one to stay behind for a few hours
were intact, others were no more than and aid the 26th Volks Grenadier Divi-
headquarters batteries with a few pieces sion in reducing the city. T h e latter
and a collection of cannoneers armed division would be left the unpleasant
with rifles or carbines. Cavalry, tank, and and difficult task (as General Kokott,
tank destroyer units which had come the commander, saw it) of containing
back as the 28th Division center the American forces in and around the
withdrew also were present with city while at the same time shifting the
the artillery, but they too were axis of attack from the east to the south
remnants of battalion and company head- and west.
quarters with few men and few weapons. On the afternoon of the 20th General
In Sibret General Cota had perhaps two Kokott gave orders to set the first phase
hundred men, mostly stragglers and of this new plan in motion. T h e 39th
strangers, for his headquarters and serv- Regiment, attacking on the south side
ice people had been organized as a pro- of Bastogne, was told to continue across
visional battalion and thrown in to help the Bastogne-Martelange highway and
hold Wiltz. There were three howitzers capture the high ground in the vicinity
near the village, but the main antitank of Assenois. T h e 26th Reconnaissance
defense consisted of two bazookas which Battalion would assemble, pass through
324 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

the rifle regiment at dark, swing around in the village. T h e first rush carried a
Bastogne, and seize and hold the village group of the enemy into the solidly built
of Senonchamps immediately west of gendarmerie at the southern entrance.
Bastogne. From this point the battalion Probably it was this initial success which
would lead an attack into the city. T h e was credited to the 5th Parachute Divi-
26th’s commander had high hopes for sion.
this admittedly risky foray. T h e recon- General Cota went through the streets
naissance battalion was in good condi- rounding up all the troops he could find
tion and its commander, Major Kunkel, for a counterattack against the gen-
had a reputation for daring. Kokott ex- darmerie, but the building could not
pected the battalion to reach Senon- be taken by unsupported riflemen. It
champs during the morning of the 21st. was well after daybreak now, but very
Through the dark hours General foggy; the armored vehicles of the Ger-
Kokott waited for some word from man battalion were closing on the vil-
Kunkel’s kampfgruppe. At daybreak the lage and it was necessary to reoccupy the
first report arrived: the reconnaissance gendarmerie as a barrier. T h e three
battalion was in a hard fight at Sibret, howitzers in the village defense had been
two miles south of its objective. Next overrun by tanks, but a battery of the
came an irate message from the corps 771stField Artillery Battalion remained
commander: the 5th Parachute Division emplaced some two thousand yards
had captured Sibret and what was the northwest of the village. After much
26th Reconnaissance Battalion doing maneuvering to attain a firing site where
hanging around that village? Kokott, his there was no minimum elevation, the
pride hurt, sent the division G–3 jolting battery opened on the Germans bar-
uncomfortably on a half-track motor- ricaded in the gendarmerie. At almost
cycle to find out what had gone wrong. the same time the enemy started a very
From very sketchy German and Ameri- heavy shelling. It was about 0900 and
can sources the following broad outline Kampfgruppe Kunkel was well behind
of the fight for Sibret emerges. When schedule. T h e garbled radio messages
Kunkel crossed the Bastogne-Neufchâ- reaching the XLVII Panrer Corps re-
teau road, he came upon a stray rifle tracted the early report that Sibret had
company of the 5th Parachute Division been taken and told of heavy fighting
which was engaged south of Sibret in a in the “strongly garrisoned” village. But
fire fight. About 0300 this German com- the Germans could not be shelled out
pany had reached the road junction at of the gendarmerie, tanks moved in on
which the remnants of the 630th Tank the American battery, and General Cota
Destroyer Battalion formed their road- ordered his small force to retire south
block. T h e American gunners, fighting to Vaux-lez-Rosikres; there he set up
on foot with rifles, apparently delayed his division command post.
the Germans for a couple of hours. Then Meanwhile the staff of the 771st Field
the rifle company and troopers from Artillery managed to get two guns into
Kunkel’s command advanced through position to meet the enemy advance
the dark to the south edge of Sibret, north of Sibret, but both guns and their
while German mortar fire started falling tractors were put out of action by direct
T H E VIII CORPS BARRIER LINES 325

shelling. Kampfgruppe Kunkel rode latter defense barred the most direct line
roughshod into the artillery assembly of march between Bastogne and St.
areas north and west of Sibret, coming Hubert. A company of German infantry
upon guns hooked to their prime movers, and four tanks appeared in front of the
motors turning, and all the signs of Company C abatis and foxholes before
hurried exodus. Kunkel reported the 0900, but two of the tanks were rendered
capture of more than a score of artillery hors de combat by a bazooka team and
pieces, much ammunition, and many the action turned into a small arms duel.
prisoners. Quickly the kampfgruppe For some reason the attackers were not
moved on Senonchamps, leaving only a immediately reinforced, perhaps be-
small force to protect its left flank by a cause there were other and more at-
drive toward Chenogne. tractive targets in the vicinity. T h e 724th
T h e 26th Reconnaissance Battalion Engineer Base Depot Company, earlier
was not alone west of Bastogne. During manhandling supplies in the depots at
the previous night the reconnaissance St. Hubert, marched in to thicken the
battalion of the Panzer Lehr Division American firing line, and by noon the
had been relieved at Wardin, strength- fight had dwindled to an occasional ex-
ened by the attachment of the division change of shots. During the lull of early
engineer battalion, and started on a afternoon the 158th Engineer Combat
march around the south side of Bastogne Battalion and the tank destroyers which
as advance guard in the resumption of had retreated from Ortheuville to St.
the Panzer Lehr attack toward the Hubert were ordered south to take over
Meuse. This Panzer Lehr task force had the defense of Libramont. T h e 35th was
orders to scout in the direction of St. left alone to blockade and delay a pos-
Hubert, the key to the road complex sible thrust by the 2d Panzer Division
west of Bastogne. Following the 26th forces now crossing at Ortheuville or
Reconnaissance Battalion through Sib- the more direct threat from the east.
ret, the Panzer Lehr column turned During the morning roving detach-
northwest and fanned out on the eastern ments of the Panzer Lehr task force had
side of the Ourthe River in the neighbor- enjoyed a field day. For one thing they
hood of Amberloup and Tillet. There seized a large truck convoy, perhaps
were numerous fords and crossing sites sixty to eighty vehicles, en route to
along this stretch of the river, but the en- Bastogne. They also surrounded the 58th
emy was concerned with securing good Armored Field Artillery Battalion near
roads and bridges for the heavy columns Tillet, although no serious attempt was
following. made to eradicate it. T h e bulk of the
T h e approaches to St. Hubert were German task force crossed the Ourthe
defended on the 21st by the 35th Engi- north of the Company C strongpoint but
neer Combat Battalion (Lt. Col. Paul H. found that the American engineers had
Symbol) , which had barricaded the done a remarkably thorough job of
northern entrance from Ortheuville and blocking the roads leading to St. Hubert.
erected a strongpoint (held by Company Abatis (mined and booby-trapped) ,
C) at a crossroad in a loop of the Ourthe blown culverts, stretches corduroyed
north of the village of Moircy. This with felled trees, and extensive mine
326 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

be cut off, VIII Corps headquarters


ordered the 35th to hold as long as
feasible, then rejoin the VIII Corps in
the south. Using several hundred pounds
of T N T which had arrived in the after-
noon the engineers prepared demolitions
to be blown coincident with the with-
drawal through St. Hubert and Libra-
mont. T h e enemy, hindered by darkness,
mines, craters, and abatis, did not inter-
fere with the engineers, and the latter
fell back through Libramont, entrucked,
and by midnight were in a new assembly
area at Bouillon close to the French
frontier.
Somewhat earlier a German detach-
ment had seized a bridge over the
Ourthe at Moircy, to the south of the
Company C strongpoints. This bridge
gave access to a back road which entered
St. Hubert from the southeast. Despite
COMBAT SETTING
ENGINEER A CHARGE. the fact that this secondary route was
When the charge detonates, the tree will f a l l relatively free from the craters and ob-
across the road toform part of a roadblock. stacles which cluttered the main roads,
the Panzer Lehr task force made no
move to strike for the town but instead
fields prompted reports to the Panzer spread out farther north. The 902d Regi-
Lehr Division commander that it would merit of the division had been relieved
be some time before the eastern and near Neffe during the evening of 2 1 De-
northeastern approaches to St. Hubert cember and been assigned an advance
could be cleared. via St. Hubert. T h e light armor of the
In the late afternoon the Panzer Lehr task force remained nearly immobile for
task force brought artillery into position the next twenty-four hours, and it was
and started shelling the Company C posi- left to the main body of the division to
tion. By this time the VIII Corps line utilize the Moircy road.5
no longer ran north and south in front With the withdrawal of the 35th
of the German drive but was forming Engineer Combat Battalion the VIII
from east to west with the enemy pass- Corps no longer had elements directly
ing across the corps front. A single bat- in the path of the main German drive,
talion of engineers and miscellaneous always excepting, of course, the troops
antiaircraft and depot troops could not
be expected to hold what remained of 5 T h e Panzer Lehr commander was well forward
with his troops. For his recollections, which have
the barrier line on the western branch proven to be excellent, see MSS # A–941 through
of the Ourthe. Fearful lest the engineers A–943 (Bayerlein) .
T H E VIII CORPS BARRIER LINES 327

defending Bastogne, which by this time There remained one more battle to
were cut off from the rest of the corps. be fought by the residue of General
The outposts of the corps at Recogne Cota’s command, gathered around the
(held by the 7th Tank Destroyer Group) outpost position at Vaux-lez-Rosières on
and at Vaux-lez-Rosières (defended by the Bastogne-Neufchâteau road. During
a scratch force from the 28th Division, the night of 21 December some two
reinforced by the 527th Engineer Light hundred survivors of the 110th Infantry
Ponton Company) thus far had escaped fight at Wiltz reached the 28th Division
the attention of an enemy moving west, command post. Those who could be
not southwest. General Middleton was provided with clothes and weapons were
concerned about his open left flank and put back into the line. Cota had in addi-
as his engineers came back ordered a tion the engineer light ponton company,
barrier line formed along the Semois retained as riflemen over the protests of
River. On the VIII Corps right, in the the corps engineer, a few howitzers sited
area south of Bastogne, reinforcements as single pieces around the village perim-
from the Third Army were concentrat- eter, and a platoon of self-propelled
ing under the command of the I I I Corps. 76-mm. tank destroyers from the 602d
The VIII Corps tactical air command Tank Destroyer Battalion, which had
post, which had been moved to Floren- just come up from the Third Army.
ville on the 21st, continued to receive While the stragglers were being organ-
rumors and half-true reports of German ized, about 0800 on the 22d, German
forces turning southwest against its front, shells commenced to burst over the per-
but it was fairly clear that the main imeter. Enemy riflemen opened fire and
threat was past. an incautious light tank poked its nose
T o meet the German forces scouting into range of an American tank de-
and probing along the corps sector stroyer, which destroyed it. One prisoner
General Middleton organized a counter- was taken before this first flurry ended, a
reconnaissance screen. Behind this were rifleman from the 5th Parachute Divi-
collected stragglers and strays, many of sion.
whom had crossed the French border The 5th Parachute Division, it will
and got as far as Sedan. What was left be recalled, had the mission of extend-
of the corps artillery, mainly the 402d ing westward the cordon which the
Field Artillery Group, assembled for Seventh Army was to erect to forestall
tactical control and re-equipment. Other American counterattack against the
field artillery battalions, as well as tank south flank of the Fifth Panzer Army.
destroyer battalions, engineer regiments, The terminus of this extension was in-
and the like, were arriving to reinforce tended as the line Sibret–Vaux-lez-
the corps and help make good its losses. Rosières–Martelange, at which point the
New infantry formations were on the 5th Parachute Division would go over
way to restore the striking power of the to the defense. Colonel Heilmann’s
corps and the Third Army commander troops had taken Martelange, the east-
already was planning the employment- ern anchor for this .projected line, late
on the offensive–of a revitalized VIII on the 21st while small detachments re-
Corps. connoitered to the west; it was one of
328 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

these which briefly engaged the 28th But the troops manning the perimeter
Division (-) perimeter at Vaux-lez- were untrained engineers or men ex-
Rosières. hausted by constant battle and retreat,
When the dispositions of the X L V I I thrown again into a fight where the odds
Panzer Corps around Bastogne were al- were with the enemy and organized in
tered on the 21st, Heilmann expected pitifully small groups with strange
that his division would be given a more officers and companions. Vaux-lez-
ambitious mission. For this reason he Rosières fell to the Germans, and the
ordered reconnaissance to be pushed 28th Division command post moved once
south from Martelange and southwest more, this time to Neufchâteau.
toward Libramont on the 22d. That There is a footnote to the events west
morning, however, a new corps com- of Bastogne on 2 2 December–the story
mander, General der Kavallerie Edwin of the 58th Armored Field Artillery Bat-
Graf von Rothkirch, arrived on the talion. This battalion, commanded by
scene. He advised Heilmann to be “fore- Lt. Col. Walter J. Paton, had taken part
sighted,” advice which the latter, draw- in the fight at Longvilly and the ensuing
ing on his battle experience in Italy, withdrawal to Bastogne. With eight guns
interpreted as a warning to secure the left the 58th went into position west
original defensive line in preparation of the town to fire for the 101stAirborne.
for imminent American counterattack. On the afternoon of the 21st, with the
Sibret and Martelange were held by the enemy on the prowl in every direction,
5th Parachute; so Heilmann started his the battalion moved close to Tillet. Here
leading regiment, the 14th, for Vaux-lez- it was cut off by enemy reconnaissance
Rosières. It was growing dark when the units, and Colonel Paton ordered his
German advance guard appeared north- drivers and gunners to dig a foxhole
east of the village. circle around guns and vehicles. Shortly
General Cota had placed his tank after midnight a radio message came
destroyers here, anticipating correctly through: the battalion was to try to
the point of greatest danger, but this pre- reach Bastogne. T h e column formed but
caution was useless. T h e enemy pushed had gone only a little way when the tank
to the fore a platoon of long-barreled at its head was knocked off by an anti-
88-mm. assault guns mounted on an old tank gun; then mortars and machine
model Tiger body with exceptionally guns raked the road. Returning to the
heavy armor. T h e armor-piercing shells position which it had just left, the bat-
fired by the American 76-mm. guns had talion waited for daylight.
no effect whatever. T h e 28th Division In the meantime strong forces of the
headquarters flashed a radio warning to Panzer Lehr Division were on the move
the VIII Corps command post, reported west and troops were detached to wipe
that it had five bazookas left, and af- out this “strongpoint.” For most of the
firmed that these weapons could stop morning the encircled Americans stood
Tiger tanks, so much had the American to their guns or fought from their fox-
infantryman’s respect for the bazooka holes. As one participant in the bitter
grown in the trying days of the Ardennes. fight phrased it, “We gave them every-
T H E VIII CORPS BARRIER LINES 329

thing we had and they gave it back just defense in such circumstances.6 T h e
as fast.” Only one of the eight self- “magnificent job” which General Mid-
propelled howitzers was in firing condi- dleton later ascribed to the engineers
tion when Colonel Paton gave the order credits the engineers i n their role as
to destroy all equipment and make a infantry. T h e VIII Corps engineer and
break for it. Moving in little groups, the various engineer group commanders
shielded by trees and falling snow, most at that time and later believed the
of the battalion succeeded in reaching engineer battalions and companies
the VIII Corps lines. could have done more to impede the
There is a German peroration to this German advance if they had been denied
action. T h e commander of the Panzer the eastern firing line and employed in
Lehr Division recalling the route taken a tactically unified second line of defense
by his division as it marched toward St. in the western part of the corps area.
Hubert drafts a detour showing the ad- For this latter purpose General Middle-
vance guard swerving close to Tillet ton would have had some 3,300 engineers
to engage an American “armored unit.” in addition to those organic in the divi-
And late on the night of the 22d a gray- sions. But it is questionable whether the
clad staff officer posting the situation 7th Armored Division would have had
map in the operations section of OKW time to establish itself at St. Vith, not
makes a heavy pencil stroke. It is under to speak of the 101stAirborne Division
the name Tillet. at Bastogne, without the intervention of
N o accurate computation can be made the engineer battalions. Nonetheless, the
of the hours added to the German march story of the Ardennes barrier lines does
tables by the efforts of the engineers, make clear that the use of engineers in
artillery, and other small detachments their capacity as trained technicians of-
who fought to delay the enemy advance ten paid greater dividends than their use
through the rear areas of the VIII as infantry, and that a squad equipped
Corps. But there is no question that the with sufficient TNT could, in the right
LVIII Panzer Corps was diverted from spot, do more to slow the enemy advance
the main stream of the western advance than a company armed with rifles and
by these efforts–halving, for many hours, machine guns.
the spearhead strength of the Fifth Pan-
zer Army. Students of the retrograde 9 In theory both Americans and Germans recog-
nized the need for proper employment of their
action fought by the VIII Corps be- technically trained engineer troops. Model, for
tween 16 and 22 December will wish example, put out an order on 18 December posi-
to examine the question as to the most tively forbidding the use of the German Pioneers
as infantry. (LVIII Corps KTB, 18 Dec 44.) Doc-
profitable use of engineer troops who trine and tactical exigencies, however, often proved
formed the backbone of the rear area contradictory during the Ardennes battle.
CHAPTER XV

The German Salient Expands to the West


T h e reaction of rifle companies and one via Gerow’s V Corps and the other
battalions to the German surprise attack via Middleton’s VIII Corps. T h e first
on the morning of 16 December was report of enemy action on the 16th
an automatic reflex to an immediate seems to have come to Gerow from the
threat. T h e speed of reaction in higher 102d Cavalry Group in the Monschau
American headquarters was appreciably sector. T h e second report reaching V
slower since the size of the enemy threat Corps was initiated by the 393d Infan-
and its direction could be determined try and was circumstantial enough to in-
only when the bits and pieces of tactical dicate a German penetration on the
information, ascending the command front of the 99th Division. By noon
ladder echelon by echelon, began to ar- Gerow had sufficient information to jus-
ray themselves in a credible manner. tify a corps order halting the attack be-
The fact that the German High Com- ing made by the 2d and 99th. Although
mand had chosen to make the main effort the First Army commander subse-
on the north flank contributed to an quently disapproved Gerow’s action and
early misreading of the scope of the ordered a resumption of the advance
attack, for in this sector of the Allied for 17 December, the American attack
line there were two possible German in fact was halted, thus permitting a
military objectives which were tactically rapid redeployment to meet the German
credible and compatible with the Allied thrust. Gerow’s decision seems to have
preconception of a limited objective at- been taken before V Corps had any cer-
tack. These were, first, a spoiling opera- tain word from the 394th Infantry on
tion to neutralize the gains of the 2d the corps right flank. Neither Gerow
and 99th Infantry Divisions in the ad- nor Middleton was given prompt in-
vance into the West Wall, and, second, formation that contact between the 99th
a line-straightening operation to reduce Division and the 14th Cavalry Group
the salient held by the 106th Infantry had been broken at the V-VIII Corps
Division within the old West Wall posi- boundary.
tions. Either or both of these interpre- Since Middleton’s corps had been
tations of the initial German effort hit on a much wider front than in the
could be made and would be made at case of its northern neighbor, a some-
corps and higher headquarters during what better initial appreciation of the
the 16th. weight of the attack was possible. Even
The chain reaction during the early so, Middleton and his superiors had too
hours of the attack followed two paths, little precise information during most
THE GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS T O T H E WEST 331

of the 16th to assess the German threat the west bank of the Our, Clerf, and
properly. Middleton seems to have felt Sure Rivers. General Bradley, whose
intuitively that his thinly held corps 12th Army Group headquarters in Lux-
front was being hammered by some- embourg City had a better telephone
thing more serious than local and link to the VIII Corps than had the
limited counterattacks. By 1030 he had First Army command post at Spa,
convinced General Hodges that CCB, talked with Middleton, then telephoned
9th Armored Division, should be taken General Patton that the 10th Armored
out of army reserve and turned over to Division would have to come north to
the VIII Corps, for he had no armor in help Middleton’s corps. At midnight
reserve behind the corps left flank. General Hodges ordered the 26th In-
Shortly after noon telephone conversa- fantry attached to V Corps and set it
tions with his corps liaison officers at the marching for Camp Elsenborn. About
106th headquarters in St. Vith convinced the same time Hodges alerted part of
Middleton that he had to be ready to the 3d Armored.
commit his own available corps reserves, It is unlikely that the responsible
four battalions of combat engineers and American commanders slept soundly on
CCR, 9th Armored Division. By 1400 the night of the 16th, but as yet they
the 168th Engineer Combat Battalion had no real appreciation of the magni-
was assembling at St. Vith and with- tude of the enemy attack. T h e tactics
in the next few hours the remaining followed by the Germans in the first
engineers and CCR were alerted and hours had made it very difficult for even
assembled, the latter moving up the front-line commanders to gauge the
behind the corps center where, Middle- threat. The disruption of the forward
ton learned at 1415, all regiments of the communications nets by German shell-
28th Division were under attack. fire on the morning of the 16th had led
The sequence of events in the hours to long periods of silence at the most
before midnight on the 16th is difficult endangered portions of the front and a
to time. Middleton talked with the subsequent overloading, with conse-
commander of the 106th Division by quent delays, of those artillery radio net-
telephone and apparently believed that works which continued to function. T h e
he, Middleton, had sanctioned a with- initial enemy employment of small
drawal of Jones’s exposed two regiments assault groups, company-size or less, had
and that such a withdrawal would be led the combat commanders on the line
made.1 Impressed with the growing to visualize and report a limited-scale
strength of the German attack, Middleton attack. T h e broken and wooded nature
drafted a “hold at all costs” order which of the terrain in the area under attack
left his command post at 2120 and which had permitted extensive German infil-
set the final defense line generally along tration without any American obser-
vation, which also contributed to an
erroneous first estimate of the enemy
forces. Finally, the speed with which the
1Intervs with Middleton and Capt L. B. Clarke,
19 Jan 45 and 20 Apr 45; Ltr, Middleton to Col American observation or listening posts
S. L. A. Marshall, 30 Jul 45. were overrun and silenced had resulted
332 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

in large blank spaces on the G–2 maps was the fact that the fighter-bomber
in the American headquarters. pilots were having to jettison their bomb
At the close of this first day of bat- loads in order to engage increasingly
tle, therefore, the only certain view of large flights of German planes.
the enemy was this: German forces Two other key pieces helped fill out
were attacking all along the line from the puzzle picture of enemy forces and
Monschau to Echternach; they had suc- intentions. Prisoners had been taken
ceeded in making some dents in the for- from a number of units known to belong
ward American positions; at a number to the Sixth Panzer Army, a formation
of points the defenders seemed to need long carried in Allied G–2 estimates
reinforcement; and the amount of Ger- as the German strategic reserve in
man artillery which had been used was the west. Second, some ninety Junker
suspiciously large for only a limited ob- 5 2 ' s had been counted in the early morn-
jective attack. During the night of 16 ing paratroop drop, an indication that
December the German assault waves the Germans had planned a serious air-
overran or destroyed a large number of borne assault. By late morning of the
communications points and much radio 17th, therefore, it can be said that the
or wire equipment in the forward areas, American commanders had sufficient in-
drastically slowing the flow of informa- formation to construct and accept a pic-
tion to higher American headquarters. ture of a major Geramn offensive. It
T o many American units 17 Decem- would take another thirty-six hours to
ber opened as just another day. Com- produce a really accurate estimate of the
pany B of the 341st Engineer General number of German divisions massing on
Service Regiment, for example, went the Ardennes front.
that morning to work on a railroad T h e 12th Army Group commander,
bridge under construction at But- General Bradley, had gone to Paris to
genbach. (Before noon the surprised discuss the replacement problem with
engineers were shelled out.) As the General Eisenhower, when, on the after-
morning progressed, however, the higher noon of the 16th, a message from his
American headquarters began to com- own headquarters in Luxembourg City
prehend that the enemy was making a gave word of the German attack. Eisen-
full-scale attack and this with no limited hower suggested that Bradley should
objective in mind. By 0730 the V Corps move the 7th Armored Division down
commander had sufficient information from the north and bring the 10th Ar-
to convince him that the enemy had mored Division up from the Third
broken through the lines of the 99th Army. T h e 12th Army Group had no
Division. At 0 8 2 0 the VIII Corps artil- strategic reserve, but plans already exist-
lery radio reported to Middleton that ed to move troops in from Patton's
German troops were approaching St. Third Army and Simpson's Ninth in the
Vith along the Schonberg road. Two unlikely event that the undermanned
hours later the American command nets VIII Corps front was threatened. Brad-
were jammed with Allied air force re- ley telephoned Patton and told him to
ports of large enemy vehicular columns send the 10th Armored Division north
moving westward. Even more significant to help Middleton. Patton, as Bradley
T H E GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS T O T H E WEST 333

expected, demurred. His own army was been comrades in World War I, and
readying for a major attack on 19 De- when Hodges asked for assistance Simp-
cember, an attack which had been the son acted promptly and generously. On
subject of controversy between Eisen- the 16th, for example, Simpson offered
hower and Montgomery and which rep- the 30th Infantry Division and the 5th
resented the Third Army’s last chance Armored on his own initiative.
to be the chief ball carrier in the Al- Prior to the invasion of Normandy
lied push to cross the Rhine. Bradley, there had been a great deal of staff
however, was firm and Patton at once planning for the creation of a SHAEF
gave the order to assemble the 10th strategic reserve for use in the first nine-
Armored. ty days of the operation in western Eu-
Bradley’s second call went to Gen- rope. T h e Allied successes during the
eral Simpson whose grueling attack to summer and autumn put these plans in
close along the Rhine River had come moth balls and the subject was not re-
to a halt on 14 December beside the opened until early December when
muddy western banks of the Roer. Here Eisenhower ordered that a strategic re-
the choice fell, as Eisenhower had sug- serve be assembled and placed under
gested, on the 7th Armored Division, the 12th Army Group, but for employ-
which was resting and refitting in the ment only at his direction as Supreme
rear of the XIII Corps zone. The 7th Allied Commander. Two days before
was turned over to the First Army and the Ardennes attack the SHAEF opera-
now Bradley had a fresh armored di- tions section submitted a plan calling for
vision moving in to shore up each of the a strategic reserve of at least three di-
endangered VIII Corps flanks. More visions. T h e concept, quite clearly, was
troops, guns, and tanks would be moved to amass a force capable of exploiting
out of Simpson’s army on 16 and 17 a success on any sector of the Allied
December, but the authorization for front without diverting divisions from
these reinforcements is hard to trace. other parts of the front. Some opera-
In many cases the transfer of units would tions officer, possibly imbued with the
be accomplished in simple fashion by Leavenworth doctrine of “Completed
telephone calls and simultaneous agree- Staff Work,” inserted the observation
ment between the higher commanders that “a strategic reserve could be used
concerned.2 Hodges and Simpson had to repel a serious breakthrough by
2 The general story of the command decisions German forces,” but hastened to add:
on the first days of the battle will b: found in “In view of current G–2 estimates, it
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New is unlikely that such employment will
York: Doubleday and Company, 1948); Omar N.
Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Henry Holt
becomenecessary.” 3
and Company, 1951); and Conquer: T h e Story of T o understand fully the position in
the Ninth Army. The Sylvan Diary and the Gay which the Supreme Commander found
Diary give details of the reactions at the First and
Third Army headquarters, respectively. Details himself on 16 December, it should be
of troop movements are given in the First U.S.
Army Report of Operations and the AAR’s of the entitled The German Counter Offensive in the
V and VIII Corps. A good analysis of troop Ardennes (n.d.).
strengths will be found in a British study by the 3 Hq SHAEF files: GCT 322-12/Ops(A), sub:
Directorate of Tactical Investigation, War Office, SHAEF Reserve.
334 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

remembered that American troops were the German counteroffensive would have
in constant movement to Europe and to come from the armies in the field.
the higher staffs tended to look upon (Simpson had already thrown the 30th
the next few troopships as containing a Infantry into the pot, in addition to the
reserve which could and would be used 7th Armored.) Late in the evening of
by the Supreme Commander to influ- the 17th Bradley telephoned Patton,
ence the direction of the battle. Four who was starting to move his troops in-
U.S. infantry divisions and one armored to assembly areas for the Third Army
division were scheduled to arrive on the attack on the Saar, and told the latter
Continent in December, with an equal that two more divisions might have to
number slated for January. Of the De- go north. By midnight of 17 December
cember contingent two infantry divisions approximately 60,000 men and 11,000
(the 87th and 104th) were already in vehicles were on the move to reinforce
the line when the Germans struck. Hodges’ First Army. In the following
There remained en route the 11th eight days three times this number of
Armored Division and the 66th and men and vehicles would be diverted
75th Infantry Divisions, the 75th hav- from other areas to meet the Germans
ing already crossed the Channel on in the Ardennes.
its way to the front. Two additional One piece of military thinking dom-
U.S. divisions were training in the inated in all the higher U.S. military
United Kingdom and waiting for equip- headquarters and is clearly traceable in
ment, but neither was expected to cross the initial decisions made by Eisenhow-
the Channel during December: the 17th er, Bradley, and the army and corps
Airborne was scheduled for France in commanders. T h e Army service schools
January, and the 8th Armored Division, during the period between the two
still missing many of its authorized ve- World Wars had taught as doctrine-
hicles, was not as yet on a movements a doctrine derived from the great offen-
list.4 sives of 1917 and 1918 on the Western
The only combatwise divisions ready Front–that the salient or bulge pro-
to the hand of the Supreme Command- duced by a large-scale offensive can be
er were the 82d and 101st Airborne contained and finally erased only if the
Divisions, which had been brought back shoulders are firmly held. T h e initial
to France after the long, tough battle movements of the American reinforce-
in the Netherlands and were not expect- ments were in response to this doc-
ed to regain full operational status un- trine.
til mid-January. By the 17th, however,
it was clear that the First Army had to T h e 30th Division Meets Peiper
be heavily reinforced, and promptly.
General Eisenhower reluctantly gave the T h e 30th Division (Maj. Gen. Leland
airborne troops to Bradley. S. Hobbs) was resting in the neighbor-
From this point on the immediate re- hood of Aachen, Germany, after hard
inforcements needed to meet and halt fighting in the Roer River sector, when
4H q SHAEF files: O and E SHAEF G–3, 370.5- a call from the XIX Corps informed its
4, vol. 1 , Flow of Divisions. commander of the German attack along
T H E GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS T O T H E WEST 335

the V and VIII Corps boundry.5 At this a few German aircraft which picked up
time (the evening of 16 December) the column early in the move and hung
the situation did not seem too om- about dropping flares or making futile
inous and the division commander strafing passes, the leading regiment
merely was told that he should alert closed by midnight. Meanwhile the V
his units in the rest area. Shortly be- Corps commander, apprehensive lest the
fore noon of the following day the corps 1st SS Panzer Division column thrusting
commander, Maj. Gen. Raymond S. Mc- south of Malmédy should destroy the
Lain, telephoned to say: “I don’t know last connection between his own and the
any of the details but you are going VIII Corps, ordered General Hobbs to
south. I think it is only temporary.” switch his leading combat team to Mal-
The 30th Division was to move to an médy at daylight.
assembly area north of Eupen where Since the 119th had detrucked and
the V Corps commander, General Gerow, bedded down for the night, the assist-
would issue detailed orders. Gerow’s in- ant division commander, Brig. Gen.
structions, actually received at noon, William K. Harrison, Jr., caught the
directed the 30th Division to relieve 117th Infantry on the road and direct-
the 18th Infantry (1st Division) around ed it toward Malmédy. Its way fitfully
Eupen and prepare for a counterattack lighted by enemy flares, the 117th (Col.
to the southeast in support of the 2d Walter M. Johnson) moved cautiously
and 99th Divisions farther south. The south from Eupen. In early morning
rapid advance of Kampfgruppe Peiper, the head of the regimental column was
however, would catch the division in bucking the heavy stream of traffic leav-
midpassage, drastically changing the ing Malmédy when new orders arrived:
manner of its ultimate commitment. (See one battalion was to go to Stavelot, erect
Map II.) a roadblock, and prevent the Germans
At 1630, on 17 December, the divi- from advancing north of the Ambleve
sion started the forty-mile trip to its River. Colonel Johnson hurried his 1st
new assembly area moving by combat Battalion toward Stavelot, deployed the
teams prepared to fight. The 30th Re- 2d Battalion on the ridge between Stave-
connaissance Troop, the 119thInfantry, lot and Malmédy, then organized the
117th Infantry, and 120th Infantry defense of Malmédy with the 3d Bat-
moved in that order, with tanks and talion and the troops already in the
tank destroyers interspersed between town.
the regiments. Despite the presence of At daybreak on 18 December the re-
mainder of the 30th Division was on
5The records kept by the 30th Division are in the road to Malmédy with the 120th
a very good state and are particularly valuable in
that they include a telephone record, attached to Infantry in the lead, under new orders
the G–3 journal, of important conversations be- for a division attack to the southeast.
tween the commander and his chief officers. Pub-
lished works on the history of the division include
The V Corps G–3 had told General
Robert L. Hewitt, Workhorse of the Western Hobbs that he expected this attack to
Front (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946) ; be made not earlier than 19 December.
History of the 117th Infantary (Washington,
1946); and History of the 120th Infantry Kegi-
But the German attack on Stavelot dur-
rnent (Washington, 1947). ing the morning caused consternation
336 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE O F T H E BULGE

in both the corps and army headquar- was apparent that the enemy had two
ters, from which erupted a stream of choices: he could continue north along
orders and demands for greater speed. the Ambléve valley, thus threatening the
Harassed by confusing and contradic- rearward installations of the First Army;
tory directions, Hobbs finally had to or he could turn west toward Werbo-
ask that he be given orders from but mont and so present a grave menance to
one source. As it was, the 119th Infan- the assembly of the 82d. Hobbs, then,
try, still in Eupen, was alerted for Stave- met Colonel Sutherland with First Army
lot while the 120th Infantry, painfully orders which would split the 119th In-
slipped and slid along the muddy roads fantry, sending one force along the val-
to Malmédy. Before trucks could arrive ley of the Amblève, the other to Wer-
for the 119th Infantry Stavelot had fallen bomont and thence to Trois Ponts.
to the enemy. T h e First Army com- T h e 119th left General Hobbs and
mander called Hobbs to Spa about noon. traveled south to Remouchamps. At
Before leaving Eupen, General Hobbs this point it divided, one detachment
instructed the 119th Infantry (Col. Ed- made u p of the 2d Battalion and the
ward M. Sutherland) to meet him at cannon company heading for Werbo-
Theux, five miles north of Spa, at which mont, the second and stronger column
time he expected to have new orders. winding along the road that descended
General Hodges had just finished a into the Amblève valley. T h e 2d Bat-
conference with the acting commander talion reached Lienne Creek after dark
of the XVIII Airborne Corps, Maj. and threw u p hasty defenses on the hills
Gen. James M. Gavin, whose two divi- about three miles east of Werbomont.
sions, the 82d and 101st Airborne, had T h e Germans under Peiper had been
started advance parties from France for stopped at the creek earlier, it will be
the Bastogne area where, according to recalled, but the battalion was in time
the initial orders from SHAEF, the divi- to ambush and destroy the separate
sions were to be employed. T h e First scouting force in the late evening. T h e
Army commander, under whose orders 3d Battalion, leading the truck column
the XVIII Airborne Corps now fell, carrying the bulk of the combat team,
determined to divert the 82d Airborne reached Stoumont after dark and hur-
Division to Werbomont as a backstop in ried to form a perimeter defense. Pa-
case Kampfgruppe Peiper succeeded in trols pushing out from the village had
crossing the Amblève and Salm Rivers. no difficulty in discovering the enemy,
T h e 82d, however, would not be in posi- whose pickets were smoking and talk-
tion before 19 December at the earliest. ing not more than 2,000 yards away. At
Meanwhile the 30th Division com- least forty German tanks were reported
mander reached the First Army head- in bivouac east of the village. Under
quarters. In the midst of a discussion of cover of darkness the remainder of the
new plans, word came in that the First American force assembled some three
Army Iiaison planes scudding under the miles northwest of Stoumont, while the
clouds had seen the German armor mov- 400th Armored Field Artillery Battal-
ing north from Trois Ponts in the di- ion, picked up during the march, moved
rection of La Gleize and Stoumont. It its batteries forward in the dark. Both
T H E GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS T O T H E WEST 337

Americans and Germans, then, were Although without artillery support,


ready with the coming of day to do bat- Colonel Frankland launched his at-
tle for Stoumont. tack at Stavelot. On the slope north
T h e 117th Infantry, first of the 30th of the town a platoon of 3-inch towed
Division regiments to be fed into the tank destroyers from the 823d Tank
line, had been deploying on the morn- Destroyer Battalion made good use of
ing of 18 December around Malmèdy. positions above the Germans to knock
Its 1st Battalion (Lt. Col. Ernest out a brace of Mark VI tanks and a few
Frankland), under orders to occupy half-tracks. T h e two leading companies
Stavelot, circled through Francorchamps of the 1st Battalion had just reached the
to approach the town from the north. houses at the northern edge of the town
On the road Colonel Frankland met of- when ten hostile tanks, returning in
ficers of the 526th Armored Infantry haste from Trois Ponts, counterattacked.
Battalion who told him that the enemy It might have gone hard with the
was in Stavelot. About this time word American infantry but for the
of the German success reached the V fighter-bombers of the IX Tactical Air
Corps headquarters, where it was as- Command and XXIX Tactical Air Com-
sumed that the 1st Battalion would per- mand which opportunely entered the
force abandon its mission. Frankland, fray. During the afternoon the American
on the contrary, kept on going. He planes had worked east from the La
made contact about 1300 with a rifle Gleize area, where the little liaison
company of the 526th Armored Infan- planes had first signaled the presence
try Battalion remaining near Stavelot, of German columns, and struck where-
then detrucked his battalion north of ever Peiper’s tanks and motor vehicles
the still-flaming gasoline roadblock and could be found. Perhaps the trail pro-
started south toward the town. vided by the rearward serials of Kampf-
All this while Peiper believed that gruppe Peiper led the fighter-bombers
the 3 d Parachute Division was close to Stavelot; perhaps the 109th Tactical
behind his column. Expecting it to Reconnaissance Squadron, which broke
reach Stavelot by the evening of 18 through the clouds to make one sweep
December, he had left only a small over the town, tipped off the squadrons
holding force in the town. In fact, the working farther west. Before the Ger-
3 d Parachute Division had been held up man tanks could make headway, planes
by a combination of jammed roads and from the 365th Fighter Group, rein-
unexpectedly tenacious American resist- forced by the 390th Squadron (366th)
ance. T h e Sixth Panzer Army there- and the 506th Squadron (404th),
fore did not expect the advance guard plunged in, crippled a few enemy ve-
of the 3 d Parachute Division to arrive in hicles, and drove the balance to cover,
Stavelot before 19 December. At this leaving the infantry and tank destroyers
point the failure of communications be- to carry out the clean-up inside Stavelot
tween Peiper and rearward German on more equitable terms. By dark the two
headquarters began to influence the American companies held half of the
course of operations, to the distinct dis- town, had tied in with the 2d Battalion
advantage of the Sixth Panzer Army. between Stavelot and Malmèdy, and were
338 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

reinforced by a tank platoon from the gray infantry and the tanks decided not
743d Tank Battalion. Also the riflemen to chance the assault alone. It is not sur-
had the comforting knowledge that they prising that the German infantry gave
could call for and receive artillery sup- over the field. T h e 118th cannoneers
port: the 118th Field Artillery Battalion fired 3,000 shells into the assault waves,
had moved through bullet fire and set working their guns so fast that the tubes
up northeast of the town. had to be cooled with water.
The fight for Stavelot continued all By the night of 19 December the 1st
through the night of the 18th with Ger- Battalion had a firm grip on Stavelot—
man tanks, now free from the air threat, but, in the most telling stroke of all,
working through the streets as far as its attached engineers had dynamited
the town square. At daybreak the 1st the Amblève bridge across which Pei-
Battalion and its tanks went to work and per’s force had rolled west on the morn-
by noon had reclaimed all of the town ing of 18 December. T h e armored
down to the Amblève River. Twice dur- weight of the 1st SS Panzer Division
ing the afternoon tank-led formations could make itself felt only if it con-
drove toward the town, but both times tinued punching westward. Without
the American gunners dispersed the field fuel the punch and drive were gone.

AMBLEVE RIVERBRIDGEAT STAVELOT


T H E GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS T O T H E WEST 339

Without the Amblève bridge and a free ment, a battalion of armored infantry
line of communications through Stavelot from the 2d SS Panzer Grenadier Regi-
there was no fuel for Peiper. Without ment, a flak battalion, a battalion of
Peiper the freeway to the Meuse which Tiger tanks (which had joined
the 1st SS Panzer Division was to open Peiper at Stavelot), a battery of
for the following divisions of the Sixth 105-mm. self-propelled guns, and a
Panzer Army remained nothing more company from the 3d Parachute Division
than a cul-de-sac. which had ridden on the tanks from
Could the 30th Division surround and Honsfeld. T h e force had suffered some
destroy Kampfgruppe Peiper before losses in its breakthrough to the west,
German reinforcements from the east but these were not severe. By now the
reopened the way to their now isolated critical consideration was gasoline. A
comrades? Would the 30th Division, its few more miles on the road or a few
rear and right flank partially uncovered, hours of combat maneuvering and Pei-
be left free to deal with Peiper? T h e per’s fuel tanks would be bone dry.
latter question was very real, even with When the 119th Infantry (minus the
the 8rd Airborne moving in, for on the 2d Battalion) moved into the Stoumont
morning of 19 December the V Corps area on the night of 18 December, the
commander had warned the 30th Divi- rifle companies of the 3d Battalion (Lt.
sion chief of staff (Col. Richard W. Col. Roy G. Fitzgerald) deployed in a
Stephens) that large German forces hastily established line north, south,
had slipped by to the south and were and east of the town. The 3d was backed
moving on Hotton. An additional up by light 3-inch towed tank destroyers
question plagued the 30th Division: belonging to the 823d Tank Destroyer
where was the 7th Armored? Patrols Battalion, two 90-mm. antiaircraft guns
sent out toward Recht on the 19th could detached from the 143d Antiaircraft
find no trace of the tankers. Battalion, and three battalion 57-mm.
While the 1st Battalion, 117th Infan- antitank guns. The 1st Battalion, it will
try, was busily severing the lifeline to be remembered, dismounted in an as-
Kampfgruppe Peiper on 19 December, sembly area about three miles northwest
Peiper was engaged with the bulk of of Stoumont, where Colonel Sutherland
his troops in an attempt to blast a located the regimental command post.
path through Stoumont, the barrier to The moment patrols had established the
the last possible exit west, that is, the proximity of the large German force
valley of the Amblève. Battle long since Sutherland was alerted, and he promised
had been joined at Stoumont when a tank company as reinforcement first
scouts finally reached Peiper with the thing in the morning. For the rest of
story of what had happened to his line the night the troops around Stoumont
of communications. dug foxholes, planted mines, and waited
The kampfgruppe, whose major part uneasily for day to break.
was now assembled in the vicinity of Stoumont and the American lines
La Gleize and Stoumont, consisted of a lay on a bald hill mass rising on the
mixed battalion of Mark IV tanks and north bank of the Amblève. La Gleize,
Panthers from the 1st SS Panzer Regi- the enemy assembly area, shared a simi-
340 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

lar situation on the road east of Stou- Pvt. Albert A. Darago, who were
mont. T h e road itself, some distance handling bazookas for the first time and
from the river bank, approached Stou- who were awarded the DSC for their
mont through patches of trees, which bravery. (An infantry officer had showed
gave way at the eastern edge of the the antiaircraft crew how to load
town to a border of level fields. T h e and fire the bazooka just before the
whole lent itself admirably to the em- battle began.) One of the two 90-mm.
ployment of armor. antiaircraft guns also did yeoman serv-
As the first light came on 19 Decem- ice in the unfamiliar ground-laying
ber Peiper threw his infantry into the role and destroyed two tanks from Pei-
attack, supporting this advance from the per’s heavy Mark VI battalion before
east with tanks firing as assault guns. the German infantry got in close enough
T h e grenadiers and paratroopers were to force its abandonment.
checked by fire from the American T h e Germans took some two hours to
lines as they crossed the open fields. force their way inside Stoumont, but
But the gunners of the 823d, who could once the panzers ruled the streets the
not see fifty yards from the muzzles of fight was ended. T h e rifle company on
their guns and whose frantic calls for the south was cut off and the company in
flares to be fired over the German tanks the town liquidated. T h e third company
went unheeded, could not pick out the withdrew under a smoke screen laid
enemy armor. The panzers, formed in down by white phosphorus grenades,
two columns, moved toward the fox- reaching the reserve position manned by
hole line and the American company the 1st Battalion about noon. T h e tanks,
on the east edge of Stoumont fell back commanded by 1st. Lt. Walter D. Macht,
to the houses, uncovering the outnum- withdrew without loss, carrying survivors
bered and immobile towed tank de- of the center company on their decks.
stroyers, all eight of which were cap- The 3d Battalion had lost most of its
tured.6 At this moment the ten tanks equipment, as well as 267 officers and
from the 743d Tank Battalion promised men.
by Sutherland arrived and went into ac- This engagement had seen the Amer-
tion. The enemy thereupon reverted to icans fighting without the artillery sup-
tactics successfully employed in reducing port so essential in American tactics.
village resistance on the march west, T h e 197th Field Artillery Battalion,
sending two or three of the heavy-ar- assigned the direct support mission, did
mored Panthers or Tigers in dashes not reach firing positions in time to help
straight along the road and into the the 3d Battalion. The 400th Armored
town. At least six German tanks were Field Artillery Battalion was finally able
crippled or destroyed in this phase of to place one battery where it could give
the action, two of them by antiair- some help, but by this time the battle
craft crewmen, Private Seamon and had been decided and the cannoneers
fired only a few missions.
6The 30th Division G–3 journal for 19 Decem- Word that the fight was going against
ber sums up this fight very simply: “We didn’t
have as many ID’S as they had tanks.” Cf., 823d
the troops at Stoumont impelled Colonel
Tack Desrioyei Bn AAR, Dec 44. Sutherland to alert his reserve battalion.
T H E GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS T O T H E WEST 341

Company C, dispatched as reinforce- few fully equipped Shermans on hand


ment, had reached the village of Targ- and the first tank company drew four-
non when it began to pass men of the teen Shermans fitted with British radios
3d Battalion moving to the rear. The (unfamiliar to the American crews) , five
company dismounted from its trucks and duplex drive tanks, and a 90-mm. self-
marched as far as the entrance to Stou- propelled gun. While Hobbs was on the
mont. Failing to find the 3d Battalion phone trying to convince the army staff
commander the riflemen joined the that he must have the tanks, his chief of
tanks, which by this time had no infantry staff, Colonel Stephens, was being bom-
cover and were running low on ammuni- barded by army demands that some part
tion. T h e newly wedded tank-infantry of the 119th should be pulled out and
team yielded ground only in a slow and shifted north to cover the road to Spa and
orderly withdrawal. T h e impetus of the First Army headquarters. This was out
German advance was considerably re- of the question for the moment, for
duced when a 90-mm. antiaircraft gun, Sutherland had only a single battalion
sited at a bend in the road west of Stou- at his disposal.
mont, knocked out a couple of German All this while the little tank-infantry
tanks and momentarily blocked the high- team held to its slow-paced withdrawal
way. along the river road, lashing back at the
T h e situation was precarious–and not Panthers in pursuit. Retreating through
only for the force left to Sutherland. The Targnon and Stoumont Station the force
only armor between the 119th Infantry reached a very narrow curve where the
command post and Liége was a detach- road passed between a steep hill and the
ment of ten Sherman tanks which had river bank. Here Lt. Col. Robert Her-
been whipped out of the First Army long, who now had all of his 1st Battalion
repair shops, manned with ordnance engaged, ordered the tanks and infantry
mechanics, and dispatched through Ay- to make their stand. It was about 1240.
waille to block the Ambléve River road. Fog was beginning to creep over the
In front of the 119th command post the valley. A forward observer from the
ten tanks of the 743d had but few rounds 197th Field Artillery Battalion, whose
left in their ammunition racks. pieces now were in position, saw three
At 1035 the 30th Division commander, German tanks leave Targnon and head
who was in Sutherland’s command post, down the road. A call sent a salvo crash-
called the First Army headquarters to ing down on the western side of the vil-
ask for the 740th Tank Battalion. The lage just as a large tank column started
S–2 of the 119th Infantry had discovered to follow the German point. Followed by
that this outfit, a new arrival on the Con- more shells these tanks turned hurriedly
tinent, was waiting to draw its tanks and back into Targnon. One of the point
other equipment at an ordnance depot tanks did reach the American position,
near Sprimont, about ten miles north of poked its nose around the bend in the
the 119th command post. The First road, got a round of high explosive un-
Army staff agreed to Hobbs’s request, comfortably close, and took off.
but the unit it handed over was far from If is true that Herlong’s tanks and in-
being ready for combat. The depot had fantry held a naturally formidable road-
342 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

block. And the presence of artillery once Battalion was already earmarked for use
again showed what it could do to alter in the event the enemy turned north on
the course of battle. But Peiper’s object the secondary road running from Stou-
in the advance beyond Stoumont was not mont directly to Spa and the First Army
to crush his way through the 119th Infan- headquarters. However, Sutherland was
try and move north through the defiles told that the 2d Battalion, 119th Infan-
of the Amblève valley. His object, thus try, was in process of turning its position
far unachieved, was to climb out of the east of Werbomont over to the 82d Air-
valley confines and resume the westerly borne Division and would be available
advance toward Huy and the Meuse. in a few hours.
Peiper had been thwarted at Trois Ponts Anxious to feel out the enemy and
and at Lienne Creek in turn. T h e ad- establish a good line of departure for an
vance through Stoumont offered a last attack on 2 0 December, Sutherland or-
opportunity, for midway between Targ- dered the 1st Battalion commander to
non and Stoumont Station lay an easy push out from the roadblock, using Capt.
approach to the river, a bridge as yet James D. Berry’s untried and con-
untouched, and a passable road rising glomerate tank company. About 1600
from the valley to join the highway lead- Herlong started east, Company C advanc-
ing west through Werbomont, the road ing on both sides of the road and tanks
from which Peiper’s force had been de- moving in the center. Just west of Stou-
flected. With this bridge in German mont Station three Panthers were sighted
hands, Peiper had only to contain the and destroyed in quick succession, one by
119th Infantry which had been retiring a fluke shot which glanced from the pave-
before his tanks while his main column ment up through the tank flooring. T h e
crossed to the west. But Peiper knew by dead tanks blocked the road; so Herlong
this time that his supply line had been sent his infantry on alone and organized
cut at Stavelot. “We began to realize,” he a line at the western edge of the station.
says, “that we had insufficient gasoline to There was no further contact with the
crossthe bridge westof Stoumont.” 7 Germans. Peiper, whose mechanized
Unaware of the enemy predicament, force by this time was nearly immobile,
the 119th Infantry took advantage of the had withdrawn his advanced troops back
lull which had followed the single Ger- to Stoumont, about two and a half miles
man pass at the roadblock position to re- east of the station. As for the road lead-
organize the remnants of the 3d Battal- ing from Stoumont to Spa, a matter of
ion. About 1530 the leading platoon of grave concern to First Army headquar-
the conglomerate company taken from ters on 19 December, Peiper, acutely
the 740th Tank Battalion arrived, but conscious of his lack of mobility, never
the additional infantry for which Colo- gave it a serious thought.
nel Sutherland had pleaded were not In midafternoon the 119th Infantry
forthcoming. Indeed, his weakened 3d and the 740th Tank Battalion (Lt. Col.
George K. Rubel) had been detached
7Ferriss, Special Rpt Based on Intervs in Janu- from the 30th Division and assigned to
ary 1945. Peiper’s progress as it was known to
the higher command may be traced in the daily
the operational control of the XVIII Air-
entries of the OB WEST K T B . borne Corps, which at the same time took
T H E GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS T O T H E WEST 343

back its 82d Airborne Division from the deploy on the bare ridge line rising west
V Corps and in addition received the 3d of the creek.
Armored Division (-) . T h e XVIII Some time later the Americans heard
Corps commander thus had an entire tracks clanking along the road between
airborne division, more than half of an their position and the creek; this was the
armored division, and a reinforced regi- reconnaissance detachment which Peiper
mental combat team to employ in check- had sent north and which had found a
ing a further westward drive by the bridge, albeit too weak a structure for
Germans assembled in the La Gleize- the German tanks. A brief fusillade from
Werbomont-Stoumont area. the ridge and the Germans fled, leaving
The subsequent operations of the five battered half-tracks behind. One
XVIII Airborne Corps would be molded prisoner from the 2d SS Panzer Grenu-
in considerable degree by events prior to dier Regiment was taken. His company,
its appearance in the battle area. Already he told interrogators, was the advance
set forth have been the engagements in guard of a four-company detachment
the Stoumont sector with two battalions whose mission was to reconnoiter toward
of the 119th Infantry committed. T h e 2d Werbomont and take that town. But no
Battalion of the 119th Infantry had left other attempt was made that night to run
the regiment on 18 December with the the 2d Battalion gauntlet. Screened by
independent mission of blocking the McCown’s force, the 82d Airborne Divi-
Germans at Werbomont and Trois sion was free to detruck and assemble
Ponts, thus covering the assembly of the around Werbomont, as the night pro-
82d Airborne. Late in the afternoon the gressed, according to plan.
battalion reached Werbomont, found no Recall that on the morning of 18
sign of the enemy, and detrucked for the December the 82d Airborne Division
march to Trois Ponts. About dusk the started for Bastogne but was diverted
column reached the Lienne Creek in the short of its destination and ordered to
vicinity of Habiemont, a village on a Werbomont. General Gavin had gone
bald summit overlooking the Lienne. from the First Army headquarters to
Here Maj. Hal D. McCown, the battal- Werbomont and made a personal recon-
ion commander, learned that German naissance of the ground as far as the
tanks had been sighted at Chevron, Amblève River. This, of course, was on
another hamlet a mile or so north on the the morning of the 18th so that he saw
Lienne. McCown, whose battalion was none of the enemy forces who at that
reinforced by a platoon each of tanks, moment were turning in the direction of
tank destroyers, and infantry cannon, Werbomont. T h e advance party of the
turned north only to find that the bridge 82d arrived in the village at dark and
near Chevron had been destroyed by opened the division command post. Al-
friendly engineers and that no hostile though there was now serious question
crossing had been made. He moved whether the convoys of the 82d would
north again but this time encountered reach Werbomont in force before the
fire from across the creek. Uncertain as Germans, the bulk of the division moved
to the situation and with darkness upon without opposition into the area during
him, McCown ordered the battalion to the night of 18 December. T h e follow-
344 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

GENERAL
RIDGWAYAND GENERAL
GAVIN

ing morning Maj. Gen. Matthew B. from the Amblève through Manhay and
Ridgway, who had resumed command Houffalize to La Roche on the Ourthe
of the airborne corps, opened his corps River, placing the corps’ right boundary
command post near that of the 82d, twenty miles northwest of Bastogne.
once again under Gavin. Three threatened areas were known to
Later in the morning at the First be in the newly assigned zone of opera-
Army headquarters (which had moved tions: the Amblève River sector, where
to Chaudfontaine) , General Hodges the 119th Infantry was deployed; the
gave Ridgway the directive which would Salm River sector, especially at Trois
make the airborne corps operational and Ponts where a lone engineer company
flesh it out with troops. The corps’ mis- still barred the crossings (although this
sion was to block further German ad- information was unknown to the 82d) ;
vance along an irregular line extending and the general area north of the Ourthe
T H E GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS T O T H E WEST 345

River where a vague and ill-defined Ger- and south in midafternoon. With the
man movement had been reported. But 508th Parachute Infantry in support, the
beyond checking these specific enemy ad- 504th and 505th moved along the roads
vances the XVIII Airborne Corps had toward La Gleize and Trois Ponts re-
the more difficult task of sealing the gap spectively. This proved to be only a route
of nearly twenty miles which had opened march, for the Germans were nowhere
between the V and VIII Corps. about.8 By midnight the 505th had a bat-
During the morning of 19 December talion each in the villages of Haute-Bo-
the 504th and 505th Parachute Infantry deux and Basse-Bodeux, effectively back-
Regiments marched out of the Werbo- stopping the small American force which
mont assembly area under orders to push still held Trois Ponts. T h e 504th, which
to the fore as far as possible, relieve the had marched northeast, occupied the
2d Battalion, 119th Infantry, and im- village of Rahier with two battalions.
prove the American defense line by T h e 325th Glider Infantry, minus the
adding a bridgehead across the Lienne battalion sent to Hotton, remained in
Creek. There were no Germans here and and around Werbomont as corps and
by noon the initial deployment was close division reserve. One of its companies
to completion. Meanwhile rumors had moved during the evening to the cross-
reached the First Army command post roads at Manhay, due south of Werbo-
that the enemy had cut the main north- mont, a crossroads which General Ridg-
south highway running between Bas- way styled “of vital significance.” And a
togne and Liège in the neighborhood of company of the 508th meanwhile estab-
Houffalize. More rumors, mostly from lished an outpost position on the
truck drivers whose missions on the rear Manhay-Trois Ponts road at Bras.
area roads usually gave them first sight By the morning of 20 December, there-
of the westernmost German spearheads, fore, the 82d Airborne Division had
put the enemy somewhere near Hotton, pushed a defensive screen north, east,
ten miles northwest of the XVIII Air- south, and west of Werbomont. It is true
borne Corps boundary marker at La that to the south and west the screen con-
Roche. Hastily complying with First sisted only of motorized patrols and
Army orders, the 3d Battalion of the widely separated pickets in small vil-
325th Glider Infantry Regiment and a lages, but now there was a good chance
tank destroyer platoon set off southwest- that any major enemy thrust could be
ward to block the approaches to Hotton. detected and channelized or retarded.
By nightfall the battalion was in place, Thus far, however, the XVIII Airborne
stuck out alone on the corps’ right wing Corps was making its deployment against
and waiting for troops of the 3d Armored an unseen enemy. Indeed, so confused
to appear. A couple of hours before mid- was the situation into which Ridgway
night a patrol did meet the armored
“point”-Maj. Gen. Maurice Rose, the 8 The German intelligence was unaware that the
3d Armored commander, riding in a XVIII Airborne was in this area. Radio intercept,
jeep far in front of his tank columns. however, had warned that a combat command of
T h e main body of the 82d Airborne the 3d Armored would move to the Werbomont
sector very shortly. OB WEST: I.C. Tagesmeldung,
Division began to push toward the east Anlage 1:2 (19 Dec 44).
346 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

OF 325TH GLIDER
TROOPS INFANTRYMOVING
THROUGH
FOG TO A NEWPOSITION

had been thrust that at midnight on 19 Ridgway had detailed plans for con-
December he was forced to send an ur- tinuing the pressure along the corps
gent message to Hodges asking for infor- front from northeast to southwest. CCB,
mation on any V or VIII Corps units in
with little connection between its combat com-
his zone. But his corps was substantially mands and subordinate task forces, it is necessary
strengthened by the next morning. CCB to rely on the three combat commands’ AAR’s
of the 3d Armored Division had reached and journals. The separate task forces can be
followed in the battalion S–3 journals. The semi-
Theux, about ten miles north of Stou- official history of the division, Spearhead in the
mont, and was ready for immediate use. West, 1941–45 (Frankfurt a/M, 1945), is very
The 3d Armored Division (minus CCA readable and informative. The story of Task Force
Lovelady is related in A. E. Roberts, Five Stars to
and CCB) had reached the road between Victory (Birmingham, 1949). Both the 30th Di-
Hotton and Manhay on the corps’ right vision and the 3d Armored are fairly well rep-
wing.9 resented in the collection of combat interviews. In
addition, see Victory TD: The History of the
9Since the 3d Armored Division was deployed 628th TD Bn.
T H E GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS T O T H E WEST 347

3d Armored, was to clear the east and circlement of such enemy forces as might
north banks of the Amblève and estab- be left to the north. T h e 3d Armored Di-
lish contact with the 117th Infantry, vision was to fan out and push reconnais-
which had its hands full in Stavelot. T h e sance as far as the road between Manhay
reinforced 119th Infantry was to secure and Houffalize, locating and developing
the Amblève River line from Stoumont the shadowy German force believed to
to La Gleize. The 82d Airborne Division be bearing down on the sketchy corps
was to take over the Salm River bridges right wing somewhere north of Houffa-
at Trois Ponts, drive the enemy from the lize.
area between the Amblève and the Wer- T h e immediate and proximate threat,
bomont-Trois Ponts road, and make on the morning of 2 0 December, was
contact with CCB when the latter Peiper’s force of the 1st SS Panzer Divi-
reached Stavelot, thus completing the en- sion, now concentrated with its bulk in

H . C Brewer, Jr.

MAP 2
348 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

the Stoumont-La Gleize area, but with had used the bridge to slip between the
an outpost holding the light bridge over two American-held towns. German rec-
the Amblève at Cheneux and its tail in- ords indicate that some much-needed
volved in a fight to reopen the rearward gasoline reached Peiper through this
line of communications through Stave- hole in the American net, but the
lot. Kampfgruppe Peiper, it should be amount was insufficient to set the kampf-
noticed, was considerably weakened by gruppe rolling again even if the road
this piecemeal deployment: further- west had been free. As to this particular
more, it lacked the gasoline to undertake German column, the Americans disposed
much maneuver even in this constricted of it in short order. Task Force Lovelady
area. (Map 2) continued on its mission and established
CCB (Brig. Gen. Truman E. Bou- three roadblocks along the main road
dinot) moved south past Spa on the between Trois Ponts and La Gleize. T h e
morning of the 20th in three task forces, Germans in the Stoumont sector were
using three roads leading to the Stou- definitely sealed in, albeit still active, for
mont-La Gleize-Trois Ponts triangle. four Shermans were destroyed by hidden
T h e largest of these detachments, Task antitank guns.
Force Lovelady (Lt. Col. William B. T h e two remaining task forces of CCB
Lovelady), had been given a complete and companion units from the 30th
tank battalion, reinforced by a company Division were less successful. Task Force
of armored infantry, and the important McGeorge (Maj. K. T. McGeorge) , the
job of cutting the Stavelot-Stoumont center column, made its advance along
road. Colonel Lovelady, then, led the a road built on the side of a ridge
force which formed the left jaw of the which ran obliquely from the north-
vise forming to clamp down on Kampf- east toward La Gleize. Most of the
gruppe Peiper. His task force, proceed- ridge road was traversed with no sight of
ing on the easternmost of the three the Germans. At Cour, about two miles
routes, reached the junction of the Trois from La Gleize, Task Force McGeorge
Ponts-Stoumont roads without sign of picked up Company K of the 117th In-
the enemy. Just as the column was mak- fantry and moved on to assault the latter
ing the turn south toward Trois Ponts, town. Midway the Americans encoun-
a small enemy column of artillery, infan- tered a roadblock held by a tank and a
try, and supply trucks appeared, appar- couple of assault guns. Because the pitch
ently on its way to reinforce Peiper’s of the ridge slope precluded any tank
main body. maneuver, the rifle company circled the
Since Trois Ponts and Stavelot were German outpost and advanced as far as
both in American hands, the appearance the outskirts of La Gleize. A sharp
of this train was surprising. What had counterattack drove the infantry back in-
happened was this: German engineers to the tanks, still road-bound, and when
had reinforced a small footbridge east of the tanks themselves were threatened by
Trois Ponts, at least to the point that it close-in work McGeorge withdrew the
would sustain a self-propelled gun car- task force for the night to the hamlet of
riage, and since the night of 18 Decem- Borgoumont perched above La Gleize. It
ber supply trucks and reinforcements was apparent that the Germans intended
T H E GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS T O T H E WEST 349

to hold on to La Gleize, although in fact close of day the attacking column had
the greater part of Peiper’s command by traversed some 3,000 yards and passed
this time was congregated to the west on five mine fields (with only two tanks
the higher ground around Stoumont. lost), the infantry advance guard climb-
The attack on Stoumont on the 20th ing the wooded hillside to flank and
was a continuation of that begun late on denude each barrier.
the previous afternoon by the 1st Battal: Now within 800 yards of the western
ion of the 119th Infantry. T h e maneu- edge of Stoumont and with darkness and
ver now, however, was concentric. T h e a heavy fog settling over the town, Colo-
1st Battalion and its accompanying tank nel Herlong gave orders for the column
company from the 740th Tank Battalion to close up for the night. One of the dis-
pushed along the road from the west abled tanks was turned sidewise to block
while Task Force Jordan (Capt. John the narrow road, while Companies B and
W. Jordan), the last and smallest of C moved up the hill north of this im-
the three CCB detachments, attempted provised barrier to seize a sanatorium
a thrust from the north via the Spa road, which overlooked the road and the town.
which had given the First Army head- T h e main sanatorium building stood on
quarters so much concern. Task Force an earthen platform filled in as a pro-
Jordan was within sight of Stoumont jection from the hillside rising north of
when the tanks forming the point were the road. Its inmates, some two hundred
suddenly brought under flanking fire by sick children and old people, had taken
German tanks that had been dug in to to the basement. After a brief shelling
give hull defilade. T h e two American the American infantry climbed over the
lead tanks were knocked out immediate- fill and, shrouded in the fog, assaulted
ly. T h e rest of the column, fixed to the the building. The German infantry were
roadway by the forest and abrupt driven out and four 20-mm. guns taken.
ground, could not deploy. Search for Companies B and C dug in to form a
some other means of approach was fu- line on the hillside in and around the
tile, and the task force halted for the sanatorium, and Company A disposed
night on the road. itself to cover the valley road. Four tanks
The 1st Battalion, 119th Infantry, and were brought up the slope just below
the company of medium tanks from the the fill and in this forward position were
740th Tank Battalion found slow but refueled by armored utility cars. T h e
steady going in the first hours of the enemy foxhole line lay only some three
attack along the western road. With hundred yards east of the companies on
Company B and the tanks leading and the hill.
with artillery and mortars firing rapidly An hour before midnight the Germans
in support, the battalion moved through suddenly descended on the sanatorium,
Targnon. T h e Germans had constructed shouting “Heil Hitler” and firing wildly.
a series of mine fields to bar the On the slope above the building German
winding road which climbed up the tanks had inched forward to positions
Stoumont hill and had left rear guard from which they could fire directly into
infantry on the slopes north of the road the sanatorium. American tanks were
to cover these barriers by fire. At the brought up but could not negotiate the
350 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

STOUMONT,
SHOWING
THE SANATORIUM

steep banks at the fill. One was set afire ever, Sgt. William J. Widener with a
by a bazooka; two more were knocked group of eleven men held on in a small
out by German tanks which had crept annex, the sergeant shouting out sens-
down the main road. T h e flaming tanks ings-while American shells fell-to an
and some outbuildings which had been artillery observer in a foxhole some fifty
set afire near the sanatorium so lighted yards away. (Widener and Pfc. John
the approach to the building that fur- Leinen, who braved enemy fire to keep
ther American tank maneuver on the the defenders of the annex supplied with
slope was impossible. By this time Ger- ammunition, later received the DSC.)
man tanks had run in close enough to Although the German assault had won
fire through the windows of the sanato- possession of the sanatorium and had
rium. The frenzied fight inside and pushed back the American line on the
around the building went on for a half slope to the north, accurate and incessant
hour or so, a duel with grenades and shellfire checked the attackers short of a
bullet fire at close quarters. About thirty breakthrough. About 0530 the enemy
men from Company B were captured as tried it again in a sortie from the town
the battle eddied through rooms and headed for the main road. But tank rein-
hallways, and the attackers finally gained forcements had arrived for the 1st Bat-
possession of the main building. How- talion and their fire, thickening that of
T H E GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS T O T H E WEST 351

the artillery, broke the attack before it enemy or friendly forces in the area.
could make appreciable headway. When Patrols sent out at daybreak were gone
day broke, the Americans still held the for hours, but about noon, as bits of in-
roadblock position but the enemy had formation began to arrive at General
the sanatorium. In the night of wild Gavin’s headquarters, the picture took
fighting half the complement of Com- some shape. Patrols working due north
panies B and C had been lost, including reached the 119th Infantry on the road
five platoon leaders. west of Stoumont and reported that the
Despite the setbacks suffered during countryside was free of the enemy.
the American advance of 2 0 December Civilians questioned by patrols on the
on the Stoumont-La Gleize area, the net Werbomont-Stoumont road told the
had been drawn appreciably tighter Americans that there was a concentra-
around Peiper. T h e German line of sup- tion of tanks and other vehicles around
ply-or retreat–was cut by Task Force Cheneux. Working eastward, other pa-
Lovelady and the Americans in Stavelot. trols found that Trois Ponts was occu-
The roads from Stoumont and La Gleize pied by Company C, 51st Engineers, and
north to Spa were blocked by tank- that the important bridges there had all
infantry teams which had pushed very been damaged or destroyed. This word
close to the former two towns. T h e 1st from Trois Ponts came as a surprise back
Battalion of the 119th Infantry had been at General Gavin’s headquarters where
checked at the sanatorium but nonethe- the presence of this single engineer com-
less was at the very entrance to Stoumont pany at the critical Trois Ponts crossing
and had the 2d Battalion behind it in site was quite unknown.10
regimental reserve. The most important discovery made
Also, during the 20th, the 82d Air- by the airborne infantry patrols was the
borne Division moved to close the circle location of the 7th Armored Division
around Peiper by operations aimed at troops in the gap between the XVIII Air-
erasing the small German bridgehead at borne Corps and Bastogne. T h e where-
Cheneux on the Amblève southeast of abouts of the westernmost 7th Armored
Stoumont. T h e 82d had planned an ad- Division positions had been a question of
vance that morning to drive the enemy grave import in the higher American
from the area bounded on the north by headquarters for the past two days. Now
the Amblève River and by the Trois a patrol from the 505th Parachute Infan-
Ponts-Werbomont road on the south. try came in with information that they
The two regiments involved (the 504th had reached a reconnaissance party of the
Parachute Infantry on the left and the 7th Armored in the village of Fosse, a
505th on the right) marched to their little over two miles southwest of Trois
attack positions east of Werbomont with Ponts, and that troops of that division
virtually no information except that they were forming an outpost line just to the
were to block the enemy, wherever he south of the 505th positions.
might be found, in conjunction with 10The engineers were not unaware of their im-
friendly forces operating somewhere off portant role and the commanding officer showed this
in his greeting to Colonel Ekman: “I’ll bet you guys
to the north and south. The first task. are glad we’re here.” Combat Interv with Col Wil-
obviously, was to reconnoiter for either liam-E. Ekman.
352 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Once General Gavin had a moderately across a knob completely barren of cover,
clear picture of the situation confronting sloping gradually up to the German posi-
his division he ordered the two leading tions and crisscrossed with barbed wire.
regiments forward: the 504th to Cheneux, T h e hostile garrison, from the 2d SS
where the enemy had been reported, Panzer Grenadier Regiment, was heavily
and the 505th to Trois Ponts. The 505th reinforced by mobile flak pieces, mor-
Commander, Col. William E. Ekman, tars, machine guns, and assault artillery.
already had dispatched bazooka teams to T o breast this heavy fire and rush the
reinforce the engineer company at the four hundred yards of open terrain, the
latter point and by late afternoon had two companies attacked in four waves at
his 2d Battalion in Trois Ponts, with one intervals of about fifty yards. T h e mo-
company holding a bridgehead across the ment the leading American assault waves
Salm. could be discerned through the darkness
Acting under orders to reach Cheneux the enemy opened an intense, accurate
as quickly as possible and seize the Am- fire. Twice the attackers were driven
blève bridge, the 504th commander, Col. back, both times with gaping ranks. T h e
Reuben H. Tucker, 3d, sent Companies first two waves were almost completely
B and C of his 1st Battalion hurrying shot down. Company C ran into the wire
toward the village. The leading company and, having no wire cutters available,
was nearing the outskirts of Cheneux in was stalled momentarily. Finally the two
midafternoon when it came into a hail tank destroyers worked their way to the
of machine gun and flak fire. Both com- front and began to shell the German
panies deployed and took up the fire guns. With their support a third assault
fight but quickly found that the village was thrown at the village. This time a
was strongly defended. Ground haze was few men lived to reach the outlying
heavy and friendly artillery could not be houses. In a brief engagement at close
adjusted to give a helping hand. Dark quarters the Americans silenced some of
was coming on and the companies with- the flak and machine guns, then set up a
drew to a wood west of Cheneux to await defense to guard this slight toehold until
further orders. reinforcements could arrive.
The 1st Battalion had not long to wait.
New plans which would greatly extend T h e West Flank of the X V I I I
the 82d Airborne Division front were Airborne Corps, 2 0 December
already in execution and it was impera-
tive that the German bridgehead on the The general advance of the XVIII Air-
north flank of the division be erased borne Corps on 2 0 December included
promptly. Colonel Tucker ordered the the mission assigned to the 3d Armored
1st Battalion commander (Lt. Col. Division of securing the Bastogne-Liège
Willard E. Harrison) to take the two highway between Manhay and Houffa-
companies and try a night attack. At lize, thus screening the right or western
1930 they moved out astride the road flank of the corps. T h e bulk of the 3d
west of Cheneux, two tank destroyers Armored was engaged elsewhere: CCA
their only heavy support. The approach deployed as a defense for the Eupen
to the village brought the paratroopers area, CCB driving with troops of the
T H E GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS TO THE WEST 353

30th Infantry Division against Kampf- and a platoon of light tanks. T h e re-
gruppe Peiper. When General Rose serve, commanded by Col. Robert L.
moved his forward command post to Howze, Jr., was made up of an armored
Hotton on 20 December, the residue of infantry battalion, two companies of
the 3d Armored was assembling between light tanks and one of mediums, plus a
Hotton and Soy, a force numbering only company of engineers. This reserve
the small reserve combat command and would follow the middle task force.
the 83d Reconnaissance Battalion. T h e attack or reconnaissance, time
Nothing was known of any friendly would tell which, began in early after-
troops to the front, nor did information noon. On the right Task Force Hogan
on the location and strength of the (Lt. Col. Samuel M. Hogan) set out
enemy have more than the validity of along a secondary road surmounting the
rumor. Since it was necessary to recon- ridge which rose on the east bank of the
noiter and clear the area west of the Ourthe River and extended south to La
important section of the north-south Roche, the boundary for the XVIII Air-
highway, now his objective, General borne Corps right wing. T h e Ourthe
Rose decided to divide his limited River, then, would form a natural screen
strength into three columns, two attack- on this flank. Hogan's column met no
ing via generally north-south routes and opposition en route to La Roche and up-
then swinging eastward: the third, on on arrival there found that the town was
the extreme left, driving east to the defended by roadblocks that had been
Manhay crossroads and then turning thrown up by the 7th Armored Division
south on the main highway. trains. At this point the route dropped
This was a risky decision, as the 3d into the river valley, following the twists
Armored commander well knew, for the and turns of the Ourthe toward the
zone of attack was very broad and if one southeast. Hogan sent on a small scout-
of the small columns ran into a superior ing force which covered some three miles
enemy force the best it could do would before it was confronted by a German
be to fight a delaying action on its own. roadblock. There was no way around,
Terrain and weather, however, would daylight was running out, and the force
aid the reconnaissance somewhat, for al- hal t ed .
though the area was laced by back roads T h e road assigned Task Force Tucker
and trails German maneuver would be (Maj. John Tucker), the center column,
drastically curtailed and a German ad- followed the Aisne River valley south-
vance limited to the few open and pass- ward. At the village of Dochamps this
able roads. General Rose tried to retain route began an ascent from the valley
as much flexibility as he could, in view onto the ridge or tableland where lay
of the vague status of the enemy and the the town of Samrée. At Samrée Task
width of the front to be covered. T h e Force Tucker was to make a left wheel
three task forces, or more properly recon- onto the La Roche-Salmchâteau road
naissance teams, assigned to Lt. Col. (N28), which followed a high, narrow
Prentice E. Yeomans each had a recon- ridge line to the east, there crossing the
naissance troop, a medium tank com- main Liège-Bastogne highway. This in-
pany, a battery-of armored field artillery, tersection, the Baraque de Fraiture,
354 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

would have a special importance in later represented a position tactically unten-


fighting. able. Hills away to the east and west
Tucker’s column moved unopposed dominated the village, and to the south-
through the Aisne valley but at east an extensive woods promised cover
Dochamps, where began the ascent to from which the enemy could bring fire
the Samrée highland, it was engaged by on the crossroads. By reason of the
a German force of unknown strength. ground, therefore, Malempré, on a hill
In an attempt to continue the reconnais- beyond the woods, was the chosen ob-
sance Major Tucker split his command jective. Kane’s task force reached Man-
in three. One force circled west and hay and pushed advance elements as far
south to Samrée where, it had only now as Malempré without meeting the en-
been learned, a part of the 7th Armored emy.
Division trains was fighting to hold the T h e three reconnaissance forces of the
town. T h e second group turned east and 3d Armored Division by the close of 2 0
finally made contact with Task Force December had accomplished a part of
Kane. Tucker’s third group moved back their mission by discovering the general
north to Amonines. direction of the German advance north-
Late in the afternoon General Rose west of Houffalize and, on two of the
learned that the 3d Armored tanks sent three roads, had made contact with the
to Samrée had been knocked out and the enemy. It remained to establish the en-
town itself lost to the enemy. T h e eleva- emy’s strength and his immediate inten-
tion on which Samrée stood and its im- tions. As yet no prisoners had been taken
portance as a barrier on the highway nor precise identifications secured, but
from La Roche to the division objective the G–2 of the 3d Armored Division (Lt.
made recapture of the town almost man- Col. Andrew Barr) made a guess, based
datory. Rose ordered Colonel Yeomans on earlier reports, that the three task
to regain Samrée and hold it; for this forces had met the 116th Panzer Division
mission two companies of armored infan- and that the 560th Volks Grenadier Divi-
try from the reserve combat command sion was following the former as support.
were detailed to Lt. Col. William R.
Orr. Colonel Orr picked up the remain- Action in Front of the X V I I I
ing elements of Task Force Tucker and Airborne Corps Right Wing on
arrived outside of Dochamps a little be- 2 0 December
fore midnight, setting up a roadblock for
the remainder of the night. As the 3d Armored Division assembled
Task Force Kane (Lt. Col. Matthew for advance on the morning of 2 0 Decem-
W. Kane), on the left in the three- ber, and indeed for most of the day, it
column advance, found easy going on 2 0 was unaware that little groups of Amer-
December. Acting as the pivot for the icans continued to hold roadblocks and
swing south and east, Kane’s column was delay the enemy in the area lying to the
charged with the occupation of Malem- front of the XVIII Airborne Corps right
pré, about 3,000 yards southeast of the wing. These miniature delaying posi-
vital Manhay crossroads. This latter tions had been formed on 18 and 19
junction on the Liège-Bastogne highway December by men belonging to the 7th
T H E GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS T O T H E WEST 355

Armored Division trains, commanded by 2 0 December, but large stores of ammu-


Colonel Adams, and by two combat en- nition, rations, and gasoline had just
gineer battalions, the 51st and 158th. As been moved to dumps at Samrée. ( M a p
the 7th Armored advanced into combat 3)
around St. Vith on 18 December and it T h e 51st Engineer Combat Battalion
became apparent that German thrusts (Lt. Col. Harvey R. Fraser) had arrived
were piercing deep on both flanks of this at Hotton on 19 December with orders
position, Adams received orders to move to construct a barrier line farther south
the division trains into the area around which would utilize the Ourthe River as
La Roche and prepare a defense for that a natural obstacle. T h e battalion was mi-
town and the Ourthe bridges. Most of nus Company C, which, at Trois Ponts,
the vehicles under Adams’ command did much to slow the pace of Kampf-
were concentrated west of La Roche by gruppe Peiper’s westward march. It did

H.C. Brewer,
Jr.

MAP 3
356 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

have the services of the 9th Canadian way through Bastogne or circled past
Forestry Company, which took on the the road complex centered there.
task of preparing the Ourthe crossings The Reconnaissance Battalion of the
south of La Roche for demolition. From 116th Panzer Division, several hours
La Roche north to Hotton and for sev- ahead of the main body of Krueger’s
eral kilometers beyond, the remaining corps, had reached Houffalize on the
two companies worked at mining pass- morning of 19 December, but because
able fording sites, fixing explosives on Krueger expected the town to be strong-
bridges, and erecting roadblocks; but ly defended and had ordered his recon-
the extensive project was far from com-, naissance to avoid a fight there the
plete on 2 0 December. T h e sketchy bar- battalion veered to the south, then west
rier line on the Ourthe was extended toward La Roche. This brief enemy
toward Bastogne by the 158th Engineer apparition and sudden disappearance
Combat Battalion.11 T o the 7th Armored near Houffalize probably account for the
trains and the engineers were added lit- conflicting and confusing rumors as to
tle groups of heterogeneous composition the location of the Germans in this sec-
and improvised armament, picked up by tor which were current in American
the nearest headquarters and hurried’to headquarters on 19 December. Between
the Ourthe River line in answer to Bertogne and La Roche the Recon-
rumors of the German advance over naissance Battalion discovered that the
Houffalize. It is hardly surprising, then, bridge over the west branch of the
that the 3d Armored Division began its Ourthe had been destroyed. At this
advance unaware of efforts already afoot point the Germans had a brush with one
to delay the enemy. of the roadblocks put out by the 7th
While little American detachments Armored troops in La Roche and thus
worked feverishly to prepare some kind alerted Colonel Adams.12 Adams had no
of barrier line on the Ourthe River and other information of the enemy.
around La Roche and Samrée, the north It seemed to Adams, as a result of the
wing of the Fifth Panzer Army was skirmish, that the German advance to-
coming closer and closer. Krueger’s ward La Roche was being made on the
LVIII Panzer Corps pushed its advance northwest bank of the main branch of
guard through the Houffalize area on 19 the Ourthe River and that the final at-
December, while the rear guard mopped tack would come from the west rather
up American stragglers and isolated de- than the east. He therefore moved the
tachments on the west bank of the Our 7th Armored dumps from locations west
River. Krueger’s orders were to push as of La Roche to Samrée, from which
far west as possible on the axis Houffa- point he hoped to maintain contact with
lize-La Roche while his neighbor on the and continue supplies to the main body
left, the XXXVII Panzer Corps, cut its of the division at St. Vith. By early morn-
11 T h e combat operations of these engineer
ing of 20 December the transfer had
battalions would have some effect on the German
advance against the western wing of the XVIII 12It was unusual during World War II for the
Airborne Corps, but since they are integral to division trains to keep a special narrative journal,
the VIII Corps defense they constitute part of but the 7th Armored did keep one that has proven
that story. See above, Chapter XIII. a gold mine for this section.
T H E GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS T O T H E WEST 357

been completed. Adams now was con- deliver the Ourtheuville bridge un-
fronted with the necessity of pushing his touched. This was the end of the fourth
defenses farther east to protect the new day of the German advance and the
supply point. He dispatched part of a Americans, he reasoned, were long since
battery of the 203d Antiaircraft Artillery on guard against a coup de main there.
Battalion to the Baraque de Fraiture Weighing the apparent American
crossroads formed by the intersection of strength in the Bastogne sector against
the Samrée-Salmchateau road and the the total absence of resistance at Houffa-
main Liège-Bastogne highway, the same lize the LVIII Panzer Corps commander
junction which had seemed so important decided, late in the evening of the
to the XVIII Airborne Corps com- 19th, to shift his advance to the north
mander in his map reconnaissance of this bank of the Ourthe River and reroute
area. Upon arrival there the newcomers the 116th Panzer Division toward Samrée
found that some gunners from the 106th by way of Houffalize. T h e order to halt
Infantry Division, commanded by Maj. his division and countermarch to Houff-
Arthur C. Parker, already had dug in to alize was a distinctly unpleasant experi-
defend the vital crossroads. ence for General von Waldenburg. (He
T h e German appearance at the bro- would later say that his decision was
ken bridge which altered Colonel “fatal to the division.”) T h e business of
Adams’ plans had even greater effect in reversing a mechanized division in full
General Krueger’s headquarters. Krue- swing under conditions of total darkness
ger had no bridging available in the is ticklish at best; when it is conducted
corps trains when the word reached him by tired officers and men unfamiliar with
on the night of the 19th. T h e fact that the road net and is hampered by supply
he had to rely on the limited capacity of and artillery trains backing up behind
the 116th Panzer Division engineers the turning columns it is a serious test
meant that the western branch of the for any unit. Nevertheless the 116th
Ourthe could not be spanned before the sorted itself out, issued supplies, refueled
evening of 2 0 December. Such a delay its vehicles, and by early morning was
was out of the question. T o sidestep to en route to Houffalize. Meanwhile the
the south would bang the corps against 1128th Regiment, leading the 560th
very strong resistance forming around Volks Grenadier Division, had been
Bastogne and would scramble the vehic- closing up fast on the 116th Panzer Divi-
ular columns of Krueger’s armor with sion in a series of forced marches (that
the 2d Panzer Division. By this time the later won for the 560th a commendation
116th Panzer Division rear guard had for its “excellent march performance”) .
occupied Houffalize without a fight. The By noon of 2 0 December the bulk of the
main body of the division, having 116th Panzer Division followed by a
marched unopposed nearly to the road large portion of the 560th Yolks Grena-
which runs from Bastogne northwest to dier Division had defiled through Houff-
Marche, was preparing to seize a second alize and was on the north bank of the
bridge over the west branch of the Ourthe River.13
Ourthe at Ortheuville. Krueger had no
13The German sources for other units than
faith that any stroke of fortune would Kampfgruppe Peiper include: MSS ETHINT-21
358 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

The maneuver now to be executed was ron. About noon word reached Samrée
a left wheel into attack against Samrée that the 3d Armored Division was send-
and La Roche, with the main effort, ing a task force to the town. T h e Ger-
carried by the tank regiment of the man patrols had not yet entered the
116th Panzer Division, made at Samrée. town; so, heartened by the approach of
The right flank of the attack would be the friendly armor, Miller gave orders
covered by the 560th Volks Grenadier that no supplies were to be destroyed.
Division. As the morning drew along the About 1430 the fire fight quickened.
Americans had made their presence felt Hearing that the 3d Armored tanks had
by increasingly effective artillery fire reached Dochamps, Miller drove to find
from the north. German scouts reported the task force and insure that he would
that there were tanks to be seen near get immediate aid. Not more than a half
Samrée (actually the American garrison hour later the Germans swarmed in un-
there had only one) but that the ground der a sharp barrage of rocket fire. By
would sustain a German tank attack. this time the one tank was out of ammu-
T h e 60th Panzer Grenadier Regiment nition, the machine gunners manning
assembled under cover of the woods the .50-caliber weapons on the quarter-
south of the town, and the tanks (from master trucks were also running low, the
the 16th Panzer Regiment) moved out antiaircraft outfit had lost three of its
onto the Samrée road. Advance patrols, weapons and fired its last round, and the
which had started a fire fight in the late division Class III officer had ordered the
morning, were able to occupy a few units to evacuate. A majority of the
houses when a fog settled in shortly after troops got out with most of their trucks
noon. and the remaining artillery ammunition,
All this time the 7th Armored Division but 15,000 rations and 25,000 gallons of
quartermaster, Lt. Col. A. A. Miller, gasoline were left behind.
had been issuing rations, ammuni- Shortly after, the detachment sent
tion, and gasoline as fast as trucks from Task Force Tucker appeared. Two
could load. T h e force he had inside armored cars, at the point, entered the
Samrée was small: half of the 3967th north edge of the town, but the six
Quartermaster Truck Company, the medium tanks following were quickly
quartermaster section of the division destroyed by German armor coming in
headquarters, part of the 440th Ar- from the east. During the shooting the
mored Field Artillery Battalion’s Service armored cars were able to pick up the
Battery, two sections of D Battery, 203d surviving tankers and escape to La
Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, armed Roche. The 7th Armored Division head-
with quadruple-mount machine guns, quarters received word of the fight, and
plus a light tank and a half-track from from La Roche the commander of the
the 87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squad- Trains Headquarters Company, 1st. Lt.
Denniston Averill, hurried to Samrée
(Kraemer) , and ETHINT-34, OKW, Ardennes with two medium tanks and a self-
Offensive (Maj. Herbert Buecks); MSS A–873 propelled tank destroyer. Averill’s little
(Waldenburg) ; A–924 (Kraemer) ; A–955 (Ding
ler) ; B–027 (Langhaeuser) ; B–321 (Krueger); B- party attempted to enter Samrée, but
506 (Triepel) . was not heard from again.
T H E GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS T O T H E WEST 359

Off to the east, at Salmchâteau, Troop force, whose rapid drive to the west had
D of the 87th Cavalry Reconnaissance caused such alarm only a few hours be-
Squadron also got orders sending it to fore, appeared to be pocketed in the
Samrée. Passing the friendly outpost at Stoumont-La Gleize sector. Effectively
the Baraque de Fraiture the troop came blocked off on the west the trapped Ger-
within two and a half miles of Samrée mans would probably try to cut their
when it encountered a German road- way to the rear via Stavelot or at least
block, not well defended. Smashing it, establish a bridgehead there as a po-
the troop moved on. Shortly it struck a tential escape hatch. Probably, too, the
second block formed by abandoned troops in the pocket would receive some
American trucks and defended by a aid from new’ German units moving
large force of German infantry (two along the north flank of the St. Vith sali-
companies of the 560th Volks Grenadier ent through the gap between Malmédy
Division). Having felt out the enemy and Recht.
and with night drawing on, the cavalry The operations designed for 2 1 De-
commander pulled his troop back a little cember left the 30th Division and its re-
to the east to await the morning. Later in inforcing armor to finish off Peiper by
the evening radio orders came from the tightening the net spread the day before.
7th Armored Division headquarters tell- Thereafter the 30th had orders to link
ing him to arrange a co-ordinated attack up with the 82d Airborne at Trois Ponts
with the 3d Armored Division task force and prepare to join in the XVIII Air-
north of Dochamps. borne Corps advance by pushing south.
T h e action at Samrée had delayed The varied indications that the Germans
Krueger’s corps considerably. But the were moving in some force toward
gasoline stores captured there had re- Malmédy, the pivot point for both the
fueled all the vehicles of the 116th Pan- corps and division left wing, seemed to
zer Division; despite assurances by Amer- be no reason for reverting strictly to
ican prisoners that sugar had been mixed the defensive. Malmédy had been pre-
with the gasoline the enemy drivers re- pared for defense since the scare of 17
ported that it suited the German motors December, the reports of enemy forces
very well. thereabouts were rather vague, and six
American artillery battalions were in
T h e Net Closes on Peiper position to give support where needed.
In detail, then, the plans prepared by
General Hobbs’s division and CCB, 3d Hobbs and his staff were formulated
Armored Division, had a job to do before against the Germans in the pocket.
the XVIII Airborne Corps could be free On the morning of 2 1 December the
to direct all its strength into a drive to American forces in and around Malmédy
re-establish contact with the VIII Corps were substantial: the 120th Infantry
and close the gap between Houffalize (minus a battalion in division reserve) ;
and Bastogne. Kampfgruppe Peiper, esti- the “Norwegians,” that is, the 99th In-
mated as comprising at least half of the fantry Battalion; the 526th Armored In-
1st SS Panzer Division, had to be eradi- fantry Battalion; a company from the
cated north of the Amblève River. This 291st Engineer Battalion; a tank com-
360 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

MINEDBRIDGE IN MALMEDY. Tapes mark safe passageway.

pany from the 740th; and two platoons the two sister regiments at the vaguely
from the 823d Tank Destroyer Battal- defined interregimental boundary were
ion.14 The American infantry line none too explicit. All roads leading to
formed an arc south of the town, swing- Malmèdy had been blocked by mines
ing to east and west. On the left this and barricades or were barred by out-
line touched the 1st Infantry Division post detachments.
outposts near Waimes; on the right it T h e first action of 2 1 December, as
had a tenuous connection with the 117th it turned out, was neither against Peiper
Infantry at the junction of the road nor at the pocket, but an engagement
from Stavelot and the road running at Malmèdy with new German troops
north to Francorchamps. In passing it thus far unidentified as a regular tactical
must be said that the responsibilities of unit. The night before, an enemy force
had assembled in Ligneuville, five miles
14 History of the 120th Infantry Regiment and
south of Malmèdy. This was the noto-
H. R. Bergen, History of 99th Infantry Battalion rious 150th Panzer Brigade which, under
(Oslo, n.d.); also 120th Inf AAR. T h e story of the command of the equally notorious
other detachments in the Malmèdy fight is told in
12th Army Group, Special Forces, AAR, December
Colonel Skorzeny, had been especially
1944. trained to seize the Meuse bridges as
‘THE GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS T O T H E WEST 361

a part of Operation Greif. When fantry were quick to acknowledge. Two


the German plans to reach the Hohes hours later the attackers had disap-
Venn on the second day of the counter- peared. T h e morning came with a dense
offensive miscarried and the regular fog floating out from the Amblève River.
German formations were checked so far Attacking under this cover the left Ger-
from the Meuse as to make a dash by man assault group, two rifle companies,
this special task force out of the question, and a tank company rolled in column
Colonel Skorzeny sought for some other along a secondary road which would
road to fame and glory. His recommen- bring it west of Malmédy against the
dation, made to the Sixth Panzer Army 3d Battalion of the 120th. One detach-
commander, that the group be re- ment turned toward the town but came
assembled and committed as an ordinary to a sudden halt when the lead vehicles
combat unit was accepted, and the cap- hit a mine field in front of B Company,
ture of Malmédy was assigned as its first 99th Infantry Battalion. It took only
mission. minutes for mortars, machine guns, and
T h e troops that gathered in Ligneu- artillery to dispel this assault.
ville must have made a motley crew. Here, on the first day of use of the
Some were completely equipped with new POZIT fuze, the Germans were
American uniforms and dog-tags; others roughly dealt with. Nearly a hundred
had olive drab trousers and American were killed by the shellbursts and for
combat boots surmounted by field gray a moment panic spread among them,
tunics; still ,others wore the German some running forward into the fire shout-
field uniform. Their vehicles were an ing “Kamerad.” But Skorzeny’s troops
assortment of German makes; captured were tough and tried repeatedly to break
American armored cars, tanks, and Lt. Col. Harold D. Hansen’s “Nor-
jeeps; and German models which had wegians,” an outfit characterized in the
been given a face-lifting job by the German intelligence reports as “old
addition of dummy turrets, decks, and men.” German machine gun crews tried
fronts to simulate an American equiva- to set up their pieces right in front of
lent. Despite this rag-tag appearance the railroad embankment where B Com-
Skorzeny’s command was composed of pany lay but were shot down or blasted
tough, picked men, abundantly armed by hand grenades. Several times the
with automatic and heavy weapons. enemy infantry reached the foot of the
Skorzeny divided his brigade into embankment, but could go no farther.
three groups, two for the assault and Finally the assault died down.
one in reserve. About two hours before The main enemy detachment headed
dawn the right group struck straight for the Malmedy-Stavelot road, pushing
north along the Ligneuville road in an its infantry to the fore. In the fog it en-
effort to seize the bridge south of Mal- countered K Company of the 120th In-
médy. T h e assault force was engaged by fantry, knocked out a platoon deployed
the 1st Battalion of the 120th Infantry, at a roadblock, and, using its tanks,
and the 3d Battalion joined the fire fight drove the remaining American infantry
as well; but it was left to the artillery back some distance to the north. Four
to “plaster” the Germans, as the in- 3-inch towed tank destroyers covering the
362 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

GERMANTANKDISGUISED
AS AN AMERICAN
TANK

road were abandoned after their crews Pfc. Francis Currey essayed a series of
removed the firing pins. gallant deeds for which he later received
Not all the Americans fell back, how- the Medal of Honor. He knocked out
ever. One who stayed was 1st Lt. a tank with bazooka fire, drove the Ger-
Kenneth R. Nelson, who decided to hold man crews out of three tanks with anti-
on with a few men left in his section tank grenades, with a bazooka blew in
and did so, savagely beating back the the front of the house where the enemy
attackers. Nelson led the fight until he tankers had taken refuge, and turned a
died of the wounds he had suffered. He half-track machine gun on the house
received the DSC posthumously. T/Sgt. with such effect as to silence the German
John Van Der Kamp then took com- fire and permit the escape of five Amer-
mand, although wounded, and held the icans who had been cornered by the
position until ordered to withdraw. He enemy.
was awarded the DSC. Part of K Com- This confused fight in the fog, taking
pany withdrew to a nearby factory, where place as it did on the boundary be-
T H E GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS T O T H E WEST 363

tween the 120th and the 117th, had re- mand. At Hodges’ First Army head-
percussions out of all relation to the quarters there had been a continuing
event. By noon garbled reports and question as to whether the enemy would
rumors placed German tanks (errone- try to shake loose in the north and drive
ously as it proved) in villages northwest for Liège. Momentarily it looked as if
of Malmédy; the 117th Infantry was wor- this indeed was the German intention.
ried that the Germans were left free to T o the west at Stavelot, a detachment
strike their left flank at Stavelot; the from the rearward march echelons of
staff of the 120th Infantry was trying the 1st SS Panzer Division made an
desperately to find out exactly what had abortive attempt to cross to the north
happened; two battalions of antiaircraft bank of the Amblève preparatory to
artillery with 90-mm. guns were hurried- reopening the route leading to Kampf-
ly taking positions to build a defense in gruppe Peiper. The Americans holding
depth as far back as the division com- the major section of the town had blown
mand post; the 120th Infantry reserve the last bridge, and the panzer grena-
was rushed west to Burnenville–but diers were forced to take to the icy
found no Germans. T h e much-touted stream. This crossing brought a hundred
German penetration finally boiled down or so of the assault force in front of
to one tank and a half-track which had B Company, 117th Infantry, whose rifle-
driven up and down the road in the fog men picked off most of the attackers
with an English-speaking soldier shout- while they still were in the stream. Be-
ing out lurid promises of warm female yond this one alarm the day passed
companionship for the Americans if they quietly at Stavelot–although one major
only would surrender. disaster occurred when a section of the
T h e German thrust along the 743d Tank Battalion fired high explosive
boundary between the two American into a building and set it afire, only to
regiments, as the event showed, had be- learn that it was filled with champagne
come jammed in the narrow corridor and cognac.
and most of its armor destroyed by cross T h e march echelons of the 1st SS
fire coming in from the flanks. Deprived Panzer Division en route to relieve
of tank support and followed unrelent- Peiper were slow in assembling and their
ingly by the new variety of shellbursts, concentration area, southeast of Stave-
the enemy infantry had withdrawn. lot, was under constant interdiction by
Skorzeny, by this time fully aware of the artillery fire. T h e 1st SS Panzer troops
defending strength at Malmédy, or- trapped to the west were closely engaged,
dered his brigade to pull back to the and as yet Peiper had no orders which
south. Thus ended the first and the last would permit a retrograde movement.
attack on Malmédy. T h e lines of the 3d On the American side the skirmish at
Battalion were restored and two of the Stavelot, coupled with German counter-
abandoned tank destroyer guns recov- attacks in the La Gleize-Stoumont sec-
ered and placed in action. Nonetheless, tor, made for bewilderment. General
the unexpected strength of the German Hobbs dryly stated the prevailing
attack on Malmédy had impacts all up opinion on the intentions of the trapped
and down the American chain of com- enemy, “They are trying to get out
364 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

forward or backward or something.” pany spent the remainder of the day


T h e main task for the 30th Division mopping up in the small villages along
and its reinforcing armored task forces the river bank, finding evidences of re-
remained that of eradicating all German volting atrocities earlier perpetrated on
troops north of the Amblève. T h e the defenseless Belgians by Peiper’s
general plan was a continuation of the troops. Attempts to mount the ridge were
one set in operation the day before: the checked by machine gun fire, and it be-
119th Infantry (reinforced) , now or- came evident that the enemy had a
ganized under the assistant division com- strong force concentrated in this sector.
mander, General Harrison, as Task Task Force McGeorge and riflemen of
Force Harrison, to capture Stoumont and the 117th Infantry likewise were unable
continue its eastward drive as far as La to make much headway in extending the
Gleize; the 3d Battalion of the 117th northern arm of the planned envelop-
Infantry (reinforced) and the two 3d ment. T h e German barrier interposed
Armored task forces to carry through the by dug-in tanks and assault guns at a
concentric attack to seize La Gleize. little stream about a thousand yards
The latter maneuver got under way on north of La Gleize could not be taken by
21 December. Task Force Lovelady, maneuver, for McGeorge’s tanks were
which had cut south between Stavelot unable to get off the road, or by single-
and La Gleize on the previous day, re- handed infantry assault. T h e American
versed its course and moved north from column then drew back along the valley
the Trois Ponts area with the intention road. About a mile east of La Gleize
of securing the ridge which overlooked the task force turned west to cross the
La Gleize from the southeast. Task Force valley and approach the town but was
McGeorge, stopped cold the evening be- halted at a curve in the road by fire
fore on the narrow ridge road which from dug-in tanks and antitank guns.
angled to La Gleize from the north, T h e riflemen formed a line of skirmishers
resumed the attack with K Company, in front of the German block and the
117th Infantry, trying to pry out the task force halted for the night.
German block to the front. South of the T h e drive to pinch out the western
Amblève, Task Force Lovelady was contents of the Peiper pocket at Stou-
screened by the low-hanging fog from mont got off to a late start on the 21st.
the strong enemy patrols working General Harrison’s original plan called
through the area; on the north bank, for a co-ordinated attack in the early
however, it ran into trouble while ad- morning. T h e 1st Battalion, 119th In-
vancing on the sunken La Gleize road. fantry, was to continue the drive to enter
Two leading tanks were crippled when the town from the west (after recaptur-
they hit a patch of mines. Then German ing the sanatorium and the high
tanks or antitank guns knocked out the ground flanking the entrance). The 2d
last two tanks in the column. At this Battalion would swing wide through the
point, therefore, the road was effectively woods north of the town, block the es-
blocked against further American or cape route to La Gleize, and then attack
future German counterattacks. T h e in- from the east. Task Force Jordan and
fantry with Lovelady and a tank com- the reorganized 3d Battalion (which
T H E GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS T O T H E WEST 365

earlier had been thrown out of Stou- Battalion made some progress in its ad-
mont) would attack from the north as vance through the woods the battalion
soon as the sanatorium, which over- commander, Major McCown, was cap-
looked the northern entrance to the tured while making a personal recon-
town as well as the western, was wrested naissance, and his troops fell back to
from enemy hands. T h e sanatorium, their original position. The American
then, and the rise on which it stood tanks, unable to advance along the nar-
held the final control of Stoumont. row sunken road under the guns of the
Peiper did not wait for the counter- Panthers and Tigers, remained north of
attack which might lose him the the town.
sanatorium. Sometime before 0500 the A call from the division commander
lull which had succeeded the night of in late afternoon for “the real picture
fierce fighting was broken by a German down there” elicited a frankly pessimis-
assault against the 1st Battalion posi- tic answer from General Harrison. Two
tions on the roadway west of the town. battalions, the 1st and 3d, had been cut
T h e road itself was blocked by a tank down and demoralized by earlier enemy
platoon from the 740th Tank Battalion, counterattacks; they were “in pretty bad
the infantry dug in behind. T h e first shape.” As to the armored detachment:
tank facing the enemy fell to an anti- “The trouble is the only places where
tank gun; in the darkness three more tanks of any kind can operate are on
were set aflame by Panzerfausts in the two sunken roads. The Germans have
hands of the infiltrating enemy infantry. big tanks, so tanks have been of no help
The Germans were finally thrown back, to us.” Further, Harrison told Hobbs,
but they had succeeded in disorganiz- he would advise against continuing the
ing the 1st Battalion to the point where attack on the morrow: “That place
General Harrison felt that his own at- [Stoumont] is very strong. I don’t think
tack would have to be postponed. The those troops we have now, without some
division commander agreed to Harrison’s improvement, can take the thing. That is
proposal that the attack be launched my honest opinion. They are way down
at 1245 instead of 0730 as planned. In in strength. T h e trouble is that we can
the meantime the regimental cannon only get light artillery fire on the town,
company and the 197th Field Artillery and the Germans can shoot at us with
Battalion set to work softening up the tank guns and we can’t get tanks to
Germans. shoot back unless they come out and get
At the new hour the 1st and 2d Bat- hit.” 15T o this forthright opinion there
talions jumped off. The 1st Battalion was little to add. General Hobbs
assault drove the enemy infantry out of cautioned Harrison to be on the lookout
some of the sanatorium rooms, but when for a German attempt to break out dur-
a heavy German tank moved in on the ing the night and head west, and told
north side (where it was screened from him that an attempt would be made
the Americans) and started blasting to work out a scheme with General Ridg-
through the windows the Americans way for an attack by the 82d Airborne
withdrew under smoke cover laid down
by friendly mortars. Although the 2d 15 30th Div telephone journal, 21 Dec 44.
366 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Division against the southern side of the the other side the counterweight con-
Stoumont-La Gleize pocket. sisted of a relatively few tanks whose
Earlier in the day Hobbs had assured crews knew that their tanks were not
the corps commander that if the 82d heavy enough for a headlong attack and
Airborne cleared out the south bank of their guns could not match the German
the Ambleve no further help would be tank guns in long-range dueling, and
needed. His request that evening for an who were working with infantry whose
attack by the 82d from the Trois Ponts strength was no longer sufficient to pry
sector came at a time when the situation the Panthers and Tigers out of their
along the entire corps front had drasti- lairs. Nonetheless the “human being”
cally altered and in part deteriorated.16 could not be exactly equated at a dis-
T o the south the XVIII Airborne Corps count rate against machines. Pfc. Jack
was heavily engaged, the 7th Armored Gebert demonstrated the point when he
Division was being pushed out of the advanced through machine gun fire, de-
St. Vith salient, and even in the Trois stroyed a German tank with a bazooka
Ponts area there had been a sudden en- round, climbed onto a U.S. tank, and
emy resurgence. Furthermore a frontal directed its fire until shot down. He
attack from the south would be almost was awarded the DSC posthumously.
suicidal so long as the Germans held the T h e answer seemed to be air attack.
higher ground on the north bank of the The missions set up to aid the 30th Divi-
Amblève. sion had been canceled on the morning
Hobbs’s diagnosis of the problem as of 2 0 December because of bad weather.
“the physical proposition of human be- The First Army air officers, however, had
ings” may have been a truism but it told Ridgway and Hobbs that there was
was sound. On the one side a tough a fair chance of flying weather on the
force of cornered Germans weighted the morning of the 22d. Hobbs assured the
scales, fighting in desperate fashion and corps commander that he “could use up
given physical and moral backing by to sixteen groups in one day,” that his
heavily armored tanks mounting a supe- own air support officer would have the
rior gun and able to employ hull defi- targets ready. Here the matter rested-
lade, blocking a few well-defined and in the lap of the weather gods.
straightened avenues of approach. On Although there was little direct help
that the 82d Airborne Division could
16The recital of the subsequent operations by
the 82d Airborne Division comes from a variety
give the 30th Division while the Ger-
of sources, mostly at regimental level, although mans still held Stoumont, it had aided
some combat interviews cover battalions and com- the attack north of the Ambleve on 21
panies: 325th Glider Inf AAR and Jnl; 517th Para
Inf AAR; 504th AAR and S–3 Jnl, 505th S–2 and
December by soldering the southern link
S–3 Per Rpts, 508th “The Belgian Campaign, Part in the bank around Kampfgruppe Peiper
I, 17–31 December”; 82d Abn Div, Commander’s and by beating off the relief detachments
Rpt, G–2 and G–3 Jnls. Published sources are
mostly of the pictorial public relations type but
of the 1st SS Panzer Division who were
some are of use, notably: W. G. Lord, Combat trying to lever an opening in this ring.
Record of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment The two companies of the 1st Bat-
(Paris, 1948); History of the 508th Parachute In-
fantry (Washington, 1945); and Saga of the All
talion, 504th Parachute Infantry, that
American (Atlanta, 1946). fought their way into Cheneux on the
T H E GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS T O T H E WEST 367

20th, had endangered Peiper’s only re- march over rough ground and entered
maining foothold on the south bank the village from the north side; by late
of the Amblève. Since the companies, afternoon the fight was ended. The
B and C, had suffered very severe losses Americans had lost 2 2 5 dead and wound-
from the waist-high fire of the German ed, mostly from the two assault com-
.20-mm. self-propelled flak pieces while panies. Company B had 18 men left and
making the assault across the open no officers; C Company had 38 men and
ground around the village, Colonel 3 officers. Few Germans were captured.
Tucker ordered in G Company and in The rear guard fought to the end, but
the hours after midnight effected some most of the garrison still living had with-
reorganization. Fighting continued in- drawn during the night leaving scores of
side the village all through the night, dead behind. Booty taken here included
for the most part a hunt with knife and fourteen flak wagons and a battery of
grenade to destroy the crews of the anti- 105-mm. howitzers, as well as many ve-
aircraft half-tracks (the flak wagons) hicles. Only one German tank was taken
which had punished the paratroopers so -a clue to the ability of the few survi-
badly. During the battle Pfc. Daniel vors from the initial assault to hang on
Del Grippo, who had been painfully in the village till help arrived.
wounded, attacked and killed the crew Peiper’s bridgehead was gone. Lack-
of a self-propelled gun. S/Sgt. William ing the gasoline to make an advance out
Walsh, leading a platoon which became of it on 19 December, and hoping that
pinned down by flanking fire from a some resupply would be forthcoming, he
flak wagon, rushed the Germans and had ordered it held as a possible future
destroyed them with a grenade, although sally port, from which to resume the
he was so badly wounded that a comrade westward drive. But even as the bridge-
had to arm the grenade. Both of these head was torn from the hands of his
soldiers received the DSC. kampfgruppe, so the German relief
When morning dawned General forces were stopped before they could re-
Gavin turned the entire regiment over open the line of communications behind
to Tucker with orders to “wipe out” Peiper. In this feat also the 82d Air-
the Germans at Cheneux. The 3d Bat- borne had a share on 2 1 December by
talion (Lt. Col. Julian A. Cook) made defending the Salm River line.
a wide flanking movement in a six-hour
CHAPTER XVI

One Threat Subsides; Another Emerges


The Attempt To Relieve Peiper’s kampfgruppe was out of touch with the
Kampfgruppe second and third march columns of the
division and was racing alone toward
The quick and cheaply won victories the west. T h e strongest of the rearward
which had taken Peiper’s armored columns, the fourth, which amounted
kampfgruppe so close to the Meuse to a reinforced armored infantry regi-
bridges in so short a time may have ment, had been held up by mines at the
blinded the higher German staffs for entrance to its designated route and in
a while to the fact that Peiper was in fact never made a start until 18 De-
danger. By the 21st, however, the most cember. The student of first causes may
strenuous efforts were being made to wish to speculate on the fateful role of
save the ground he had won north of the unknown cavalry, engineers, and
the Amblève and to rescue the men foot soldiers who laid the mines between
and materiel in his command. What Lanzerath and Manderfeld, thus delay-
happened to leave the kampfgruppe ing most of the 1st SS Panzer Division
stranded and alone? armored infantry for a critical twenty-
The 1st SS Panzer Division had begun four hours.
its drive west in four march groups mov- By 19 December, it will be recalled,
ing independently. T h e bulk of the 1st Peiper was over the Hohes Venn high-
Panzer Regiment, a motorized battalion lands, had crossed to the north bank
of armored infantry, a mobile company of the Ambléve River, and had secured
of engineers, and a battery of self-pro- the Stoumont-La Gleize area. At the
pelled artillery (as well as most of the same time he had almost completely
gasoline available) had gone to Peiper drained his fuel tanks. On that same day
with the expectation that the armored radio communication of a sort had been
weight and the mobile character of this re-established between Peiper and the
spearhead detachment would permit a 1st SS Panzer Division headquarters,
quick breakthrough and exploitation so that his plight was known. The sec-
even to the Meuse River. T h e balance ond march group, the mobile recon-
of the division was to follow hard on naissance battalion, had come up and
Peiper’s heels, provide reinforcement as engaged the Americans at Stavelot, get-
required, and keep the line of com- ting through some reinforcement to
munications open until such time as Peiper but failing in the larger task of
following divisions could take over and keeping the door open behind Peiper.
be prepared to re-form as a unit at the Meanwhile the third march group was
Meuse. By noon of 17 December Peiper’s moving slowly toward Stavelot while the
ONE T H R E A T SUBSIDES; ANOTHER EMERGES 369

fourth, following the southern route The glaring fact was that the Sixth
through Recht, had become involved Panzer Army had failed to crack a gap
at roadblocks on the north flank of the in the American front wide enough for
7th Armored Division salient. the passage west of the two armored
T h e hardening American resistance divisions supposedly leading the I SS
ahead of Peiper and on his exposed north Panzer Corps or for the quick forward
flank, plus reports that his fuel supply movement of the infantry divisions that
was low, prompted the Sixth Panzer were earmarked for the northern block
Army commander and staff to undertake protecting the line of communications
new plans and orders calculated to get to the west. T h e best the Sixth Panzer
the kampfgruppe rolling once again. Army could do on the 19th and 20th
T h e army chief of staff was particularly was to order supply troops and a small
concerned lest Peiper be forced to face reconnaissance detachment of the 12th
north so as to protect his endangered SS Panzer Division to guard the north
flank and line of communications–as in flank between the 3 d Parachute Division
fact happened. T h e nearest intact for- positions and Peiper, tell General Priess
mation was the 3d Parachute Division. (the I SS Panzer Corps commander) to
But if this division were taken out collect the 1st SS Panzer Division (-)
of its blocking position south of Waimes for an attack to relieve Peiper, and ur-
the road would be open for American gently request the Luftwaffe to drop
reinforcements from the north to reach gasoline and ammunition for the isolated
St. Vith. T h e 12th SS Panzer Division, kampfgruppe. (One air resupply mis-
originally scheduled to be the 1st SS sion was flown on the night of 2 1 De-
Panzer Division’s running mate on the cember. But it was difficult to hit the
north, had been taken out of the fight constricted zone in darkness, and the
at Krinkelt-Rocherath but was engaged kampfgruppe got only enough gasoline
in refitting and a very roundabout move to keep its radios going and to move
to get back onto the road west. There a few of its tanks to more favorable
was no chance now that the 12th SS firing positions. Thereafter the Luft-
could reach the Malmedy sector as waffe refused all Sixth Army requests
planned and so cover Peiper’s flank. for such missions.)
Peculiarly enough (and a commentary On the morning of 2 1 December SS-
on the state of communications), both Oberfuehrer Mohnke, the 1st SS Pan-
Peiper and the commander of the 3d zer Division commander, had collected
Purachute Division thought that the most of his third and fourth march
12th SS Panzer Division actually was in groups in the area south of Stavelot and
the vicinity of Malmédy, there covering east of Trois Ponts. T o reach Peiper it
the north flank. T h e I I SS Panzer Corps, would be necessary to get onto the north
whose two armored divisions were sup- bank of the Amblève and strike north-
posed to form a second wave behind the west or to cross the Salm and then turn
I SS Panzer Corps, was still in the army north. What Mohnke’s intentions actu-
rear and could not reach the Stoumont- ally were is hard to tell. Apparently he
La Gleize sector for three or four days, sent part of his infantry to ford the Am-
even if committed at once. blève between Trois Ponts and Stavelot
370 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

about the same time that Task Force woods and draws.
Lovelady crossed to the north bank. T h e The commander of the 2d Battalion,
two forces probably missed each other 505th Parachute Infantry (Lt. Col. Ben-
in the morning fog, but it seems certain jamin H. Vandervoort) tried unsuccess-
that the sizable German detachment en- fully to reach his regimental command-
countered by Colonel Lovelady when er by radio. In the absence of specific
he attempted to push away from the instructions as to the bridgehead, he
north bank and up the ridge was that then dispatched Company F to climb
sent by Mohnke. Meanwhile, when the the cliff across the river. Company F
Germans tried to cross heavy assault moved into the woods on the right of
guns on the temporary bridge above Company E, while a jeep towed a single
Trois Ponts the frail structure collapsed 57-mm. antitank gun across stringers laid
out of hand. Attempts to put in bridges atop the broken bridge structure. This
at other points were all frustrated by gun, manned by Lt. Jake Wurtich,
artillery fire. fought an unequal duel with the panzers
Mohnke made his main effort with a -its shells bouncing off the German
westward thrust at the Salm River line, armor–until it was knocked out and
first in the direction of Trois Ponts, Wurtich killed. T h e tanks, however,
then as a groping attempt to find some could not maneuver on the soggy, snow-
weak spot farther south. His force covered ground and the fight broke into
would collide with the 505th Parachute a series of hand-to-hand engagements
Infantry, now spread along an 8,000- swirling around little knots of infantry-
yard front reaching from Trois Ponts men.
south to Grand Halleux. The initial Ger- The American rifle line was steadily
man attack was thrown against E Com- decreasing in strength, denuded by
pany of the 505th Parachute Infantry, casualties and carrying parties laborious-
which had organized a small bridgehead ly moving the wounded down and am-
on the cliff across the river east of Trois munition up the cliff. Vandervoort put
Ponts the day before. Fleeing civilians one more platoon across the river. By
halted by patrols on the morning of the this time the assistant division com-
21st bore word of German tanks and mander and the regimental commander
infantry assembling in Wanne. Shortly both had reached Trois Ponts and it was
before noon a company led by self-pro- agreed that Ekman could withdraw his
pelled guns appeared through the fog troops from the minuscule bridgehead.
along a road running past the rise held Having a third of his regiment commit-
by the paratroopers. An 8-man ba- ted at this single point on his extend-
zooka section knocked out the assault ed and exposed front, Colonel Ekman
guns, but its members were captured or decided to chance a daylight withdrawal.
killed. The howitzers of the 456th Para- Some troops came back over the bridge
chute Field Artillery Battalion west of but many, hard pressed, leaped off the
the river went to work and for a time cliff into the river. A number of the
disorganized the enemy. Tanks were enemy, in close pursuit, crossed behind
seen moving about and more German the Americans by fording or swinging
infantry were heard gathering. in the along the broken bridges. Before the 2d
ONE T H R E A T SUBSIDES; ANOTHER EMERGES 371

Battalion could reorganize on the west machine guns for help on the morrow.
bank, at least two German platoons had When 2 2 December dawned the
crossed the river. They were immedi- XVIII Airborne Corps still was engaged
ately knocked back, however. in maneuvering to create a solid barrier
T o the south of Trois Ponts the 3d along its 45-mile front against the Ger-
Battalion of the 505th had been de- mans heading for the Meuse. Things
ployed on a wide front which was ex- were not going too well. T h e St. Vith
tended still more as its neighboring bat- salient had been dealt heavy blows and
talion concentrated at Trois Ponts. Near the lines there were crumbling. T h e
the three or four houses of the hamlet of enemy had pushed as far along the
La Neuville a bridge still spanned the Ourthe River valley as Hotton and
Salm, covered by a platoon roadblock was gathering to the west of that river.
on the east bank. At dark a German General Hobbs, whose 30th Division was
column of tanks (or assault guns) and holding the corps north flank, felt that
infantry approached the bridge. T h e his sector now was secure although he
platoon called for artillery, engaged in knew that enemy reinforcements had
a short exchange of fire, withdrew, and crossed the Ambléve. But he was con-
blew the bridge. Four large enemy fight- cerned lest the Germans bring off a
ing vehicles remained at the bridge site successful eccentric attack north of Trois
when the rest of the thwarted column Ponts which would separate the 30th
turned away. They were too close for Division from the 82d Airborne. This
shellfire; so a four-man patrol armed he told General Ridgway in a telephone
with Gammon grenades crossed in the conversation on the morning of the 22d,
dark to deal with them, but as the patrol but Ridgway gave him Gavin’s assurance
reached the east bank the tanks turned that the paratroopers would hold, that
and lumbered off. During the evening nothing would get through to the west.
enemy foot soldiers also tried to sneak T o the corps commander the priority
across the wreckage of the railroad project in this sector remained that of
bridge south of Trois Ponts, an attack eliminating the La Gleize-Stoumont
quickly ended when shellfire caught pocket as rapidly and as thoroughly as
them right at the river. possible, freeing the 30th Division and
Although most of the night of 2 1 De- its attached armor for urgent work else-
cember passed quietly it was a time of where.
strain because the 505th line at Trois After a quiet night in most of the
Ponts was thin, the enemy was known 30th Division lines the day came with
to be strong, and the river was fordable. intense cold, falling snow, and heavy
The 82d Airborne Division as a whole overcast. Veteran troops by this time had
was too widely dispersed to permit im- learned that beautifully clear weather
mediate and large-scale help in the Trois at the foxhole line often meant bad
Ponts sector. General Gavin, who had flying weather back at the air bases:
been in and out of the regimental com- but they knew too that close tactical
mand post all day long, could give Colo- support necessitated a decent modicum
nel Ekman only one rifle company and of clear weather. At 0806 the 30th Divi-
a battery of groundmount .50-caliber sion air officer learned that his targets
372 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

had been approved and that a fighter- organized units of the relieving force
bomber group would be on hand of the 1st SS Panzer Division succeed in
“weather permitting.” At almost the breaking through to Peiper in La Gleize.
same moment General Hobbs got the At the west end of the Peiper pocket
word that he could expect no help from the night of 2 1 December had witnessed
the air. T h e resumption of the attack to the final reduction of the sanatorium,
deflate the pocket would depend on opening the way for a direct attack on
ground troops and guns, most of all Stoumont by Task Force Harrison. Early
guns. T h e artillery, however, was finding that evening an officer of the 740th Tank
it difficult to get into good firing posi- Battalion had crawled into the enemy
tions, and the American troops were so lines, scouting for a way to bring tanks
near the target towns as to require the around to the northwest of the build-
nicest type of precision ranging. Pros- ing. Returning to his own lines he called
pects for the attackers seemed as dis- for volunteers to build a ramp over
couraging as the weather. the fill, or embankment, which had
T h e plan of 2 2 December included barred direct assault earlier in the
the continuation of the drive to take fight. The ramp, constructed from shell
La Gleize and Stoumont plus an attack castings, worked, and by midnight four
to mop up the 1st SS Panzer Division Shermans were firing into the sanatori-
relief detachment which had dug in um. Shortly thereafter the Germans left
north of the Ambléve between Stavelot the place. When the Americans entered
and Ster. This latter group was estab- the basement, they found that none of
lished on the nose of a ridge, from which the civilian inhabitants had been killed
its fire swept north, west, and south, and or injured.
in surrounding woods. Two rifle com- General Harrison felt that it would
panies of the 3d Battalion, 117th In- be possible to bring in his attached
fantry, working from the north, and the armor and the 3d Battalion, 119th In-
rifle company of the 120th Infantry fantry, from the north, now that the
attached to Task Force Lovelady, enemy flanking position on the high
attacking from the west, found every ground was gone. He set up this attack
move checked by mortars, Werfers, and to precede the final assault from the west.
bullet fire. Finally a rifle company was Patrols, groping their way through the
sent from Stavelot to hit the Germans morning snowstorm, found Stoumont
in the rear. Thereafter the Americans strangely quiet, but Harrison was well
were able to converge on the ridge, but aware that the 119th had been seriously
as day ended pockets of the enemy still weakened and went ahead with plans
remained in the woods. During the day for pounding the town with artillery
other enemy troops had crossed the
Ambléve and for a time isolated one of
Lovelady’s roadblocks north of Trois Engineer Combat Battalion) took part in a fierce
and successful attempt to recapture an American
Ponts. 1 But at no time on the 22d did aid station and evacuate the wounded. After the
platoon leader was killed, these two men inspired
1During the confused ebb and flow of battle on their comrades, led in the fight, and were largely
22 December, Sgt. John Bueno and Cpl. Adam F. responsible for the rescue of the wounded. Both
Burko of the division engineer battalion (105th were awarded the DSC.
ONE T H R E A T SUBSIDES; ANOTHER EMERGES 373

preparatory to the all-out infantry-armor tained through most of the day. A little
push he had ordered for 1300. At noon after noon Task Force McGeorge,
the storm was beginning to break and blocked on the valley road east of La
visibility promised to improve, a neces- Gleize, saw a column of German tanks
sity if the artillery was to give support and infantry move out to the north
by fire so close to the American lines. along the ridge road on the opposite side
At 1320 the guns opened the fifteen- of the valley, the same route McGeorge’s
minute drum fire intended to pave the column had been forced to abandon the
way for the northern assault. Almost at day before. This reconnaissance, for it
once shells began to explode in the seems to have been no more, was driven
American assembly areas, and there off by a few artillery concentrations.
was nothing to do but call off the bar- Later in the day Task Force McGeorge
rage. The 3d Battalion and the tanks made a pass at the block barring the
nevertheless started forward. By 1410 river road in the bend but lost its two
they were at the edge of Stoumont, and lead tanks. Colonel Johnson of the 117th
the 1st Battalion had started in from the Infantry, commanding in this sector, ad-
west. vised General Hobbs that tanks could
N o German fire was received-the oc- not get past the bend and into La Gleize,
cupants of Stoumont were wounded Ger- that foot soldiers would have to do the
mans and Americans left in the houses. job.
Peiper had withdrawn his last forces in T o the south along the Salm River
Stoumont during the night and early line the 1st SS Panzer Division made
morning with the intention of fighting a a number of attempts on 2 2 December
last-ditch action at La Gleize where the to seize a bridge, build a bridge, or in
ground permitted an easier all-round some manner gain a crossing. T h e 505th
defense. La Gleize, be it added, lay closer Parachute Infantry had little trouble in
to the area where the remainder of the wiping out the few small detachments
1st SS Panzer Division had assembled. that actually made it across, but with so
But it seems likely, as Peiper himself much enemy activity apparent on the
later said, that Peiper’s decision to aban- east bank the 505th anticipated momen-
don the western town had been prompt- tarily the launching of a full-scale as-
ed to great degree by the threat, posed sault. Mohnke, it appears, was trying
by the 2d Battalion, 119th Infantry, on to do too much with too little and so
21 December, to the line of communica- dissipated his limited strength that a
tions linking Stoumont and La Gleize. forthright blow was not struck at any
Despite General Hobbs’s insistence that one point during the 22d. T h e strongest
Task Force Harrison push on promptly effort came late in the evening when two
to La Gleize the advance was halted just of his companies tried to seize the bridge
east of the recaptured town. It was now at Grand Halleux; this bridge was blown
late in the day, and patrols had dis- when the leading Germans actually were
covered German tanks operating as rear on the span. On the whole the day had
guard on the road to La Gleize. gone as badly for the 1st SS Panzer
Elsewhere on the northern edge of the Division as for Peiper. It is true that
Peiper pocket the status q u o had ob- few of the American riflemen had had
374 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

German infantry in their sights, but the as rumors ran wild of parachutists
artillery supporting the 30th Division sighted hither and yon.
and 505th by interdiction fire had taken Interrogation of prisoners and artil-
heavy toll in the enemy assembly areas lery observer reports had indicated that
and on the roads, as later attested by the Germans were moving troops into
the Germans themselves. the sector south of Malmédy reviving
Priess, the I SS Panzer Corps com- the earlier American concern that a
mander, had reasoned with the Sixth hard blow might be dealt there at the
Panzer Army staff that Peiper should be 30th Division. As a result General Hobbs
given a chance to break out to the east was able to hold onto all the reinforce-
while his force still was reasonably in- ments which had accumulated to the
tact. The higher German commands, 30th, as well as CCB, 3d Armored Divi-
all the way up to OKW, remained con- sion. The Malmédy threat seems to have
vinced on 2 2 December that despite the been raised by a few troops of the 3 d
growing strength of the Americans on Parachute Division, who had moved west
the north flank the build-up there of Waimes, and by rumors rife in the
would not reach dangerous proportions German camp that the 12th SS Panzer
before their own armored columns had Division (held up by the Sixth Army
reached and crossed the Meuse. Peiper, attempt to seize the Elsenborn ridge)
therefore, had to hold until such time was moving in to support the 1st SS
as reinforcement and resupply could Panzer Division. Actually the 23d passed
once again set his kampfgruppe on the quietly in the Malmédy-Stavelot sector.
way west. Opposite the 505th Parachute Infantry
During the night of 2 2 December the enemy contented himself with spo-
twenty Luftwaffe planes carrying gaso- radic firing across the river. Mohnke, it
line and ammunition flew to the trapped would appear, lacked the strength
force. Probably the pilots had been needed for resumption of the attack to
briefed on the assumption that Peiper free Peiper. At least his corps com-
still held Stoumont, for many of the mander, Priess, asked the II SS Panzer
gasoline containers parachuted into Corps to deflect the 9th SS Panzer Divi-
American hands there. Peiper certainly sion, coming forward on the left, and
was helped little by this minor and mis- throw it in at Stavelot. This request was
taken effort. On this occasion, as it denied.
turned out, the American air-warning Major action on 23 December did
net worked a bit too well. Both the 30th flare up at La Gleize and along the north
Division and the 82d Airborne were bank of the Amblève, where a part of
placed on alert against an airborne at- the 1st SS Panzer Division relief force
tack (although General Hobbs avowed still maintained a foothold. In the latter
that such an attack made little sense in sector six American rifle companies were
this heavily forested and broken coun- assembled to clear out the woods and
try). The numerous antiaircraft artil- restore the cut made by the enemy on
lery batteries backing up the divi- the road between Trois Ponts and Stave-
sions stood to their guns all night long, lot. Regrouping in the heavy woods took
and the infantry were given little sleep nearly all day and was marked by some
ONE THREAT SUBSIDES; ANOTHER EMERGES 375

sharp clashes. At Petit Coo, close by cellars of the town by the incessant shell-
Stavelot, S/Sgt. Paul Bolden and T/Sgt. fire, increasing in the afternoon as the
Russell N . Snoad decided to attack a American attack brought forward ob-
house from which the Germans were servers closer to the target, and made
firing. While his companion fired to even more effective by the new POZIT
cover him, Bolden rushed the door, fuze which the 113th Field Artillery
tossed in a pair of hand grenades, then was using. But wherever and whenever
went in firing his Tommy gun. Bolden the attacking tanks and infantry tried
killed twenty of the enemy, then with- to move along the roads and trails wind-
drew. A blast of fire killed Bolden’s com- ing up the ridge nose to La Gleize,
rade and wounded the sergeant, but he they encountered mine plots swept by
dashed back into the house, killing fif- direct fire from deeply dug in tanks and
teen more of the enemy. (Bolden later antitank guns. Progress then was slow;
received the Medal of Honor and Snoad the leading American tank would be
was awarded the DSC posthumously.) knocked out or burned by a direct hit
As for La Gleize the story once again with armor-piercing ammunition, even-
was one of frustration and failure. Most tually the infantry would work around
of Peiper’s troops were driven to the and destroy or neutralize the German

105-MM. HOWITZERS
M7 OF THE 30TH DIVISION
IN ACTIONnear La Gleize.
376 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

weapon, the engineers would remove it impossible to mop up the bridgehead


the mine field, and the advance would force; General Ridgway for his part.
continue. essaying on the scene the role of the
Harrison decided that a flanking move honest broker. T h e final decision was
through the woods to the north might favorable to Hobbs: General Boudinot,
work and in the afternoon elements of the CCB commander, would start his
the American rifle companies reached trains moving but at least two-thirds of
the edge of La Gleize, only to come the command would be left for the final
under machine gun and 20-mm. fire tough fight envisaged for the coming
from streets and houses. General Har- morning.
rison's main worry was the heavy The net had been drawn tight around
German tanks gathered in the center of Peiper, as tight as it could be drawn in
the town. Would they break out in a this complex of woods and hills. But
desperate counterattack against the on the morning of the 24th most of
lighter and more vulnerable Shermans? the quarry had flown. Late the previous
Would they slip through the net and afternoon Mohnke had radioed Peiper
bludgeon their way to the Amblève? T o permission to break out. Peiper knew
deal with the tanks, Allied planes that he could not take his vehicles or
were promised for a strike at the town his wounded, that the escape would
square. They came as promised but hit have to be made at night and on foot.
Malmédy instead of La Gleize, their Leaving a rear guard to demolish the
bombs burying a number of civilians tanks, trucks, and guns, Peiper and some
in one of the hotel buildings before the eight hundred of his command started
strike could be called off. at 0100 in single file through the woods
Peiper had yet to be driven out of fringing La Gleize on the south, crossed
La Gleize; the 1st SS Panzer Division the river, and as day broke took cover
bridgehead force north of the Ambléve among the densely wooded hills north of
(which had cut off a part of Task Force Trois Ponts. On the night of the 24th
Lovelady) still had to be liquidated. Peiper's force crossed the Salm, briefly
But this fight in the bend of the Ambléve engaging troops of the 82d Airborne
had become anticlimactic, dwarfed by Division in a brisk exchange of fire,
far more important operations elsewhere and on Christmas morning rejoined the
on the northern shoulder of the Arden- 1st SS Panzer Division south of Stavelot.
nes salient. Through the early evening of The 30th Division commander, under
the 23d the telephone wires connecting pressure from corps and army to finish
the headquarters of the First Army, the the job at La Gleize and release Boudi-
XVIII Airborne Corps, and the 30th not's armor, had made no promises that
Division were busy: the First Army in- La Gleize would fall on the 24th but
sisting that Hobbs must release CCB, had urged his unit commanders to get
3d Armored, for immediate return to the attack rolling early and finish off
its hard-pressed division; the 30th Divi- the defenders. T o tired troops who had
sion commander protesting that the loss expected a desperate last stand it must
of the combat command would leave have been gratifying to find the town
La Gleize open on two sides and make open for the taking. They liberated
ONE T H R E A T SUBSIDES: ANOTHER EMERGES 377

about 170 Americans, most of whom had the 120th Infantry (at least thirty-seven
been captured at Stoumont on 19 De- Americans lost their lives on the first
cember. The prisoners they took, nearly day), killed a considerable number of
all wounded, numbered 300. Twenty- civilians, and set the town afire. A mass
eight tanks, 70 half-tracks, and 25 artil- flight started by the population was
lery pieces were found in the town. This halted only with great difficulty. 2
booty, plus the German tanks and guns
destroyed earlier in the operation, ac- T h e 3d Armored Division Is
counted for nearly the entire heavy Checked, 21–23 December
equipment of the 1st SS Panzer Regi-
ment. Although those of Peiper’s troops Still minus two of its combat com-
who had escaped were back in the line mands the 3d Armored Division was pre-
with the reconstituted 1st SS Panzer pared, on the morning of 2 1 December,
Division, that elite unit could no longer to retake Samrée, the communications
be considered an armored division. and supply center on the middle route
In an epilogue to the taking of La of the 3d Armored (-) advance which
Gleize, foot troops of the 117th and had been seized by the enemy the pre-
120th Infantry Regiments began the vious afternoon. (Map V I I ) With this
slow work of beating the woods in the intent General Rose sent a part of his
triangle formed by the Salm and the very small reserve to reinforce the center
Amblève where a part of the 1st SS task force (now Task Force Orr) north
Panzer Division relief force continued of the village of Dochamps. During the
to hold out. In the woods north of La previous night Rose had asked General
Gleize some fifty Germans who apparent- Ridgeway for respite from his main mis-
ly had not received the orders to with- sion, that is, the advance to the Liège-
draw tried to fight it out. All were killed. Bastogne highway and an attempt to
What German strength had seeped into re-establish contact with the VIII Corps,
this appendix at the rivers no one knew. until the situation at Samrée could be
Rumors of twenty-five enemy tanks hid- cleared up. At 0815, however, Rose as-
ing in the road cuts north of Trois Ponts sured Ridgway that the 3d Armored was
had the result of delaying the relief of moving once again to accomplish its
CCB of the 3d Armored Division. That major mission. Less than a half-hour later
some armored vehicles had crossed to German tanks were discovered moving
the north bank of the Amblève by im- toward Hotton, where the rear command
provised bridging seems certain, but 2 T h e unfortunate and costly bombing raids on
most succeeded in escaping to the south, Malmédy were the result of tragic errors. This was
By the 26th the last Germans had been acknowledged by the IX Bombardment Division,
but the Ninth Air Force and General Carl Spaatz
captured, killed, or driven off from the at first refused to do so and referred to the “al-
north bank of the Amblève. T h e satis- leged” errors at Malmédy, a view corrected in
faction which the 30th Division could Craven and Cate (eds.) , Europe: A R G U M E N T to
V–E Day, p. 670. Royce L. Thompson has a quite
take in giving the quietus to Kumpf- complete study of these air strikes in his unpub-
gruppe Peiper was alloyed by untoward lished manuscript entitled Malmédy, Belgium, Mis-
events at Malmédy on the 24th and 25th. taken Bombing, 23 and 25 December 1944 (1952),
in OCMH files. Thompson’s work is based on
On these days American planes bombed official Air Force records.
378 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

post and installations of the 3d Armored along a secondary route parallel to


Division were located. The immediate and between the roads on which Task
result of this threat was to nullify the Force Hogan and Task Force Orr had
reinforcement readied for dispatch from made their advance during the day.
Soy, where the combat reserve held by Just at daybreak members of an Amer-
Colonel Howze was located, to the ican patrol operating out of the Com-
Samrée sector. bat Command Reserve headquarters
General Krueger, the LVIIIPanzer at So): were fired upon. They reported
Corps commander, had reason to con- that they “thought” they had heard
gratulate himself at the close of the German voices. This was the first
40th for the decision to back away from evidence that the enemy had pene-
the Ourthe River line northwest of Bas- trated to the 3d Armored rear. T h e
togne. In turning north his corps had next message from Soy to reach the
crossed the east-west segment of that division command post at Erezée came
river without trouble, had discovered at 0850: “many enemy tanks” had de-
large stocks of gasoline at Samrée, bouched astride the Soy-Hotton road
and had met so little opposition as to and were heading west toward Hotton.
indicate a general retrograde move on Actually the attack at Hotton had al-
the part of the Americans. Krueger de- ready begun.
termined to strike while the iron was The town of Hotton (about ten miles
hot, drive northwest at top speed to northwest of La Roche), is built astride
the bridgehead town of Hotton, recross the main channel of the Ourthe at
the Ourthe River at that point, and con- a point where the valley widens. Here
centrate his corps on the far bank be- a series of roads converge to cross the
fore the Americans could establish a river and proceed on the west bank
blocking line. Thus far Krueger’s ad- to the more important junction center
vance guard had fought only outpost or at Marche from which roads radiate
patrol actions with the 3d Armored in all directions. In the center of Hot-
Division and there was little reason, as ton the river was spanned at this time
Krueger saw it, to anticipate much re- by a class 70 two-way wooden bridge.
sistance during the next twenty-four In the buildings east of the river were
hours. He did know, from radio mes- installed about two hundred men from
sages intercepted by OB WEST, that the service detachments of the division
one combat command of the 3d Armored and CCR headquarters. There were, in
Division had moved into the Wer- addition, one light and one medium
bomont area on 19 December. tank. On the west bank at the bridge
After the seizure of Samrée, Krueger exit a platoon of the 51st Engineer
dispatched an armored task force Battalion (Capt. Preston C. Hodges)
(Kampfgruppe Buyer) from the 116th was deployed, reinforced by two 40-mm.
Panzer Division to gain control of the antitank guns, a 37-mm. antitank gun,
road between Soy and Hotton prelimi- and a Sherman tank. A squad of engi-
nary to seizure of the latter bridgehead neers guarded a footbridge at Hamp-
town. During the night of 20 Decem- teau, two thousand yards south of the
ber this task force marched northwest town.
ONE T H R E A T SUBSIDES: ANOTHER EMERGES 379

At dawn mortar and small arms fire east of Hotton against the counterat-
suddenly gave notice of the enemy. De- tack which Colonel Howze had launched
spite casualties and confusion a defense along the Soy road. About this time
was hastily set up by the executive Howze was able to get a small group
officer of the 23d Armored Engineer of tanks and infantry around to the
Battalion (Maj. Jack W. Fickessen) , en- north of the attackers and into Hotton,
gineer trucks were driven out to block redressing the balance somewhat. As yet
the roads, and bazookas and machine it was impossible to bring any friendly
guns were distributed for a close-in de- artillery to bear, and the foot troops
fense of the town. Taking advantage of continued to rely largely on their own
the woods that came right up to the weapons for the rest of the day.
eastern edge of Hotton, four or five en- General Rose, as already indicated,
emy tanks rumbled forward to lead the had at his immediate disposal a very
assault. T h e two American tanks east of limited reserve. Although he had or-
the river were knocked out at once; but dered Howze to counterattack with the
on the opposite bank a 90-mm. tank entire force of the Combat Command
destroyer “appeared from nowhere,” got Reserve it became apparent as day
a direct hit on a Panther and perhaps wore on that this would be insufficient.
a second German as well. T h e enemy T h e ground over which the counterat-
infantry were able to take about half tack from Soy had to move gave every
the buildings on the near bank but were advantage to the Germans. Maneuver
checked short of the bridge by the rifles, was restricted by the cuts through
bazookas, and machine guns in the which ran the Hotton road, by a stream
hands of men on both banks of the riv- bordering the road on the south, and
er. (A “hailstorm of fire,” say the Ger- by the German position atop the nose
mans.) T h e engineer squad guarding of the hill between the two towns which
the footbridge south of Hotton was over- gave observation and fire over the bar-
run, apparently by Germans wearing ren ground to the north. Since Gener-
American uniforms, but fortunately this al Rose had been promised the use of
bridge could bear no vehicles. a battalion from the 5 17th Parachute
By the middle of the morning the de- Infantry, he decided to hold up the drive
fenders, now recovered from their in- from Soy until it arrived. Also it ap-
itial surprise, were holding their own peared that the defenders of Hotton
and the vehicles in the town were evac- would shortly be reinforced by part of
uated to the north along with most of the leading R C T of the 84th Infantry
the medical personnel and ambulances. Division, moving via Marche under
Two or three more German tanks were orders from Ridgway to secure the
destroyed by bazookas (one was even Ourthe River line south of Hotton.
chalked up to the account of the 37- This help was slow in coming. As
mm. antitank gun). For some reason early as 0900 the 51st Engineer Battal-
the enemy had not thrown all of his ion commander had asked the 84th to
tanks into the battle at once, a fortu- send aid to Hotton but the staff of the
nate circumstance. By 1400 the tanks latter seem to have taken rather skeptical-
still in town joined those on the hill ly reports of the enemy strength in-
380 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

volved. Two platoons finally arrived in became apparent during the morning
Hotton late in the afternoon but by this of 2 1 December, forced Krueger to face
time the German infantry were leaving much of the strength of the two regi-
the town and loading into their half- ments to the east and northeast so as
tracks as if the fight were over. Through to form a protected corridor for the
the night American mortars in Hotton drive into Hotton.
laid down a defensive barrage of illumi- Through this corridor the 156th Pan-
nating shell and high explosives, but the zer Grenadier Regiment, which had
enemy made no move to return to the been in reserve south of Samrée, moved
assault. late in the afternoon to an assembly area
T h e commander of the 116th Panzer around Beffe. At the base of the corri-
Division, as well as General Manteuf- dor, that is, around Dochamps, the
fel, would later pay tribute to “the brav- 1128th Regiment of the 560th Volks
ery of the American engineers” at Grenadier Division made an attack to
Hotton. They had reason for this ac- widen the path northwest to the Ourthe
knowledgment (in which they could crossing. Early in the day the grenadiers
have included signal and service troops, collided with Task Force Orr while the
unknown gun and tank crews) because latter was trying to eradicate the road-
the failure to secure the Hotton bridge block which barred the road up to
was decisive in the future history of the Dochamps and Samrée. In a sharp action
L V I I I Panzer Corps. Credit must al- at a hairpin turn in the road at the base
so go to the Combat Command Reserve of the Dochamps hill the German in-
at Soy whose fire, as the enemy acknowl- fantry infiltrated close enough to ba-
edged, caught Kampfgruppe Buyer in zooka three tanks but themselves took a
the flank and checkmated its single- beating from the American artillery.
minded employment against Hotton. Twice during the day Orr had to order
Finally, a share in the successful defense a withdrawal, the last bringing the task
of the Hotton bridge should be assigned force to Amonines, three miles south-
those elements of the three 3d Armored east of Soy. Here on a slight rise over-
task forces which, on the 21st, had en- looking the Aisne valley road Orr’s
gaged the bulk of the 116th Panzer Divi- column formed a perimeter defense for
sion and 560th Volks Grenadier Divi- the night.
sion and prevented a wholesale advance Task Force Hogan, checked the pre-
into the Hotton sector. vious day in the winding Ourthe val-
Krueger’s original intention had been ley southeast of La Roche, came under
to risk a. thrust for the Hotton bridge attack early on the 21st by small enemy
without regard to flank security. The groups striking out from the roadblock.
armored task force moving on Hotton T h e L V I I I Panzer Corps commander
accordingly contained most of the for- had no intention of taking La Roche
ward combat elements of the 116th Pan- unless it could be occupied without a
zer Regiment and 60th Panzer Grena- fight and had committed only a frac-
dier Regiment. But the presence of tion of the 60th Panzer Grenadier Regi-
American armor and infantry in the ment to throw out a screen here. Later
area between Soy and Dochamps, as this in the day part of the Reconnaissance
ONE T H R E A T SUBSIDES: ANOTHER EMERGES 381

Battalion, 116th Panzer Division, arrived ceived orders during the afternoon to
from Houffalize and started running move on Dochamps as part of a pro-
combat patrols through the woods in jected concentric maneuver to retake
front of La Roche. Hogan, under orders Samrée and did advance about a mile
to hold up his own advance until Orr south of Grandménil before darkness
could take Samrée, finally received a closed in.
change in orders about 1300 which The 3d Armored Division had met a
directed his task force to fall back on superior force on the 21st, had failed
Amonines. It was crystal clear by this to retake Samrée, had been forced to
hour that there could be no advance to use its reserves in a fight to reopen the
Samrée. Hogan’s column moved north, road to Hotton, and had seen its west-
skirmishing with small German forces ern and center task forces pushed back.
along the way, but at twilight ran into But there were some reasons to expect
machine gun fire and lost its lead tank an improvement in what had been a
to a German bazooka just at the edge of deteriorating situation. The Hotton
the hamlet of Beffe. Without realizing bridge had been held and there was
the fact, the Americans had hit the as- word that the 84th Infantry Division
sembly area of the 156th Panzer Grena- would lend a hand. T h e 3d Armored
dier Regiment. There was nothing for Division was going to get back its own
it at this time of day but to pull away. CCA, although under a corps prohibi-
Task Force Hogan retired to the south tion against using it save in dire cir-
and bivouacked on a hill near Marcou- cumstances, and during the. night of 2 1
ray. Although their plight was not im- December CCA did close north of Man-
mediately apparent, Hogan and his 400 hay. At least a battalion of the 517th
men had been cut off from the rest of Parachute Infantry was on its way to
the 3d Armored Division. reinforce the Combat Command Re-
The eastern column, Task Force serve at Soy. T h e eastern flank had
Kane, alone of the 3d Armored forces been more or less secured by contact
passed the morning of the 21st without made between Task Force Kane and the
enemy contact. As planned, Kane sent 82d Airborne Division during the day.
a detachment south to the important All this was heartening, but there re-
crossroads at Baraque de Fraiture, on mained the worry as to what the full
the Vielsalm-Samrée route, to reinforce enemy strength and intentions might be.
the mixed group of Americans already Operations maps posted on the night
there and to take part in the final attack of the 21st in the bunkers housing the
on Samrée. This detachment reached the Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab showed the
crossroads in the middle of the afternoon L V I I I Panzer Corps as the most ad-
and there met the 7th Armored Division vanced unit of all the German forces
cavalry which had come in from Viel- driving west, with its 116th Panzer Divi-
salm the previous evening. Caught up sion at Hotton, only twenty air-line miles
in the fight already started at the cross- from the Meuse River. But the fight at
roads, the tanks and armored cars were Hotton, despite what the operations
unable to proceed to Samrée. The re- map might show, had convinced the
maining troops of Task Force Kane re- L VIII Panzer Corps commander that,
382 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

instead of finding a quick and easy way would indicate. He records that his com-
to cross the Ourthe by his shift to the mand had suffered very heavy casualties
northwest, he stood an excellent chance during the fighting of the 21st, that troop
of running his corps into a cul-de-sac. morale was flagging, that fatigue was be-
Unwilling to continue down what might ginning to tell, and that, for the first
turn into a blind alley, if the Americans time, the advance had begun to decel-
continued to defend Hotton as stanchly erate.
as they had during the day, General While Krueger laid plans for shift-
Krueger revised his plans. His southern ing the L V I I I Panzer Corps armor to
neighbor, Lauchert’s 2d Panzer Divi- the west bank of the Ourthe, his oppo-
sion, was reported to have seized a nent, General Ridgway, was issuing or-
bridge across the western arm of ders designed to strengthen and extend
the Ourthe and might be expected to the XVIII Airborne Corps right wing
move so rapidly into the Marche sector, west of the Ourthe. At dawn of the 22d,
on the west side of the main channel, CCA of the 3d Armored Division had
that the American barrier line which just completed its move to rejoin Gen-
Krueger had feared at the Ourthe could eral Rose when the corps commander
not be placed in operation. Krueger, ordered Rose to throw out a screen on
therefore, ordered the 116th Panzer the west bank between La Roche and
Division to disengage on the Soy-Hotton St. Hubert as cover for the American
road, pull back as rapidly as possible to concentration in process around Marche.
the south, and cross the Ourthe at La By noon a task force from CCA
Roche. This town had been abandoned was en route to carry out this mission.
by the Americans during the afternoon Of the reinforcement that General Rose
when the 7th Armored Division trains, had counted on only one tank battalion
threatened with encirclement, crossed and one company of armored infantry
the river and moved to Marche, leaving were left. T h e 3d Armored Division
only some pickets to guard the road- would have to continue the battle to
blocks at the various bridges. establish a holding position with forces
Krueger intended to use the 560th hardly stronger than those which had
Volks Grenadier Division to continue been driven back on the 21st. T h e
the attack northwest, aiming for the final orders for the day were “counter-
Ourthe crossings at Han north of Hot- attack”: first, to drive the enemy out
ton. At twilight the leading elements of of the Soy-Hotton sector, second, to re-
the 2d SS Panzer Division were in posi- take the hill mass at Dochamps-Sam-
tion on the right flank of the 560th. rée in the center of the division zone.
This fresh division, when assembled, was The job of dealing with German pene-
to pass to the L V I I I Panzer Corps and tration between the Ourthe and the
could be used to cover the exposed east- Aisne Rivers fell to CCR (and Task
ern flank-a source of continuous con- Force Hogan). For this Colonel Howze
cern to the corps commander. General would get the battalion from the 517th
Krueger, an experienced and intelligent Parachute Infantry as soon as it arrived.
officer, may not have been as hopeful of Those troops of CCA still in the
success as his plans for 2 2 December division commander’s hand (Task Force
ONE T H R E A T SUBSIDES; ANOTHER EMERGES 383

Richardson) would serve as backstop be- valley reported more German troops
hind the two remaining task forces, Orr moving northwest. This looked like a
and Kane, which were charged with the trap of some sort and Orr withdrew his
capture of Dochamps. column to the starting point on the crest
Task Force Orr was at the vortex at Amonines, where he was reinforced
of the action on the 2 2 d , standing as by infantry and tank destroyers. T h e
it did in the path of the main move- 1128th did not follow in force (Task
ment by the 560th Volks Grenadier Force Kane still threatened from the
Division. T h e 116th Panzer Division, on east) but was content to fire smoke shells
the German left, would have to dis- onto the American position and probe
engage its forward units during the with patrols. T h e troops in field gray
coming night, and in order to effect seen moving west of the valley were the
the relief the 560th had to be brought 1129th Regiment en route to Beffe to re-
forward. This German advance, be- lieve the 116th Panzer Division. They
gun by two regiments abreast, started paid no attention to Task Force Orr.
at daylight, its object the command of Task Force Kane, easternmost of the
the Erezée-Soy-Hotton road. Meanwhile 3d Armored detachments, obviously
Colonel Orr led his counterattack force was playing an important part in de-
out of Amonines, heading down the laying the German advance toward Amo-
Aisne valley road for Dochamps. One nines. T h e attack toward Dochamps,
company of armored infantry had been started the previous afternoon and re-
left to defend the base at Amonines. sumed on the 22d, was hampered by
The detachment with Orr consisted of the necessity of keeping a blocking force
a company of armored infantry plus at the Manhay junction and reinforcing
three medium and three light tanks. the scratch defense farther south at the
About 0900 the small American col- Baraque de Fraiture crossroads. De-
umn saw an enemy column coming up spite the fact that Task Force Kane was
the road from Dochamps, and each fighting with its left arm tied down,
halted to size up the other. Task Force by noon the drive toward Dochamps
Orr’s opponent was the 1128th Regiment reached the village of Lamormenil. Dur-
which, though reduced to a combat ing these morning hours the American
strength of seven hundred, was the tanks proved too much for the German
strongest unit in the 560th Volks Gren- infantry; it is probable that an entire
adier Division. As it happened a part battalion of the 1128th was engaged and
of the German force had been pinned siphoned away from the attack against
down by an attack against flank and Orr.
rear thrown in by Task Force Kane, T h e terrain beyond Lamormenil,
but this intelligence was unknown to however, was distinctly adverse to ar-
Orr. The German commander disen- mored tactics. A single road wound
gaged from Kane, put in his engineer southward through a narrow semi-
battalion to hold Dochamps, then moved wooded valley until, about eight hun-
to the ridge east of the valley road and dred yards east of Dochamps, it climbed
began the fire fight. Shortly after noon abruptly up the east face of a bare
Orr’s scouts on the ridge west of the hill to reach the village. As soon as
384 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Kane’s tanks reached the foot of the rushed into action with his tanks half
hill German antitank guns started to full, was running out of gasoline. In
work. Maneuver on the soft earth flank- early afternoon his column retired to
ing the road promised that the tanks Marcouray and sent out requests for
would bog down; attack straight along fuel, surgical supplies, and reinforce-
the road was suicidal. After futile at- ments. All this while the enemy knew
tempts at counterbattery against the Hogan’s exact whereabouts but paid
enemy gunners the tanks withdrew to him scant attention. When the 116th
the north. Kane’s column had been Panzer Division moved out on the
short of infantry, and Dochamps pre- night of 22 December, the com-
sented a problem to which the answer mander of the 560th detailed some of
was infantry. his engineers to watch Hogan’s laager.
Just after dark there appeared in the The armored German kampfgruppe
American bivouac six trucks carrying astride the road between Soy and Hot-
two officers and eighty men belong- ton was content to remain on the defen-
ing to the 1st Battalion, 517th Para- sive pending its withdrawal southward,
chute Infantry. Lost from its convoy the but the German tanks and antitank guns
detachment had been passed around ruled as “King of the Rock” on the
from headquarters to headquarters, crest overwatching the road. Grooved
finally ending up with Kane. T h e para- by the road, the first American attack
troopers were handed the job of taking from Soy toward Hotton slammed
Dochamps, this time by an attack from straight into direct fire and lost six
the north guiding on a narrow-gauge medium and two light tanks. Cross-
railway which approached the village. country maneuver by infantry was indi-
Twice the detachment moved forward, cated. Long awaited, the 1st Battalion
only to meet machine gun fire from of the 517th Parachute Infantry and
front and flank. T h e second try ended a company from the 643d Tank De-
when the Germans counterattacked stroyer Battalion arrived in Soy at twi-
from a hill northwest of the village. light. Howze had expected to use the
More than a handful of infantry would paratroopers in a daylight attack to re-
be required if the 3d Armored Divi- open the Hotton road, but the division
sion was to regain control of the commander demanded an immediate
Dochamps-Samrée heights. commitment. Thrown into assault over
T h e story of Task Force Hogan on strange ground, only half an hour
the 22d is quickly told. Cut off at Mar- after crawling out of their trucks, the
couray, Hogan received radio orders to paratroopers made little headway against
try once more to break out northeast six German self-propelled guns and
through Beffe. Little aid could be spared clusters of machine gun nests. By 2000
by the Americans in the north, but the attack west from Soy was stopped
a small task force from CCA was or- dead still.
ganized to drive toward Hogan. There An alarm from Hotton, suddenly as-
proved to be simply too many Germans sailed after a day of quiet, forced a
between Beffe and the Soy-Hotton road. second try. This time Howze ordered
In any case, Hogan, who had been two of the paratroop platoons, tank-sup-
ONE T H R E A T SUBSIDES; ANOTHER EMERGES 385

ported, to circle around and into Hot- along the Salmchâteau-La Roche road
ton from the north, intending a squeeze as a breakwater against the anticipated
play by attack in the dark from both German surge to the north. From the
Soy and Hotton. But neither claw was head of the enemy salient, between Soy
able to grip the enemy holding the and Hotton, to the Salmchâteau-La
core high ground. So the night ended. Roche road was a distance of eleven
During its course the 560th Volks Gren- miles. Attempts to get this counterat-
adier Division had made a smooth tack moving in the night battles near
and unperceived relief of the 116th Hotton and Dochamps had failed.
Panzer Division. At dawn the grena- Strength to do the job had increased
diers held an irregular front reaching somewhat but far from enough to guar-
from the Ourthe River east to the Ba- antee success. With the main force of
raque de Fraiture crossroads athwart CCA west of the Ourthe and CCB still
the Liège-Bastogne highway. This sec- mopping up in Kumpfgruppe Peiper's
tor from river to highway now formed stronghold, General Rose had available
the center of the LVIII Panzer Corps three tank battalions and four armored
with the 2d SS Panzer Division moving infantry companies of his own divi-
in on the east and the 116th Panzer sion. Newly arrived reinforcements had
Division circling to form the western swelled the rifle contingent by two bat-
wing beyond the Ourthe. talions, the 1st Battalion of the 517th
Events of the 22d had shown a move- Parachute Infantry and the 509th Para-
ment of large German forces to the chute Infantry Battalion. Total artillery
west, consequent to the fall of St. Vith, support consisted of the 105-mm. self-
and brought the threat–epitomized propelled howitzers belonging to the
by the appearance of the 2d SS Panzer 54th and 83d Armored Field Artillery
Division–of a large-scale build-up for Battalions, plus three self-propelled 155-
an attack to push through the XVIII mm. guns from the 991st Field Artil-
Airborne Corps in a climactic, dramat- lery Battalion–any unbalance of force
ic bid for Spa and Liège. The orders is- favorable to the Germans hardly would
sued by General Ridgway on the night be redressed by the weight of Ameri-
of 22 December, it will be remem- can gun metal. In conference on the
bered, were a detailed expression of the morning of the 23d the commanders of
larger Allied plan to halt and then the XVIII Airborne and VII Corps
amputate the German forces swelling agreed that Rose needed more troops.
the western end of the salient, orders But the one battalion of the 75th In-
to hold the line or win more favorable fantry Division assigned could not reach
positions while the VII Corps assembled the scene for some hours.
on the right flank and a counterattack T h e story of the 23d is one of local
to regain St. Vith formed on the left. counterattacks to hold or restore exist-
Between the Ourthe River and the ing positions against an enemy who re-
Liège-Bastogne road the single combat tained the initiative and maintained
command of the 3d Armored Division, the momentum of the attack rolling
now reinforced, had the mission on northward. T h e critical point would be
the 23d of building a forward line the Baraque de Fraiture crossroads at
386 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

the boundary between the 3d Armored the valley route again, but this time
Division and the 82d Airborne Division, farther north and from the opposite
a point marking the thrust line along side. Five light tanks and a squad of
which the 2d SS Panzer Division intend- riflemen posted at Odeigne were set
ed to proceed north. T h e action at this upon by enemy infantry who lighted
road junction, “Parker’s Crossroads,” their targets by flares and moved in
requires independent treatment. It has with self-propelled 40-mm. guns to
bearing at this point because the small make the kill. T h e Americans held
combat reserve available to the 3d Ar- their ground until nearly surrounded,
mored Division would be drained away then-when so ordered-withdrew. This
here and because American operations foray came from the Baraque de
set in train to east and west would Fraiture crossroads sector, where the 2d
be conditioned by the shaky character SS Panzer Division finally had broken
of the 3d Armored left flank. through, and was made by elements of
In front of Dochamps Task Force the 3d Panzer Grenadier Regiment
Kane resumed the attack broken off in moving with much difficulty along the
the early morning. German mortars lob- narrow forest trails south of Odeigne.
bing down 81-mm. and 120-mm. shells Now Task Force Kane would have to
stopped the infantry on the slopes, and battle to hold its narrow corridor
direct fire knocked out an entire platoon against an enemy closing in from both
of Sherman tanks when they tried to as- flanks and circling to the rear.
cend the hill road. T h e plain fact was In the center sector, at Amonines,
that Kane lacked the men, tanks, and Task Force Orr waited for CCR to wipe
guns to take Dochamps. But this was out the enemy between Soy and Hot-
not all. During the day a part of the ton, then turn south in an attack with
task force had to be diverted to man the two forces abreast. With the ex-
roadblocks along the valley north to ception of the maneuver to clear the
Grandmenil which was both Kane’s Americans out of the territory north
flank and line of communications. In of Dochamps described earlier, the
the afternoon the 1130th Regiment 560th Volks Grenadier Division was
(possibly reduced to battalion strength) in no hurry to attack those American
and an assault gun platoon moved in positions where the defenders seemed
from the west to cut the Dochamps- willing and able to put up a stiff fight.
Grandmenil road. Fighting at Frey- After all, the German corps commander
neux and Lamorménil was touch and had promised the support of fresh as-
go, but the enemy suffered badly and sault troops. Therefore, although the
failed to gain the road. This maneuver Germans pressed in around Amonines
from the west had been given top pri- they made no move to tackle Task
ority by the 560th Volks Grenadier Di- Force Orr.
vision. whose command was as anxious The vise created the night before to
to erase the Dochamps salient as Gen- close on the German hill positions
eral Rose was to pinch out the Hotton astride the Soy-Hotton road compressed
bulge. very slowly on the 23d, nor did the jaws
Sometime after dark the Germans hit meet. Radio communication between the
ONE T H R E A T SUBSIDES; ANOTHER EMERGES 387

two American assault forces failed to 486th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion.


function in the morning, the Hotton Hogan had accompanied his radio re-
group was forced to spend much of the port of the German surrender demand
day mopping up the enemy who had with a request for “maximum support.”
seeped into the village during the night CCR was having its hands more than full
battle, and both the eastern and western in its own backyard on the 23d, and the
groups–when the attack finally started Germans obviously could not be left to
moving–were too weak to make head- one side while a relief party went to aid
way against German tanks and antitank Hogan. The immediate question then
guns firing from hull defilade on the was how to supply the task force and keep
high ground. Four tanks from the Soy it in being until the tactical situation
force were knocked out in five minutes; improved. T h e 54th Armored Field Ar-
there was little point in courting such tillery Battalion was near enough to
losses and in any case there was only a Marcouray for an attempt to shoot med-
single tank still operating so the battle ical supplies into Hogan’s lines. The
was left to the infantry. gunners loaded howitzer shells with med-
Lacking the numbers needed to envel- ical packets, using the same technique
ope the German position, the infantry as with propaganda leaflets, but the
turned to a fire fight that lasted well into supplies were so damaged on impact as to
the night. Pfc. Melvin Biddle, a para- be worthless. Resupply by airdrop went
trooper, tried to carry the fight to the awry.3
enemy by advancing in front of his own T h e position of the 3d Armored Divi-
troops to throw grenades and pick off the sion was measurably more difficult by the
enemy infantry with his rifle. (Later he end of the 23d. As in the days just past
was awarded the Medal of Honor.) But General Rose had the promise of some
there was no apparent diminution in the addition to his command, but thus far
enemy firepower and toward dawn the piecemeal reinforcement had failed to
fight dwindled away. T h e rifle battalion keep pace with growing enemy strength,
promised from the 75th Infantry Divi- much less create a balance. Late in the
sion had not arrived. afternoon the 3d Armored Division was
Task Force Hogan, out of gasoline and assigned to the VII Corps, which had
immobile in its ridge road laager at assumed the conduct of operations west
Marcouray, was not hard pressed by the of the Ourthe. Tactically the transfer
encircling German pickets. Enemy par- made no marked change. Rose’s com-
lementaires appeared during the after- mand east of the Ourthe remained tied
noon with a demand for immediate to the 82d Airborne Division and the
surrender but were politely told that if XVIII Airborne Corps, sharing the same
they wanted Marcouray they could come terrain compartment and facing the
and take it. T o underline the isolation same major enemy maneuver. General
of the American force, a detachment of Collins, the VII Corps commander,
enemy infantry started an assault; this
promptly was blasted by slugs pouring 3 A very complete and instructive analysis of
the failure to resupply Task Force Hogan by air
from the multiple .50-caliber machine is in Thompson’s MS, Air Supply to Isolated
guns carried by a half-track section of the Units, pp. 34–63.
388 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

managed to provide some assistance to held, had been held. Could the 3d Ar-
the 3d Armored, during the night at- mored Division and the troops forming
taching the 290th Infantry of the 75th the western wing of the 82d Airborne
Division and the 188th Field Artillery Division throw back the fresh 2d SS Pan-
Battalion, whose 155-mm. howitzers zer Division, which had already punched
would provide a weight and range sadly a deep hole at the interdivision bound-
deficient in the artillery supporting ary, and hold other German forces be-
Rose. lieved to be moving into the battle zone?
Even so, the coming day promised to
be grim. All plans for counterattack to T h e Fight at the Baraque de Fraiture
regain the La Roche–Salmchâteau line Crossroads, 23 December
were dismissed. T h e critical hour was at
hand. General Rose told the CCR com- Baraque de Fraiture is a handful of
mander, “Impress on every individual buildings at a crossroads south of the
that we must stay right here or there will Belgian hamlet of Fraiture. There are
be a war to be fought all over again, many such crossroads in the Belgian
and we won’t be here to fight it.” The Ardennes, but this crossing of ways
560th Volks Grenadier Division could be stands on one of the highest summits of

BARAQUEDE FRAITURE
ONE T H R E A T SUBSIDES; ANOTHER EMERGES 389

the Ardennes, a small shelf or tableland 105-mm. howitzers of the ill-starred


at an elevation of 652 meters (2,139 589th Field Artillery Battalion on the
feet). T h e roads which here intersect crossroads. T h e rest of the battalion had
are important: N15, the north-south been cut off on the Schnee Eifel or am-
road, is the through paved highway link- bushed during the withdrawal to St.
ing Liège and Bastogne; N28, the east- Vith. Parker’s mission was to establish
west road, is classed as secondary but is one of the roadblocks that the 106th
the most direct route for movement Division was preparing behind St. Vith.
along the northern side of the Ourthe T h e next day, four half-tracks mounting
River, connecting, for example, St. Vith multiple .50-caliber machine guns ar-
with La Roche. T h e crossroads and the rived from the 203d Antiaircraft Artil-
few buildings are on cleared ground, but lery Battalion, now moving in with the
heavy woods form a crescent to the north 7th Armored Division to establish the
and west, and a fringe of timber points defensive lines around St. Vith. That
at the junction from the southeast. In the night, for the first time, vehicles were
main the area to south and east is com- heard moving about to the south along
pletely barren. Here the ground de- the road to Houffalize. (They probably
scends, forming a glacis for the firing belonged to the 560th Volks Grenadier
parapet around the crossroads. Division, which that afternoon had taken
T h e tactical stature of the Baraque de part in the capture of Samrée.) Before
Fraiture intersection was only partially dawn an 80-man enemy patrol came up
derived from the configuration of roads the road from Houffalize, stumbled onto
and terrain. T h e manner in which the the American half-tracks, and was cut to
XVIII Airborne Corps had deployed its pieces by streams of bullet fire. T h e dead
units in the initial attempt to draw a and prisoners were grenadiers from the
cordon along the northwest flank of the 560th, but among them was an officer
German advance was equally important. from the 2d SS Panzer Division, scouting
The mission assigned the three recon- out the route of advance for his incoming
naissance forces of the 3d Armored Divi- division. In the afternoon D Troop of
sion had been to close up to the Liège- the 87th Cavalry Squadron, earlier
Bastogne highway (with the crossroads dispatched by the 7th Armored to
as an objective), but it had not been aid Task Force Orr in the projected
carried out. East of the same highway the counterattack at Samrée, came in to join
82d Airborne had deployed, but with its the crossroads garrison. T h e troop leader
weight and axis of advance away from the had gone to Dochamps to meet Orr but,
crossroads. Circumstance, notably the finding Germans in the town, disposed
direction of the German attacks from 2 0 his men and vehicles under orders from
December onward, left the Baraque de General Hasbrouck that the crossroads
Fraiture crossroads, and with it the inner must be held.
flanks of the two divisions, to be de- Fog settling over the tableland in late
fended on a strictly catch-as-catch-can afternoon gave the enemy a chance to
basis. probe the defense erected at the cross-
On the afternoon of 19 December roads, but these jabs were no more than
Maj. Arthur C. Parker III, led three a warning of things to come. Meanwhile
390 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

eleven tanks and a reconnaissance pla- this area as the 560th Volks Grenadier
toon arrived from Task Force Kane. T h e Division advanced northwest, from time
Americans spent the night of 21 Decem- to time interrupted movement in and
ber ringed around the crossroads, tanks out of the crossroads position. That was
alternating with armored cars in a stock- all. During the day the 3d Armored had
ade beyond which lay the rifle line. received some reinforcements; these were
There was no sign of the enemy despite parceled out across the front with a pla-
reports from all sorts of sources that Ger- toon from the 643d Tank Destroyer Bat-
man armor was gathering at Houffalize. talion going to the crossroads. En route
Messengers coming in from the head- south from Manhay on the night of the
quarters of the 3d Armored and 82d Air- 22d the tank destroyer detachment lost
borne Divisions brought the same its way and halted some distance north
message, “Hold as long as you can.” of the crossroads. German infantry sur-
General Gavin was especially con- prised and captured the platoon in the
cerned by the threat to the 82d flank early morning. Already the 2d SS Pan-
developing at the crossroads and went to zer Division was moving to cut off and
talk the matter over with Rose at his erase the crossroads garrison. Attack was
command post in Manhay. T h e 3d Ar- near at hand, a fact made clear when an
mored commander assured Gavin that officer patrol from the 2d SS was cap-
his troops would continue to cover the tured at dawn in the woods near the
western wing of the 82d Airborne. Gavin American foxholes.
nevertheless acted at once to send the 2d At daylight, shelling increased at the
Battalion, 325th Glider Infantry, from crossroads as German mortar and gun
his division reserve to defend Fraiture, crews went into position; yet the long
the latter on a ridge three-quarters of a awaited assault hung fire. T h e reason
mile northeast of Parker’s crossroads was lack of fuel. T h e 2d SS Panzer Divi-
position. In addition, having made a per- sion had only enough gasoline to move
sonal reconnaissance of the area, Gavin its Reconnaissance Battalion on the 2 1st
told Col. Charles Billingslea, the regi- and this had been committed near Viel-
mental commander, to dispatch a com- salm. All through the 22d the division
pany of the glider infantry to reinforce waited in its final assembly areas. To-
the crossroads defenders. The 2d Battal- ward evening enough fuel arrived to set
ion reached Fraiture before dawn on the the 4th Panzer Grenadier Regiment,
22d, and Capt. Junior R. Woodruff led some tanks, and an artillery battalion to
F Company into the circle around the moving. In the course of the night the
crossroads just before noon. This slight grenadiers relieved the small reconnais-
reinforcement was negated when Kane sance detachments of the 560th, which
took away his tanks to stiffen the attack had been watching the crossroads, and
going on in front of Dochamps. filed through the woods to set u p a cor-
The day of 22 December was spent in don west and north of Baraque de
waiting. The 2d SS Panzer Division was Fraiture. T h e commander of the 4th
having ‘fuel troubles and moving in fits Panzer Grenadier had placed his 2d
and starts. Mortar fire, laid on by the Battalion on the right of the main north-
German reconnaissance screen left in south highway, while his 3d Battalion
ONE THREAT SUBSIDES; ANOTHER EMERGES 391

deployed around and to the rear of the snow the line of defense was clearly vis-
crossroads. In the dark hours before ible to the panzers, and the Shermans
dawn of the 23d the first move came, had no maneuver room in which to back
as the 2d Battalion made a surprise at- up the line. T h e fight was brief, moving
tack on Fraiture and was driven back to a foregone conclusion. At 1700 the
after a bitter fight with the para- commander of F Company asked Bill-
troopers. 4 ingslea for permission to withdraw; but
The surprise attack at Fraiture having Gavin’s order still was “hold at all
aborted, the Germans settled down to costs.” Within the next hour the Ger-
hem in and soften up the crossroads de- mans completed the reduction of the
fense. Radios that had been taken from crossroads defense, sweeping u p prison-
captured American vehicles were used ers, armored cars, half-tracks, and the
to jam the wave band on which the three howitzers. Three American tanks
American forward observers were calling managed to escape under the veil of half-
for fire, Whenever word flashed over the light. Earlier they had succeeded in
air that shells were on their way, enemy spotting some panzers, who were firing
mortar crews dumped shells on Amer- flares, and knocked them out. A number
ican observation posts–easily discernible of men escaped north through the woods;
in the limited perimeter–making sens- some got a break when a herd of cattle
ing virtually impossible. Late in the stampeded near the crossroads, providing
morning Lt. Col. Walter B. Richardson, a momentary screen. Company F of the
who had a small force backing up Kane 325th Glider Infantry suffered the most
and Orr, sent more infantry and a pla- but stood its ground until Billingslea
toon of tanks toward the crossroads. By gave permission to come out. Ultimately
this time the German grenadiers occu- forty-four of the original one hundred
pied the woods to the north in sufficient sixteen who had gone to the crossroads
strength to halt the foot soldiers. T h e returned to their own lines. Drastically
American tanks, impervious to small outnumbered and unable to compensate
arms fire, reached the perimeter at about for weakness by maneuver, the defenders
1300, whereupon the rifle line pushed of the Baraque de Fraiture crossroads
out to east and south to give the tankers had succumbed, like so many small forces
a chance to maneuver. at other crossroads in the Ardennes.
But at the crossroads time was running T h e dent made here at the boundary
out. Shortly after 1600 the German ar- between the 3d Armored and the 82d
tillery really got to work, for twenty Airborne Divisions could all too quickly
minutes pummeling the area around the develop into a ragged tear, parting the
crossroads. Then, preceded by two pan- two and unraveling their inner flanks.
zer companies (perhaps the final assault The next intersection on the Liège road,
had waited upon their appearance), the at Manhay, was only four miles to the
entire rifle strength of the 4th Panzer north. From Manhay the lateral road be-
Grenadier Regiment closed upon the tween Trois Ponts and Hotton would
Americans. Outlined against new-fallen place the Germans on the deep flank and
4 The main actions of the 2d SS Panzer in this rear of both divisions. Generals Rose and
sector are developed as a part of Chapter XXIII. Gavin reacted to this threat at once; so
392 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

did General Ridgway. Order followed Baraque de Fraiture crossroads had been
order, but there remained a paucity of lost and CCB was to join the defense al-
means to implement the orders. The def- ready forming on the road to Manhay.
icit in reserves was somewhat remedied As darkness settled and the enemy re-
by the troops of the 106th Division and formed to continue the attack beyond
the 7th Armored who, all day long, had the crossroads, Maj. Olin F. Brewster
been pouring through the lines of the formed a strongpoint at the north edge
82d Airborne after the hard-fought bat- of a fringe of woods about 3,000 yards
tle of St. Vith. 5 General Hoge, CCB, 9th north of Baraque de Fraiture. There he
Armored commander, had been told at placed Company C of the 509th Para-
noon to send his 14th Tank Battalion to chute Infantry Battalion, which earlier
bolster the right flank of the 82d. One had failed to break through from the
tank company went to the Manhay cross- north with Richardson’s tanks, a platoon
roads; the rest moved into Malempré, of armored infantry, and a tank platoon.
two miles to the southeast and off the With straggling tanks and infantry drift-
Liège highway. Coincident with the Ger- ing in from the south and a platoon of
man attack at Baraque de Fraiture tank destroyers sent in by General Hoge,
General Hoge received a torrent of re- Brewster’s force grew. All through the
ports and orders. By this time Hoge was night German infantry tried to filter past
not sure as to either his attachment or and on toward Manhay, but when morn-
mission. He finally gathered that the ing came Brewster’s command still stood
between the 2d SS Panzer Division and
Manhay. A new and critical phase of
5 The final withdrawal from St. Vith into the operations was about to open–the battle
lines of the XVIII Airborne Corps is described at
length in the following chapter. for the Manhay crossroads.
CHAPTER XVII

St. Vith Is Lost


T h e Defenders of St. Vith Pass to the tions of the St. Vith perimeter. T h e Ger-
XVIII Airborne Corps man successes in this area had already
isolated the St. Vith forces from the re-
On the morning of 20 December the mainder of the VIII Corps, although a
Americans defending St. Vith held the slim connection remained between the
easternmost position of any organized 7th Armored Division rear installations
nature in the center sector of the Ar- at La Roche and the VIII Corps head-
dennes battleground. T h e most advanced quarters at Bastogne. Communication
elements of the German drive by this between the 7th Armored rear head-
time were twenty-five air-line miles to quarters and the St. Vith command post
the southwest of St. Vith. T h e St. Vith (thirty-five miles by road) was extremely
perimeter, now of substantial size, con- difficult. Communication between the
tinued to act as a breakwater holding the VIII Corps headquarters and the St. Vith
LXVI Corps in check while other Ger- command post was almost nonexistent,
man units forged westward past its north- even by radio.
ern and southern extensions. As yet the T h e road to Spa and the First Army
enemy forces passing to the north and headquarters, albeit roundabout and
south had failed to coalesce to the west hazardous, remained open on the morn-
of the St. Vith perimeter. T h e northern ing of the 20th. Thither the 7th Armored
penetration, represented at its tip by the Division commander sent a liaison offi-
1st SS Panzer Division, remained narrow cer (Lt. Col. Frederic Schroeder) with a
and road-bound. Well to the rear of the letter to the First Army chief of staff,
1st SS the 9th SS Panzer Division, rein- Maj. Gen. William B. Kean, and orders
forced by the 519th Heavy Antitank to explain that St. Vith was out of touch
Battalion, was toiling slowly westward on with the VIII Corps. T h e letter, safely
the single, free main road which served delivered, gave the First Army its first
as the main supply route for two armored definite picture of events in the far-
and two infantry divisions. T h e advance removed St. Vith sector:
guard had arrived near Recht the pre- Dear Bill:
vious evening, T h e southern advance, I am out of touch with VIII Corps and
which had carried a mass of German ar- understand XVIII Airborne Corps is
mor and infantry from the XLVII and coming in.
LVIII Panzer Corps toward Bastogne My division is defending the line St.
and Houffalize, had the troops and the Vith–Poteau both inclusive. CCB, 9th AD,
the 424th Inf Regt. of the 106th Div and
maneuver room to constitute a real the 112th Inf Regt of the 28th Div are on
threat to the southern and western sec- my right and hold from St. Vith (excl)
ST. VITH
ST. V I T H IS LOST 395

to Holdingen. Both infantry regiments are mored commander phrased it: “I never
in bad shape. My right flank is wide open knew who was in my command. I just
except for some reconnaissance elements, did everything I thought necessary. T h e
TDs and stragglers we have collected and
organized into defense teams at road command status was more or less of an
centers back as far as Cheram [Chérain] assumption.” Actually the perimeter
inclusive. Two German Divisions, 116 Pz held from St. Vith westward was so large
and 560 VG, are just starting to attack and the defending units so thoroughly
NW with their right on Gouvy. I can delay mixed that command functioned on an
them the rest of today maybe but will be
cut off by tomorrow. area basis, even after the receipt of the
VIII Corps has ordered me to hold and First Army order, with the 106th Divi-
I will do so but need help. An attack from sion headquarters continuing to direct
Bastogne to the NE will relieve the situa- the defense south and southwest of St.
tion and in turn cut the bastards off in Vith.1
rear. I also need plenty of air support. Am
out of contact with VIII Corps so am To the surprise of the St. Vith forces
sending this to you. Understand 82AB is this day (the 20th) passed rather quietly.
coming up on my north and the north Only a few feeble German jabs were di-
flank is not critical. rected against the American line, which
BOB HASBROUCK on its eastern face had been strengthened
T h e First Army headquarters was in by a series of withdrawals to more favor-
process of drafting plans for uniting the able ground during the previous night.
XVIII Airborne Corps and the St. Vith T h e American positions were much bet-
force when General Hasbrouck’s letter ter integrated than on previous days: the
arrived. General Hodges’ answer, dis- 7th Armored Division artillery and at-
patched at 1230, stated: tached battalions-of particular impor-
tance the one medium tank battalion-
Ridgway with armor and infantry is
moving from west to gain contact with you. were tied in closely with the troops they
When communication is established you supported. Finally, the enemy was under
come under command of Ridgway. You compulsion to reconnoiter anew the out-
retain under your command following lines of the American eastern front which
units: 106th Inf Div, RCT 112, and CCB had been redrawn during the night of
9th Armed Div. . . . [Ridgway] holds
Malmédy, Stavelot and Trois Ponts. . . . 19 December. German reports covering
activity on the 20th assume the defense
For the first time since forming the St. of the St. Vith area as much stronger than
Vith perimeter the force there knew it was in fact. T h e enemy was much im-
what measures were under way for its
reinforcement or relief as well as the 1The exchange between the commanders in-
precise status of command within the volved in the St. Vith defense will be found in
the G–3 journals of the XVIII Corps, the 7th
force. Thus far General Hasbrouck and Armored Division, and the 106th Division. T h e
General Jones, the two division com- military student will be interested in the delay
between the dispatch of the various messages and
manders, had directed the units in the their receipt. For the last phase of the battle see
perimeter on a basis of mutual agree- Boyer, S t . Vith; CCB, 9th Armored, journal and
ment, although Hasbrouck, with the AAR; the various battalion journals cited in
Chapter XIX; and General Matthew B. Ridgway,
largest force in his own command, made Soldier: T h e Memoirs of Matthew B . Ridgway
most of the decisions. As the 7th Ar- (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956).
396 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

pressed by the collection of American Remer decided to await the arrival of


armor confronting him–“tanks were the fullbrigade. 2
everywhere,” said the 18th Volks Gren- East of St. Vith the 18th Volks Grena-
adierDivision–and by the amount of ar- dier Division was regrouping as it waited
tillery fire his every movement attracted. for its artillery and trains, involved in
It must be added, however, that the traffic jam caused by the Fuehrer
Lucht’s LXVI Corps was not in position Begleit columns. As usual, attempts to
to bring off the smashing attack against bring u p the horse-drawn caissons past
St. Vith which had been set tentatively the armor only resulted in more delay
for the 20th. T h e Fuehrer Begleit Bri- and confusion. T h e division commander,
gade, whose tanks were supposed to add General Hoffmann-Schönborn, did try a
new punch to operations of the infantry piecemeal attack on the high ground
corps, was still strung out along the north of the Schönberg road with the in-
jammed and miry roads east of St. Vith. tent to seize the St. Vith railroad station.
Its commander, Colonel Remer, impa- He personally accompanied the 295th
tient with delay, had ordered an assault Regiment in the assault. T h e attacking
west of Wallerode at midnight on the troop assembled in Wallerode toward
19th, but the small detachment of ar- midmorning where they offered wonder-
mored infantry and assault guns at hand ful targets for the artillery supporting
came under shellfire each time it formed CCB, 7th Armored. T h e gunners, as in-
for attack and Remer finally gave over fantry observers reported, “threw every-
the whole idea. Before daylight some of thing at Wallerode but the shoes on their
his tanks arrived in the woods west of feet.” Within half an hour the German
Born. Having convinced the corps com- regimental commander was hors de com-
mander that direct attack on St. Vith bat and the attack dissipated.
from the east was no longer feasible, Re- South of St. Vith, where CCB, 9th Ar-
mer tried to make good on his own mored, had redressed its lines during the
favored plan for an armored flanking at- previous night consonant with the 7th
tack in the north even at the risk of a Armored position on the left and taken
piecemeal effort. over a five-mile front, the enemy made
Taking advantage of a heavy fog which some attempt to press westward. T h e
rose in midafternoon, Remer sent a tank 62d Volks Grenadier Division had been
company through Ober-Emmels and up given the mission of cutting the possible
the slope west of Hünningen. American escape routes southwest of St. Vith by an
90-mm. tank destroyers from the 814th advance through Grufflange and Maldin-
Tank Destroyer Battalion, waiting on gen. T h e fact that this attack, launched
the reverse slope, caught the first wave about 1630 by the German center and
of four Panthers in their sights, fired left, miscarried was due as much to the
seven rounds, and knocked out all four. enemy’s failure to locate the new line of
Remer’s battalion of armored infantry
and two assault gun batteries, waiting in T h e detailed recital of the Fuehrer Begleit
reserve in the valley below, never were actions, supported by documents and memorabilia,
committed. This then was the extent of is given in Die Geschichte Des Panzerkorps
Grossdeutschland (Bielefeld 1958) , vol. 2, Teil
the Fuehrer Begleit effort on the 20th; VIII (hereafter cited as Panzerkorps G-D).
ST. V I T H IS LOST 397

defense as to American resistance. T h e contact with the 3d Armored task force


190th Regiment advanced in close for- north of Samrée. On the whole it ap-
mation toward the 27th Armored Infan- peared that the north flank of the St.
try Battalion, almost as if in route march, Vith force shortly would be battened
and took a terrible beating from artillery, down at its western terminus and that
mortars, tank destroyers, antitank guns the danger of a German turning move-
on ground mounts, and machine guns. ment there had been removed.
T h e 164th Regiment, advancing oppo- T h e main danger, apparent since 19
site the southern flank of CCB, reported December, was the open south flank of
success while moving unopposed through the St. Vith defense hanging on the air
Maspelt and across ground which had at Holdingen. It was known that a Ger-
been abandoned the previous night, but man move northwest toward this open
at a crossroads in the Grufflange woods flank was in process-indeed the 116th
American shells suddenly poured in and Panzer Division and the 560th Volks
the advance came to a dead stop. Pris- Grenadier Division had been identified.
oners subsequently told of very severe Furthermore the 7th Armored trains had
losses here in the forest.3 reported signs of an enemy force far to
Although action had flared up on 20 the west of the 7th Armored out-
December along the eastern face of the post positions. Acutely aware of the
St. Vith perimeter, the feature of this threat now forming, General Hasbrouck
day was the series of rearrangements to stripped such elements as he dared from
tighten the perimeter on the north and his north flank, added the remnants of
south. Hasbrouck earlier had been “sus- the 14th Cavalry Group, and created
picious” of what was happening in the Task Force Jones (Lt. Col. Robert B.
northern sector around Recht and Po- Jones, Commanding Officer, 814thTank
teau, but he was no longer too apprehen- Destroyer Battalion) to guard the south
sive after the successive march groups of and southwestern flank. Admittedly this
the 1st SS Panzer Division had bounced scratch force was too weak to make a se-
off the 7th Armored Division roadblocks. rious defense in the endangered sector,
T h e gap between the western anchor of but it could be expected to block the key
the north flank at Vielsalm and the east- road junctions and sound a warning
ern outposts of the 82d Airborne Divi- should the enemy attempt any flanking
sion was closed toward the end of the movement.
day when patrols from the 505th Para- Colonel Jones organized three small
chute Infantry met a reconnaissance detachments to occupy Deifeld, Gouvy,
party from the 7th Armored south of and Chérain, a screening position a little
Trois Ponts. In addition light tanks be- over six miles from east to west. Deifeld
longing to the 87th Cavalry Reconnais- was occupied without trouble. T h e high
sance Squadron had established radio ground commanding Chérain, seven
miles northeast of Houffalize at the junc-
3 The operations of the LXVI Corps around St. tion of the roads from Vielsalm and St.
Vith are described in MSS #B–026 (Hauser); Vith which led to that town, was or-
B–333 ( P c h t ) ; and B–688 (Moll). The midday
and evening reports on OB WEST K T B are par- ganized for defense without enemy
ticularly useful. hinderance. By chance the Chérain de-
398 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

tachment received reinforcement late in not being trained infantrymen.” Battery


the afternoon when a company of the C had been assigned to support the
112th Infantry appeared. At an earlier 112th Infantry and with the consent of
and more optimistic hour this com- the latter shifted its 155-mm. howitzers
pany had been dispatched to Houffalize to give Stone’s men a hand,
with orders to make a counterattack Actually the pick-up force of quarter-
southward to relieve the pressure on master troops, light tanks, and stragglers
Bastogne. T h e company commander under Stone’s command was deployed so
was persuaded that the situation had as to defend the railhead stocks at Gouvy
changed somewhat and that he should Station east of the village proper, but
wait at Chérain for further orders. A this fact was unknown to the 7th Ar-
little later a company of German infan- mored Division headquarters. During
try was detected marching north along the night of 19 December the bulk of the
the valley toward Chérain. During the 1130th Regiment, 560th Volks Grena-
night a few of the enemy entered the dier Division, bivouacked in and west of
village but quickly were driven out. Gen- the village of Gouvy. This regiment,
eral Hasbrouck decided to wait further which had sent combat patrols against
developments before committing any of Stone’s force on the 18th, was at the tail
his meager reserves at Chérain. end of the L V I I I Panzer Corps columns
T h e detachment which Jones had sent pushing past Houffalize. It had become
to Gouvy, midway between Deifeld and embroiled with the 112th Infantry at
Chérain, was surprised to find the village Sevenig, had suffered intensely (the
occupied by German infantry. On 18 fighting strength of the regiment now
December the 7th Armored had learned was between five and six hundred), and
in a roundabout way that a “Lieutenant had been unable to disengage in the Our
Colonel named Stone” had collected a River sector as quickly as the rest of the
few troops and was holding Gouvy. Sub- division. T h e L V I I I Panzer Corps com-
sequently Hasbrouck sent a platoon of mander was anxious to get the 1130th u p
light tanks to help out and an injunction to cover his right rear and had ordered
that it was “imperative” that the village the regiment to seize and block the St.
be held. All through the day and night of Vith–Houffalize road in the neighbor-
19 December German vehicles (units of hood of Gouvy and Chérain.
the 116th Panzer Division and the ad- In midmorning of 20 December the
vance guard of the 560th Volks Grena- Germans in the village deployed skir-
dier Division) had rolled past Gouvy to mishers and began a fire fight to test the
the south and west, but no attempt had American strength around the station.
been made to repeat the attack of the After three hours of this the Americans
previous day. Stone sent out one of his observed the enemy going into attack
staff to try to line u p some help; this formation in an open field next to the
officer discovered the command post of village church. Using the church spire as
the 965th Field Artillery Battalion, near a reference point the cannoneers of Bat-
the town of Beho, and put forth the case tery C opened fire, their 155-mm. how-
of the Gouvy defenders “who were at- itzers scattering the German formation
tempting to hold the line despite their in every direction. When the 7th Ar-
ST. VITH IS LOST 399

CHÉRAIN. A disabled German self-propelled gun is in the foreground.

mored detachment arrived to set u p the combat elements. On this day it was nec-
Gouvy roadblock, it found the Germans essary to instruct all unit commanders
inside the village. T h e detachment drove that the rations, water, and gasoline on
them out in a sharp fight but at nightfall hand must be made to last for three days.
withdrew to a road junction a mile and T h e eight battalions of field artillery
a half to the west, here blocking any taking part in the defense were put on a
further German move toward the north. strict ration, seven rounds for each 105-
Stone’s group was incorporated in Task mm. howitzer, to fire only on the most
Force Jones. T h e next day it was able, urgent and well-defined targets. Harass-
with some pride, to turn over to the 7th ing and interdiction fire, therefore, was
Armored Division the 350 German turned over to the mortar crews, who
prisoners it had guarded since 18 De- mixed high explosives and white phos-
cember and the stores at the railhead. phorous shells to make the supply last.
Possession of the First Army ration Fortunately the stock of artillery shells
dumps at Gouvy Station was a boon to was replenished (for the first time in
the units in the St. Vith–Vielsalm de- three days) from the Samrée dump be-
fense, for by 20 December the 7th Ar- fore it was overrun by the enemy. An
mored Division trains for all practical attempt to give greater weight to the
purposes were cut off from the forward artillery in the St. Vith–Vielsalm area
400 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

failed when the 4.5-inch guns of the request, got Middleton to cancel the or-
770th Field Artillery Battalion were cut der, and CCB, 9th Armored, subse-
off at Samrée en route from La Roche. quently was taken under the First Army
Even when separated from the 7th command. T h e attachment already exist-
Armored trains the St. Vith front was ing was thus legalized. What Hasbrouck
considerably stronger and better organ- needed now he tersely relayed in a mes-
ized than it had been. Incidentally, the sage through the 7th Armored trains to
quick and forceful reaction to all Ger- the XVIII Airborne Corps: “We can
man probing during the day and the fact hold if no troops are taken away from us
that Hasbrouck had kept only a very and our right rear is given protection.”
small reserve out of the line had created T h e addition of the 7th Armored
an impression of American strength in Division to the XVIII Airborne Corps
the enemy headquarters well beyond the had contributed greatly to the phenom-
fact. T h e front held by the 7th Armored enal expansion of a corps front which
Division, CCB of the 9th Armored, and measured only some twenty-five miles on
attached units by this time had expanded 19 December but which represented a
to about thirty-two miles. Traced on the sector of approximately eighty-five miles
map the line assumed the form of a on the evening of 20 December. On the
horseshoe, the bend at St. Vith, the open 19th most of Ridgway’s troops had en-
prongs facing west. This opening had gaged in patrolling with no enemy con-
been partially covered by the advance tact; on the 20th the XVIII Airborne
southeastward of the 82d Airborne Divi- Corps faced the westernmost elements of
sion, but a gap of some five miles still the I SS Panzer Corps, the entire L X V I
existed north of the Chérain outpost set Corps, and the LVIII Panzer Corps.
up by Task Force Jones. Additional infantry units, tank destroy-
T h e VIII Corps passed to General ers, and badly needed artillery were on
Patton’s Third Army during the 20th. their way to reinforce Ridgway’s com-
Word of this, handed down by Colonel mand, but the enemy force in opposition
Ryan who had been at the VIII Corps was strong and at most points along the
headquarters in Neufchâteau and had extended front the initiative remained
worked his way back to the division in German hands.
trains, caused a little confusion as to the Whether the XVIII Airborne Corps
exact status of the units attached to the could maintain the freshly added burden
7th Armored Division. In the early eve- imposed by the 7th Armored Division
ning CCB, 9th Armored Division, re- salient remained to be seen. But that the
ceived orders to revert to the VIII Corps XVIII Airborne Corps lacked the
and move that same night to St. Hubert, strength to close the gap of thirteen road
seventeen miles west of Bastogne. T h e miles between the VIII Corps and itself
loss of this combat command would (that is, the gap between the 7th Ar-
create a wide breach in front of the mored Division detachment at Chérain
enemy congregating south of St. Vith, a and the elements of the 101st Airborne
breach which hardly could be filled by at Foy) was rapidly becoming apparent
the last reserves at Hasbrouck’s disposal. to all. T h e corps’ mission, as it had de-
T h e 7th Armored commander, at Hoge’s volved by the end of the day, would be
ST. V I T H IS LOST 401

this: pivoting on Malmédy, to continue by the morning of the 21st:on the north
the advance to the southeast and east with and east the line was as well organized
“utmost vigor,” driving back the German as the forces available would permit; the
forces found west of the line Malmédy- southern flank had been somewhat rein-
Pont-Vielsalm-Hebronval-Houffalize. forced and prolonged by a covering
That the enemy was prepared to con- screen extending westward; the 82d Air-
test this move all intelligence reports borne Division was in position to give
affirmed. True, Kampfgruppe Peiper some support in the northwestern seg-
had been pretty well bottled u p on the ment of the gap to the rear of the 7th
corps left wing; but this effort had been Armored and 106th Infantry Division;
made by thinning the line between and there was a fair number of light
Malmédy and Trois Ponts. First Army batteries supporting the front and flanks
intelligence sources carried word of an of the salient. Although rationing had
enemy force building u p here south of begun, there was no immediate threat
the 30th Division, a matter of consider- that food, gasoline, or ammunition
able concern to Generals Ridgway and would fail. T h e piecemeal German at-
Hobbs by the night of 20 December. Fur- tacks on the 20th had been turned back
thermore, it was recognized that Peiper with little loss or difficulty. Command
might try to break out through Stavelot. relations under the XVIII Airborne
German documents, taken in the fight at Corps had been clarified (the 106th was
Gouvy, showed clearly the intention of no longer attached to the 7th Armored)
the LVIII Panzer Corps to drive on and communications established. For
Hotton, at the moment the location of the first time the two divisions holding
the 3d Armored Division command post. the salient had some clear picture of the
Already the advance guard of this force dispositions and plans of neighboring
had pushed beyond Samrée. T h e St. Vith friendly units. No one could say with
salient, where the 7th Armored Division certainty, of course, what strength the
was to remain on the defensive during enemy was preparing for the final assault
the XVIII Airborne advance, was con- to gain St. Vith. (See Map VII.)
fronted with growing German forces on T h e Fifth Panzer Army, constantly
three sides. Prisoners had reported that prodded by the higher staffs and acutely
the Grossdeutschland Panzer Division, aware that the St. Vith road net must
previously identified on the Eastern be opened to allow forward movement
Front, had joined the LXVI Corps be- of the reinforcements needed to main-
fore St. Vith. Even though the new ar- tain the momentum of the advance to-
mored outfit did not prove to be the ward the Meuse, was in no mood for
famous division but Remer’s much further delay. General Manteuffel was
weaker panzer brigade, the report was anxious to free the LXVI Corps and
of particular concern. hurry it forward to the Salm River sec-
tor as right wing cover for the two pan-
The Enemy Closes on the zer corps. General Model hoped to shake
St. Vith Salient the corps free and use Remer’s armor to
help the Sixth Panzer Army get moving
T h e St. Vith salient looked like this in the north. Lucht, therefore, was or-
402 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

dered to make an all-out attack and take ise motorization of the brigade’s bicycle
St. Vith itself on 21 December, whether battalion. T h e American tankers caught
or not the Fuehrer Begleit Brigade was on to what had happened when mes-
ready. This, one of his division com- sengers and liaison officers failed to
manders opined, was easier said than arrive at their destinations, but by this
done. time the Germans had journeyed on to
T h e course of battle on 21 December the southwest. Near Hinderhausen they
initially affirmed the pessimistic view attempted to surprise the 275th Ar-
with which most of German unit com- mored Field Artillery Battalion, an out-
manders seem to have started the attack. fit that had been exposed to close-quarter
Remer, still missing most of his tanks, fighting before. With the help of two
had been instructed to drive from tanks and an antiaircraft artillery half-
Nieder-Emmels straight south into St. track mounting the dreaded .50-caliber
Vith. South of Nieder-Emmels the St. quad, the artillerymen beat off the. at-
Vith road crossed the ridge where, the tack. When the raiders turned back to
day before, the American tank destroyers rejoin Remer they found the American
had broken the back of the German at- tankers waiting: however, evasion in the
tack before it could get rolling. T h e woods was easy, although at this point
Fuehrer Begleit commander, with the in- the prized vehicles were abandoned and
dependence that characterized the ac- most of the captured Americans escaped.
tions of a man who stood ace-high with Meanwhile Remer’s amored group had
Hitler, decided to shift the attack and arrived north of St. Vith and the brigade
take Rodt (Sart-lez-St. Vith) , about two was ready for attack as soon as darkness
and a half miles west of his assigned ob- came.
jective. T h e rifle battalion assigned to On most of the front held by the 7th
carry out this mission happened to come Armored and the troops of the 9th Ar-
under American artillery fire while as- mored and 106th the morning passed in
sembling west of Nieder-Emmels be- ominous quiet. Patrols working in front
fore dawn, or thus Remer explains the of the American lines came back with
failure to strike Rodt. So he compro- reports of enemy activity and movement:
mised by sending a large combat patrol some kind of an attack was in the offing
into the woods west of that village with but it seemed slow in coming. Appar-
orders to find a covered route along ently the German corps command had
which the tanks might advance on Viel- some difficulty in organizing a co-ordi-
salm once they arrived. nated and well-timed advance over the
T h e section of the main St. Vith- broken and wooded ground around St.
Vielsalm supply road west of Rodt was Vith. In fact, he had not reached the com-
guarded by two American medium tank manders of his two infantry divisions
companies spread over a distance of with orders until daylight. T h e center
three miles. It was easy for the German regiment of the 62d Volks Grenadier
infantry to move unnoticed through the Division (the 190th) , charged with seiz-
heavy timber. They even succeeded in ing the high ground in the thick forest
ambushing enough vehicles, passing east of Grufflange, did get one battalion
back and forth along the road, to prom- under way in the morning and succeeded
ST. V I T H IS LOST 403

in overrunning an armored infantry pla- 18th Volks Grenadier Division and the
toon and three tank destroyers belong- Fuehrer Begleit Brigade had formed.
ing to CCB, 9th Armored. Once the Faced with the problem of organizing
element of surprise was lost the Germans and integrating a defensive line which
made no further headway in the forest; had come into being piecemeal and with
artillery and bullet fire held them until little regard to the integrity of the tacti-
a platoon of American tanks arrived, cal units involved, the Americans di-
whereupon theywithdrew. 4 vided command responsibility along
T h e American defense of St. Vith it- easily discerned map features. Thus the
self was based on the possession of ridge draws coming in from the southeast
lines and hills masking the town to the marked the boundary between CCB of
northeast, east, and southeast. Two the 9th Armored and CCB, 7th Ar-
draws cut through this shield of high mored, while the northern defile and the
ground, one on the north represented by Büllingen road designated the boundary
the highway running from Büllingen in- between two sector commands within
to St. Vith, the other angling from the CCB, 7th Armored. T h e easternmost de-
southeast and traversed by the road and fenses, as a result, were in the sector
railroad line from Prüm. Directly east bounded by the Prüm road on the right
of St. Vith ran the Schönberg highway, and the Büllingen road on the left, sus-
which had been the avenue of the very ceptible to penetration at either flank or
first German attacks, but this road ran both. This sector was under Lt. Col.
over a ridge just outside St. Vith where William H. G. Fuller (commanding
the Americans had stood successfully to officer of the 38th Armored Infantry
meet all previous enemy thrusts. Much Battalion) , whose command consisted of
of the area here described was covered four companies of armored infantry,
with dense stands of timber spaced Troop B of the 87th Reconnaissance
irregularly with clearings between. Con- Squadron, and some four hundred men
necting the Büllingen and Schönberg ap- remaining from the 81st and 168th Engi-
proaches a spider web of secondary roads neer Combat Battalions (the men who
and trails ran back and forth, centering had taken the first enemy blows at St.
at the hamlet of Wallerode (two miles Vith), backed u p by a tank company
northeast of St. Vith) behind which lay and a platoon of self-propelled 90-mm.
a large forest. It was here that the un- tank destroyers.
successful attacks launched earlier by the T h e frontal attack planned by the
LXVI Corps commander, under pressure
for a quick victory, would be mounted
4During the skirmish around Grufflange Cpl. by the 18th Volks Grenadier Division
Horace M. Thorne, Troop D of the 89th Cavalry
Reconnaissance Squadron, led a patrol to scout and the 62d Volks Grenadier Division,
out the enemy location. H e killed the crew of an whose highly successful envelopment
immobilized enemy tank, set up a light machine tactics east of St. Vith had bagged pris-
gun on the tank deck, and there conducted a fire
fight in which he personally accounted for two oners finally counted on this day as ap-
machine gun crews. He was killed by rifle fire proaching eight thousand. T h e main
while trying to clear a stoppage on his weapon.
Corporal Thorne was awarded the Medal of
effort would be made by the 18th in the
Honor. north and the 183d Regiment from the
404 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

right wing of the 62d, this force attack- waves then hit between Company A of
ing in the sector outlined by the two the 38th Armored Infantry Battalion
draws where Colonel Fuller’s command and Company A of the 23d Armored
was deployed. To the right of the main Infantry Battalion. Meanwhile the 293d
effort Remer’s brigade was under or- Regiment had pushed south of the
ders to enter St. Vith by direct assault Schönberg highway toward Company B
from the northwest via the Hunningen of the 38th Armored Infantry Battalion,
road, orders which he subsequently dis- Troop B, 87th Reconnaissance Squad-
obeyed. T o the left the two remaining ron, and Company A, 81st Combat
regiments of the 62d were to attack due Engineers, left to right. Only two
west with the object of reaching the road medium tanks were barring the road.
between St. Vith and Maldingen; they For some reason this attack never fully
would take no part, however, in the as- developed–later German reports indi-
sault on St. Vith. cated that the assault waves lost their
By prodigious effort the LXVI Corps direction while moving through the
artillery finally had been wormed thick woods. Suddenly, about 1700,
through the traffic jam east of St. Vith, the German pressure along the Schön-
and towed and manhandled into posi- berg road eased. T h e enemy had found
tion. Around 1400 the German guns and a soft spot and was regrouping while
Werfers opened u p against Fuller’s posi- his tanks and assault guns moved for-
tions in front of the town. West of ward. General Lucht ordered the com-
Wallerode the 295th Regiment started mander of the 18th Volks Grenadier
into the assault, possibly only as a feint, Division to throw everything he had
but withdrew as the guns supporting behind the 294th and continue the at-
CCB, 7th Armored, went into action. tack.
This gambit was succeeded by a fifteen- North of the threatened area the
minute artillery concentration; as it 295th Regiment had come out of the
raised westward the main German attack woods behind Wallerode and started an
moved forward. It was now about 1600 advance southwest, covered by assault
hours. gun or tank fire from the ridge west
One of the heaviest and longest-sus- of the town. This move brought the
tained barrages the veteran American grenadiers across open ground and
combat command had ever encountered under flanking fire from American tanks
tied the troops of CCB to their foxholes, located by the railroad underpass just
and even there tree bursts claimed north of St. Vith. At the same time Com-
many a victim. On both sides of the pany A of the 38th Armored Infantry
main Schönberg road the 294th Regi- Battalion fired into their ranks from the
ment moved groups of forty to fifty men front. American artillery joined in, the
forward in bounds through the woods. A attack broke, and the 295th streamed
platoon of Sherman tanks stationed just back from whence it had come.
north of the road was caught in the At 2 0 0 0 the battle along the Schön-
thickest of the German concentrations. berg road flared u p again. This was the
Three lost their commanders and the end. Most of the American troops were
platoon withdrew. T h e first German killed or captured, so that only a condi-
ST. V I T H IS LOST 405

tional reconstruction of the German a matter of minutes German infantry


breakthrough east of St. Vith can ever and tanks were to the rear of the foxhole
be made. T h e American units flanking line. Lt. Col. Thomas J. Riggs, Jr., com-
the road had been badly understrength mander of the 81st Engineer Combat
before the 21st, but the lengthy and de- Battalion, who had tried to organize a
structive barrage laid down by the enemy counterattack to wipe out the earlier
had caused very severe casualties and penetrations was lost trying to organize
shaken the defenders. Sustained shelling a last-ditch defense in the hamlet of
had also destroyed all means of com- Prümerberg on the main road. No with-
munication, except by runner, and left drawal orders reached the troops now
the little groups isolated and unable to behind the enemy. Some held where
support one another. Troop B of the they were; some stampeded blindly
87th Reconnaissance Squadron and Com- through the woods in search of an exit to
pany A of the 81st Engineer Combat the west.
Battalion, both directly in the German A double column of enemy troops and
path, probably numbered less than forty vehicles marched along the road into
men apiece when the final blow fell. St. Vith. On the right of Colonel Fuller’s
It appears that if there were any mines sector Company B of the 23d Armored
left on the Schönberg road they had Infantry Battalion and a platoon of the
been lifted in preparation for a promised 814th Tank Destroyer Battalion, after
counterattack by American tanks. having withstood almost continuous as-
Actually there were only three Sher- sault for four hours, succumbed about
mans on the main road, remnant of a the same time to the 183d Regiment,
reserve platoon which had been com- which attacked along the draw from
mandeered when the initial tank sup- the southeast between CCB, 7th Ar-
port had decamped. During the earlier mored, and CCB, 9th Armored. T h e
lull the enemy infantry worked through 183d Regiment now poured through the
the thick woods, penetrating the thin draw into St. Vith. Two of the American
and disordered American line at a tank destroyers reached St. Vith and here
number of points. T h e final assault, blocked the main street until nearly mid-
made by the 294th and one or two pla- night, when one was destroyed by a
toons of Tigers, simply peeled the bazooka round. Of the force originally
Americans back on both sides of the commanded by Colonel Fuller in the
road. T h e three Shermans had aimed eastern sector only some two hundred
their guns to blast the first tanks as escaped, and half of these had to be
they came over the ridge where the evacuated for wounds or exhaustion.
American foxhole line had been drawn. T h e loss here of the four armored in-
In the darkness, and with radios and fantry companies would be keenly felt
wire no longer functioning, the first sign by CCB, 7th Armored Division.
of the enemy armor was a volley of General Clarke, the CCB, 7th Ar-
flares fired in flat trajectory from the mored Division, commander, could do
Panthers. Silhouetted in light and with little to influence the course of the battle.
blinded crews the Shermans were dis- Communications were gone and he had
posed of in one, two, three order. In no reserves. About 2130 he ordered what
406 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

was left of his command to fall back necessitating that Hoge’s left be pulled
to the high ground west of the city, back some two thousand yards. This was
planning to anchor the new line on those accomplished. T h e remainder of CCB,
of his troops who were still intact in 9th Armored Division, remained in the
the Nieder-Emmels sector, northwest of positions on the ridge line west of the
St. Vith. T h e troops east of St. Vith Braunlauf Creek and draw.
simply had to be written off (at least About 2200 General Clark reached
600 officers and men) although some General Hasbrouck with word of what
later would be able to work their way had happened at St. Vith and the latter
back through the German lines. immediately informed the XVIII Air-
T h e new defense ordered by Clarke borne Corps. But this was not all that
began to form shortly before midnight. the 7th Armored Division commander
It was a ragged, piecemeal affair about had to report. Earlier, Task Force Jones
two miles long, running south from (deployed on the southern flank of the
Hünningen along the chain of hills a salient) had captured a German engi-
thousand yards west of St. Vith. Lt. Col. neer officer who, under questioning,
Robert C. Erlenbusch (Commanding said that his division, the 2d SS Panzer
Officer, 3 1st Tank Battalion) was Division, was moving toward Gouvy.
charged with the organization of this new Thus far the 2d SS Panzer Division had
position. He and Lt. Col. Robert L. Rhea not been located. Its presence on the
(Commanding Officer, 23d Armored In- weak southern flank (in case the cap-
fantry Battalion), who had taken over tured officer was not a “plant”) was
from Colonel Fuller when the latter was disturbing. Apparently General Has-
evacuated because of exhaustion, were brouck accepted the veracity of the re-
able to restore some measure of confi- port (he could hardly risk the chance
dence and order. CCB, 7th Armored that it was not true) and so recom-
Division, be it remembered, was a mended that General Ridgway send the
battle-tested outfit of superior morale- 3d Armored Division east and south to
as was the entire division–so credit also meet this new enemy. Already Has-
must go to the unnamed officers, brouck had ordered Task Force Jones to
noncoms, and men who withdrew in shorten its line because the last reserve
good order to the new line. Fortunately, available behind the southern wing (the
the enemy, too, had to regroup before 17th Tank Battalion) was en route to re-
he resumed the battle, inforce CCB. Without Wemple’s tanks,
CCB, 9th Armored, also made read- or with them, Task Force Jones was no
justments to meet the new situation. match for any large detachment of the
General Clarke had informed General 2d SS Panzer Division.
Hoge, whose command post was close T h e First Army commander still ex-
at hand, that his command was moving pected, on the night of the 21st, that
back to re-form west of S t . Vith. Since Ridgway’s corps would shortly gain con-
the shift would leave Hoge’s northern tact with the 7th Armored–but the
flank open, it was agreed that contact situation was deteriorating at a fast clip.
between the two combat commands After a hasty meeting of his corps staff
would be re-established at Bauvenn, the XVIII Airborne commander sent
ST. V I T H IS LOST 407

new orders to Hasbrouck (it was now occupation of St. Vith had considerably
about 0200 on the 22d). T h e 424th and disorganized the attacking division,
112th Infantry Regiments were to with- whose regiments jammed into the town
draw from their positions. T h e entire from east, north, and south. Orders given
force under Generals Hasbrouck and the 18th Volks Grenadier Division early
Jones was to form a defensive ring west on the 22d to continue the attack along
of St. Vith and east of the Salm River. the main road through Rodt and Poteau
By early morning of the 22d the with- toward the Salm River could not be
drawal of the southernmost units was carried out for some hours. On the left
under way and the circle was beginning the bulk of the 62d Volks Grenadier
to form. T h e command situation finally Division was still confronted with an un-
was “regularized” when Ridgway gave broken defense. T h e only force in posi-
Maj. Gen. Alan W. Jones the com- tion for an immediate exploitation was
mand of the 7th Armored Division Remer’s Fuehrer Begleit Brigade, whose
(he ranked Brig. Gen. Robert W. tanks finally had arrived on the evening
Hasbrouck) in addition to his own divi- of 21 December.
sion and its attachments. Actually this
change had no effect on the conduct T h e Final Withdrawal from
of subsequent operations and was the St. Vith Sector
effective for only a few hours.
A perimeter defense by units cut off T h e raid made by Remer’s infantry
from the rest of the XVIII Airborne past Rodt now paid dividends. Having
Corps was a very temporary expedient; found a negotiable route for his heavy
the ground now occupied, in the opinion vehicles, Remer prepared to capture
of the local commanders, could not be Rodt, cut the main road between that
held for long. General Clark later village and Vielsalm, and overrun such
phrased the problem thus: of the American batteries as remained
in the way. In the midst of a snowstorm,
In studying the map of the area it will
be noted that the troops were to be dis- sometime around midnight of the 21st,
posed surrounding a forest through which Remer’s tank group and his armored
there was a paucity of roads. There was infantry started along the narrow trails
practically no possibility of being able to winding through the thick woods north
shift forces to meet a threat at any point. of the Rodt-Vielsalm road. By daybreak
HOWunits were to be supplied in such
a situation is not understood. Air supply the Fuehrer Begleit advance guard had
of such a large and scattered force would arrived at the edge of the forest north
have been most difficult. Without supply of Rodt. This small village, 4,000 yards
the force would have been through in two west of St. Vith, lay on the reverse slope
or three days. of a ridge line along which extended
Fortunately for the forces in the sali- the north flank of the 7th Armored Divi-
ent the withdrawal to the “goose egg” sion. Here a number of secondary roads
defense, a move made with extreme entered the St. Vith–Vielsalm highway,
difficultyon muddy and congested roads one from Recht in the north, others from
and trails, was unhampered in its first Hinderhausen and Crombach in the
phases by any German reaction. T h e south. As a result of the regrouping
408 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

TANKOF THE 7TH ARMORED


DIVISION
in a temporary position near St. Vith.

under way in the 7th Armored zone, trails running in from the north. To the
Rodt was the junction point between northeast the troop from CCB which
CCA, still holding the division north originally had held the left wing of the
flank, and CCB, raising a new line along St. Vith sector around Hünningen was
the low hill chain that extended south of still in position; as yet it had not
the village. T h e ground at Rodt, then, sustained any heavy blows.
overlooked the flank and rear of CCB. As light broke, the right battalion of
T h e village itself was garrisoned by Remer’s brigade attacked to cut the main
the service company of the 48th Armored western road close to Poteau. T h e
Infantry Battalion and some drivers be- German assault here was beaten off by
longing to the battalion whose vehicles the drivers in a vehicle park who used
were parked there. Astride the woods the .50-caliber machine guns on their
road running north to Recht were small two-score half-tracks in a withering
blocking detachments of tanks, engi- fusillade. In the east, at Rodt, Remer’s
neers, and antitank guns. Between Rodt left battalion tried to rush the village
and the next village to the west, Poteau, from the woods but ran straight into
two companies of medium tanks pa- artillery fire. Some of the Germans made
trolled the main road and watched the it to the houses and defended them-
ST. V I T H IS LOST 409

selves in the cellars, but most of the destroyers, hoping to stop the Panthers
battalion finally had to pull back. A if they should turn west from Rodt.
number of prisoners were later rounded Remer’s objective, however, was not in
u p by the Americans on the Recht road. that direction.
T h e second German assault was made in All during the morning of 22 Decem-
a more methodical manner. First, ber American observers had watched
mortars went to work against houses enemy troops and vehicles milling
and foxholes. Then the German tank around Recht, just to the north of
group, which had been delayed by a Poteau. Here the first identification
mine field, and an infantry company or was made of the 9th SS Panzer Divi-
two swung to the west and rolled down sion. This fresh armored division was in
the main road into the village. T h e fact moving its main strength west from
Sherman tanks on the Recht road were Recht toward the Salm River and col-
caught in masked positions from which lision with the 82d Airborne Division,
they could not return the panzer fire but a kampfgruppe had been dropped
coming in from higher ground, and the off to cover the south flank of the divi-
troops in Rodt could not stand alone sion by attacking in the direction of
against the Panthers. T h e enemy took Vielsalm. With the discovery of this new
the village quickly, and with it many enemy force in the north and the knowl-
of the half-tracks belonging to the 48th edge that the only route of withdrawal
Armored Infantry Battalion. remaining to CCA was along the road
Word that the St. Vith–Vielsalm road from Poteau to Vielsalm, Colonel Rose-
had been cut at Rodt reached Lt. Col. baum gave over the effort against
Vincent L. Boylan, Commanding Officer, the Fuehrer Begleit armor and gathered
87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, the major part of his command in a
who took charge of the few troops of circular defense around the Poteau
CCB remaining north of St. Vith on the crossroads. As yet he had only vague in-
wide open flank. Boylan got orders from formation of the serious situation con-
Clarke to withdraw south at once. De- fronting the American troops in the
spite a brush with Remer’s group and south and southeast.
the loss of several tanks in the swampy T h e capture of Rodt left General
ground south of Rodt the command Clarke no alternative but further with-
reached Crombach and Hinderhausen, drawal. In the early afternoon the
where General Clarke was building a sketchy line just west of St. Vith was
second line of defense. This line was abandoned and CCB fell back to the
now gravely endangered on its open secondary position which had been
north flank by the German position under preparation since the early morn-
astride the ridge at Rodt. ing hours. T h e villages of Hinderhausen
In the meantime, Colonel Rosebaum, and Crombach, on which this position
the CCA commander, sent two of his was based, both offered emergency exits
tank companies east of Poteau to engage to the west along dirt roads and trails.
Remer’s tanks. In a long-distance duel T h e three task forces organized along
along the ridge the Shermans were out- the new line nominally represented a
ranged. Rosebaum asked for some tank total of five medium tank companies, a
410 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

light tank company, three platoons of ing the connective tissue between the
90-mm. tank destroyers, two troops of 7th and 9th Armored combat commands.
cavalry, and the equivalent of four or T h e course of the valley westward
five rifle companies. But unit integrity proffered a natural line of advance, and
had been lost, the armored components through it, in the early hours of the
were far below strength, and many of 22d, pushed small detachments of the
the armored infantry were weary, ill- 62d Volks Grenadier Division. Unde-
equipped stragglers who had been put tected, a German rifle company reached
back in the line after their escape from Neubrueck, in the valley southwest of
St. Vith. General Clarke’s plea for rein- Bauvenn, where the command post of
forcements brought in a rifle company, the 27th Armored Infantry Battalion
a company of tank destroyers, and a few was located. About 1000 the enemy
light armored vehicles. That was all. rushed the village and killed or captured
Supplies were running short and the the entire battalion staff. A counterat-
ground now occupied was not well tack thrown in by a scratch force of in-
adapted to defense. Still worse, CCB fantry and tanks from Bauvenn drove
had no friendly contact on the north, the Germans out and freed those Amer-
and a patrol sent to establish connection icans still alive. In a subsequent read-
with CCB, 9th Armored, on the south justment of the CCB line to round out
had disappeared. T h e fact was that the the goose egg, Hoge’s tanks and infantry
62d Volks Grenadier Division had thrust were arrayed from Neubrueck south and
a force through the woods and along west through Grufflange and Maldingen.
Braunlauf Creek into the gap between Late in the afternoon a battalion of the
the two combat commands. 424th Infantry was added to the line,
It will be recalled that on the night but as yet the enemy made no appear-
of 2 1 December General Hoge had set ance in force in this sector.
in motion a withdrawal of the northern T h e L X V I Corps was in no position
flank of CCB, 9th Armored, to conform to capitalize with speed and immediate
with Clarke’s first defensive position just effect on its capture of St. Vith. As the
west of St. Vith. In blinding snow, on intermingling of roadways at St. Vith
slippery roads, 9th Armored tanks and had made it possible for the defenders
infantry headed for Bauvenn, desig- to bar the way west, so now this knot
nated as the linkage point for the two in the Belgian-German road prevented
combat commands. Confusion, darkness, a quick transfer of men and guns in
and mud slowed the move, but by morn- pursuit. Of the L X V I Corps only those
ing a medium tank company and a units which had swung wide of the city
platoon of riflemen had reached the vil- during the attack were able to main-
lage. tain pressure on the Americans: the
Bauvenn, no more than a jog in the Fuehrer Begleit Brigade, executing
road, lay three-quarters of a mile north its semi-independent turning movement,
of the natural corridor through which and the advance guard of the 190th
flowed the Braunlauf Creek, the corridor Grenadier Regiment, inserting a com-
at whose eastern entrance the enemy pany or so between the two CCB’s. In
had attacked the night before in sever- the course of the night battle at St. Vith
ST. V I T H IS LOST 411

the German assault units had become To the commander of the 18th Volks
badly scrambled. T h e problem involved Grenadier Division, whose men had
in extricating and re-forming these units taken St. Vith, the events of 22 De-
was enhanced by the natural desire of cember spelled catastrophe; to the
the German soldiers to make the most Americans falling back from the city they
of this opportunity to sleep for a little were a godsend. Given this breath-
while in warm billets. Service and army ing spell, the Allies now faced the ques-
troops, with and without orders, jammed tion of whether the tired, depleted, and
into the city in a kind of scavenger hunt divided forces trying to form a new
for anything usable that the Americans perimeter should make a lone and
had left behind. desperate stand or fall back to join the
T h e Sixth Panzer Army, thus far un- XVIII Airborne Corps. This decision
able to win enough roads for a mass rested with Field Marshal Montgomery,
movement to the west, turned its reserve the newly assigned commander of all
formations into the roads threading into Allied forces north of the German sali-
the city. T h e traffic jam thus created ent, who had been authorized by the
was made worse by the horde of officers Supreme Commander to give up such
and men driving American vehicles ground as was necessary in order to as-
captured in the Schnee Eifel who were semble sufficient strength for a decisive
grimly determined to hang onto their counterattack. During the morning of
loot. By midmorning of 22 December the 22d a red-tabbed British captain
the flood of vehicles streaming into St. arrived at General Hasbrouck’s head-
Vith was out of control. For some hours quarters, introducing himself as one of
the columns could move neither forward the field marshal’s liaison officers. Po-
nor back, and when Field Marshal Model litely he asked Hasbrouck what he
arrived on the scene he was forced to thought should be done with the 7th
dismount and make his way into the Armored. T h e general answered that the
city on foot. Corps and division military division naturally would continue to de-
police, too few in number for a traffic fend if its present position was con-
problem of this magnitude, were brushed sidered to be vital but that he personally
aside. T h e volks grenadier officers who favored withdrawal.5
tried to restore some semblance of order Hasbrouck’s answer and a report on
found the SS officers of the army units the existing state of the American forces
truculent and unyielding. Divisional were taken to Montgomery. Mean-
and corps artillery, emplaced with great while Hasbrouck dispatched a memo-
effort in the woods east of the city, now
5Montgomery’s first source of information on the
had to be snaked out along the narrow, American situation and, subsequently, his best
muddy, woods trails and wedged piece liaison agency with the American commanders
by piece onto the overburdened roads was the British intelligence-communications organi-
zation known as Phantom. T h e Phantom officers
entering St. Vith. Even the batteries were particularly welcome at Hodges’ headquarters
supporting the 62d Volks Grenadier and Collins’ VII Corps headquarters, a partial
Division on the south flank were explanation of the close tie-in between Montgomery
and these particular commands. See R. J. T. Hills,
brought to a standstill in the mire on the Phantom Was There (London: Edward Arnold &
bypass through Galhausen. Co., 1951).
412 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

randum to the XVIII Airborne Corps German advance against the north flank
commander setting forth the hard facts of CCB, 7th Armored, in the Rodt sector.
of the case already put to the British General Hasbrouck now had a postscript
captain. to add, one bringing tenseness and
urgency to the precise military form and
. . . Unless assistance is promptly forth- phraseology of the main text.
coming I believe our present position may
become serious for several reasons, namely:
a. Our supplies must come in through a P.S. A strong attack has just developed
bottleneck over a bridge near Vielsalm. b. against Clarke again. He is being out-
We may become subjected to enemy artil- flanked and is retiring west another 2,000
lery fire from practically any direction. c. yards refusing both flanks. I am throwing
The road net within our position is in my last chips to halt him. Hoge has
totally inadequate to the troops and ve- just reported an attack. In my opinion if
hicles concentrated therein. The map we don’t get out of here and up north of
shows many roads, but on the ground, the the 82d before night, we will not have a
majority of these are mere tracks on which 7th Armored Division left. RWH.
even a jeep bogs down if more than two
or three travel on it. d. If the 2d S S Panzer This message reached Ridgway’s head-
Division attack should succeed in driving quarters ten minutes before noon.
back the two RCTs of the 82d Airborne Hasbrouck was not alone in this ap-
Division now between Salmchâteau and prehensive view of things to come. Over
Hebronval even as little as 3000 yards we the field telephone General Jones con-
will be completely severed from any source
of supplies. curred in the opinion furnished Mont-
Since the chances of assistance in the gomery and Ridgway, but at 1250 Jones
immediate future do not seem bright, I dispatched a memo to Ridgway saying,
would like to suggest that consideration be “My intentions are to retain the ground
given to withdrawal of the 7th Armored now defended.” Without further orders
and 106th Divisions to a position to the
right (west) of the 82d Airborne Division the two commanders, their staffs, and
where they may be of assistance in halting subordinates set to work on plans for
a possible advance north by the 2d S S demolitions and a rear guard stand to
Panzer. keep the escape routes to the Salm open.
The withdrawal of CCB, 7th Armored During the afternoon the 7th Armored
Division, last night from St. Vith was ex-
pensive. So far we are missing at least one Division trains, whose officers and men
half of Clarke’s force. Of course many of had done a remarkable job in support-
them will show up, but they will be minus ing the troops in the salient, got through
weapons, ammunition, blankets and ra- one last supply column of ninety ve-
tions as well as at a low physical level. I hicles to Salmchâteau. T h e arrival
don’t think we can prevent a complete
break-through if another all-out attack of gasoline, rations, ammunition, and
comes against CCB tonight [italics sup- the presence of a few replacement ve-
plied] due largely to the fact that our hicles in the division park would make
original three infantry battalions have at the last-ditch stand or withdrawal,
present melted to the equivalent of only whichever it might be, a little easier.
two very tired battalions.
In the middle of the afternoon the
It was about an hour before noon. order came-withdraw. Montgomery had
Hasbrouck had not yet sent his message consulted with General Hodges, the
to Ridgway when word came of the First Army commander, and here
ST. VITH IS LOST 413

showed the ability to honor the fighting one of the roads would be serious. T h e
man which had endeared him to the 7th Armored Division, CCB of the 9th
hearts of the Desert Rats in North Armored, the remnants of the 106th
Africa: “They can come back with all Division, and the sizable attached units
honor. They come back to the more all would have to make their westward
secure positions. They put up a wonder- exit through a 3,000-yard-wide bottle-
ful show.” The First Army commander, neck with only two bridges, those span-
tired and worried from the strain under ning the Salm River at Vielsalm and
which he had lived since 16 December, Salmchâteau. T o achieve the tight con-
agreed to the withdrawal.6 trol needed in this type of operation
In the chain of command only General General Ridgway ordered General Has-
Ridgway demurred. He still hoped to brouck to take charge of all the troops
counterattack and restore the line in the ring, General Jones becoming
Malmédy–St. Vith. As an airborne com- assistant to the corps commander and
mander thoroughly indoctrinated in the General Hoge being named deputy com-
concept of isolated action by units cut mander of the 7th Armored.
off from friendly ground contact and T h e plan for withdrawal, slowly and
supply he took a sanguine view of the carefully worked out by Hasbrouck and
ability of the goose-egg defenders to hold Colonel Ryan on the evening of the 22d,
until the projected corps counterattack envisaged a progressive siphoning from
relieved them. This optimism, as the the units farthest to the east in which
record shows, was not shared by the these troops passed gradually into the
commanders in the ring itself. At 1500 main routes leading to the bridges while
a radio message from the XVIII Air- rear guard forces staged holding actions
borne Corps headquarters informed in echelon along the roads and trails.
Hasbrouck that the “request of CG, 7 Originally three routes were chosen: a
AD” for withdrawal had been approved. northern route along the Poteau-Viel-
With this concrete mission assigned, salm road; a center route from Comman-
planning began for the extremely diffi- ster to the Vielsalm bridge (nothing
cult job of disengaging from an enemy more than a poor woods road); and
who might continue the attack at any a southern route via Maldingen, Beho,
moment. Even as a logistical exercise and Bovigny, thence north along the
withdrawal presented a tricky staff prob- Salm valley road to the Salmchâteau
lem. T h e roads to be used were few bridge and east along the Salmchâteau-
and in poor state, the troops and vehicles La Roche road by way of the Baraque
to be moved were so numerous that a de Fraiture crossroads, which at this
thirty-minute gap in a column on any time was still in American hands.
6 T h e role played by Montgomery while in General Ridgway estimated that Has-
command on the north flank of the Ardennes is brouck’s troops would have fourteen
described in two of his books: Field Marshal
Montgomery of Alamein, Normandy to the Baltic
hours of darkness in which to make their
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948) and getaway. But at least four hours were
T h e Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount consumed in drafting the plan and dis-
Montgomery of Alamein (Cleveland, Ohio: T h e
World Publishing Company, 1958). For the numer-
patching liaison officers, who had to
ous visits to General Hodges see the Sylvan Diary. memorize the general plan and the
414 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

specific instructions for the unit to which were well posted. A protective barrage
they were sent. At 0030 on the 23d dropped in a half moon, sometimes no
General Hasbrouck informed General more than three hundred yards in front
Hoge that his combat command, which of the American foxholes, checked part
was to initiate the move west, would of the 190th Grenadier Regiment east
begin withdrawal at 0200. By this time of Crombach. But some Germans filtered
both Hoge’s and Clarke’s combat com- into town from the north and started
mands were under attack. T h e two com- hunting down the American tanks and
manders consulted, agreed that Hoge assault guns. With little protection
could not break loose and thus expose against the German bazooka teams a
Clarke to encirclement from the rear, number of the fighting vehicles pulled
and telephoned Hasbrouck at his com- out of danger. Colonel Wemple and
mand post in Vielsalm that the with- other officers restored a line, but when
drawal must be delayed. Meanwhile the daylight came it was hard to tell whether
hours of darkness were slipping away. friend or foe really held Crombach.
The bulk of the LXVI Corps re- T h e left battalion of the 190th made
mained wedged in the streets of St. Vith use of the predawn hours on the 23d
or backed up along the roads funneling to renew the push along Braunlauf
in from the east. But the combat eche- Creek (on the north flank of Hoge’s
lons of the two regiments of the 62d combat command) , which had been
Volks Grenadier Division which had by- beaten back by the American tankers
passed the city on the south were in posi- early in the day. This time the enemy
tion by the night of the 22d to renew the gained Neubrueck and held it, feeding
attack. A few tanks, light armed recon- in more troops hourly from the assembly
naissance troops, most of the division area of Galhausen. Horse-drawn artillery
engineers, and considerable rifle strength succeeded in getting into position near-
struck through the dark against the east- by and had a share in the action. T h e left
ern arc of the loosely organized Ameri- flank of CCB, 7th Armored, folded back
can ring. At first there was no artillery to the southwest. Then Hoge’s center
forward to give weight to the assault, was hit, at this point by the 164th
but densely wooded approaches and Grenadier Regiment whose troops got
darkness gave the advantage to the at- into Grufflange in the darkness and over-
tackers. ran a medium tank platoon. The situa-
At Crombach, in the sector held by tion at Grufflange was so confused that
CCB, 7th Armored, the attack came in neither Americans nor Germans reacted
along the railroad, and the American to the fight there, either to seal off the
tanks again were blinded by high sector or to continue the penetration.
velocity flares which gave the first clear Meanwhile, as dawn drew near, the left
shot to the enemy armor. East of the wing of the 164th moved against
village American infantry and engineers Thommen, where a cavalry platoon held
were aided by friendly gunners, for the an outpost to the south of the main
434th Armored Field Artillery Battalion CCB, 9th Armored, lines. A heavy bar-
had received some ammunition when the rage (the 62d Volks Grenadier Division
trains came in and its forward observers by this time had a number of pieces
ST. VITH IS LOST 415

in firing position) and a massed infantry whether circumstances are favorable or


assault drove the troopers out. When not if we are [to] carry out any kind of
ordered back into the village the cavalry- withdrawal with equipment. Inform me of
your situation at once particularly with re-
men found it jammed with German in- gard to possibility of disengagement and
fantry. execution of withdrawal.
By daylight small hostile groups had
pushed far to the west in the sectors General Hoge, whose combat com-
of the two armored combat commands. mand was first in the march table, was
Some had even climbed out of the able to give a favorable answer, but
Braunlauf valley and engaged in scat- all this last-minute improvisation took
tering fire against the battalion of the time. As a result, orders charging CCB,
424th Infantry in the reserve position 9th Armored, to pull out at 0600 were
at Maldingen. In general, however, the received in Hoge’s command post at
battle was waning all along the eastern 0605. About ten minutes later the with-
arc, bringing a brief respite to the men drawal commenced, running smoothly
in the foxholes, now subjected to a to conclusion. One tank company was
freezing, blasting wind after hours of left as rear guard north of Maldingen,
fighting in snow and slush. Although there blocking the approach from the
no major disruption had occurred in the German concentration area at Gal-
ring defense, the night attacks had de- hausen, but the enemy reacted slowly
veloped cracks in the line at Crombach and the rear guard got away with the loss
and in the valley of the Braunlauf of only two tanks. A small cavalry de-
which would widen under a little more tachment, Task Force Lindsey (Capt.
pressure. Most important, the 62d Volks Franklin P. Lindsey, Jr.), remained
Grenadier Division had robbed the through the morning, screening the
Americans of their chance for a night exit route at its Maldingen entrance.
withdrawal. T h e first phase of the withdrawal had
At Vielsalm General Hasbrouck been auspicious. Be it noted, however,
waited impatiently for word that the two that the southern route (via Beho,
harassed combat commands were ready Salmchâteau, and through the 82d Air-
to disengage. He was acutely conscious borne lines at Lierneux) followed a
of the narrow margin of protection af- hard-surfaced motor road, that as yet
forded by the 82d Airborne Division and there was little traffic congestion, and
worried lest a northward attack by the that the enemy efforts prior to the with-
incoming 2d SS Panzer Division beat drawal had not disorganized the com-
back the west flank of the 82d and mand but had simply forced its left flank
close off the Salm River exits once and closer to the avenue of escape.
for all. Finally, at 0500, this message T h e southern force of CCB, 7th Ar-
went out from the command post of the mored, under Colonel Wemple, was next
7th Armored Division: to go, the plan calling for a move south
through Braunlauf and onto the route
The situation is such on the west of the traveled by Hoge’s columns. Wemple’s
river south of [the] 82d that if we don’t
join them soon the opportunity will be task had been complicated by the events
over. It will be necessary to disengage of the night, since the Germans had
416 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

won partial control of Crombach and The bulk of CCB, 7th Armored Divi-
were sitting across the road in the rear sion, represented by Task Force Lohse
of the American tanks and riflemen to (formerly Erlenbusch), commanded by
the east of the village. But the assault Maj. Leslie A. Lohse, and Task Force
guns which had pulled out of Crombach Boylan, started to withdraw shortly after
and gone south during the night battle daybreak, Boylan’s command acting as
now came handily into play. At 0718 the division rear guard. Maneuver by
Wemple sent the guns blazing into the these elements of CCB was rigidly con-
western side of the village in an attempt stricted by the presence of the Fuehrer
by smoke and shell to drive the Germans Begleit armor in the north around Rodt
off the streets. and by the German hold on Crombach.
The enemy grenadiers and gunners Access to the Poteau-Vielsalm route in
refused to stay put. When the American the north or the Beho-Salmchâteau
tanks rolled in from the east, two of route in the south was no longer possible.
the leaders were hit by antitank fire There remained a narrow, rutted trail
and left helplessly blocking the road. running from Hinderhausen (around
Fate took a hand to save the rest of which Task Force Boylan was deployed)
the column. During the night a quick west through the woods to the crossroads
freeze had hardened the ground just at Commanster, from which a secondary
enough to allow the tanks and half- road ran to the bridge at Vielsalm. This
tracks from the east, covered with cling- jeep trail–it was no more–had been
ing foot troops, to swing cross-country reconnoitered by General Clarke on the
and south to the Braunlauf road. Even 22d and designated (with much mis-
so, a number of vehicles mired and had giving) as an emergency exit. The
to be abandoned at the soft banks of emergency had arrived, fortunately along
a small stream. At Braunlauf the col- with the sudden freeze that gave a
umn found a company of the 424th surface hard enough to bear the weight
Infantry in a fire fight with German of armored vehicles. Even so the one-
infantry who had sneaked in during the way trail was a poor and precarious
night. T h e tankers, mindful of their road to safety; a sudden thaw or one
passengers, could not use the tank can- tank askew could trap both Lohse and
non; so the column rolled through the Boylan.
streets with the infantry riders firing While Boylan’s men took positions to
wildly in every direction. The Germans defend Hinderhausen against attack
were somewhat disconcerted, but snipers from Rodt, Lohse’s heavy column formed
accounted for two American officers. T h e to enter the trail at Hinderhausen.
rest of the journey behind Hoge’s col- It consisted of four tank companies, two
umns into the 82d Airborne lines was cavalry reconnaissance troops, a com-
without incident. By noon most of the pany of tank destroyers, and many foot
424th Infantry and Wemple’s force were soldiers hitchhiking on the vehicles. The
across the Salm. Of the southern half move had no more than started when
of the original ring there remained only the Fuehrer Begleit Brigade descended
the rear guard and covering forces strung on Hinderhausen. While Boylan took on
along the roads east of Salmchâteau. the Germans, Lohse’s column circled
ST. VITH IS LOST 417

the village, then funneled slowly into the maneuvered into position to renew the
woods. One tank threw its track on the attack, the Americans broke free and
one-way stretch but obligingly coasted fell back toward Commanster. German
off the trail and into the trees. At infantry and a few tanks pursued but
Commanster a traffic jam started. Most were held off until the last of the CCB
of the nine field artillery battalions in column had been pushed through the
the ring had been grouped in this area village and was on its way northwest
and their displacement–while some bat- to the Vielsalm bridge.
teries remained to keep u p fire–was a Colonel Boylan led the rear guard
slow, painful process. General Clarke back toward the bridge but then was
took a hand here as a kind of super ordered, because of a traffic jam at the
traffic cop until the jam cleared. By noon bridge, to hold on the east bank until
Task Force Lohse and most of the artil- the 7th Armored Division headquarters
lery had crossed the river at Vielsalm. could cross. This covering force con-
Having cut the St. Vith–Vielsalm road sisted of a few light tanks, a couple of
by capturing Rodt in the late morning tank destroyers and a few rifle squads
of the 22d, Remer’s Fuehrer Begleit from the 112th Infantry. The Fuehrer
Brigade made no serious attempt to push Begleit Brigade did not follow CCB.
beyond Rodt, either against CCA, 7th Remer’s orders were to join the LVIII
Armored Division, to the west or CCB Panzer Corps west of the Salm, and his
to the south. Remer’s heavy Panthers immediate design was to reach the paved
had made bad going of the muddy roads road leading to Salmchâteau. The motor-
north of Rodt. Only a few arrived in ized rifle battalion, now led by an as-
time to take part in the battle there; sault gun company, headed south toward
for the rest of the day and far into the the road center at Beho, found it free
night the Panthers crawled into the of American troops, and there joined a
Rodt assembly area. T h e Fuehrer part of the 62d Volks Grenadier Divi-
Begleit trains could not negotiate the sion. T h e time now was midafternoon.
churned and mired trails at all. They Task Force Lindsey, whose cavalry
would have to be threaded through the and infantry had screened the main with-
St. Vith bottleneck. drawal of the southern segment of the
In the early morning of 23 December ring, had come under damaging shell-
Remer gathered a truck-mounted bat- fire as the 62d Volks Grenadier Division
talion of armored infantry, put some artillery got into position. About 1315
tanks at their head, and started them the task force fell back through Beho
for Hinderhausen, with the intention of and proceeded west to Salmchâteau,
cutting south across the rear of the picking up other small blocking groups
Americans. About 0800 the Panthers en- as it went. Thus far events in the
gaged the small covering force at southern sector had gone well for the
Hinderhausen. A brace of 90-mm. tank Americans. There remained the task of
destroyers knocked out two of the lead evacuating the blocking force which for
tanks, temporarily halting the attack so long had held the southernmost out-
and giving Lohse’s column time to reach posts of the St. Vith salient. This was
Commanster. When the Germans finally Task Force Jones, assembling in the
418 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

middle of the afternoon at Bovigny some assault guns in the 9th SS Panzer Divi-
three and a half miles south of Salm- sion screen mistook the newcomers for a
château on the west side of the Salm withdrawing American column and
River. To protect the valley corridor poured in heavy flanking fire. It was
through which Task Force Jones would some hours later–and the Americans
have to move some companies of the had decamped–when the 293d finally
112th Infantry were still left east of the entered Poteau.
river in the villages of Rogery and Poteau lends itself well to defensive
Cierreux. action. It stands at the entrance to the
When CCB of the 9th Armored, the valley road which leads to Vielsalm, and
424th Infantry, and the larger part of mechanized attack from either Recht or
CCB, 7th Armored, had peeled away in Rodt had to funnel through the narrow
layers from the ring, the last two combat neck at this crossroads, vehicle maneuver
commands of the 7th Armored defend- off either of the two approaches being
ing the Poteau-Vielsalm highway had almost impossible. Away from the cross-
to be drawn off. At Poteau, five miles roads the ground rises sharply and is
from the river, CCA stood facing the cluttered with thick stands of timber.
enemy to north, east, and south. CCR T h e formation adopted by CCA was
maintained its cordon along the valley based on a semicircle of ten medium
road. T h e Americans did not know that tanks fronting from northwest to east,
the troops of the 9th SS Panzer Division, backed by tank destroyers and with rifle-
who in past days had made raids from men in a foxhole line well to the front.
Recht southwest toward Poteau, were About 1035 the blocking troops left by
few in number and that only the day the 9th SS Panzer Division made an
before the main body of the 9th SS attack. Tank and artillery fire stopped
Panzer Division had started on a forced the Germans just as it had on previous
march to the northwest in an attempt days. Perhaps the enemy would have
to break through to Kampfgruppe returned to the fray and made the final
Peiper, now nearing the end of its tether. withdrawal hazardous, but shortly after
T h e German force left at Recht was no noon some P–38’s of the 370th Fighter
more than a screen, although under Group, unable to make contact with the
orders to maintain pressure on Poteau. 82d Airborne Division control to which
T o the east of CCA, 7th Armored they were assigned, went to work for
Division, however, some part of the 293d the 7th Armored Division, bombing
Regiment of the 18th Volks Grenadier and strafing along the road to Recht.
Division finally had worked its way The enemy recovery was slow.
through St. Vith, arriving during the At 1345 Hasbrouck sent the signal for
night of 2 2 December at Rodt. After CCA to pull out. In an hour the armored
some confusion in getting through the infantry were out of their holes and
Fuehrer Begleit Brigade around Rodt their half-tracks were clanking down the
on the morning of 23 December, the road to Vielsalm. Forty minutes later
293d continued along the road to Po- the tanks left Poteau, moving fast and
teau. Again a confused command situa- exchanging shots with German tanks,
tion took its price. T h e infantry and while the 275th Armored Field Artillery
ST. VITH IS LOST 419

fired a few final salvos to discourage the 82d Airborne engineers tried to blow
pursuit. When the last vehicle of CCA the bridge the charge failed to explode.
roared over the Vielsalm bridge (at 1620) It was after midnight when the engineers
the remaining artillery followed; then finally reported that the charge had been
came the little force from CCR which replaced and successfully detonated.7
had held the road open while CCA made Even then the span was only partially
its withdrawal. Darkness descended over wrecked and was still capable of bearing
the Salm valley as CCR sped across the foot troops; but the German tanks mill-
Vielsalm bridge. ing about the burning buildings east of
T h e vacuum which had existed for the river would have to find other means
some hours in the northern reaches of of crossing the Salm.
the one-time ring had filled rapidly in As for the last American troops extri-
the late afternoon as the 18th Volks cated from the ring, Task Force Jones,
Grenadier Division brought its infantry it will be recalled, had assembled at
out of St. Vith. Through most of the Bovigny, south of Salmchâteau and on
23d, confusion and immobility char- the west bank of the river, while ele-
acterized the St. Vith bottleneck. But ments of the 112th Infantry waited east
the process of disentangling this mass of the river at Rogery and Cierreux for
of men and vehicles was speeded up the withdrawal order from General Has-
considerably during the afternoon when brouck. T h e Germans driving on Salm-
the 402d and 485th Squadrons (370th château were held in tighter control
Fighter Group) winged their bombs than those advancing toward Vielsalm
onto the city and its approaches. By and moved with greater speed and co-
dark the 293d Regiment was march- ordination. Around 1500 the mobile col-
ing through Poteau and the rest of the umn of the Fuehrer Begleit Brigade
infantry formations of the division were appeared in front of Rogery. There two
jumbled along a five-mile front on the companies of the 1st Battalion, 112th
east side of the Salm. Control, as the Infantry, were deployed, guarding a
18th’s commander later reported, was draw and secondary road which provided
almost nonexistent. As a result the small quick access to the Salm valley at a
body of riflemen from the 112th Infantry point midway between Jones’s assembly
and Boylan’s tiny armored rear guard area at Bovigny and Salmchâteau. Lack-
were able to see the headquarters of the ing armored or other antitank means,
7th Armored safely across the Vielsalm the American infantry fell back in some
bridge and to withdraw themselves confusion through the draw to Cierreux,
through that city without much inter- less than a half-mile east of the river.
ference from the enemy closing along General Hasbrouck was apprised of this
the river. This was sometime after 1900. new enemy threat; by what he later
Although troops of the 18th Volizs remembered as “one of the funniest
Grenadier Division or the 9th SS Panzer 7 1st Lt. George D. Lamm of the 508th Parachute
Division fired on Boylan as his detach- Infantry led a series of charges to hold back the
ment reached the river, they made no Germans while the bridge was being prepared
attempt to rush the bridge–a fortunate for demolition; thereafter he braved the enemy
fire to detonate the explosives himself. He was
circumstance, as it turned out, for when given the DSC.
420 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

orders I ever issued,” the 7th Armored officer, Col. William F. Train, and a few
commander sent his “division reserve” other officers set to work to organize a
-two tank destroyers–hurrying south breakout.
from Vielsalm. One of the tank destroy- Actually the column was blocked at
ers arrived just as a German tank pla- Salmchâteau before the pursuing troops
toon hove into sight at Cierreux, hit the of the Fuehrer Begleit Brigade caught
two leaders, and drove off the five re- up with the tail. This bridgehead village
maining tanks. During the lull that lay in the outpost line of the 508th
followed, a platoon of light cavalry tanks Parachute Infantry. Just north, the wing
and a section of towed tank destroyers of the 82d Airborne defense running
came east from the river road to give a west to the Baraque de Fraiture cross-
hand. roads (and junction with the 3d Ar-
Colonel Nelson, commanding the mored Division) rested on the Salm
112th Infantry, had sent a radio message River. In the late afternoon of the 23d
some time around 1300 telling Has- the single company of the 112th Infantry
brouck that the withdrawal east of the at the eastern end of the SaIm River
river had been completed, that only the bridge had been attacked by a larger
112th covering force remained. Nelson force from the 62d Volks Grenadier
waited for three hours for the division Division. T h e Americans had blown the
order to withdraw (a liaison officer with bridge and fallen back through Salm-
such an order had left Hasbrouck’s com- château to the lines of the 82d, where-
mand post at 1345) . Then, with German upon a few of the Germans crossed the
tanks only two hundred yards from the river and entered the village. T h e
regimental command post, lacking any stopper was more firmly seated in the
communication with the 7th Armored bottleneck just at dark with the arrival
headquarters, and out of touch with what of a detachment from the 2d SS Panzer
was happening elsewhere, he gave the Division coming in from the southwest.
word to pull out of Salmchâteau. By While the 2d SS Panzer Division
this time Task Force Jones was moving was awaiting the gasoline needed for
along the Bovigny-Salmchâteau road its projected attack north along the
which traversed the narrow defile cut seam between the 82d Airborne Di-
by the Salm River. T h e infantry, con- vision and the 3d Armored in the Bara-
siderably disorganized, had just crossed que de Fraiture sector, the reinforced
the river west of Cierreux and started Reconnaissance Battalion (Maj. Ernst
feeding into the 2,500-yard-longcolumn Krag) had been dispatched on the 22d
on the valley road when word passed to cut the main road between Salm-
down the line that the light tanks in château and the Baraque de Fraiture
the van had been hit by enemy fire as crossroads. Krag’s detachment attacked
they entered Salmchâteau. Here was the straight north, driving in the American
column, strait-jacketed on the valley floor outposts in villages south of the road
by high ridges to either side, unable to and dropping off small parties en route
move forward or back, and with the to form blocking positions covering the
enemy apparently closing in from every eastern flank of the division advance.
side. But Colonel Nelson, his executive An attack to seize the village of Jou-
ST. VITH IS LOST 421

biéval, on the main road, was launched the mechanized force at the tail was
late in the day but was repulsed by destroyed.
the American artillery. This was not to be the end. A trail
Krag decided to shift his advance to- had been discovered leading west out
ward Salmchâteau and there possibly of the valley, and most of the middle
link up with friendly forces he knew of the column, led by a light tank
to be coming from St. Vith. He had company, escaped over it. Fortunately
available nearly three reconnaissance bright moonlight allowed some maneu-
troops and an assault gun battalion. ver. Striking northwest and fighting
His accompanying battalion of self-pro- off the small blocking forces left be-
pelled artillery was within range of hind by Kampfgruppe Krag, the bulk
Salmchâteau. A sharp attack in the of this part of the column succeeded
late afternoon brought Krag’s detach- in reaching the 82d Airborne. By mid-
ment through the American outposts night on the 23d over two hundred
in the hamlets west of Salmchâteau, men from the column had reached the
and by nightfall he had a troop in the 508th Parachute Infantry and many
south section of the town, its task others straggled in before daylight.
made easier by the preliminary shell- How many vehicles and men were cap-
ing laid in by the battalion of field tured by the enemy is impossible to
guns. From this point on Kampfgrup- say.
pe Krag fought two battles, one to There is a postscript to this story.
mop u p the town, the other to capture During Task Force Jones’s disengage-
American vehicles trying to break out ment the 440th Armored Field Artil-
of the valley road in the south. lery had emplaced to give covering fire
As the evening wore on, the leading and protect the flank of the task force.
Americans bottled up in the defile When the 440th commenced its with-
hastily organized an attack to open the drawal word came in that the Germans
exit through Salmchâteau, but there had blocked the designated crossing
was little room to deploy, and this at- site at Salmchâteau. Thereupon the
tempt failed. At the tail of the column 440th formed in column, cut loose with
disaster, in the form of the Fuehrer every available machine gun, knifed
Begleit advance guard, suddenly struck. through the startled enemy, and roared
T h e light tanks and tank destroyers, over the bridge at Vielsalm.
earlier disposed at Cierreux, and now The troops under General Has-
brought back to form the column rear brouck’s command who came back across
guard, were spotted by German scouts the Salm River were greeted by a
and set upon in the dark by assault warm letter of commendation from the
guns that lighted their targets with Supreme Commander and orders to
high velocity flares. Several of the return at once to the fight. It is
American fighting vehicles were de- difficult to determine with surety how
stroyed before they could return fire. much of the 7th Armored Division,
T o make matters worse some engineers CCB, 9th Armored, 424th Infantry,
blew a culvert, trapping the tail of 112th Infantry, and the numerous at-
the column. In sharp fighting most of tached’ units had been lost during the
422 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

fight for St. Vith and in the subsequent The losses sustained by the defend-
withdrawal. Many records were de- ers of St. Vith must be measured
stroyed during the final retreat, units against their accomplishments. They had
were put back in the line on the 23d met an entire German corps flushed
with no accounting of their existing with easy victory and halted it in its
strength, and the formations of the 106th tracks. They had firmly choked one of
Division and 14th Cavalry Group had the main enemy lines of communica-
taken very severe losses before the de- tion and forced days of delay on the
fense of St. Vith began. Casualty figures westward movement of troops, guns,
subsequently compiled for the 7th Ar- tanks, and supplies belonging to two
mored Division, and the 14th Cavalry German armies. They had given the
Group list 3,397 officers and men either XVIII Airborne Corps badly needed
killed, wounded, or missing, Statistics time to gather for a co-ordinated
on losses suffered by the various artil- and effective defense. Finally, these
lery, engineer, and tank destroyer units units had carried out a successful with-
have never been compiled. T h e 7th Ar- drawal under the most difficult condi-
mored Division (by fairly accurate reck- tions and would return again to do
oning) had lost 59 medium tanks, 29 battle.
light tanks, and 25 armored cars.8 hundred usable tanks in the forces which came
8Ridgway was told that there were about one out of St. Vith. Cf. XXIII below, pp. 582–83.
CHAPTER XVIII

The VII Corps Moves To Blunt the Salient


Thus far the story of the German went to Maj. Gen. J. F. M. Whiteley,
counteroffensive has been developed on deputy chief of staff for operations at
a geographical pattern generally from SHAEF, with a proposal which would
east to west with particular attention have very audible repercussion. T h e
given the initial battles fought by the German drive, said Strong, showed no
American forces attempting to hold the sign of turning northwest toward Liège
shoulders of the salient, the defense of but seemed to be developing on a
St. Vith, the VIII Corps’ attempt to thrust line directly to the west. This
form a barrier line across the area of meant, in his opinion, that the Ameri-
penetration, and the First Army’s efforts can forces north and south of the grow-
to extend the north flank alongside the ing salient would be split by its further
expanding bulge. While these bitter de- expansion toward the Meuse. It was his
fensive battles were being waged, Amer- idea, therefore, that two commands
ican forces were already moving to go should be created to replace General
over to the offensive in the south, Bradley’s 12th Army Group control of
for as early as 19 December General the divisive battle front, General Brad-
Eisenhower and his field commanders ley to retain command of the troops on
had laid plans for a major counterat- the southern shoulder of the salient,
tack. But before this counterattack, by Field Marshal Montgomery to take
the Third Army, takes stage center, those in the north under the wing of
three important developments are un- the British 21 Army Group. Strong’s
folding: the division of the Ardennes proposal seemed sound to Whiteley.
battlefield between Field Marshal Mont- Although both officers were British,
gomery and General Bradley, the assem- neither had broached this idea to the
bly and intervention of the VII Corps field marshal.
in an extension of the American north Whiteley immediately took his col-
shoulder, and the initial defense of the league in to see the SHAEF chief of
Bastogne sector.1 staff, Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith.
General Smith, famous in the head-
Division of the Battlefield quarters for his hair-trigger temper, first
reacted negatively and with considerable
Late on Tuesday evening, 19 De- heat, then cooled off and admitted the
cember, Maj. Gen. Kenneth w. D. logic of the proposal. Sometime that
Strong, the SHAEF chief of intelligence, same evening Smith telephoned Brad-
1 This last will be the subject of the next ley. Bradley was none too sympathetic
chapter. toward the idea but did concede that
424 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Montgomery would be more apt to T h e decision to pass the U.S. First


throw British reserves into the battle and Ninth Armies to British command
under such a command arrangement. must have been hard to make, since
T h e next morning Smith brought up the both Eisenhower and Smith were acute-
matter in the Supreme Commander's ly conscious of the smoldering animos-
usual meeting with his staff. Eisenhower ity toward the British in general and
in his turn telephoned Bradley, who Montgomery in particular which exist-
agreed to the division of command. ed in the headquarters of the 12th
The new army group boundary line, Army Group and Third Army, not to
now ordered by Eisenhower, would ex- mention the chronic anti-British senti-
tend from Givet, on the Meuse, to St. ment which might be anticipated from
Vith. (That both these locations would some circles in Washington.3 This de-
be Montgomery's responsibility was not cision involved no question of Bradley's
clarified until nearly twenty-four hours ability as a commander–that had been
later.) T h e reorganization placed the abundantly proven–but rather was a rec-
U.S. First and Ninth Armies under ognition of the communications prob-
Montgomery's 21 Army Group. Bradley lem presented by the German thrust
would command all forces to the south between Bradley’s headquarters in Lux-
of the salient–which in effect meant embourg City and Hodges’ headquar-
Patton's Third Army–and eventually he ters, which had been moved on the 19th
might add Devers’ 6th Army Group. from Spa to Chaudfontaine.
The reorganization required a like shift Face-to-face discussion between Brad-
in the Allied air forces, meaning that ley and Hodges–let alone Simpson–so
the U.S. IX and XXIX Tactical Air needful if the army group commander
Commands (Maj. Gen. Elwood R. was to give the continuous encourage-
Quesada and Maj. Gen. Richard E. ment and counsel demanded in these
Nugent) were put under the operation- trying days, was already difficult. If
al control of the British Second Tac- German raiders crossed the Meuse, it
tical Air Force commanded by Air Chief might become impossible. Bradley had
Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham. Be- last visited Hodges in the early evening
cause the British had very strong forces of the 17th by motoring directly from
of fighter-bombers, enough of these Paris. Further visits would involve tra-
planes were taken from IX Tactical versing three sides of a square: west
Air Command to give Brig. Gen. Otto from Luxembourg across the Meuse
P. Weyland's XIX Tactical Air Com- (and perhaps as far west as Reims),
mand, slated to support Patton's coun- north into Belgium, then east again be-
terattack into the German bulge, ten hind the none too certain American
fighter-bomber groups. 2 front. Telephone and radio contact still
existed; indeed, Bradley talked half a
2 Daily notes kept by the Chief of the Air Staff,
dozen times on the 18th with Hodges
SHAEF, Air Marshal James M. Robb on the meet- and General Kean, the First Army chief
ings held in the Supreme Commander's office, of staff, and at least twice on the 20th.
SHAEF (Main), in OCMH files (hereafter cited
as Robb Notes) ; SHAEF (Main) files: Montgomery 3Pogue, T h e Supreme Command, pp. 378–80
to Eisenhower. and n.; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 355.
T H E VII CORPS MOVES T O BLUNT T H E SALIENT 425

CAR BEARING
GENERAL
BRADLEY
FORDSA BELGIAN
RIVER

But this was hardly a satisfactory substi- on guard duty at Jemelle, were or-
tute for personal presence. dered out when the enemy was in sight
T h e 12th Army Group had approx- of the station. Very high frequency radio
imately fifty important wire circuits stations seem to have been available
on 16 December between Luxembourg throughout the battle but transmission
and First and Ninth Armies, these ex- did not carry very far and had to be
tending laterally to link the three head- relayed. These stations twice had to be
quarters in sequence. T h e mainstay moved farther west to avoid capture.
and trunk line of this system was a com- Nonetheless the Signal Corps would
bination open-wire and buried cable succeed in maintaining a minimum
line from Aubange, near Luxembourg, service, except for short interruptions,
via Jemelle to Namur and Liège. Jem- by stringing wire back into France and
elle was a repeater station (near Mar- through the various army rear areas.
che) and the key to the whole northern Whether this would have sufficed for the
network. As it turned out the Germans 12th Army Group to exercise adminis-
subsequently cut both the wire line and trative as well as tactical control of the
cable; the signal operators, as well as First and Ninth Armies from Luxem-
a rifle platoon and a few light tanks bourg is problematical.
426 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

A British major presented himself at the German drive if it reached the


the First Army headquarters about two- Meuse River south of Givet was still
thirty on the morning of the 20th. Ush- open to question.
ered up to Hodges’ bedroom he told News of the decision to split the Amer-
the general and Kean that Montgomery ican forces battling in the Bulge came
was moving 30 British Corps (Lt. Gen. to the First Army later in the morning
B.G. Horrocks) south into the Has- when Bradley telephoned this word.
selt–Louvain–St. Trond area to back Montgomery himself arrived at Hodges’
up the Meuse line if needed, that four command post an hour or so after noon,
divisions were on the way and a fifth commencing a series of daily visits. He
would follow. Further, he said, the Brit- promptly agreed with Hodges that the
ish were taking over the responsibility V Corps’ position jamming the German
for the Meuse bridges at Namur, northern shoulder would have to be
Liège, Huy, and Givet. One of Hodges’ held at any cost and concurred in the
main worries could now be shouldered handling of the XVIII Airborne Corps
by somebody else. Whether there would as it had been deployed in the past
be a sufficient force available to halt thirty-six hours. Eisenhower’s formal or-

GENERAL COLLINS, FIELD MARSHAL MONTGOMERY, AND GENERAL RIDGWAY, after


a conference at VII Corps headquarters.
T H E VII CORPS MOVES T O BLUNT T H E SALIENT 427

der placing the First and Ninth Armies be taken from the Ninth Army reserve.
under Montgomery’s command stressed Collins, who considered the veteran, 2d
that the flanks of the penetration must and 3d the best armored divisions in
be held but added that all available the U.S. Army, accepted with enthusi-
reserves should be gathered to start asm. Later in the day Montgomery
counterattacks in force. Montgomery’s met with Hodges and Simpson, confirm-
problem, then, was to cover the west ing the proposed transfer of the 2d Ar-
flank of the First Army between the mored from Simpson’s command.
XVIII Airborne Corps and the Meuse
while re-forming his new command for T h e V I I Corps Assembles
the counterattack mission. It would
appear that at this juncture the field Along the Roer River front the Ninth
marshal was thinking in terms of a Army was being stripped progressively
counterattack against the western tip of its reserves as the German threat
of the salient, for he told Hodges that in the south increased. After the 7th Ar-
he wanted the most aggressive Ameri- mored and 30th Infantry Divisions had
can corps commander who could be been rushed to the First Army on 17
found and sufficient troops to launch an December, the next to go would be
attack from the area southwest of the the 84th Infantry Division (Brig. Gen.
XVIII Airborne. Alexander R. Bolling), taken out of
As to the first item, the marshal made the Geilenkirchen sector. Bolling re-
his wishes very clear: he wanted Maj. ceived orders on the night of the 19th
Gen. J. Lawton Collins (“Lightning to make ready for relief by the 102d
Joe”), whose VII Corps had been car- Infantry Division, and at noon the next
rying the left wing of the December day his leading regimental combat team,
Roer River offensive; nor would he lis- the 334th, was on the road to Belgium.
ten to any other names. Where to find At Chaudfontaine the First Army G–3
the divisions needed was more difficult. told Bolling to assemble the 84th in the
But Bradley already had ordered the Marche sector, but the First Army staff
84th Infantry Division to leave the could furnish little accurate information
Ninth Army and come in on Ridgway’s as to the location of friendly or enemy
flank, the 75th Infantry Division had troops in that area. Temporarily at-
just arrived from the United States and tached to the XVIII Airborne Corps,
would reach the battle zone in a few Bolling had no knowledge of the embryo
days, the 3d Armored Division might attack plan for the VII Corps. He was
be available in the proximate future. alerted, however, to be ready to attack
This, then, was the line-up for the new northeast or east on order.4
VII Corps when Collins reported to
Hodges in the early morning of the 21st. 4B o t h the VII Corps and the 84th Division
prepared AAR’s and G–3 journals. T h e regiments
Collins got the promise of an addition of the 84th also have AAR’s and unit journals.
to his putative force when Brig. David T h e semiofficial history of the latter division was
Belchem, 21 Army Group chief of opera- prepared by a member of the division, Lt. Theo-
dore Draper, T h e 84th Infantry Division in the
tions, who was visiting headquarters, Battle of Germany, November 1944–May 1945
suggested that the 2d Armored Division (New York: T h e Viking Press, 1946). See also
428 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE

Two hours before midnight on 20 suffused with the upland marshes and
December the leading troops of the 84th bogs so common to the Ardennes ex-
entered Marche. The remainder of the tended as far south as St. Hubert. Marche
division was coming out of the line was the central and controlling road
about the same time, ready to begin the junction for the entire area between the
seventy-five-milemove from Germany to middle Ourthe and the Meuse. Here
Belgium. As it stood it would be some crossed two extremely important paved
twenty-four hours before Bolling could highways; that running south from
be sure of having the entire division Liège to Sedan; and N4, the Lux-
in hand. T h e 84th had been blooded on embourg City–Namur road which ran
the West Wall fortifications in the diagonally from Bastogne northwest to
Geilenkirchen sector and had spent a Namur and the Meuse with an offshoot
month in combat before the move south. to Dinant. Eight miles south and west
Battalions had been rotated in the front of Marche the Liège-Sedan highway
lines and were less battle-weary than passed through the town of Rochefort, at
many of the troops thrown into the which point secondary but hard-surfaced
Ardennes, but losses had been heavy and roads broke away to the west, north,
the division was short 1,278 men. and southwest. Rochefort, by road, was
T h e area in which the 84th Division approximately twenty miles from Din-
(and the VII Corps) would assemble ant and the Meuse. Marche was some
was high and rolling. There was no twenty-eight miles from Bastogne and
well-defined system of ridges but in- about the same distance from the
stead a series of broad plateaus separat- confluence of the Sambre and Meuse
ed by deep-cut valleys. Although some at Namur. T h e entire area was rich in
sections were heavily forested, in gen- all-weather primary and secondary roads.
eral the countryside was given over to (Map VIII)
farm and pasture land dotted with small In the small, dark hours of 21 De-
wood lots. Concealment was possible in cember while the leading regimental
the narrow stream valley and the larger team of the 84th Infantry Division was
forests. The sector in question was outposting Marche and bedding down
bounded on the east by the Ourthe in the town, the advance guard of the
River, a natural barrier of considerable crack 2d Panzer Division bivouacked on
significance. At a right angle to the the west bank of the Ourthe only fifteen
Ourthe another and less difficult river miles away. Neither of these future
line composed of the Lesse and its tribu- antagonists had knowledge of the other.
tary, L’Homme, ran south of Marche, At this point in the battle, the Fifth
through Rochefort, and into the Meuse Panzer Army had taken the lead from
near Dinant. Beyond Marche a plateau the Sixth, whose hell-for-leather Peiper
had run his tanks into a net on the north
Cpl. Perry S. Wolff, A History of the 334th In-
fantry (Mannheim, Germany: Mannheimer Gross-
flank. Two armored divisions from the
druckerei, 1945). The tank battalion supporting F i f t h were driving for the gap which
the 84th also has published its combat record: German reconnaissance had found open
Capt. E. Castagna, T h e History of the 771st Tank
Battalion (Berkeley, Calif.: Lederer, Street & Zeus between the XVIII Airborne Corps and
Co., Inc., 1946). the VIII Corps. In the north the 116th
T H E VII CORPS MOVES T O BLUNT T H E SALIENT 429

Panzer Division had righted itself, after only by forward patrols of the 2d Pan-
the countermarch ordered on the night zer Division and the 116th, the two
of 19 December, and had pushed the spearhead formations separated by the
attack over Samrée on the 20th. The Ourthe River and, in ensuing days, fight-
order for the following day was to cross ing distinctly separatebattles. 5
the Ourthe in the neighborhood of Hot- The commander of the 84th Infantry
ton, just northeast of Marche, before the Division set up his command post in
Americans could bring troops into the Marche on the late afternoon of 21 De-
area, and thus open the road straight to cember under order to assemble his
the Meuse. The 116th Panzer had lost at division in this area. T h e enemy, so far
least twenty-four hours by the counter- as he knew, was some miles away. T h e
march on the 19th, for on that night its only friendly troops he found in the
armored cars had been as far west as the neighborhood were those of the 51st En-
Bastogne-Marche road. In the neigh- gineer Combat Battalion, whose com-
boring corps to the south, the 2d Panzer mand post was located in Marche. This
Division finally had taken Noville on the battalion was part of the small engineer
20th and been ordered to head for force which the VIII Corps had gath-
Namur, disregarding the fight which had ered to construct the barrier line along
flared up from Bastogne. When its re- the Ourthe River. T h e engineer com-
connaissance battalion seized the Ourthe mander, Colonel Fraser, spread out his
bridge at Ortheuville, shortly after mid- two companies at roadblocks and dem-
night, the road to Marche and Namur olition sites all the way from Hotton,
opened invitingly. Luettwitz, the XL VII on the river, to a point just south of
Panzer Corps commander, ordered Lau- the Champlon crossroads on the Bas-
chert to disengage the 2d Panzer Divi- togne-Marche highway. This latter road-
sion north of Bastogne and speed for the block was only three miles north of the
Meuse. Ortheuville bridge, which the 2 d Panzer
Here, then, were two armored divi- advance guard wrested from the detach-
sions from two different corps striking ment of the 158th- Engineer Combat
out for the Meuse, one in the possession Battalion during the night of 20 De-
of a crossing on the Ourthe, one ex- cember.
pecting to seize a crossing in only a A few German patrols probed at the
few hours, but both divisions with their roadblock before dawn but no attempt
flanks uncovered and both uncomfort- was made to break through. T h e Ger-
ably aware of the fact. Nonetheless the man reconnaissance troops bedded down
two corps commanders expected to in Tenneville, and batteries of the
thicken their armored thrusts within division flak rolled into position to
twenty-four hours: Luettwitz was trying guard the new bridgehead. For some
to shake the Panzer Lehr loose south hours this was all. Lauchert’s tanks
of Bastogne; Krueger had been promised were waiting for gasoline and literally
that the 2 d SS Panzer Division was on could not move. Although the 2 d Panzer
its way to the L V I I I Panzer Corps. had captured enough American trucks,
During the 21st, however, the Fifth Pan-
zer Army’s advance would be carried 5 OB WEST K T B , daily entries for this period.
430 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

jeeps, and half-tracks to motorize both T h e first word of an attacking enemy


of its bicycle battalions, the grenadiers reached the 84th Division command
would have to start the march west on post in Marche at 0900, but the attack
foot for the same reason. Furthermore, was being made at Hotton, to the north-
fatigue had begun to tell; the 2d Panzer east, where the 116th Panzer Division
troops had been marching and fighting had thrown in an assault detachment
almost without respite since 16 De- to seize the Ourthe Bridge. General
cember. Some of the human grit was Bolling ordered his single RCT, the
beginning to slow the wheels of the mili- 334th under Lt. Col. Charles E. Hoy,
tary machine. But why Lauchert, a ruth- to establish a perimeter defense around
less and driving commander, did not Marche. Meanwhile the 5 1st Engineer
prod his reconnaissance and flak for- Combat Battalion asked for help in
ward on the morning of the 21st can the Hotton fight. But when troops of
only be surmised. the 334th reached the scene in midaf-

HOTTON, SHOWING KNOCED-OUT GERMAN TANK


T H E VII CORPS MOVES T O BLUNT T H E SALIENT 431

ternoon, the embattled engineers, aided V Corps, however, still was hard beset
by a few men from the 3d Armored and Hodges would not at this moment
Division, had halted the enemy and cut into its reserve. T h e commander of
saved the bridge–a feat of arms subse- the 84th, who did not know that a 3d
quently acknowledged by the German Armored picket still held Hotton, or-
corps and army commanders. dered the rest of his division to come
About noon Bolling received word in on a road farther to the west. By
from the XVIII Airborne Corps that midnight of the 21st, he had his en-
the 334th was to hold the enemy south tire division and the attached 771st
of the Hotton-Marche line, both these Tank Battalion assembled and in proc-
villages to be the responsibility of his ess of deploying on a line of defense.
division. A few minutes later a corps About dark, as the second R C T de-
message arrived saying that fifteen Ger- trucked, Bolling relieved the 334th of its
man tanks and an infantry company close-in defense of Marche and moved
had been reported five miles southeast the 2d and 3d Battalions out to form
of Marche in the hamlet of Bande the left flank of the division, this an-
and that they were heading west. By chored at Hotton where troops of the
this time General Bolling had a more 3d Armored finally had been met. The
precise statement of his mission, for he 335th (Col. Hugh C. Parker) deployed
had telephoned army headquarters to the right of the 334th with its right
about eleven o’clock to report the enemy flank on N4 and its line circling south
blow at Hotton and to ask whether his and east through Jamodenne and Waha.
single R C T should be committed to bat- T h e 333d (Col. Timothy A. Pedley,
tle on the Marche-Hotton line. T h e an- Jr.), last to arrive, assembled north of
swer was “Yes, hold.” T h e question Marche in the villages of Baillonville
posed by the commander of the 84th and Moresée ready to act as cover for
had been much in the minds of Hodges the open right flank of the division–and
and Collins that morning. With the army–or as the division reserve.
German armored spearheads breaking During the night the regiments
out toward the west, the risk entailed pushed out a combat outpost line,
in assembling the VII Corps piecemeal digging in on the frozen ground some
as far forward as Marche was very real, thousand yards forward of the main
and the American commanders consid- position, which extended from Hogne
ered that perhaps the corps concentra- on Highway N4 through Marloie and
tion should be made farther back to the along the pine-crested ridges southwest
north. But with the order given Bolling of Hampteau. T h e division now was in
the die was cast. position forward of the Hotton-Marche
There remained the question of how road and that vital link appeared secure.
best to bring in the rest of the 84th Earlier in the day the 51st Engineer
and the bulk of the corps. Collins asked roadblocks on the Marche-Bastogne
for CCR of the 5th Armored Division, highway had held long enough to allow
which was at Rötgen under V Corps, the 7th Armored trains to escape from
to be detailed to help the 3d Armored La Roche and reach Marche, but at
hold N4, the road from Namur. 1930 the tiny engineer detachments were
432 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

given orders to blow their demolition XVIII Airborne Corps instructed Bol-
charges and fall back to Marche, leaving ling to block all roads east, southeast,
the road to Bastogne in German hands. and south of Rochefort (seven and one-
The main task confronting the 84th half miles from Marche) until the 3d
Division as day dawned on the 22d was Armored could extend its flank to this
to determine the location of the enemy. area. A rifle company was loaded into
All through the day armored cars, light trucks and reached Rochefort in the
tanks, and infantry in jeeps and trucks late afternoon without trouble.
probed cautiously along highways and Shortly after issuing this order Ridg-
byways east, south, and west. Some of way extended the mission of the 84th.
these vehicles were shot up and the Earlier General Collins had visited the
men came back on foot; others engaged First Army to express his concern that
in brief duels with unseen foes hidden the enemy might crowd in south and
in villages and wood lots. N o German west of Marche, thus interdicting the
prisoners were taken, but it was clear planned VII Corps concentration. Ridg-
that the enemy also was feeling way’s order therefore called for the 84th
his way. At noon an order from the to extend a counterreconnaissance

84TH DIVISION MP’s CHECKING VEHICLES AT TRAFFIC CIRCLE near Marche.


T H E VII CORPS MOVES T O BLUNT T H E SALIENT 433

screen along the line Harsin-Grupont- lin at daybreak. T h e battalion of


Wellin, some ten miles south of Marche, the 335th bumped into Germans at the
at the same time sending security forces same spot, left an infantry company to
southwest to hold the vital crossroad engage the enemy, then swung back
villages at Rochefort, Wanlin, and through Marche and Humain, arriving
Beauraing, the latter nearly twenty at Rochefort in the early morning to
miles from the division command post find its own I Company in the town
at Marche. It will be recalled, as well, and no sign of the Germans.
that Ridgway had ordered the newly Although the enemy obviously was
arrived CCA of the 3d Armored Divi- in front of the 84th Infantry Division
sion to throw out a screen on the west in some strength and had shown signs
bank of the Ourthe between La Roche of increasing his forces during the 22d,
and St. Hubert as further protection the assembly of the VII Corps was
for the VII Corps assembly. At noon moving rapidly. Having turned over his
a task force from CCA was on old sector at Duren and its divisions to
its way but by dark had progressed only the XIX Corps, General Collins and
a short distance south of Marche. There some of the corps troops moved during
it halted on word that the 335th In- the day into the new VII Corps area
fantry might need help against tanks southwest of Liège. Of the divisions
seen moving north toward Marche. Part promised Collins the 84th was in the
of the task force became involved with line, the “Hell on Wheels” 2d Armored
enemy armored vehicles near Hargi- Division closed to the rear in the area
mont and in a short, sharp fight ac- before midnight, as did the new
counted for five of them. 75th Infantry Division. T h e 3d Ar-
Bolling could free two rifle battalions mored, of course, was still bitterly
and the necessary motors for what he engaged as the right wing of the neigh-
regarded as the first-priority tasks. boring XVIII Airborne Corps. General
Early in the evening the two battalion Collins and his staff could feel at home
task forces, augmented with tanks and in this new sector, for the VII Corps had
tank destroyers, started out. The 1st Bat- driven the German forces out of the
talion of the 333d (Lt. Col. Norman area during the first two weeks of Sep-
D. Carnes) had orders to secure Wan- tember. Furthermore Collins had visited
lin and bar the Neufchâteau road to Bolling’s command post and was con-
Dinant on the Meuse; the 3d Battalion vinced that the 84th had matters well
of the 335th (Maj. Gordon A. Bahe) in hand.
was to hold Rochefort and cover the The First Army commander’s deep
road thence to Marche with detach- concern for his open western flank-
ments at Harsin, Hargimont, and Jem- a concern shared by Collins—was very
elle, the important repeater station. considerably relieved on the 22d when
T h e task force from the 333d tried the Field Marshal Montgomery arrived at
Rochefort road to Wanlin but ran into his headquarters with the welcome news
the enemy near Marloie and had to de- that the British 29th Armored Brigade,
tour back through Marche and round- equipped with fifty tanks, had taken
about through Haversin, reaching Wan- over the defense of the Namur, Dinant,
434 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

and Givet bridges, and would move on T h e 2d Armored assembly had been
the morrow to reconnoiter the west handled with all possible secrecy and
flank of the VII Corps assembly area. 6 the entire division was under radio
Because another twenty-four hours blackout, for Collins counted heavily on
would be needed to deploy Collins’ divi- the combination of surprise and shock in
sions and get the corps artillery into the forthcoming counterattack. Events,
position, Montgomery and Hodges however, were racing on to shatter the
agreed that the VII Corps counterattack hope that the VII Corps would be al-
on which so much depended would lowed to mount a planned and co-ordi-
commence on Sunday, the 24th. T h e nated assault. Harmon was conferring
new corps front (officially assumed by with his commanders an hour or so be-
the VII Corps at 1630 on 23 December) fore noon on the 23d, when a message
would reach from the Ourthe River on arrived that one of the armored cars out
the left to the junction of the Lesse on patrol had been shot up at a little
and Meuse on the right, approximately hamlet near Ciney, which was a criti-
fifty miles. The 2d Armored Division cal road center northwest of Marche
(Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon) was in- from which main highways debouched
tended to flesh out the right wing of the for Dinant and Namur. Without
corps when the attack began, the 84th waiting for orders, Harmon dispatched
already held the center, and the 3d Ar- CCA (Brig. Gen. John Collier) to rush
mored Division was expected to fight full speed for Ciney and cut off any
its way farther south and become the German tanks found there. This proved
left wing. Since the 75th Infantry Divi- to be a false alarm; British armored pa-
sion was as yet untried, it was to be trols were in the town and there was
kept in reserve. no sign of the enemy.
The 2d Armored Division had small By now, however, reports of large en-
patrols scouting to the west of Marche emy forces moving toward Ciney were
on the 23d, but the bulk of the divi- pouring into the corps and division
sion assembled in three combat com- command posts. There was no longer
mands well to the north of Marche any point in trying to hide the iden-
astride the main road to Huy. Its 70- tity of the 2d Armored and it appeared
mile road march (some units moved certain that battle would have to be
nearly a hundred miles) had been com- given without regard to the planned
pleted in twenty-two hours despite a corps counterattack. Harmon started his
cold rain, hazardous roads, and the de- whole division moving into line west
lay normal to armored movement in of the 84th, displaced the 14th and
column at night. All told the division 92d Field Artillery Battalions to sup-
had suffered some thirty damaged ve- port CCA, and ordered Collier to con-
hicles in traffic mishaps, including eight tinue south on the Ciney-Rochefort
tanks. (Later one officer wryly remarked, road to seize Buissonville, where twenty
“We lost more vehicles on the march heavy German tanks had been reported.
down here than in the subsequent CCA clanked through the darkness, led
fighting.”) by a task force composed of the 2d Battal-
6 Sylvan Diary, appropriate daily entries. ion, 66th Armored Regiment, and the
T H E VII CORPS MOVES T O BLUNT T H E SALIENT 435

2d Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry on the other hand few of the lower field
Regiment. About 2100 the combat com- commands had committed themselves to
mand became involved in a scrambling any fixed march calendar. As of the 21st
skirmish with some Germans who had there is no evidence in the German
dismounted from half-tracks in the vil- accounts of any pressing concern about
lage of Leignon, wheeled a few small the rate at which the Fifth Panzer Army
guns into position covering the road, and attack was proceeding. After all, Sepp
were now able to halt the Americans Dietrich’s much-touted Sixth Panzer
for some little time. By midnight Col- Army had bogged down, the Fifth was
lier’s advance guard of armored infantry well out in front, and German intelli-
was again on the move but this time gence saw no viable American forces bar-
with a more ambitious mission. T h e ring the door to the Meuse that had
sortie toward Ciney had become a full- opened between Bastogne and the main
scale attack to aid the hard-pressed 84th valley of the Ourthe.
Infantry Division and relieve those of its Manteuffel still had a few problems to
units cut off in Buissonville and Roche- solve before he could make the final
fort.7 sprint for the Meuse River in force. Fuel
deliveries for his tanks were flagging, his
German Armor Advances divisions had been fighting day and
on the VII Corps night since 16 December, a part of his
left armored corps was hung up at Bas-
When the advance guards of the 2d togne, and his armored corps on the right
Panzer Division seized the bridge over had been forced to retrace its steps with
the southern arm of the Ourthe at Or- some appreciable loss in time. Manteuf-
theuville on the 21st, they stood only six- fel’s first order, sent to the commander
teen miles by road from Marche and less of the XLVII Panzer Corps, was to get
than forty from Dinant and the Meuse. the Panzer Lehr out of the Bastogne
It is difficult to determine whether the battle. With the 2d Panzer Division, now
2d Panzer Division and Manteuffel’s free of involvement in the army center,
Fifth Panzer Army were abreast of the and with the Panzer Lehr and the 116th
German attack schedule or behind it. Panzer Divisions coming up on the left
Certainly Manteuffel was two or three and right, respectively, Manteuffel would
days behind the optimistic predictions have the armor needed for a full-blooded
generated in Hitler’s headquarters, but blow northwest to the Meuse, and
Dinant. T h e day of the 22d passed, how-
7 T h e sources for the history of the 2d Armored ever, with little activity on the part of
are about as informative and complete as is the
case with the average armored division. T h e the 2d Panzer and with little more than
AAR’s compiled by the combat commands contain regrouping by Panzer Lehr, which fi-
the bulk of the story. T h e diary maintained by the nally had to start the march with part of
division artillery commander, Col. Carl I. Hutton,
has been made available to the author. Formal the division still engaged in the fight for
publications of value are: A History of the Second Bastogne.
United States Armored Division, 1940–1946 By the morning of the 23d these two
(Atlanta: Albert Love Enterprises, 1946), and
History, 67th Armored Regiment (Burnswick, divisions were on the move, but their
Germany: Georg Westermann, 1945). component parts were widely spaced and
436 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

strung out over long miles of road. T h e the VII Corps thus far chronicled has
German troops who hit the 84th Divi- been the main column of the 2d Panzer
sion outposts and patrols during the day- Division, which on the night of 23 De-
light hours and whose appearance west cember had its head at Buissonville and
of Marche brought the 2d Armored Divi- its body snarled in a long traffic jam on
sion precipitately into action constituted the single road through Hargimont,
little more than a screen for the main Harsin, and Bande. But German ar-
body of the X L V I I Panzer Corps. By the mored cars, tanks, and motorized infan-
late afternoon, however, the advance try detachments had been encountered
guards of the 2d Panzer and Panzer Lehr west and southwest of Marche all during
had come up to the forward screen and the day. These troops belonged to the
were ready for attack. So far only the 2d Panzer reconnaissance battalion that
84th Division had been identified as during the night was attempting to re-
being in the way. T h e 2d Panzer Divi- assemble as a homogeneous striking force
sion, its first objective Marche, had the west of Buissonville astride the road to
shortest road to follow but was delayed Dinant. It was the point of this battalion
for several hours by the demolitions at which Collier’s armored infantry en-
the crossroads west of Champlon touched countered at Leignon.
off by the detachment of the 51st En- Under the new orders to attack toward
gineers. Not until early afternoon did the Rochefort, CCA had driven a few miles
leading battalion of the 304th Panzer south of Leignon when Capt. George E.
Grenadier Regiment overrun the 4th Bonney, riding at the head of the
Cavalry Group outpost at Harsin, and it column in a jeep, heard the sound of
was dark when this battalion fought its motors on the road ahead. Bonney
way into Hargimont, there severing the whirled his jeep and rode back along the
road from Marche to Rochefort. column of American half-tracks, passing
Inexplicably the forward momentum the word to pull off the road and let the
of the 2d Panzer main column ceased approaching vehicles through. When the
early in the evening. When Luettwitz, small German column was securely im-
the corps commander, hurried into pounded, the Americans cut loose with
Hargimont, he found that the attack had the .30-caliber machine guns on the half-
been halted for the night because Amer- tracks, killing thirty of the enemy and
ican tanks were reported north of the capturing a like number. Bonney had
village. Stopping briefly to tongue-lash his leg almost cut off by slugs from one
and relieve the colonel in command, of his own tanks farther back in the col-
Luettwitz put in a fresh assault detach- umn. Since the night was far spent, the
ment which pushed west as far as Buis- enemy strength and location were un-
sonville and there bivouacked. T h e certain, and his command had few if any
appearance of this force was responsible detailed maps, Collier ordered the CCA
for the reports reaching American head- task forces to reorganize and to laager
quarters shortly before midnight that until dawn. T h e leading task force by
Company E of the 333d had been this time was near the village of Haid,
trapped in Buissonville. eight miles from Rochefort.
Chief protagonist of the advance on On the day before (23 December),
T H E VII CORPS MOVES T O BLUNT T H E SALIENT 437

the Panzer Lehr had been brought for- lengthened. He did not forget his main
ward on the left wing of the 2d Panzer task, however, and sent a part of the
Division, General Manteuffel himself 902d around Rochefort to find a way
leading the march from St. Hubert. The across L’Homme River, which looped
immediate objective was the road center the town on the north. These troops
at Rochefort, for this town, like Marche, found one bridge intact, giving the
had to be secure in German hands if a Panzer Lehr access to the Dinant road.
major assault with all its impedimenta During the night Manteuffel and
was to be launched on the roads leading Luettwitz discussed the plan to seize
to Dinant. German gunners had shelled Dinant. They altered the axis of the 2d
the town in the late afternoon without Panzer attack to conform with the actual
any return fire, and just at dark, scouts tactical situation, struck Marche from
came back from Rochefort to report that the operations map as an immediate
the town was empty. Apparently the goal, and instructed Lauchert’s armor to
scouts had not entered Rochefort. If they bypass it on the southwest. Rochefort, it
had, they would have learned that the appeared, would have to be taken, but
84th Division had built up a garrison it was intended that the Panzer Lehr
there during the past twenty,-four hours. would reinforce its bridgehead force
In fact the Rochefort defense under promptly and get the attack rolling to-
Major Bahe consisted of the 3d Battal- ward Dinant while battering down the
ion (minus Company L) of the 335th; Rochefort defense. Luettwitz, a bold and
a platoon each from the 638th Tank experienced corps commander, was anx-
Destroyer Battalion, 309th Engineer ious to push on for the Meuse but
Combat Battalion, and 29th Infantry; worried about his flanks. Marche was an
plus two platoons of the regimental anti- obvious sally port through which the
tank company. Americans could pour onto the exposed
The approach to Rochefort by the St. flank of the 2d Panzer Division unless
Hubert road lay along a narrow defile something was done to cut the road
between two hills. Perhaps General Bay- north of the town and thus interdict re-
erlein’s military intuition told him that inforcement. This task had been assigned
the town was defended and that the the 116th Panzer Division, whose main
ground and the darkness presented some strength was still separated from Luett-
hazard, for he gave the order, “Also los, witz’ divisions by the Ourthe River.
Augen zu, und hinein!” (“OK, let’s go! Promising that the 116th would come
Shut your eyes and go in!”) The leading forward to cover the 2d Panzer flank,
battalion of the 902d rushed forward, Manteuffel set out by automobile to
only to be hit by cross fire from the hills give the 116th a little ginger.
and stopped cold by a formidable barri- The army group commander, Model,
cade on the road. The Germans took had said that the 9th Panzer Division
heavy casualties. Bayerlein then set to would support the 2d Panzer on 24 De-
work in systematic fashion to take Roche- cember, but neither Manteuffel nor
fort. He brought forward his guns to Luettwitz seems to have counted on its
pound the hills and the town, and appearance. While commanding the 2d
edged his troops in close as the night Panzer Division in Normandy Luettwitz
438 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

had learned the hard way about the reli- mishes flared up all along the VII Corps
ability of flank protection promised by front on 24 December. But the VII Corps
others. He had already begun to strip front was not a homogeneous line, and
troops from both of his forward divisions the German drive was not conducted by
for deployment on the shoulders of the division columns whose units were con-
thrust being readied for Dinant. T h e tiguous to each other and flanked by
Panzer Lehr had most of one regiment over-watching screening forces on paral-
(the 903d) , as well as its antiaircraft and lel roads. The opposing commanders by
engineer battalions, strung all the way this time did have a fairly accurate idea
from Moircy (west of Bastogne) to the of what formations were on “the enemy
area southwest of Rochefort as cover on side of the hill,” but neither Americans
the left for the division attack corridor. nor Germans were too certain as to
Bayerlein had been forced to leave one where these formations would be en-
regiment in the Bastogne battle; so his countered. The hottest points of combat
effective assault force on the 24th con- on the 24th were Rochefort, Buisson-
sisted of the division reconnaissance bat- ville, and the Bourdon sector east of the
talion, some corps and division artillery, Hotton-Marche road.
and one reinforced regiment. All of the At Rochefort the Panzer Lehr com-
2d Panzer Division was available to mander began his main attack a couple
Lauchert, but the kampfgruppen of the of hours after midnight, but the de-
division were widely separated and for fenders held and made a battle of it in
every mile forward troops would have to houses and behind garden walls. Com-
be dropped off to cover the division panies I and K of the 333d concentrated
north flank. in and around a large hotel, dug in a
When daylight came on the 24th, the brace of 57-mm. antitank guns and a sec-
head of the leading kampfgruppe had tion of heavy machine guns in front of
advanced well to the northwest of the the hotel, and so interdicted the town
Marche-Rochefort road in considerable square. About 0900 on the 24th the 3d
strength. In this kampfgruppe were the Battalion lost radio contact with the
reconnaissance battalion, one battalion division, but four hours later one mes-
of Panthers from the 3d Panzer Regi- sage did reach Marche: an order from
ment, the 304th Panzer Grenadier Regi- General Bolling to withdraw. By this
ment, two artillery regiments, a battal- time a tree burst from a German 88 had
ion of heavy guns, and two-thirds of the put the antitank guns out of action. TO
division flak, the whole extending for disengage from this house-to-house com-
miles. T h e remainder of the 2d Panzer bat would not be easy. Fortunately the
remained on the Harsin road southeast attackers had their eyes fixed on the mar-
of Marche under orders from Luettwitz ket place in the center of the town,
to protect the corps right shoulder. apparently with the object of seizing the
crossways there so that armored vehicles
T h e Main Battle Is Joined could move through from one edge of
24 and 25 December the town to the other. So preoccupied,
they neglected to bar all the exits from
Pitched battles and fumbling skir- Rochefort. Driven back into a small area
T H E VII CORPS MOVES T O BLUNT T H E SALIENT 439

CAPTURED GERMAN 88-MM. GUN

around the battalion command post fragmented nature of the German forces
where bullet and mortar fire made the on this day that the American column
streets “a living inferno,” the surround- reached the Meuse without being am-
ed garrison made ready for a break. bushed. T h e foot column, led by Lt.
Enough vehicles had escaped damage to Leonard R. Carpenter, started north
mount the battalion headquarters and with the idea of reaching the outposts
Company M. T h e rest of the force of the 3d Armored task force known to
formed for march on foot. be thereabouts, but here the spoor of
At 1800 the two groups made a con- the enemy was very strong and move-
certed dash from the town, firing wildly ment was slow. During the night some
as they went and hurling smoke gre- trucks were sent east from Givet and
nades, which masked them, momen- found parts of Companies I and K; two
tarily, from a German tank lurking near- officers and thirty-three men belonging
by. Sgt. J. W. Waldron manned a to Company I were picked up in an ex-
machine gun as a line rear guard, was hausted state by 2d Armored patrols and
wounded, but rejoined his company. brought back to the American lines.
(He received the DSC.) T h e vehicular T h e defense of Rochefort had not
column headed west for Givet, and it is been too costly: fifteen wounded men,
indicative of the widely dispersed and under the care of a volunteer medic,
440 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE

were left in the town and another get word of this movement to the Amer-
twenty-five had been killed or captured. icans, but the message had to pass sur-
But the Panzer Lehr commander, who reptitiously through a number of hands
had fought in both engagements, would and did not reach the 2d Armored com-
later rate the American defense in mand post until the afternoon of the
Rochefort as comparable in courage and 24th. T h e CCA sortie from Ciney, as a
in significance to that at Bastogne. Sig- result, was being made obliquely to the
nificantly, the Panzer Lehr Reconnais- German axis of advance and would
sance Battalion carried the attack for the intersect the enemy line of march at
Meuse without any help from the rest Buissonville only after the leading
of the division until after midnight, kampfgruppe of the 2d Panzer had passed
when the 902d finally reached the Buis- on to the west.
sonville area. This is not to say that Collier’s task
Buissonville had been the primary ob- forces encountered no opposition when
jective of the 2d Armored Division when CCA resumed the attack on the morn-
Harmon first propelled his CCA into ing of the 24th. Flank guard and block-
action. True, Rochefort was the goal ing detachments backed by tanks had
when CCA resumed its march on the been left to screen the 2d Panzer line of
morning of the 24th, but Buissonville communications on the north and these
first had to be brought under American had to be disposed of. Furthermore,
control. A glance at the map will show CCA had to proceed with some caution,
the reason why. feeling out to the flanks as it went; in-
The village lay in a valley where the deed General Harmon added a recon-
Dinant-Rochefort highway dipped down, naissance company to Collier’s command
but in addition it controlled the entry because “the situation is changing all the
to that highway of a secondary road net time.” T h e leading American task force
running west from the Marche-Rochefort reached Buissonville in early afternoon
road. T h e hamlet of Humain, four miles and formed for an assault to encircle the
to the east, was the nodal point of this village from the north. By chance the
secondary system. second task force, advancing in echelon
During the night the Humain-Buis- on the right flank, had run into antitank
sonville road had been jammed with fire and, in process of maneuvering onto
German columns from the 2d Panzer a ridge overlooking the German guns,
reconnaissance battalion and advance saw its sister detachment moving into the
guard. But now the wealth of good, attack. An enemy column, coming in
hard-surfaced roads which characterize from Havrenne, appeared about the
this part of Belgium came into play. same time on the opposite side of the
Entering the main highway at Buisson- village.
ville, the German units had gone north While the American attack swept
for about a mile, then made a V-turn through and round Buissonville, the
back onto a secondary road running tank and tank destroyer crews on the
straight west to Conjoux, a village four ridge opened fire, laying their guns at
miles south of Ciney. The Belgian tele- four thousand yards, and directing the
phone operator at Conjoux attempted to salvos crashing in from the field batteries
T H E VII CORPS MOVES T O BLUNT T H E SALIENT 441

supporting CCA. The final tally was 38 Harmon had not waited for confirma-
wheeled vehicles, 4 antitank guns, 6 tion of the early British reports, the right
pieces of medium artillery, 108 prisoners, and rear of CCA being too exposed for
and a large but uncounted number of that. At 1045 he ordered CCB (Brig.
German dead. After this action a squad- Gen. Isaac D. White) to secure Ciney-
ron of P–38’s strafed the village, prob- at the moment occupied by some of
ably on a mission which had been called Collier’s troops-“as a base for future
for before the assault, killing one Amer- operations.” At the same time the divi-
ican officer and wounding another be- sion artillery commander, Colonel Hut-
fore the airplanes could be diverted. ton, sent two battalions of armored ar-
With Buissonville in hand, Harmon tillery into firing positions north of
ordered Col. John MacDonald, whose Ciney. (Throughout the day artillery
4th Cavalry Group had just been at- support for both the 2d Armored and the
tached to the 2d Armored, to take Hu- 84th had been rendered under difficult
main and thus put a stopper in the circumstances. T h e location of friendly
narrow channel between his division units was none too certain and a num-
and the 84th which led to the west and ber of the advanced outpost positions
the rear of the Marche position. Mac- along the VII Corps front. were beyond
Donald had only the 24th Squadron- the range of their own guns.)
his 4th Squadron was deploying in the T h e eastern flank of the VII Corps was
west as a screen between CCA and CCB the third area of hot combat on the 24th.
-and in the early evening he sent Troop On the previous night the 116th Panzer
A into Humain. The troopers experi- Division finally had begun to build u p
enced little opposition. Mines and booby a bridgehead on the west bank of the
traps were their greatest hazard, and by Ourthe. Perhaps Manteuffel’s visit had
midnight they had full control of the had some effect, or, more likely, the
village. 116th had more troops for the attack
All through the day messages had now that reinforcements were arriving
come into the 2d Armored Division to take on the Americans in the Soy-
headquarters telling of German tanks in Hotton sector. T h e mission set for Gen-
increasing numbers in and around Cel- eral Waldenburg’s division was of criti-
les, a main crossroads village southwest cal importance to the Fifth Panzer
of Ciney and only four miles from the Army attack. First, the 116th Panzer was
Meuse River. During the morning the to break through the American position
British light armored cavalry patrolling forward of the Hotton-Marche road.
this area had been forced back toward Then, having cleaned out Marche in the
Dinant. At midday two P–51’s flew over process, the division was to swing north
to take a look at Celles but got an ex- onto the Baillonville road, which offered
ceedingly warm reception from flak bat- good tank going, drive west through
teries there and were driven off. Further Pessoux, and make contact with the 2d
evidence of a large German concentra- Panzer Division in the neighborhood of
tion came in the afternoon when the Ciney. At that point the two divisions
Belgian report of enemy columns in Con- would provide reciprocal protection for
joux finally reached the Americans. their inner flanks.
442 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Waldenburg was low on fuel for his this order did not reach the two forward
tanks but attempted to set the ball roll- companies. When the American tanks
ing by sending two rifle companies suddenly appeared on the wooded ridge
through the dark to infiltrate the Amer- north of Verdenne, they ran head on into
ican lines at the junction point of the the enemy just assembling at the wood’s
334th and 335th Regiments. T h e tactic– edge in assault formation. T h e Germans
penetration along boundary lines–was broke and fled, some fifty were captured,
a German favorite, attended by success and the woods were cleared.
in the initial days of the offensive. T h e But this was only the first act. An hour
two companies (dismounted troops of later five enemy tanks and two half-
the division reconnaissance battalion) tracks carrying or covering a hundred or
stealthily worked their way forward and so grenadiers struck Verdenne from the
at dawn were to the rear of the 334th. south, engaged the second platoon of
There they sought cover on a wooded Company I in what Waldenburg later
ridge north of Verdenne. This village, called “a bitter house-to-house battle,”
outposted by the Americans, was the finally overwhelmed the Americans, and
immediate goal of the attack planned for pushed on to a château a stone’s throw
the 24th. Commanding the Marche- north of the village. In a last assault at
Hampteau road–roughly the line held eventide the attackers drove this wedge
by the left wing of the 84th Division–it deeper. Companies I and K of the 334th
afforded immediate access via a good fell back to a new line barely in front of
secondary route to Bourdon on the main the crucial Marche-Hotton road, and
Hotton-Marche highway, and its posses- German light artillery moved up to
sion would offer a springboard for the bring the road under fire.
German armored thrust. Christmas Eve in the far western sec-
T h e 116th Panzer Division did not tor of the Ardennes Bulge found various
attack with daylight, for its fuel trucks shadings of uneasiness in the American
had not yet appeared. Instead Walden- headquarters and a pall of foreboding,
burg sent detachments of the 60th Regi- silver-lined by the proximity of the
ment into the Bois de Chardonne, the Meuse, in the German. T h e attack
western extrusion of a large wood lot planned for the VII Corps had turned
partially held by the Germans southwest into a defensive battle. On the east wing
of Verdenne. Unusual movement in the the 3d Armored (–CCB) was hard
Bois was noticed by the Americans dur- pressed and some of its troops were sur-
ing the morning, but this came into rounded-indeed two regiments of the
really serious light about noon when a 75th Infantry Division were en route to
prisoner revealed the presence of the two help General Rose. T h e 84th Division,
companies behind the 334th. General so far as then was known, had lost a bat-
Bolling gathered the 1st Battalion, 334th, talion in Rochefort, might be driven out
and three tank platoons of the 771st of Marche, and stood exposed to an ar-
Tank Battalion to trap the infiltrators. mored exploitation of the penetration
It appears that his opponent, General made at Verdenne. T h e 2d Armored
Waldenburg, had postponed the Ger- Division had had a good day but was not
man attack for an hour or so but that yet securely linked to the 84th on the
T H E VII CORPS MOVES T O BLUNT T H E SALIENT 443

left and could only surmise what tank the tip of the Bulge diminished. Rund-
strength the Germans had accumulated stedt seems to have become reconciled,
opposite CCB on the right. with the fatalism and aloofness of the
Field Marshal Montgomery, chipper aged and veteran soldier, to whatever
as always but cautious, had taken steps the fortunes of war now might bring.
during the day to bring the 51st Division Model, the commander of Army Group
(British) across the Meuse and into B , was outwardly optimistic; his order
backstop position behind the First Army for Christmas Day called for the passage
in the sector southeast of Liège. Other of the Meuse and the capture of Bas-
British troops were on the move to assist togne. This official mien of optimism
the 29th Armoured Brigade (British) if contrasts sharply with the attitude his
the enemy should hit the bridges at personal staff had noted on 18 December
Givet or Namur. This was good news to when, it since has been reported, he
the First Army commander and his staff, phoned Rundstedt and Jodl to say that
not to mention that some elation was the offensive had failed. Perhaps he saw
abroad as the result of Allied air force in the events of 24 December the possi-
activity on this clear day and the reports bility that the Meuse at least might be
of prisoners and booty taken from the reached and some degree of tactical suc-
1st SS Panzer Division at La Gleize. cess east of the river be attained, thus
The gloomy side of the picture was all confirming his earlier opposition to the
too readily apparent. T h e fall of St. Vith Big Solution dictated by Hitler and Jodl.
had opened the way for fresh forces and Manteuffel, as Fifth Panzer Army com-
new pressure against the army center and mander, was the man in the middle. He
right. T h e 82d Airborne Division was was well aware of the exposed and pre-
exposed to entrapment in the Manhay carious position of the 2d Panzer Divi-
sector and in the course of the evening sion. He had traveled the forward roads
Hodges would order a withdrawal. T h e at the tip of the salient, and his practiced
situation as it appeared in the VII Corps eye recognized that the narrow corridor
on the army right wing was, as just to the Meuse must be widened if the
described, somewhat of a cliff-hanger. last stage of the drive to the river was to
On the left wing, in the V Corps sector, be logistically supported. Doubtless he
the enemy appeared ready to resume recognized the tactical merit of Luett-
strong offensive operations, and after witz’ suggestion, probably made late in
their Christmas Eve supper Hodges the afternoon of the 24th, that the for-
and Huebner sat down to plan the evac- ward columns of the X L V I I Panzer
uation of the corps’ heavy equipment in Corps should be withdrawn from their
order to leave the roads free in the event position of dangerous isolation until
that withdrawal to the north became such time as reinforcements arrived. On
mandatory. the other hand Manteuffel was well
In the higher echelons of German aware of the Fuehrer’s attitude toward
command the attitude on Der Heilige surrendering ground and could not pos-
Abend became more somber as the sibly acquiesce in Luettwitz’ proposal.
distance between the particular head- During the evening Manteuffel tele-
quarters and the 2d Panzer position at phoned Jodl with a personal and desper-
444 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE

ate plea for assistance: he argued that his very cold comfort to Manteuffel. 8
army, not the Sixth, was carrying the
main effort of the offensive and that the 8 The problems facing the Fifth Panzer Army
dions in the OKW reserve earmarked commander are graphically presented in MSS
ETHINT-45 and 46, and MSS #B-151, B-151a,
for Sepp Dietrich should be releasedat all by Manteuffel. The story of the 116th Panzer
once to reinforce the attack to the Meuse. Division is recounted by the division commander
It would appear that Jodl spoke reassur- (Waldenburg) in MS #A-873. The best of the
fragmentary personal accounts on the history of
ingly of divisions en route to the Fifth the 2d Panzer Division is that by Lt. Col. Ruediger
Panzer Army but this must have brought Weiz in MS #B-456.
CHAPTER XIX

The Battle of Bastogne


The Initial Deployment East 18th the two commanders met in the VIII
of Bastogne Corps command post to confer on the un-
certain tactical situation and to give Colo-
T h e one standing order that General nel Ewell, whose regiment would first be
Middleton gave General McAulliffe be- committed, his instructions. T h e map
fore leaving Bastogne on the morning of spread out before Ewell showed a few
19 December was: “Hold Bastogne.” * blue-penciled marks east of Bastogne
Both generals felt that the enemy needed where the American armored groups
Bastogne and the entrance it afforded were believed to be fighting at their
to a wider complex of roads leading original roadblock positions. General
west. (Map VI) During the night of the Middleton told Ewell that his job would
be to make contact with these endan-
* T h e most complete story of the siege of gered forward posts. Ewell, however, was
Bastogne is S. L. A. Marshall’s Bastogne: The
First Eight Days (Washington: T h e Infantry interested in the red-penciled lines and
Journal Press, 1946). T h e then Colonel Marshall circles which showed the enemy between
was on the scene, had complete access to the daily Bastogne and the armored roadblocks.
record entries, and was persona grata to the entire
command, this happy circumstance resulting in In view of the uncertain situation, he
the fine collection of combat interviews which suggested that he be given “mission-type
formed the basis for this interesting and graphic orders” which would permit his 50 1st
account. It is worth noting that the authors of
the official history of the foist did not write a Parachute Infantry some flexibility of
chapter on Bastogne but simply introduced an action. McAuliffe agreed, as did Middle-
abridged version of Marshall’s book. (The present ton, but the latter still hoped that the
author has borrowed extensively from Brigadier
General Marshall, but the careful reader will roadblock defenders at Allerborn, eight
notice quite different interpretations of the same miles to the east on the Bastogne road,
actions based on the same source materials. would somehow survive until the 501st
Marshall, concerned with the heroic story of a n
encircled unit, focuses on that unit, in effect look- reached them. McAuliffe’s order, then,
ing from Bastogne at the perimeter. T h e present was for Ewell to move out at 0600, attack
author, engaged in presenting the over-all cam- eastward, and develop the situation.
paign, directs his attention from the periphery
inward.) T h e G–3 journal of the 101st is rather At the appointed hour on 19 Decem-
cursory. T h e 501st Summary of Actions is re- ber Ewell’s 501st Parachute Infantry
constructed from memory since most of the regi-
mental records were lost; the 502d AAR is slim; the
marched out of the assembly area in col-
327th Narrative is terse hut informative; the umn of battalions. Ewell knew that this
506th AAR is the most complete and useful of was no time to engage in the all-out,
any of the regimental reports. See also Scrapbook
506th Parachute Infantry Regiment (Munich,
full-bodied assault tactics to which the
1945) paratroopers were accustomed. He told
BASTOGNE
448 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

his officers to “take it easy,” avoid com- Gilbreth started his guns displacing to
mitment to an action which would in- the rear some time before daybreak, but
volve their whole force, and deploy to the main force commenced to defile
right and left as soon as they hit resist- through the western exit from Longvilly
ance so that they would not be easily cut about 0800, only to be ambushed and
off and surrounded. 1 thrown into disorder when approaching
Hindsight, of course, bestows a view Mageret, midway between Longvilly and
of the American and German disposi- Bastogne. Team Cherry (Lt. Col. Henry
tions at 0600, when the 101st advance T. Cherry) of CCB, 10th Armored Divi-
guard marched out, which was denied sion, which had been sent along the road
Ewell and the corps and division staffs toward Longvilly the previous evening,
in Bastogne. T h e battles already de- found itself involved in a series of dis-
scribed were now coming to a close on jointed actions as enemy troops cut the
the roads, in the villages, and through highway. Team Hyduke (1st Lt. Ed-
the woods east of the town as the 101st ward P. Hyduke) was caught up in the
was taking its stance. During the night fight east of Mageret, subsequently
of 18 December the three small task losing all its vehicles in a sharp and
forces of CCR, 9th Armored Division, aggressive armored action which the 2d
which Middleton had ordered Colonel Panzer commander dignified as an Amer-
Gilbreth to position on and overwatch- ican “counterattack.” (Late on the after-
ing the Allerborn-Bastogne road (N12), noon of the 19th Lieutenant Hyduke led
were cut to pieces. Some men and ve- his men on foot out of the melee under
hicles would escape to take a part in the orders to rejoin CCB. He was afterward
fight for Bastogne, although some of killed at Bastogne.)
Colonel Booth’s command took six days Team Ryerson (Capt. William F.
of dodging the enemy before they Ryerson), the main force belonging to
reached the American lines. At Long- Cherry, had laagered during the night
villy, next, and to the west, on the Bas- between Mageret and Longvilly–and
togne road, Gilbreth had gathered what thus would fight an action almost inde-
was left of CCR and its attached troops pendently of the Longvilly column–but
to fight a rear guard action until the 19th before daybreak Ryerson knew that the
dawned and an orderly withdrawal enemy was in Mageret and that he would
might be effected. have to punch his way back to the west.
Cherry sent orders confirming this with-
1 Middleton recalls that he directed McAuliffe drawal about 0830. Ryerson found his
to reinforce the 10th ,Armored roadblock on the team outnumbered and outgunned by
Longvilly road. (Ltr, Middleton to Col Marshall, the Germans holding Mageret, but on
1 Jul 45.) The S–3 journal of CCB, 10th Armored
Division, notes at 0740 on 19 December that the night of the 19th four squads of his
Ewell’s mission is to relieve “the surrounded armored infantry held a narrow foothold
groups” and assist CCB. The 101st AAR simply
states that Ewell was ordered to attack to the
in a few houses on the eastern edge of
east and “secure Bastogne.” The story as given the village, waiting there for help prom-
in the text is based on Ewell’s recollections (in ised from the west. Colonel Cherry had
a conversation with the author on 22 July 1961)
and squares with information given the author
gone back to Bastogne to see the CCB
by Middleton and McAuliffe. commander late on the 18th, returning
T H E BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 449

thereafter to his own headquarters out- three German divisions were bearing
side Neffe (a mile and a quarter south- down on Bastogne. T h e 2d Panzer Divi-
west of Mageret) with word that the sion’s successes during the night of 18
101st would reinforce his command the December against the outpost positions
next day. On the road back, however, he east of Longvilly had netted forty Amer-
learned that the Germans were in Mag- ican tanks, and the apparent crumbling
eret and his troops were cut off. About of the last defenses east of Bastogne
the time Ewell’s paratroopers debouched promised quick entry to that city on the
on the Bastogne road, Neffe was hit by 19th.
tanks and infantry from Panzer Lehr; Actually the three German divisions
some hours later Cherry’s detachment moving toward Bastogne were not all
would pull back to Mont. 2 maneuvering to attack the city. Lauch-
On the morning of 19 December, ert’s 2d Panzer Division had other fish
therefore, the job confronting the 501st to fry–its objective was the Meuse
was that of developing, fixing, and fight- bridges–and when daylight came on the
ing the German detachments, now in 19th the division advance guard was
strength, which stood to the rear of the working its way to bypass Bastogne in
erstwhile American blocking positions the north. T h e 2d Panzer’s end run,
and presaged the coming main effort to across country and on miserable third-
crash the panzer columns through or class roads, collided with Maj. William
around Bastogne. R. Desobry’s task force from CCB at
Noville (four miles north of Bastogne),
T h e German High Command was then blundered into a series of sharp
aware that. the two American airborne actions reaching back to Longvilly.
divisions had orders to enter the battle; On the left the Panzer Lehr, having
in the late afternoon of 18 December seized Mageret during the night, began
intercepted radio messages to this effect an attack about 0500 on the 19th de-
reached OB WEST. German intelligence signed to take Bastogne; it was a part of
knew that the Americans were moving this forward detachment of Panzer Lehr
by truck and so estimated that none of which hit Cherry’s headquarters at
these new troops would appear in the Neffe. Close on the heels of Panzer Lehr,
line before noon on the 19th. The Ger- two regiments of the 26th Volks Gren-
man staffs believed that the two divi- adier Division had made a right wheel
sions would be deployed along a front with the intention of circling through
extending from Bastogne to the north- Longvilly and Luzery so as to enter
east. In any case the German attack plan Bastogne from the north via the Noville
was unfolding about as scheduled and road. Kokott’s grenadiers, who had ac-
complished a truly remarkable feat in
2 On the earlier actions by the armored units keeping pace with the mechanized col-
see Chapter XXI and also the documents cited umnsof the Panzer Lehr,by now were
there. The CCB, 10th Armored, AAR and S–3
journal are among the most valuable of the docu- spent. The regimental trains were far to
ments describing the Bastogne operation. The the rear and resupply had to be made.
personal recollections of the CCB commander Furthermore the boundaries and attack
have been incorporated in Nichol’s Impact: The
Battle Story of the Tenth Armored Division. plans for the three divisions converging
450 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

on Bastogne were so confused that it the engineer foxholes during the night.
would take some time for the 26th Volks When the 158th reported about 0200
Grenadier Division (–) to orient and that its outpost at Mageret had been
co-ordinate its attack. On the morning overrun, Middleton sent what help he
of the 19th Kokott’s two regiments lay could–five light tanks taken from ord-
quiescent and exhausted in the scattered nance repair shops. At daybreak two
woods southeast of Longvilly. Only the enemy rifle companies, led by a few
advance guard of the Panzer Lehr, there- tanks, hit Company B, whose right flank
fore, was attacking directly toward Bas- touched the Bastogne highway near
togne when the paratroopers of the 501st Neffe. T h e engineers succeeded in halt-
marched on to the Bastogne-Longvilly ing the advance along the road, although
road.3 at a cost of some thirty casualties. Pvt.
Bernard Michin seems to have blocked
Ewell had his 1st Battalion (Maj. the panzers when he put a bazooka round
Raymond V. Bottomly, Jr.) out as ad- into the leader at ten yards’ range. Mean-
vance guard. T h e road was curtained at while Team Cherry had lost its road-
intervals by swirling fog and from time block at the Neffe station but momen-
to time rain squalls swept in. Some tarily had stopped the Germans at Neffe
2,000 yards out of the city (it now was village. Enemy pressure then eased
about 0820) the battalion ran onto a few somewhat; perhaps the German infantry
howitzers from the 9th Armored whose were waiting for their tanks to break
crews were “ready, willing and able,” as through at Mageret. T h e fight had
the journals report it, to support the slackened to a small arms duel when
501st. Less than a thousand yards be- Ewell’s paratroopers came on the scene.4
yond, the advance guard encountered Feeling carefully to the north and
the enemy near the railroad station at south of the highway, the 1st Battalion
the edge of Neffe; here was the road- found that the Germans were deployed
block which the Panzer Lehr had in some force and that this was no occa-
wrested from Cherry’s headquarters de- sion for a quick knockout blow to handle
tachment. a single roadblock. About 0900 Ewell
On the previous evening the VIII turned the 2d Battalion (Maj. Sammie
Corps commander had sent the 158th N. Homan) off the road in a maneuver
Engineer Combat Battalion (Lt. Col. on the left of the vanguard intended to
Sam Tabets) to establish a line east of seize the higher ground near the village
Bastogne between Foy and the Neffe of Bizory and Hill 510, a fairly substan-
road, Nearly a thousand antitank mines tial rise to the east which overlooked
had been scraped together from other both Neffe and Bizory. When the 3d
corps engineers to aid the 158th, and at Battalion (Lt. Col. George M. Griswold)
least part of these were laid in front of
4 S. L. A. Marshall, who interviewed Bayerlein,
3 Generals Kokott and Bayerlein were responsible says that the Panzer Lehr commander momentarily
for the initial investiture of Bastogne, and their lost his nerve on the 19th and failed to prod his
accounts, basic for “the other side of the hill,” troops forward personally. (Marshall, Bastogne,
can be found in eight manuscripts: ETHINT–44, pp: 184-86.) Bayerlein admits to his great sur-
B–040, and P–32d by Kokott; and A–941 through prise when he encountered strong armored opposi-
A–945 by Bayerlein. tion east of Bastogne. MS # A–341 (Bayerlein).
T H E BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 451

came up, Ewell sent it to the right with T o the west, near the hamlet of Mar-
orders to take Mont and the ridge south vie, lay the tanks and armored infantry
of Neffe. By noon the regimental attack of Team O’Hara (Lt. Col. James
had attained most of its objectives. O’Hara) holding the right of the three
(Bizory already was outposted by troops blocking positions set up by CCB, 10th
of the 158th Engineer Combat Battal- Armored, the day before. O’Hara thus
ion.) Hill 510, however, was no easy nut far had seen no Germans. His first warn-
to crack. The enemy held the position ing that the fight was expanding in his
with automatic weapons sweeping the direction was the “stragglers of airborne
bare glacis to west and south-here the around us” and high velocity shellfire
paratroopers made no progress. On the directed at his left tank platoon. For
right one of Griswold’s platoons arrived some reason the enemy failed to close
in time to give Colonel Cherry a hand with O’Hara, perhaps because of the
in the fight at the Neffe château com- low, clinging fog which had reduced visi-
mand post and, when the Americans bility to about seventy-five feet. Ordered
were burned out, the subsequent with- to do so by Colonel Roberts, the CCB
drawal to Mont. T h e 3d Battalion had commander, O’Hara sent tanks back in-
not been able to get around Neffe, but to Wardin, but the village was empty.
Company I did go as far as Wardin, The tanks retired to the Marvie position
southeast of Neffe, where it ambushed a as dark came on, and late in the evening
25-man patrol. Panzer Lehr occupied Wardin.
T h e appearance of the Americans in A message from McAuliffe ended this
this area, little more than a mile south of initial day of battle for the 501st and
Mageret, was interpreted immediately the regiment dug in where it stood.
as a flanking threat to the two grenadier Ewell now had a fair picture of the
regiments of the Panzer Lehr which had enemy to his front but no clear idea of
wheeled to the right and away from the fate or location of Team Cherry’s
Bastogne to engage the American col- main force, not to mention the CCR
umns transfixed on the Mageret-Long- roadblock detachments.
villy road. Bayerlein detached a part of Although the 501st had deployed suc-
his reconnaissance battalion to meet this cessfully astride the main road east of
threat. The Americans made a fight of Bastogne and had developed a sketchy
it inside Wardin, retreating from house outline of the most advanced German
to house as the long-barreled self-pro- positions, it had not at any time con-
pelled guns blasted in the walls. One fronted the main German forces. These,
paratrooper walked into the street to the bulk of Panzer Lehr and the two for-
confrontone of the guns with a bazooka; ward regiments of the 26th Volks Gren-
he got the gun, then was cut down. adier Division, spent most of the day
Finally the guns jolted the paratroopers chopping down the American column
out of Wardin; they had inflicted thirty- trapped between Mageret and Long-
nine casualties on Company I, all of villy. Kokott apparently had expected to
whose officerswere hit, and killed Capt. push his two grenadier regiments un-
Claude D. Wallace, Jr., the company opposed through Longvilly, as soon as
commander. they were rested, in a circling march to
452 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

enter Bastogne from the north, but the those of his corps somewhere to the
German corps commander, General north, ordered Desobry to investigate
Luettwitz, himself took these regiments the town of Houffalize. (During the
out of Kokott’s hand and thrust them night, a patrol Desobry had sent in that
into the battle with the American rear direction reported the road open.) Be-
guard at Longvilly–which held there fore anything could be done about the
longer than expected-and against the Houffalize mission, the Germans un-
retreating column en route to Mageret. leashed their artillery against Noville.
Suffice it to say that the 501st had been Lauchert, intent on regaining the mo-
effectively debarred from the Longvilly mentum which the 2d Panzer had lost
arena by the Panzer Lehr troops holding in the night fighting around Allerborn
Neffe, Hill 510, and the stopper position and Longvilly, and determined to get
at Mageret. By the evening of the 19th off the miserable side roads which he
the American troops east of Mageret had chosen as a quick way around Bas-
were in varying stages of tactical dissolu- togne, put all the guns that had kept
tion-all but Team Ryerson, still clutch- pace with the forward elements into a
ing its piece of Mageret village. Luett- shoot to blast a way through to the west.
witz was elated by this victory over the At 1000 the fog curtain suddenly parted
American armor (which as an old tanker revealing a landscape dotted with Ger-
he attributed in large part to the supe- man tanks-at least thirty of them. Four-
riority of the Panther tank gun), but he teen tanks from the 3d Panzer Regiment
realized that a precious day had been made a try for Noville, coming in from
lost and with it the chance of an armored the north. Several bogged down in a vain
coup de main at Bastogne. attempt to maneuver off the road; others
At Noville, the left of the three block- were stopped by Desobry’s company of
ing positions, Middleton had assigned Sherman tanks and by tank destroyer
Colonel Roberts and CCB. Here Team fire. On the east the enemy had started
Desobry, organized around fifteen me- an infantry assault, but the fog lifted
dium tanks, stood athwart the main before the first waves reached the village
paved highway running north from Bas- and, suddenly divested of cover, most of
togne to Houffalize. This force had been the attackers turned and ran.
in position about five hours, reporting Desobry could not know that Noville
all quiet, when at 0720 on the 19th Ger- was the focus of the entire 2d Panzer
man half-tracks hit the American road- maneuver, but he did ask for permission
blocks. Americans and Germans pitched to withdraw. Roberts replied that Deso-
grenades at each other in the fog and bry should use his own judgment, then
one or two panzers reached the village added that more tank destroyers were
itself. T h e enemy-probably a patrol on the way from Bastogne (Desobry had
feeling a way in front of Lauchert’s 2d only a platoon from the 609th) and that
Panzer– soon pulled out, and the noise the 101st was sending a rifle battalion
of battle died away. within the half hour. Coincident with
The VIII Corps commander, much Roberts’ message the last of the German
concerned by the gap which he knew assault force pulled back. Lauchert had
existed between his southern troops and decided that the ground was too poor
T H E BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 453

for tank maneuver, that reinforcements way forward in short spurts to a point
must be brought up for a headlong where one last dash would put them on
plunge. Meanwhile the German cannon- the crest. As the paratroopers lay here,
eers continued to pummel Noville. Deso- a mass of green-clad figures suddenly
bry had many casualties, but several erupted over the hill. Later the 1st Bat-
ambulances had been wrecked by shell- talion estimated this attack was carried
fire and it was difficult to get the by a rifle battalion backed by sixteen
wounded out. tanks. The American assault had
The reinforcements reaching Desobry smacked headlong into the attack the 2d
consisted of a platoon from the 705th Panzer had been readying since mid-
Tank Destroyer Battalion (three com- morning. As the fight spread, nearly
panies of which constituted the only thirty-two panzers were counted on the
corps reserve Middleton had to give the field. T h e two antagonists each reported
101st Airborne) and the 1st Battalion subsequently that “the enemy counter-
(Lt. Col. James L. LaPrade) of the attack halted.” Both probably were cor-
506th Parachute Infantry. Although Mc- rect-although both continued to suffer
Auliffe assigned the 506th the mission heavy casualties. The German tanks
of covering the northern approaches to might have decided the issue, but for
Bastogne, the remaining two battalions over half an hour they stayed well back
had a string attached as the division re- of the rifle line, perhaps fearful lest ba-
serve, and the regimental commander, zooka teams would reach them in the
Colonel Sink, was under strict orders not smoke and fog billowing up the hill,
to move them from their positions just perhaps fearful of the bite in the few
north of Bastogne. As the paratroopers Shermans left. When a few of the enemy
approached Noville, they came under tanks finally ventured to approach, the
heavy, well-aimed artillery fire, twenty American tank destroyers south of the
to thirty rounds exploding on the village village got on the flank of the panzers
every ten minutes. Vehicles and build- and put away five of them at 1,500-yards
ings were aflame-this was indeed a hot range.
corner, the village itself practically bare Now as the smoke and fog increased,
of life. Desobry’s detachment was de- only small eddies broke the pall to give
ployed south and west of the village; the a few minutes of aimed fire. Two of the
Germans were firing from the north and airborne companies fell back to the out-
east, a more comfortable position since skirts of Noville while the third, on the
the higher ground encircling Noville hill to the east, waited for darkness to
tilted up on the enemy side of the dish. cover its withdrawal. At one juncture the
By 1430 the 1st Battalion was ready 1st Battalion was under orders to leave
to begin the assault against the enemy- Noville, but Brig. Gen. Gerald J. Hig-
held high ground. The center company gins, the assistant division commander
walked almost immediately into a rain who was acting alter ego for McAuliffe,
of barrage fire and was stopped with told the paratroopers to stay put and
heavy losses. T h e two remaining com- promised assault gun and tank destroyer
panies were met with intense small arms support for the morrow.
fire but in fifteen minutes worked their T o the Noville garrison the dark
454 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

hours were a nightmare. Every half hour 501st at Bizory. (Ryerson later was killed
a gust of enemy artillery fire shook the at Bastogne.)
town; one shell crashed near the Amer- General Luettwitz lacked the full Ger-
ican command post, killing LaPrade and man corps he craved to throw against
wounding Desobry. Maj. Robert F. Har- Bastogne on the 20th. The 26th Volks
wick, a paratrooper, assumed over-all Grenadier Division could count on only
command, while Maj. Charles L. Hu- two of its regiments. Panzer Lehr had a
stead replaced Desobry as the armored substantial part of the division immedi-
team commander. (Desobry, with an ately east of Bastogne, but at least one
agonizing head wound, was placed in an infantry regiment, much of its artillery,
ambulance headed for Bastogne, but the and the bulk of the division trains were
ambulance was captured en route.) still toiling along the gummy little roads
Through the night the panzers prowled –hardly more than trails—climbing west
on the edge of the village and the Ger- out of the Wiltz valley. Furthermore,
man grenadiers came out of their fox- Luettwitz had ordered Bayerlein to hold
holes in abortive forays to reach the out a reserve for a dash toward Sibret.
streets. But the paratroopers held the T h e neighboring corps might lend
enemy at arm’s length and the enemy Luettwitz a hand in the north–after all
tankers showed little inclination to en- its 2 d Panzer either had to break through
gage Hustead’s remaining eight Sher- at Noville or had to retrace its steps-
mans, which had been brought into the but the Fifth Panzer Army commander
village, in a blindfold duel. had reiterated in no uncertain manner
Earlier in the day the 101st command- that Lauchert’s goal was the Meuse, not
er had planned to establish a defensive Bastogne.
line running northwest to southeast in T h e entire artillery complement of
front of Bastogne from which the 501st, the 2d Panzer was in place to support
tied in with Desdbry and Cherry as flank the attack at Noville when the 20th
guards, would launch a counterattack. dawned. Lauchert’s armor was in poor
The events of the 19th, as it turned out, repair after the long and rough march.
showed how little room for maneuver A goodly number of tanks had been shot
was left the Americans. Colonel Roberts, up in the first day’s action at Noville, and
assessing the reports from CCB in the the combination of muddy terrain and
early evening, advised McAuliffe that American antitank fire boded no good
“right now the whole front is flat against for a headlong armored assault. Lauch-
this town [Bastogne] .” Roberts was ert therefore told his panzer grenadiers
right; nonetheless there remained two to carry the battle in company with small
indentations in the fast-forming German tank packets.
line: the thumb sticking out at Noville While the German guns plastered the
and Team Ryerson’s little enclave on village the grenadiers moved in about
the east edge of Mageret. T h e latter, 0530 on three sides. Smoke and swirling
however, disappeared during the night fog veiled the attackers but the 420th
hours, for Ryerson, on orders, circled the Armored Field Artillery Battalion, firing
enemy troops in Mageret and brought his from northwest of Bastogne, laid down a
depleted command into the lines of the protective curtain which held the enemy
T H E BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 455

at bay for over an hour. T h e eight Sher- talion of the 506th covered the right
mans by this time had run out of armor- flank of the 3d and was in contact with
piercing ammunition and half a dozen the 501st on the east. T h e battalion sent
panzers tried to close in. A fresh platoon from the 502d was in position west of
of tank destroyers from the 705th Tank Foy. Beginning the counterattack at
Destroyer Battalion, sent up by Higgins, 1400, paratroopers pushed back through
took a hand and broke up this sortie. Foy and dug in some 200 yards to the
In midmorning, when a promised pla- north where late in the afternoon they
toon of quad mount antiaircraft failed met the column fighting its way back
to appear, Harwick and Hustead learned from Noville.5
that the enemy had cut the road to the T h e smoke and fog that run through
rear. The two aid stations could handle all reports of the Noville fight did good
no more wounded–most of the medics service as cover when the Americans
and aid men were casualties-and the formed for the march out. T h e main
enemy grip obviously was tightening. German barrier force had arrayed itself
T h e word relayed through the artillery just north of Foy, complete with armor
net back to Bastogne told the story: “All and self-propelled guns. Four Shermans,
reserves committed. Situation critical.” in the van with a few half-tracks, were
McAuliffe and Roberts consulted, put out of action before they could re-
agreed that the Noville force should turn fire. While one paratroop company
withdraw. T o free the troops in Noville attacked to open the road, Major Har-
would take some doing. General Higgins, wick sent for two tank destroyers from
in charge of the northern sector, already the rear of the column. Shells were burst-
had acted to meet this crisis by sending ing among the troops crouched by the
the 3d Battalion of the 502d Parachute roadside, and the clank of tank tracks
Infantry (assembled near Longchamps) could be heard approaching from No-
into an attack northeast against the Ger- ville. But the tank destroyers and their
mans who had descended on the road armor-piercing shell did the trick-and
linking Noville and Foy. T h e latter vil- an assist must be credited also to the
lage, 2 , 5 0 0 yards south of Noville on the Americans in Foy who were now on the
Bastogne road, had been occupied by the enemy’s rear. By 1700 the column was
3d Battalion of the 506th, which had its back inside the American lines. T h e
own fight going. Foy lies at the bottom fight at Noville cost the 1st Battalion of
of a pocket and during the night ele- the 506th a total of 13 officers and 199
ments of the 304th Panzer Grenadier men killed, wounded, and missing.
Regiment had wormed their way onto Team Desobry has no record of its casu-
the hills overlooking the village from alties but they must have been very
north, west, and east. With this vantage heavy, both in men and vehicles. T h e
the Germans brought their direct fire 506th estimates that the 2d Panzer lost
weapons to bear and forced the 3d Bat- thirty-one vehicles in the Noville fight
talion back onto the high ground south
of the hamlet.
But by noon the 101st had a solid 5For bravery in this action Pfc. Gilbert Van
base for a counterattack. T h e 2d Bat- Every was awarded the DSC.
456 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

and perhaps half a regiment of foot. At caught the Germans in the flank. This
least the first part of this estimate may halted the move and forced the 78th to
be close to the fact, for it is known that swing wide into the cover given by the
one battalion of the 3d Panzer Regiment woods north of the village. Masked by
was badly crippled at Noville. the woods the enemy proceeded west as
There is an epilogue. In late after- far as the Bourcy-Bastogne rail line,
noon, as his soldiers poked about the then unaccountably stopped. When the
ruins of Noville, Lauchert radioed the 2d Battalion of the 506th came up on the
LVIIIPanzer Corps commander for per- left of the 501st, its disposition was such
mission to wheel the 2d Panzer into Bas- that it faced this German force, plus its
togne. Krueger’s answer was prompt and sister regiment the 77th, at the point
astringent: “Forget Bastogne and head where the Foy-Bizory road crossed the
for the Meuse!” railroad.
The attack planned for the 19th east Through most of the daylight hours
of Bastogne and carried out by the Pan- on the 20th the enemy seemed content
zer Lehr and 26th Volks Grenadier Divi- to probe the main line occupied by the
sions had signally failed of success. The 501st. During the evening Bayerlein sent
soft ground had made it impossible for his own 902d Panzer Grenadier Regi-
the German tanks to maneuver easily ment against Neffe, but a roving patrol
off the roads—a factor of great worth to from Team O’Hara happened to spot
the defenders. The Americans had at the tank detachment of the regiment as
least five artillery battalions on call in it filed along the Neffe-Wardin road and
this sector, whereas neither of the two brought friendly artillery into play. Be-
enemy divisions had been able to get tween the American gunners and para-
any substantial number of guns and troopers the 902d took a formidable
howitzers forward. Also, the pell-mell, beating–very severe casualties were re-
piecemeal deployment east of Bastogne ported by the enemy division comman-
by the advance guard formations was be- der. A tank destroyer platoon from the
ginning to reap a harvest of delay and 705th used ground flares to sight and
tactical confusion. There was some sav- destroy three of the panzers reinforcing
age fighting here during the day, but the infantry assault waves.
un-co-ordinated—on the part of the en- When the 501st went into position on
emy-and never pressed in force to a the 19th, its southern flank had been
definite conclusion. none too solidly anchored by the thin
On the 20th Luettwitz turned the counterreconnaissance screen operated
78th Volks Grenadier Regiment over to by Task Force O’Hara and the tired,
the Panzer Lehr commander for the understrength 35th Engineer Combat
close-in northern hook at Bastogne Battalion (Lt. Col. Paul H. Symbol).
planned for execution the previous day. Enemy pressure around Wardin, al-
T h e immediate goal was Luzery, a sub- though subsequently relaxed, indicated
urb of Bastogne on the Houffalize high- that here was a gap which had better be
way. The 78th circled north to pass the sealed. On the morning of the 20th Mc-
village of Bizory, the left wing pin for Auliffe sent the 2d Battalion of the 327th
the 501st, but fire from Company F Glider Infantry from the division assem-
T H E BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 457

bly area through Bastogne to relieve togne defense. T h e certainty of the 4th
Company A of the engineers. 6 Armored’s appearance explains in part
T h e engineers had just climbed out the routine and rather cavalier treat-
of their foxhole line west of Marvie and ment accorded Capt. Bert Ezell and his
turned the position over to the 2d Bat- little team from CCB, 4th Armored,
talion when one of O’Hara’s outposts when it arrived in Bastogne shortly after
saw a German column streaming into noon.7 Quite obviously McAuliffe and
Marvie. This was the advance guard of Middleton anticipated the early appear-
the 901st Regiment which had finally ance of the entire armored division.
extricated itself from the Wiltz valley. A second premise–accepted in most
With only a single rifle company and of the 101st planning efforts on 20 De-
four tanks, the Germans never had a cember-was that the VIII Corps still
chance. In an hour’s time O’Hara’s me- had viable forces in and around Bastogne
diums had accounted for the panzers and which could be employed in common
the 2d Battalion had beaten the attackers with the airborne divisions. This idea,
back in disorder and occupied Marvie. of course, went hand in hand with the
The paratroopers waited through the very real ignorance of enemy forces
day for the main attack to come, but the and locations which obtained both in
only evidences of the enemy were a Bastogne and at Middleton’s new head-
smoke screen drifting in from the east quarters in Neufchâteau. Earlier Mc-
and occasional tanks in the distance. Un- Auliffe and his staff had counted on
known to the Americans a shift in the Roberts’ 10th Armored combat com-
Panzer Lehr’s stance before Bastogne mand to reinforce a counterattack
was taking place. east by the 101st—a vain expectation, as
it turned out. There remained the 28th
T h e inchoate American defense form- Infantry Division—or at least some part
ing at Bastogne was conditioned by a set thereof. In midafternoon McAuliffe sent
of optimistic premises. T h e first of these a liaison officer to General Cota, whose
was the promised arrival of the 4th Ar- headquarters was now at Sibret south-
mored Division from Patton’s Third west of Bastogne, with instructions to
Army in the south. During the night of find out the German dispositions and
19 December the VIII Corps commander, to ask the question: “Could the 28th at-
acting on word from Patton, told Mc- tack towards Wiltz in conjunction with
Auliffe that one combat command from the 101st Airborne tomorrow?”
the 4th Armored was on its way to Bas- Cota’s reply is not even recorded in
togne and would be attached to the the 101st Airborne log. After all he
101st. At noon McAuliffe and Roberts could give only one answer: the 28th
(who had been promised this initial Infantry Division no longer existed
4th Armored force) learned that the en- as a division (although two of its regi-
tire division was to be added to the Bas- ments would continue in stubborn bat-

6 It is indicative of the confusion and lack of 7 Ezell’s excursion is treated with the 4th
precise information then current that the 2d Armored story in Chapter XXI. T h e news of
Battalion journal reports, as if in surprise, that no Ezell’s subsequent departure from Bastogne is
casualties were sustained during this move. reflected only in scant journal notations.
458 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE

tle under other commands). T h e fall There had been a few indications,
of Wiltz on the night of 19 December and rumors, of enemy activity west of
had written finis to the story of the Bastogne–indeed the 101st had lost
110th
Infantry, Cota’s single remaining some of its trains in the division assem-
regiment. On the morning of the 20th bly area during the previous night–but
Cota had gone into Bastogne, finding thus far all this could be charged to
its streets jammed with vehicles, corps raiding parties roaming on the loose un-
artillery trying to bull a way through, der cover of night in a fluid and chang-
and a host of stragglers, including many ing battle. In early evening a report
of the survivors of the 110th Infantry. reached Bastogne that the road north-
General Middleton gave Cota permis- west to La Roche and Ortheuville
sion to get his people out of Bastogne (where two platoons of the 705th Tank
and the latter ordered them out on foot, Destroyer Battalion now attached to the
abandoning to the traffic jam those ve- 101st were operating) was free of the
hicles still in their possession. (So im- enemy. The roads south to Neufchâteau
pressed was General Cota by the traffic and Arlon were still open–and waiting
choking the streets and alleys of Bas- for traverse by the 4th Armored. So the
togne, that he advised the VIII Corps situation looked in McAuliffe’s Bastogne
commander to keep all contingents of headquarters at 1900 on 20 December.
the 4th Armored Division out of the Across the lines the German com-
town.) mander, Luettwitz, was none too pleased
Despite McAuliffe’s failure to secure by the rather dilatory operations of his
the immediate assistance which would corps. He knew by this time that the
make a full-bodied counterattack feas- American front east of Bastogne had
ible, it seemed that the tactical problem stiffened and that his troops had been
facing the 101st on the evening of 20 able to find no holes. On the other hand
December remained linear, that is, the the strength of his corps was increasing
creation of a homogeneous and defen- by the hour as the two divisions hauled
sible line barring entrance to Bastogne their tails up on the muddy roads–it
from the north and east. The corps let- looked as though he had the forces
ter of instructions reaching McAuliffe needed for maneuver. As a last flick of
at noon on the 20th was rather more the hand Luettwitz ordered Bayerlein to
sweeping in its definition of mission. throw the 902d into the night attack
“There will be no withdrawal”—this against Neffe. This was at most a diver-
was clear enough to all concerned. “The sion, for Luettwitz had decided to envel-
[ 101st Airborne] Division will stabilize ope Bastogne from the south and west.
their front lines on the front P798945 He intended to use the bulk of the Pan-
[that is, Recht] to St. Vith, south along zer Lehr, leaving only one of its grena-
a general line east of [Highway] N15 dier regiments to flesh out the eastern
. . . to connect with the 4th Infantry front with the foot elements of Kokott’s
Division at Breitweiler.” It may be as- 26th Volks Grenadier Division, but in
sumed that neither Middleton nor Mc- addition he had in hand the 39th Volks
Auliffe took this part of the order either Grenadier Regiment of the 26th which
literally or seriously. had just come u p behind the corps’
T H E BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 459

south flank. All told there was a sizable the 21st the German infantry following
motorized force for this venture: the re- the armored troops were ensconced on
inforced reconnaissance battalion, the both the main roads running from Bas-
engineer battalion, and the 902d (as togne south, while light forces were
soon as it could be disengaged) from the running up and down the western
Panzer Lehr; plus the reconnaissance reaches of the Bastogne–St. Hubert high-
battalion and 39th from the 26th Volks way. In the north the circle had been
Grenadier Division. clamped shut during the night when the
T h e immediate objectives seem to 2d Panzer seized Ortheuville on the
have been clearly stated. T h e Panzer Marche road.
Lehr spearheads were to advance via
Hompré and Sibret to St. Hubert, while Bastogne Is Encircled
the units of the 26th would start the
attack from an assembly point at Remon- Some of the Bastogne defenders re-
fosse on the Bastogne-Arlon road with call in the saga of the 101st Airborne
the intention of stabbing into Bastogne Division that their lone fight began on
from the southwest. In fact this night 20 December. “It was on this day, 20
operation developed into a mad scram- December,” reads the war diary of the
ble in which the troops from the two 327th Glider Infantry, “that all roads
divisions jockeyed for the lead as if they were cut by the enemy . . . and we were
were in a flat race for high stakes. completely surrounded.” This is only
Truly the stakes were high. Through- hindsight. T h e picture of complete en-
out this maneuver Luettwitz and his circlement was built up in McAuliffe’s
superior, General Manteuffel, had an headquarters only slowly on the 21st, nor
eye single to shaking the armored col- did the ring at first seem to be hermetic
umns of the XLVII Panzer Corps free and contracting. Doubtless the word
for the dash to the Meuse bridges. Bas- passed among the regiments very rap-
togne, sitting in the center of the web of idly-the 501st journal notes at 1030 that
hard-surfaced roads, was important–but the last road is cut–but it was late after-
only as a means to a geographically dis- noon before an armored patrol sent out
tant end. Bastogne had failed to fall like by CCB affirmed that the way south cer-
an overripe plum when the bough was tainly was closed.
shaken, but it could be clipped off the What were the means available for
branch—or so the German High Com- defense of the Bastogne perimeter? T h e
mand still reasoned—and without using 101st Airborne was an elite, veteran
Bayerlein’s armor. outfit at nearly full strength, and well
The enemy drive across the south acquainted with isolation as a combat
face of Bastogne and on to the west dur- formation. Only five battalions from
ing the night of 20 December did not McAuliffe’s four regiments had been
immediately jolt McAuliffe’s command; seriously engaged in the fight thus far.
it was rather a disparate series of clashes Its four artillery battalions were rein-
with scattered and unsuspecting units of forced by the 969th and 755th Field
the VIII Corps. Central to the story at Artillery Battalions, armed with 155-
this point is the fact that by daylight on mm. howitzers whose range was nearly
460 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

three times that of the airborne artillery, It is impossible to reckon accurately


a very important make-weight for the the number and the fighting worth of
101st. In addition the 10th Armored those stragglers who reached Bastogne
Troops were supported by the 420th and stayed there. CCR contributed
Armored Field Artillery Battalion, about two hundred riflemen; CCB may
whose mobility and tactics made it espe- have had an equal number; General
cially useful in a perimeter situation. Cota culled two or three hundred men
Also available were stray gun sections from Team SNAFU to return to his 28th
and pieces from artillery units which Division; and one may guess there were
had been decimated during the VIII another two or three hundred stragglers
Corps’ withdrawal. whose identity has been lost. Many of
Probably CCB, 10th Armored, and these men, given a hot meal and forty-
CCR, 9th Armored, had between them eight hours’ rest, could be used and were
some forty operable medium tanks by used, but they appear as anonymous
the 21st. 8 T o this number of fighting figures in the combat record (thus:
vehicles should be added the light tanks, “ 1 0 0 infantry left for Team Browne”) .
cavalry assault guns, and antiaircraft ar- McAuliffe now had the advantage of
tillery automatic weapons carriers— a clearly defined command structure.
probably no more than two platoons in Before the 20th he and Colonel Roberts
each category. A very heartening addi- had commanded independently, but on
tion to the Bastogne force, of course, was that date Middleton gave McAuliffe the
provided by the 705th Tank Destroyer “say” (as General Cota had advised after
Battalion. his visit) over all the troops in the
T h e highway nodal position which Bastogne sector.10 T h e presence of Rob-
made Bastogne so necessary to the Ger- erts would prove particularly valuable.
mans also set up a magnetic field for Early in the war he had been the ar-
the heterogeneous stragglers, broken in- mored instructor at the Army Command
fantry, and dismounted tankers heading and General Staff School, where his
west. Realizing this fact, Colonel Rob- humorously illustrated “Do’s” and
berts got permission to gather all “Don’ts” of tank warfare showed a keen
stragglers into his command. Roberts’ appreciation of the problems posed by
force came to be known as Team armor and infantry co-operation. T h e
SNAFU9 and served mainly as a reser- paratroopers were in particular need of
voir from which regular units drew this advice for they seldom worked with
replacements or from which com- armor, knew little of its capability, and
manders organized task forces for special even less of its limitations, and–as be-
assignments. fitted troops who jumped into thin air–
8 T h e records of the badly fragmented armor were a little contemptuous of men who
absorbed in the lines of the 101st Airborne are fought behind plate steel. (During the
so scanty as to give no really precise strength
figures.
Bastogne battle Roberts developed a
9 In the vernacular of the time, SNAFU stood formal memorandum on the proper em-
for: Situation Normal, All Fouled Up. Thus ployment of armor, but this was not
Team SNAFU was named in a typical soldier
cock of the snoot at adverse fate and the sensi- 10General McAuliffe subsequently was given the
bilities of higher command. DSC for the defense of the town.
T H E BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 461

distributed to the 101st until 28 De- of course, a considerable quantity of am-


cember.) On the other hand the tankers munition, food, and other supplies in-
had much to learn from commanders side Bastogne which the VIII Corps had
and troops who were used to fighting been unable to evacuate. (Officers of
“surrounded.” Middleton’s staff bitterly regretted the
McAuliffe’s logistic means were less loss of the wine and liquors which had
substantial than the tactical. T h e air- been carefully husbanded for consump-
borne division normally carried less sup- tion at Christmas and New Year). Bas-
ply than conventional divisions and the togne was sizable enough to have some
101st had been hurried into Belgium reserve civilian stocks, and the mélange
with ammunition and grenade pouches of armor, engineers, and artillery units
not quite full, much individual equip- around the city had supplies and ammu-
ment missing (overshoes, helmets, sleep- nition in their own vehicles. (Pancakes
ing bags, and the like), and only a few would appear regularly in the rations
truckloads of 105-mm. howitzer shells. served during the siege, these concocted
In fact some of the first paratroopers in- from the doughnut flour left in a huge
to line had to be supplied with ammu- American Red Cross dump.)
nition from the CCB trains. Fortunately Through assiduous scrounging, req-
Roberts’ trains were full, and in some uisitioning, and an enforced pooling of
major supply items even had overages, unit resources, the G–4 of the 101st
when they arrived at Bastogne. would be able to work minor logistic
T h e ability of the 101st to sustain it- miracles-but these alone would not
self had been severely diminished on the have insured the survival of the Bas-
night of 19 December when German togne garrision. T h e airborne division
raiding parties (some reported in civil- had been supplied by air during the
ian garb) surprised and overran the Holland operation, and when, on the
division service area around Mande-St. 21st, McAuliffe knew that his command
Etienne. Most of the quartermaster and was isolated he asked for aerial re-
ordnance troops made their way to the supply. Unfortunately no plans had
VIII Corps, but the raiders captured or been worked out in advance for air-
killed most of the division medical lift support and the supply records of
company. Only eight officers and forty- the Holland campaign-which would
four men escaped. This loss of doctors, have made logistic calculation and pro-
aid men, and medical supplies was one cedure easier-were back in France. In
of the most severe blows dealt the 101st. the first instance, therefore, the troops
A number of transport vehicles also were in Bastogne would have to take what
lost in this affray, but about a hundred they got whenever they could get it.
trucks had been sent to the rear for re- Communications would present no
supply and so escaped. Very few of these major problem. A corps radio-link ve-
got back to the 101st before the ring hicle arrived in Bastogne just before the
closed. road to Neufchâteau was severed; so
In addition, Roberts had sent the Middleton and McAuliffe had two-way
CCB trucks back for resupply just be- phone and teletype at their disposal
fore the roads were closed. There was, throughout the siege. Inside Bastogne
462 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

there were enough armored and artil- the 501st) and sent it due south of Bas-
lery units–comparatively rich in signal togne; here tenuous contact was estab-
equipment-to flesh out a speedy and lished with the division engineer battal-
fairly reliable command and artillery ion-the 326th-strung thinly across the
net. Tactical communication beyond the Neufchâteau road and on to the west.
Bastogne perimeter, however, as for ex- (The airborne engineers were not well
ample with the 4th Armored, had to be equipped with demolition matériel and
couched in ambiguous-sometimes quite this road had to be blocked; McAuliffe
meaningless-terms. phoned the VIII Corps for assistance
and in the early dark a detachment from
Mobile forces racing cross-country, the 35th Engineer Combat Battalion
shooting u p isolated posts and convoys, came north and did the job.)
do not necessarily make a battle. T h e Directly west of Bastogne lay the rem-
German dash around Bastogne was pre- nants of the division trains and service
eminently designed to encircle, not con- companies. Defense here would devolve
strict. T h e German commanders, well initially on the 420th Armored Field
aware of the fragmentization of their en- Artillery Battalion (Lt. Col. Barry D.
veloping forces, did not consider that Browne) , which was gathering infantry
Bastogne had been surrounded until the and tank destroyers and finally would
evening of the 21st. T h e major enemy be known as Task Force Browne. T h e
impact on this date, therefore, came as last link in the perimeter was the 3d
in previous days against the east face of Battalion of the 327th, holding on a
Bastogne. T h e American perimeter, front northwest of Bastogne which ex-
then taking form, represents basically a tended from the Marche-Bastogne high-
reaction to the original German inten- way to Champs.
tions with only slight concessions to the T h e dispositions just described repre-
appearance of the enemy in the south sent the more or less static formations
and west. T h e 502d held the northern in the Bastogne force, the beef for
sector of the American line in the Long- sustained holding operations. Equally
champs and Sonne-Fontaine area. North- important were the mobile, counter-
east of Bastogne the 506th was deployed punching elements provided by the ar-
with one foot in Foy and the other mor, assault guns, and tank destroyers.
next to the Bourcy-Bastogne rail line. These units, with constantly changing
To the right of this regiment the task force names and composition, would
501st faced east-one flank at the rail line have a ubiquitous, fluid, and highly im-
and the other south of Neffe. T h e 2d portant role in maintaining the Bastog-
Battalion, 327th, held the Marvie posi- ne perimeter against the German con-
tion with an open flank abutting on the centric attack. Their tactical agility on
Bastogne-Arlon highway. the interior line would be greatly en-
T h e American deployment on hanced by the big freeze which set in on
through the south and west quadrants the 21st.
could not yet be called a line. In the
early afternoon McAuliffe took the 1st All through the night of 20 December
Battalion of the 327th (then attached to the troops of the 506th in Foy had been
T H E BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 463

buffeted by German artillery. At dawn Panzer Lehr, and Kokott could not af-
the enemy advanced on the village, and ford two regiments in attack at the rail
the Americans, as they had done earlier, line.
retired to the better ground south of Through most of 21 December the
Foy and Recogne. This early effort was Germans lashed out at the 501st with
not followed up because the 2d Panzer artillery and sporadic infantry assaults.
was on its way west and had no further On the American left flank Kokott’s
concern in this sector save to neutralize 77th carried the ball but the main effort
a possible American foray against its was made by the 902d, attacking from
rear. an assembly area at Neffe against the
T h e primary attack of the day came 3d Battalion. T h e records of this bat-
along the Bourcy-Bastogne rail line, talion were lost in later fighting, but
right at the seam between the 506th and participants in the action speak of a
501st. During the previous night Kokott “determined” attack by two German
had built up the concentration of his rifle battalions and “vicious close-in
26th Volks Grenadier Division in the fighting.” Although Colonel Ewell ex-
woods east of the railroad to include pected a second all-out assault when day-
much of the rifle strength of the 77th light ended, this never came. T h e 902d
and 78th Regiments. The two Amer- had its orders to catch up with the Pan-
ican regiments had failed to make a zer Lehr van in the west and during the
firm commitment as to tactical respon- night assembled for the march to rejoin
sibility and, indeed, the left flank of the General Bayerlein.
501st was nearly a thousand yards to South of the 501st positions the enemy
the rear of the 506th. At 0830 a 506th seemed content to sit back and shell
patrol chanced upon some Germans in the headquarters of the 2d Battalion,
the woods behind the regiment’s right 327th, at Marvie. T h e 2d Battalion re-
flank. Companies D and F attacked cords no other action than the appear-
promptly to seal the gap at the rail line ance of some tanks and infantry along
while the 501st turned its weapons to the Arlon road forcing a flank exten-
deny any movement on its side. sion across the road. German evidence,
Enough of the enemy had infiltrated however, speaks of attacks by the 901st
for McAuliffe to ask Colonel Sink to in this sector which “miscarried.” 11 If
send in his 1st Battalion, which had been discretion in this particular instance
badly hurt at Noville, as a cauterizing proved the better part of valor, it prob-
force. It took three hours of musketry ably was induced by the CCB tanks
and, at several points, bayonet work to which had taken position on the Arlon
liquidate the Germans in the pocket; road.
the battalion killed about 50, took pris- Farther west the enemy was more ag-
oner 85, and drove a large number into gressive. Having played havoc with the
the hands of the 501st. This hot sec- 11 Both the German and American records for
tor of the front cooled off during the the Ardennes contain, from time to time, reports
afternoon. T h e 26th Volks Grenadier of “attacks” which in fact were never noticed by
the alleged targets and which probably were no
Division was realigning and extending more than dutiful commotion in response to the
to take over the ground vacated by promptings of higher authority.
464 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

VIII Corps’ artillery and trains assem- a couple of hundred yards and Battery
bled outside Sibret, Kumpfgruppe A of the 755th alongside the headquar-
Kunkel turned north in the late morn- ters battery of the 969th laid down a
ing toward Senonchamps, a village of hail of machine gun fire which momen-
some importance since it controlled the tarily halted the enemy. This small rear
secondary road leading onto the Marche- guard force itself was saved by the ap-
Bastogne highway. T h e immediate prize pearance of two American tanks that
before Kunkel, but probably unknown casually wandered into the fight and out
to him, was the American artillery again. Only one howitzer was lost dur-
groupment consisting of the 755th and ing the displacement to Senonchamps,
969th Field Artillery Battalions, em- and it was disabled by a mortar shell.
placed with their 155-mm. howitzers At the edge of Senonchamps Team
near Villeroux, a crossroads some 2,500 Pyle made a stand, for the German drive
yards south of Senonchamps. threatened to strike the 420th Ar-
At Senonchamps the 420th Armored mored Field Artillery Battalion (Team
Field Artillery Battalion under Colonel Browne) and the two battalions of 155’s
Browne was busily engaged in firing from the rear. When the enemy infantry
against the enemy east and north of Bas- formed to join their tanks in an assault
togne, but Browne had been able to take on the village they came directly under
some steps to secure his gun positions the eyes of Battery B of the 796th Anti-
with a scratch force of infantry and aircraft Artillery Battalion, whose .50-
light tanks raised by CCB. Around Vil- caliber “meat choppers” quickly ended
leroux, however, all was confusion and this threat. Kunkel decided to delay an
no single officer seemed to be respon- attempt for conclusion until the mor-
sible for defense of this sector. As Kun- row.
kel sped north from Sibret toward Vil- North and northwest of Bastogne the
leroux he met the 771st Field Artillery day passed quietly, although small Ger-
Battalion, which abandoned its guns and man detachments did make a few sorties
fled. About this time Team Pyle (a de- on the Marche road. T h e company of
tachment formed from the remnants of the 3d Battalion, 327th, which had been
CCR and numbering fourteen tanks and sent on a lone mission to aid the sur-
a couple of hundred stray riflemen) vivors of the division medical company,
came south on the Neufchâteau road. was attacked and momentarily cut off but
Kunkel hit the point of this force east succeeded in rejoining the battalion.
of Villeroux and drove the Americans
back in the direction of Senonchamps. T h e Enemy Begins a Concentric
T h e brief respite given the Villeroux Attack
defenders by this encounter enabled the
two medium howitzer battalions to T h e evening situation report that
“march order” their batteries and head reached OB W E S T on the 21st made
for Senonchamps. German infantry in good reading. Rundstedt was convinced
half-tracks closed on Villeroux before that the time was ripe for a concentric
the last howitzers could displace, but attack to crush Bastogne and make this
visibility by this time had dwindled to road center available for the build-up re-
T H E BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 465

quired to support the Fifth Panzer Army detached from Panzer L e h r ) , an extra
at or over the Meuse. His order to Man- fifteen Panther tanks, and some artil-
teuffel made the seizure of Bastogne a lery battalions. What the 5th Parachute
must, but at the same time stressed Division could put into the pot depend-
the paramount necessity of retaining ed, of course, on the Americans to the
momentum in the drive west. Manteuf- south.
fel had anticipated the OB WEST It would take some time to relieve
command and during the evening visited those troops pulling out and redress the
the X L V I I Panzer Corps’ command alignment of the 26th Volks Grenadier
post to make certain that Luettwitz Division’s battalions. There was little
would start the squeeze on Bastogne the point to attacking the 101st Airborne in
next day-but without involving the the eastern sector where its strength
mobile armored columns of the Panzer had been demonstrated, but west of Bas-
Lehr. togne the Panzer Lehr and Kokott’s own
Manteuffel, Luettwitz, and Kokott, reconnaissance troops had encountered
who was now made directly responsible only weak and disorganized opposition.
for the conduct of the Bastogne opera- T h e first blow of the new series designed
tion, were optimistic. For one thing the to bore into Bastogne would be de-
fight could be made without looking livered here in the western sector,
over the shoulder toward the south accompanied by systematic shelling to
(where the Luftwaffe had reported bring that town down around the
heavy American traffic moving from defender’s ears.
Metz through Luxembourg City), be- T h e battle on the 22d, therefore,
cause the right wing of the Seventh largely centered along an arc rather
Army finally had shouldered its way roughly delimited by Villeroux and the
west and seemed ready to take over the Neufchâteau highway at one end and
prearranged blocking line facing Neuf- Mande-St. Etienne, just north of the
château, Arlon, and the American rein- Marche highway, at the other. One can-
forcements predicted from Patton’s not speak of battle lines in this sector:
Third Army. The advance guard of the the two antagonists were mixed higgledy-
5th Parachute Division already had piggledy and for much of the time
crossed the Arlon road north of Marte- with no certain knowledge of who was in
lange. General Brandenberger, the Sev- what village or at what crossroads. It
enth Army commander, himself came to is indicative of the confusion prevailing
Luettwitz’ command post during the that the 501st tried to evacuate its regi-
evening to promise that all three regi- mental baggage train-which had suf-
ments of the division would take their fered from enemy shelling-through Si-
allotted positions. bret after Kampfgruppe Kunkel had cut
Kokott apparently was promised rein- the road north of the town by the dash
forcement for the attack à outrance on into Villeroux. (The 501st lost fifteen
Bastogne but he had to begin the bat- trucks and nearly all its bed rolls.)
tle with those troops on the spot: his The arena in question earlier had
own 26th Volks Grenadier Division, the been the 101st service area and con-
901st Kampfgruppe (which had been tained in addition a good deal of the
466 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

VIII Corps’ artillery and trains. Much of mm. howitzers which, from battery posi-
the fighting on the 22d revolved around tions east and south of Senonchamps,
two battalions of armored field artillery: provided round-the-clock fire support for
Colonel Paton’s 58th Armored Field friendly infantry five to eight miles dis-
Artillery Battalion, which had emplaced tant. Close-in defense was provided by
near Tillet–af ter the Longvilly battle– a platoon of thirty stragglers who had
to support the 101st Airborne; and been rounded up by an airborne officer
Browne’s 420th, now operating as a com- and deployed three hundred yards south
bined arms team on a 4,000-yard perim- of the gun positions. (This platoon held
eter in the neighborhood of Senon- for two days until all were killed or
champs. Tillet lay about six miles west captured.) Browne’s main weapon
of Senonchamps. Much of the interven- against the German tanks and self-pro-
ing countryside was in the hands of pelled guns was not his howitzers but
roving patrols from Panzer Lehr, one of the seventeen Sherman tanks brought up
which had erected a strong roadblock by Team Pyle and Team Van Kleef the
midway between the two villages. day before. These were disposed with
On the night of the 21st the Germans nine tanks facing a series of wood lots
encircled Tillet, where Paton, hard west of the battery positions, four firing
pressed, radioed the VIII Corps for help. south, and the remaining four placed
Middleton relayed this SOS to Bastogne on the road to Villeroux.
but Browne, himself under attack by At daybreak the first task was to clear
Kunkel’s 26th Volks Grenadier Division the enemy from the woods which lay un-
reconnaissance battalion, was forced to comfortably near the firing batteries.
say that the 58th would have to get back Pyle’s scratch force of riflemen entered
to Senonchamps under its own power. the woods but found only a few Ger-
Nevertheless, Team Yantis (one me- mans. Off to the northwest came the
dium tank, two light tanks, and a couple sound of firing from the area known to
of rifle squads) moved forward to the be occupied by a battalion of the 327th
German roadblock, expecting to give Glider Infantry; so Browne reported to
the 58th a hand when day broke.12 Colonel Roberts that his team would join
Paton and his gunners never reached this fight as soon as the woods were clear.
Team Browne,13 which had had its Before the sortie could be organized, a
hands full. Browne’s force not only had detachment from Kampfgruppe Kunkel
to defend a section of the Bastogne per- struck out from Villeroux against the
imeter and bar the Senonchamps entry, American flank. Direct tank fire chased
but also had to serve the eighteen 105- the enemy away, but this was only the
12 Team Yantis (1st Lt. Ray J. Yantis) was sent opener. During the afternoon the enemy
back on the night of 22 December to find a way made three separate assaults from the
through the enemy and bring back badly needed woods that earlier had been reported
artillery ammunition from Neufchâteau. The team
was ambushed and shot up near Pinsamont and cleared, and again the tanks made short
had to abandon its vehicles. Special AAR, Com. work of the Germans (Van Kleef report-
pany C, 55th Armored Engineer Battalion. ed eighteen enemy tanks destroyed dur-
13See above, Chapter XIV, pages 328–29, for
the rest of the story of the 58th Armored Field ing the day).
Artillery. As the afternoon wore on fog and snow
T H E BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 467

clouded the scene and the tank gunners T h e airdrop laid on for the 22d never
began to lose their targets. T h e Ameri- reached Bastogne–bad flying weather
can howitzer batteries, however, pro- continued as in the days past. All that
vided a static and by this time a well- the Third Army air liaison staff could do
defined target for enemy counterbattery was to send a message that “the 101st
fire. At twilight Colonel Browne radioed Airborne situation is known and appre-
CCB that his heterogeneous team was ciated.” Artillery ammunition was run-
taking “terrible casualties.” Earlier he ning very low. T h e large number of
had asked for more troops, and McAu- wounded congregated inside Bastogne
liffe had sent Company C of the 327th presented a special problem: there were
and Team Watts (about a hundred men, too few medics, not enough surgical
under Maj. Eugene A. Watts) from Team equipment, and blankets had to be gath-
SNAFU. At dark the howitzer positions ered u p from front-line troops to wrap
had a fairly substantial screen of infantry the men suffering from wounds and
around them, although the enemy guns shock. Nonetheless, morale was high.
continued to pound away through the Late in the afternoon word was circu-
night. lated to all the regiments that the 4th

IN ANIMPROVISED
CASUALTIES WARDduring the siege of Bastogne.
EMERGENCY
468 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Armored and the 7th Armored (so vague would be a red-letter day–long remem-
was information inside the perimeter) bered–because of the bombers and
were on their way to Bastogne; to the fighter-bombers once more streaming
men in the line this was heartening news. overhead like shoals of silver minnows
What may have been the biggest mo- in the bright winter sun, their sharply
rale booster came with a reverse twist– etched contrails making a wake behind
the enemy “ultimatum.” About noon them in the cold air.
four Germans under a white flag entered In Bastogne, however, all eyes looked
the lines of the 2d Battalion, 327th. for the squat planes of the Troop Carrier
T h e terms of the announcement they Command. About 0900 a Pathfinder
carried were simple: “the honorable sur- team dropped inside the perimeter and
render of the encircled town,” this to be set up the apparatus to guide the C–47’s
accomplished in two hours on threat of over a drop zone between Senon-
”annihilation” by the massed fires of champs and Bastogne. T h e first of the
the German artillery. T h e rest of the carriers dropped its six parapacks at
story has become legend: how Gen- 1150, and in little more than four hours
eral McAuliffe disdainfully answered 241 planes had been vectored to Bas-
“Nuts!”; and how Colonel Harper, com- togne. Each plane carried some twelve
mander of the 327th, hard pressed to hundred pounds, but not all reached the
translate the idiom, compromised on drop zone nor did all the parapacks fall
“Go to Hell!” The ultimatum had been where the Americans could recover
signed rather ambiguously by “The Ger- them. Nevertheless this day’s drop les-
man Commander,” and none of the Ger- sened the pinch–as the records of the
man generals then in the Bastogne sector 101st gratefully acknowledge. On 24 De-
seem to have been anxious to claim cember a total of 160 planes would take
authorship.14 Lt. Col. Paul A Danahy, part in the drop; poor flying weather on
G–2 of the 101st, saw to it that the story Christmas Day virtually scrubbed all
was circulated–and appropriately em- cargo missions-although eleven gliders
bellished-in the daily periodic report: did bring in a team of four surgeons
“The Commanding General’s answer and some POL badly needed by Roberts’
was, with a sarcastic air of humorous tanks. The biggest airlift day of the siege
tolerance, emphatically negative.” None- would come on the 26th with 289 planes
theless the 101st expected that the com- flying the Bastogne run.15
ing day—the 23d—would be rough. T h e bulk of the air cargo brought to
T h e morning of 23 December broke Bastogne during the siege was artillery
clear and cold. “Visibility unlimited,” ammunition. By the 24th the airborne
the air-control posts happily reported all batteries were down to ten rounds per
the way from the United Kingdom to tube and the work horse 420th Armored
the foxholes on the Ardennes front. T o Field Artillery was expending no more
most of the American soldiery this than five rounds per mission, even on
14In a television interview early in 1960 General
von Luettwitz admitted that he was responsible 15A complete listing of the Bastogne airdrop
for the ultimatum to the Bastogne garrison. This missions, carrier losses, weather conditions, and
confirms a like statement made to Colonel Marshall similar information can be found in Thompson’s
in 1945 but later denied by Luettwitz. MS, Air Supply to Isolated Units, pp. 64–135.
SUPPLYBY AIR. Pathfinder unit (above) sets up radar equipment. Medical supplies (be-
low) are dragged by hand from drop Zone.
470 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

very lucrative targets. This battalion, front of eighteen miles, reaching from
covering a 360-degree front, would in Neufchâteau clear back to the Sauer
fact be forced to make its original 1,400 crossings. Indeed, during the day the
rounds last for five days. T h e two 155- 26th Yolks Grenadier Division had to
mm. howitzer battalions were really take over the portion of the 5th Para-
pawing at the bottom of the barrel. T h e chute line between Clochimont and
969th fired thirty-nine rounds on 24 De- Hompré because the American forces
cember and two days later could allow from the south threatened to pierce this
its gunners only twenty-seven rounds, very thinly occupied segment of the
one-sixth the number of rounds ex- blocking line. Kokott, then, could em-
pended per day when the battle began. ploy only two regiments and his recon-
T h e airdrop on the 23d brought a div- naissance battalion in the assault, while
idend for the troops defending Bastogne. maintaining what pressure the remain-
T h e cargo planes were all overwatched ing two regiments might have along the
by fighters who, their protective mission balance of the American perimeter.
accomplished, turned to hammer the T h e enemy tactics on this and the fol-
Germans in the Bastogne ring. During lowing days reflect the manner in
the day eighty-two P–47’s lashed out at which Kokott had to husband his re-
this enemy with general-purpose and sources. Extensive preparatory fires by
fragmentation bombs, napalm, and artillery and Werfers opened the show
machine gun fire. T h e 101st reported while the infantry wormed in as close to
to Middleton, whose staff was han- the American foxhole line as possible.
dling these air strikes for the division, By this time the new-fallen snow had
that “air and artillery is having a field put every dark object in full relief; the
day around Bastogne.” grenadiers now donned white snow
T h e German attack on the 23d was capes and the panzers were painted
mounted by the 26th Volks Grenadier white. (The Americans replied in kind
Division and the attached regiment left with wholesale raids on Belgian bed
behind by Panzer Lehr. Lacking the linen and with whitewash for their ar-
men and tanks for an assault around mored vehicles.) T h e assault would be
the entire perimeter, General Kokott led by a tank platoon–normally four or
elected to continue the fight at Senon- five panzers–followed by fifty to a hun-
champs while attacking in two sectors dred infantry. If this first wave failed,
diametrically opposite each other, the a second or third–seldom larger than
Marvie area in the southeast and the the initial wave–would be thrown in.
Flamierge area in the northwest. By the It is clear, however, that the German
happenstance of its late and piecemeal commander and his troops were chary
deployment the 327th Glider Infantry of massed tactics at this stage of the
stood in front of the enemy at both these game.
critical points. T h e 39th Volks Grenadier Regiment,
The 5th Parachute Division, now bad- freshest in Kokott’s division, was assem-
ly fought out and with gaping ranks, bled to the west and northwest opposite
could be of little help at Bastogne. Ac- Team Browne and the 3d Battalion of
tually this division was scattered on a the 327th. The latter had maintained
T H E BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 471

an observation post at Flamierge and with its tanks.


a string of roadblocks along the Flam- At 1845 the 901st (with at least two
ierge road well in front of the battalion tank companies in support) commenced
position. Here the enemy dealt the first a co-ordinated attack delivered by pla-
blow of the day and got into Flamierge, toons and companies against the front
only to be chased out by a counterat- manned by the 2d Battalion and Team
tack. Next, the enemy gathered south of O’Hara.16 One quick rush put an enemy
Company C—positioned astride the detachment on a hill south of Marvie
Marche highway–and tried to shoot the which overlooked this village. T h e pla-
Americans out with tank fire. In early toon of paratroopers on the hill was
evening the Germans moved in for the surrounded and destroyed, but when a
assault and at one point it was reported half-track and a brace of tanks tried to
that Company C had been lost. This was move down the hill into Marvie a lucky
far from fact for the American artillery shot or a mine disabled the half-track,
beat off the attackers; the 3d Battalion, leaving no way past for the tanks. On
however, pulled back closer to Bastogne. the Bastogne-Arlon road a group of tanks
This enemy effort also extended to em- (twelve were counted) started north to-
brace Team Browne. More infantry ward the right flank of the 2d Battalion.
were hurried to Senonchamps on light Here Company F later reported that the
tanks, and at 1830 McAuliffe sent one tanks “made repeated attempts to over-
half of his mobile reserve (Team run our positions but were halted.” It is
Cherry) to give a hand against the Ger- probable that the three medium tanks
man tanks. But the American tanks, from Team O’Hara and the three tank
tank destroyers, and artillery already on destroyers from the 609th Tank De-
the scene were able to handle the pan- stroyer Battalion which stood astride the
zers without additional help–and even road (not to mention the darkness and
while this fight was on the cannoneers artillery fire) had a more chastening
around Senonchamps turned their effect on the panzers than the small arms
pieces to lob shells across the perimeter fire of the paratroopers.
in support of the hard-driven paratroop- The Germans seem to have had the
ers and tankers at Marvie. village of Marvie as their main objective
During the hours of light the 901st for by midnight the fight had died down
made no move to carry out its scheduled all along the line except at Marvie,
attack between Marvie and the Arlon where it burst out with fresh virulence.
road. Quite possibly the activity of the It is estimated that at least one rifle
American fighter-bombers, once more in battalion and some fifteen tanks were
the skies, made it necessary to wait for thrown against Company E (now rein-
nightfall. Through the afternoon the en- forced by an understrength company of
emy shelled the 2d Battalion, 327th, and airborne engineers) and Team O’Hara.
its command post in Marvie. As night 16 The official records credit Pfc. N. A. Osterberg,
came on the barrage increased in inten- a bazooka man of headquarters company, with
sity, sweeping along the battalion front driving back the German tanks that assaulted the
2d Battalion positions. Private Osterberg was
and onto its northern flank–beyond wounded during the three-hour fight. He was
Marvie—where Team O’Hara stood awarded the DSC.
472 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Using the hill which earlier had been ber of points. T h e artillery groupment
wrested from Company G as a mounting west of Bastogne was particularly ex-
block, three German tanks made their posed, and the 327th Glider Infantry
way into the south edge of Marvie, but had already been forced to shorten its
O’Hara’s tanks and assault guns stopped lines. Then too the segments of the pe-
a major penetration from the east by rimeter defense were not as well co-
gunning down the panzers silhouetted ordinated as they might be. T h e tankers
in the glare of burning buildings, thus of CCB complained that they had no
enabling the Americans to hold on in idea of the airborne positions, and quite
the north half of the village. T h e threat probably the regiments of the 101st
of a breach here impelled McAuliffe to were hazy as to the location of the small
send the remaining half of Team Cherry tank and tank destroyer detachments on
to Marvie. Because this switch stripped their flanks.
Bastogne of its last counterattack force, Colonel Kinnard, whose sharp tactical
Cherry’s detachment, which had gone sense was rated highly by all the com-
west to assist Team Browne, was recalled manders who worked with him during
to Bastogne. An hour before dawn on the siege, drew up on 24 December a
the 24th the battle ended and quiet came plan to regroup the Bastogne forces. T h e
to Marvie. O’Hara’s troops had ac- plan was put into operation that same
counted for eight panzers in this fight, evening. Kinnard’s scheme placed all
but the village was still clutched by both four regiments of the 101st Airborne on
antagonists. the line as combined arms teams. Team
The battle on the 23d had been O’Hara and a platoon of the 705th Tank
viewed in a somewhat somber light in- Destroyer Battalion were attached to the
side Bastogne. That evening, only a few 501st. T h e 506th, whose sector had been
minutes after the German attack began quiet, got two platoons of the 705th but
in the Marvie sector, Lt. Col. Harry W. no tanks. T h e 502d was given two pla-
O. Kinnard (the 101st Airborne Divi- toons from the 705th and Team Ander-
sion G–3) telephoned his opposite num- son (it is symptomatic of the shoestring
ber at the VIII Corps command post. defense which perforce had evolved at
The gist of his report, as recorded in the the perimeter that Captain Anderson’s
corps G–3 journal, was this: “In regard “team” consisted of two cavalry as-
to our situation it is getting pretty sault guns, one tank destroyer, and
sticky around here. They [the 4th Ar- two jeeps). T h e 327th took over the
mored Division] must keep coming. 326th Airborne Engineer Battalion, two
T h e enemy has attacked all along the platoons of the 9th Armored Engineer
south and some tanks are through and Battalion (which had won distinction in
running around in our area. Request the Noville fight), and four platoons of
you inform 4th Armored Division of our the 705th. Also attached to the 327th
situation and ask them to put on all was the amalgam of infantry, tank de-
possible pressure.” stroyers, and tanks which had grown up
T h e events of the past hours had around Browne’s 420th Armored Field
shown that the force under McAuliffe’s Artillery Battalion and which, on the
command was overextended at a num- 23d, had been reorganized as Team
T H E BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 473

Roberts. (Colonel Browne was wounded of the ground. Creation of a tactical re-
by a shell fragment on the 24th and died serve was therefore mandatory, albeit
the next day.) 17 difficult of accomplishment with the
This readjustment of the 101st posi- limited mechanized force at McAuliffe’s
tions resulted in a taut and tenuous line disposal. The 101st reserve,as now organ-
of approximately sixteen miles. ( M a p 4 ) ized, consisted of Roberts’ CCB; that is,
That it could not be defended in equal Teams Cherry and Arnsdorf (with per-
strength at all points was not only a mili- haps nine medium and five light tanks
tary aphorism but a simple fact dictated operational at any given time) plus a
by the troops available and the accidents part of the original Team SNAFU, put
together by Colonel Roberts from the
remnants of CCR, 9th Armored, and vari-
17 He received a posthumous award of the DSC. ous waifs and strays. (Colonel Gilbreth,

MAP 4
474 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

the commander of SNAFU, was wounded regrouping, this punctuated with heavy
on the 22d and then hospitalized.) gusts of artillery and mortar fire when-
This reshuffle stripped CCB of its own ever the opponent showed signs of move-
reserve; so Roberts organized a new ment. Once again, however, a beautiful
formation (Team Palmaccio, com- flying day gave the Americans an edge.
manded by 1st Lt. Charles P. Palmaccio) P–47’s belonging to the 512th, 513th,
equipped with four antiaircraft half- and 514th Squadrons of the XIX Tac-
tracks, one tank destroyer, and two light tical Air Command worked around the
tanks. Roadblocks at the entrances to Bas- Bastogne perimeter, at one point, in the
togne were established, each manned by Noville sector, bombing so close to the
two guns from Company C, 609th Tank airborne lines that the 101st sent frantic
Destroyer Battalion. Inside Bastogne it- word to the VIII Corps asking that the
self, McAuliffe had a part of Team SNA- flight leader be told to call off the mis-
FU as a kind of “interior guard,” backed sion. T h e 115th Kampfgruppe from the
up by four self-propelled tank destroyers 15th Panzer Grenadier Division duly
and forty men from the 705th. All this arrived for attachment to Kokott’s divi-
regrouping tightened and strengthened sion and took over a sector in the north-
the rifle line surrounding Bastogne, but west between Flamierge and Givry. T h e
the resources at hand for fire fighting 420th Armored Field Artillery Battalion
enemy armored incursions or for quick, and the medium howitzer battalions dis-
local counterattacks were woefully lim- placed to new firing positions just north
ited-as shown by the commitment of of the Marche road and not more than a
Team Cherry on opposite sides of the mile and a half from Bastogne. T h e
perimeter during 23–24 December. Americans abandoned their last road-
General Luettwitz, with only a rein- block at Mande-St. Etienne—now it was
forced division to use against Bastogne, too far out-and drew in the western line
was worse off than McAuliffe. He had held by Team Roberts and the 3d Bat-
been given rather vague promises of re- talion of the 327th. Germans and Amer-
inforcement, but no decision was ren- icans both claimed Marvie, a circum-
dered by the High Command until the stance which may have accounted for an
23d when Hitler agreed to release two American air strike on Marvie by P–47’s
fresh divisions (the 9th Panzer and 15th during the afternoon.
Panzer Grenadier) from the OKW re- In the headquarters at Bastogne Mc-
serve. Once these troops were handed Auliffe’s staff had been kept pretty well
over to Army Group B, Field Marshal abreast of the enemy movements indica-
Model decided that they were more tive of incoming reinforcement. Team
sorely needed to shore up the left flank Anderson, scouting around Champs, re-
of the Fifth Panzer and Seventh Armies ported armor and tracked vehicles mov-
than at Bastogne. One regimental com- ing into Givry (this was the new 115th
bat team from the 15th Panzer Grena- Kampfgruppe) ; other reports noted the
dier Division was all he would give movement of German traffic coming
Luettwitz for the Bastogne operation. from the northeast and moving south-
On both sides of the line, then, the ward across the American front. All this
daylight hours of the 24th were spent in must have been a headache for the 101st
T H E BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 475

G–2, but aside from shortening the lines sions, toward the Meuse and seize the
and tightening up tactical control there Marche plateau in an attempt to widen
was little the Americans could do but the German thrust? Hitler’s answer,
wait for the blow to fall. finally relayed by Model, was that the
Early in the afternoon the VIII Corps attack to seize the Marche plateau should
relayed a message from General Patton be continued with all available forces.
and the Third Army: “Xmas Eve pres- This answer did nothing to relieve Man-
ent coming up. Hold on.” But there teuffel’s worries about his thin and en-
were more tangible items to lessen the dangered southern flank.18 T o leave
nostalgia and depression of the sur- Bastogne as a sally port onto his left
rounded garrison on Christmas Eve. T h e rear made no military sense to this ex-
second day of air resupply had been perienced soldier-so Manteuffel ordered
“a tremendous morale booster”–so re- that Bastogne be taken on 25 December.
ported CCB and most of the regiments. (The attack order read: “Displacement
Allied air activity on the 24th had heart- [in this context a kind of euphemism
ened the men on the ground. When for “destruction”] of the enemy at Bas-
night fell they could see the fires left as togne.”)
aftermath of the fighter-bomber strikes T h e German order of battle on Christ-
blazing all the way round the perimeter. mas Eve was this (read from the north
(Twice during the night of 24 Decem- clockwise). The 26th Volks Grenadier
ber, however, the Luftwaffe retaliated engineer battalion and a few antitank
with very damaging and lethal bombing guns maintained a security screen in the
sorties on Bastogne and the surrounding Foy-Recogne sector. The 78th Fuesiliers,
area.) Less obtrusive but of considerable brought back to strength by a large draft
impact was the confidence that the com- of replacements, held on a front extend-
manders and the troops had in each ing from Foy to Neffe. T h e 901st, its
other; a lesson for future commanders ranks much depleted by the fighting just
may be read in the considerable effort ended, continued the circle past Marvie
put forth by McAuliffe, Roberts, and the and to a point west of the Arlon road.
regimental commanders to apprise all T h e 39th was deployed on both sides of
the troops of the “situation.” the Neufchâteau road. What earlier had
Christmas Eve in the German head- been the “western front”–that is, from
quarters brought forth some cognac and Senonchamps north to the Marche road
a few “Prosits” but in the main was de-
voted to preparations for a major attack 18All of the higher German field commanders
on Christmas Day. As late as the evening appear to have been in a quandary at this stage
as to Hitler’s intention toward Bastogne. See
of the 24th Luettwitz hoped to obtain Manteuffel’s queries to his superiors as described
more troops from the 15th Panzer Gren- in MS #B–151a, and ETHINT–46, Fifth Panzer
adier Division, but the Fuehrer had Army, Mission of November 1944–January 1945.
I n a conference which the author held with
other ideas. Earlier in the day the Fifth Manteuffel and his chief of staff, Generalmajor
Panzer Army commander posed a ques- Carl Gustav Wagener, in Karlsruhe on io June
tion which finally reached Jodl and Hit- 1960, Wagener said that Hitler expressed no
particular interest in Bastogne during the offensive
ler: should he turn to finish off Bastogne phase, nor did he insist that his original orders
or continue, with the bulk of his divi- to capture Bastogne be followed.
476 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

–was occupied by the reconnaissance on the fresh strength provided by the


battalion of the 26th Volks Grenadier 15th Panzer Grenadier (–). T h e main
Division, which had moved onto the effort would be made in the northwest
ground left free by the American with- between the Marche road and Champs,
drawal on the 24th. T h e regiment from the latter point included as an initial
the incoming 15th Panzer Grenadier objective. It was known that the Amer-
Division (Colonel Deckert) was bivou- ican hold in this sector was weak, the
acked west of Flamizoulle. T h e 77th frozen ground gave good tank going and
Fuesilier Regiment completed the circle, observation for the artillery, and there
the bulk of its troops concentrated west were no large villages or woods to hold
of Champs. Uneasy about the ability of up the assault. T o open a way for the
the 5th Parachute Division to cover his main effort Kokott quietly assembled the
back, Kokott was forced to strip a few major part of his division artillery
companies from his own division and the around Flamierge and Givry. T h e plan
901st to form a subsidiary front facing included a heavy blow by the Luftwaffe
south. against Bastogne itself (this eventuated
T h e attack plan for the 25th turned in the two bombing attacks during the

A BASTOGNE
STREETAFTERLUFTWAFFE
BOMBARDMENT
T H E BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 477

night of 24 December which killed a been arranged with the tanks supposed
Belgian nurse and a score of wounded to support the 115th. Maucke’s supe-
paratroopers) . riors simply pointed out the tremendous
T h e original time schedule was ex- advantage that would accrue to a sur-
ceedingly optimistic: to put in the in- prise attack on Christmas Day—he had
fantry assault at 0400; to break through his orders.19
the American rifle line by 0600, at which The main assault, handed the ele-
time the artillery could see to fire on ments of the 15th Panzer Grenadier, was
targets of opportunity and the tanks to be a straight thrust over Flamizoulle
would be able to move with speed; and into Bastogne with the right wing guid-
to rush an armored group from the 15th ing on the Marche highway, a distance of
Panzer Grenadier into Bastogne be- about four miles. For this Maucke put
tween 0800 and 0900 hours before the two battalions in line and one in reserve.
American fighter-bombers took to the The 1st Battalion, with tanks carrying
air. some of the infantry, was to pass through
T h e optimism breathed by this sched- Flamizoulle; the 2d Battalion, supported
ule must have expired shortly after it by the tank destroyer company, would
was put on paper although the plan re- circle Flamizoulle to the north and strike
mained. Kokott has recorded his shock for the northern edge of Bastogne. To
and surprise at the weak state of the the left of Maucke’s kampfgruppe the
reinforcements brought in by Deckert: 77th Grenadier Regiment was ordered
the 115th Regiment (three battalions of to attack along the secondary road run-
fusiliers) , the reconnaissance battalion ning through Champs and Hemroulle
and two armored field artillery battal- into Bastogne. Here the 1st Battalion
ions of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Divi- had the job of seizing Champs and open-
sion, a company of tank destroyers, and ing the way while the 2d Battalion,
seventeen tanks belonging to the 115th following to the left and rear, would be
Panzer Battalion. Hitler’s failure to prepared to leapfrog forward as Champs
name Bastogne as the primary objective fell, the two making the final push into
had been reflected in the dilatory and Bastogne abreast. T h e reconnaissance
contradictory orders issued by the higher battalion of the 26th Volks Grenadier
commanders for the employment of Division, south of Maucke’s force, had a
Deckert’s division. True, the second of special mission: to attack from Senon-
Deckert’s regiments (the 104th) finally champs and pierce the new American
had been given to the XLVII Panzer position by seizing Isle-la-Hesse, a ham-
Corps, but on Christmas Eve it was toil- let standing where the Senonchamps
ing slowly toward the east side of Bas- road fed into the Marche highway. Al-
togne and would not arrive in time to though nearly all the German units sur-
join the battle. Col. Wolfgang Maucke,
commander of the 115th, objected–as 19T h e history of the 15th Panzer Grenadier
strongly as a colonel would dare—when Division is related by the commander of the
he received his orders toward dusk on detachments at Bastogne in MS # P–032c,
Ardennes Project: Report on the 15th Panzer
the 24th. He had been given no time for Grenadier Division, 16 December 1944–2 February
reconnaissance; no co-ordination had 1945 (Maucke) .
478 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

rounding Bastogne had some diversion- marching partner and an hour and a
ary mission during the Christmas Day quarter after the advance began reported
assault, only the 39th Grenadier Regi- to Kokott that the only evidence of
ment had a major attack assigned in American reaction was some tank or
support of the effort in the northwest, tank destroyer fire coming in from the
this to be an advance astride the Neuf- south. Thirty minutes later a brief and
château-Bastogne highway (which was optimistic radio message flashed to the
never carried out). rear: the tanks and the infantry battal-
ion festooned thereon had reached the
The Battle on Christmas Day western edge of Bastogne. But elation at
the German command post was short
About 0300 a few German planes lived: word that the German tanks were
droned over the 502d lines and dropped in the streets of Bastogne never came.
bombs indiscriminately around Rolle, The commander of the 115th sent a
the regimental command post. This liaison officer forward to find the battal-
seems to have been the Luftwaffe sup- ion or its tanks, but without success.
port promised Kokott. A few minutes German forward observers were alerted
later the German gunners and mortar to listen for the sound of German tank
crews started to work, their target the fire-but all they could hear was the
American positions at Champs. Here crash of artillery fire and the crump of
Company A of the 502d was deployed exploding mortar shells.
on the northwest edge of the village, its T h e story of the lost tank group is
right flank joining the 2d Battalion in a soon told. T h e eighteen Mark IV’s and
large wood lot midway between Champs the riding grenadiers had broken
and Longchamps. Clad in white snow through the positions held by Compan-
suits the first German assault party, some ies A and B of the 327th Glider Infantry
fifty grenadiers from the 77th, crept for- before dawn and got as far as the battal-
ward under the waning moon toward ion command post. Several of the enemy
Champs. At 0400 this group dashed into tanks passed straight through battery
the village and the German attack be- positions of the 755th Field Artillery
gan. More of the enemy moved through Battalion, whose gunners opened u p
the woods against the left flank of the with machine guns as soon as they dis-
2d Battalion, and within the hour a full cerned the distinctive German muzzle-
German battalion had joined the fight. brakes. But the 155-mm. howitzers could
Company B moved up as a backstop if not be brought to bear at such close
its sister company should be engulfed or range and the Germans rolled on un-
pushed aside, but the confused melee scathed. Just west of Hemroulle about
around Champs in the predawn darkness half the German tanks wheeled left, de-
pinned the Germans down. filing along a cart path which led to the
Meanwhile the two assault battalions road between Champs and Bastogne. As
of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division they approached the road the panzers
were moving against the 3d Battalion of formed in line abreast, now bearing
the 327th. T h e tank group on the right straight toward Companies B and C of
of the German line drew ahead of its the 502d, which were on the march to
T H E BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 479

help the paratroopers in Champs. itself after the initial armored punctures.
Colonel Chappuis had a few minutes About fifty German riflemen who had
to face his companies toward the on- hidden in a stream bed were captured by
coming tanks, but the initial shock was cannoneers from the 755th. At noon
absorbed by two tank destroyers from General Kokott wrote the tanks and the
Company B of the 705th Tank Destroyer accompanying infantry from the 1st
Battalion which were knocked out as Battalion of the 115th off as lost—why
they fell back toward the Champs road. 20 and where remained a mystery to the
As the panzers rolled forward, Company German headquarters.
C made an orderly withdrawal to the T h e 2d Battalion of the 115th seems to
edge of a large wood lot midway be- have made good use of the rupture
tween Champs and Hemroulle. Now it created in the 327th positions west of
was the paratroopers’ turn. They Hemroulle, advancing almost unper-
showered the tanks with lead, and the ceived and unopposed until daybreak
German infantry clinging to the decks when it was brought under fire by Com-
and sides fell to the snow. T h e tank pany C, the 3d Battalion reserve. At first
detachment again wheeled into column, light the American artillery and mor-
this time turning toward Champs. Two tars took on the German infantry starkly
of the 705th tank destroyers, which were outlined against the snow-covered slopes
backing u p Company C, caught the col- west of Hemroulle. T h e panzer grena-
umn in process of turning and put away diers tried digging in but the ground
three of the panzers; the paratroopers’ was too hard frozen; so they lay in the
bazookas accounted for two more. snow and took their losses. T h e regimen-
T h e half of the enemy tank-infantry tal commander, Colonel Maucke, began
formation which had kept on toward in midmorning to re-form his remaining
Hemroulle after knifing through the troops, pulling what was left of the 1st
327th foxhole line received its coup de Battalion back to a hill southeast of
grâce in a fury of cross fire laid down by Flamizoulle (where it took a merciless
four of the 705th tank destroyers, tanks pounding from Allied fighter-bombers)
from Team Roberts, the 463d Parachute and sending his reserve battalion into
Field Artillery Battalion, and bazookas the woods north of the 1st to cover its
handled by the glider infantry. As re- flank. When night fell Maucke ordered
counted by Col. s. L. A. Marshall after the remnants of the 1st Battalion to
the battle: “The German tanks were sideslip south across the gap left by the
fired at from so many directions and with disappearance of the tank group. Of the
such a mixture of fire that it was not battalion staff all were dead or wounded
possible to see or say how each tank met and the battalion commander was a
its doom.” The survivors of those pan- young lieutenant from one of the rifle
zer grenadiers of the 1st Battalion who companies. Maucke himself went for-
had ridden into battle on the tanks ward to find his lost tanks but was
found themselves surrounded and alone, stopped by machine gun fire.
for the American rifle line had sealed At Champs, where the battle had be-
gun, most of the Germans left the village
20Colonel Chappuis later was awarded the DSC. in the middle of the morning to let their
480 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

gunners blast the paratroopers out of the had just been repaired, and he did not
houses and surrounding woods. T h e dare put these on the road until dark-
commander of the 77th, apprehensive of ness sent the American fighter-bombers
a continued house-to-house battle, asked home. Both Kokott and the corps com-
for and received permission to circle mander, Luettwitz, still expected the
around the village, but the new attack main battle to be fought on the Arlon or
up the slopes toward Hemroulle was Neufchâteau road, but in the late after-
shot to pieces. In the early afternoon noon the commander of the 39th radioed
General Kokott called the German attack that American tanks had broken through
to a halt, planning to resume the battle farther to the west at Assenois. Kokott
under cover of the night. asked Luettwitz for help, but the latter
This last “desperate effort,” as Kokott had empty hands. Late that night new
himself termed it, took long to organize orders came from Field Marshall Model:
and did not get under way until the the 26th Volks Grenadier Division
morning hours of the 26th. Using the would hold the defenders inside the
German salient at the Isle-la-Hesse road Bastogne perimeter until the tanks of
fork as his base, Kokott sent a small as- the Fuehrer Begleit Brigade could arrive
sault group from his own division and to sever the narrow corridor opened to
ten mobile tank destroyers northeast in the defenders that afternoon by the
the direction of Hemroulle with the in- American armor.
tention of circling through Savy into T h e siege of Bastogne, for purposes of
Bastogne. This force wedged its way be- historic record, may be considered ended
tween the two right flank companies of at 1645 on 26 December when the 326th
the 327th but was caught in the open by Airborne engineers reported contact
the howitzers massed west of Bastogne with “three light tanks believed
which literally blew the infantry assault friendly.” True, the breach in the Ger-
apart. Four armored tank destroyers con- man-held ring opened by the 4th
tinued toward Hemroulle but were Armored Division was narrow and pre-
finally brought to a halt by a large ditch. carious, but it would not be closed de-
Here, while maneuvering, all were put spite the most strenuous enemy efforts
out of action by artillery and tank de- in coming days. T h e staunch defense of
stroyer fire at close range. Bastogne had impeded the Fifth Panzer
In midafternoon more bad news Army drive to the west, just as the des-
reached Kokott’s command post. He had perate rear guard battle by the 7th
counted on the 5th Parachute Division Armored at St. Vith had slowed the ad-
to keep Patton’s armor at bay in the vance of the Sixth, demonstrating the
south, and to make doubly certain had axiom of World War I that no salient
faced parts of the 901st and 39th away thrust into the defender’s position can
from Bastogne in support of the para- be expanded rapidly and successfully if
troopers. Now word came that the 5th the shoulders of the salient are firmly
Parachute Division had broken and held by the defender. T h e human cost
that the 39th Regiment was under at- of the Bastogne battle, therefore, prob-
tack. Kokott had little to give the ably was not out of proportion to the
39th, only five or six tanks which military gains achieved. T h e 101st Air-
T H E BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 481

borne Division suffered battle casualties who shared in the defense of Bastogne.
numbering 105 officers and 1,536 men. Nor can any casualty roster now be com-
CCB of the 10th Armored Division had piled of those units which fought east of
approximately 25 officers and 478 men Bastogne prior to 19 December and gave
as battle casualties. There is no means of the 101st Airborne Division the time
numbering the killed, wounded, and and the tactical opportunity to array it-
missing in the miscellany of unrecorded self in the defense of that town.
tankers, gunners, infantry, and others
CHAPTER XX

The XII Corps Attacks the


Southern Shoulder
The End of the Defensive Battle, Although the Seventh Army was in the
2 2 December process of going over to the defensive, it
had pushed its right wing forward, ac-
Intercepted radio messages, a most cording to plan, and on 2 0 December
fruitful source for German intelligence, re-established contact with its northern
had clearly indicated by 19 December neighbor, the Fifth Panzer Army. I n
that the Americans were moving rein- effect the right wing of the Seventh
forcements in large numbers toward the Army had wheeled to face south, while
Bulge. The OB WEST staff reasoned at the same time elongating the shoulder
that the bulk of these new divisions of the Fifth. This extension had widened
would be committed in the west in de- the gap between the LXXXV Corps, in
fense of the Meuse River or along the the Ettelbruck sector, and the LXXX
north side of the salient. Thus far there Corps, west of Echternach, but as yet
was no cause to be concerned about the the higher German headquarters were
southern flank. T h e weak Seventh Army unconcerned about the thinning line.
had made progress, although not so much (See M a p V.)
as Hitler wished, and there were no T h e division and corps commanders of
signs of change in the defensive attitude the Seventh Army were less sanguine. By
shown by the Americans in this sector. intuition, or through the natural appre-
Late in the evening of the 19th, Army hension induced by heavy losses, they
Group G reported that the U.S. Third already flinched mentally from the re-
Army was giving ground on the Saar taliatory blow. Concerned with their
front, but the American move was inter- own weakness, rather than the strength
preted as a readjustment which could and successes of the panzer armies, it
not bring Third Army reinforcements to seemed logical to them that the Ameri-
the Ardennes before 22 December. T h e cans would seek to exploit such weak-
German intelligence staffs again agreed ness.1 Across the lines, as it happened,
that there was no immediate threat to
the Seventh Army, and that the west- 1 The German sources of greatest use are: the
OB WEST/IC-Tagesmeldungen for this period;
ward advance by the Fifth Panzer Army MSS ETHINT–34 (Buecks) ; ETHINT–40, LXXXV
would necessarily force the Americans to Infantry Corps in the Ardennes Offensive (General
strengthen the battle line there and pro- der Infanterie Baptist Kniess) ; ETHINT–51
(Jodl); ETHINT–54, Seventh Army, Ardennes
hibit any thrust into the deep southern (Generalmajor Rudolf Freiherr von Gersdorff) ;
flank. MSS # A-876 (Brandenberger) ; A–330 and A–931
T H E XII CORPS ATTACKS T H E SOUTHERN SHOULDER 483

plans were in process for a counterattack mitted no serious penetration of the


against the German southern flank, but ridge position overlooking the Wark
General Patton, charged with this opera- valley) until, on the morning of 2 2 De-
tion, would not have his troops in readi- cember, troops of the incoming 80th
ness before 2 2 December and feared that Infantry Division headed north through
in the interim the enemy would launch their positions.
a spoiling attack from the Echternach T o the south and east the 276th Volks
area. Grenadier Division, now some distance
With the main weight of the Seventh from the 352d, re-formed its two leading
Army echeloned forward on its right regiments on a common front and
(western) wing, pressure to regain con- worked feverishly to bring artillery am-
tact and to grapple with the 109th munition and supplies forward from
Infantry was stepped up during the night bridges which at long last were in opera-
of 2 0 December. T h e 352d Volks Grena- tion. It appears that the new division
dier Division pushed through Ettelbruck commander of the 276th had ordered a
and probed cautiously in the dark, limited attack for 21 December, intended
searching to the west and south for the to carry from Waldbillig to Christnach
outlines of the 109th’s new position. and the more readily defended creek line
This advance onto the ridge rising in there. Late on the previous day a few
the triangle formed by the Wark Creek assault guns, probably no more than five
and Alzette River had a limited object. or six, had arrived west of the river.
Luxembourg, an appetizing target, lay These weapons, it was hoped, would
only fifteen miles south of Ettelbruck lend the tired German infantry the
and on a good road, but the orders re- necessary punch.
ceived by the 352d aimed solely at the In the 9th Armored Division (-)
quick acquisition of a good blocking sector plans were under way to retake
position against any American riposte Waldbillig, using Task Force Chamber-
from the south. T h e objective of the lain of the 10th Armored Division, which
352d, therefore, was a line based on the had been reorganized with a strength of
villages of Bettborn and Bissen that thirteen medium tanks and two much
would cut the main roads running north understrength armored infantry com-
and northeast from Luxembourg and panies (total: 130 men). Before the
Arlon, respectively. Parts of two regi- German attack got under way on 2 1
ments, the 914th and 916th, went up December Task Force Chamberlain at-
against the outpost positions of tacked toward Waldbillig. T h e Sher-
the 109th Infantry on 21 Decem- mans, protected by tank destroyers over-
ber, gaining ground on both of watching on the flanks, negotiated the
the open flanks. For the Americans the dangerous skyline crossing on the ridge
fight was one to gain time (they per- between Christnach and Waldbillig and
by noon were in Waldbillig.
(Sensfuss); B–029. LIII Corps, 8 December 1944- Reports that the enemy had with-
21 January 1945 (General der Kavallerie Edwin drawn proved erroneous the moment
Graf Rothkirch); B–030 (Kniess) ; B–067
(Schmidt) ; B–073 (Sensfuss) ; B–081 (Beyer) ; P-
that the supporting infantry started to
032f (Dempwolff). move up with the tanks. Mortar and rifle
484 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

fire burst from the village, while Werfers to Scheidgen. T h e engineers had no
in the neighboring woods joined in. working radios and did not know that
Although the infantry support had a reinforcements in the shape of a hundred
bad time, the tanks were little concerned or so men from the division headquarters
by this enemy action. Their presence company were on the way. Actually this
inside the village had some effect: a relief party had to fight its way forward
hundred prisoners were taken from the as the engineers struggled to clear a path
988th. About midnight the American back, and darkness was coming when the
artillery laid on a brief, sharp concentra- two bodies made contact. Almost out of
tion and the few tanks still in Waldbillig ammunition, the engineers fell back to
made a rapid withdrawal. Then Ameri- Scheidgen, but the Germans made no
cans and Germans both shelled the move to follow.
village, by now a kind of no man’s land. While the fusilier battalion was gain-
T o the east, opposite the weakest ing ground in its drive toward Scheidgen,
portion of the 4th Infantry Division line, other troops of the 212th Volks Grena-
the 212th Volks Grenadier Division dier Division were trying, albeit with
made still another effort to reach its less success, to make headway to the east
original objective–the good defensive and west. Assembling in the woods near
terrain and blocking position in the Rodenhof, the 320th Grenadier Regi-
Consdorf-Scheidgen-Michelshof area. In ment launched an attack to take Os-
the afternoon of 2 1 December the 212th weiler, but ran into two companies of
Fuesilier Battalion moved along the the 2d Battalion, 2 2 d Infantry, en route
main Echternach-Luxembourg road to clean out the woods. Neither side was
through Lauterborn, which the Ameri- able to advance and the Americans dug
cans earlier had abandoned. Just ahead in for the night a few hundred yards
lay Hill 313,overlooking the road south. south of Rodenhof. On the left flank of
Here a part of Company C, 159th Engi- the 12th Infantry sector a sharp fight
neer Combat Battalion, was stationed, flared up in midafternoon when two
with Company B occupying a smaller companies of the 423d Grenadier Regi-
hill just to the west. There was no pro- ment tried to take Consdorf. T h e Amer-
tection for the engineer flanks. About ican tanks and infantry held their fire
1300 the Germans started a 30-minute until the enemy assault formation had
shelling, covering their advance through cleared its assembly area in the woods
the draws fringing the American-held and was fully deployed on the bare slope
heights. before the town. Then they cut loose.
Company B caught the full force of Some sixty Germans were killed and the
the first assault, the grenadiers erupting rest withdrew.
from the draws, firing their burp guns, T h e 212th Volks Grenadier Division
and shouting in broken English, “Kill made a last attempt to expand the gains
the sons of bitches.” Two platoons fell achieved in the Scheidgen sector on 2 2
back from Company B onto Company December, the date on which the
C, which in turn came under attack by American counterattack finally began. A
Germans who had worked around Hill stealthy advance through the draws be-
313 and threatened to cut the road back tween the Americans occupying the
T H E XII CORPS ATTACKS THE SOUTHERN SHOULDER 485

villages of Scheidgen and Michelshof General Patton and Maj. Gen. Hoyt S.
during the early afternoon was perceived Vandenberg met to discuss plans for a
and handily checked by shellfire. At dusk combined air and ground attack to
the Germans tried again, debouching smash through the German West Wall-
from the central ravine in a wedge for- target date, 19 December. After three or
mation. This effort was suicidal. Tanks, four days of intense bombing by the
tank destroyers, artillery, engineers, Ninth Air Force and the Royal Air
and infantry were all in position and Force, Maj. Gen. Manton S. Eddy’s XII
watching the draw like hungry cats in Corps would attack from the Saar River
front of a mouse hole. T h e German to penetrate the West Wall and start the
point was only a hundred yards from the Third Army, stymied by mud, reinforced
American foxholes when the first Ameri-
can fired. When the fusillade ended, 142
dead and dying Germans were left on
the snow, still in their wedge formation.
One lone grenadier, with five bullet
holes in him, came forward with his
hands held shakily over his head.
This bootless enemy effort on 22
December was no more than a counter-
attack to cover a general withdrawal
which the 212th had begun the night
before on corps orders. T h e defensive
period for Americans in the Sauer sector
in fact had closed with darkness on 21
December. This six-day battle had given
adequate proof of General Barton’s
dictum, “The best way to handle these
Heinies is to fight ’em.” It was a battle
fought off the cuff in a situation which
mimeographed periodic reports would GENERALEDDY
call “fluid” but which, for the most,
could better be described as “obscure” concrete, and the wasting effect of the
seen from either side of the past battles of attrition, once again on the
way to the Rhine. Patton was jubilant
The XII Corps Moues to at the prospect of the biggest blitz (so he
Luxembourg fondly referred to the planned air as-
sault) in the Third Army’s history. Gen-
Three days before the beginning of eral Eisenhower, however, did not con-
the German thrust into the Ardennes, ceive of the attack in the Saar sector as
2See Chapter X, passim, and the American rec- the major Allied effort and had decided
ords cited therein. 1st Lt. Edgar C. Heist, Com- “regardless of [the] results,” to transfer
pany D, 70th Tank Battalion, so distinguished
himself that he was awarded the DSC. He was
divisions from this sector, once the attack
killed on 22 December. had been made, to the north for the
486 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

major assault against the Rhine and Third Army to begin on the 17th. Gen-
Germany itself. eral Morris started his division north,
Meanwhile the XII Corps had the task and Patton canceled the 6th Armored
of cleaning out the German positions in attack which had been poised in front of
the small forests and wood lots between Forbach–one of the few occasions on
the Saar and the West Wall so that no which the Third Army commander
entanglement in these outworks would called off an attack that he personally
dull the full shock of the hard blow had ordered. So far as the Third Army
which was being readied. For this mis- staff knew at this stage, however, the
sion General Eddy employed two infan- German blow in the Ardennes presented
try divisions, the new 87th and the no dire threat and the attack on the 19th
veteran 35th, their attack to begin on 16 would go as scheduled.
December. But on 18 December Bradley called
T h e fighting was extremely bitter, and Patton to his Luxembourg headquarters,
the enemy made the Americans pay and there Patton learned for the first
dearly for each yard gained toward the time of the grave situation faced by the
West Wall. T h e superiority of the at- First Army. When asked what help he
tacker in men and materiel, however, as could give, the Third Army commander
usual was clearing the field, a fact of replied that he could intervene in the
battlefield life that was all too evident to battle with three divisions “very shortly.”
the German defenders. On the night of He telephoned the Third Army chief of
16 December the commander of the XC staff to stop the XII Corps attack form-
Corps, facing Eddy’s divisions, warned ing for the following day and to prepare
his superiors that the German line was the 4th Armored and 80th Infantry Divi-
so thin and ragged that if the Americans sions for immediate transfer to Luxem-
decided on an all-out attack neither the bourg. The 87th Division halted its slow
existing battle line nor the West Wall advance, as did the 35th. On the move
could be held. But in this instance the out of rest area for assembly in prepara-
calculated risk assumed by Hitler in tion for the XII Corps’ attack, the 4th
stripping the Army Group G sector to Armored and 80th likewise stopped.
feed troops and weapons into Army When it became apparent by nightfall
Group B paid off. It turned out that the of the 18th that the situation on the First
battered and weakened German divi- Army front had deteriorated beyond
sions in front of the XII Corps had done expectation, General Bradley decided
their job, had held long enough. upon immediate use of the Third Army’s
T o take the pressure off the XII Corps resources. Patton had returned to his
infantry Patton was preparing to bolster command post at Nancy when, a couple
the attack with the 6th Armored Division of hours before midnight, Bradley called
when General Bradley informed the with word that conditions on the VIII
Third Army commander of the day’s Corps front were much worse, that the
happenings on the VIII Corps front. The troops promised by the Third Army had
army group commander ordered that to move at once, and that Patton was to
the 10th Armored be dispatched to Mid- attend a meeting with the Supreme Com-
dleton forthwith, this move from the mander the following morning at Ver-
T H E XII CORPS ATTACKS T H E SOUTHERN SHOULDER 487

dun. By midnight one combat command attack selected would, as Patton then
of the 4th Armored Division was on its saw it, be delivered by the VIII and III
way north to Longwy; at dawn on the Corps. When Patton arrived at Verdun
19th the 80th Infantry Division had on the morning of the 19th, Eisenhower
started for Luxembourg City. And asked how soon the III Corps could
through the night before the Verdun launch its counterattack. Patton replied
meeting the Third Army staff worked that he could start a piecemeal attack in
feverishly to draft plans for the inter- three days, a co-ordinated attack in six.
vention of all or any part of Patton's T h e Supreme Commander, who seems
forces in the battle raging in the north, to have felt that Patton was a bit too
for Bradley had intimated that Patton confident, subsequently informed Field
was to take command of the VIII Corps Marshal Montgomery that the counter-
and other forces moving to its assistance. attack from the south would be made on
Bradley already had directed that the the 23d or 24th.3
III Corps headquarters would be moved T h e master plan outlined by Eisen-
from Metz to take command of an attack hower in the Verdun meeting of the 19th
to be mounted somewhere north of turned on a major effort to plug the
Luxembourg City. Patton's general staff, holes developing in the north and the
launching of a co-ordinated attack from
the south. To free the force needed for
this initial counterattack, Eisenhower
ordered all offensive operations south of
the Moselle to be halted forthwith and
turned over the entire Third Army sec-
tor (except for that occupied by Maj.
Gem. Walton H. Walker's XX Corps on
the border of the Saar) to General
Devers' 6th Army Group. This north-
ward extension of Devers' command
would spread the American forces in
Alsace and Lorraine rather thin, but
Devers (who was present at the Verdun
meeting on the 19th) was promised some
of the Third Army divisions and artil-
lery.
It was now clear that Patton would
be responsible for a major effort to knife
into the German southern flank, that he
GENERALPATTON would have at least two of the three
Third Army corps, six of its divisions,
therefore, prepared three plans for a
counterattack: on the axes Neufchâteau
–St. Hubert; Arlon-Bastogne; and Lux- 3 See below, Chapter XXI, note 2, for documen-
tary sources relating to Patton and the Third
embourg-Diekirch–St. Vith. T h e final Army.
488 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE

and the bulk of the army troops for the XX Corps’ bridgehead at Saarlautern.4
task. (On 2 0 December, however, after T h e troops in the line when Eddy took
a visit to Middleton’s command post, over were the 4th Infantry Division, the
Patton found that the VIII Corps was in 10th Armored Division (less CCB),
such shape that it could not be used CCA of the 9th Armored Division, the
offensively and that the two Third Army 109th Infantry, and other smaller units
corps would have to carry the ball.) A of the 28th Infantry Division. (Map IX)
telephone call from Verdun, using a When the XII Corps took control of
simple code which had been arranged its new zone on the 21st, the German
before Patton left Nancy, informed the thrust into eastern Luxembourg had
Third Army chief of staff (Brig. Gen. been pretty well checked. T h e three
Hobart R. Gay) that the XII Corps was German divisions which the Seventh
to disengage at once, that the command Army had thrown into the initial attack
post of Eddy’s corps and an advance were drastically depleted by then and
command post for the Third Army were apprehensive that the Americans might
to transfer to Luxembourg City, that the undertake a counterattack in such force
26th Infantry Division was to start north as to penetrate this part of the Seventh
on the following morning, and that the Army’s blocking position on the south-
35th Infantry Division–which had been ern flank of the German salient. T h e
in the line for 160 consecutive days–was Americans likewise were concerned lest
to be relieved as quickly as possible and the enemy make a last major try for a
be sent to Metz for much needed re- breakthrough before the promised rein-
habilitation en route to the Ardennes forcement arrived from the Third Army.
battle. At midnight of the 20th, the XIII There was, however, a fairly continu-
Corps front was taken over by its south- ous-although jagged–line of defense
ern neighbor, Maj. Gen. Wade H. Hais- confronting the enemy. T h e new corps’
lip’s XV Corps. T h e 4th Armored and front, facing east and north, reached
80th Infantry Divisions had that day from Dickweiler, near the west bank of
passed to the command of the III Corps the Sauer River, to Schieren, on the Al-
in the Arlon sector south of Bastogne. zette River, due north of Luxembourg
The next morning General Eddy and City. T h e eastern wing was defended
his immediate staff departed for Luxem- by the 4th Infantry Division and task
bourg with a new mission: to assume forces from the 10th Armored Division.
command of the American troops north The northern wing was held by the
and east of Luxembourg City who had 109th Infantry and CCA, 9th Armored
Held so tenaciously along the southern Division, backed by detachments from
shoulder of the original German pene- the 10th Armored. This wing, at its
tration. General Eddy’s new command,
aside from corps troops, consisted of 4The combat interviews with the XII Corps
provide an enlightening account of the problems
those units already in the area and the encountered in the Third Army ninety-degree
5th Infantry Division, which had been wheel to the north. See also the XII Corps AAR
added to the roster of Third Army for- and G–3 journal. The semiofficial history of the
XII Corps is Lt. Col. George Dyer’s XII Corps:
mations rolling northward. It moved in Spearhead of Patton’s Third Army (Baton Rouge:
piecemeal as it was relieved from the Military Press of Louisiana, n.d.), ch. 11, passim.
T H E XII CORPS ATTACKS T H E SOUTHERN SHOULDER 489

western tip, had been wide open. But the 8 18th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and
the 80th Infantry Division of the III the 735th Tank Battalion toward Thi-
Corps was moving in to establish an ex- onville on the Luxembourg road. The
tension of the American line beyond the next order bade Irwin bring his 11th
Alzette and on the 22d deployed to Infantry out of the bridgehead during
envelop the enemy bridgehead west of the night.
Ettelbruck. T h e withdrawal of the tank and tank
General Patton intended to give Gen- destroyer battalions, each of which had
eral Eddy two infantry divisions from two companies west of the river, went
the old Third Army front, the 5th and forward by ferry in full daylight; by 1700
35th. T h e latter had seen very rough these battalions were on the road to
fighting; it would need some refitting Luxembourg. T h e relief of the 11th In-
and for this reason had been ordered to fantry, by an extension of the 2d Infantry
Metz to reorganize before rejoining the sector, began as soon as darkness settled.
XII Corps. Maj. Gen. S. LeRoy Irwin’s It went well also, only two casualties
5th Infantry Division was in good condi- being incurred. By 1000 the next morn-
tion. Introduced into Walker’s XX ing the entire regiment was in trucks en
Corps bridgehead at Saarlautern to re- route to Thionville. T h e enemy was
lieve the 95th Division, two of Irwin’s neither in strength nor in frame of mind
regiments had attacked on 18 and 19 able to interfere with the American
December to widen the breach made ear- withdrawal, although the 2d Infantry
lier in the main bunker lines of the attempt to hide the reduction of the line
forward West Wall position. General by increased fire fooled the Germans not
Irwin, however, had some inkling that one whit. Relieved on the night of 21
his division might soon leave the bridge- December by troops of the 95th Division,
head for on the night of the 19th the the 2d Infantry was already rolling to
corps commander warned that the attack join its sister regiments when the morn-
was to be held up, that the situation in ing fog blew away.
the north was very much confused and
that the 5th Division might be moved in The XII Corps’ Counterattack
that direction. T h e 10th Infantry divi-
sion reserve was put on one-hour alert to That same morning the 10th Infantry
move “in any direction.” initiated the 5th Division fight on a new
General Walker arrived at Irwin’s battleground.5 Despite confusion, frag-
command post toward noon of the fol-
lowing day. He told Irwin that one reg-
The 5th Infantry Division, as one would expect
iment of the 95th would relieve the 5th of an old line outfit, maintained very good records.
Division in the bridgehead and that the General Irwin also made his personal diary avail-
XX Corps was pulling back across the able to the author. All three of the infantry
regiments published official accounts: History of
Saar except in one small bridgehead. As the Second Infantry Regiment, History of the
to the future employment of the 5th Di- Tenth Infantry Regiment, History of the Eleventh
vision he had no word. More precise Infantry Regiment (All Baton Rouge: Army and
Navy Publishing Company, 1946). The journals
directions shortly came from the corps maintained by each of the rifle battalions are
headquarters, moving the 10th Infantry, particularly useful.
490 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

mentary orders, and a general sense that Further, the XII Corps commander
the leading columns of the division were told General Irwin to be prepared to
moving toward an unknown destination attack north or northeast, or to counter-
and enemy, the 10th Infantry (Col. attack in the southeast. Later General
Robert P. Bell) transfer to Luxembourg Eddy warned that the 10th Infantry
had been accomplished in good time. might have to go into the line that very
Two officers of Irwin’s staff reached the afternoon to help the 12th Infantry re-
Third Army headquarters in Luxem- store the American positions south of
bourg at 1730 on 20 December and there Echternach. T h e 10th did move forward
received an assembly area for the regi- to Ernzen, but no counterattack order
ment and some maps. Hurrying back was forthcoming.
down the Thionville road the staff of- In the meantime the 11th Infantry
ficers met the column, blacked out but arrived in Luxembourg City, its mis-
moving at a good clip. In the early sion to take over the 80th Division posi-
evening the column rolled through the tion north of the city between Ernzen
streets of Luxembourg City, and an hour and Reuland and cover the deployment
or so after midnight the first trucks drove of the XII Corps-a rather large order
into the assembly area near Rammel- for a regimental combat team. However
dange. Then the column closed, the in- the regimental commander, Col. Paul J.
fantry shivering out the rest of the night Black, was forced to halt his column
in the trucks.6 when the 80th Division commander gave
T h e mission of the 5th Infantry Di- him a direct order to keep off the road
vision had not yet been defined, but it net then being used by the 80th for a
was clear that it had moved from one shift west into the I I I Corps’ sector. T h e
battle to another. A series of meetings in regimental S-3 later reported that the
Luxembourg during the morning of the 80th Division had used the roads only
2 1st resulted in the decision to place the intermittently during the afternoon and
5th Division north of the city in the sec- that the 11th Infantry could have moved
tor briefly occupied by the 80th Division. north without difficulty. But on the other
hand Maj. Gen. Horace L. McBride had
6 Combat interview and General Irwin’s diary. orders to attack the next morning, and
The move of the 10th Infantry seems to have
gone according to plan only in its first stages. Lt. the Third Army commander, as he very
Col. Donald W. Thackeray, the division G–2, well knew, would brook no delay. In any
and Lt. Col. George K. Moody, assistant G–3, case the halt of the 111th Infantry on the
were told by the Third Army staff that the
regiment would go into assembly area in the north edge of the city did create a mam-
vicinity of Rammeldange but that the 10th moth road jam.
Armored would provide guides and prepare During the evening General Eddy met
billets at the bivouac point. Apparently the 10th
Armored did not get the word, and the skeleton his commanders at the 4th Division com-
staff in Luxembourg made no plans for the re- mand post. Reports coming in from the
ception of the 10th Infantry until an officer from 1 2 th Infantry, holding the weakest sec-
the 5th Division literally stumbled upon the 10th
Armored forward command post. As a result the tion of the 4th Division front, were dis-
incoming infantry were put on the road to couraging, for that afternoon the 212th
Rammeldange but no billets were provided. See Volks Grenadier Division had made
Ltr, Maj Gen William M. Breckenridge to OCMH,
30 Nov 60. substantial progress in an attack along
THE XII CORPS ATTACKS T H E SOUTHERN SHOULDER 491

5TH INFANTRY DIVISION TROOPS MNG TOWARD THE FRONT

the main road leading from Echternach Irwin probably summed up what all
toward Luxembourg City. Although the were thinking: “Situation on whole front
12th Infantry line had hardened and from east of us to north varies from fluid
now held near Scheidgen, General Bar- to no front at all. Information is very
ton expected that the enemy would try scanty and the situation changes hourly.”
another punch down the road. But, even Under these circumstances General Eddy
while the American commanders were decided that the 10th Infantry should be
meeting, the German LXXX Corps staff placed under tactical control of the 4th
was drafting orders for a piecemeal with- Division and attack around noon the
drawal by the 212th Yolks Grenadier following day to restore the situation on
Division to begin that very night. the 12th Infantry front.
The enemy gains on 2 1 December Admittedly this was the kind of par-
marked the high tide of the advance over tial solution frowned upon by the field
the Sauer begun six days before, a fact service regulations. General Irwin noted,
that could not yet be appreciated by the “I anticipate too much. piecemeal action
little group of commanders gathered in for a while to get any tangible results.”
the 4th Division command post. General But the 4th Division had undergone six
492 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

days of heavy fighting, its last reserves that the German assault waves struck.
had been used up, and the events of the T h e troops on the line were able to beat
day just ended seemed to presage a hard- the enemy back, but not before the 2d
ening of the enemy’s resolve. Battalion troops had been deflected to
T h e critical section of the main line the right and left by the enemy onrush.
of resistance was that marked by the vil- Considerably disorganized, the two com-
lages of Scheidgen, Michelshof, and Os- panies hurriedly dug in just to the south
weiler. Here the line was defended by of the original American covering force.
elements of the 1st and 3d Battalions, On the right of the road the 1st Bat-
12th Infantry, the regimental antitank talion was faced with thick woods and
company, and part of the 159th Engineer very rough ground. During the morning
Battalion. During the afternoon of the reconnaissance parties had come forward
21st the 212th Volks Grenadier Division to look over the route of advance but
had used one rifle regiment and the divi- had been foiled by a thick ground fog
sional fusilier battalion (both at low and alert enemy gunners. When the bat-
strength) in the attempt to take the talion deployed for the advance to the
three villages and the commanding line of departure it ran into trouble, for
ground on which they stood, ground that the company next to the road came un-
represented the final objective of der the artillery concentration laid down
the 212th. General Barton, therefore, in support of the German assault just
planned to meet the German threat by described and suffered a number of
sending the 10th Infantry into attack casualties. Control in woods and ravines
astride the road from Michelshof to was difficult and the company drifted
Echternach, the two attack battalions across the road behind the 2d Battalion.
jumping off at noon from the crossroad It was growing dark when the 1st Battal-
Scheidgen-Michelshof. This line of de- ion finally reorganized and dug in, still
parture was occupied by two rifle com- short of the line of departure. T h e in-
panies, four tanks, and five platoons of tense artillery and Werfer fire by enemy
engineers. gunners throughout the day, together
Through the morning of the 22d en- with the infantry assault of the after-
emy batteries busily shelled the area just noon, had been designed to cover the
behind the American positions. T h e 212th Volks Grenadier Division while it
attack by the 1st and 2d Battalions of the withdrew from the exposed position in
10th Infantry never really got going. T h e the Scheidgen salient. Fresh American
2d Battalion on the left of the road de- reinforcements had been held in check;
ployed some three hundred yards behind the German withdrawal had been
the assigned line of departure and successful.
started forward just as the Germans be- General Eddy telephoned General
gan an assault against the small force Irwin during the evening to say that he
dug in on the line. German guns sup- planned to use the 5th Division as part
porting the grenadiers made any of a corps attack to drive the Germans
movement in formation impossible. As it back over the Sauer in the angle formed
was, the bulk of the two fresh companies by the Sauer and Moselle Rivers. Irwin’s
reached the line about the same time whole division was in Luxembourg but
T H E XII CORPS ATTACKS T H E SOUTHERN SHOULDER 493

somewhat dispersed. T h e 11th Infantry side the woods. Then the German shells
had taken over the reserve battle posi- began to burst through the trees. The
tions north of Luxembourg City for- company broke into little groups, turn-
merly occupied by the 80th Division. ing this way and that to avoid the fire-
T h e 2d Infantry, having left the XX many were scooped up by Germans who
Corps’ bridgehead with only minor inci- had been waiting in their foxholes.
dent,’ was assembled around Junglinster, When the company withdrew it num-
ready with trucks and attached tank bered forty-six men, but later a large
destroyers for use as the corps’ mobile number of stragglers appeared at Mich-
reserve. Given time to assemble, the elshof. On the left Company E advanced
fresh 5th Division could take over from until it came under fire from a cross-
Barton’s battle-weary 4th. That night grained ridge just ahead. As the com-
Irwin and his staff pored over maps and pany deployed for the assault a large
march orders for the attack to clear the force of German infantry erupted from
enemy from the near side of the Sauer, the draw on its flank, preceded, as it
an attack scheduled for the morning of moved, by a curtain of bursting shells.
24 December. There was plenty of American artillery
In the interim the two battalions of on call for such an emergency-six bat-
the 10th Infantry began their second day talions were supporting the 10th Infan-
of action, a clear day but bitter cold with try attack-and the Germans were dis-
snow underfoot. On the right the 1st Bat- persed. A few tough enemy riflemen dug
talion made some progress, but one in as best they could on the frozen
company lost its way in the heavy woods ground and held their place, forcing
and a gap opened between the battalions. Company E to “infiltrate” back to its
T h e main difficulty encountered by both take-off position. This day, then, had
battalions was that of negotiating the been only moderately successful for the
heavy belt of timber which lay to the 10th Infantry, in part because it was
front and in which a relatively small working without the support of its own
number of the enemy could put up a 5th Division artillery, but the reserve
fight out of all relation to their actual battalion had not been committed and
strength. Further, the American advance the division stood waiting to expand to
followed a series of parallel ridge lines: attack.
screened by the woods the Germans T h e final field order issued by the
could and did filter along the draws XII Corps called for an attack at 1100
separating the American companies and hours on the 24th to seize and hold the
take them on individually. line of the Sauer and Moselle Rivers with
The 2d Battalion had a particularly such enemy crossings as might remain
rough time. Company F, which entered intact. T h e main effort was delegated to
the forest northeast of Michelshof, at the 5th Infantry Division and the 10th
first killed or captured a number of Ger- Armored Division, the latter having ex-
mans in snow-covered foxholes just in- tracted much of its strength from the
line on the left of the 4th Division to
7The enemy pitched a couple of smoke grenades form a counterattack reserve. T h e 4th
into a crowded cellar, causing quick spread of the
rumor that gas warfare had begun. Infantry Division was to hold in place as
494 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

the 5th passed through, supporting the western end. To cover this gap the 423d
5th’s attack by fire wherever possible. Regiment had spread thin, so thin that
Finally, the 2d Cavalry Group (rein- its main line of resistance was little more
forced), which was just moving into the than a series of smallish strongpoints. As
new XII Corps area from the old, would a result the LXXX Corps’ order short-
take over the extended Moselle flank on ening the 212th line by withdrawal on
the right of the corps. This had been a the night of 21 December was issued
constant concern to General Barton dur- with the intention of contracting the
ing the 4th Division battles and had 423d to give more body to absorb the
absorbed battalions of the 22d Infantry American punches when they came.
badly needed on the fighting line. T h e T h e Echternach bridgehead, ex-
artillery support planned for the attack panded toward Michelshof, was de-
included fifteen battalions of corps ar- fended by the 320th Infantry and the
tillery plus the organic battalions in the division fusilier battalion. T h e far left
divisions. T h e mechanized units avail- wing of the division and corps was tied
able represented considerable strength: to the Sauer by the 999th Penal Battal-
two combat commands of the 10th Ar- ion. On paper, General Sensfuss’ 212th
mored Division with CCA of the 9th Volks Grenadier Division had a third
Armored Division attached; two sep- regiment, the 316th, but although this
arate tank battalions; five tank destroyer unit had helped establish the bridgehead
battalions, of which three were self- it was the Seventh Army reserve and not
propelled; and two cavalry squadrons. even the corps commander could use it
The German LXXX Corps faced the freely. T h e field replacement battalions
XII Corps with two divisions in the line belonging to the LXXX Corps were al-
anchored on the Sauer and no corps re- most completely drained by the heavy
serve. T h e deep valley of the Schwarz losses incurred in the infantry regiments.
Erntz remained the boundary between T h e rifle companies of the two line divi-
these divisions, constituting as it had in sions numbered about forty men apiece.
earlier fighting an ever present physical Each division had only one light and one
obstacle to a homogeneous corps front medium field artillery battalion in direct
and co-ordinated maneuver. On the support; the corps had perhaps five bat-
right the 276th Volks Grenadier Divi- talions, plus one Werfer brigade. Prob-
sion was engaged in small-scale attacks ably the bulk of this firepower had
near Savelborn and Christnach. T h e ex- displaced across the river to positions di-
treme left or eastern wing of this divi- rectly behind the divisions. T h e infantry
sion was not solidly anchored, and all companies had fought during the first
attempts to break out of the Schwarz days without the aid of assault guns, but
Erntz gorge and bring the left forward a few of these and two companies of
in conformity with the advance of the antitank guns reached the LXXX Corps
neighboring division had been thwarted. just before the American attack on the
The result was that the 212th Volks 24th.
Grenadier Division, on the right, occu- The Seventh Army, and more partic-
pied a south-facing line stepped forward ularly Beyer’s corps, began the Ardennes
of the 276th and precariously open at its battle as the kitchen maid in the scullery
T H E XII CORPS ATTACKS T H E SOUTHERN SHOULDER 495

and would end it in the same status. white phosphorus, a killing device for
Replacements, artillery, armor, and sup- which General Patton had built up some
plies by this stage of the German coun- attachment among troops of the Third
teroffensive went first to the two panzer Army. It seemed to the Americans that
armies. Since there was inadequate trans- the good shooting by enemy gunners in
port for resupply in the main battle area, the forty-eight hours past required an
Brandenberger could hardly expect that answer; so counterbattery work began
additional trucks and critical items the moment the infantry jumped off in
would reach the tactical backwater the attack. During the day and night the
where his army was stranded. T h e Ger- XII Corps artillery would fire 21,173
man commanders on the Sauer front had shells to support the attack on a ten-mile
recognized as early as the 21st and 22d front. T h e 5th Division artillery fired
that the bolt had been shot; they and 5,813 rounds, exceeding the daily ex-
their weary troops knew that the coming penditure during the bitter September
battle already was lost. T h e ground to battle in the Arnaville bridgehead. Gen-
be held, however, generally favored the eral Weyland’s XIX Tactical Air Com-
defense, just as it had favored the Amer- mand, old friend of the 5th Division,
icans in the first phase. made good use of beautiful flying weath-
There was one notable exception-the er, but there were many targets to divert
natural corridor of the Schwarz Erntz. the fighter-bombers beyond the XII
This corridor could be used to split the Corps zone. T h e 405th Fighter Group
two German divisions. Moreover, it led flew eight missions during the day, drop-
directly to the main corps’ bridge at ping fragmentation and napalm bombs
Bollendorf and this bridge, if lost, would at points along the Sauer, then strafing
leave the bulk of the 276th Volks Gren- and bombing the roads east of the river.
adier Division stranded on the west bank At 1100 the ground attack com-
of the Sauer. So seriously was this threat menced. There must have been an
regarded that on 2 2 December the uneasy feeling that the enemy had
Seventh Army started work on a heavy plenty of fight left because the
bridge at Dillingen to the rear of the corps commander told Irwin that
276th. should he feel the attack was prov-
T h e morning of the 24th broke clear ing too costly it would be called off. Cau-
and cold, bringing a mixed blessing. T h e tion, it may be said, had become less
thermometer stood below 20º F, and the opprobrious in the Third Army since
American foot sloggers would suffer 16 December. The XII Corps G–2, who
(trench foot was commencing to like many other intelligence officers had
appear), but the gunners and fighter- miscalculated the German ability to re-
bomber pilots could rejoice. With two sist during the optimistic days of early
fire direction centers handling the corps September, now estimated that the en-
artillery and with perfect visibility at emy reserves in front of the corps
the observation posts, the battalions fired equaled one infantry and one armored
salvo after salvo for interdiction and division. At the same time the American
destruction. A few woods and villages staffs had an uncertain feeling that the
got special treatment-TOT’S with extremely tenuous connection between
496 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE

A WHITE PHOSPHOROUS BURST during bombardment of German emplacements.

the XII and XX Corps along the Mo- aimed in its early stages at high ground
selle would attract German attention. overlooking the Echternach bridgehead:
The 5th Division began the attack Hill 313 southwest of Lauterborn, the
with three regiments in line on an 8- scene of much bitter fighting when first
mile front reaching from Savelborn on the Germans pushed down the road from
the west to Osweiler on the east. From Echternach; the ridge south of Berdorf
the line of departure, generally in the commanding the Schwarz Erntz gorge:
rear of the main line of resistance, Irwin and, in the old 9th Armored sector north
would feed his battalions into the 10th of the gorge, the plateau and village of
Armored line on the left and the 4th Haller.
Division line on the right, eventually re- On the right of the division the two
lieving the latter by extending the 5th battalions of the 10th Infantry continued
Division wing, lengthened by the 2d their attack north of Michelshof. Along
Cavalry Group, to the Sauer. Task forces the thickly wooded ridges to their front
of the 10th Armored Division were to the 320th Infantry, supported by most
attack on a northern thrust line, clearing of the 212th Volks Grenadier Division
the villages on the south banks of the artillery, was concentrated to block the
Sauer as they went. T h e main effort by way to Echternach. T h e 1st Battalion,
the 5th Division, also looking north, advancing to the right of the Michelshof-
T H E XII CORPS ATTACKS T H E SOUTHERN SHOULDER 497

Echternach highway, once again found went well the regiment would swing on-
the combination of heavy woods, Ger- to the Berdorf plateau and face eastward
mans in well-disguised foxholes, and above the Sauer River.
accurate shellfire too much. Two hours T o gain entrance to the Mullerthal
after the attack began the enemy retal- was no simple task. It required an attack
iated with a counterattack, assault guns due west down into the draw, where ar-
paving a way for the infantry. T h e tillery could be of no help. Companies
American gunners quickly disposed of F and G undertook the task, and the
this. T h e 2d Battalion, to the west, had fight became a manhunt, rifleman against
eight medium tanks belonging to the rifleman, stalking one another in crev-
737th Tank Battalion and less difficult ices, on cliffs, from tree to tree. T h e
ground. Four tanks and two platoons of quarry, skillfully hidden, had the best
Company G started along the main road, of it. Company F ran against a strong-
covered by other troops advancing on the point on a cliff and was the loser in a
ridges to either side of the draw. Shell fire fight. Company G lost direction sev-
bursts on the road and bullet fire soon eral times in the maze of cross corridors,
drove the troops to the cover of the trees but at every point drew sharp fire. At
lining the draw, where others of the bat- dark the two companies dug in against
talion were ferreting German riflemen bullets seemingly whistling in from
out of camouflaged foxholes. Smoke fired every direction. It was evident that the
to cover the attack gave added momen- tree-covered and rocky floor of the gorge
tum; then the tanks destroyed a pair of was no place for further attack, and Colo-
machine gun nests on Hill 313. Momen- nel Roffe ordered the two companies to
tarily, however, the attack wavered when fight their way out of the gorge at day-
a part of Company G turned west toward break. The battalion was then to gather
a hill mass it mistook for its objective. in an attack on Doster Farm, which over-
Brought back, the infantry followed the looked the road to Berdorf.
tanks to the proper objective. T h e Ger- The 3d Battalion, north of Scheidgen,
mans there decided not to engage the also had hard fighting and a slow ad-
Shermans, and by dark the battalion had vance. The terrain over which the attack
Hill 313. was made consisted of alternating draws
The 2d Infantry sector, in the division and ridges, cleared ground and timber.
center, extended from the Scheidgen Advance by ridge line or draw termi-
draw west to the Mullerthal (Schwarz nated in cross corridors, natural glacis
Erntz) . Immediately to the north lay the for the enemy riflemen firing down the
thick forest and rugged ground of the slope. At one point Company L suddenly
Kalkesbach, an unsavory obstacle. Col. was swept by rifle and machine gun fire,
A. Worrell Roffe, the 2d Infantry com- suffered thirty casualties, lost two com-
mander, decided to risk a flanking thrust pany commanders in the space of min-
along the Mullerthal with his 2d Battal- utes, and became disorganized and un-
ion and to use his 3d Battalion in a fron- able to move. Lt. Col. Robert E.
tal attack against the Kalkesbach. For the Connor, the battalion commander, got
final punch a tank company and the 1st the division artillery to work on the
Battalion lay waiting in Colbet. If all ridge line confronting the company, sent
498 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

SCHEIDGEN

his S–3, Capt. Frederic C. Thompson, up mans, familiar with the ground, had
to sort out the demoralized soldiers and run back and forth through the draws,
replace the platoon and squad leaders popping up in new and unexpected posi-
who were hors d e combat, then put his tions. T h e Americans had lost direction
reserve, Company K, in to flank the and found maneuver difficult in the
German position. T h e reserve company dense woods and jagged terrain, while
made its way to the head of a draw from their advance along the more direct
which the enemy could be taken in en- paths offered by the draws had given
filade. While this flanking fire swept the German batteries easy targets. After
the German line, Company L (reorgan- the untoward events of this first day the
ized in two platoons of twenty-five men regimental commander instructed his
each) attacked with marching fire. T h e battalions to avoid the draws as much as
ridge was gained and most of the de- possible and work along the higher
fenders killed, but this time the attackers ground by short flanking attacks in which
lost only three men. Company I, advanc- control could be retained.
ing along a draw on which Werfers were T h e 1 1 th Infantry took its attack po-
directed, took many losses during the sitions during the night of the 23d in the
day. All told the 2d Infantry had made rear of the 10th Armored screen, the
only a few hundred yards gain by the 3d Battalion on the left at Larochette
close of 24 December. (Fels) and the 1st Battalion southeast
T h e 3d Battalion commander re- of Christnach. Colonel Black had been
ported that the action had been like try- ordered to put his main effort on the
ing to catch a rat in a maze. T h e Ger- right in an attack up the draws in sup-
T H E XII CORPS ATTACKS T H E SOUTHERN SHOULDER 499

port of the 2d but decided to throw his mental reserve, then wheel to the right,
weight on the left. T h e left battalion, bypass south of Haller, and seize the
draped in white sheets and supported two hill objectives, the Hardthof and
by tanks, made its advance in column Hohwald, in front of the 1st Battalion.
of companies on a narrow thrust line During the night 1st Battalion patrols
bearing north in the direction of Haller worked to the edge of Waldbillig, found
and hit squarely between the battalions little indication of enemy strength and
of the 988th Regiment. Whenever the by daylight the battalion had a company
enemy stood his ground, artillery in the village.
and tank fire was brought to bear, This first day of the 5th Division at-
quickly followed by infantry assault tack had netted rather limited gains ex-
paced with machine gun fire. Following cept on the extreme left flank and in the
a level ridge line the 3d Battalion made 10th Infantry sector at Hill 313. T h e
good time. By midafternoon it held its six American battalions engaged had
objective, a wooded rise less than a lost about two hundred dead and wound-
thousand yards southwest of Haller. ed. T h e enemy generally had held the
T h e 1st Battalion had as its objective attackers at arm’s length (only nineteen
the wooded table which arose above the prisoners went through the 5th Division
Schwarz Erntz northeast of Christnach- cage) and probably had fewer casual-
the scene of bitter fighting and bloody ties. T h e German artillery had been very
losses for the Americans when the en- active and effective, despite heavy coun-
emy had held the initiative. Company terbattery fire, while the tortuous na-
A, sent down into the Müllerthal gorge ture of the ground had robbed the gun-
while the remainder of the battalion ners supporting the 5th Division of much
threw in a holding attack on the left, good shooting. But something had been
moved slowly but steadily, until after accomplished. T h e 4th Infantry Divi-
some three hours it was opposite the vil- sion at last had been relieved (although
lage of Mullerthal. Here the Germans it proved difficult to find and make phys-
had dug in, checking the advance with ical contact with some isolated outposts
machine gun and mortar fire into the of the 4th Division line), and Col.
gorge from Waldbillig. Company B Charles H. Reed’s 2d Cavalry Group took
came in to help against Waldbillig, over the quiet portion of the line on the
moving northwest through one of the right of the 5th Division.
cross corridors. As soon as the troops At the close of day, there were indica-
left the cover of the draw they encoun- tions at several points that the enemy
tered direct fire, and it looked as though was pulling away. A German withdraw-
the 1st Battalion would find it tough to al actually did take place during the
continue a frontal attack. night. T h e 2d Infantry battle along the
T h e rapid advance by the 3d Battal- floor and sides of the Schwarz Erntz,
ion on the left appeared a solution to viewed so pessimistically by those en-
this tactical problem. Colonel Black pre- gaged, had convinced General Sensfuss,
pared to alter the 11th Infantry scheme the 212th Volks Grenadier Division
of maneuver on the 25th. T h e 3d Bat- commander, that his extended right
talion was to be relieved by the repi- flank soon would be pierced or turned.
500 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

WHITE-CLAD 11TH INFANTRY TROOPS ATTACK TOWAD HALLER

T o form a shorter and thicker line, Sens- with the 5th Division attack on the right,
fuss drew in both flanks and gave up the axis of advance generally ran north-
ground at his center, creating a new posi- east. Task Force Standish, on the right,
tion which reached from Berdorf was weighted with tanks and armored
across the hills flanking the entrance to infantry backed by two armored field
Echternach (only 2 , 5 0 0 yards from the artillery battalions. One of its two teams
center of that town) and west to the advanced with little opposition, ending
Sauer. Meanwhile the miscellaneous the day just northwest of Eppeldorf. T h e
troops covering the flank of the 212th second team came under the German
west of the river withdrew behind the guns while moving across open ground
Sauer, leaving only small outposts be- west of Eppeldorf; the first reports said
hind. half the team was lost to shellfire and
T h e 10th Armored Division, to which rockets. Driven back to the cover of a
were attached the 109th Infantry and wood lot the team reorganized, took on
CCA, 9th Armored, put two task forces reinforcements, and returned to the at-
into the attack on 24 December, their tack, this time swinging wide of the
mission to clear the enemy from the town to join the companion team. Later
Ermsdorf-Gilsdorf road. In keeping a task force from CCX (as CCA, 9th
T H E XII CORPS ATTACKS T H E SOUTHERN SHOULDER 501

Armored Division, now was named) except for sounds of the tank destroy-
seized the high ground west of Eppel- ers sporadically blasting at German
dorf. traffic across the Sure on the Diekirch-
Task Force Rudder, composed of two Bettendorf road. But for the 5th Infan-
battalions (less than half strength) of try Division Christmas was no day of cel-
the 109th Infantry, most of the 90th ebration. At 0730 the infantry crawled
Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, and out of their frozen foxholes and moved
a company of tank destroyers, found the into the attack. During the first hours
Germans decamping from the narrow they encountered few of the enemy, for
strip they had held south of the Sure the 212th had given up considerable
River. Most of the fighting involved en- ground during the night withdrawal, but
emy on the north bank from Ettelbruck the German assault guns and artillery
to the east. T h e tank destroyers claimed quickly made their presence known. Al-
to have caught and destroyed numerous though the 10th Infantry right slammed
vehicles and one horse-drawn battery. against the new enemy line in the Hardt
In Gilsdorf the German rear guard suc- woods before the day was through,
ceeded in gaining a little time, but it succeeded in lining up with the 22d
the attack continued eastward until Infantry to the east.
nightfall, when Rudder’s troops paused T h e 3d Battalion, which had taken
on the hill west of Moestroff. over Hill 313 during the night, found
While this advance was sweeping the that the Germans had fallen back a few
near bank of the Sure the enemy de- hundred yards to the far side of a fine
stroyed his foot and ponton bridges. T h e natural barrier, the Leimerdelt draw.
10th Armored attack and the deep thrust This ravine was some two hundred feet
achieved by the left wing of the 5th Di- deep and five hundred yards across; its
vision in the Haller sector was rapidly sides were virtually cliffs. Attempts to
crowding the 276th Volks Grenadier Di- work around the draw by way of trib-
vision back on Wallendorf and Dillin- utary cross corridors failed because the
gen, the crossings over which the divi- enemy had blocked these routes with
sion had come on 16 December. On machine guns. Lt. Col. Alden Shipley,
Christmas Eve Colonel Dempwolff the battalion commander, asked permis-
moved the command posts of his divi- sion to sideslip westward and flank the
sion and regiments closer to the river–a draw from higher ground, but the 2d
sign of things to come. By this time there Infantry was engaged in the area Ship-
was no real tactical connection between ley needed for this maneuver and the
the 276th and the 212th Volks Grena- request had to be denied.
dier Divisions; each had been com- North of Scheidgen, on the 3d Bat-
pressed into the area of its original talion, 2d Infantry, front, American ar-
bridgehead. tillery had pounded the enemy all
Since the river line in the 10th Ar- through the night in preparation for the
mored Division zone had been reached attack, some batteries using the new
on the first day of the XII Corps’ at- POZIT fuze. Soon after the infantry
tack, Christmas passed quietly on the started forward, reports came back that
Ettelbruck - Moestroff - Eppeldorf line much damage had been done the enemy,
502 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

MULLERTHAL

that his line was softening. By afternoon T h e battalion finally re-formed on


the battalion had advanced well into the Company E, and the three serviceable
Friemholz woods, but not until the tank- tanks left in the attached platoon then
ers had shelled the enemy out of a fox- prepared to attack Doster Farm, a small
hole line at the timber’s edge. T h e 2d collection of stone buildings on an open
Battalion, after a rugged night for its rise. T h e German infantry had en-
main force in the Mullerthal gorge, set trenched here, while in the woods
about extricating the two companies to the north a section of antitank
there in preparation for the attack guns covered the clearing. One of
against Doster Farm. This was no easy the enemy guns knocked out a tank but
task. Rather than work its way the length in so doing enabled American ob-
of one of the exit draws in which servers to direct accurate fire on
Company G had settled during the the gun positions. Once the guns
night, this company attacked up and were stilled the tanks and infantry took
over the bank, firing and taking its losses. the farm by assault, then pushed to with-
Company F had a hard time disengag- in a thousand yards of Berdorf.
ing, but got out along the path taken West of the Mullerthal the 11th In-
by Company G. fantry set out on the wheeling move-
T H E XII CORPS ATTACKS T H E SOUTHERN SHOULDER 503

ment planned the night before to re- troops under cover.


duce the stubborn resistance in front of The LXXX Corps could hardly be
its right flank. Company A of the gist said to have a line of defense in either of
Chemical Battalion smoked Haller its division bridgeheads on the 26th.
while the 3d Battalion, reinforced by ten Rather there remained an unevenly
Jumbo tanks from the 737th Tank Bat- linked chain of small troop concentra-
talion, crossed the southern face of the tions defending wood lots, hills, or
village and attacked toward the Hardt- villages–in effect a series of bridgeheads
hof rise. After this rapid and success- within the two main bridgehead areas.
ful advance, the tanks withdrew to help T h e 212th Volks Grenadier Division was
the 1st Battalion drive the enemy off in a particularly hazardous position,
the Hohwald northeast of Waldbillig. for the attack by the 3d Battalion in the
Haller itself fell to the reserve battalion, 2d Infantry sector had carried to within
which at twilight sent a rifle company sight of the Sauer, thus separating the
and tank platoon against the village. German centers of defense at Berdorf
Nearly two hundred prisoners were and Echternach. In fact the enemy in-
rounded up from the 988th, the center fantry to the front of the 3d Battalion
regiment of the 276th Yolks Grenadier had been forced to swim the chilly river
Division. on the night of the 25th.
The 5th Division rate of advance had T h e 1st Battalion, 10th Infantry,
accelerated appreciably during the sec- emerged from the Hardt woods and ad-
ond day of action, particularly at those vanced astride the ridge lines leading
points where tanks were brought into north to Echternach. German Teller
action. Difficult terrain, however, denied mines linked with trip wires dotted the
rapid exploitation and a clear break- trails and the ridge crests, slowing the
chrough to the Sauer. Then, too, trench advance, but by dark the battalion was
foot showed an alarming incidence only a half-mile from the town. T h e 3d
among the attacking infantry, who Battalion, stopped the previous day at
found it impossible to keep their feet the Leimerdelt draw, renewed its ad-
dry in this attack across the snow-fed vance about 0300 with a stealthy de-
streams in the bottom of the draws. T h e scent into the draw, Company L mov-
5th Division, like other veteran divi- ing on the right to the bend where the
sions, was filled with troops who had draw turned north toward Echternach.
returned to duty after evacuation for Company I, on the left, attacked at day-
wounds or sickness, and these “RTD’s” break through two tributary draws lead-
were much more susceptible to trench ing out to the north, each rifleman
foot than other troops. Still, it was obvi- weighed down with three bandoleers
ous that the enemy was in bad shape and of ammunition. Attacking boldly, fir-
lacked the rifle strength or the heavy ing at every possible enemy hiding place,
weapons to stand for long against tank- and never halting for cover, the company
infantry assault. General Eddy and Gen- killed the Germans in their foxholes or
eral Irwin agreed that the attack was drove them back in flight toward the
profitable and should continue, al- river. A small detachment of the enemy
though both were anxious to get their made a brief stand at Melick Farm,
504 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

then gave way to artillery shelling and talion had captured half the town, a few
assault by Company L. Company I drove prisoners, a number of decorated Christ-
on to the ridge overlooking Echternach mas trees, and the cold leftovers of
and the Sauer, while tanks shelled the Christmas dinner.
woods and draw on the flank. Early in the fight Colonel Roffe de-
From this vantage point the artillery cided to employ his reserve, the 1st Bat-
observer accompanying the riflemen talion, in a drive for the final regimental
could see little groups of the enemy pad- objective, the woods near Hamm Farm
dling across the river in rubber boats. on the ridge north of Berdorf. T h e re-
A few were swimming, others were run- serve battalion marched in column to-
ning across a small wooden bridge. Time ward Berdorf, expecting to pass through
after time the forward artillery observer the 2d Battalion, but found a bitter
called for battalion concentrations, fight in progress and the surrounding
watching the bursts with the POZIT area plastered with shellfire. When the
fuze thirty feet over the heads of the 1st Battalion tried to sideslip to the west
fleeing Germans and the murderous ef- it ran into a group of Germans in the
fects therefrom. For a while the enemy draw on its left flank and very heavy
persisted in using the crossing site, then artillery fire. Company C alone lost
broke, fleeing into Echternach or along thirty-two men while deploying to
the road to Berdorf. That night patrols attack. Not until the morning of 27 De-
entered Echternach but could find no cember did the final collapse of the Ber-
signs of the enemy or of Company E, dorf defense enable the 1st Battalion
12th Infantry, which, it was hoped, to reach the woods at Hamm Farm. T h e
still would be holed up somewhere in 3d Battalion had meanwhile come for-
the town. ward to the east of Berdorf and reached
In the 5th Division center the 2d In- Birkelt Farm, overlooking the river.
fantry struck at Berdorf and the hill All that remained were small rear guard
mass next to the Sauer, two companies detachments, but these put up a real
of the 2d Battalion closing on Berdorf fight in the woods and stone farmhouses.
at dawn. There in the half-light Com- That night many Germans withdrew
pany G, marching on the left, saw troops and swam the river to reach the West
standing in formation along the main Wall lines.
village street while an officer pointed to The operations of the 11th Infantry
various houses, apparently disposing his on Christmas Day had forced consider-
men. The American commander thought able retraction in the southern flank of
that Company E might have come in the 276th Volks Grenadier Division.
from the right, but when he called out, Colonel Black ordered the attack con-
“Is that Easy Company?” a gruff voice tinued on the 26th, sending two bat-
answered “Yah, das ist Easy Company.” talions against what was left of the
The surprised Americans recovered in 987th and 988th Regiments. Before
time to shoot down or capture a num- daybreak the 2d Battalion wheeled
ber of the enemy, but enough reached right and began an attack along
the houses to organize a stubborn de- the road running from Haller to
fense. Nevertheless by dark the 2d Bat- Beaufort. T h e leading company en-
T H E XII CORPS ATTACKS THE SOUTHERN SHOULDER 505

BERDORF

countered the first of the enemy the town of Beaufort, located on com-
in the wooded ravine of the Hallerbach, manding ground and controlling one of
well camouflaged in unorthodox posi- the main exit roads leading to the Dillin-
tions facing both sides of the ravine so gen bridge. T h e enemy held for awhile
that the attackers found themselves re- in the north edge of Beaufort but
ceiving mortar, Werfer, and bullet fire by daybreak had abandoned the town
from front and rear. to the 2d Battalion.
About 1000 Maj. John N. Acuff, the During the morning of 26 December
battalion commander, withdrew his in- the 3d Battalion had attacked almost
fantry a short distance to see what a mor- without opposition, crossing the Haller-
tar barrage could do. T h e woods were bach ravine and gaining the high ground
thick, visibility was poor, and mortar to the east of Beaufort and overlooking
fire proved not very effective. When the the road to Dillingen. But when the
Americans resumed the assault they in first appetizing target appeared, a col-
turn were hit by a counterattack. It was umn of a hundred or more vehicles
dusk when the enemy finally gave way heading for the Dillingen bridge, the
and the 2d Battalion reached the woods artillery radios failed to function and
north of the ravine. Ordered by Colonel a hasty barrage laid on the road by mor-
Black to continue the attack through the tars and machine guns caught only the
night, the battalion converged shortly tail of the column. By noon patrols were
after midnight in a pincers move on in position on the river bank to observe
506 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

the Dillingen bridge site. Calls for ar- talion dear in attacks against Bigelbach
tillery fire this time got through to the on the 27th. German artillery and
batteries, but the gunners had difficulty Werfers, emplaced on the east bank of
in directing fire into the deep river Val- the river, made good practice, while the
ley. T h e division air support party vec- worn grenadiers fought stubbornly
tored a flight of P–47’s over the bridge, wherever they were assailed.
but three separate passes failed to gain There was one exit through which
a hit. Later in the day the artillery ob- the German rear guard could hope to
servers succeeded in getting high-angle escape with minimum loss of men and
fire on the bridge; one hit registered equipment once its delaying stint was
while the span was crowded with men completed-the Dillingen bridge, built
and vehicles, but the bridge continued by the Seventh Army engineers for just
in use. this purpose. American fighter-bombers
At the end of this third day of the made a second effort against the span on
5th Division attack General Eddy and 2 7 December, but reported near mis-
General Irwin agreed that the mission ses. Colonel Dempwolff has said that he
assigned was as good as accomplished. was much worried about the bridge dur-
T h e west bank of the Sauer had been ing the daylight hours of the 27th. Dra-
gained at several points, and the enemy matically, the real danger to the division
was hastening to recross the river and came after dark just as the final with-
gain the protection of the West Wall. drawal commenced. Perhaps the law of
The Americans had taken over five hun- averages was working, or it may be that
dred prisoners in the period of 24–26 an American gunner put some partic-
December and had recovered much ularly potent spell on this one shell;
American materiel, lost in the first days in any case, a direct hit blasted a gap
of the German advance. There still re- of about fifteen yards in the bridge
mained some necessary mopping up in structure. When the German engineers
those pockets where the German rear hastened to repair the span, they came
guard held on to cover the withdrawal under small arms fire from American pa-
of the last units of the LXXX Corps as trols working down toward the river.
these made their way to safety. Then, about 0200, shellfire suddenly in-
Although the 212th completed its creased to feverish intensity and the en-
withdrawal over the Bollendorf bridge gineers were driven off the bridge. This
during the night of 26 December, rov- shelling finally slackened, the span was
ing patrols continued to operate on the repaired, the assault guns, flak, and ve-
American side of the river well into hicles filed across, and just after day-
January. The 276th Yolks Grenadier break the Germans blew the bridge.
Division held in some force for another From 2 2 December, when the 10th In-
twenty-four hours under specific Seventh fantry launched the 5th Division attack
Army orders to do so in keeping toward the Sauer, until 28 December,
with the larger army mission of when the last formal resistance ended,
containment. For the 11th Infantry, the division took over 800 prisoners. Es-
therefore, there was one last round of timates by burial parties set the num-
fighting, fighting which cost the 1st Bat- ber of Germans killed at about the same
T H E XII CORPS ATTACKS T H E SOUTHERN SHOULDER 507

figure. Losses in the 5th Division totaled on this broken ground which normally
46 officers and 899 men as battle cas- would be the case. T h e military stu-
ualties; 2 2 officers and 598 men were dent, however, will have noticed that
nonbattle casualties–a high ratio but the psychological effect of American
understandable in terms of the contin- tanks and tank destroyers on an enemy
ued 20º cold and the footslogging ad- who had no tanks and very few anti-
vance through countless icy streams. tank guns was considerable. For this bat-
T h e 276th Volks Grenadier Division tle German commanders all make much
lost about 2,000 officers and men be- of those periods during the initial Amer-
tween 2 0 and 28 December, from all ican defense and the ultimate coun-
causes, and the original division com- terattack when tanks, even in platoon
mander had been killed in the action. strength, were employed against them.
Many of its companies were reduced to T h e relative immobility of the two Ger-
ten-man strength. T h e average strength man divisions, whose flexibility in at-
of the rifle companies in the 212th Volks tack and defense depended almost
Grenadier Division, when they returned entirely on the leg power of tired in-
to the West Wall, was 25–30 men, fantry, gave both General Barton and
but the figure is derived from losses suf- General Irwin a considerable advan-
fered since 16 December. Although this tage in timing, whether it was in mov-
division was better trained than the ing troops to counter a thrust or in ex-
276th, it generally had engaged in ploiting weaknesses in the enemy line.
harder fighting. Its total losses, as esti- T h e use of artillery on both sides of
mated by the division commander, were the line is one of the features of the
about 4,000 officers and men. T h e only XII Corps operations at the Sauer, and
exact casualty report extant is that of in numerous actions German use of the
the 988th Regiment, which on 15 De- rocket launcher proved particularly
cember had been at its full strength of disquieting to the Americans. This
1,868 officers and men. By 28 December weapon, whose total weight was only
the regiment had suffered losses as fol- some 1 , 2 0 0 pounds, but which could dis-
lows: 190 known killed, 561 missing in charge 450 pounds of high explosive in
action, 411 hospitalized as sick or ten seconds, more than made up for the
wounded. limited number of conventional artil-
T h e terrain on which the 4th Infan- lery tubes that the LXXX Corps had in
try Division had defended and over the bridgehead, and its ease of move-
which the 5th Infantry Division had ment and small silhouette were admir-
attacked proved to bees difficult as any ably suited to the broken ground west
on which military operations were con- of the Sauer. T h e rate and weight of
ducted in the course of the Ardennes rocket projector fire, plus the fact that
campaign. For this reason the battle at the limited German artillery could con-
the south shoulder of the Bulge merits centrate to cover well-defined and de-
perusal by the student of tactics. Amer- limited paths of advance, led the veter-
ican superiority in heavy supporting an 5th Division to claim that it had been
weapons, tanks, and tank destroyers more heavily shelled during these days
never had the full tactical effectiveness than in any battle it had sustained.
508 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE

T h e artillery support furnished the 5th tion of the Third Army opposite the
Division, however, had been very effec- German shoulder was secured. When it
tive; German records note it with con- became apparent that the fight on the
siderable distaste. As might be expected near bank of the Sauer was nearly fin-
of this pockmarked and tortuous ground, ished, the corps commander made a ten-
both sides speak with respect of the tative plan–probably at Patton’s instiga-
enemy’s mortars. tion-for an attack north over the Sure
By 26 December, the last day of full- River and on toward Bitburg using his
fledged attack by the XII Corps against new armored division and the 10th In-
the Sauer salient, the Third Army was fantry. In addition Eddy asked Irwin’s
fully oriented on its new axis. With the opinion on a river crossing by the 5th
6th Armored Division en route from Infantry Division. General Irwin agreed
the south to join the XII Corps, it was that such a follow-up was “worth a
possible to relieve the armor already in thought,” reasoning that “the West Wall
the zone and effect a general regrouping line in front is weak and we have de-
calculated to restore some organizational stroyed much of the garrison.”
unity. CCA, 9th Armored, there- T h e Third Army commander finally
fore, was ordered to Arlon and decided that the 5th and 80th Infantry
III Corps control; the 109th Infantry Divisions would hold the existing line
was restored to the 28th Infantry while the 6th Armored moved west to
Division, still with the VIII Corps; the Bastogne sector and there attacked
the 10th Armored Division was directed northward on the left of the 4th Ar-
to hand over its sector to the 6th Ar- mored Division. T h e corps front was
mored Division on 2 7 December and duly re-formed, the 5th Division edging
rejoin the XX Corps at Metz. General to the left to join the 80th and the 4th
Patton, wishing to integrate his northern Infantry Division (now commanded by
front a little better, redrafted the bound- Brig. Gen. Harold W. Blakeley because
ary between the III and XII Corps so General Barton had been evacuated
that the 80th Infantry Division passed by reason of illness) taking over
in place to the latter. This new inter- a wider sector on the right. T h e corps
corps boundary would originate in the commander did not immediately dismiss
north near Wiltz, run south toward Hei- the idea of an attack east across the Sauer
derscheid, and continue to a point be- River and through the West Wall. This
low Merzig. project was on-again-off-again until, on
Neither Patton nor Eddy had a defi- 2 January, Patton ordered that plans be
nite plan for the employment of the made for a corps attack northward. T h e
XII Corps once its immediate mission XII Corps front, however, would re-
was accomplished and the anchor posi- main quiet until 18 January.
CHAPTER XXI

The III Corps’ Counterattack


Toward Bastogne
The Verdun meeting on 19 December a couple of divisions and that it then
set in chain the first of a series of actions would develop piecemeal, as had the
which the Allies would take to wrest the German counterattack in Normandy,
initiative from the enemy. Nonetheless a without a solid tactical base or concrete
few momentous, nerve-shaking days had result. T h e Supreme Commander him-
to elapse before the first gun of the self was well aware of the Third Army
counterattack could be fired. T o gain commander’s penchant for cut and
time and save troops the Supreme Com- thrust tactics and probably needed little
mander was willing to let the Allied urging to take some action calculated to
forces fall back as far as necessary–al- hold Patton within the constraints of
though it was tacitly understood that the “the big picture.” On the other hand
Meuse River must be the limit for any Eisenhower recognized that the con-
withdrawal. On the 20th General Strong, tinued occupation of Bastogne, the key
the SHAEF chief of intelligence, ad- to the entire road net on the south side
vised General Eisenhower that it looked of the German Bulge, was essential to
as if the German command had com- future offensive operations. Patton, as
mitted everything it had to the offensive. the SHAEF staff saw it, would make the
Flying weather was poor and there was narrow thrust on the Arlon-Bastogne
a chance that the Allies now could re- axis, but any more ambitious plans
group for a concerted counterattack both would have to be subordinated to the
north and south without these troop larger strategy.1 Eisenhower, therefore,
movements being discovered from the told Bradley that the American counter-
air. On this date, therefore, Eisenhower attack via Bastogne should be held in
gave Bradley and Montgomery their check and not allowed to spread, that it
orders for a counteroffensive against the was, after all, only a steppingstone for
German salient, to be undertaken as soon the “main counteroffensive.”
as possible.
Air Chief Marshal Tedder, the Dep- Preparations for the Attack
uty Supreme Allied Commander, and a
number of others on the SHAEF staff Possibly the “lucky” commander
feared that the impetuous Patton would needed some curb. on his inherent opti-
persuade Bradley to let him start the 1The Robb Notes are the source of the Supreme
counterattack from the south with only Commander’s views.
510 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

mism, but regardless of any pose which


Patton may have assumed in the war
council at Verdun he and his staff went
about the business of mounting this first
counterattack coolly and methodically. 2
T h e direction of attack already had been
set by General Eisenhower, that is,
north from an assembly area around
Arlon. T h e immediate mission, assigned
by the higher command after the Verdun
meeting, was the “relief” of Bastogne
and the use of its road net as a sally port
for a drive by the Third Army to St.
Vith in the larger Allied offensive. D-
day for the counterattack was 22 Decem-
ber. It must be added that the Third
Army order issued the day before the
attack was rather ambitious, containing
a typical Patton flourish in the prescrip-
tion of an eventual wheel to the north- GENERAL MILLIKIN
east and seizure of the Rhine crossings
“in zone.” The forces to be employed dered north, and thus were selected al-
had been earmarked as early as the night most automatically.3
of 18 December when Bradley and Pat- T h e area chosen for the III Corps
ton agreed to move the new III Corps counterattack extended from the Alzette
headquarters (as yet inexperienced and River on the east to Neufchateau in the
untried) from Metz to Arlon. T h e divi- west, a front of some thirty miles. Actu-
sions given Maj. Gen. John Millikin (the ally these points were not on formal
26th Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Di- boundaries but rather represent the
vision, and 4th Armored Division) all limits within which the III Corps opera-
had been out of the line or in a quiet tion finally developed. This zone, the
sector when the Third Army was or- eastern part lying in Luxembourg, the
western in Belgium, contains some of the
most rugged ground in the Ardennes.
2The operations of the Third Army in the
East of the Arlon-Bastogne axis two
Bastogne counterattack are the subject of a special deeply eroded corridors, cut by the Sure
journal prepared by the TUSA G–3 staff (in and Wiltz Rivers, form effective barriers
the author’s possession). In addition the TUSA
chief of staff, General Gay, kept an official Third
to mechanized or motorized advance
Army diary (referred to hereafter as Gay Diary), from the south. T h e entire area is criss-
a copy of which was used by the author. The crossed with rivers and streams, but those
personal data on General Patton is interesting
but adds little to the official records. See also
of the tableland west of Bastogne lack
George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It (Boston: the gorgelike beds found to the east.
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947) and Harry Here, as in other parts of the Ardennes,
H. Semmes, Portrait of Patton (New York: Apple-
ton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955) . 3III Corps AAR; G–2 and G–3 Jnls.
T H E III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 511

dense woods alternate with rolling fields 352d Yolks Grenadier Divisions. All
and clearings. T h e land is veined with but the 5th Parachute had been identi-
roads, but of varying quality; at their fied days earlier as belonging to the
interlacings are found the single farm- Seventh Army. What these enemy divi-
house or the village of a half-dozen sions could do and what they intended
dwellings, all promising the phenome- to do quite literally was any man’s guess.
non common to military operations in T h e III Corps attack would have to push
the Ardennes–the fight for the cross- off through a fragmentary screen of
road. Bastogne, with seven entrant roads, friendly troops whose positions were un-
naturally dominates the road complex in certain, against an enemy whose exact
this area whether movement be from east location was unknown, over terrain
to west, as attempted by the X L Y I I which had not been scouted by the
Panzer Corps, or from south to north, as Third Army.
planned for the American III Corps. But T h e enemy was equally in the dark as
in addition to the south-to-north highway to the III Corps capabilities and inten-
from Arlon to Bastogne, there are main tions. T h e 26th Infantry Division could
roads branching from Arlon to the north- not be located by German intelligence
east and northwest, thus offering some after it left Metz and would not be iden-
flexibility of maneuver. Only one main tified as present in its new sector until
road south of Bastogne runs east and two days after the American drive com-
west, that from Luxembourg City menced. T h e enemy traced the 80th into
through Arlon to Neufchateau. This Luxembourg, but on 2 2 December be-
road would form the base of operations lieved it was reinforcing “remnants” of
for the III Corps. (See Map IX.) the 4th Infantry Division in a purely de-
T h e enemy situation on the new III fensive role.
Corps front was obscure. T h e Bastogne When General Millikin and his staff
garrison knew little of the German de- settled into the Arlon headquarters on
ployment beyond the encircling units in 20 December, with only two days to go
direct contact, while the VIII Corps’ before the counterattack target date, the
screen, behind which the III Corps was divisions that made up the attack force
forming, had been too weak to fight for were either still on the move or were
information. T h e situation along most of barely completing their shift. T h e 26th
the tenuous and sketchy VIII Corps line Infantry Division was en route from
was indeed so confused that the location Metz to Arlon; the 80th Division had
of friendly roadblocks or outposts could just closed into an assembly area near
hardly be plotted. On the day before the Luxembourg City after a march of 150
counterattack it was known that the miles; the 4th Armored Division had
German columns had carried to and be- reached Arlon and was trying to find its
yond Bastogne. It was presumed that the assembly area on the Arlon-Neufchateau
Arlon-Bastogne road had been cut, but road. Nor were the three divisions
this was not certain. Elements of four equally ready for return to the fray.
German divisions were supposed to be in T h e 26th Division (Maj. Gen. Willard
the line opposite the III Corps: the 5th S. Paul) was full of rifle replacements,
Parachute and the 212th, 276th, and mostly inexperienced and lacking recent
512 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

infantry training. This division had seen conferences by the top commanders and
its first combat in October and had lost the receipt of this decision in the lower
almost 3,000 men during bitter fighting tactical units. CCB, for example, oper-
in Lorraine. Withdrawn in early Decem- ated for two days under VIII Corps
ber to take over the Third Army “rein- while the rest of the division was en
forcement” training program at Metz, route to III Corps-a fact that has bear-
the 26th Division had just received 2,585 ing on the subsequent story of Bastogne.
men as replacements and, on 18 Decem- On the night of 18 December General
ber, was beginning its program (sched- Bradley had told Patton, “I understand
uled for thirty days) when the German from General Ike you are to take over
counteroffensive canceled its role as a the VIII Corps.” That same night CCB,
training division. T h e “trainees,” men 4th Armored, started for Longwy and the
taken from headquarters, antitank sec- road to Luxembourg. T h e next day the
tions, and the like, at once were pre- rest of the division followed, under
empted to fill the ranks left gaping by verbal orders from Patton attaching the
the Lorraine battles. Knowing only that 4th Armored Division to the III Corps.
an undefined combat mission lay ahead, These orders were countermanded, then
the division rolled north to Arlon, com- reaffirmed by the 12th Army Group in
pleting its move shortly before midnight the course of the 19th.
of the 20th. Not until the next day did T h e advance party of CCB arrived
General Paul learn that his division was meanwhile at Arlon, and found that the
to attack on the early morning of the 22d. VIII Corps was the only corps operating
T h e 80th Division (General Mc- in the area, the I I I Corps headquarters
Bride) was in good condition. As one of not yet having appeared on the scene.
the units being primed by the Third Brig. Gen. Holmes E. Dager reported to
Army for the forthcoming attack against the commander of the VIII Corps,
the West Wall, the 80th had been which was officially under the First Army
granted priority on replacements, had and would be until noon on 20 Decem-
been rested at St. Avold, and on 18 ber, although all concerned knew that it
December was on its way into the line was to pass to the Third Army. General
near Zweibrücken when General Patton Middleton perforce had command of
ordered the move to Luxembourg. this Third Army unit before the antici-
There the 80th found itself under the pated change, whereas Third Army
control of the III Corps, its only orders records continued to show the entire 4th
to take up a reserve battle position in Armored Division as assigned to the III
the 4th Infantry Division zone. On 2 1 Corps. At Dager’s request the corps
December McBride first learned that his commander agreed to keep CCB to-
division would attack the following gether as a tactical unit instead of
morning. parceling it out along the front.
The 4th Armored Division (Maj. Gen. T h e 4th Armored Division had won a
Hugh J. Gaffey) had come north under brilliant reputation during the autumn
hurried and contradictory orders, the battles in Lorraine. It was a favorite of
result of the usual time lag between a the Third Army commander; so, when
command decision reached in personal its leader, Maj. Gen. John S. Wood, was
T H E III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 513

returned to the United States for rest quiring initiative and battle know-how.
and recuperation, General Patton named
his own chief of staff as Wood’s successor. T h e Ezell Task Force
On 10 December the 4th Armored Divi-
sion came out of the line after five It is obvious that the Third Army
months of incessant fighting. T h e last could never have put troops into the
phase of combat, the attack in the Saar Luxembourg area as quickly as it did
mud, had been particularly trying and without a wholesale scuttling of “paper
costly. Replacements, both men and work” and “channels”; that improvisa-
matériel, were not to be had; trained tion and reliance on the field telephone
tank crews could not be found in the as a medium for attaining clear under-
conventional replacement centers–in standing have inherent dangers is
fact these specialists no longer were equally clear. A bizarre adventure that
trained in any number in the United befell CCB of the 4th Armored in its
States. When the division started for peregrinations typifies the period of
Luxembourg it was short 713 men and “piecemeal reaction,” as some of the
19 officers in the tank and infantry bat- participants style it, when Middleton’s
talions and the cavalry squadron. VIII Corps was trying to plug the yawn-
The state of materiel was much ing gaps in its front with rifle platoons of
poorer, for there was a shortage of engineers and mechanics, and before an
medium tanks throughout the European American riposte could be made in force.
theater. T h e division could replace only Bradley had told the VIII Corps com-
a few of its actual losses and was short mander on the night of 18 December
twenty-one Shermans when ordered that reinforcements were coming up
north; worse, ordnance could not ex- from the Third Army. Sometime later
change worn and battle-damaged tanks Middleton learned that the 4th Armored
for new. Tanks issued in the United Division was heading northward, led by
Kingdom in the spring of 1944 were still CCB and apparently under attachment
operating, many of them after several to his dwindling command. Another
major repair jobs, and all with mileage tank command from the Third Army
records beyond named life expectancy. (CCB, 10th Armored Division) had just
Some could be run only at medium arrived on the scene, but this Middleton
speed. Others had turrets whose electri- had committed at once to shore up the
cal traverse no longer functioned and crumbling defenses between Bastogne
had to be cranked around by hand. and Wiltz. At noon on the 19th (before
Tracks and motors were worn badly: the VIII Corps had passed to the Third
the 8th Tank Battalion alone had thirty- Army) General Middleton telephoned
three tanks drop out because of mechan- the First Army commander and asked if
ical failure in the 160-mile rush to the he might use CCB of the 4th Armored
Ardennes. But even with battle-weary on its arrival. Uncertain of the command
tanks and a large admixture of green situation Hodges referred the request to
tankers and armored infantry the 4th Bradley, who told the VIII Corps com-
Armored Division, on its record, could mander that he could employ CCB but
be counted an asset in any operation re- only if necessary to hold his position.
514 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

By midnight CCB had ended its 150- Ezell to assemble his task force at
mile ride and closed in villages on the Villeroux two and a half miles southwest
east side of Vaux-lez-Rosihres; all the of Bastogne and gave him a number of
journal sergeant could enter at this hour missions.
was “mission unknown.” But by the About 1400 a radio message from CCB
morning of the 20th the status and duties rescinded Ezell’s original orders and told
of Dager’s command were really con- him to return to Nives, the 8th Tank
fused, for the III Corps had opened its Battalion bivouack. This is what had
command post at Arlon and proceeded happened. Telephone connection be-
to give orders on the assumption that tween CCB and General Gaffey’s 4th
the 4th Armored Division in its entirety Armored command post had opened,
was reporting to General Millikin. T h e giving Dager an opportunity to express
VIII Corps had ordered Dager to send his concern over the way in which his
an officer to Bastogne at daylight on the command was being whittled away piece-
20th to determine the exact situation meal. Gaffey immediately ordered Dager
there, but about 0500 that morning to recall the task force at Bastogne and to
someone on the VIII Corps G–9 staff- move CCB into assembly with the rest of
who it was cannot be determined–or- the division northwest of Arlon.
dered Dager to send a tank company, an Figuring that someone higher in
armored infantry company, and a bat- authority would inform Roberts or
tery of self-propelled artillery into McAuliffe, Ezell and his team started for
Bastogne. home. On the way into Bastogne the task
Although Dager argued against this force had noticed two battalions of field
fragmentization of his force, at 1030 the artillery beside the road, the pieces and
small team was on its way, led by Capt. prime movers jammed together, equip-
Bert Ezell, executive officer of the 8th ment scattered, and most of the gunners
Tank Battalion, who earlier had been fleeing along the road to the south. This
named the liaison officer to the 101st time the task force stopped, found one
Airborne. The only mission specified was dead man lying by his prime mover, shot
“to aid CCB of the 10th Armored Divi- in the head, and an artillery captain
sion.” Since CCB had bivouacked close singlehandedly trying to hitch up the
to the Neufchâteau-Bastogne road this guns and move them to the road. Lieu-
route was used. There had been rumors tenant Kiley, who commanded the tank
that the Germans had cut the road, but company, hitched three of the pieces to
nobody seemed to know for certain and his tanks and left a few of his men to
American reconnaissance was woefully help the anonymous captain. Seven hours
lacking in this sector. En route the team after the team set out it was back with
received–or heard–a little small arms CCB. Ezell had counted only three ar-
fire. In Bastogne Ezell reported to the tillery rounds during the trip and had
101st chief of staff, who turned him over seen signal men calmly laying wire along
to the division G–3, who passed him on the highway. At dusk on the 20th, then,
to General McAuliffe, who assigned him the Neufchâteau-Bastogne road still was
to Colonel Roberts, commanding CCB in friendly hands. Why was CCB as a
of the 10th Armored. Roberts ordered unit not put in to hold this corridor
T H E III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 515

open? There is no certain answer. T h e Combat Battalion with reinforcements,


episode of Ezell’s task force can be read was assigned the task of erecting road-
only through the fog of war as this blocks and preparing bridges for dem-
is generated by the failure of communi- olition.
cations, the complexity and unwieldi- T h e Third Army commander’s last
ness of field command, and the natural, instruction to his commanders reflected
human proclivity for overrating (or the admonition against a dribbling at-
underrating) the accomplishments of tack given by General Eisenhower: he
the enemy.4 (General Patton) favored an attack in
column of regiments, “or in any case
“Drive Like Hell” lots of depth.” As usual Patton was
optimistic. He felt certain that the
General Patton inspected the III enemy was unaware of the storm about
Corps dispositions and divisions on 2 0 to break, that German intelligence had
December, concluded that the corps con- not spotted the appearance of the 26th
centration was proceeding satisfactorily, Division in the area, and that it did not
and the following day gave the order know the exact location of the other
for attack at 0600 on the 22d. T h e corps two divisions. “Drive like hell,” said
scheme of maneuver, issued to the divi- Patton.
sions in the early afternoon, was simple.
T h e III Corps would advance north in T h e 80th Division Advance
the direction of S t . Vith. T h e 80th
Infantry Division, on the right, would Despite hurried preparations the I I I
maintain contact during its advance with Corps attack got off at the appointed
the left wing of the XII Corps. T h e hour on the 22d. T h e 80th Division,
26th Division would form the center. whose regiments earlier had assembled
T h e 4th Armored Division would ad- north of Luxembourg for the defense of
vance on the left–Bastogne lay in its that city, had as line of departure the
zone. Mersch-Arlon road on a front of five and
T h e last of the eleven field artillery a half miles.5 During the night it was
battalions which had been taken from learned that the 109th Infantry of the
active engagement on the old Third dispersed 28th Division still was facing
Army front to form the corps artillery the enemy near Vichten, five miles to
arrived during the day. They had the north. This would give some cover
wheeled north at an average twenty- for the development of the 80th Divi-
mile-per-hour clip. In addition the infan- sion attack; so McBride ordered his
try divisions each had a tank battalion left wing regiment to pass through the
and a self-propelled tank destroyer bat-
talion attached. T o eke out some cover
on the open west flank, Task Force 5 Very detailedcoverage of the 80th Division
operation will be found in the combat interviews.
Lyon, consisting of the 178th Engineer The division records are less useful than the
AAR’s and journals of the three infantry regi-
4 Ezell’s adventure was carefully checked at the ments. See also, Capt. Roy T. McGrann, T h e
time and is the subject of a special series of com- 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Pittsburgh, Pa.;
bat interviews. Geyer Printing Company, 1946).
516 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

109th Infantry, relieving it in place. hurriedly, using the town as a base, but
There was no artillery preparation (nor in the process lost its heavy metal, for
were there any certain targets) for the the German batteries were in no posi-
surprise attack. tion to engage in an artillery duel, and
T h e two assault regiments, the fell back to Diekirch.
319th Infantry on the left and the 318th Farther west the rear of the 915th
Infantry on the right, went forward fast Regiment column was moving directly
on this cold cloudy morning, tramping across the 319th Infantry line of march.
over a light blanket of snow which T o their amazement, troops of the 3d
had fallen during the night. In two hours Battalion suddenly saw the Germans
the 319th Infantry (Col. William N. filing past, only a few hundred yards
Taylor) reached Vichten and relieved away and oblivious of any danger. Tanks,
the 109th; as the regiment moved on tank destroyers, and the 57-mm. anti-
toward Merzig the first few rounds of tank guns of the 1st Battalion ended
small arms fire came in. T h e 318th In- this serene promenade. Many Germans
fantry (Col. Lansing McVickar) headed were killed, a gun battery was blown
for Ettelbruck, constricted to column to pieces, and numerous trucks and
formation by the Alzette River on the horse-drawn weapons were destroyed.
east and a high ridge on the west. South T h e 319th Infantry had knifed between
of the bridgehead town enemy shellfire head and tail of the 3 5 2 d . It now swung
briefly stopped the advance until the right onto the Ettelbruck road and
German guns were quieted by counter- that afternoon reached the villages of
battery from the 314th Field Artillery Oberfeulen and Niederfeulen. Merzig,
Battalion. however, remained in German hands.
The cannonading was brought on by At sundown the 80th Division could
a peculiar circumstance. T h e 352d Volks look back on a highly successful day.
Grenadier Division (General Schmidt) Extensive gains had been the story along
on this morning was advancing along the entire III Corps front and Patton
the Diekirch-Ettelbruck-Merzig highway was very much pleased. This was, he
in front of but at a right angle to the told General Millikin, a chance to win
American advance from the south. the war: the attack must be kept rolling
Schmidt was under the impression that through the night. T h e 319th Infantry
his division had broken through the put its 2d Battalion, the reserve, into
American line and was now marching trucks as far as Oberfeulen. There the
through undefended, unoccupied coun- battalion dismounted about midnight
try. T h e 914th Regiment had just and under a full moon began an advance
entered Ettelbruck when the 318th to take Heiderscheid. T h e 318th Infan-
Infantry appeared. It was the artillery try, which had found it difficult to ma-
regiment of the 3 5 2 d , bringing up the neuver on the constricted southern ap-
tail of the division east of the town, proach to Ettelbruck or to bring its tanks
which ran afoul of the Americans. and tank destroyers to bear against the
Quite obviously the Germans did not town, at nightfall began a series of suc-
expect an attack from this direction. cessful assaults to gain the hills which
The 914th faced left and deployed looked down upon Ettelbruck from the
T H E III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 517

west. Company B moved with such speed German forces, well entrenched in towns
that it reached the houses at the western and villages which could be attacked
edge of the town. Although its command- only over broken and difficult terrain.
er was wounded during the assault his In the course of the afternoon General
company held on alone. T h e 80th Divi- McBride decided to keep the attack roll-
sion would have to do some bitter fight- ing by introducing his reserve regiment,
ing before this bridgehead over the Sure the 317th,between the two attacking
and Alzette was cleared of the enemy, regiments. T h e 317th Infantry (Lt. Col.
but the division had cut one of the Henry G. Fisher), which had been
main supply routes of the German following the 318th Infantry, was given
Seventh Army. the mission of clearing the ridge which
One lone rifle company holding a few ran north to Welscheid. Once beyond
houses hardly made for a hand-hold on this town Fisher’s troops were to turn
Ettelbruck. In and around the town the east toward the Sure River, thus cutting
enemy had a grenadier regiment and to the rear of Ettelbruck. When night
many direct-fire heavy weapons. Because fell the regiment was on its way, the
the bluffs surrounding the town pre- 2d Battalion in the lead and the 1st
cluded much maneuver in attack, assault Battalion a thousand yards to its rear.
on the west, or American, bank of the Nearing Welscheid sometime after mid-
Alzette had to be made frontally. Lt. night, the forward battalion started into
Col. A. S. Tosi had brought the two the assault over a series of rough slopes
other rifle companies of his 1st Bat- where each man was outlined by the
talion close to the edge of the town bright moonlight reflecting from the
when daylight came on the 24th (B glazed field of snow. T h e enemy, wait-
Company still held inside), but three ing with machine guns on the reverse
separate attempts to reach the town slopes, had all the best of it. T h e Ameri-
failed, and with severe casualties. In the can tanks tried but could not maneuver
afternoon a few tanks were maneu- over the broken ground. T h e battalion
vered into the van, and with their commander therefore sent two of his
help the 1st Battalion reached the houses companies to make a wide detour
and took fifty or sixty prisoners. By this through a deep gorge, their place in the
time the battalion had lost the equiva- line being taken by the 1st Battalion.
lent of a full company, Colonel Tosi But too much time was consumed by
had been seriously wounded, and all this movement, and day broke on the
company leaders had been killed or 24th with the two battalions out in the
wounded. One tank reached the streets open and dangerously exposed to Ger-
but found them cluttered with debris man fire. T h e attack had to be aban-
and impassable. The division com- doned; new plans were made for
mander decided to call off the attack; bypassing the town and striking directly
at dusk all of the companies withdrew at Bourscheid and the Sure River.
while artillery plastered Ettelbruck. The 319th Infantry had continued its
This second day had voided the bright battle by sending the 2d Battalion
promises of the first, for the 80th Divi- against Heiderscheid, which lay on the
sion finally was in contact with the main Ettelbruck-Bastogne route and from
518 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

which a secondary road ran laterally turn as eleven enemy tanks hove in sight,
west to Martelange across the 26th decks and cupolas packed with snow for
Division zone of advance. Just north of camouflage. While a hurried call was
Heiderscheid were several crossing points dispatched for armored aid, bazooka
on the Sure River, the chief natural teams crawled forward to try their luck.
obstacle to be surmounted by the 80th Two of the enemy tanks fell prey to
Division in its march northward. T h e the bazooka teams, led by 2d Lt.
2d Battalion (Lt. Col. Paul Bandy) Michael Hritsik,7 whereupon the others
reached Heiderscheid about 0230 on the showed themselves loath to close in.
morning of the 23d, but when two rifle Friendly tank destroyers appeared in
companies neared the edge of the village time to account for four more German
they were stopped by assault gun fire tanks, and an American tank knocked
and machine guns firing tracers to out a fifth.
point the targets for the gun crews. Infan- By the time the 3d Battalion (Lt.
trymen with submachine guns worked Col. Elliott B. Cheston) came hurry-
close enough to fire bursts into the posi- ing up the battle was ended. Cheston’s
tions from which the orange line of battalion, having spent most of the morn-
the tracers came but could not deal with ing rounding up a large enemy detach-
the German assault guns. Two American ment in Merzig, now turned northeast
tanks belonging to the 702d Tank Bat- from Heiderscheid and marched through
talion came forward only to be checked a deep defile to reach and take the
by a mine field at a crossroad. A hamlet of Tadler on the Sure. T h e
German gun took a shot at the tanks but Germans blew the nearby bridge, then
in so doing gave away its own location, sat back on the far bank to pound the
and a quick return shot set the assault battalion with rocket salvos. About dark
gun afire. Guided by the light from the the regimental commander ordered a
blazing gun carriage the American rifle- company to move west along the river
men rushed the gendarmerie, took it, and outpost Heiderscheidergrund; ad-
and there barricaded themselves. About mittedly this was poaching in the
this time the explosion of a German zone of the 26th Division, but the bridge
shell detonated the mine field, and the there was needed. T h e company found
tanks ground forward to the village. An the bridge intact and a stream of German
hour or so before noon the last of the vehicles running back and forth. Organ-
stubborn defenders had been routed izing an ambush, the company spent the
out and the 2d Battalion was north of night picking off unwary travelers.
the village. On the eastern flank the 1st Battalion
T h e fight was not finished, for at noon and its tank support spent most of the
two enemy companies converged in a 23d negotiating the rough ground,
yelling assault on Heiderscheid. Some dense woods, and deep snow in an ad-
of the 2d Battalion broke but the rest vance from Feulen toward Kehmen.
stood firm, killed the German infantry From a hill south of Kehmen the advance
commander, and wrote quietus to this
threat.6 Then affairs took a more serious courageous leadership in the fighting on this day.
6Colonel Bandy was awarded the DSC for 7 Lieutenant Hritsik was awarded the DSC.
T H E III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 519

HEIDERSHEIDERGRUND BRIDGE

guard counted twenty-four tanks rolling With their help, the battalion delivered
toward the village from the east, ap- a sharp assault, destroying three
parently on their way to retake Heider- German tanks and freeing the village.
scheid. Word already had gone back for T h e night battles had shown clearly
more tanks, but those with infantry, that the 80th Infantry Division faced
plus a few tank destroyers, got in the hard going as the 24th dawned. T h e
first fire, immobilized two of the leaders, advance had carried north to a point
and so surprised the rest that they turned where it impinged on the Seventh Army
tail and hurried back to Bourscheid- communications leading to the Bastogne
which the 905th Field Artillery Bat- battleground. T h e main fight for the
talion promptly took under fire. Dis- III Corps was that flaring farther west.
cerning at least a tank platoon backing Henceforth McBride’s operation would
the grenadiers inside Kehmen, the 1st be subsidiary to the attack by the corps’
Battalion waited until after dark for left and center, an operation designed
reinforcements-ten tanks formerly at- to interdict the movement of reinforce-
tached to the 28th Infantry Division. ments heading for Bastogne and to
520 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

contain the enemy in the Ettelbruck and seven air miles away, before it could
Bourscheid sectors. Orders from General follow a main thoroughfare. There were
Millikin, received at the 80th Division numerous secondary roads and trails
command post early on the 24th, under- going north, and the attack would fan
lined the shift of gravity westward: out over these. But this network became
McBride was to send two battalions increasingly difficult to traverse as it
of the 318th Infantry from Ettelbruck descended into the ravines and through
to assist the 4th Armored Division, and the forests leading to the gorges of the
at once. Sure River. T h e ground between the
Sure trench and the valley of the Wiltz
T h e 26th Infantry Division Attack was equally rugged. Since little was
known of the enemy, the division plan
T h e 26th Division advance in the simply called for the troops to expand
center of the III Corps zone began under over roads and trails, eliminating
circumstances similar to those in the German resistance wherever found.
sector of the 80th Division.8 Before dawn While the 26th Reconnaissance Troop
on 2 2 December the 104th Infantry and rolled out as a screen several thousand
the 328th Infantry moved from their yards to the fore, the 104th Infantry
assembly areas east of Arlon to the line (Lt. Col. Ralph A. Palladino) on the
of departure at the Attert River. A very right and the 328th Infantry (Col. Ben
large number of men in the rifle com- R. Jacobs) on the left marched through
panies had yet to see their first German, dense woods and over slushy, muddy
many of them were replacements whose trails, finally coming out onto open, roll-
only recent experience with a rifle con- ing fields near the village of Pratz, about
sisted of a day or two at the Metz train- three miles by road from the Attert.
ing ground. All had heard the current Unaware of the fact, the Americans were
rumors of atrocities perpetrated by the nearing the advance guard of the 915th
German SS troops and paratroopers: all Regiment, marching out from Ettel-
were steeled, according to the capacity bruck. (It was this column of the 352d
of the individual, to meet a ruthless Volks Grenadier Division whose tail the
enemy. 80th Division pinched near Merzig.)
The general axis of advance was Arlon- The 104th Infantry continued north,
Wiltz; but there was no main road from assailed only by scattered small arms
the Attert north to Wiltz–indeed the fire and machine gun bursts fired at
advance would have to reach Eschdorf, long range. A mile farther on a small
detachment of enemy tanks and infantry
8 The combat interviews are fragmentary for the essayed an attack but were repelled by
26th Division and the historian must rely on the mortar fire.
regimental records. The 26th Division AAR is The first real test of strength came
fairly complete, but the account of the action is
very terse. The only publications of value are
when the leading company was a couple
S/Sgt. Jerome J. Theise, ed., History of the Three of miles southeast of Grosbous, from
Hundred Twenty-Eight Infantry Regiment, From which town a road led north to Eschdorf.
Reactivation, 12 February 1943, to VE Duy, 9 May
1945 (Wels: Verlagsdruckerei, 1945; and The Here the advance battalion of the
History of the 26th Yankee Division (Salem, 1955). 915th Regiment struck so suddenly and
T H E III CORPS' COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 521

with such force that the lead company Rambrouch on the left flank? Night
fell back for at least half a mile. T h e was near and the true strength of the
guns supporting the 104th Infantry were enemy unknown; so the regiment halted
in position, however, and finally bent while scouts worked their way to the
back the counterattack. In the mean- front and flanks.
time a handful of riflemen from the Who were these German troops? Since
109th Infantry, 28th Division, who had it was known that the 352d Volks Grena-
been waging a long battle in Grosbous dier Division could not have reached
until driven out by four German tanks, this point the first guess was that the
made their way back to the 104th. As 5th Parachute Division, believed to be
it turned out the body of the 352d Volks farther north, had pushed down into
Grenadier Division was not present the area. Actually the 328th Infantry
here but was in the 80th Division zone. had run into the Fuehrer Grenadier
T h e 915th Regiment consisting of troops Brigade, which the Seventh Army had
now split off from their trains, artillery, borrowed from the OKW reserve, rush-
and the bulk of the division by the ing it across the front to bolster this
wedge which the 80th had thrust for- south flank. At first the brigade had
ward west of Ettelbruck, withdrew to been sent in to hold the Sure River line,
make a stand in the neighborhood of but the Seventh Army then decided to
Grosbous. Colonel Palladino left Com- expand its blocking position well to the
pany E to hold in check some Germans south of the river, and so turned the
who had taken to the nearby woods, brigade through Bourscheid and Esch-
while the rest of the 104th Infantry dorf to the neighborhood of Arsdorf.
continued tramping north along the road This unit contained a battalion of forty
to Grosbous. T h e village itself was taken Mark IV and Panther tanks, one bat-
a couple of hours after midnight in a talion of mobile infantry, and one of
surprise attack by a combat patrol from foot, but thus far only a few tanks and
Company G. the rifle battalion in personnel carriers
The series of blocks thrown against were on the scene.
the 352d Volks Grenadier Division by T h e new turn of events caused
the 80th Division and the 104th Infantry General Paul some concern about his
gave the western wing of the 26th Divi- left flank. T h e 4th Armored attack had
sion a clear field. By the middle of the carried abreast of the line held by the
afternoon the 328th had covered nearly 328th Infantry but there remained a
six miles without firing or receiving a gap of three miles, densely wooded, be-
shot. T h e advance guard was nearing tween the two. As a temporary expedient
the village of Arsdorf, from which a a small task force, organized around
series of small roads and trails radiated Company K, 101st Infantry, and Com-
through ravines and along ridges to the pany A, 735th Tank Battalion, deployed
Sure, when a few rounds came in from to screen the open left flank of the 26th
self-propelled guns firing from a hill to
the north. Concurrently reports arrived 9 The American 'cavalry was greatly outnum-
bered
from the 26th Reconnaissance Troop Sgt. Lawrence at Rambrouch and forced to withdraw.
L. Hatfield, whose platoon covered
that there was a strong German force in the withdrawal, was given the DSC.
522 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Division. Meanwhile Paul’s two regi- regiment of the 352d Volks Grenadier
ments prepared to continue the attack Division and the incoming Fuehrer
through the night as the army and corps Grenadier Brigade, only a small part
commanders had ordered. T h e objective of the new brigade was in contact with
was Wiltz, once the command post of the forward American battalions early
the American 28th Infantry Division, on the 23d. The German brigade com-
and now the headquarters of the German mander had been seriously wounded by
Seventh Army and the concentration a shell fragment while reconnoitering
point for enemy troops feeding in from on the previous evening, the hurried
the northeast. march to action had prevented unified
While the 104th moved forward to commitment, and the heavy woods south
hit the enemy congregated at Grosbous, of the Sure made control very difficult.
the 328th Infantry reorganized to keep Also there were troubles with fuel.
the drive going, under somewhat opti- The LXXXV Corps hoped to repel
mistic orders to seize crossings on the the American attack by means of a co-
Wiltz River. At midnight the 1st and ordinated counterattack south of the
3d Battalions jumped off to take Grevils- Sure which would develop as a pincers
Brésil, from which a fairly good ridge movement, grappling the American
road ran north to Eschdorf. T h e village troops who had penetrated into the dense
was garrisoned by two companies of the forest north of the Ettelbruck-Grosbous
Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade, reinforced road. For this maneuver, set to open
by several Panthers from the Seventh on the 23d, the new 79th Volks Grena-
Army reserve. Unshaken by a half-hour dier Division was to attack toward
shelling, the Germans held tenaciously Niederfeulen, secure the Wark River,
to the village all night long. and hook to the northwest. On its right
When daylight came on 23 December the Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade would
the 26th Division had little to show for attack in a southeastern direction from
its night attack. T h e 104th Infantry held Heiderscheid and Eschdorf with Gros-
Grosbous, but the 328th was checked bous and union with the 915th Regi-
at Grevils-Brésil by a company of stub- ment as the immediate objective. This
born German infantry backed up with German scheme was slow to come into
a few tanks. In the woods south of operation and only a part of the Fuehrer
Grosbous the men of Company E, 104th Grenadier Brigade was brought against
Infantry, had taken on more than they the 26th Division during the 23d, and
had bargained for: a couple of hundred then mostly in small packets of infantry
riflemen from the 915th Regiment led supported by a platoon or less of tanks.
in person by the regimental commander. The two attacking regiments of the
(The American regimental command- 26th Division continued to fan out over
er had to throw in Company I, but even secondary roads and trails, moving very
so this pocket was not wiped out until cautiausly for fear of ambush as the
Christmas Eve.) woods thickened and pressed closer to
Although the right wing of the the roadways. Here the supporting
26th Division was driving along the weapons came into play. Detachments of
boundary between the isolated forward the 390th Antiaircraft Artillery Auto-
THE III CORPS' COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 523

matic Weapons Battalion, moving close keep the mass of the two regiments
behind the infantry point, blasted at (the third was corps reserve) from get-
wood lines, hedges, haystacks, and farm ting too far forward. Patrols, Millikin
buildings. Their .50-caliber machine advised, should try to get to the Sure
guns and the 37-mm. cannon mounted River bridges before daylight of the
on half-tracks pinned the German infan- 24th. As things now stood, the 80th Divi-
try down until supporting artillery sion had pushed a salient ahead on the
could be brought to bear, then shifted right of the 26th Division in the Keh-
to a new position before the German men sector and was waiting for the cen-
gunners could get on target. ter division to come abreast. On the left
The American cannoneers wheeled there remained a fair-sized gap be-
their pieces from position to position so tween the 4th Armored Division and
as to give the closest support possible. the 26th, only partially screened by very
At one point the commanding officer small detachments at roadblock posi-
of the 102d Field Artillery Battalion, tions. Thus far the enemy had failed to
Lt. Col. R. W. Kinney, went forward recognize or exploit this gap.
alone under direct enemy fire to pick
out the targets for his guns. (Kinney T h e 4th Armored Division Attack
was awarded the DSC.) When an enemy
pocket was discovered in some corner On 21 December the 4th Armored
of the woods the self-propelled tank Division, then assembled in the Leglise-
destroyers went into action, spraying Arlon area, learned what its mission
the enemy with high explosive. Thus would be when the III Corps attacked
a platoon of the 818th Tank Destroyer on the 22d: advance north and relieve
Battalion ultimately blasted the lost bat- Bastogne.10 Martelange, an outpost of
talion of the 913th Regiment out of the the VIII Corps engineer barrier line
woods near Grosbous. on the Sure River, was twelve miles on
It was no more than natural that the a hard-surfaced highway from the
26th Division, full of green troops, center of Bastogne. A Sherman tank
wanted the comforting presence of could make it from Martelange to
friendly tanks or guns. The 735th Tank Bastogne in a half hour–if the road was
Battalion after action report says that the
104th Infantry would not enter Dellen 10With the exception of those conducted with
the 101st Airborne Division, the combat inter-
ahead of the tanks. T h e 328th Infantry views with the 4th Armored Division are the most
also was slow in moving without tanks informative of all those bearing on the battle
ahead. Since through all this day the at Bastogne. The 4th Armored AAR and G–3
Americans had little or no idea of the journal provide little exact or detailed information.
The combat command AARs and journals remedy
enemy strength that lay ahead or per- this lack. Each battalion has either an AAR or
haps lurked on the flanks, the lack of unit journal. See also K. A. Koyen, The Fourth
swashbuckling haste was not abnormal. Armored Division (Munich, 1945); Lt. Col. D. M.
Oden, 4th Armored Division-Relief of the 101st
The corps commander shared the feel- Airborne Division, Bastogne, Pamphlet Series,
ing that caution was due. At dark he Command and General Staff College, 1947; History
of the Ninety-Fourth Armored Field Artillery
ordered General Paul to keep pushing Battalion (n.d., n.p.); and The Armored School
with small patrols but enjoined him to MS, Armor at Bastogne (May 1949).
524 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

passable and if the enemy confined his the west, a front of over fifteen miles.
opposition to loosing rifle and machine T h e mission assigned the 4th Armored,
gun bursts. T h e task at hand, however, rather than zones and boundaries, deter-
was to “destroy the enemy in zone” and mined the commitment of the division
cover the open west flank of the corps. and the routes it would employ.
Of the three divisions aligned to jump Bastogne could be reached from the
off in the I I I Corps counterattack, the south by two main approaches, on the
4th Armored would come under the right the Arlon-Bastogne road, on
closest scrutiny by the Third Army com- the left the Neufchâteau-Bastogne road.
mander. Its mission was dramatic. It General Millikin and the III Corps staff
was also definite, geographically speak- preferred the Arlon route, at whose en-
ing, and so lent itself the more readily trance the 4th Armored already was
to assessment on the map in terms of poised. General Middleton, whose VIII
success or failure. Furthermore, the rep- Corps nominally controlled the troops
utation of the 4th Armored as a slash- in Bastogne, favored a broad thrust to
ing, wheeling outfit would naturally employ both routes but with the weight
attract attention, even though its maté- placed on the Neufchâteau road. The
riel was not up to par, either in amount Arlon-Bastogne road was the shortest by
or mechanical fitness, and many green a few miles and on the most direct line
troops were riding in its tanks and infan- from the III Corps assembly area. To
try half-tracks. T o all this must be added control the Arlon approach would block
a less tangible item in evaluating readi- the reinforcement of the enemy troops
ness for battle. General Gaffey, the already south of Bastogne. Attack on
division commander, was a relative new- this axis also would allow the left and
comer to this veteran and closely knit center divisions of the I I I Corps to main-
fighting team; he had as yet to lead the tain a somewhat closer contact with
entire division in combat. CCA likewise each other. T h e Neufchâteau-Bastogne
had a commander who was a stranger route, on the other hand, was less tightly
to the division, Brig. Gen. Herbert L. controlled by the enemy, although there
Earnest. It might be expected, therefore, was some evidence that German strength
that the 4th Armored would take some was building up in that direction.
little time in growing accustomed to the T h e problem facing the I I I Corps
new leaders and their ways of conduct- was not the simple one of gaining access
ing battle. to Bastogne or of restoring physical con-
Theoretically the VIII Corps covered tact with the forces therein, contact
the western flank of the I I I Corps, but which had existed as late as 2 0 Decem-
on 2 2 December the situation in Middle- ber. The problem was: (a) to restore
ton’s area was so fluid and his forces and maintain a permanent corridor into
were so weak that no definite boundary the city; and (b) to jar the surrounding
or contact existed between the VIII and enemy loose so that Bastogne and its
I I I Corps. T h e actual zone of operations road net could be used by the Third
for the 4th Armored Division, therefore, Army as a base for further operations
proved to be an area delimited by Bigon- to the north and northeast. T h e problem
ville on the east and Neufchâteau on was well understood by the 4th
T H E III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 525

Armored Division. General Gaffey’s in the Third Army.


letter of instructions to General Dager, At 0600 on 2 2 December (H-hour for
commanding CCB, said, “ . . . you will the III Corps counterattack) two combat
drive in, relieve the force, and proceed commands stood ready behind a line of
[italics supplied] from Bastogne to the departure which stretched from Habay-
NE. . . .” T h e impression held by 4th la-Neuve east to Niedercolpach. General
Armored commanders and staff was that Gaffey planned to send CCA and CCB
an independent tank column could cut into the attack abreast, CCA working
its way through to the city (“at any along the main Arlon-Bastogne road
time,” said Dager), but that the open- while CCB advanced on secondary roads
ing of a corridor equivalent to the width to the west. In effect the two commands
of the road bed would be self-sealing would be traversing parallel ridge lines.
once the thin-skinned or light armored Although the full extent of damage done
columns started north to resupply and the roads and bridges during the VIII
reinforce the heavy armor which reached Corps withdrawal was not yet clear, it
Bastogne. T h e mission set the 4th was known that the Sure bridges at
Armored would require the co-ordinated Martelange had been blown. In the
efforts of the entire division, nor could event that CCA was delayed unduly at
it be fulfilled by a dramatic ride to the the Sure crossing CCB might be switched
rescue of the Bastogne garrison, east and take the lead on the main
although this may have been what Gen- road. In any case CCB was scheduled
eral Patton had in mind. to lead the 4th Armored Division into
T h e Third Army commander, veteran Bastogne.
tanker, himself prescribed the tactics to On the right CCA (General Earnest)
be used by Gaffey and the 4th Armored. moved out behind A Troop of the 25th
The attack should lead off with the Cavalry Squadron in two task forces of
tanks, artillery, tank destroyers, and battalion size. Visibility was poor, the
armored engineers in the van. The main ground was snow-covered, but the
body of armored infantry should be tracked vehicles were able to move with-
kept back. When stiff resistance was out difficulty over the frozen terrain-
encountered, envelopment tactics should without difficulty, that is, until the east-
be used: no close-in envelopment ern task force commenced to encounter
should be attempted; all envelopments demolitions executed earlier by the VIII
should be started a mile or a mile and Corps engineers. T h e upshot was that
a half mile back and be made at right both task forces converged on the main
angles. Patton, whose experience against Arlon road and proceeded as a single
the Panther tank during the Lorraine column. Near Martelange a large crater
campaign had made him keenly aware delayed the column for some time. Short-
of its superiority over the American ly after noon it was bridged and the
Sherman in gun and armor, ordered advance guard became embroiled in a
that the new, modified Sherman with fire fight with a rifle company of the
heavier armor (the so-called Jumbo) 15th Regiment (5th Parachute Divi-
should be put in the lead when available. sion) guarding the bridges, now de-
But there were very few of the Jumbos molished, at Martelange. T h e town,
526 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

sprawling on a series of terraces rising lage. Thus far the column had been sub-
from the river, was too large for effective ject only to small arms fire, although
artillery fire and the enemy riflemen a couple of jeeps had been lost to Ger-
held on until about 0300 the next morn- man bazookas. But when the cavalry and
ing when, unaccountably, they allowed a light tanks neared Chaumont antitank
company of armored infantry to cross guns knocked out one of the tanks and
on one of the broken spans. Most of the advance guard withdrew to the main
the 23d was spent in bridging the Sure. body, deployed on a ridge south of the
The width and depth of the cut through village. Daylight was near. CCB had
which the stream flowed forbade the covered only about a quarter of a mile
use of either ponton or treadway. Corps during the night, but because Chaumont
engineers came up to fabricate a 90-foot appeared to be guarded by German guns
Bailey bridge, but it was afternoon be- on the flanking hills a formal, time-
fore the tanks could start moving. De- consuming, co-ordinated attack seemed
lays, however, had not dimmed the necessary.
general impression that CCA could cut During the morning the 10th Armored
its way through to Bastogne in short Infantry Battalion and the twenty-two
order, and at 1500 the III Corps sent Shermans of the 8th Tank Battalion that
word to Middleton that contact with were in fighting condition organized for
the 101st was expected “by tonight.” a sweep around Chaumont to west and
On the lesser roads to the west, north, coupled with a direct punch to
General Dager’s CCB, which had started drive the enemy out of the village. T o
out at 0430, also was delayed by demoli- keep the enemy occupied, an armored
tions. Nonetheless at noon of the 22d field artillery battalion shelled the
the 8th Tank Battalion was in sight of houses. Then, as the morning fog cleared
Burnon, only seven miles from Bastogne, away, fighter-bombers from the XIX
nor was there evidence that the enemy Tactical Air Command (a trusted friend
could make a stand. Here orders came of the 4th Armored Division) detoured
from General Patton: the advance was from their main mission of covering the
to be continued through the night “to cargo planes flying supplies to Bastogne
relieve Bastogne.” 11 Then ensued the and hammered Chaumont, pausing
usual delay: still another bridge de- briefly for a dogfight with Luftwaffe
stroyed during the withdrawal had to be intruders as tankers and infantry be-
replaced, and it was past midnight when low formed a spellbound audience.
light tanks and infantry cleared a small While CCB paused south of Chau-
German rear guard from Burnon itself. mont and CCA waited for the Marte-
Wary of German bazookas in this lange bridge to be finished, the Third
wooded country, tanks and cavalry jeeps Army commander fretted at the delay.
moved cautiously over the frozen ground He telephoned the III Corps headquar-
toward Chaumont, the next sizable vil- ters: “There is too much piddling
around. Bypass these towns and clear
them up later. Tanks can operate on this
11 Patton, in his book, War As I Knew It (page
201), admits that his order for day and night ground now.” It was clear to all that
attack by the armor was an error. General Patton’s eye was on the 4th
T H E III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 527

WATCHING A DOGFIGHT BETWEEN AMERICAN AND LUFTWAFFE PLANES

Armored Division and his erstwhile in the afternoon sun and the Shermans
chief of staff, General Gaffey, and that were left churning in the mud. A com-
he counted on the 4th Armored to cut pany of the 14th Regiment, 5th Para-
its way into Bastogne. chute Division, tried to fight it out in
At Chaumont the ground assault came the houses, but after a couple of hours
about 1330 on the heels of a particularly nearly all the enemy had been rounded
telling strike by friendly fighter-bombers. up. Then the scene changed with some
German artillery had begun to come abruptness.
alive an hour or so earlier, but with During the night a liaison officer carry-
the Jubos in the sky the enemy gunners ing the CCB attack orders had taken
were quiet. Two rifle platoons mounted the wrong turning and driven into the
on tanks made a dash into the village, German lines. Perhaps the enemy had
where more of the armored infantry seized the orders before they could be
soon arrived on foot. Even so, the lunge destroyed. Perhaps the cavalry foray in
to envelop Chaumont on the west failed the early morning had given advance
of its intent for the fields were thawing warning. In any case General Kokott,
528 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

commanding the 26th Volks Grenadier screen, the German assault guns knocked
Division responsible for the Chaumont- out those American tanks they could
Martelange sector, had taken steps to sight and discharged their gray-clad
reply to the attack on Chaumont. This passengers into the village.
village lies at the bottom of a bowl T h e American riflemen (Lt. Col.
whose sides are formed by hills and Harold Cohen’s 10th Armored Infantry
connecting ridges. The rim to the north- Battalion) battled beside the crippled
east is densely wooded but is tapped and mired tanks in what Maj. Albin
by a trail leading on to the north. Along Irzyk, the veteran commander of the
this trail, screened by the woods, the 9th Tank Battalion, called the bitterest
Germans brought up the 11th Assault fighting his battalion ever had encoun-
G u n Brigade, numbering ten to fifteen tered. The forward artillery observer
remodeled Mark I I I carriages. bearing was dead and there was no quick means
75-mm. guns and with riflemen clinging of bringing fire on the enemy assault
to their decks and sides. Rolling down guns, which simply stood off and blasted
the slope behind an artillery smoke a road for the German infantry. Com-

4TH ARMORED DIVISION ROLLING TOWARD CHAUMONT past the bodies of American
soldiers.
T H E III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 529

pany A, 10th Armored Infantry Bat- of Company G, 51st Armored Infantry


talion, which had led the original assault Battalion, clanked forward along the
against Chaumont, lost some sixty-five pavement.
men. T h e battle soon ended.12 In small It was growing dark. Oden brought
groups the Americans fell back through his light tank company and assault guns
the dusk to their original positions, leav- (used throughout the Bastogne relief
ing eleven Shermans as victims of the as- as medium tanks) abreast of the medium
sault guns and the mud. T h e only officer tank company with orders to continue
of Company A left alive, 1st Lt. Charles the advance through the night. T h e head
R. Gniot, stayed behind to cover the of the task force now was close
withdrawal until he too was killed. Gniot to the village of Warnach, which lay to
was awarded the DSC, posthumously. the east of the main road. T h e light
At the hour when the CCB assault tanks had just come in sight of the village
first reached Chaumont, the eastern com- when the company of armored infantry
bat command had started moving across appeared around a bend in the main
the Martelange bridge. Since it would road. T h e Germans in Warnach, ap-
take a long while for the whole column parently waiting for such a thin-skinned
to close up and cross, General Earnest target, knocked out the first two half-
ordered Lt. Col. Delk Oden, commander tracks. T o bypass the village at night
of the 35th Tank Battalion, to forge was out of the question. While the as-
ahead with his task force in a bid to sault guns shelled the houses a light
reach Bastogne. The road ahead climbed tank platoon and a rifle platoon went in.
out of the valley and onto a chain of Only one of the tanks got out, although
ridges, these ridges closely flanked by most of the foot troops finally straggled
higher ground so that the pavement ran back. Shortly after midnight a company
through a series of cuts that limited of Shermans tried to get into Warnach
maneuver off the road. T h e cavalry point but were stopped by antitank fire. Mean-
had just gained the ridge line when, at a while tanks and infantry of the task
sharp bend, the Germans opened fire. force pushed on to the north, clearing
Fortunately the tank company following the woods on either side of the main
was able to leave the highway and find highway (the leading tank company
cover behind the rise to the west of the ended up in a marsh).
pavement. For half an hour artillery It was daylight when tanks and infan-
worked over the enemy location, and try resumed the assault at Warnach,
then the artillery observer with the tanks driving in from three sides with the
“walked” the fire along the successive riflemen clinging to the tanks. T h e bat-
ridges while the tanks moved north in tle which ensued was the most bitter
defilade. At the same time the half-tracks fought by CCA during the whole
Bastogne operation. Heilmann, com-
12The story of this fight at Chaumont is con-
manding the 5th Parachute Division,
fused. As many as twenty-two “tanks” were had reasoned that the sector he held
reported by the Americans, and these are alleged south of Bastogne was far too wide for
to have swept in from west, north, and east. See a connected linear defense, and so had
combat interviews; CCB S–2 Jnl; and MS # B–023
(Heilmann) . concentrated the 15th Parachute Regi-
530 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

ment along the Martelange-Bastogne the advance guard of the Fuehrer


road. Warnach was the regimental com- Grenadier Brigade which had appeared
mand post and there was at least one in front of the left wing of the 26th
rifle battalion in the village, reinforced Division). T o protect CCA’s open right
by a battery of self-propelled tank flank, Gaffey ordered Col. Wendell
destroyers. Two American artillery bat- Blanchard to form the Reserve Combat
talions kept this enemy force down, firing Command as a balanced task force (using
with speed and accuracy as the Shermans the 53d Armored Infantry Battalion and
swept in, but once the artillery lifted, 37th Tank Battalion) and advance to-
a house-to-house battle royal commenced ward Bigonville. Early on 23 December
in earnest. Four Shermans were de- CCR left Quatre-Vents, followed the
stroyed by tank destroyer fire at close main road nearly to Martelange, then
range. The enemy infantry fought des- turned right onto a secondary road which
perately, filtering back into houses angled northeast. This road was “sheer
which had been cleared, organizing ice” and much time was consumed
short, savage rushes to retake lost build- moving the column forward.
ings, and showing little taste for sur- About noon the advance guard came
render. But try as they might the Ger- under fire from a small plot of woods
man paratroopers could not get past the near a crossroads at which point CCR
American armored infantry and at the would have to turn due north. T h e
tanks-only one was knocked out by Ger- accompanying artillery battalion went
man bazooka fire. The result was slow into action, pouring high explosive into
to be seen but none the less certain. At the woods for nearly an hour. One rifle
noon, when the battle ended, the Amer- company then dismounted and went in
icans had killed one hundred and thirty- to clean out the survivors. T h e company
five Germans and taken an equal num- found no serious resistance, returned to
ber of prisoners. T h e little village cost the road, and was just mounting its half-
them sixty-eight officers and men, dead tracks when a fusillade of bullets burst
and wounded. from the little wood. Apparently the
Chaumont, on the 23d, and Warnach, enemy had withdrawn during the shell-
on the 24th, are tabbed in the journals ing, only to return at the heels of the
of the 4th Armored as “hot spots” on departing Americans. Tanks were now
the march to Bastogne. Quite unexpect- sent toward the crossroad but were
edly, however, a third developed at stopped by mines. All this had been
Bigonville, a village some two and a time-consuming. Bigonville was still a
half miles east of the Bastogne highway mile away, and Blanchard ordered a
close to the boundary between the 4th halt. T h e enemy in the woods continued
Armored and the 26th Infantry Division. to inflict casualties on the troops halted
The gap between these divisions, only beside the road. Even the tankers were
partially screened by light forces, sud- not immune-nearly all of the tank com-
denly became a matter of more than manders of one company were picked
normal concern on the Eight of 2 2 De- off by rifle fire.
cember with reports that a large body of In the course of the night the Germans
German armor was moving in (actually left the wood and fell back to the shelter
T H E III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 531

of the stone houses in Bigonville. T h e replacement tanks from the repair


assault on the morning of the 24th fol- echelons and for the rest of the division
lowed what had become standard tactics to draw abreast. Meanwhile the Ameri-
with the 4th Armored. First came a short can paratroopers and their heterogene-
concentration fired by the artillery. ous comrades inside the Bastogne perim-
There followed an advance into the vil- eter fought and waited, confining their
lage by two teams, each composed of one radio messages to oblique hints that the
tank and one infantry company working 4th Armored should get a move on.
closely together. As at Chaumont and Thus, at the close of the 23d McAuliffe
Warnach there was little trouble from sent the message: “Sorry I did not get
the enemy artillery, for by this time the to shake hands today. I was disap-
5th Parachute Division was rationed to pointed.” A less formal exhortation from
only seven rounds per howitzer a day. one of his staff reached the 4th Armored
Mostly the German infantry held their command post at midnight: “There is
fire until the Americans were in the only one more shopping day before
streets, then cut loose with their bazoo- Christmas!”
kas, light mortars, and small arms. While Perhaps a few of the armored officers
the two assault companies of the 53d still believed that a hell-for-leather tank
advanced from house to house the tanks attack could cleave a way to Bastogne.
of the 37th blasted the buildings ahead, But by the evening of 24 December it
machine-gunned the Germans when they seemed to both Gaffey and Millikin that
broke into the open, and set barns and tanks were bound to meet tough going
out-buildings afire with tracer bullets. in frontal attack on the hard-surfaced
One team burst through to the northern roads to which they were confined and
exit road and the garrison was trapped. that the operation would demand more
By 1100 the village was clear. Most of use of the foot-slogger, particularly since
the 328 prisoners taken here were from the German infantry showed a marked
the 13th Parachute Regiment, which had proclivity for stealing back into the vil-
just been released from its flank guard lages nominally “taken” by the tankers.
positions farther to the east on Heil- Attack around the clock, enjoined by
mann’s insistence that the 5th Parachute General Patton, had not been notably
Division could not possibly block the successful so far as the tank arm was
American drive north with only two of concerned. From commander down, the
its regiments in hand. 4th Armored was opposed to further
The pitched battles at Bigonville and use of the weakened tank battalions in
Warnach on 24 December made a con- hours of darkness. Further, night attacks
siderable dent in the front line fighting by the two infantry divisions had failed
strength of the 5th Parachute Division to achieve any unusual gains and the
but failed to bring CCR and CCA troops were tiring.
appreciably closer to Bastogne. CCB, the The corps commander therefore
most advanced of the combat commands, ordered that his divisions hold during
had only two platoons of medium tanks the night of the 24th in preparation for
left after the affair at Chaumont and attack early on Christmas day. Two bat-
had spent the day quietly waiting for talions of the 318th Infantry were join-
532 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

ing the 4th Armored to give the needed west constituted the closest link the 80th
infantry strength in the corps’ main Division would have with the dramatic
effort. Reinforcement by the fighter- effort being made to reach the en-
bombers had been requested (Gaffey circled 101st Airborne. From this time
asked the corps for high-priority flights forward the 80th Division attack would
over the 4th Armored as a Christmas be related to the fighting farther west
present), and good flying weather only in that it was blocking the efforts
seemed likely. On the debit side there of the Seventh Army to move its reserves
were indications that reinforcements into the Bastogne area.
were arriving to bolster the German line For the next three days the division
facing the III Corps. would wage a lone battle to reach and
Thus far the Third Army counter- cross the Sure River, the scene of action
attack had tended to be a slugging being limited to the wedge formed on
match with frontal assault and little the north by the Sure and on the east
maneuver. General Patton’s insistence by the Sauer River with a base rep-
on bypassing centers of resistance had resented by the Ettelbruck–Heider-
been negated by the terrain, the weather, scheidergrund road. This area the 80th
and the wide-reaching impact of the came to know as the Bourscheid triangle.
earlier VIII Corps demolitions scheme. Within this frame lay thick forests,
Perhaps the pace could be speeded up deep ravines, and masked ridges, the
by maneuver, now that the enemy had whole a checkerboard of little terrain
been drawn into the defense of the compartments. Control of a force larger
Arlon-Bastogne approach. At Gaffey’s than the battalion would be most diffi-
request the III Corps commander cult, artillery support-except at clear-
shifted the boundary between the 4th ings and villages-would be ineffective,
Armored and the 26th Division, making and the maintenance of an interlocking,
the infantry division responsible for the impervious front nigh impossible. Once
Bigonville sector and releasing CCR, a battalion cleared a compartment and
on the night of the 24th, for employ- advanced to the next the enemy could
ment on the open west flank of the be counted on to seep back to his original
corps with entry into Bastogne as its position. Unobserved fire and loss of
primary mission. direction in the deep woods, down the
blind draws, and along the twisting
The 80th Division Battle in the Woods ridges made each American unit a poten-
24–26 December tial threat to its neighbors, often forcing
the use of a single battalion at a time.
On the morning of 24 December the T h e infantryman would be duly thank-
80th Division lost the two battalions ful when tanks, tank destroyers, or
pre-empted by the corps commander as artillery could give a hand or at least
infantry reinforcement for the 4th encourage by their presence, but the
Armored Division. This diminution in battle in woods and ravines was his own.
its rifle strength and successive collisions On the 23d the enemy forces facing
with German units crossing the front the 80th Division were so weak and so
en route to the Bastogne sector in the disorganized that the Seventh Army
T H E III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 533

commander, Brandenberger, had feared Brigade, a younger brother of the elite


that the 80th Division would drive Grossdeutschland Panzer Division and
across the Sure during the course of the like it charged with guarding Hitler’s
night and sever the main line of com- headquarters (albeit as the outer guard),
munications leading to the west. By the should have been one of the first of the
morning of the 24th, however, rein- Wehrmacht formations. In fact this bri-
forcements had arrived and the threat gade was of very recent vintage, had
of a clean, quick American penetration suffered intense losses in East Prussia
was on the wane. The LXXXV Corps during its single commitment as a unit,
(Kniess) thus far had faced the Ameri- and was not fully refitted when finally
can III Corps with only two divisions, sent marching to the west. Replacements,
the 5th Parachute and the 352d. De- drawn from the same pool as those for
spite the Seventh Army apprehension the Grossdeutschland and the Fuehrer
that two divisions would not possibly Begleit Brigade, were handpicked
hold the long blocking line from Ettel- from the younger classes but had little
bruck to Vaux-lez-Rosihres and despite training. T h e Fuehrer Grenadier Bri-
daily requests that OKW release addi- gade numbered some six thousand men,
tional divisions to the army to strengthen had a rifle regiment mounted on ar-
this line, the German High Command mored half-tracks and 1½-ton trucks, a
was slow to dip into its strategic reserve. reconnaissance battalion, an assault gun
The two larger units earmarked battalion, and a mixed tank battalion
for employment by the Seventh Army made up of Mark IV’s and Panthers.
were the Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade T h e 79th Volks Grenadier Division pos-
and the 79th Volks Grenadier Division. sessed an old Wehrmacht number but,
Both were a considerable distance to the as it stood at the time of its commit-
rear and both were equipped with the ment in the Ardennes, was a green divi-
conglomeration of makeshift, battle- sion the bulk of whose riflemen had
weary vehicles that was the lot of those been combed out of headquarters troops
divisions not scheduled to join in the in early December. Woefully under-
original breakthrough and penetration. strength in both transportation and sup-
Even when they were released from the porting weapons, it had neither a flak
OKW Reserve, it would be a matter battalion nor an assault gun battalion
of days-not hours-before the mass of and would be forced to lean heavily on
either unit could be placed in the front its artillery regiment.
lines. When OKW finally responded to T h e Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade, the
the pleas of the Seventh Army, the most first to start for the battle front, was
optimistic estimates placed the Fuehrer ordered to take the road from Ettelbruck
Grenadier Brigade and the 79th Volks to Martelange and there deploy in sup-
Grenadier Division in the LXXXV port of the 5th Parachute Division.13 Its
Corps area on the morning of 2 3 Decem-
ber. 13The history of the Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade
Neither of these two formations was is included in Die . Geschichte Des Panzerkorps
Grossdeutschland, II, p p . 735ff. For other German
rated as having a high combat value. units facing the XII Corps see MSS # B–023
Theoretically the Fuehrer Grenadier (Heilmann) ; B–067 (Schmidt); B–030 (Kniess) ;
534 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

mission, assigned before the Third Col. Hans-Joachim Kahler, further de-
Army began its counterattack, was moralized the Fuehrer Grenadier. For
changed on the evening of 21 December, successive days the command changed
and so was its route, now menaced by hands as new elements of the brigade
the 80th Division advance on Ettelbruck. arrived under more senior officers; this
Trying to cross the Our River at the lack of leadership hardly was calculated
Roth bridges, the brigade ran into to restore the shaken confidence of
trouble. The bridges had been damaged young, inexperienced troops. Yet despite
by attack from the air, and traffic was these early reverses in the counterattack
backed up for miles on both sides of role the young soldiers of the brigade
the river. Untrained drivers and mechan- would prove tough and tenacious on the
ical failures further delayed the brigade defensive.
as its columns entered the icy, narrow, On the morning of the 24th the
twisting roads of the Ardennes, but by Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade, still with-
2 3 December the reconnaissance bat- out artillery and with half of its tanks
talion, a rifle battalion in armored and infantry still east of the Our River,
carriers, and two tank companies had stood opposite the inner wings of the
reached Eschdorf and Heiderscheid. American 26th and 80th Divisions. T h e
Gravely concerned by the rate of the force of perhaps two rifle companies
American advance, the Seventh Army which had been cut off by the 26th
commander sidetracked these troops Division south of Eschdorf was known
short of the Bastogne sector to restore to be fighting its way out to the east.
the gap which was opening between the The LXXXV Corps commander there-
5th Parachute Division and the 352d fore decided to use his incoming rein-
Volks Grenadier Division, and, as al- forcements-infantry of the 79th Volks
ready noted, the main body went in on Grenadier Division–in a counterattack
on the 23d to stop the 80th Division at to regain contact with the lost companies
Heiderscheid. A part of the battalion of somewhere around Eschdorf. This
armored infantry marched south from would be followed by a pivot to the
Eschdorf and succeeded in getting cut east, intended to strike the Americans
off by the 26th Division night attack at in the flank at Heiderscheid. For this
Grevels-Bresil. maneuver Col. Alois Weber, command-
T h e heavy losses suffered by the green ing the 79th, had available one regiment,
brigade in its first hours of battle had the 208th, and a single battalion of the
a marked adverse impact on the morale 212th. His division, like the Fuehrer
of the entire command. Many times, in Grenadier Brigade, had encountered the
subsequent days of battle, higher com- traffic jam at the Our River and while
manders would comment on the damage crossing on the Gentingen bridge had
done the brigade by piecemeal commit- been further delayed by American
ment and defeat in its baptism of fire. fighter-bombers. T h e assault gun bat-
T h e loss of the brigade commander, talion and tanks from the Fuehrer
Grenadier were at Weber's disposal,
and the German Seventh Army B.T.O., Taetig-
but his artillery regiment was missing,
keitsbericht, 2. Halbjahr, 1944. entangled someplace on the road east
THE III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 535

of the Our. By chance the 79th found bypassed Ettelbruck, and the 3d Bat-
an artillery battalion, belonging to the talion of the 318th was left to harass
5th Parachute Division, which had been the enemy therein with artillery and
left behind when its prime movers broke mortar fire. T h e immediate division
down, and these guns were impressed to mission remained the same: to root
support the counterattack toward Hei- out the enemy south of the Sure River
derscheid. and close in the northalong the Sauer.
There remained to the LXXXV Corps The 319th, on the left, was in posses-
the 352d Volks Grenadier Division, by sion of the road net at Heiderscheid and
this time reduced to two battered regi- had only a mile to cover before theregi-
ments huddled north and east of Ettel- ment was on the Sure. Indeed, two com-
bruck. These regiments were needed panies had spent the night within sight
where they stood for not only did they of the river at Heiderscheid although
guard the Ettelbruck bridgehead, cover- this was in the zone of the 26th Division.
ing the flank of the Sauer crossings in T h e 317th had farther to go because the
the LXXXV Corps sector, but they also Sure looped away to the north in its
represented the only cohesive defense sector. Furthermore the regiment was
on the north bank of the river in the advancing with its right flank exposed
event that the American XII Corps de- to any riposte coming from east of the
cided to turn in that direction. The Sauer River. Advance northward would
bulk of the 915th Regiment of the 352d, have to be made under the eyes of
cut off by the American advance on German observers atop two dominating
23 December, could no longer be reck- hill masses, one close to the Sure at
oned with. (The major portion of these Ringel, the other rising on the west
troops finally escaped through the thick bank of the Sauer near the bridgehead
woods, but would not reach the lines village of Bourscheid, the initial as-
of the 352d until 25 December and then sembly area of the 79th Volks Grena-
minus most of their equipment.) The dier Division. Fortunately for the Ameri-
fight to bring the American 80th Divi- cans the 79th lacked the artillery to make
sion to a halt south of the Sure, or at full use of such commanding ground,
the river itself, would have to be waged but the German gunners proved to be
by the half-strength 79th Volks Grena- very accurate.
dier Division. T h e battleground, be it For the past twenty-four hours the
said, favored the defender so long as he 317th Infantry had been attacking to
retained sufficient strength to seal off reach Bourscheid and the high ground
all penetrations. Whether he could do so there. Although the 2d Battalion lunged
remained to be seen. ahead as far as Welscheid during the
General McBride continued the attack night, it failed to take the village and
on 24 December with the 317th and spent all the daylight hours of the 24th
3 19th, whose forward battalions had waiting for two companies to extricate
been engaged with the enemy all through themselves from the ridge on whose slope
the previous night. After the loss of the they lay pinned by German fire. (The
two battalions from the 3 18th to the 4th regimental commander would later re-
Armored Division, the 219th had simply mark on the excellent musketry training
536 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

and first-rate small arms practice of this the morning of the 24th, the 1st Bat-
German unit.) talion (Lt. Col. Hiram D. Ives)
T h e 1st Battalion, meanwhile, tried marched west out of Kehmen intending
to hook around to the northeast and to turn north at the next crossroad, two
gain entrance to Bourscheid along the miles away, and push for Ringel on
main road. This advance brought the the river.
battalion onto open ground where Daylight was breaking when the head
the enemy assault guns spotted farther of the column came in sight of the cross-
north could get to work. Then the bat- road. About that time two things hap-
talion came under flanking fire from the pened. A German detachment rushed
Germans around Kehmen, in the zone into Kehmen, which the 1st Battalion
of the neighboring regiment. Mercilessly had just left, while a German tank
pounded from front and flank the bat- suddenly opened fire from a masked
talion fell back for half a mile; its casual- position near the crossroad and knocked
ties numbered 197, mostly wounded. At out two Sherman tanks with the advance
this point each of the three battalions guard. T h e remaining American tanks
had taken a crack at punching a way hastily reversed to the cover of a nearby
through to Bourscheid. At the close of draw and the infantry deployed along
the 24th the 3 17th Infantry could report the road. About 0930 one of the attached
severe losses but no progress and the self-propelled tank destroyers sneaked
German tanks and assault guns were forward and gave the coup de grace to
raking the Americans wherever they the German tank. New orders, however,
concentrated, even laying with accuracy left the battalion standing at the cross-
on the battalion command posts. road, for the 2d Battalion at Heider-
While the 317th was being held in scheid was hard hit by the main force of
check by well-directed gunfire, the 3 19th the German counterattack and needed
attack collided with the enemy counter- protection on the east. Ultimately fire
attack aimed at Eschdorf and Heider- from the 1st Battalion did contribute to
scheid. For this the 79th seems to have halting an enemy attempt at encircling
assembled at least two battalions of Heiderscheid.
infantry, as well as tanks, assault guns, Colonel Bandy had held his 2d Bat-
and armored cars from the Fuehrer talion in Heiderscheid during the night
Grenadier Brigade. T h e 3 19th occupied of 23 December while awaiting the re-
a triangular position: at the apex the turn of the two companies that had been
3d Battalion held Tadler, overlooking sent down to the river. An hour or so
the Sure: to the right and rear the 1st before daylight the first German shells
Battalion had bivouacked in Kehmen came in. After ten minutes of this prepa-
on the Bourscheid road; the 2d Bat- ration the enemy, on trucks, armored
talion (less its two companies near the half-tracks and armored cars, suddenly
Heiderscheidergrund crossing) was sta- appeared at the southwest corner of the
tioned as the left wing anchor at Heider- village. This was the main counterattack
scheid. Colonel Taylor, the regimental of the day for the 79th Volks Grenadier
commander, wished to bring his right Division, launched as planned, from
forward to the river. In the dark, on Eschdorf. T h e single American tank in
T H E III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 537

the way was surprised and put out of from its position of vantage close to the
action, but strangely enough the German Sure. On the whole the 80th Division
armored vehicles, mostly light flak tanks had been through a hard day’s fight, and
with 20-mm. guns, did not risk a precip- McBride was more than willing to accept
itate dash into the village, contenting the corps commander’s orders to hold up
themselves with racing up and down the the attack until the following morning.
road which passed on the south, firing Across the lines the Seventh Army
madly at the houses. The Americans, for was bringing in a new, provisional
their part, clustered at the windows and headquarters to assume direction of the
returned the fire with every weapon they battle around Bastogne. T h e boundary,
could lay hand on. to be effective on Christmas Day, ran
One tank destroyer was in position to between Eschdorf and Heiderscheid, ap-
enfilade the road but by a curious chance proximating that between the Ameri-
it had been in the path of a bomb can 26th and 80th Infantry Divisions.
dropped by a stray German plane during T h e Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade now
the night and the firing mechanism was passed to the new Corps Rothkirch but
damaged. T h e tank destroyer com- would continue to oppose the 26th Di-
mander tracked his gun on the passing vision just as the major part of its
targets, jumped up and down on the strength had done on 24 December. T h e
firing treadle, swore volubly, and banged L X X X V Corps was left with the 79th
the firing mechanism with a hammer but and 352d. On Christmas Eve the last
to no avail. Twice the German grena- troops of the 352d left Ettelbruck,
diers got close enough to pitch grenades shelled out by high explosive and white
through windows. Finally one American phosphorus. T h e German line north and
tank worked its way around to get clear east of the city hereafter would rest on
aim and did destroy four of the enemy the far bank of the Sauer.
armored vehicles. Eventually the enemy Kniess was not yet ready to with-
foot troops made their way into the draw his right wing to the protection
streets. With this the forward observer of the river barrier, nor would the
for the 315th Field Artillery Battalion Seventh Army commander permit it,
took over, calling for his 155-mm. for the high ground in the Bourscheid
howitzers to shell the village. For half bridgehead could still be used to observe
an hour shells exploded, killing and and interdict any crossing of the Sauer
lacerating the unprotected enemy. When farther south and at the same time act
the Germans retired they left 76 dead as an anchor at the eastern end of the
and 26 badly wounded: their Red Cross Sure. Because the 79th Volks Grenadier
had removed many more during the Division still lacked much of its infan-
fight. try and nearly all of its heavy weapons,
By midafternoon firing died down all the corps commander ordered Colonel
along the 319th front. T h e hastily organ- Weber to defend the bridgehead by con-
ized 79th Volks Grenadier Division centrating in the heavy woods around
counterattack had failed in its larger Kehmen and Welscheid. With the limit-
purpose although it had led Colonel ed rifle strength at his disposal. Weber
Taylor to recall his advance battalion was able to man the Burden ridge, his
538 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

left flank thus adhering to the Sauer, the battalion was content to outpost
but in the north the right flank of the along the river. From Tadler small
79th consisted only of a thin outpost groups of the enemy could be seen mov-
line extending to Ringel Hill and the ing about on Ringel Hill, farther to the
Sure. east. The 90th Field Artillery Battalion
Early on Christmas morning in the dropped a few shells into the village
bitter cold the 80th Division returned atop the hill; then the 2d Battalion oc-
to the attack, its main thrust aimed at cupied the area with little trouble. T h e
Bourscheid. Colonel Fisher sent the 1st hill position seriously endangered the
and 3d Battalions of the 317th Infantry German bridgehead, but the 79th was
toward Kehmen and Scheidel, hoping too far understrength to mount any
to open the road east into Bour- sizable counterattack on this flank.
scheid. At Scheidel the attack surprised During the afternoon an American
the enemy infantry; one platoon cap- outpost saw a small German detachment
tured the hamlet and a large number marching in column of twos up a draw
of prisoners. But when the two battalions east of Ringel. T h e men at the outpost
turned north toward Kehmen the could not believe their eyes; they could
enemy (a battalion of the 266th Regi- only conclude that the approaching Ger-
ment) was ready and waiting. Each as- mans were coming to surrender. When
sault, made across open ground, was re- challenged the little column kept on
pelled by deadly fire from the village coming, until a light machine gun put
and the woods to the north. When Gen- an end to this “counterattack.” An hour
eral McBride finally intervened to end before midnight more figures were seen
the attack the assault battalions had lost approaching from the same direction.
nearly two hundred officers and men. What had happened was that the
Kehmen once again had proved a hard Seventh Army commander had inter-
nut to crack.14 vened personally to order that Ringel
While the 317th Infantry hit head on Hill be retaken. Not only was its posses-
against the main position held by the sion necessary to the defense of the 79th
79th Volks Grenadier Division, the 319th Volks Grenadier Division bridgehead
Infantry moved north into the gap on but Brandenberger needed the serv-
the German right flank. T h e 3d Bat- ices of an army engineer brigade that
talion, which had withdrawn from its had been committed as infantry on the
location close to the Sure in order to north bank of the Sure, in the sector
back up the other battalions in the fight- overlooked by the hill. If this high
ing around Heiderscheid on the pre- ground could be retaken and some com-
vious day, simply marched back into mand of this stretch of the Sure retained,
Tadler. Since General McBride had or- the engineers could be employed else-
dered the regiment to close up to the where.
Sure but eschew any crossing attempt, Since the fight with the 317th Infan-
try had died down some hours earlier,
Colonel Weber was able to gather a sub-
14Capt. Robert W. Smith, commanding Company
K, was awarded the DSC for bravery and leader- stantial force for the counterattack, but
ship displayed in the fight at Kehmen. there was little ammunition for the few
T H E III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 539

guns supporting the 79th. T h e Amer- without a change of ground. In the days
icans, on the other hand, were wired that followed battalions rotated between
in to their division artillery and by now the deep snow of the outpost lines and
had a prearranged pattern of fire: four the relative warmth of shell-torn vil-
battalions answered the 2d Battalion lages, waiting while General Patton de-
call for help. A few of the attackers got bated giving the XII Corps the go sign
close to Ringel, only to meet the whis- for an attack across the chill, swollen
tling ricochet of armor-piercing shells courses of the Sure and the Sauer. In
fired by a single tank destroyer that the corresponding German headquar-
rushed around the village like a man ters other plans were under considera-
stamping out a lawn fire. tion, plans to use the Bourscheid bridge-
Christmas Day witnessed the most ar- head as a springboard from which to
tillery activity of the entire division ad- throw a spoiling attack against the flank
vance; the guns were well forward, the of the American forces congregated
infantry held good ground for obser- around Bastogne. But neither Branden-
vation, and the fighting now surged at berger nor Kniess could scrape up the
many points out of the woods and in- men, guns, and shells for such an am-
to the open.15 The total number of bitious adventure. T h e 79th Volks Gren-
rounds fired by the 80th Division artillery adier Division did what it could with
was large when assessed against the ter- what it had in almost daily counterat-
rain: 3,878 rounds and 142 missions. T h e tacks of small compass, only to be beaten
80th Division advance ended the day off each time by the American howitzers.
after Christmas, with the 3 19th Infantry Ringel Hill continued as the chief ob-
chasing the enemy out of the woods on jective in these fruitless and costly at-
the near bank of the Sure, the 317th dig- tempts, and here the 79th made its last
ging in opposite the Bourscheid bridge- full-blown effort in a predawn attack
head, and the lone battalion of the 3 18th on 30 December. T h e previous evening
exchanging fire with the Germans Company E, 319th Infantry, at that time
across the Sauer, in the course of which forming the Ringel garrison, learned
the commander of the 352d was severe- from prisoners taken on patrol that the
ly wounded. attack would be made. T h e American
General Patton was in the process division arranged for nine battalions of
of strengthening the Third Army attack field artillery to give protective fire and
with more divisions. One of these, the the men in the garrison strengthened
35th Division, was assembling in the their outposts. The enemy made the as-
rear before joining the III Corps. Gen- sault, as promised, but with such speed
eral McBride’s division, as a result, trans- and skill as to enter the village before
ferred to the XII Corps on 26 December a single salvo could be fired. One group
of Germans penetrated as far as the bat-
15 Pfc. J. O. Bird, of Company G , 319th Infantry,
talion command post, but Pfc. W. J,
was awarded the DSC for gallantry in the Ringel McKenzie drove them off, killing the
action. When his company was pinned down by leaders, then taking sixteen prisoners.
an enemy machine gun, Private Bird went forward
alone, under direct fire, and shot the crew; he (McKenzie was awarded the DSC.)
accounted for fifteen Germans with his rifle. Their surprise tactics failed to save the
540 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

attackers. Concentration after concentra- leading to the Sure but they become lost
tion poured in on the buildings that shel- in deep, twisting ravines or run blindly
tered the garrison troops, killing, maim- through dense timber. All at this time
ing, and demoralizing the grenadiers. were clogged by snow and ice. T h e road
Those of the enemy who could not es- to Eschdorf follows a well-defined ridge
cape surrendered in groups to the first and for much of its length gives a clear
Americans they could find. field of vision on both sides. Eschdorf,
When the 80th Division got its orders a town with perhaps two thousand peo-
on 5 January to resume the attack, it ple, is built on three hills which rise
could look back on a record of impor- well above the surrounding countryside
tant accomplishment. It had contained and give excellent observation over open
and badly mauled two German divi- ground for a half-mile to a mile in every
sions, had helped delay and cripple the direction. T h e ascent to the town is
Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade, on its way made across ridge folds. T h e main road
to enter the Bastogne battle, and had coming in from the south turns away
advanced sixteen miles and erased the east to Heiderscheid and the Sauer cross-
Ettelbruck bridgehead, so important in ing at Bourscheid, but other roads, three
the communications system of the Sev- in all, continue north to the Sure River,
enth Army. one leading to the bridge at Heider-
scheidergrund.
T h e 26th Division Fight for a T h e road net centering at Eschdorf
Bridgehead on the Sure was very important in the German plans
24-27 December to hold the Seventh Army blocking posi-
tion south of the Sure. Originally Bran-
T h e 26th Division had not yet been denberger hoped to use the town as
able to push patrols through the woods a concentration point for a counterat-
to the Sure River when morning dawned tack by the Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade
on 24 December. Two companies of along the road to Martelange. T h e bri-
the 80th Division had crossed into the gade, as recounted earlier, had started
division zone and were waiting on the this move by piecemeal commitment
river near Heiderscheidergrund, but the while the main body still was on the
foremost troops of the 26th Division march to the front, but when the 26th
were at Dellen, three and a half miles Division banged into the Fuehrer Gren-
away, while the main force still was adier advance guard southwest of Esch-
around Grosbous. Although small dorf a part of the leading battalion
pockets of German riflemen fought stub- was cut off and the way to Martelange
bornly in the woods there seemed to effectively barred. The staff of the
be no cohesive, planned resistance by LXXXV Corps therefore drew new plans
the enemy. To get the attack rolling on the night of the 23d to conform with
and out of the woods, however, the Brandenberger’s order that the Amer-
Americans had to open the main road to ican attack must be checked south of
the Sure. And to open the road they had the Sure. T h e idea was that the Fuehrer
to capture the town of Eschdorf. Grenadier Brigade, on the west, and the
There are many trails and byroads 79th Volks Grenadier Division, from the
T H E III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 541

east, should launch a concentric drive, dorf, sent back the trucks, and put out
pinching off the most forward units in pickets for the night. By this time Ger-
the American advance. Although much mans had appeared in some numbers
of the heavy weapon strength of the bri- east and west of the task force and their
gade was loaned to the 79th, the bri- tanks had opened fire, but the 104th
gade itself was expected to hold back was coming up and by agreement was
the Americans south of Eschdorf, at the to cover Hamilton’s flanks.
same time striking in strength east from At daylight on the 24th scouts on the
that town to retake Heiderscheid. But hills to the front reported much activity
whether the operation ordered for 24 around Eschdorf, with vehicles dashing
December fared well or ill, the Seventh in and out of the town. T h e Fuehrer
Army commander was adamant on one Grenadier attack against the 80th
point: Eschdorf was to be held. Division garrison in Heiderscheid was
General Paul was equally convinced in full swing, although hardly develop-
of the importance attaching to the com- ing according to plan. T h e road to Esch-
mand of Eschdorf and its radial roads. dorf, now ahead of Task Force Hamil-
As early as the night of the 22d, when ton, rose and dipped to conform with
the I I I Corps optimistically prescribed the ridge folds reaching back to the
the capture of Wiltz as the next step to hills on either side. T h e leading com-
be taken by the 26th Division, Paul or- pany had just climbed to the crest of
dered that a task force be created to one of these wooded folds when a storm
leapfrog ahead of the 104th Infantry, of bullet and tank fire raked into its
capture Eschdorf, and chisel a groove to flank, coming down the length of the
the Sure. Unwilling to expend his divi- main ridge. The second company at-
sion reserve, Paul took the 2d Battalion, tempted to swing wide and to the van: it
328th Infantry, as the task force nu- too found the ridge a bullet conductor.
cleus and turned it over to an officer with About this time the rear of the column
the division staff, Lt. Col. Paul Hamil- came under direct and rapid shellfire
ton. A few tanks and tank destroyers from a hill on the right. Boxed in on
were added, but through confusion in front and rear, Task Force Hamilton
orders the engineer company supposed spent most of the day trying to maneu-
to be attached never joined the task ver off the road and across the wooded
force. nose ahead. The 81-mm. mortars got a
In the first hour of the 23d, Task real workout, churning the woods until
Force Hamilton left Hostert in trucks. they had fired four times their normal
As the column turned north it found load of shells.
the 104th Infantry busy along the road- Toward sundown help came in the
side with small groups of German in- air. P-47’s of the 379th Squadron
fantry who were holding out in the (362d Fighter Group), out on their last
woods. North of Grosbous two German mission of the day, swept low over the
tanks lay in wait just off the road, but pine stands on the ridge, dropping frag-
were dispatched summarily by an as- mentation bombs and strafing. For some
sault gun. The column dismounted fifty Germans, well and wounded, this
about a mile and a half south of Esch- was the finishing touch; they came strag-
542 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

gling out of the woods, hands high. dorf rose well above the undulating
Now that bullet fire no longer shaved ridges and there was no higher ground
the ridge like a razor Task Force Ham- to lend itself to a wider flanking move-
ilton could move. It took the hamlet ment.
of Hierheck, where the woods gave way Forty-five minutes after midnight the
to the open ground leading up to Esch- two rifle companies started to climb the
dorf, and then Hamilton gave orders highest of the three hills on which the
to dig in for the night-orders which town stands, this being the south side.
were countermanded almost at once by The night was cold and clear, and a
the division commander, who wanted full moon was out. As the attackers
Eschdorf that night. tramped forward, long, grotesque black
While Task Force Hamilton was shadows followed on the glittering
pinned down, General Paul had notified snow. For the first few minutes all was
the III Corps that the 104th Infantry was quiet, ominously lovely and peaceful;
taking over the task force. In early eve- then, as the first line reached the crest,
ning the 104th Infantry received orders all hell broke loose. T h e German rifle
for the 1st Battalion (Maj. Leon D. line lay along the reverse slope, the
Gladding) to take Eschdorf, while grenadiers in white capes and sheets
Hamilton went on to secure the Sure blending unobtrusively with the pano-
crossing. Later the division ordered the rama of snow. Burp guns and rifles
1st Battalion, 104th Infantry, to make cut loose at the splendid targets the
the Sure crossing and Hamilton to take Americans provided. In face of such a
Eschdorf. Taking Eschdorf would not fusillade the attack wavered, then fell
be an easy job. When a small group back. Three tanks, all that Hamilton
of Hamilton’s men started forward to had, churned to the fore through the
set up an observation post, they encoun- snow but were checked by a little creek,
tered enemy fire before they had moved extended by an antitank ditch, about
twenty-five yards from their foxholes. 300 yards from the nearest building.
The Germans in Eschdorf were alert A hurried call by Hamilton, who
and waiting. wanted reinforcements to cover his
Colonel Hamilton and Maj. Albert flanks, brought no reply from the divi-
Friedman, the 2d Battalion commander, sion headquarters except “Take Esch-
worked as rapidly as they could to de- dorf.” There was little choice but to
vise a plan of attack and bring the task continue with frontal tactics. At 0400 a
force into assault position, but it was second assault started, this time with
midnight before all was ready. Two the tanks and Company G forming the
companies, E and F, were to lead the center under orders to drive straight in-
attack, moving on either side of Esch- to Eschdorf without pause. Company G
dorf with their inner flanks touching, got only as far as the crest; the tanks
but they were not to enter the village. went as far as before, and no farther.
Company G, with tank support, would But the Germans facing the center were
follow the assault companies and clear kept occupied long enough to start the
the village. This plan had been adopted wing companies moving. Firing as they
in deference to the ground, since Esch- went the two companies reached the vil-
T H E III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 543

lage. Instead of marching past and As the day went on the two company
around, the men closest to the buildings commanders tried to sort out their men
drifted inward, seeking the shadows and and resume the drive to cut through to
some kind of cover, dragging the two the roads entering Eschdorf from the
companies in with them. north. Whether this was accomplished
What then happened cannot be re- remains a matter of debate. Finally, in
corded with any certainty. The story of the late afternoon, the division head-
Christmas Day inside Eschdorf was one quarters responded to Hamilton’s urg-
of confusion at the time and recrimina- ing and instructed the 104th Infantry to
tion later. Members of the 104th In- send its 1st Battalion and envelop Esch-
fantry subsequently claimed to have cap- dorf. The instructions were followed.
tured Eschdorf and believed that no part Company C entered the village an hour
of Task Force Hamilton held on in the or so after daylight on 26 December
town. Officers and men of the task force, and by 0800 reported Eschdorf clear of
somewhat closer to the scene, have a dif- the enemy.
ferent story.16The men of the two com- Throughout Christmas Day corps and
panies that had reached Eschdorf on division artillery beat the northern ap-
Christmas Eve were stranded there in proaches to Eschdorf, hoping to isolate
the houses while German armored ve- the uncertain dogfight within the town.
hicles jockeyed about, firing at doors and As it turned out, the Fuehrer Grena-
windows. In the meantime the bulk of dier Brigade had no intention of inter-
the enemy infantry gathered in the vening there but was slipping north
southeastern corner to meet any attempt through the woods and ravines, while
to reinforce the attackers. When day a few rear guard detachments fought on
came the commander of Company E, to form a new bulwark to defend the
Capt. Vaughn Swift, took his chances in Sure River line. As early as the after-
the gauntlet of bullets and ran out to noon of 24 December the 3d Battalion,
the American tanks. By some miracle 104th Infantry (Lt. Col. Howard C. Del-
he reached the Shermans alive and led lert) , had reached Heiderscheid, there
them into Eschdorf. Two were knocked secured guides from the 319th, and had
out there, but not before they had gone on to relieve the two companies of
quieted the enemy armored vehicles. the 319th on the river at Heider-
(Captain Swift was given the DSC.) scheidergrund.17
While the 104th put troops along the
river, its sister regiment made a march
16The Eschdorf fight is well covered in the of three and a half miles over rough
combat interviews held shortly after the event.
The orders and counterorders given Hamilton are
found in the 26th Division G–3 journal and the
104th Infantry journal. The journal of the 104th 17There seems to have been some initial con-
records that Company F was driven out of fusion as to the exact status of the troops already
Eschdorf (at 0835 on 25 December) and seems to in that village, for in one of the rare changes
have been interpreted as meaning that none of made in an official periodic report that of the
Hamilton’s force was in the town. However, no III Corps was amended to read that the 26th
part of the 1st Battalion, 104th Infantry, was Division “relieved two companies of the 80th
committed in this fight until after the air strike Division” in place of “liberated two companies of
on the afternoon of 25 December. the 80th Division.”
544 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

country but against little opposition and mas Day an additional battalion had to
by nightfall of the 24th was near the be committed at both of these towns.
bridge site at Bonnal. On the extreme Although troops of the two attacking
left flank at Bilsdorf, Company C of the regiments were within sight of the river
249th Engineer Combat Battalion was on Christmas Eve they found that there
on reconnaissance when it was struck by would be no surprise crossing. In the
a much larger enemy force deployed in zone of the 104th Infantry the enemy,
the village. T h e company commander, alerted by the presence of the two com-
Capt. A. J. Cissna, elected to stay panies of the 319th,had strengthened
behind and cover his men as they with- his position at the opposite end of the
drew from Bilsdorf; he fought alone un- Heiderscheidergrund bridge and it was
til he was killed. Cissna was awarded apparent that a crossing site would have
the DSC posthumously. T h e 1st Battal- to be sought elsewhere. On the left the
ion of the 328th (Lt. Col. W. A. 3d Battalion of the 328th Infantry (Lt.
Callanan), aided by the 2d Battalion, Col. Arthur C. Tillison) reached the
101st Infantry, found a rear guard group bare hill above Bonnal on Christmas
of the Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade holed morning, just in time to see the last
up in Arsdorf, near the division west German half-track cross the bridge be-
boundary, and spent the night of the fore it was blown.
24th digging the grenadiers out of attics T h e corps commander now released
and cellars. By midmorning Arsdorf was the 101st Infantry from reserve and or-
in hand and the left flank of the 26th dered General Paul to “keep going” and
Division was fairly secure except for get to Wiltz, four miles the other side
Bigonville, three miles northwest, which of the Sure. Paul planned to relieve the
now passed into the division zone as 328th with his reserve regiment, but
CCR, 4th Armored Division, left that while arrangements were being made,
village to play a new role on the western on the night of the 25th, word flashed
flank of the corps. back that a bridge had been captured
But the main mission of the 26th Divi- and that the 3d Battalion was crossing.
sion, to make a crossing at the Sure This episode of the Bonnal bridge is an
River, had yet to be accomplished when apt–and instructive–example of the
Task Force Hamilton started the fight at “fog of war.” T h e bridge actually had
Eschdorf on the night of 24 December. been destroyed eight to ten hours earlier,
General Paul, beset by incessant urging but it was nearly midnight before the
from the I I I Corps commander, passed 328th Infantry was able to ascertain that
the word to his two forward regiments none of its troops had got across the
that the attack must get into high gear, river. Bad news never comes singly. T h e
then sent a message to General Millikin 104th Infantry had to report that the
that he hoped to seize the Sure crossing Germans had blown up one span of the
before daylight on Christmas Day. bridge at Heiderscheidergrund.
Pitched battles at Eschdorf and Arsdorf T h e Sure River is in itself not too
so entangled the division that the idea of difficult an obstacle, at its widest point
a general movement forward had to be no more than twenty-five yards across.
abandoned, particularly when on Christ- T h e current is not swift, and there are
T H E III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 545

many places where it is possible to wade out of keeping with reality. T h e 1st Bat-
across. (Plans actually were made for talion of the brigade, for example, had
sending an assault party through the first appeared in front of the west wing
bitter cold stream, then wrapping the of the 26th Division headed southwest,
troops in blankets and thawing them out then had been turned around, had
on the far bank.) The problem is to get bumped back across the front of the
down to the river and to get up the 328th–fighting here and there in the
steep cliffs to the north bank. So twisting woods as it went–and then had taken
and tortuous is the river course and so a hand against the 104th. Furthermore
blind are its bends that great care must the Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade was an
be exercised in choosing a crossing point amorphous organization which accorded
lest one have to cross the river twice. T h e with none of the tables carried in the
approaches to the river, the meanderings American handbook on German order of
of the river bed, and the exits on the battle. Since its numbering and unit
north bank combined therefore to dic- names fitted much of the description of
tate where the 26th Division might cross. the elder formation, the Grossdeutsch-
Whether the enemy was strong land Panzer Division, the brigade had
enough to dictate how the division had been first identified as the division. It
to cross remained to be seen. T h e lay of would take much time and numerous
the ground gave three potential crossing prisoners before the 26th Division order
sites in the 26th Division zone: from of battle team could complete the true
east to west, Heiderscheidergrund, Esch- picture of the brigade.
sur-Sure, and Bonnal. All had stone arch When the Seventh Army commander
bridges of solid construction–or did ordered the Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade
prior to 25 December 1944. Heider- to withdraw to the Sure on 25 December,
scheidergrund normally would present he intended the defense to continue on
the most attractive of the three crossings the south bank of the river. But the
because it gave entrance to the main brigade’s rifle regiment, much under-
Wiltz road. But the fight for Eschdorf strength as the consequence of the rough
had slowed down the 104th Infantry and handling received at Arsdorf, Eschdorf,
prevented a thoroughgoing exploitation and in the counterattack at Heider-
of the 3 19th toehold at Heiderscheider- scheid, could no longer provide the nec-
grund. Furthermore the enemy had first essary infantry. T h e bulk of the brigade
concentrated to defend this, the most had apparently crossed to the north side
obvious of the three crossings. What he of the river by the morning of 26 Decem-
was set to do to defend Esch-sur-Sureand ber, forming a line–or what passed for
Bonnal remained to be tested. a line–east and west of Esch-sur-Sure.
The fragmented commitment of the The only German reserve in this sector
Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade had resulted was the army engineer brigade at
in heavy losses and blunted the fighting Nothum, a 2½-mile march north of the
edge of this “elite” unit. By the very Bonnal crossing. But General Branden-
nature of its dispersed and staggered berger was loath to employ any of his
commitment the brigade had succeeded small engineer complement in the firing
in creating a picture of strength quite line except under the direst of circum-
546 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

stances. There was little artillery to de- enemy planes that tried to strafe along
fend the line of the Sure; most of the the river were destroyed or driven off
guns and Werfers which had good prime by alert fighter-bombers and the 390th
movers and could be hauled along the Antiaircraft Automatic Weapons Battal-
crowded roads west of the Our were at ion. Nor did a small German counter-
work around Bastogne or firing in de- attack during the evening have any
fense of the Bourscheid bridgehead. One effect.
advantage the defenders did have: good T h e eyes of the Fuehrer Grenadier
observation from the heights overlook- Brigade were fixed on Heiderscheider-
ing the separate crossing sites. grund where the German fighting ve-
T h e morning of 26 December dawned hicles and riflemen waited for the main
bright and clear with the promise of air American effort. Although one span of
support for the 26th Division at the river. the stone bridge had been blown as a
On the left the 101st Infantry had re- precautionary measure, the enemy threw
lieved the 328th and stood ready to a trestle over the gap, preserving the
attempt the crossing. T h e 101st was the bridge as a sally port to the south
fresh and its ranks were full. After its bank. Twice German tanks and assault
first effort to reach the piers of the stone guns made a bid to recross and counter-
bridge at Bonnal was met by rifle fire, attack the 104th Infantry. T h e first
a patrol discovered a good site farther attempt was stopped short of the bridge
to the west where a river loop curled to by rapid shellfire. T h e second was more
the American side. Engineer assault successful: four tanks and an assault gun
craft reached the 3d Battalion (Lt. Col. rammed across the bridge but were aban-
James N. Peale) shortly before noon, doned by their crews when American
but a rumor had circulated that the guns and howitzers brought salvo after
enemy was lying in wait on the opposite salvo of white phosphorus to sear the
bank and the troops showed some re- near bank. During the 26th, patrols
luctance to move. Col. Walter T. Scott, operating in the 104th Infantry sector
the regimental commander, took a single put their glasses on Esch-sur-Sure. They
bodyguard and crossed the river in a reported that there was no sign of the
rubber boat, returning without mishap, enemy in the village, but Colonel Palla-
T h e battalion then crossed, the silence dino could not risk an immediate cross-
broken only by the sound of the paddles, ing on his left while the Germans
an occasional hoarse-voiced command, opposite his right held a bridge and still
and a few rifle shots. T h e 1st Battalion seemed willing to carry the fight back
(Maj. Albert L. Gramm), closer to to the American side of the river.
Bonnal, likewise made an uneventful The troops in the attenuated 101st
crossing. The enemy, no more than a bridgehead easily repulsed a minor
few stray pickets, did not loiter. Engi- counterattack on the morning of 2 7 De-
neers started a Bailey bridge, using the cember. As yet there was nothing to
supports of the stone bridge at Bonnal, indicate an enemy shift to meet this
while the two battalions, tired by their threat to the Sure River position. By
scramble up the steep banks, dug in midmorning the Bailey bridge was open
along the edge of the bluffs. The few and tanks and tank destroyers crossed to
T H E III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 547

ESCH-SUR-SURE

support the 3d Battalion as it climbed far bank. By the close of the day it could
on up the bluffs to Liefrange. Since the be said that the Sure bridgehead was
two bridges at Esch-sur-Sure had been firm and the way open to recapture
demolished, the commander of the 104th Wiltz.18
Infantry arranged for his left battalion
to borrow the Bonnal Bailey. As the T h e 4th Armored Division
right battalion put on a demonstration Reaches Bastogne
with much firing at Heiderscheider-
grund, the left crossed, then swung back Christmas Day came and went leaving
toward Kaundorf as if to command the the 4th Armored Division toiling slowly
road climbing from Esch-sur-Sure.While toward Bastogne. T h e left wing of the
this maneuver was in process the engi- III Corps now conformed to the slow,
neers constructed a treadway bridge at
Esch and tank destroyers were put across 18The 26th Division fight on the far bank of
to reinforce Palladino’s battalion on the the Sure is described in Chapter XXIV.
548 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

foot-slogging pace of the divisions on the man gunners. Tired of taking losses
right and in the center. Both CCA and where it lay, the company asked per-
CCB had an additional rifle battalion mission to take the burden of the assault
when the attack resumed on the 25th, on its own shoulders. Two platoons
for the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 318th advanced through the forward compa-
Infantry had reported to General Gaffey nies and the enemy infantry inside the
late on Christmas Eve after a cold, miser- village immediately opened fire. In so
able, six-hour truck ride from the 80th doing the Germans gave away their
Division sector. Both battalions, the 1st locations to the third platoon, which had
attached to CCA and the 2d to CCB, circled in from the east. Return fire
were considerably understrength after coming in from the east momentarily
the bloody engagements at Ettelbruck. silenced the garrison; galled by its losses
T h e 1st Battalion, whose officer losses Company B rushed the village, captured
had been very high, had a new com- the maddening assault gun as its crew
mander and so did all of its companies. sought to escape, and took 161 prisoners.
During the fight at Warnach a few This action must be credited to the in-
tanks from CCA had tried to drive on to fantry, but it should be added that eight
Tintange but had bogged down. Gen- fighter-bombers from the 377th Squad-
eral Gaffey therefore decided to employ ron had hit Tintange on call, blasting
a part of his infantry reinforcement with with bombs and rockets just before the
the general mission of attacking to reach riflemen moved in. During the day the
Bastogne, and the more immediate job 5 1st Armored Infantry Battalion carried
of taking. Tintange. After a freezing the advance on the west side of the
night bivouacked in the snow, Maj. Arlon-Bastogne highway as far as Hol-
George W. Connaughton’s 1st Battalion, lange, pausing here with night coming
3 18th, set off for a line of departure south on and the enemy showing his first in-
of the village that was shown on the tention of making a stand. CCA now
map as a small creek. had cleared another-stretch of woods and
Gaffey had said that the battalion villages flanking the Bastogne highway-
would have to fight for its line of de- but the streets of Bastogne still were
parture. He was right. T h e two assault seven miles away.
companies reached the creek only to dis- The 2d Battalion, 318th Infantry (Lt.
cover that they faced a deep gorge, with Col. Glenn H. Gardner), did its chore
Germans arrayed to defend it. Somehow of woods clearing and village fighting on
the infantry scrambled down and up Christmas Day alongside the armored in-
again while their opponents pitched in fantry and tanks of CCB. Chaumont,
hand grenades. Emerging south of the scene of the bitter action two days
village the attackers came under con- earlier, remained the immediate objec-
tinuous rifle fire, but what stopped them tive. This time the enemy was deeply
cold was a single large-caliber assault dug in, all through the woods south of
gun whose shells burst wherever the the village. While tanks from the 8th
Americans turned. T h e support, Com- Tank Battalion edged around the woods
pany B (Capt. Reid McAllister), was firing indiscriminately into the pines, the
given very special attention by the Ger- foot troops routed out the German
T H E III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 549

AMERICAN TROOPS IN TINTANGE JUST AFTER ITS CAPTURE

infantry from holes and log-covered number of panzers had come in during
trenches where they sought shelter from the night, but in fact there were no tanks,
the tankers’ shells. This was a slow, pre- except the derelict Shermans left on the
carious business. Some of the enemy 23d. T h e American light tanks moved
paratroopers could be persuaded that in with the infantry and by dark the
surrender was the better part of valor, village was in American hands–most of
but many had to be finished off with the enemy had withdrawn farther north
grenades and even bayonets. In this after the struggle in the woods. T h e 2d
manner the 2d Battalion worked Battalion saw nearly a hundred of its
through three successive wood lots, meet- men evacuated for bullet wounds, mostly
ing strong rifle and automatic weapons suffered inside the woods. Both here and
fire in each. Here Sgt. Paul J. Wiedorfer at Tintange the 5th Parachute troopers
made a lone charge against two German had been forced to rely on their small
machine guns. He killed the crew serv- arms; the 318th as a result sustained
ing the first weapon and forced the crew more casualties from bullet fire than at
of the second to surrender. (He was any time since its frontal attack at the
awarded the Medal of Honor.) Moselle River in early .September.
Chaumont village was less of a prob- Artillery and large numbers of fighter-
lem. Prisoners had reported that a large bombers belabored the 5th Parachute
550 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Division on 26 December. T h e advanc- broke up one German position with


ing Americans of the two combat com- grenades after he had been hit in the
mands and the attached infantry found shoulder and could not use his rifle. (He
that more and more of the enemy were received the DSC.) 19
willing to lay down their arms after Spread across a wide front, CCA and
honor had been satisfied by token re- CCB could maintain little contact: nor
sistance, but for each point where the could the rifle battalions and tank-infan-
combination of American fighter- try teams. Much of the American combat
bombers, artillery, tanks, and infantry
won quick surrender there was a cross-
19 The battles on 26 December elicited numerous
road, a patch of woods, or a tiny deeds of heroism. DSC’s were subsequently
collection of houses to which a tough awarded to Capt. James H. Leach and 2d Lt. John
young officer and a few men clung A. Whitehill of the 4th Armored Division; Capt.
Gabriel R. Martinez and Pfc. A. G. Means of the
fiercely. Bravery was matched with brav- 318th Infantry; and 2d Lt. Frederick Rau of the
ery. Pfc. O. M. Laughlin of the 318th 274th Armored Field Artillery Battalion.

GERMAN PRISONERS CARRYING ONE OF THEIR WOUNDED IN A BLANKET


T H E III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 551

strength had to be diverted to screen On Christmas Eve, when it was appar-


the flanks of the individual detachments ent that no quick breakthrough could
or to circle back to stamp out resistance be expected on the Arlon-Bastogne high-
flaring up unexpectedly in areas sup- way, the 4th Armored Division com-
posed to be free of the enemy. (CCA, mander could look to two possible means
for example, captured a battalion head- of levering the slowing attack into high
quarters and a large number of pris- gear. The two battalions of the 318th
oners in a fight at Hollange, south of were ready to add more riflemen to what
Chaumont, which had been taken by had become a slow-paced infantry bat-
CCB the day before.) Mines also made tle; perhaps this extra weight would tell
for delay. There were more in the path and punch a hole through which the
of the advance than ever before, but they tanks of CCA and CCB could start
had been laid hastily, were not well con- rolling again. But General Gaffey was a
cealed, and often lacked fuzes. Again the veteran and convinced armored officer,
most lethal and in numerous cases the serving a commander whose name was
sole German weapons were the rifle, everywhere attached to feats of speed
machine gun, or machine pistol. These and daring in mechanized warfare and
served the enemy well, and gaps in the whose doctrine was simple: if the ground
ranks of the attackers widened even as and the enemy combined to thwart the
the prisoner bag swelled. Captured para- tanks in the area originally selected for
troopers complained that they no longer attack, then find some other spot where
had artillery support, that morale was the enemy might be less well situated
cracking when friendly guns could not to face a mechanized thrust.
be seen or heard; nonetheless the dwin- T h e command had caught a cat nap
dling strength of the 318th and the by 1100, fuel tanks were filled, com-
armored infantry battalions bore witness manders were briefed, an artillery plane
that the enemy still was in a fighting had oriented the gunners–and the drive
mood. began. T h e light tanks and a platoon of
Despite all this the lines of the 101st tank destroyers from the 704th Tank
Airborne Division were appreciably Destroyer Battalion led off, followed by
closer. By dark the 2d Battalion, 318th paired teams of tank and armored in-
Infantry, after bitter battle and very fantry companies. T h e scattered German
heavy casualties, had reached the woods outposts, members of a replacement en-
near Hompré, some 4,000 yards from the gineer battalion, dived for cover as the
Bastogne perimeter. Using green and tanks raced along the road, then hastily
red light signals, learned from prisoners surrendered to the infantry following.
in the past two days, 1st Lt. Walter P. Beyond Vaux-lez-Rosieres the column
Carr and a four-man patrol stole through left the pavement and headed northeast
the German lines, reaching the Bastogne on a secondary road, hoping to find it
outposts at 0430. T h e return trip, with ill-defended. Thus far the teams had
a situation map marked by the 101st Air- leapfrogged, taking turns in dealing
borne G–3, wrote finis to a daring and with the little villages away from the
successful mission. But other Americans main route. About 1400 the advance
had beaten Carr to Bastogne. guard was checked at a small creek near
552 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Cobreville where the only bridge had side of Bercheux was a company of First
just been blown. Abrams called for the Army engineers, which, as part of the
battalion bulldozer, always kept close to VIII Corps barrier line, was preparing
the headquarters tank in the column. It to make a stand. Thus far, however, the
took an hour for the bulldozer to de- Germans had shown little disposition to
molish a stone wall and push the debris push much beyond Vaux-lez-Rosieres,a
into the creek–then on went the column. mile and a half farther up the road, from
CCR of the 4th Armored Division had which the 28th Division headquarters
just taken Bigonville on the division east had been driven on the night of the 22d.
flank, and was counting its prisoners, Remonville was next. Perhaps some
waiting for orders, and making plans for sixth sense warned that it was full of
feeding its troops a big Christmas dinner Germans; maybe a spotter plane had
when Colonel Blanchard heard from the seen movement there or a frightened
division commander. The order given prisoner had talked. Whatever the rea-
was brief: move to Neufchateau at once. son, Remonville got the treatment. A
Starting an hour after midnight, the company of Shermans lined up on the
combat command was near Neufchâteau high ground outside the village with
when it received other and more de- their guns trained on the houses. Four
tailed orders–attack toward Bastogne to battalions of artillery, emplaced close
assist the advance of CCB (then south enough to reach the target, opened rapid
of Chaumont) and to protect the left fire with high explosive and the tanks
flank of the division and corps. joined in. For five to ten minutes, long
For this task CCR had the 37th Tank enough for the A Team to race to the
Battalion (Lt. Col. Creighton W. village, shells rained down. In the streets
Abrams) , the 53d Armored Infantry the tank crews worked their machine
Battalion (Lt. Col. George Jaques) , guns until they were hot, while the in-
the self-propelled 94th Armored Field fantry leaped from their half-tracks and
Artillery Battalion, and a battery of 155- sprinted from building to building. The
mm. howitzers from the 177th Field German garrison, the 3d Battalion, 14th
Artillery Battalion. Although CCR nor- Parachute Regiment, had remained hid-
mally was not employed as an integral den up to this point. Some now emerged
tactical unit in 4th Armored practice, -but it was too late. Tank gunners and
the tank and rifle companies of the two riflemen cut them down from every side.
battalions had teamed together in many Hand grenades tossed through cellar
a fight. windows and down cellar stairs quickly
Colonel Blanchard had selected his brought the recalcitrant–and living-to
own route (to avoid blown bridges) and the surface. By dusk the job was finished.
an assembly area southwest of Bercheux CCR had taken 327 prisoners.
village on the Neufchâteau-Bastogne The light tanks in the advance guard
road. Here the column closed shortly be- moved on, but only for a few hundred
fore dawn on Christmas Day. Almost yards. A large crater pitting the road
nothing was known about the German where a small creek made a detour im-
strength or dispositions along the twelve- possible brought the column to a halt
mile stretch of road that lay ahead. In- as the day ended. CCR had come abreast
T H E III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 553

of CCB, in fact was fearful of using its CCR would displace from Juseret to new
artillery against any targets to the east. positions south of Cobreville, but be-
Gaffey still expected CCB to make the cause the exact location of CCB was
breakthrough now that its west flank was unknown the howitzers would not be
protected. T o this end General Taylor, laid on Remichampagne. Immediate
impatient to reach his division in Bas- targets would be two: a large block of
togne, had joined General Dager’s com- woods west of Remichampagne, for
mand post, bringing the first word Dager which CCR could spare none of its lim-
had that CCR had come up on his left. ited armored infantry; and the road
Even so the general mission for all of from Morhet, leading east of the Neuf-
the 4th Armored Division remained the château-Bastogne highway, on which
relief of the 101st Airborne. spotter planes had observed German
On Christmas night Colonel Blanch- tanks.
ard and his officers huddled over a map When CCR started for Remicham-
which had just arrived by liaison plane. pagne on the morning of 26 December,
This map showed the American disposi- the ground was frozen, and tank going
tion in the Bastogne perimeter, only six was even better than it had been during
miles away, and a somewhat hypothetical the summer pursuit across France. T h e
scheme of the German order of battle column had just gotten under way when
as it faced in toward Bastogne and out suddenly a number of P–47’s appeared.
toward the 4th Armored. T h e red- Although the 362d Fighter Group was
penciled symbols representing the en- slated to give CCR a hand, these par-
emy were most numerous and precise ticular planes, probably from the 362d,
where they faced north; by now the 101st had not been called for. Bombing only
had had ample opportunity to gauge the a few hundred yards in front of the lead-
German strength and dispositions hem- ing tanks, the P–47’s shook all ideas of
ming it in. The red figures farther south resistance out of the few Germans left
were few and accompanied by question in the village or the woods.
marks. Next was Clochimont. CCR was reach-
Basing it on this rather sketchy infor- ing the point where a collision with the
mation, Blanchard gave his plan for enemy main line of resistance could be
attack on 26 December. This called for expected or a strong counterattack be
an advance through Remichampagne, a suffered. Carefully then, CCR deployed
mile and a half away, and Clochimont. near Clochimont, moving its teams out
Then the combat command would turn to cover the flanks. Colonel Abrams dis-
northwest to Sibret, thus returning to the patched one tank company northward
Neufchâteau-Bastogne road. At Sibret, hoping to uncover the next enemy posi-
which air reconnaissance had reported tion or draw fire from Assenois, straight
to be full of troops, the main fight would to the fore, or Sibret, the objective on
apparently be made. Fighter-bomber the Bastogne highway. It was about 1500
support had been promised for the morn- when these dispositions were completed.
ing of the 26th, and CCR had seen the Orders called for the attack to be con-
sky full of American planes over Bas- tinued toward Sibret, over to the north-
togne. T h e four firing batteries with west, but this town was probably well
554 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

defended and German tanks, more likely Company C of the 53d Armored Infantry
than not, would be found guarding the Battalion), telling him: “It’s the push!”
main road. T h e 37th Tank Battalion had By 1620 all was ready and the team
lost tanks here and there along the way moved out, Shermans leading and half-
and had no more than twenty Shermans tracks behind. Abrams stayed glued to
in operation. The 53d Armored Infantry his radio. At 1634 he checked with the
Battalion, weak to begin with, now was 94th Field Artillery Battalion and asked
short 230 men. The two battalion com- if he could get the concentration on
manders, Abrams and Jaques, stood by Assenois at a minute’s notice. Exactly
the road discussing the next move and one minute later the tank company com-
watching what looked like hundreds of mander, 1st Lt. Charles Boggess, called
cargo planes flying overhead en route to from the lead tank. Colonel Abrams
drop supplies to the 101st when Abrams passed the word to the artillery, “Con-
suggested that they try a dash through centration Number Nine, play it soft and
Assenois straight into Bastogne. It was sweet.” A TOT could hardly be expected
true that Sibret was next on the CCR with existing communications, but the
itinerary, but it was known to be strongly thirteen batteries (an unlucky number
held and Bastogne was the 4th Armored for the enemy) sent ten volleys crashing
Division objective. Jaques agreed. onto Assenois.
Abrams radioed Capt. William Eight antitank guns were sited around
Dwight, the battalion S–3, to bring the the village; here and there a gun crew
C Team forward. It was now about 1520. fired a wild shot before a shell blasted
Another message, this time through the the piece or the furious fire of the Sher-
artillery liaison officer, gave the plan to man machine guns drove the cannoneers
the 94th Armored Field Artillery Battal- to their holes. At the dip in the road on
ion and asked that the 101st Airborne be the village edge Lieutenant Boggess
told that the armor was coming in. T h e called for the artillery to lift, then
94th already was registered to fire on plunged ahead without waiting to see
Assenois, but there was little time in whether the 94th had his message. So
which to transmit data to the division close did the attack follow the artillery
artillery or arrange a fire plan. CCR that not a hostile shot was fired as the
alone among the combat commands had tanks raced into the streets. T h e center
no telephone wire in. Continuous wave of the village was almost as dark as
radio could not be counted on. Fre- night, the sun shut out by smoke and
quency modulation was working fairly dust. Two tanks made a wrong turn. One
well, but all messages would have to be infantry half-track got into the tank col-
relayed. Despite these handicaps, in umn; another was knocked out when an
fifteen minutes three artillery battalions American shell exploded nearby. T h e
borrowed from CCB (the 22d, 253d, and initial fire plan had called for the battery
776th) were tied in to make the shoot of 155’sto plaster the center of the town,
at Assenois when the call came. and these shells still were coming in
Colonel Abrams had entrusted Cap- when the infantry half-tracks entered
tain Dwight with the shock troops (Com- the streets. Far more vulnerable to the
pany C of the 37th Tank Battalion and rain of shell fragments than the tankers,
T H E III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 555

the armored infantrymen leaped from nel Abrams (subsequently awarded the
their vehicles for the nearest doorway or DSC for the action at Assenois) shook
wall. In the smoke and confusion the hands with General McAuliffe, who had
German garrison, a mixed group from come to the outpost line to welcome the
the 5th Parachute and 26th Volks Gren- relieving force.
adier Divisions, poured out of the cel- Colonel Jaques and the 53d Armored
lars. T h e ensuing shooting, clubbing, Infantry Battalion missed this dramatic
stabbing melee was all that the armored moment; they were involved in a scram-
infantry could handle and the C Team bling fight for possession of Assenois-
tanks rolled on to glory alone. strictly an infantry battle now that the
T h e “relief column” heading out of artillery no longer could intervene. This
Assenois for the Bastogne perimeter now battle continued into the night, the 53d
consisted of the three Sherman tanks capturing some five hundred prisoners
commanded by Lieutenant Boggess, the in and around the town. One American,
one half-track which had blundered into S./Sgt. James R. Hendrix, took on the
the tank column, and two more Sher- crews of the two 88-mm. guns with only
mans bringing up the rear. Boggess his rifle, adding crews and guns to the
moved fast, liberally spraying the tree bag in Assenois. (Hendrix was awarded
line beside the highway with machine the Medal of Honor). More Germans
gun fire. But a 300-yard gap developed filtered in along the dense woods which
between the first three vehicles and the lined the east side of the Bastogne road
last three, giving the enemy just time north of Assenois. Here Company A of
to throw a few Teller mines out on the the 53d was put in to dig the Germans
road before the half-track appeared. T h e out, the company commander, Capt.
half-track rolled over the first mine and Frank Kutak, directing the fight from
exploded. Captain Dwight then ran his his jeep for he had been wounded in
tow tanks onto the shoulder, the crews both legs. (For bravery here and in other
removed the mines, and the tanks rushed actions Kutak was awarded the DSC.)
on to catch up with Boggess. At 1650 An hour or so after midnight enough
(the time is indelibly recorded in the of the enemy had been killed or cap-
4th Armored Division record) Boggess tured to give relatively safe passage along
saw some engineers in friendly uniform the Bastogne road. Over 2 0 0 vehicles had
preparing to assault a pillbox near the been gathered at Rossignol waiting for
highway. These were men from the the road to open, and during the night
326th Airborne Engineer Battalion- the light tank company of the 37th Tank
contact with the Bastogne garrison had Battalion escorted forty trucks and sev-
been made. Twenty minutes later Colo- enty ambulances into Bastogne.
CHAPTER XXII

The Battle Before the Meuse


T h e Meuse River Line command diagnosed the enemy intent as
that of driving to the Meuse in the vicin-
Across the western edge of the Ar- ity of Liege. But there could be no cer-
dennes massif runs the Meuse River. tainty in the early phases of the German
This river, throughout history, has been counteroffensive that such a diagnosis
the natural line of resistance against an was correct. It was quite possible that
enemy advancing from east to west over the enemy might swerve south at the
the Belgian highlands. Actually, of Meuse, following the historical invasion
course, the river channel changes direc- route past Sedan and on to Paris instead
tion as it passes through Belgium, run- of turning north toward Liege and Ant-
ning south to north between Maastricht werp. General Middleton and the VIII
and Liege, generally following an east- Corps staff were concerned particularly
west line between Liege and Namur, with the possibility that the enemy plan
and bending sharply at Namur to as- might unfold into a thrust southward
sume a south to north orientation. Al- through the Meuse valley.
though rather shallow, the Meuse aver- Busy with plans and troop movements
ages a width of 120 yards in its main designed to bolster the threatened sector
course and is fed by so many streams that of the First Army front and harden the
its current is unusually rapid, particu- shoulders of the corridor through which
larly in the winter season. There are the German divisions were crowding,
some fairly level approaches to the SHAEF took its first steps to defend the
Meuse crossing sites; there also are long line of the Meuse (with anything more
stretches of steep banks bordering the than local security measures) on 18
channel, some of them are cliffs nearly December. Late that day General Eisen-
three hundred feet high. As a comple- hower ordered the 17th Airborne and
ment to the natural strength of this 11th Armored Divisions, both training
barrier the Belgian Government, before in the United Kingdom, to move to the
World War II, had limited the number Continent without delay. These two
of bridges spanning the Meuse. The divisions were intended for use north
events of 1940, however, demonstrated and west of the Meuse, but they could
that modern armies could cross the not be expected for some days. From
Meuse speedily, either by surprise or by Reims, which was designated as concen-
an overwhelming concentration of force. tration area for the airborne division,
Within forty-eight hours of the launch- the airborne could be moved to the west
ing of the 1944 attack the Allied high bank; the armored division was slated
T H E BATTLE BEFORE T H E MEUSE 557

for use on the north bank. On the 20th, ments hastily organized from Special Air
however, the 11th Armored Division was Services (British) and tank replacement
ordered to assemble north of Reims. At center troops joined the American Com-
the same time SHAEF instructed the 6th munications Zone personnel to set up
Airborne Division (British) to move at cover parties at the bridges between
once by sea to the 21 Army Group area Liège and Givet. British armored cars
as a preliminary to strengthening the de- patrolled the north bank of the river be-
fense on the north bank of the Meuse. tween Liège and Namur. T h e 29th
In the meantime the 1st SS Panzer Armoured Brigade, then refitting
Division was drawing uncomfortably with new tanks in western Belgium, was
close to the Huy-Dinant sector of the ordered to pick u p its old tanks
Meuse and the Fifth Panzer Army had and hurry to defend the Namur-
ruptured the VIII Corps center. If the Dinant sector. Reports from the First
German forces continued to hold their Army at the close of the 19th
pace westward the reinforcements from led Montgomery to believe that there
the United Kingdom would arrive at was “little to prevent German armoured
the Meuse too late. On 19 December, cars and reconnaissance elements [from]
therefore, Field Marshal Montgomery on bounding the Meuse and advancing on
his own initiative started troops moving Brussels.” That night British troops
south from the 21 Army Group. T h e erected barriers and deployed roadblock
British commander had been in process detachments to protect the capital city,
of shifting the weight of his forces to the which had been liberated by the Guards
north in preparation for an offensive in Armoured Division on 3 September.1
the Rhineland when the Germans un- The rapid deployment of the British
leashed the attack in the Ardennes; screen between Liège and Givet de-
indeed Montgomery’s southernmost creased considerably the chance of a sur-
command, the 30 Corps, already had prise crossing on this stretch of the
started its advance parties moving north Meuse, and the concentration of the 30
to the Canadian front. But at 1730 on Corps would be accomplished in time to
1 9 December the 21 Army Group com- provide a strong counterattack force in
mander ordered General Horrocks to the event that the enemy did win a
move his 30 Corps from Boxtel, Holland, bridgehead. The 120-mile stretch of
into the area between Liège and Brus- river from Givet (terminal point of the
sels and gave him the Guards Armoured British line) to Verdun was far less
Division and the 43d, 51st, and 53d strongly defended than that in the north.
Infantry Divisions, as well as three ar- It would take approximately a week to
mored brigades. bring the 17th Airborne and 11th
Because the situation late on the 19th Armored Divisions from the United
“remained unpleasantly vague,” to use Kingdom into the line. Reinforcements
Montgomery’s own phrase, the British moving from the Third and Ninth
commander undertook emergency meas-
ures to bar the Meuse crossings between 1 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 28off.;
T h e Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery, p.
Liège and Givet while the 30 Corps 276. The latter touches on the Ardennes campaign
made its move. Reconnaissance attach- only lightly.
558 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

BRITISH TANK PATROLLING THE MEUSE AT NAMUR

Armies were already tagged for stiffen- into the forward headquarters indicated
ing the First Army line of battle in the clearly enough that the enemy had
Ardennes. In these first critical days, trained and committed special forces to
then, the southern line of the Meuse seize the Meuse crossings. Parachutists
would have to be guarded on a catch-as- captured behind the forward lines in the
catch-can basis by troops brought up first hours of the battle told lurid tales
from the depots, supply dumps, adminis- of the plans to capture General Eisen-
trative installations, and headquarters hower, blow u p ammunition dumps, and
in France and western Belgium. As late destroy radio and telephone installations
as the 22d there were bridges with no and POL pipelines. When a few bona
organized defense whatever. fide Germans were captured complete
The initial danger, or so it seemed, with American uniforms, dog tags, and
was posed by saboteurs, parachutists, or jeeps, the word spread through the battle
small motorized detachments masquer- area and raced from mouth to mouth
ading as Americans or Belgian civilians. back into France.
The bits of tactical intelligence accumu- Rumors, grossly elaborated from the
lating as prisoners and documents came few bits of fact, quickly jammed the
T H E BATTLE BEFORE T H E MEUSE 559

roads to Paris and Liège with hundreds In the first days of the German ad-
of jeeps carrying enemy saboteurs or vance, security measures along the Meuse
raiding parties in American uniform. had been handled by the commanders
Belgian or French café keepers who for of installations in the army rear areas.
weeks had been selling vin ordinaire, By the 20th this responsibility, particu-
watered cognac, and sour champagne to larly along the Meuse south of Givet,
the GI’s suddenly were elevated by had been largely handed over to the
rumor, suspicion, and hysteria to cap- Communications Zone and its com-
taincies in the Waffen-SS. Ladies of no mander, Lt. Gen. John C. H. Lee.
certain virtue who so far forgot them- General Lee’s responsibility of course
selves as to use some Teutonic phrase reached far west of the Meuse. Guards
picked up from their clients during the had to be provided for the great supply
years of German occupation found them- dumps and headquarters cities, so also
selves explaining this linguistic lapse to for rail lines, pipelines, supply roads, and
the military police or Counterintelli- the French telephone and telegraph sys-
gence Corps agents with far more earn- tem. Far to the west in Normandy supply
estness than they had ever shown in troops went on the alert against a pos-
justifying a moral lapse to agent or flic. sible raid by the German garrisons of the
The American officer who had the mis- Channel Islands. In Paris, the GI’s
fortune to appear on the heels of the Mecca, soldiers on leave were rounded
most recent rumor in some headquarters up and started back to their units; those
where he was unknown stood a good who remained in the City of Light found
chance of being welcomed with a cocked night life drastically curtailed by a rig-
pistol leveled at his belt buckle. Jeep idly enforced curfew.
drivers who had forgotten their grade Four engineer general service regi-
school geography quickly brushed up on ments could be assembled for the Meuse
the list of the forty-eight state capitals line but would require some time to
after having been stopped six or seven make the move. T h e commander of the
times by guards who thrust the muzzle of Oise Intermediate Section of the Com-
an M1 into the driver’s seat with a gruff munications Zone, Brig. Gen. Charles O.
demand for a quick identification of the Thrasher, had two locally available
capital of Alabama or Oregon. Field engineer units, the 354th and 1313th
grade officers tried once to “rank” their Engineer General Service Regiments,
way past a barricade, then resigned and these were organized as Task Force
themselves to singing the first bars of Thrasher on 20 December, beginning at
“Mairzy Doats” for the edification of an once the work of preparing the Meuse
adamant young private. And the heavily rail and road bridges for demolition.
wrapped, pregnant farm wife who Shortly afterward General Thrasher was
wished to cross any bridge found her authorized to blow these bridges if their
delicate condition a cause of considerable
embarrassment both to herself and the (Bruxelles, 1946). It may be added that not a
suspicious bridge guards. 2 single act of sabotage at the Meuse crossings
was reported during the entire Ardennes campaign.
2 For a Belgian view of the German offensive, Headquarters Advance Section, G–3, History of
see Paul Levy, Les Heures Rouges des Ardennes Operations: December 1943–1 July 1945.
560 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

capture appeared imminent. 3 Earlier movement but the main corps supply
this decision had rested with the tactical line, over which Middleton’s troops were
commands. One can only speculate as to being re-equipped, could be cut by raids
what would have happened if a German directed against the Semois and Chiers
armored column had kept to schedule Rivers, eastern tributaries of the Meuse.
and reached one of the important bridges Corps engineers were stationed at cross-
before the bridge guards received au- ings as far west as Bouillon, and the
thority to destroy the span. Semois bridges west of Bouillon that had
On 22 and 23 December, the 342d, not been destroyed by the Germans
392d, 366th, and 1308th Engineer Regi- during the September retreat were
ments took up positions along the Meuse, blown.
reinforced by a field artillery battalion, The enemy did not turn against the
a regimental antitank company, and six VIII Corps east-west line, and the added
French light infantry battalions provided burden of defending the Meuse between
by the military governor of Metz. These Givet and Semois, accorded Middleton
recently organized French troops were on the 23d, rested more lightly when
poorly equipped with a motley collection a part of the 11th Armored Division
of small arms and a few trucks but they reached the west bank on the following
proved very useful in screening the day. This division, moving by forced
military and civilian traffic along the marches from Normandy, closed on the
roads leading to the Meuse, both east 25th; its commander, Brig. Gen. Charles
and west of the river. All of these troops S. Kilburn, took charge of all troops in
and the responsibility for the sector the sector. T h e 17th Airborne Division,
Givet to Verdun were handed over to the ordered from the United Kingdom at
VIII Corps on the 23d by orders of the the same time as the 11th Armored, was
Third Army commander, who by now delayed by bad weather which grounded
had command on the south side of the its carrier planes. It finally closed at
Bulge. Charleville on 2 7 December, by which
Even at this late date Middleton and date the threat south of Givet had faded.
Patton had some apprehension that the The German panzer forces, had actu-
enemy columns might make a left wheel ally aimed at crossing the Meuse be-
on the east or west bank of the Meuse tween Givet and Liège. Montgomery
and drive for Sedan. There was no had reacted promptly to the danger
definition of the VIII Corps rear bound- posed by the onrushing 1st SS Panzer
ary; as the corps commander saw his Division, but with his 21 Army Group
responsibility, “a vast area was in- caught off balance in the middle of its
volved.” Not only were the corps west shift from south to north the plans and
flank and rear open to a German turning orders of the 19th could be implemented
but slowly and in sketchy form. T h e
3T h e more general impact of the Ardennes on American Communications Zone person-
the American supply bases and logistical system nel and the few British troops who took
is treated in Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical over the bridges were hardly enough to
Support of the Armies, UNITED STATES ARMY
IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959). vol. II,
prepare demolitions, screen the traffic
pp. 181–87. passing back and forth over the river in
T H E BATTLE BEFORE T H E MEUSE 561

the large bridgehead cities, and main- poised to roll up the flank of any pene-
tain patrols, much less make an adequate tration across the Meuse.
defense against any crossing attempt in Next day the new disposition of the
force. 30 Corps was completed. T h e 29th Ar-
As of noon, 21 December, Brig. Gen. moured Brigade had returned to its
Ewart C. Plank reported that the vital battle-worn tanks and armored cars and
crossings at Liège, Huy, Namur, and was established along the river between
Givet were guarded only by the 29th Namur and Givet. The 2d Household
Infantry (a separate regiment assigned Cavalry Regiment, already on the river
to line of communications duty), two line for the past twenty-four hours,
antiaircraft gun battalions, two antitank crossed the Meuse and pushed reconnais-
guns, four British scout cars, and a Brit- sance as far as Marche and Rochefort,
ish reconnaissance force of 300 men. T h e meeting American patrols but no enemy.
great bridgehead city of Liège had as By the close of the day, General Horrocks
crossing guards only two rifle companies could decide and did that now it was
and two cannon company platoons. possible to hold the enemy at the Meuse
T h e bridges at Liège and other line. T h e British responsibility, be it
nearby points presented a special prob- remembered, extended only as far south
lem. T h e V-bomb barrage directed into as Givet and did not include the actual
the area and German bombing planes defense of the bridges at Liège.
made any installation of demolition On the night of 23 December a jeep
charges on the bridge structures a haz- load of Germans dressed as Americans
ardous business. Fearful that these im- appeared at Dinant, one of the few
portant spans would be prematurely actual materializations of the oft-
destroyed by sympathetic explosion, the rumored saboteur parties. T h e jeep and
engineers could do no more than collect its crew were captured by a British post.
explosives and detonating devices in the It was a little late for such tactics. By
vicinity of, but not on, the bridges in this time each of the main crossings–
question. Givet, Dinant, and Namur–was guarded
Although the crossings north of the by an armored regiment and a rifle
bend in the Meuse still were weakly held company, and it is a fair assumption that
on the 21st, the danger of a successful the opportunity for a German coup de
enemy penetration beyond the river had main in the British-held sector was gone
lessened. T h e movement of the 30 Corps, by the 23d. 4 In the VIII Corps sector
begun late on the 19th,was not designed south of Givet the possibility of a sur-
to erect a linear defense for every yard prise stroke still existed on this date, for
of the Meuse line but instead was the there remained a number of weak links
first phase of Field Marshal Montgom- in the Meuse chain, but the odds were
ery’s plan to create a counterattack force increasing that the defender could at
capable of dealing with any German
columns which might reach and cross the
river. By the afternoon of the 20th the 4 On 23 December Montgomery ordered all
demolition charges removed from the bridges in
British 43d Division and an attached the British sector. SHAEF SGS 38 ½ Germany,
tank brigade were west of Maastricht, German Counter Offensive, vol. I.
562 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

REFUGEES AT THE DINANT BRIDGE

least enforce delay at the Meuse. There tion of what those moves might be. True,
remained, of course, the possibility that some German troops were very close to
German armor might reach the Meuse the Meuse and the advance to the west
somewhere along its length in sufficient still had considerable momentum, but
strength to gain by force what no longer the initiative was gradually slipping
could be won easily by stealth or surprise. from German fingers and could not be
regained unless the German armies held
T h e Meuse Seems Within Reach the Marche plateau as a wider base for
the final drive to and over the Meuse.
By Christmas Eve the German coun- A résumé of decisions made in the
teroffensive showed signs of losing co- higher German headquarters between
hesion. The outlines of the over-all 22 December and the night of the 24th
strategic plan still were discernible, but will show what was happening. On the
the higher field commands had begun 22d O B WEST prepared for Jodl an in-
to extemporize: in a word the German telligence appreciation which said that a
armies had commenced to “react” to the major Allied counterattack from the
moves made by the enemy or in supposi- north and south by reserves from the
T H E BATTLE BEFORE T H E MEUSE 563

MARCHE

U.S. Third and Seventh Armies was un- T h e Fuehrer replied with congratula-
likely before 1 January, and that a tions and, more to the point, released
“limited” intervention against the flanks the 9th Panzer and 15th Panzer Grena-
of the Bulge probably could not be dier Divisions for free use by O B WEST.
attempted before 28 December. OB That same evening Model phoned Rund-
WEST did recognize that the Allies stedt to tell of a strong American
might assemble a strong force northwest counterattack forming to relieve Bas-
of the Meuse and assumed that they togne which must be expected to strike
would be able to defend the Meuse in on 24 December; he, Model, would have
considerable force by 30 December. It to retain a kampfgruppe of the 15th
appeared from this analysis that time Panzer Grenadier for the expanding
still was on the side of the German battle at Bastogne, but the remainder of
armies, time to interject armor from the this division and the new 9th Panzer
Sixth Panzer Army into the columns would be rushed westward to assist the
driving for the Meuse and to give the 2d Panzer.
depth to the forces in the van which On the morning of the 24th a note of
Rundstedt now regarded as absolutely urgency appeared in the orders coming
essential. On the 23d a report that the out of Model’s command post: the Fifth
advance guard of the 2d Panzer Division Panzer Army must take Bastogne at once
was only nine kilometers from the Meuse and “lance this boil” in the southern
flashed to Model, Rundstedt–and Hitler. flank. For this purpose Manteuffel would
564 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

retain a kampfgruppe of the 9th Panzer into the battle for control of the Marche
southeast of Bastogne as a link with the plateau. Manteuffel could hardly disen-
Seventh Army, now hard pressed by the gage from Bastogne and turn the fight
American counterattack from the south. over to the Seventh Army (indeed, this
The sense of urgency heightened as the was not the Fuehrer’s intention), but
day wore on-it can almost be plotted it was crystal Clear that the 2d Panzer
like a fever chart in the exchanges be- Division advance guard had to be rein-
tween Rundstedt and Model: Rundstedt forced and the narrow wedge it had
demanding that the Sixth Panzer Army driven toward the Meuse had to be ex-
get its armored divisions forward and panded into a pile driver blow to cross
alongside Manteuffel’s spearhead before that river. 5
the Allies can counterattack from both Manteuffel’s immediate tactical prob-
south and north; Rundstedt ordering lem had four parts: the road to the
that the Allied forces be destroyed east isolated 2d Panzer advance guard must
of the Meuse before they can organize a be reopened, 6 both for tank fuel and
major countereffort; Model telling reinforcements; the northern flank of
Rundstedt that the 2d Panzer has run the salient reaching toward Dinant
short of motor fuel and that he has would have to be covered at once and in
ordered the advance guard to march for considerable strength; in the southwest
the Meuse on foot. (One has the impres- where signs of an American concentra-
sion–it can never be verified–that as tion were appearing the southern side of
tension mounted Model commenced to the corridor toward the Meuse must be
turn to the older and more experienced barricaded, perhaps as far back as Bas-
field marshal for moral support.) togne; finally, the assault front in the
General Manteuffel faced a military center required greater width and depth
and political dilemma as day drew to a on the Marche plateau. T h e solution of
close on 24 December. Janus-like, his this problem demanded more strength
Fifth Panzer Army faced toward the than the Fifth Panzer Army, with its
Marche plateau and the road to Dinant tail caught in the crack at Bastogne,
and toward Bastogne. Manteuffel later could amass.
would say that he saw no opportunity Manteuffel had been promised at least
for a successful battle west of the Meuse three more divisions, Jodl had assured
(although he still hoped for military him that the II SS Panzer Corps was
success east of the river) , but the decision being rushed forward by the Sixth
as to which direction the Fifth Panzer Panzer Army to take over the fight on
would throw its weight obviously had his right wing east of the Ourthe River,
to be made by Hitler himself. This ap- and he had reason to expect that the
peal to the highest German authority 9th Panzer Division would arrive in time
was made through various channels by to take part in the attack planned for
Manteuffel and his chief of staff,
Wagener, on the 24th and 25th. Hitler’s
order, as relayed to the Fifth Panzer 5 Manteuffel’s recollections of this period are
very vivid: see MS # B-151a.
headquarters by Jodl early on the 25th, 6 SeeChapter XVIII for the earlier story of the
told Manteuffel to put all available forces 2d Panzer advance guard.
T H E BATTLE BEFORE T H E MEUSE 565

Christmas Day. For this attack, pri- midafternoon on 24 December General


marily designed to reach the “extended Harmon telephoned the VII Corps
index finger” (as one German report command post and asked permission
calls it) formed by the advance detach- to throw another combat command
ment of the 2d Panzer in the woods of his 2d Armored Division against
around Foy–Notre Dame, Manteuffel elements of the 2d Panzer which had
counted on a drive by the bulk of the been identified in the neighborhood of
2d Panzer to reach its cut-off troops while
Ciney and Celles. (See Map VIII.) T h e
the Panzer Lehr attacked Humain and corps commander was away from the
Buissonville to reopen the line of com- command post visiting his divisions; so
munication. the call was taken by the corps artillery
In addition the Fifth Panzer Army commander, Brig. Gen. Williston B.
commander had plans to employ the Palmer. Palmer knew that the First
divisions already in this northwestern Army had attached strings to any whole-
sector as the vertebrae on which a full- sale commitment of Harmon’s division
bodied and integrated salient could be and that Hodges’ consent and probably
developed reaching to and overlapping Montgomery’s would be needed before
the Meuse. T h e right shoulder of the ex-
more of the 2d Armored was unleashed.
panding salient would, in Manteuffel’s He therefore told Harmon to wait–it
plan, be formed by the 116th Panzer was too late in the day to launch an
Division. This unit was now in full forceattack in any case-until the corps com-
on the west bank of the Ourthe, had mander reached the 2d Armored com-
penetrated the American line at Ver- mand post. Harmon was persistent and
denne, and was in position to bring called again asking for “immediate au-
artillery fire on the Hotton-Marche road.thority.” Palmer, sorely tempted to give
T h e objective given the 116th Panzer, Harmon the permission he needed, re-
therefore, was the town of Baillonville luctantly steeled himself and told Har-
(north of Marche), from where it could mon to await Collins’ appearance at the
block an Allied attack southward along 2d Armored command post.
the highway from Liège to Marche. T h e A few minutes later Palmer had a call
9th Panzer Division, upon arrival, was from the First Army chief of staff,
ticketed to take position on the right ofGeneral Kean, who said that Collins was
the Panzer Lehr, thus beefing up the 2d authorized to use all his corps and could
Panzer attack in the center. This was thechange his defensive line. In guarded
German plan for 25 December. words Kean asked Palmer if he saw “a
town A and a town H” on the map and
T h e Celles Pocket then mentioned a “pivoting move.”
Palmer, imbued with Collins’ attack
Although the VII Corps had become philosphy and eager to give the green
involved in a defensive battle, General light to the 2d Armored, looked hastily
Collins still expected to launch the at the map spread before him, picked out
corps counterattack which would signal two villages southwest of Ciney and
the beginning of aggressive operations forward of the 2d Armored positions:
against the north flank of the Bulge. In Achêne and (Le) Houisse. This looked
566 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

like the go signal for the VII Corps and fore, was to go on the defensive and its
an attack to advance its western wing. commander was “authorized” on his
Because the wire line to the 2d Armored own judgment to drop back to the line
command post had gone out, Palmer Andenne-Hotton-Manhay. In any case
sent his aide with a message for Collins the VII Corps was to retain a firm con-
giving his own optimistic interpretation tact with the XVIII Airborne Corps,
of the conversation with Kean. which that evening was withdrawing to
T h e aide had just departed when the Manhay position.
Kean called again. On further reflection, Although General Collins courteously
he said (perhaps Kean had caught a tone asked the senior members of his corps
of exultation in Palmer’s voice), he staff to give their opinions on the action
doubted whether Palmer had under- now to be taken by the corps, neither he
stood him correctly. Then came the cold nor any of his officers considered giving
water douche: “Now get this. I’m only over the attack planned for the 2d Ar-
going to say it once. Roll with the mored. During the day Harmon’s tanks
punch.” Palmer’s glance flicked over the had inflicted very severe damage on the
map, this time to the north; there, thirty German columns; the 84th Division had
miles to the rear of the villages he had experienced some reverses but seemed to
selected earlier were the towns of An- be holding its own. On balance the pic-
denne and Huy. Palmer remembers that ture as seen from the VII Corps’ point of
this was the only moment in the war view was far less gloomy than that ap-
when he was “ill with disapproval.” parently prevailing in higher headquar-
Out went a second messenger with an ters. Collins recognized that a retrograde
explanation of Palmer’s mistake and an move would strengthen the defenses of
urgent request for Collins to come home. Huy and Liège. He also knew that such
Collins, who had received the first mes- a move would expose Namur and the
sage at Harmon’s command post, was just major Meuse crossings south of that city,
giving the finishing touches to an attack for example, those at Dinant. The final
plan for the entire 2d Armored when the decision, made by the corps commander
second messenger appeared. Telling himself, probably could have been pre-
Harmon to “hold everything” but mak- dicted: on 25 December the 2d Armored
ing clear that the 2d Armored was to go Division would advance as planned; the
ahead with plans for the attack on corps then would continue with limited
Christmas morning, Collins hurried back objective attacks to break up any danger-
to his own headquarters. He arrived ous concentration of enemy forces on its
there about 1830 but nothing more could front.7
be done until a liaison officer, promised The boundary between the VII Corps
by Kean, came in from the First Army. and the XVIII Airborne Corps lay
Two hours later the First Army staff generally along the direct road from
officer (Col. R. F. Akers) appeared and Bastogne to Liège, but this was essen-
confirmed the bad news. Montgomery
and Hodges had agreed to shorten the
First Army line in order to halt the 7 General Collins had a detailed memorandum
on these events prepared by his staff and later
German advance. The VII corps, there- kindly provided a photostat copy to the author.
T H E BATTLE BEFORE T H E MEUSE 567

tially an artificial division and coincided was acutely aware of the perilous situa-
neither with the compartmentalization tion confronting his forward troops and
of the terrain, naturally divided as it was knew they had to be reinforced and
by the Ourthe River, nor with the man- resupplied at once. His orders, however,
ner in which the German attack was were to use the rest of his division to
developing.8 T h e ebb and flow of the protect the right flank of Luettwitz’
battle on Christmas Day may best be X L V I I Panzer Corps in the Marche sec-
understood by tracing the movements of tor until the incoming 9th Panzer
three German divisions: the 2d Panzer, Division could take over the task. Since
the Panzer Lehr, and the 116th Panzer. the Americans in and around Marche
Perhaps it would be more accurate to say seemed quiet, Lauchert proposed to
the attempted movements, for the day Luettwitz that he be relieved of this
came bright and clear, bringing the security mission. While Panzer Lehr
American and British air forces into the attacked west of Marche to reopen the
skies over the Bulge in one of the greatest road, Lauchert wanted to switch the
demonstrations of tactical ground sup- main body of his division back through
port ever witnessed by American troops. Rochefort, then push northwest to the
By the morning of the 25th the ad- troops in what German reports already
vance kampfgruppe of the 2d Panzer had were calling the Conneaux Pocket. At
been split in two, in part by a loss of first Luettwitz would not listen to the
direction during the night march toward importunate Lauchert. Probably the re-
Dinant, in part by the activity of Ameri- fusal made no difference. As Lauchert
can tank patrols operating out of Ciney, himself admits, the air was so thick with
where CCB of the 2d Armored had Allied Jabos that his tactical units could
established its base for future operations. not move during the daylight hours, nor
The 2d Panzer reconnaissance battalion was there a German interceptor plane
and a part of the German artillery col- to be seen this far to the west.
umn had bivouacked near Foy–Notre In the early afternoon Manteuffel and
Dame, only four or five miles from the his chief of staff visited General Luett-
bridges at Dinant. Major Cochenhausen, witz. T h e latter once more proposed that
who commanded the main column, in- the forward echelons of the 2d Panzer
cluding a tank battalion and a regiment be withdrawn-although he was well
of panzer grenadiers, halted at daylight aware that such a decision was beyond
in the woods southwest of Conneaux– the power of the Fifth Army commander
perhaps 5,000 meters behind the detach- -and once again was refused. Something
ment in Foy–Notre Dame. might be done, however. Since a kampf-
Lauchert, the division commander, gruppe of the 9th Panzer was finally at
hand and could be used to relieve
Lauchert in the Hargimont sector facing
8 T h e present chapter will be concerned only Marche, the 2d Panzer commander re-
with the battles fought by those troops of the
VII Corps which were west of Hotton on 25 ceived permission to carry out his relief
December. T h e next chapter will deal with the operation. All day long radio reports
remaining combat elements of Collins’ corps as
these played their part in the XVIII Airborne
from Cochenhausen had told of bitter
Corps’ fight farther east. fighting, heavy losses at the hands of
568 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Allied planes and tanks, dwindling am- lost three half-tracks. The 370th Fighter
munition, and no fuel. Now, just as Group of the IX Tactical Air Command,
Lauchert had his orders in hand, he flying in support of CCB, then flushed
heard that radio contact with the force out four Panther tanks and put them
cut off at Foy—Notre Dame had ceased. out of action, at least temporarily. The
T h e attack mapped out by Collins and column again drew fire near Boisselles,
Harmon late the previous afternoon was but two platoons of the 67th Armored
launched by CCB at 0800 on Christmas Regiment moved in and destroyed three
Day, the idea a double-pronged sweep to Panthers doing the shooting. By the
capture Celles and annihilate the Ger- middle of the afternoon Task Force A
man armor believed to be thereabouts.9 reached the high ground overlooking
For this maneuver General White di- Celles, blocking the roads to the west
vided his command into two task forces. and southwest. Task Force B had a brief
Task Force A (Lt. Col. Harry Hillyard) battle at Conjoux, then rushed on–
had its line of departure on the Achene knocking out isolated tanks and guns–
road and orders to take the Bois de until it arrived on the ridge 1,300 yards
Geauvelant, a large wood some thousand southeast of Celles.
meters across, which lay midway between T h e British 29th Armoured Brigade
Achene and Celles. It was to assemble was conducting its own private battle
for the final assault on high ground west of Foy–Notre Dame while pushing
northwest of Celles. Task Force B (Maj. reconnaissance toward the Lesse River.
Clifton B. Batchelder) , starting its The British knocked out three Panthers
move near Leignon, was to make the and some infantry near Sorinne, then
main envelopment and cut off Celles on shot up more German vehicles and took
the southeast. The 82d Armored Recon- prisoners around Foy–Notre Dame. In
naissance Battalion went in on the open the skirmish near Boisselles a few tanks
right flank of the attack to screen toward of the British 3d Royal Tank Regiment
the west and as far forward as the Lesse and some British gunners gave a hand to
River, south of Celles. CCB would be Task Force A.10
supported by artillery emplaced west of Meanwhile the 82d Reconnaissance
Ciney and by both American and British Battalion had run into the remnants of
fighter-bombers. the 2d Panzer reconnaissance battalion
Task Force A, medium tanks to the at Foy–Notre Dame (part of this group
front, went through the Bois de Geauve- had escaped eastward to rejoin the main
lant with almost no opposition. As it force huddled in the woods northeast of
debouched it came under fire from a Celles) . These Germans intended to
little farm near Foy–Notre Dame and make a fight of it, though at first sight
Foy–Notre Dame seemed a peaceful
9 For the American sources used in this chapter farming village-nothing more. When a
see the bibliographical notes included in the foot-
notes to Chapter XVIII. There are a number of
combat interviews covering the 2d Armored Divi- 10British participation is acknowledged in the
sion during this period. General Harmon’s own CCB AAR, 25 December 1944. See also MS, 30
story is told in an article entitled, “We Gambled Corps, Operations during the German Attack in
in the Battle of the Bulge,” T h e Saturday Eve- the Ardennes, December 1944–January 1945 in
ning Post (October 2, 1948). Hist Div ETOUSA files.
T H E BATTLE BEFORE T H E MEUSE 569

platoon from the 82d moved in, the ordination between the artillery and the
enemy began a fusillade of antitank and fighter-bombers of the 370th Fighter
machine gun fire from hidden positions. Group and Royal Air Force 83 Group.
Worse, four Panthers on high ground At noon, for example, a spotter plane
just south of the village took a hand. picked up a column of seven enemy
The American cavalry suffered some tanks north of Celles–all were destroyed
casualties, but Sergeant Rogers used by artillery fire. Twelve P–38’s and an
his assault gun to charge a German unknown number of British Typhoons,
antitank gun in the middle of the village taking time out only to replenish fuel
and the mop-up began. T h e four Pan- tanks and ammunition racks, worked
thers were brought under fire by Brit- over the woods where lay Cochen-
ish gunners, then finally destroyed by hausen’s command and strafed roads and
air attack. (Probably these were the trails whenever vehicles showed signs of
tanks which had struck Task Force A making a break for it.
near the Bois de Geauvelant.) This What of the German efforts to reach
skirmish marked the end of the German Cochenhausen’s force? Two small forays
reconnaissance battalion: the com- were attempted during the day by the
mander and 147 others were captured, Panzer Lehr, whose commander had
and much of its remaining equipment dispatched tanks along the Custinne
was taken. road toward Celles, but these efforts
When General White’s two task forces were foiled by the ubiquitous Allied
finally sent tanks into Celles they met planes. That night the kampfgruppe
little resistance. At first it seemed empty with which the 2d Panzer had been
except for the townspeople who had blocking in the Hargimont sector was
gathered in the church; later some 200 relieved by the 9th Panzer, and Lauchert
dispirited prisoners were rounded up in finally was free to attempt Cochen-
and near the town. With the capture of hausen’s relief. The force which he led
Celles the string was drawn on the bag from the Rochefort road through the
in the forest between that town and Bois de Famenne and Ciergnon was not
Conjoux. Harmon ordered CCB to turn likely to give much confidence of suc-
back the next morning and give the cess: a company or two of tanks, a bat-
coup de grâce to the trapped enemy. talion of armored infantry, a light
Although Christmas Day had brought artillery battalion, two companies of
much sporadic action and occasional engineers, and part of a flak battalion.
flare-ups like the fight at Foy–Notre The Germans had neared the twin
Dame the main German pocket simply villages of Petite and Grande Trisogne,
had been bypassed. It is known that little more than a mile from Celles, when
Cochenhausen’s tanks had very little they saw the ridge ahead “crawling with
gasoline, probably not enough to permit tanks.” (These may have been British
any appreciable skirmishing or tactical tanks because the 29th Armoured Bri-
movement, but the German sluggishness gade was blocking behind the CCB
in the pocket may be credited to the lines.) 11 T h e 2d Panzer never got to
gunners supporting CCB, the army pilots
in their “flying OP’s,” and the close co- 11CCB AAR, 2 6 Dec 44.
570 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

launch an attack, for the American guns ion of the 3d Panzer Regiment, three
opened “a hellish fire” (their targets artillery battalions, and two-thirds of the
spotted-as Lauchert later recalled-by division flak battalion had to be left
five artillery planes). Then to top this behind.12
came the P–38’s and Typhoons. On
nearby roads more Allied tanks hove in T h e Fight at Humain
sight but made no concerted attack.
Lauchert’s group was saved by an order T h e 2d Armored Division’s “limited
radioed from the XLVII Panzer Corps: objective” attack, so carefully planned
he was to return to Rochefort at once; for Christmas Day, included a drive by
the troops in the pocket would have to CCA straight south from Buissonville on
destroy their vehicles, leave their the paved highway to Rochefort, there to
wounded, and get out on foot. A Panzer relieve the battalion of the 84th Division.
Lehr attempt to reach the pocket via This move never was carried through,
Custinne on 26 December was equally although Harmon did not learn that the
futile, and for the same reasons. Bayer- Rochefort troops had escaped until early
lein’s kampfgruppe–at no time in the afternoon. Instead CCA and the 4th
battles on the Marche front did the Cavalry Group were caught up in a quite
Panzer Lehr commander have his entire unexpected battle whose focal point was
division in hand-also was ordered back Humain, east of Buissonville. During
to Rochefort during the night of 26 the night of 24 December Troop A of
December. the 24th Cavalry Squadron occupied
The story of the 2d Panzer pocket is Humain as an outpost for the CCA
quickly told. CCB spent two days clear- assembly area at Buissonville. But the
ing the thick woods and dense under- troopers had short tenure in Humain,
brush between Celles and Conjoux. T h e for across the lines the Panzer Lehr was
procedure was simple and effective: first, gathering its few tanks to break the
heavy shelling on a given area, then a American stranglehold on the throat of
slow, methodical advance by the infantry the 2d Panzer spearhead. Bayerlein di-
line backed with the tanks. In an exten- vided his Panthers into two assault
sion of the Bois de Geauvelant, where groups: a platoon, supported by a rifle
tanks could operate with some freedom, company, to seize Humain; a company,
an armored sweep was made which reinforced by an understrength rifle bat-
killed about 150 of the enemy. In the talion, to drive on the left for Havrenne,
main forest near Celles a final squeeze then Buissonville.
produced 200 prisoners, 12 guns, and 80 T h e German blow struck Humain at
vehicles of various types to add to the first light, driving the cavalry out of
larger bag. Nonetheless many of the town. T h e attack to the west rolled past
German troops did succeed in escaping the burned-out relics of the American
on foot. Major von Cochenhausen and
nearly 600 of his men ultimately reached 12The dramatic end of the hopes nourished for
Rochefort, but all the equipment of the the 2d Panzer and Panzer Lehr find expression in
very detailed recollections by Lauchert; Bayerlein,
reconnaissance battalion, the 304th Pan- MSS # A-941, A-943, and A-944; and Luettwitz,
zer Grenadier Regiment, the 2d Battal- MSS # A-938 and A-940.
T H E BATTLE BEFORE T H E MEUSE 571

successes of the day before– 2d Panzer General Collier, on his own cognizance,
trucks, many armored cars, half-tracks, ordered the American cavalry to with-
and, near Havrenne, the guns of an draw, blocking the roads to the north and
entire artillery battalion. Havrenne be- east lest the enemy erupt toward Marche.
ing empty, the German column moved When the 26th dawned the defenders
on toward Buissonville, Here a ruse was had a fresh force in the town. Panzer
tried and worked. A German officer in Lehr, it will be remembered, had been
American uniform went forward to the relieved during the night by the 9th
two Sherman tanks guarding the bridge Panzer to engage in the sortie toward
over which the Havrenne road entered Celles. T h e 9th Panzer Division (Brig.
Buissonville; so effective an actor was he Gen. Elverfeldt) had been brought from
that the tank crews obeyed without ques- Holland on 22 December. In view of its
tion his order that they return to their exposure to air attack and delays while
bivouac. Four of the German tanks actu- it waited along the road for tank fuel the
ally crossed the bridge at daylight, but division had made very good time, albeit
were driven out by fire from the CCA arriving in the battle line a day behind
tanks’ guns. On the heels of this skirm- schedule. A veteran of the Arnhem and
ish, the leading CCA task force started Aachen battles (it had opposed the 84th
down the road for Rochefort. Near Infantry Division at Geronsweiler in the
Havrenne the Panther company at- north), the 9th Panzer may have had as
tempted to make a stand but was out- many as 90tanks and 35 self-propelled
gunned and lost five tanks. Havrenne assault guns or tank destroyers. Appar-
fell to the Americans, but CCA discon- ently the division artillery regiment did
tinued the advance toward Rochefort not arrive until three or four days later.
for by this time it was known that the When the first march column reached
friendly infantry there had escaped. the line on the afternoon of the 25th it
Meanwhile a considerable threat was deployed south of Marche, there taking
looming on the exposed flank at Hu- over the Marloie-Hedree blocking posi-
main. tion held by the 2d Panzer.
Col. John C. MacDonald’s 4th Cavalry As more troops arrived the 9th Panzer
Group had set about retaking Humain, extended westward, thus including
but his light tanks and tank destroyers Humain in its bailiwick, but Elverfeldt’s
were no match for the heavier German fresh division had more than a defensive
Panthers; nor could the American assault mission. Although Luettwitz intended to
guns get a direct shot at them, shielded employ this new armor to nourish the
as they were behind the stone walls of drive westward, it is questionable
the village. MacDonald tried a dis- whether the X L V I I Panzer Corps com-
mounted assault, but this failed. Artil- mander had anything more in mind than
lery was unable to dislodge the enemy. the defeat of the American armor east
Late in the afternoon Harmon sent a of the Meuse when he gave the 9th
company of medium tanks to assist the Panzer its orders on the night of 25
24th Cavalry Squadron. One last attack December: attack from the Humain sec-
was made in the waning daylight-this, tor and take Buissonville.
too, made no headway. At midnight About 0700 the cavalry observation
572 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

posts north of Humain saw tanks defiling Rochefort over to the 9th Panzer, leaving
from the town onto the Havrenne-Buis- that division with its line bent at a right
sonville road. This word was flashed to angle.
the 2d Armored command post where All through the night of 26 December
Harmon ordered Col. Carl Hutton, the the medium and heavy calibers of the 2d
division artillery commander, to fire a Armored Division artillery blasted away
“serenade” (a T O T ) on Humain with at the Germans in Humain. T h e town
all the 155-mm. and 8-inch battalions in had to be retaken, for it presented a con-
range “right away.” The avalanche of tinuing point of entry into the left flank
heavy shells falling in Humain did not of the 2d Armored. But as part of the
disrupt the German attack formation en larger VII Corps’ scheme, Harmon had
route to Havrenne but may have pre- the task of carrying forward the Ameri-
vented its prompt reinforcement. The can front to the east-west line of the
engagement at Havrenne began within L’Homme and Lesse Rivers. For this
a half-hour, carried by fifteen Panther general advance Harmon brought up
tanks and a battalion of grenadiers from CCR (Col. Sidney R. Hinds), which had
the 10th Panzer Grenadier riding in been waiting at Hogne since Christmas
armored half-tracks. At the edge of the Day, and attached it to Collier’s CCA.
village the German infantry took over Collier ordered CCR to take on the
the initial assault, only to be beaten off Panthers in Humain and sent CCA to
by tank guns, tank destroyers, and artil- clear the large forested area and the
lery. Company I of the 66th Armored roads running south to Rochefort and
Regiment, with its attached platoons of L’Homme. CCB was thus left in the west
infantry and tank destroyers, met and to eradicate the last remnants of the
threw back three separate attacks during Celles pocket while extending patrols,
the day. The job was made easier by the in co-operation with the British 29th
capture of the German attack plan and Armoured Brigade–all of its troops now
the warm attention paid Humain–the east of the Meuse–to the line of the
German sally port–by Hutton’s artillery Lesse River.
and MacDonald’s light armor, the latter T o trap the Humain garrison, Colonel
engaged in shooting up the thin-skinned Hinds made his attack on the morning
half-tracks bringing reinforcements into of the 27th with tanks circling south,
Humain. east, and west of the town, and the ar-
It may seem strange that the 9th Pan- mored infantry moving in from the
zer, with fresh troops and close to its full north. The 2d Battalion (Lt. Col. Lem-
tank complement, did not press the at- uel E. Pope) of the 67th Armored Regi-
tack against CCA. But the 9th, like the ment had isolated Humain by 1 0 1 5 but
2d Panzer and Panzer Lehr before it, found the Panthers missing, driven out
was fighting with one arm behind its during the night by the artillery bom-
back. Luettwitz, gravely concerned that bardment. There remained considerable
the Americans might break through west bite in the Humain defenders and
of Bastogne and surge north to cut off the they momentarily halted the Amer-
divisions in the salient beyond Roche- ican tank column led by Pope.
fort, turned the blocking position at Pope went to the head of the column,
T H E BATTLE BEFORE T H E MEUSE 573

2D ARMORED DIVISION INFANTRYMEN MOVING TO NEW POSITIONS durng the fight


f o r Humain.

reorganized the formation under in- ate that this last effort against the 2d
tense fire, and started the attack Armored should have been dealt with
moving again. (Colonel Pope was by the fighter-bombers whose co-opera-
awarded the DSC.) By noon CCR was tion had contributed in striking measure
in Humain, where it took another ten to the 2d Armored successes before the
hours to clear the houses of the 150 Meuse. Fourteen P–38’s from the 379th
grenadiers who had been left behind. Fighter Group struck Hargimont and,
Even while this fight was in progress as a cavalry outpost happily reported,
Harmon telephoned Collier to “go to the “gave them everything they had.” Two
river with abandon.” more flights were vectored in: “much
This was not quite the end of the flame and smoke observed.” As a final
three-day battle. An artillery spotter and fitting gesture of Allied co-operation
plane flying over Hargimont in the early it may be noted that CCR, faced with a
afternoon saw a column of German ve- stubborn hold-out detachment in a large
hicles gathering for a march down the château east of Humain, called on the
Humain road. It seems rather appropri- flame-throwing Crocodile tanks of the
574 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Scottish Fife and Forfar Yeomanry to T h e Fight at Verdenne


apply the finishing touch to the fight for
Humain. 13 On the night of 24 December the 84th
The ill-fated battle of the XLVII Infantry Division was deployed along an
Panzer Corps in front of Dinant was arc of some twelve miles reaching from
ended. Luettwitz had new orders: his Hogne, northwest of Marche, through
corps must make one final, all-out effort Waha, south of Marche, thence bowing
to take Bastogne, leaving a minimum back to the northeast in front of the
force in the Rochefort area to guard its Marche-Hotton road.15On the right, the
back. Across the lines, on 28 December, 4th Cavalry Group formed a screen mask-
the 83d Infantry Division and the Brit- ing the infantry line. T h e center at the
ish 53d Division began to replace the 2d moment was quiet, but on the left the
Armored Division combat commands.14 116th Panzer Division had broken
By 31 December the 2d Armored was in through the outpost line and despite the
billets, belatedly eating its Christmas successful American counterattack made
dinner. During the brief operation east late in the afternoon still held an en-
of the Meuse the 2d Armored Division trant position at Verdenne.
had racked up a considerable tally: 1,213 T h e 116th Panzer faced a lone battle
prisoners taken, 82 tanks, 83 guns, and as it prepared to carry out the Fifth
441 vehicles captured or destroyed. T h e Panzer Army orders for attack westward.
American losses in armor were light: 5 Thus far the fighting on its right in the
light tanks and 22 mediums. T h e fight sector east of the Ourthe River had not
had cost the 2d Armored Division and its gone too well; neither the 2d SS Panzer
attached units 17 killed, 26 missing, and nor the 560th Volks Grenadier Division
201 wounded-an illuminating commen- managing to gain ground on the 24th.
tary on the use by a veteran formation of To the left the attention of the 2d Pan-
the combined arms, the impossibility of zer was centered on Foy–Notre Dame
striking power inherent in the piecemeal and Celles far to the west. Nonetheless
tactics employed by the enemy, the lack so long as Luettwitz’ armor had any
of a strong German artillery to counter chance of breaking through to the Meuse
the weight of metal always available to the 116th had to continue its attack to
the Americans, and the complete absence breach the American defenses north of
of German attack planes in skies ruled Marche and press forward as a covering
by the American and British fighter- shell for the drive to Dinant.
bombers. General Bolling knew that some Ger-
mans still were around Verdenne on the
13CCR AAR, 27 Dec 44. night of 24 December, but the 84th Di-
14The 2d Armored still was in contact with the vision was unaware that the enemy had
enemy on 28 December. Pvt. C. W. Dilling- slipped on into the woods between
ham was given the DSC for bravery in breaking
through a defended roadblock with his tank; Pfc. Verdenne and Bourdon until a lucky
F. S. Rose was given the DSC for crawling with a fluke revealed the new threat. About
broken leg for one and a half miles through snow
and cold to bring aid to his mortally, wounded
scout section leader after their jeep had hit a 15Sources used in this section are the same as
double Teller mine. those cited in Chapter XVIII.
T H E BATTLE BEFORE T H E MEUSE 575

midnight Companies A and K of the Waldenburg still had hopes that the de-
334th Infantry and Company L, 333d tachment in the woods could be saved,
Infantry, started along the woods trails for during the day the Fuehrer Begleit
and byroads to converge in a night as- Brigade came in on his right, freeing
sault against Verdenne. Moving in from the troops he had deployed to watch
the west, Company K took a wrong turn Hampteau and the Hotton approaches.
and suddenly bumped into a column of More than this, Waldenburg apparently
six or eight tanks. Sgt. Donald Phelps, expected to use the wedge which would
marching at the point, went forward to be created in reaching the pocket as a
check the lead tank. Suddenly a figure means of splitting the Marche-Hotton
leaning out of the tank shouted, “Halt!” line and starting the major advance west-
Phelps, recognizing the German accent, ward.
took a snap shot at the figure who T h e area in which the Germans were
screamed as the bullet struck. T h e hemmed posed a very neat problem in
German tanks opened fire with not only minor tactics. It was about 800 yards by
their machine guns but their main arma- 300, densely wooded, and shaped with
ment, and the American infantry file hit an inner declivity somewhat like a serv-
the dirt. Severely lacerated before it ing platter. Guns beyond the rim could
could break away, the remaining forty not bring direct fire on the targets inside,
men of Company K joined the main as- and tanks rolling down into the pocket
sault against Verdenne an hour later. would be exposed before they could
T h e Germans inside Verdenne had train their weapons. Tanks inside the
been softened by an intense preparatory pocket would be in the same position if
shelling and the American infantry suc- they moved up and over the edge. As-
ceeded in getting clear through the sault by infantry could be met with tank
village–although fighting resumed in fire whether the assault went into or
daylight with the dangerous task of house came out of the pocket.
clearing. One enemy tank showed up Just such an assault was the first tried
during the night, but Sgt. E. T. Rein- by the 333d Infantry, which put Com-
eke killed the tank commander with panies A and B into a predawn attack
a rifle ball, then tossed a grenade into the on 26 December. T h e American skir-
open turret. More American infantry mish line, its movements given away by
arrived in the morning, and by the end the snow crackling under foot, took a
of Christmas Day 289 Germans had number of casualties and was beaten
surrendered. back, but it gave some test of the enemy
T h e seizure of Verdenne cast a loop strength, now estimated to be two rifle
around the German tanks and infantry companies and five tanks. Actually most
in the woods north of the village. At of the Germans in the 1st Battalion, 60th
noon on Christmas Day a tank company Panzer Grenadier Regiment, took part in
from the 16th Panzer Regiment tried an the fighting at the pocket or in attempted
assault in staggered formation against infiltration through the woods to join
Verdenne but found Company B of the their comrades there. One such relief
771stTank Battalion waiting and lost party, led by a tank platoon, did cut its
nine tanks–its entire complement. way in on the morning of the 26th. Now
576 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

that the enemy had been reinforced the smash through Hampteau, grab the
333d Infantry decided to try the artillery, ridge running back to the west where it
although not before Colonel Pedley had overlooked Hotton and Ménil, and take
been given brass-bound assurance that Hotton by attack from the rear, that is,
the gunners would lay their pieces with the west bank of the river. Success at
such minute precision as to miss the Hotton would permit the 116th Panzer
friendly infantry edging the pocket. to peel the American flank back from the
Through the rest of the day an 8-inch Marche road.
howitzer battalion and a battalion of The first contingent from the Fuehrer
155’s hammered the target area, intent Begleit came into the line opposite
on jarring the panzers loose, while a Hampteau at noon, deployed, and at
chemical mortar company tried to burn 1400 hit Company G of the 334th Infan-
them out. try, which was guarding the Hampteau
On 27 December patrols edged their bridge site. This attack seems to have
way into the pocket, to find nothing but been poorly organized (prisoners said
abandoned tanks. T h e previous evening that the attack formation had been
General Waldenburg heard that the wrecked in the assembly area by artillery
Fuehrer Begleit Brigade was being taken fire). In any event it crumbled under
away from his right flank and that he the shells of tank destroyers and the 84th
must go over to the defensive at once. Division artillery. This proved to be the
Still in radio contact with the pocket, single pinch-hit performance of the
Waldenburg ordered the troops there to Fuehrer Begleit, for later in the after-
come out, synchronizing their move with noon it was ordered out of the line and
an attack at dusk which would be made sent marching for Bastogne.
toward Ménil, northeast of Verdenne. At 1830 the German attack shifted
Perhaps the feint at Ménil served its toward Ménil, conducted as an envelop-
purpose-in any event most of the gren- ment on the east and west by infantry
adiers made their escape, riding out on and tanks of the 116th Panzer. T h e
the tanks still capable of movement. western blade of the scissors ran into
Although this last sortie against Ménil trouble when the tanks leading the at-
was only a ruse, Ménil and the surround- tacking column were forced off the road
ing area had been the scene of bitter by a daisy-chain of antitank mines. While
fighting and stubborn German attacks attempting to re-form, the tanks were
on 26 December. Krueger, the LVIII suddenly assailed by salvo fire from three
Panzer Corps commander, saw in the field artillery battalions. Six tanks fell
newly arrived Fuehrer Begleit an oppor- prey to the American cannoneers and the
tunity to carve the Hotton garrison, attack collapsed. Later the enemy made
which had been so effectively barring a demonstration here as part of Walden-
his advance over the Ourthe, down to burg’s feint. On the east side of the town
size. The villages of Hotton, Hampteau, the assault had to be made across 500
and Ménil form a triangle, Hampteau yards of bare ground. T h e enemy fusil-
being the apex of the triangle, if this is iers bravely attempted the passage, at-
pictured as projecting toward the tempted it several times during the
German lines. Krueger’s plan was to course of two hours, but unprotected
T H E BATTLE BEFORE T H E MEUSE 577

flesh and blood were no match for the new fight brewing at Bastogne. T h e
2,000 rounds of high explosive which 84th Infantry Division sent out patrols
the 326th Field Artillery Battalion and counted its prisoners—592 for the
poured down on this killing ground. Verdenne engagement. T h e entire oper-
By the morning of 27 December the ation as part of the VII Corps cost the
whole Marche-Hotton front had quieted. 84th Division 112 killed, 122 missing,
In the enemy lines the crippled and and 348 wounded. On New Year’s Day
demoralized 116th Panzer licked its the 84th was relieved by the British 53d
wounds and dug defensive works while Division and moved north, prepared to
its neighbor on the left, the XLVII Pan- team once again with the 2d Armored
zer Corps, retired to a shortened position Division–but this time for the offensive.
in order to free men and tanks for the
CHAPTER XXIII

The Battle Between the Salm


and the Ourthe
24 December - 2 January
The Sixth Panzer Army had begun the its place in the German scheme of ma-
Ardennes counteroffensive with two dis- neuver. Therefore, the task-and glory
tinct missions in hand: the first, to cross –of leading the drive across the Meuse
the Meuse River between Liège and had passed to the Fifth Panzer Army.
Huy as a prelude to the seizure of Ant- But General Sepp Dietrich’s SS forma-
werp; the second, to wheel a cordon of tions had failed quite as signally to
divisions onto a blocking line extending achieve the second mission-to create the
due east of Liège to cover the depth of blocking line east of Liège. Left free to
the advancing army and to deny incom- deploy along the proliferating highway
ing Allied reinforcements the use of the system southeast of Liège, the Americans
highway complex southeast of Liège. had been able to throw two fresh corps
Constricted by the American grip on the into defensive array along the Salm, the
Elsenborn Ridge “door post” (as the Ourthe, the Lesse, and L’Homme Riv-
German High Command called this PO- ers, thus still further obstructing the ad-
sition), the Sixth Panzer Army had vance of the Sixth Panzer and, more im-
bumped and jostled some of its divisions portant, endangering the exposed right
past Elsenborn and on toward the west, flank of the Fifth Panzer as it maneu-
but had failed to achieve the momentum vered before the Meuse. (See M a p
and maneuver room requisite to the as- VIII.)
signed missions. T h e armored gallop for By 24 December the westernmost
the Meuse had foundered on the north armored columns of the Fifth Panzer
bank of the Amblève River when Pei- Army had been slowed to a walk quite
per’s mobile task force from the 1st SS literally, for the OB WEST orders on
Panzer Division had run squarely against that date called for the advance toward
the 30th Infantry Division. T h e 12th SS the Meuse “to proceed on foot.” In part
Panzer Division, supposed originally to the loss of momentum arose from sup-
be running mate with the 1st SS Panzer, ply failure, but basically the slowing
had become involved in a costly and process stemmed from the failure of the
time-consuming fight to budge the Amer- Sixth Panzer Army to form a protected
ican “door post,” failing thereby to keep corridor for its neighbor to the south
T H E BATTLE BETWEEN T H E SALM AND T H E OURTHE 579

and so to cover the flank, the rear, and cause its westernmost divisions, which
the line of communications for Man- had followed the level path of the Fam-
teuffel’s salient. enne Depression at Marche and Roche-
It was apparent by the 24th to all of fort, were under attack from American
the higher German commanders that the forces holding command of the high
advance must be strengthened in depth ground on the Marche plateau to the
and-if possible-enlarged by pushing north. It therefore seemed essential for
out the northern flank on the Marche the Sixth Panzer to establish itself on the
plateau. German intelligence sources same high ground if it was to relieve the
now estimated that the Allies were in pressure on Manteuffel’s open and en-
the process of bringing a total of four dangered north flank. In theory the
armored and seven infantry divisions strategic objectives of the Sixth Panzer
against the northern flank between the were Liège and Eupen, but the German
Salm and Meuse Rivers. T h e Sixth Pan- war diaries show clearly that Rundstedt
zer Army had to transfer its weight to (and probably Model) hoped only that
the west. Hitler, who had been adamant Dietrich could wheel his forward divi-
that Sepp Dietrich should drive the sions into a good position on defensible
Americans back from the Elsenborn posi- ground from which the Fifth Panzer
tion, finally granted permission on 24 Army could be covered and supported. 1
December to give over the battle there On the morning of 24 December the
and move in second-line divisions ca- Sixth Panzer Army was deployed in an
pable only of defensive action. Rund- uneven stairstep line descending south-
stedt already had gone on record that it west from the boundary with the Fif-
was “useless” to keep five divisions in the teenth Army (near Monschau) to the
Elsenborn sector. Neither Rundstedt nor Ourthe River, newly designated as the
Model had completely given up hope dividing line between the Fifth and
that the point of the Sixth Panzer Army Sixth. In the Monschau-Höfen sector the
might shake free and start moving again, L X V I I Corps held a north-south line,
for the German successes in the Vielsalm the corps’ front then bending at a right
area at the expense of the American
XVIII Airborne Corps promised much
1Model’s suicide, later in the war, permits in-
if Dietrich could reinforce his troops on terpretations by his superiors and subordinates
this western flank. Nonetheless, the main which may or may not be in accord with the
play still would be given the Fifth Pan- facts. Even so, the OB WEST KTB does provide
a reasonable guide to Model’s conduct of the
zer Army. Ardennes operation in these last days of the
T h e orders passed to Dietrich for 24 offensive. Also, the OB WEST/IC-Tagesmeldungen
December were that his attack forces in reveal what information on the Allied dispositions
and intentions was available to Model. A further
the Salm River sector should push hard check is provided by a series of postwar interro-
toward the northwest to seize the high gations involving Rundstedt and Jodl. For the
ground extending from the swampy former see CSDIC (U.K.) # GRGG330, SRGG
1332 and SRGG 1334 (these interrogations date
plateau of the Hohes Venn southwest from July and August 1945). Jodl was interro-
across the Ourthe River. In the opinion gated by the USFET Historical Division before
his execution: MS ETHINT–51 (Jodl). See also
of Rundstedt’s staff the Fifth Panzer the testimony of Jodl’s aide in MS ETHINT–34
Army was at tactical disadvantage be- (Buecks) .
580 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

angle past the Elsenborn ridge line. This on the German side of the line. There
corps front coincided almost exactly with the LVIII Panzer Corps, forming the
that of the American V Corps. T h e I SS right wing tip of the Fifth Panzer Army,
Panzer Corps continued the German line lay astride the Ourthe with its armor
west along the Amblève River where (the 116th Panzer) on the west bank
it faced the reinforced 30th Infantry and the bulk of its infantry (the 560th
Division, but at the juncture of the Yolks Grenadier Division) on the east
Amblève and the Salm the line bent bank, echeloned in front of the incoming
south at a sharp angle, following the east II SS Panzer Corps.
bank of the latter river as far as Vielsalm. When, on the night of 2 2 December,
This section of the German line opposite the advance guard of Bittrich’s II SS
the 82d Airborne Division was poorly Panzer Corps first descended on the
manned. T h e 1st SS Panzer Division American-held crossroads at Baraque de
(the only division available to the Fraiture, General Bittrich had only one
corps) had put troops across both the regiment of the 2d SS Panzer Division
Amblève and Salm, but by the 24th the available for mounting this new Sixth
1st SS, already badly beaten, was able to Panzer Army attack. On 23 December,
do little more than patrol its corner when the Americans at the crossroads
position. finally succumbed to superior numbers,
T h e fall of St. Vith had opened the Bittrich had nearly all of the 2d SS at his
way for the westernmost corps of the disposal and the advance guard of his
Sixth Panzer Army to form a base of 9th SS Panzer Division was nearing the
attack running generally west from Viel- east bank of the Salm. Field Marshal
salm and the Salm River to the cross- Model had just wheeled the two infantry
roads at Baraque de Fraiture (Parker’s divisions of the L X V I Corps northward
Crossroads). This corps, the I I SS Pan- with orders to attack astride the Salm
zer, had relieved the 560th Volks Gren- valley, thus bolstering Bittrich’s right
adier Division of its attack against the flank, now insecurely held by the deci-
south front of the 82d Airborne and 3d mated 1st SS Panzer Division.
Armored Divisions, the 560th sideslip- General Bittrich had been promised
ping further west to take over the front, still more forces for his attack to the
facing elements of the 3d Armored Divi- northwest. T h e Fuehrer Begleit Brigade,
sion between the Aisne and Ourthe re-forming after its battles in the St. Vith
Rivers. The diagonal course of the Our- sector, was en route to join the 2d SS
the valley and the broken nature of the Panzer at the Baraque de Fraiture cross-
ground lying east of it posed an organ- roads. T h e 12th SS Panzer Division, so
ization and command problem for both Bittrich was told, would be relieved in
Germans and Americans. Those ele- the Elsenborn sector and hurried to the
ments of the 3d Armored east of the new Sixth Panzer front. Finally, Hitler
Ourthe, though belonging to Collins’ himself would order the 3d Panzer Gren-
VII Corps, were actors in the story of adier Division moved from the Elsen-
the XVIII Airborne Corps. T h e same born battle to the fight looming between
lack of neat accord between battle roles the Salm and the Ourthe. Bittrich has
and order of battle listings was reflected not recorded any gloomy suspicion of
T H E BATTLE BETWEEN T H E SALM AND T H E OURTHE 581

this potential plethora of riches, but as to march forward at the right shoulder
a veteran commander he no doubt rec- of the 2d SS Panzer. This was the out-
ognized the many slips possible between line plan for 24 December.
cup and lip: the increasing poverty of
POL, Allied air strikes against any and On the morning of 24 December the
all moving columns, the poor state of American troops between the Salm and
the few roads leading back through the Ourthe Rivers were deployed on a front,
narrow Sixth Panzer zone of communi- if so it can be called, of over thirty miles.
cations, and, finally, the pressing and This, of course, was no flankless and
probably overriding demands of the integrated position. On the west wing in
Fifth Panzer Army with one foot en- particular the American line consisted of
tangled at Bastogne and the other poised small task forces from the 3d Armored,
only a few miles from the Meuse. each defending or attacking a hill or
T h e German attack plans, formulated hamlet in what were almost independent
during the night of 2 3 December as the operations. In the Salm sector the 82d
2d SS Panzer mopped up the last of the Airborne Division faced north, east, and
defenders around the Baraque de Frait- south, this disposition reflecting the
ure crossroads, called for a continuation topsy-turvy condition encountered when
of the 2d SS Panzer attack northwest, the division first came in to cover the
astride the Liège highway on the 24th. deployment of the XVIII Airborne
T h e immediate objective was the Man- Corps. T h e 504th Parachute Infantry
hay crossroads five miles away. Once at (Cor. Reuben H. Tucker), on the divi-
Manhay the attack could either peel off sion north flank, was bent at an angle
along the road west to Hotton, there reaching west and south from the con-
freeing the Fifth Panzer Army forma- fluence of the Amblève and Salm Rivers,
tions hung up at the Hotton-Marche a position assumed while Kampfgruppe
road, or swing northwest to gain the Peiper was on the rampage west of
main Ourthe bridge site at Durbuy. T h e Stavelot. T h e 505th Parachute Infantry
II SS Panzer Corps attack base on the (Col. William E. Ekman) over-watched
Salmchâteau-La Roche road seemed se- the Salm from positions on the west
cure enough. On the left the 560th had bank extending from Trois Ponts south
driven a salient clear to Soy, a distance past Grand Halleux. T h e 508th Para-
of eleven miles. On the right American chute Infantry (Col. Roy E. Lindquist)
stragglers from St. Vith were fighting to held a series of bluffs and ridges which
escape northward through or around faced the bridge sites at Vielsalm and
Salmchâteau. T h e 82d Airborne Divi- Salmchâteau, then extended westward
sion still had an outpost line covering overlooking the La Roche highway. T h e
much of the road west of Salmchâteau, 325th Glider Infantry (Col. Charles
but the Fuehrer Begleit Brigade was in Billingslea) held the division right flank
position to roll back the Americans in and continued the westward line along
this sector. In any case the 9th SS Panzer the ridges looking down on the La Roche
Division would, in a matter of hours, road; its wing was affixed to the village
cross the Salm River in the Vielsalm- of Fraiture just northeast of the cross-
Salmchâteau area and swing northwest roads where the 2d SS Panzer had begun
582 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

its penetration. the German penetration which had


From Fraiture west to the Ourthe the driven as far north as the Soy-Hotton
American “line” was difficult to trace. road and threatened to engulf Task
Here elements of the 3d Armored Divi- Force Orr, standing alone and vulner-
sion and two parachute infantry battal- able at Amonines on the west bank of
ions were attempting to hold an exten- the Aisne River. Two regimental com-
sion of the American line west of bat teams from the as yet untried 75th
Baraque de Fraiture, none too solidly Infantry Division were en route to help
anchored at Lamorménil and Freyneux.2 shore up the ragged 3d Armored (–)
At the same time the Americans’ exposed front but probably would not reach Gen-
right wing was counterattacking to erase eral Rose until the evening of the 24th.
There were some additional troops
2 The term “elements of the 3d Armored Divi-
sion” is used advisedly for CCB was operating immediately at hand to throw in against
with the 30th Division in the La Gleize sector, the II SS Panzer Corps. All through the
while Task Force Doan (Lt. Col. Leander L. Doan) afternoon and evening of the 23d the
was with the 84th Division west of the Ourthe.
For the preceding action of these elements, see St. Vith defenders poured through the
Chapter XXII. American lines. When the last column,

PRIME MOVER TOWING AN 8-INCH HOWITZER ALONG A ROAD NEAR MANHAY


T H E BATTLE BETWEEN T H E SALM AND T H E OURTHE 583

led by Colonel Nelson of the 112th In- to husband his fuel for a short, direct
fantry, reached the paratroopers, some thrust.
15,000 men and about a hundred usable T h e assault, however, was initiated by
tanks had been added to Ridgway’s force the right wing of the 560th Volks Gren-
west of the Salm. Aware of the increasing adier Division, which had provided the
enemy strength south of Manhay, Gen- cover for the 2d SS Panzer assembly.
eral Ridgway sent troops of the 7th During the previous night the 1130th
Armored and the remnants of the 106th Regiment, now reduced to fewer than
Division to extend and reinforce the 500 men, had slipped between the 3d
right flank of the 82d Airborne. At the Armored outposts manned by Task
same time, he ordered CCB, 9th Ar- Force Kane at Odeigne and Freyneux.
mored, to assemble as a mobile reserve T h e American outpost in Odeigne hav-
around Malempré, east of the Manhay ing been withdrawn, a German assault
road, and to back up the American gun platoon supported by a company or
blocking position just north of the Bara- two of grenadiers moved into the open
que de Fraiture. Ridgway, however, to attack Freyneux. About a dozen Amer-
recognized that the 7th Armored was ican tanks, half of them light, remained
much below strength and that the quiet in their camouflaged positions in-
rugged, forested terrain on his front was side Freyneux. T h e German infantry en-
poor for armor; so, on 24 December, he tered the village while the assault guns
asked Hodges to give him an infantry closed in to give support; this was what
division. the short-barreled Shermans needed.
They destroyed or crippled over half
T h e Battle at the Manhay the guns, an American tank destroyer
Crossroads shelled the enemy infantry out of the
houses, and the skirmish abruptly ended.
By dawn on 24 December General- A second German force meanwhile
leutnant Heinz Lammerding, comman- had made a pass at the third of Kane’s
der of the 2d SS Panzer, had brought his roadblock positions here in the valley,
two armored infantry regiments into Lamorménil, just west of Freyneux. In
line north of the Baraque de Fraiture this case the enemy first perched up on
crossroads. The zone on the west side of the heights, trying to soften the Amer-
the road to Manhay was given over to ican detachment with long-range as-
the 3d Panzer Grenadier, that east of sault gun fire, but when the guns moved
the road to the 4th Panzer Grenadier. down into the village for the kill the
Both groups possessed small panzer de- American tankers promptly knocked out
tachments, but the bulk of Lammer- the leaders. At twilight further enemy
ding’s tanks were left bivouacked in adventures in this sector were abandoned
wood lots to the rear. T h e terrain ahead since the possession of Odeigne opened
was tactically negotiable only by small the way for a flanking thrust at the Man-
packets of armor, and in the past twenty- hay crossroads and the seizure of Grand-
four hours the amount of POL reaching ménil on the road to Hotton and the
the westernmost German columns had Ourthe. In any case the 1130th had sus-
been gravely reduced. Lammerding had tained such severe losses during the day
584 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

MANHAYCROSSROADS

that it was temporarily out of action. of pavement would provide, the Amer-
Kane’s task force was not hit again and ican fighter-bombers were exceedingly
withdrew to the north under cover of busy–whatever his reason Lammerding
fog and artificial smoke on the 26th. did no more during the morning than
It will be recalled that Task Force to probe at Brewster’s position while
Brewster had established a roadblock waiting for elbow room to be won a
position athwart the Manhay road late mile or two on either side of the
on the 23d. During the night German highway.
infantry had filtered into and through Remer’s Fuehrer Begleit Brigade,
the surrounding woods, taking posses- which had the task of driving the Amer-
sion of Odeigne—only 1,200 yards to the icans back and giving free play to the
west–in the process, but Brewster’s tanks east wing of the 2d SS Panzer, moved
and guns were deployed with enough in- up past Salmchâteau in the early morn-
fantry to hold the enemy riflemen at ing and struck through the village of
arm’s length. For any one of a number Regné, where a platoon of paratroopers
of reasons General Lammerding did not and three 57-mm. antitank guns proved
essay a tank assault in force to oust Brew- no match for the panzers. Possession of
ster from the highway. T h e Americans Regné opened the way into the Lienne
in part were masked from direct obser- River valley, thus endangering the 82d
vation, the ground was poor, the Ger- Airborne flank and line of supply. More
man main force needed a wider corri- immediately, the German coup de main
dor than possession of twenty-two feet at Regné opened the way for the 4th
T H E BATTLE BETWEEN T H E SALM AND T H E OURTHE 585

Panzer Grenadier to initiate a pincers 23d Ridgway had ordered Hasbrouck to


attack against the 2d Battalion of the collect a force from the 7th Armored
325th Glider Infantry at Fraiture, the sufficient to hold the Manhay junction
western corner post of the 82d Airborne and to tie this force to the 82d Airborne
defenses. Hard on the heels of the Ger- positions. Hasbrouck selected Colonel
man infantry, the point of the Fuehrer Rosebaum’s CCA, which had come
Begleit swung to take a hand against through the withdrawal from St. Vith
Fraiture. Here the 2d Battalion, “tired in fair shape. T h e first part of the 7th
of attempting to stop armor with tired Armored mission was carried out in the
men and thin air,” received permission early morning of the 24th when a task
about noon to withdraw a half-mile to force outposted Manhay and its radial
the northeast. T h e battalion fell back roads, but a reconnaissance detachment
with almost no loss, although it had to sent southeast to contact the 82d Air-
take on one of the flanking detachments borne was halted by a blown bridge.
from the 4th Panzer Grenadier en route. There remained a gap, therefore, be-
While this rear guard action was in tween the 7th Armored advance task
progress, the reserve company of the force, which was assembling at noon in
325th and a medium tank company from the vicinity of Malempré, southeast of
the 14th Tank Battalion counter- Manhay, and the new 82d Airborne
attacked at Regné and wrested it from flank being formed north of Fraiture.
the tank detachment left there by Re- On the west wing co-ordination be-
mer. This village no longer had a place tween the 7th Armored and the 3d Ar-
in the Fuehrer Begleit scheme. T h e bri- mored task forces would prove to be
gade was shifting to Fraiture, and even very complicated indeed. That portion
before its columns could close new or- of General Rose’s division east of the
ders arrived from Marshal Model which Ourthe River by now was fighting two
would send Remer and his panzers separate battles, one in the Hotton-Soy
hurrying posthaste to join the Fifth sector where the 560th Volks Grenadier
Panzer Army farther west. penetration had occurred, and the other
During the morning of the 24th a se- along the series of blocking positions
ries of somewhat un-co-ordinated and that reached from Task Force Brewster’s
disconnected steps had been taken by the handhold on the Manhay road, through
American commanders facing the threat Freyneux and Lamorménil, and north-
posed by the II SS Panzer Corps. Gen- west to Orr’s position at Amonines on
eral Ridgway had no direct authority the Aisne River. T o give cohesion to the
over the 3d Armored Division troops, 3d Armored defensive battle east
who belonged to the VII Corps, and the of the Aisne, General Rose recalled
units which had just come out of the Brig. Gen. Doyle Hickey, his CCA
St. Vith salient were scattered hither commander, from the 84th Divi-
and yon without much regard to tactical sion sector and placed him in command
unity or proper integration in the wire there. Early in the afternoon Hickey
and radio command net earlier estab- met Colonel Rosebaum, who had just
lished for the XVIII Corps formations brought the main force of CCA, 7th
west of the Salm. On the night of the Armored Division, into Manhay, and
586 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

ELEMENTS OF THE 3D ARMORED DIION ADVANCING NEAR MANHAY

the two worked out a plan to co-ordinate its retirement new orders arrived from
the efforts of their respective commands. the XVIII Airborne Corps. Field Mar-
T h e 7th Armored troops would deploy shal Montgomery had visited Ridgway’s
on the high ground south of Manhay and headquarters in midmorning and had
extend their line across the highway decided at once that the American front
and along the ridge leading east to Ma- between the Ourthe and the Salm was
lempré. Thereafter Task Force Brew- too full of holes and overextended.3 Fur-
ster would attempt to withdraw from thermore he was concerned with the in-
its beleaguered roadblock position, re- creasing German pressure on the west-
tire through the 7th Armored line, and ern flank of the First Army as this was
swing westward to bolster the 3d Ar- represented by movement against the
mored outposts in the Lamorménil-Frey-
neux sector. 3 See Msg, Montgomery to Eisenhower, 25 Dec
Colonel Rosebaum’s command took 44, SHAEF Msg file. Montgomery appears to have
the rest of the daylight hours to carry been kept fully apprised of the Manhay fight by
the Phantom service. See Hills, Phantom Was
out the planned deployment, but be- There. See also Sylvan Diary and XVIII Airborne
fore Task Force Brewster could begin Corps G–3 Jnl.
T H E BATTLE BETWEEN T H E SALM AND T H E OURTHE 587

VII Corps flank at Ciney. He told the until the 7th Armored had redressed
First Army commander, therefore, that its lines.
the XVIII Airborne Corps must be with- A glance at the map will show how
drawn to a shorter, straighter line and difficult the series of American maneu-
that the VII Corps could be released vers begun on Christmas Eve would be
from “all offensive missions.” General and how tricky to co-ordinate, particu-
Collins might, on his own volition, draw larly in the Manhay sector. Yet it was
the left wing of the VII Corps back on precisely in this part of the front that
the line Hotton-Manhay, conforming to communications had not been thorough-
Ridgway’s regroupment.4 ly established and that tactical cohesion
T h e American line to be formed dur- had not as yet been secured. As shown
ing the night of 24 December was in- by later events, communication be-
tended to have a new look. T h e 82d tween the 3d Armored and the 7th Ar-
Airborne would pull back to a much mored commanders and staffs failed
shorter front extending diagonally from miserably. There had been so many re-
Trois Ponts southwest to Vaux Chav- visions of plans, orders, and counteror-
anne, just short of Manhay. CCA of the ders during the 24th that Colonel Rose-
7th Armored would withdraw to the baum did not receive word of his new
low hills north of Manhay and Grand- retrograde mission until 1800. T h e with-
ménil (although Colonel Rosebaum pro- drawal of CCA, 7th Armored, and the
tested that the high ground now occu- elements of CCB, 9th Armored, south
pied by his command south and south- and southeast of Manhay was scheduled
east of Manhay was tactically superior) to begin at 2230-and most of these
and retain a combat outpost in the valley troops and parts of the 3d Armored
at Manhay itself. T h e 3d Armored task would have to pass through Manhay.
forces had been promised support in the Toward Manhay, on the night of 24
form of the 289th Infantry, due to ar- December, the main body of the 2d SS
rive on Christmas Eve; so Hickey Panzer Division was moving. T h e sei-
mapped his new position to rest on the zure of Odeigne the night before had
Aisne River with its east flank tied to opened a narrow sally port facing
Grandménil and its west resting on Grandménil and Manhay, but there was
Amonines. Since the 289th, a green reg- no road capable of handling a large
iment, would be put into an attack on armored column between Odeigne and
the morning of the 25th to clear the the 2d SS Panzer assembly areas
Germans out of the woods near Grand- south of the Baraque de Fraiture. On
ménil, Hickey decided that Task Force the 24th the commander of the 3d Pan-
Kane would have to remain in its zer Grenadier Regiment secured Gen-
covering position at Freyneux and eral Lammerding’s approval to postpone
Lamorménil while the 289th assembled, a further advance until the German en-
and that Task Force Brewster—thus far gineers could build a road through the
exposed only to desultory attack-would woods to Odeigne. By nightfall on
have to hold on at the Manhay road Christmas Eve this road was ready-and
the Allied fighter-bombers had returned
4 Collins’ decision is described in Chapter XXII. to their bases. T h e 3d Panzer Gren-
588 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

TROOPS OF THE 84TH INFANTRY DIVISION DIGGIG IN

adier now gathered in attack formation word by radio to report in Manhay,


in the woods around Odeigne, while there to be given new orders-the orders,
tanks of the 2d Panzer Regiment formed that is, for the general withdrawal north.
in column along the new road, T o T h e commander of the 7th Armored
the east the 4th Panzer Grenadier sent position north of Odeigne (held by a
a rifle battalion moving quietly from company of the 40th Tank Battalion
Fraiture through the woods toward Ma- and a company of the 48th Armored In-
lempré. By 2100, the hour set for the fantry Battalion) had just started for
German attack, the column at Odeigne Manhay when he saw a tank column
was ready. Christmas Eve had brought coming up the road toward his position.
a beautifully clear moonlit night, the A call to battalion headquarters failed to
glistening snow was hard-packed, tank- identify these tanks, but since the leader
going good. showed the typical blue exhaust of the
About the time the German column Sherman, it was decided that this must
started forward, the subordinate com- be a detachment from the 3d Armored.
manders of CCA, 7th Armored, received Suddenly a German bazooka blasted
T H E BATTLE BETWEEN T H E SALM AND T H E OURTHE 589

from the woods where the Americans on the tankers’ heels), the support eche-
were deployed; German infantry had lon of CCB, 9th Armored, already had
crept in close to the American tanks passed through Manhay, and the head-
and their covering infantry. Four of quarters column of CCA, 7th Armored,
the Shermans fell to the enemy bazooka was just on its way out of Manhay when
men in short order and two were crip- the American tanks that had escaped
pled, but the crippled tanks and one from the first roadblock position burst
still intact managed to wheel about and into the latter village. Thus far the
head for Manhay. T h e armored infantry headquarters in Manhay knew nothing
company asked for permission to with- of the German advance–although a
draw, got no answer, and finally broke- quarter of an hour earlier the enemy
the survivors turning toward Manhay. gunners had shelled the village. A pla-
A thousand yards or so farther north toon commander attempted to get two
stood another 7th Armored roadblock, of his medium tanks into firing posi-
defended by an understrength rifle com- tion at the crossroads itself, but the
pany and ten medium tanks which had situation quickly degenerated into a
been dug in to give hull defilade. suave qui peut when the leading pan-
Again the Americans were deceived by zers stuck their snouts into Manhay.
the Judas Goat Sherman leading the en- In a last exchange of shots the Amer-
emy column. When almost upon the im- icans accounted for two of the panzers
mobile American tanks the Germans cut but lost five of their own tanks at the
loose with flares. Blinded and unable rear of the CCA column. Thus Manhay
to move, the ten Shermans were so many passed into German hands.
sitting ducks; most were hit by tank The medium tanks and armored in-
fire and all were evacuated by their fantry that had started to follow the
crews. The American infantry in turn light tank detachment out of Malempré
fell prey to the grenadiers moving circled around Manhay when they
through the woods bordering the road heard the firing. Working their way
and fell back in small groups toward north, the road-bound tanks ended u p
Manhay. at Werbomont while the riflemen moved
It was now a little after 2230, the cross-country to reach friendly lines
hour set for the 7th Armored move to about two thousand yards north of Man-
the new position north of Manhay. T h e hay. There Colonel Rhea, commanding
covering elements of the 3d Armored the 23d Armored Infantry Battalion,
had already withdrawn, but without had formed a defense on the hills bor-
notifying CCA of the 7th. 5 T h e light dering the highway to Werbomont and
tank detachment from Malempré had Liège. All this while Major Brewster
left that village (the grenadier battal- and the task force astride the highway
ion from the 4th Regiment moving in south of Manhay had been under fire,
but the enemy had refused to close for
a final assault. It soon became apparent,
5 T h i s failure is confirmed in the XVIII Air- however, that this small American
borne Corps Inspector General Report of Investi-
gation, CCA, 7th Armored, Manhay, 24–25 force was on its own and that the Ger-
December 1944, dated 6 January 1945. mans were in strength to the rear. Brew-
590 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

ster radioed for permission to pull out; headquarters. General Ridgway saw that
when it was granted he turned east his new corps defense might be split
toward Malempré, hoping to find this in the center before it could properly
spot still in friendly hands. T h e Ger- solidify. General Hodges sent message
man battalion which had come up from after message to the XVIII Airborne
Fraiture met Brewster’s column at Ma- Corps insisting that Manhay must be
lempré and shot out his two lead tanks. retaken, for it was all too clear that
Since there was no other road, Brew- if the Sixth Panzer Army could rein-
ster ordered his vehicles abandoned and force the Manhay salient, Liège and
released his men to reach the American the Meuse bridgehead would be in grave
lines on their own–most of his com- danger. 6 In addition, he pressed Field
mand made it. Marshal Montgomery for more divisions
Although the 2d SS Panzer had pre- to backstop the threatened sector be-
empted a piece of the new American tween the Salm and the Ourthe.
line, General Lammerding was none too By daylight on the 25th Colonel Rhea
pleased by the results of the Christmas had amassed a sizable force on the hills
Eve attack. His tanks had bitten only north of Manhay, his own armored in-
a small piece from the tail of the “long fantry battalion, reinforced by the 2d
American column” reported fleeing Battalion of the 424th Infantry, plus
Manhay. (Their inability to do better the tanks and stragglers that had worked
his officers ascribed to the difficulty at- their way past the enemy in Manhay.
tendant on bringing more than one or T h e Germans scouted this position,
two tanks into firing position on the nar- then broke contact–probably discour-
row roads.) T h e accompanying infan- aged by twelve P–47’s from the 389th
try formations had failed to co-ordinate Squadron who claimed ten tank kills
their advance with that of the armored on this mission. T o the east General
assault from Odeigne and to seize, as Gavin sent the 1st Battalion of Billings-
planned, the wooded heights northwest lea’s glider infantry to secure his divi-
of Manhay and Grandménil. Lammerd- sion’s right flank at Tri-le-Cheslaing,
ing and the II SS Panzer Corps com- a tiny collection of houses in the valley
mander, General Bittrich, agreed that about 2,000 yards east of Manhay. For
the 1st SS Panzer should continue the some reason, perhaps the lack of co-or-
battle with shock tactics aimed at secur- dination which had bothered Lammer-
ing an enlarged maneuver space east ding, the 4th Panzer Grenadier had
and west of Manhay. T h e 9th SS Panzer not pushed forward and the village was
(which had crossed the Salm River be- unoccupied. Thus far the 82d Airborne
hind the withdrawing 82d Airborne) had had no physical contact with CCA
was to align itself as rapidly as might of the 7th Armored, but Gavin was
be with Lammerding’s division in an apprised by radio that his western neigh-
advance up the Lienne valley toward bor was in position on the Werbomont-
Bras, commanding the high ground Liège highway.
northeast of Manhay.
T h e fall of Manhay roused consider- 6 Sylvan Diary; XVIII Airborne G–3 Jnl, 25
able apprehension in the American Dec 44.
T H E BATTLE BETWEEN T H E SALM AND T H E OURTHE 591

General Bittrich had no intention of 289th Infantry (Col. Douglas B. Smith)


pushing the 2d SS Panzer north toward had come into assembly areas west of
Liège. Although the time at which the Grandménil on Christmas Eve in prep-
I I SS Panzer Corps commander received aration for a dawn attack to drive the
his orders is uncertain, it is known enemy off the wooded hills southwest
that by the small hours of 25 December of Grandménil.7 The lead battalion, the
Bittrich was embarked on a new mis- 3d, actually had started forward from
sion assigned by General Kraemer, the its bivouac in Fanzel when it encoun-
Sixth Panzer Army chief of staff. T h e tered some 3d Armored tanks (the lat-
2d SS Panzer now was to turn west ter supposed to be screening the 289th
from Manhay, drive along the lateral deployment) hurrying to the west.
road to Erezée on the Aisne River, About this time the battalion received
then pivot northwest to seize the Ourthe orders from Hickey that it should dig
bridgehead at Durbuy, all this as a ma- in to bar the two roads running west
neuver to strike the American VII and northwest from Grandmenil. De-
Corps in the flank and break the dead- ploying as rapidly as possible in the
ly ,grasp Collins and Harmon had on the deep snow, the battalion outposted the
throat of the Fifth Panzer armored col- main west road to Erezée. T h e Germans
umns in the Celles-Marche sector. negotiated this forward roadblock with-
For such a change of axis the Ger- out a fight, the ubiquitous and deceptive
mans needed turning room, and they Sherman tank again providing the ticket.
could best gain it by seizing the road When the panzers, some eight of
center at Grandménil just west of the them, arrived at the main foxhole line
Manhay crossroads. As a result, then, the German tankers swiveled their gun
the major part of the 2d SS Panzer turrets facing north and south to blast
would turn away from the 7th Armored the battalion into two halves. One un-
to engage General Hickey’s troops from known soldier in Company K was un-
the 3d Armored. Richardson’s task daunted by this fusillade: he held his
force, really little more than a light ground and put a bazooka round into
tank platoon, had fallen back from the spot but he had stopped the enemy
Manhay to Task Force Kane’s roadblock column cold in its tracks, for here the
at Grandmenil. Here Kane had his road edged a high cliff and the remain-
trains and a platoon of tank destroyers. ing panzers could not pass their stricken
T h e Panthers, followed by the German mate. Apparently the Panther detach-
infantry, pursued the Americans into
Grandmenil. T h e American tank de- 7 Like nearly all green divisions the 75th In-
fantry Division failed to keep or transmit really
stroyers attempted a fight from the high complete and useful historical records during its
ground west of the village but had no first combat operations. The bulk of the detailed
infantry in support and, as the grena- information on the regimental actions of this
division comes from the 3d Armored units to
diers close in, withdrew westward along which the formations of the 75th were attached
the road to Erezée. By 0300 on 25 De- and from the combat interviews with the former.
cember, then, the Germans held Grand- For the 289th Infantry, however, there exists the
written recollections of the regimental communica-
ménil and were poised on the way west. tions officer, Capt. Walter G. Runte’s study in the
It will be remembered that the new Advanced Infantry Officers’ Course, Class No. I.
592 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

ment had outrun its infantry support or mounted at 2000, McGeorge’s armored
was apprehensive of a close engagement infantry and a company from the 289th
in the dark, for the German tanks backed preceding the American tanks in the
off and returned to Grandménil. dark. Within an hour five tanks
It took some time to reorganize the and a small detachment of the armored
3d Battalion of the 289th, but about infantry in half-tracks were in Grand-
0800 the battalion set off on its assigned ménil, but the enemy promptly coun-
task of clearing the woods southwest of terattacked and restored his hold on the
Grandménil. At the same time the rest village.
of the regiment, on the right, moved T h e 2d SS Panzer had nevertheless
into an attack to push the outposts failed on 25 December to enlarge the
of the 560th Volks Grenadier Division turning radius it needed around the
back from the Aisne River. General Grandménil pivot. T h e German records
Hickey, however, needed more help show clearly what had stopped the ad-
than a green infantry regiment could vance. Every time that the 3d Panzer
give if the 3d Armored was to halt Grenadier formed an assault detach-
the 2d SS Panzer and restore the block- ment to break out through the woods
ing position at Grandménil. His plea south and west of Grandménil, the
for assistance was carried by General American artillery observers located on
Rose up the echelons of command, and the high ground to the north brought
finally CCB was released from attach- salvo after salvo crashing down. All
ment to the 30th Division in the La movement along the roads seemed to be
Gleize sector to give the needed ar- a signal for the Allied fighter-bombers
mored punch. to swoop down for the kill.9 T o make
Early in the afternoon Task Force matters worse, the 9th SS Panzer had
McGeorge (a company each of armored failed to close up on the 2d SS Panzer
infantry and Sherman tanks) arrived Division’s right. General Lammerding
west of Grandménil. T h e task force was dared not swing his entire division in-
moving into the attack when disaster to the drive westward and thus leave
struck. Eleven P–38’s of the 430th Squa- an open flank facing the American ar-
dron, which were being vectored onto mor known to be north of Manhay.
their targets by the 7th Armored Divi- Although General Ridgway had
sion, mistook McGeorge’s troops for
Germans and made a bombing run over
the wooded assembly area. CCB later re- were using the distinctive U.S. orange insignia.
ported that 3 officers and 36 men were The IX TAC operations summary of 25 December
notes that the 7th Armored had set the co-ordinate
killed by the American bombs. Here P–5388 as the “no-bomb” line; everything to the
again the failure of communications be- east, therefore, was fair game. McGeorge’s assem-
tween the 3d and 7th Armored Divi- bly area was almost exactly on the co-ordinates
given.
sions had cost dear. 8 A new attack was 9At 1345 on the 25th, General Kean, First Army
chief of staff, called the IX TAC and said that
8 CCB, S–3 Jnl and AAR. The 474th Squadron the first priority air mission for the entire First
Operations report of 25 December 1944, says Army was the enemy penetration at the junction
that the vehicles attacked were displaying orange of the XVIII Airborne and VII Corps. IX TAC,
panels. By this date, however, some German units A–2 Jnl.
T H E BATTLE BETWEEN T H E SALM AND T H E OURTHE 593

ordered the 7th Armored to recapture west along the Erezée-Soy road, the
Manhay “by dark tonight,” the means at battle-weary and depleted 560th Volks
Hasbrouck’s disposal on the 25th were Grenadier Division fought to gain con-
meager. CCA, which had been employed trol of the western section of the same
earlier because it had come out of the road between Soy and Hotton. Having
St. Vith fight with the fewest wounds, driven a salient north in the Aisne valley,
now was in poor shape indeed, having the left wing of this division set up a
lost nearly two medium tank companies night attack on Christmas Eve intended
and much of its tank destroyer comple- to dislodge Task Force Orr from the
ment. CCB had not yet been reorganized Aisne bridgehead at Amonines. This
(and in any case it was very much below small American task force held a three-
strength in men and vehicles) but it mile front-little more than a chain of
could furnish two understrength tank pickets-with no support on the flanks
companies and one company of armored and no troops to cover its rear. When
infantry. T h e main road into Manhay evening came, crisp and clear, the enemy
from the north, intended as the avenue guns and rocket launchers set to work.
of Hasbrouck’s advance, would take some Probably the Germans used a battalion
hours to clear, for the retreating tankers of infantry, making twelve separate at-
had littered it with felled trees during tempts to break through Orr’s line. At
the night withdrawal. T o get at grips one point they were near success: Orr
with the enemy from this direction the said later, “If they’d have had three
2d Battalion of the 424th Infantry was more riflemen they’d probably have over-
added to the attack; the whole operation run our positions.” But the attacker
would, or so it was hoped, mesh with lacked the “three more riflemen” and
the 3d Armored advance on Grandménil Task Force Orr retained control of
from the west. Amonines.
T h e abatis on the Manhay road While the enemy hammered futilely
effectively stopped the 7th Armored at Task Force Orr on the night of 24
tanks. When a company of six tanks December, Hogan’s encircled task force
lined up for a charge into Manhay from far to the south at Marcouray finally
the east, half of them were knocked made a break to reach the American
out; General Hasbrouck, who was on lines.10 All the operable vehicles were
the scene, ordered the remaining tanks destroyed or damaged, and the wounded
to retire. T h e battalion from the 424th were left in the charge of volunteer
did succeed in nearing the village but medical aid men. Guiding on the stars
paid a heavy toll for the few hundred and compass, Hogan’s men moved
yards crossed-later estimated as some stealthily through the enemy positions.
35 percent casualties-and at dark was At one point a German sentry gave a
ordered back to the north. challenge, but a sergeant got to him
with a bayonet before he could spread
T h e Fight in the Aisne Valley the alarm. Most members of the task

While the 2d SS Panzer was struggling 10The early story of Hogan’s task force is told
to shake itself loose for the drive in Chapter XV.
594 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

force reached their comrades by wooded ridge south of the road.


Christmas morning. About midnight on the 24th the bat-
T h e appearance of the 75th Infantry talions started their assault companies
Division (Maj. Gen. Fay B. Prickett) in forward, crossing a small stream and
the 3d Armored sector promised the ravine, then halting to reorganize at a
needed rifle strength to establish a solid tree line which edged a broad meadow
defense in the rugged country east of over which the assault had to be carried.
Hotton and along the bluffs of the Aisne Here all was confusion and the com-
River. T o establish a homogeneous line panies were not straightened out until
the Americans would have to seize the dawn. Finally the assault began, straight
high, wooded, and difficult ground south across the open, snow-covered meadow
of the Soy-Hotton road, and at the beyond which lay the ridge line objec-
same time push forward on the left to tive. Losses among these green troops
close up to the banks of the Aisne over were severe and most of the officers were
the tortuous terrain south of the Erezée- killed or wounded. Despite this harsh
Grandmenil road. With the two regi- baptism of fire the troops reached the
ments of the 75th attached to the 3d wood cover at the foot of the ridge
Armored (the 289th Infantry and the and held on. In midafternoon more
290th Infantry), General Rose ordered infantry came up (probably from the
a drive to cement the CCA wing in the 517th), plus a platoon of tank de-
west, stroyers, and a fresh assault was now
T h e units of the 75th had been scat- organized. This carried through the
tered in widely separated areas after woods and onto the ridge. Participants
their arrival in Belgium. A smooth- in the action later estimated that the
running supply system had not yet been 3d Battalion, 290th Infantry, alone suf-
set up, and to concentrate and support fered 250 casualties, but this figure
the rifle battalions would prove difficult. probably is exaggerated 11
.
But the 290th (Col. Carl F. Duffner), Farther east the 289th Infantry also
which had been moving into a defensive had a rough introduction to battle on
position around Petit Han, north of Hot- rugged terrain far more difficult than
ton, received orders at 1600 on the 24th any training ground in the States. On
to assemble at Ny for an attack to begin the night of 24 December the regiment
two hours later. There ensued much moved by truck to Fanzel, north of
confusion, with orders and counter- Erezée, there receiving orders to attack
orders, and finally the attack was re- at 0800 the next morning and seize the
scheduled for a half-hour before mid- high ground north of the Aisne. Early
night. T h e regiment had no idea of the on Christmas morning, as already re-
ground over which it was to fight but did lated, the 3d Battalion was hastily thrown
know that the line of departure was then into the fight being waged by the 3d
held by a battalion or less of the 517th Armored troops west of Grandménil.
Parachute Infantry Regiment deployed By the hour set for the 289th to attack,
along the Soy-Hotton road. T h e 2d and
3d Battalions of the 290th were chosen 11 Capt. David C. Clagett, Study for the Advanced
for this first battle, their objective the Infantry Officers Course, class 1.
T H E BATTLE BETWEEN T H E SALM AND T H E OURTHE 595

however, a part of the 3d Battalion duels, So heavy was the traffic on the
could be freed to move into the regi- meager Sixth Panzer Army line of com-
mental advance. The 560th Volks Grena- munications, and moving as it did by
dier Division had only a thin screen fits and starts under the watchful eyes
facing the 289th and by dusk the 3d of Allied air, that only one battalion of
Battalion was on its objective, the hill corps artillery and one corps Werfer
mass southwest of Grandmenil. On the battalion succeeded in crossing to the
right flank the 1st Battalion reached the west bank of the Salm. Ammunition
line of the Aisne, but in the center the resupply from the rear was almost non-
2d Battalion lost its direction in the existent. On Christmas Eve the corps
maze of wooded hills and ravines. By had taken matters in its hands and dis-
midnight of the 25th it had gravitated patched its own trucks to the ammu-
into and around La Fosse, a village nition dumps back at Bonn, but each
southwest of Grandmenil, leaving a wide round trip would take three to four
gap between itself and the 1st Battalion. nights because the daylight movement
T h e next day, under a new commander, of thin-skinned vehicles carrying high
the 2d Battalion deployed along the explosive was almost certain suicide.
Aisne but still had no contact with the Finally, the 9th SS Panzer had failed
1st. 12 to keep to schedule and probably would
not come abreast of the 2d SS until the
T h e 2d SS Panzer Is Halted night of 26 December.
But General Lammerding could not
Although the 2d SS Panzer Division delay his bid for a breakout until rein-
still held Grandmenil and Manhay on forcements arrived. On the morning of
the morning of 26 December, it had the 26th he ordered the 4th Panzer
lost much of its bite and dash. T h e two Grenadier to attack northward, using
grenadier regiments had been whittled Manhay and the forest to the east as a
down considerably; the 4th Panzer line of departure. T h e 3d Panzer Grena-
Grenadier had lost heavily, particularly dier would have to make the main
in officers, during the fight for the effort, forcing its way out of Grandmenil
Baraque de Fraiture. Across the lines and along the road west to Erezée.
thirteen battalions of field artillery were T h e enemy attempt to shake loose
firing into the German positions between and break into the clear proved abortive.
the Aisne and the Lienne, and the II SS On the right the 4th Panzer Grenadier
Panzer Corps had been unable to bring sent a battalion from the woods east of
forward enough artillery and ammuni- Manhay into an early morning attack
tion to engage in any counterbattery that collided with Billingslea’s glider
infantry in Tri-le-Cheslaing. I n the pre-
12The price for the intial commitment of the dawn darkness some of the grenadiers
two regiments from the 75th was relatively high.
The total losses of CCA, 3d Armored, during sneaked in on the battalion command
the fighting from 22 to 31 December were 70 post, only to be driven off by a reserve
killed, 376 wounded, and 218 missing. Of this platoon. A move to encircle the village
total the attached 289th Infantry alone lost 37
killed, 208 wounded, and 79 missing. 289th Inf from the east was beaten back almost
AAR, Dec 44. singlehandedly by a stray Sherman tank
596 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

which the glider infantry had com- a liaison plane to find the enemy tanks,
mandeered during the 7th Armored but to no avail. It is known that Com-
withdrawal. When daylight came the pany L of the 289th Infantry knocked
enemy assault force was in full retreat, out a Panther leading a vehicular col-
back to the woods. Plans for a second umn through a narrow gorge on the
attack north from Manhay died aborn- Mormont road and took a number of
ing, for by that time the Americans had casualties during a scrambling fight be-
the initiative. tween bazookas and tank weapons. T h e
T h e German advance out of Grand- German accounts say that this road was
ménil was planned as a double-pronged blocked by fallen timber and that in-
assault: one column thrusting straight tense American artillery fire halted all
west on the Erezée road; the other movement north of Grandmenil. What-
heading off to the northwest along a ever the reason, this group of tanks
narrow, precipitous road which would made no further effort to force the Mor-
bring it to Mormont and a flanking mont road.13
position vis-à-vis Erezée. T h e westward Task Force McGeorge received six-
move began at false dawn, by chance teen additional Shermans at noon and
coinciding with Task Force McGeorge’s a couple of hours later, on the heels
renewal of its attack to enter Grand- of a three-battalion artillery shoot, burst
ménil. Again the road limited the action through to retake Grandmenil. T h e
to a head-on tank duel. McGeorge’s pounding meted out by the 3d Armored
Shermans were outgunned by the Pan- gunners apparently drove most of the
thers, and when the shooting died down grenadiers in flight from the village;
the American detachment had only two by dark the 3d Battalion of the 289th
medium tanks in going condition. had occupied half of the village and held
Sometime after this skirmish one of the road to Manhay.
the American tanks which had reached There remains to tell of the 7th
the edge of the village during the Armored’s attempt to recapture
attack of the previous evening suddenly Manhay. T o visualize the 7th Armored
came alive and roared out to join the as a ready combat division at this time
task force. What had happened was one would be to distort reality. By the
of the oddities born of night fighting. 26th its three armored infantry bat-
Captain Jordan of the 1st Battalion, 33d talions were woefully understrength, and
Armored Regiment, had led five tanks less than 40 percent of its tanks and
into Grandménil, but during the earlier tank destroyers were operable. Even this
fight four had been hit or abandoned very reduced capability could not be
by their crews. Jordan and his crew sat 13 The man who stopped the lead tank may
through the night in the midst of the have been T/Sgt. Stephen G. Andromidas of Com-
dead tanks, unmolested by the enemy. pany L (Ltr, Maj. C. W. Anderson to Maj. Gen.
William F. Train, 1 3 Dec 60). It is also possible
When the captain reported to his head- that these German tanks were checked by a tank
quarters, he told of seeing a German destroyer of the 629th Tank Destroyer Battalion.
column, at least twelve Panthers, Sgt. Oscar M. Mullins and Pfc. Edwin W. Metz
were awarded the DSC (both posthumously) for
rumbling out of Grandménil in a north- stopping an attack of “fourteen” enemy tanks on
erly direction. T h e 3d Armored put up this date.
T H E BATTLE BETWEEN T H E SALM AND T H E OURTHE 597

employed with full effect against the honor”; but it was too much to expect
enemy. It was only a matter of hours of human flesh and blood, mind and
since the 7th Armored had been driven heart, that the 7th Armored should
from St. Vith, and the officers, men, and continue, only hours after the retreat,
vehicles of most of its units were spread to demonstrate the same high order of
about helter-skelter from village to vil- combat efficiency seen in the defense
lage just as they had arrived back in the of St. Vith.
American lines after the disorganization General Hasbrouck had no plans for
attendant on the withdrawal across the retaking Manhay on the morning of the
Salm. T h e problem of combat morale 26th; he counted rather on a few hours
is more difficult for the historian, writing to regroup his command. But about 0900
long after the event, to analyze. Has- General Collins called from the VII
brouck’s division had made a fight of Corps to ask that Ridgway put the 7th
it at St. Vith, more than meriting the Armored into an attack at Manhay as
eulogy of Field Marshal Montgomery’s an assist for the 3d Armored drive
retreat order, “They come back in all against the twin village of Grandménil.

DESTRUCTION AT GRANDMÉNIL, including a damaged Panzerkampfwagen V (Panther).


598 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Within the hour the First Army Com- It would appear that the 7th Armored
mander had General Ridgway on the tank detachment which had neared the
telephone, insisting that the 7th Ar- Grandménil-Manhay road had convinced
mored must attack-and that forthwith. the commander of the 3d Panzer Grena-
Ridgway could do no more than tell dier that his battalion in Manhay was
Hasbrouck to retake Manhay “as soon in danger of being surrounded (partic-
as possible.” T h e 7th Armored com- ularly since Billingslea’s paratroopers to
mander put the few tanks he could scrape the east had driven back the 4th Grena-
together into a march toward the road diers) and that he had ordered the
linking Manhay and Grandménil, but Manhay garrison to withdraw under
this move was slow in starting and the cover of night, leaving its wounded be-
3d Armored troops entered Grandménil hind.
while the 7th Armored tanks still were T h e loss of Manhay ended the 2d
several hundred yards to the north. SS Panzer battle in this sector, and the
About this time the 7th Armored de- German corps and division commanders
tachment came under accurate direct agreed that there seemed little chance
fire from some German tanks dug in of starting the attack rolling again. On
north of the connecting road and the the morning of the 27th orders from
Americans halted. Sepp Dietrich told General Lammerding
Meanwhile Allied fighter-bombers that his division would be relieved by
had been vectored over Manhay to soften the 9th SS Panzer Division and that the
up the defenders, and General Ridgway 2d SS Panzer would move west to join
decided to use the fresh 3d Battalion of the 560th Volks Grenadier Division and
the 517th Parachute Infantry, which had the newly arrived 12th SS Panzer Divi-
just come down from helping the 30th sion in a new Sixth Panzer Army attack
Division in the La Gleize operation, for directed at the Hotton-Soy-Erezée line.
a night assault at Manhay. This attack,
made an hour or so after midnight and T h e 82d Airborne Withdraws From
preceded by an eight-battalion artillery the Salm River Line
concentration fired for twenty minutes,
gained quick success. By 0400 on 27 When the XVIII Airborne Corps
December the paratroopers had cleared commander ordered the defense of St.
the village, at a cost of ten killed and Vith abandoned on 23 December, one
fourteen wounded. By dawn airborne of his chief concerns was the mounting
engineers had cleared the fallen trees enemy strength which threatened to out-
from the road back to Werbomont, and flank and overrun the small detach-
a platoon of medium tanks moved in ments of the 82d Airborne Division,
to cover the approaches to the village. plus the 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry,
Some clue to the ease with which the deployed to hold the bridgeheads at
paratroopers took Manhay–not forget- Salmchâteau and Vielsalm through
ting, of course, the weight of metal which the St. Vith garrison had to with-
thrown into the town by the American draw. T h e 82d, it will be remembered,
cannoneers–may be found in the was forced to hurry troops from its north
German account of events on the 26th. flank, where they had been involved in
T H E BATTLE BETWEEN T H E SALM AND T H E OURTHE 599

hard battle with the 1st SS Panzer Divi- sector until the first days of January.
sion around Trois Ponts and Cheneux, American identification of this new
in order to reinforce the opposite flank armored division, however, added to the
of the division, which extended from list of factors that resulted in the de-
Salmchâteau west to Fraiture, at Frai- cision to withdraw the 82d Airborne
ture dangling in the air. T h e danger and shorten the XVIII Airborne Corps
now was that the German armor already line.
on the west side of the Salm River would Early on Christmas Eve General
speed to turn this open flank and crush Gavin met with some of his officers in
the 82d Airborne back against the Salm, the command post of Ekman’s 505th.
or at the least make a powerful jab He knew that his division was faced
straight along the west bank to dislodge by elements of at least three German
the American hold on the two bridge- divisions, his right was overextended,
head towns. Kampfgruppe Krag, as al- the support which might be expected
ready recounted, did succeed in doing from his right wing neighbor was
exactly that at Salmchâteau late on the problematical, and a large German force
23d and entrapped part of Task Force (the remnants of Kampfgruppe Peiper)
Jones and the last column of the was actually in his rear somewhere
112th Infantry on their way back from near Trois Ponts. Gavin now had to
St. Vith. decide whether he should divert some
T h e 9th SS Panzer Division, charged of his troops to hunt out and fight the
in the enemy scheme with breaking enemy in his rear or proceed with the
across the river at Salmchâteau and planned withdrawal. T h e main problem,
Vielsalm and here rolling up the 82d Gavin concluded, was to put his division
Airborne south wing, failed to arrive in an organized position, dug in with
at the Salm on schedule. As a result wire and mines in place, to confront
General Gavin was faced with one the attack of “several” panzer divisions
major threat against his position, on the on the morning of the 25th. He held,
night of 23 December posed by the then, to his plan for withdrawing the
2d SS Panzer and the Fuehrer Begleit 82d Airborne.14
Brigade at Fraiture, rather than two as Gavin’s plan was to bring back the
the II SS Panzer Corps had hoped. By bulk of his regiments under cover of
midday on the 24th, however, the night; he would leave small detach-
Germans had patrols across the river ments from each as covering shells until
at Vielsalm. This covering force came the early morning. About 2100 the divi-
from the 19th Panzer Grenadier Regi- sion moved out for the new Trois Ponts
ment, recruited from Germans living in –Manhay line. Christmas Eve was
the Black Sea area, and it had earned crystal clear and the moonlight on the
a reputation as the élite regiment of
the 9th SS Panzer Division. T h e rest of 14For this phase of the action, the most useful
the 9th SS Panzer either had been de- materials are W. G. Lord, History of the 508th
tached on other missions or was strag- Parachute Infantry (Washington, 1948); 82d Abn
Div, Chronology, Dec 44; 82d Abn Div, T h e Story
gling to the east–indeed, the divisional of the Bulge: T h e Division Commander’s Report;
tank regiment did not reach the Salm and especially the combat interviews.
600 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

snow made it easy to follow the routes whooping and yelling as they charged
assigned. (Overhead the buzzbombs the paratroopers. T h e platoon from
could be traced on their flight to Company B had a few moments to get
Antwerp.) At only two points did the set and then stopped the grenadiers with
enemy interfere with the marching col- machine gun fire before they could reach
umns of the 82d Airborne, and at only the position. T h e Company A platoon,
one of these by design. After the de- closer to the river’s edge, had a worse
bacle at La Gleize, Colonel Peiper and time of it. Here a few of the enemy
some 800 of his kampfgruppe had taken got into the American position, while
refuge in the densely wooded and broken others blocked the withdrawal route
ground north of Trois Ponts, waiting to the west. At one point the 508th
for an opportunity to cross the Salm and wrote this platoon off as lost; but skill-
rejoin their comrades of the 1st SS Pan- fully led by 1st Lt. George D. Lamm
zer. T h e hour chosen by Peiper coin- the paratroopers fought their way
cided with the move made by the 505th through the enemy and back to their
Parachute Infantry as it pivoted on own lines.
Trois Ponts back from the river. T h e T h e 19th Regiment, which had hit
two forces, both attempting to with- the paratroopers at Vielsalm, followed
draw, brushed against each other and the American spoor doggedly, despite
one company of the 505th got into a the laggard pace of the rest of the divi-
brief but hot fire with Peiper’s men. sion, and in the early afternoon of 25
Colonel Ekman, however, had a mission December was observed in Odrimont, a
to complete before day dawned and with couple of miles from the 508th outpost
General Gavin’s permission the 505th line. That night the 19th hit the regi-
let Peiper go. mental left, with perhaps two bat-
T h e second action this night was no talions making the assault, but was beat-
accident. It involved the covering force en back after a three-hour fire fight. Two
of the 508th, led by Lt. Col. Thomas nights later the 19th struck again, this
Shanley, in what the regiment later re- time driving on a narrow front against
corded as “one of the best pieces of the right wing of the 508th. Company
fighting in the 508th’s history.” T h e G was driven out of the twin villages
main body started on the seven-mile trek of Erria and Villettes where it was
to its new line with no sign of the bivouacked, but this penetration came
enemy and by 0415 was in position. Some to an abrupt halt when two artillery
time around midnight the covering pla- battalions went to work. T h e following
toons near the Vielsalm bridge site (one morning the commander of the 3d
each from Companies A and B) heard Battalion (Lt. Col. Louis G. Mendez)
much noise and hammering coming from organized a counterattack which swept
the direction of the bridge, which the through Erria (catching a number of the
airborne engineers had partially de- tired grenadiers still asleep in captured
molished. Suddenly artillery and mortar bedrolls) and restored the line. T h e
shells erupted around the American fox- American gunners had done much to
hole line, a barrage followed by smoke take the sting out of the enemy force-
shells. Out of the smoke rose dark figures, over 1 0 0 German dead were counted
T H E BATTLE BETWEEN T H E SALM AND T H E OURTHE 601

around the village crossroad (the than planned. T h e march west by the
German account relates that the 1st Bat- 12th SS Panzer Division had taken much
talion of the 19th was “cut to pieces” longer than reckoned, for the slow-
here) . moving 9th SS Panzer had jammed the
roads in front of the 12th SS Panzer,
“ T h e Sad Suck Affair” there had been a series of fuel failures,
Allied air attacks had cut most of the
As the year came to a close the Sixth march to night movement, and just as
Panzer Army made one last effort to the division was nearing the Aisne
breach the American defenses between River OB WEST had seized the rear-
the Salm and the Ourthe. This battle ward columns for use at Bastogne. All
took place in and around the hamlet that the 12th SS Panzer could employ on
of Sadzot (so tiny that it does not appear 27 December, the date set by the army
on most of the Belgian maps). Sadzot commander for the new attack, was the
lay on a small creek 400 yards south 25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, most
of Briscol, a village on the main road of which was already in the line facing
between Grandménil and Erezée. T h e the 3d Armored. T h e 2d SS Panzer con-
engagement at Sadzot was fought by tribution perforce was limited: its re-
squads and platoons, and so may be connaissance battalion, a battalion of
appropriately called a “soldiers’ battle”; mobile guns, and two rifle companies,
with equal propriety the name coined a task force commanded by the same
by the GI’s for this confused action is Major Krag who had raised such havoc
used here: “The Sad Sack Affair.” 15 at Salmchâteau. T h e time for the attack
Having given up the fight for Manhay was midnight.
and Grandménil, the 2d SS Panzer began During the 27th the lines of General
to parcel out its troops. Some were left Hickey’s command had been redressed.
to cover the deployment of the 9th In the process the 1st Battalion of the
SS Panzer as it extended its position in 289th Infantry had tied in with Task
front of the 82d Airborne to take over Force Orr on the Aisne River while the
the onetime 2d SS Panzer sector. Other 2d Battalion, having finally straightened
units shifted west to join the incoming itself out, continued the 3d Armored
12th SS Panzer in what was planned line through the woods southwest of
as a major attack to cross the Trois Ponts Grandménil. Unknown at the time,
–Hotton road in the vicinity of Erezée a 1,000-yardgap had developed south of
and regain momentum for the drive to Sadzot and Briscol between these two
the northwest. Once again, however, the battalions.
forces actually available to the II SS At zero hour the German assault
Panzer Corps were considerably fewer force started forward through the deep
woods; the night was dark, the ground
15The German account of this action will be pathless, steep, and broken. T h e grena-
found in MS # P–032E. T h e best American diers made good progress, but radio
account is that given in Spearhead I n t h e West. failed in the thick woods and it would
See also journals of the 289th Infantry and CCA,
3d Armored Division. T h e paratroopers took the
appear that a part of the attackers
main losses in this fight: 120 casualties. became disoriented. At least two com-
602 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

panies from the 25th Panzer Grenadier moved forward. By 1100 the 509th had
Regiment did manage to find their way clicked the trap shut on the Germans
through the gap between the battalions inside Sadzot.
of the 289th and followed the creek into There remained the task of closing
Sadzot, where they struck about two the gap between the two battalions of
hours after the jump-off. the 289th. General Hickey put in the
T h e course of battle as it developed 2d Battalion of the 112th Infantry at
in the early morning hours of 28 De- dark on the 28th, but this outfit, hastily
cember is extremely confused. T h e first summoned to the fight, lost its direction
report of the German appearance in and failed to seal the gap. Early on the
Sadzot was relayed to higher headquar- morning of the 29th Hickey, believing
ters at 0200 by artillery observers belong- that the 112th had made the line of
ing to the 54th Armored Field Artillery departure secure, sent the 509th and
Battalion, whose howitzers were em- six light tanks to attack toward the
placed north of the village. T h e two southeast. But the enemy had reorgan-
American rifle battalions, when queried, ized in the meantime, put in what
reported no sign of the enemy. Inside probably was a fresh battalion, and be-
Sadzot were bivouacked Company C of gun a new march on Sadzot. In the
the 87th Chemical Battalion and a tank collision that followed, a section of
destroyer platoon; these troops rapidly German 75-mm. antitank guns destroyed
recovered from their surprise and during three of the light tanks and the para-
the melee established a firm hold on troopers recoiled; but so did the enemy.
the north side of the village. General During the morning the 2d Battalion,
Hickey immediately alerted the 509th 112th Infantry, got its bearings—or so
Parachute Infantry Battalion near it was believed—and set out to push a
Erezée to make an envelopment of bar across the corridor from the west,
Sadzot from west and east, but no sooner where contact with the 1st Battalion of
had the paratroopers deployed than they the 289th was firm, to the east and the
ran into Krag’s kampfgruppe. socket provided the 2d Battalion, 289th.
This meeting engagement in the dark- Across the deep ravines and rugged hills
ness seems to have been a catch-as-catch- American troops were sighted, and be-
can affair. T h e American radios, like lieving these to be the 2d Battalion
the German, failed to function in this the troops from the 112th veered toward
terrain (the 3d Armored communi- them. What had been seen, however,
cations throughout the battle were most- proved to be the paratroopers of the
ly by wire and runner); the Germans 509th. After this misadventure and the
were confused and put mortar fire on jolt suffered by the paratroopers, Hickey
their own neighboring platoons; and and the battalion commanders con-
the fight on both sides was carried by cerned worked out a co-ordinated attack.
squads and platoons firing at whatever First the paratroopers put in a twilight
moved. When daylight came the para- assault which forced the Germans back.
troopers got artillery support, which Then the 2d Battalion of the 112th made
far outweighed the single battalion be- a night attack with marching fire, guid-
hind the enemy assault force, and ing this time on 60-mm. illuminating
T H E BATTLE BETWEEN T H E SALM AND T H E OURTHE 603

Corps by 24 December formed a firm


mortar shells fired by the 2d Battalion of
the 289th. Crossing through deep ravines barrier along the northern shoulder of
the infantrymen of the 112th drove the deepening German salient. This
the enemy from their path. At dawn on front, extending from Monschau to
the 29th the gap finally was closed. Waimes, relapsed into relative inactivity.
T h e German failure to penetrate The Sixth Panzer Army had tried to
through the Erezée section on 28–29 widen the road west by levering at the
December was the last serious bid by American linchpin in the Monschau
the Sixth Panzer Army in an offensive area, by cutting toward the Elsenborn
role. On that day Field Marshal Model Ridge via Krinkelt-Rocherath, and by
ordered Sepp Dietrich to go over to the chopping at Butgenbach in an attempt
defensive and began stripping the Sixth to roll back the V Corps’ west flank, but
of its armor. The German commanders the entire effort had been fruitless and
left facing the VII and XVIII Airborne its cost dear. Having failed to free the
Corps east of the Ourthe record a right wing of the Sixth Panzer Army, the
number of attacks ordered between 29 higher German commands gave the ball
December and 2 January, the units in- to the Fifth Panzer Army and perforce
volved including infantry detachments accepted the narrow zone of advance in
from the 9th SS Panzer Division and the Sixth Panzer Army sector which gave
the 18th and 62d Volks Grenadier Divi- two instead of the originally scheduled
sions. But to order these weak and four main roads for its drive west. Be
tired units into the attack when the it added that the northernmost of the
German foot soldier knew that the two remaining roads was under Ameri-
great offensive was ended was one thing, can artillery fire for most of its length.
to press the assault itself was quite It cannot be said that the Sixth Panzer
another. T h e American divisions in thisArmy clearly had written off the possi-
sector note only at the turn of the year:bility of overrunning the Elsenborn
“front quiet,” or “routine patrolling.” Ridge. The attacks by the German right
wing had dwindled away by 24 De-
T h e initiative had clearly passed to
the Americans. General Ridgway, who cember because of sheer fatigue, heavy
had been champing at the bit to go over losses, the withdrawal of most of the
to the offensive even when his corps German armor, the feeling on the part
was not hard pressed, sought per- of the army staff that it would be best
mission to start an attack on the last to wait for further successes in the south
day of the year with the XVIII Air- before going out on a limb, and the
borne, but Field Marshal Montgomery desire to withhold sufficient strength to
already had decided that the Allied meet any American counterattack di-
offensive on the north flank would be rected from the Elsenborn area against
initiated farther to the west by Collins’the shoulder of the salient. Furthermore,
corps and had set the date–3 January on 24 or 25 December, Hitler dropped
1945. the plan for the secondary attack by the
Fifteenth Army toward Maastricht and
T h e Elsenborn Shoulder Heerlen, which had been intended to
T h e four infantry divisions of the V assist the Sixth Panzer drive after the
604 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

latter got rolling. the main advance. T h e Army Group B


But there still were five German divi- commander, acting on Hitler’s order,
sions in this sector under Hitzfeld’s took the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division
LXVII Corps, the corps maintaining a out of the LXVII Corps and told Hitz-
front whose boundaries coincided al- feld to abandon his planned attack
most exactly with those of the American against the strong Elsenborn Ridge posi-
V Corps. There could be no further tion. T h e corps was left a limited task,
thought of a drive to Eupen and the to iron out the Wirtzfeld angle.
establishment of a blocking cordon west Finally, on 28 December, Hitzfeld
of that point; this mission had been was ready, but his assault force now rep-
scrubbed when the last attacks at resented only parts of two divisions,
Monschau collapsed. Nor was there hope the 12th Volks Grenadier Division and
that the right wing of the Sixth Panzer the 246th. Early that morning two bat-
Army could be set in motion at this talions of the 352d Regiment (246th
date, the armor already having been Volks Grenadier Division) moved out
shifted to beef up the advance on the of the woods near Rocherath against
left. Hitzfeld’s task was to defend, to the forward lines of the 99th Infantry
hold the shoulder; but his line, bent in Division on the Elsenborn Ridge. This
a sharp right angle near Wirtzfeld, was attack was blown to pieces by accurate
expensive in manpower and tactically shelling from the batteries on the ridge.
poor. On Model’s order Hitzfeld and A battalion of the 48th Regiment (12th
his division commanders ran a map Volks Grenadier Division) met an
exercise on 26 December whose solution identical fate when it started toward
was this: the angle at Wirtzfeld must the 2d Infantry Division position north-
be straightened and the line shortened. west of Wirtzfeld. Two battalions from
The powerful groupment of American the 27th Regiment (12th Volks Grena-
artillery on Elsenborn Ridge constituted dier Division) took a crack at the 1st
an ever-present threat; therefore this Infantry Division front in the Butgen-
ground should be taken. Four divi- bach sector, but intense rocket fire and
sions, it was planned, would attack to shellfire failed to shake the defenders
achieve this solution. and left their supporting artillery un-
Meanwhile the main German advance scathed. T h e German assault battal-
was having trouble. The Bastogne road ions had not even deployed from ap-
center continued in American hands, proach march formation when a rain of
greatly hampering the development of bursting shells scattered them in every
the Fifth Panzer Army attack. T h e for- direction. A handful of riflemen and
ward wing of the Sixth Panzer Army engineers reached a draw leading to the
had collided with the American defenses American foxhole line only to be cap-
along the line of the Ambléve and tured or driven off. This was the last
Salm Rivers but had failed to gain attack against the American forces ar-
maneuver room and was proceeding on rayed on the north shoulder. Hitzfeld
a dangerously narrow front. Every mo- was left to hold what he could of his
bile or semimobile unit which could be lengthy front with a force which by the
found would have to be thrown into close of December had dwindled to
T H E BATTLE BETWEEN T H E SALM AND T H E OURTHE 605

three understrength divisions. hensive that the Allied effort would be


The German High Command and the made there in a drive through to St.
troops of the Sixth Panzer Army now Vith, and set two ordnance companies
waited apprehensively and hopelessly scrambling to re-create a single opera-
for the retaliatory blow to fall. That tional tank company from the armored
the American attack would come in a debris the 1st SS Panzer Division had
matter of hours or a very few days was brought out of the La Gleize debacle.
clear to all. Where it would be delivered What Rundstedt and Model expected
along the length of the north flank of the of their adversary can never be known,
Ardennes salient was a good deal less although their respective staffs seem to
certain. A few of the German leaders have read into Patton’s battle around
seem to have anticipated originally that Bastogne a strong indication that the
the Allied counterattack would come poised Allied pincers would close some-
from north and south against the base where in the vicinity of Houffalize. It
of the salient, but by the end of De- is known, however, how Rundstedt re-
cember intelligence reports definitely garded the Allied strategy which on 3
ruled out any Allied build-up at the January sent the American divisions at-
shoulders of the salient. T h e Sixth Pan- tacking from north and south to snip
zer Army staff, acutely aware of the off the tip of the salient at Houffalize:
weakened condition of the German this was, says the OB WEST War Diary,
troops in the Malmédy sector, was appre- “the small solution.”
CHAPTER XXIV

The Third Army Offensive


Widening the Bastogne Corridor but the only direct tactical effect this
division could have on the fight south of
When the 4th Armored tanks reached Bastogne would be to threaten the
the Bastogne perimeter on 26 De- Seventh Army line of communications
cember, the contact between McAuliffe’s and divert German reserves.2 T h e gap
command and the Third Army was between the 26th Infantry and the 4th
dramatic and satisfying but none too Armored Divisions, rather tenuously
secure 1. T h e road now opened from screened by the 6th Cavalry Squadron,
Assenois to Bastogne could be traversed would be filled by the 35th Infantry
under armed convoy, and for the mo- Division (Maj. Gen. Paul Baade) , which
ment the Germans in this sector were had just come up from Metz and had
too demoralized by the speed and sharp- orders to attack across the Sure on 27
ness of the blow to react in any aggres- December. 3If all went well this attack
sive manner. The two main highways would break out to the Lutrebois-Har-
east and west of the Assenois corri- lange road, which fed into the Arlon
dor, however, still were barred by the highway, and proceed thence abreast of
Seventh Army and such small detach- the 4th Armored.
ments as could be hurriedly stripped West of the Assenois corridor the left
from the German circle around Bas- wing of Gaffey’s command was screened,
togne. Continued access to Bastogne
would have to be insured by widening 2T h e earlier operations of the 26th Division on
the breach and securing the Arlon high- the right flank of the III Corps are discussed in
way-and perhaps that from Neufchâ- Chapter XXI. pp. 540–47.
3T h e 35th Division had suffered heavily in the
teau as well-before the enemy could Lorraine battles (for which see Cole, T h e Lorraine
react to seal the puncture with his Campaign, ch. XII, passim) and General Gay
armor. ( M a p X ) persuaded Patton not to throw the division into
the Ardennes fight until other Third Army divi-
The main weight of Gaffey’s 4th sions in better condition had been committed.
Armored, it will be recalled, lay to the (The AAR’s of the 35th Division in the early
east of Assenois on the Arlon-Bastogne phases of the Ardennes are so abbreviated as to
be practically useless. Fortunately the story is
axis. On the right of the 4th Armored told in considerable detail in the combat inter-
the 26th Infantry Division was eche- views. The published histories of the division’s
loned to the southeast and on 26 Decem- activities are very good. See Miltonberger and
Huston, 134th Infantry Regiment: Combat History
ber had put troops over the Sure River, of World W a r II (Washington, n.d.); Combat
History of the 134th Infantry Regiment (Baton
1 The 4th Armored attack toward Bastogne is Rouge, 1946); and T h e 35th Infantry Division in
described in Chapter XXI, pp. 523–32, 547–55. World W a r II (Atlanta, n.d.).
T H E T H I R D ARMY OFFENSIVE 607

but rather lightly, by scratch forces that shepherded trucks on the Assenois road
General Middleton had gathered from while CCB and CCA continued the foot-
his VIII Corps troops and what remained slogging pace north toward Bastogne.
of Cota’s 28th Division. On the after- T h e armored infantry and the two rifle
noon of 26 December General Patton battalions of the 3 18th marched through
assigned CCA, 9th Armored, which was the snow, fighting in those woods and
near Luxembourg City, to the III hamlets where the German grenadiers
Corps with orders that it be attached and paratroopers–now with virtually no
to the 4th Armored and attack on the artillery to back them up–decided to
left to open the Neufchâteau-Bastogne make a stand. CCB made its attack from
highway. T h e 9th Armored Division’s west of Hompré against troops of the
CCA was relieved that same afternoon 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, here
by CCA of Maj. Gen. Robert W. Grow’s faced about from Bastogne; by nightfall
6th Armored Division. its patrols had reached the 101st Air-
Although the enemy troops around borne perimeter. CCA, farther from
Assenois had been broken and scattered the point of impact on 26 December,
by the lightning thrust on the 26th, had a rougher time although the com-
the III Corps’ attack on the following manders of the two battalions from the
day met some opposition. T h e 35th 15th Parachute Regiment confronting
Division, its ultimate objective the Long- the Americans had been captured in
villy-Bastogne road, had more trouble battle the previous day. When the 51st
with terrain and weather than with Armored Infantry Battalion moved to-
Germans, for the enemy had elected to ward the village of Sainlez, perched on
make a stand on a series of hills some a hill to the front, the enemy para-
five thousand yards beyond the Sure. troopers made such good use of their
On the left the 137th Infantry (Col. commanding position that the Shermans
William S. Murray) trucked through had to enter the action and partially
the 4th Armored, crossed the tankers’ destroy the village before the German
bridge at Tintange, and moved out cross- hold was broken. T h e defenders flushed
country in snow six inches deep. T h e from Sainlez moved east and struck the
2d Battalion drove off the German out- 1st Battalion of the 318th, which had
post at the crossroads village of Surré, cleared Livarchamps, in the rear, start-
but to the west the 3d Battalion, de- ing a fire fight that lasted into the
filing along a draw near Livarchamps, night. American battle casualties in this
came suddenly under fire from a pillbox sector were high on the 27th, and about
which checked further movement. T h e an equal number of frost bite cases
320th Infantry (Col. Bernard A. Byrne) plagued the infantrymen who had now
had to make its own crossings at the spent six days in the snow and wet.
Sure, one company wading the icy river, While the 4th Armored and its at-
but Boulaide and Baschleiden, on the tached troops pressed forward to touch
single road in the regimental zone, were hands with the Bastogne garrison, the
occupied without a casualty. Thence the perimeter itself remained in unwonted
3d Battalion pushed on toward the north. quiet. General Taylor went into the
In the 4th Armored zone CCR city to congratulate McAuliffe and re-
SUPPLIES MOVING THROUGH BASTOGNE
T H E T H I R D ARMY OFFENSIVE 609

sume command of his division.4 Supply During the morning of 28 December


trucks and replacements for the 101st it became apparent that the German
rolled through the shell-torn streets. A units in front of the III Corps were
medical collecting company arrived to stiffening. T h e 35th Division gained very
move the casualties back to corps hospi- little ground, particularly on the right.
tals and by noon of the 28th the last On the left the 137th Infantry made
stretcher case had left the city. Perhaps slow going over broken ground and
the most depressing burden the defense through underbrush, the bushes and
had had to bear during the siege was scrub trees detonating percussion mis-
the large number of seriously wounded siles before they could land on the Ger-
and the lack of medical facilities for man positions. T h e 3d Battalion, pinned
their care. As early as 21 December the down in the ravine in column of com-
division surgeon had estimated the panies, took nearly all day to work
101st casualty list as about thirteen hun- around the irritating pillbox, which fi-
dred, of whom a hundred and fifty were nally was destroyed. Thus far the 35th
seriously wounded and required sur- Division, filled with untrained replace-
gery. As this situation worsened the ments, was attacking without its usual
Third Army chief of staff, General Gay, supporting battalion of tanks, for these
made plans on his own responsibility had been taken away while the division
to move surgeons into Bastogne under was refitting at Metz.
a white flag, but the successful flight of Meanwhile General Earnest, com-
the Third Army surgeons sent in by manding CCA of the 4th Armored, had
liaison plane on the 25th and by glider become concerned with the failure of
on the 26th changed the plans and did the 35th to draw abreast on his open
much to alleviate the suffering in the east flank, particularly since the rifle bat-
cellar hospitals of Bastogne. T h e casual- talion borrowed from the 80th Division
ties finally evacuated numbered 964; was under orders to rejoin its parent
about 700 German prisoners were also formation. He therefore asked that the
sent out of the city. reserve regiment of the 35th (134th
Uncertainty as to the tenure of the Infantry) be put into the attack on his
ground corridor resulted in a contin- right, with the object of taking
uation of the airlift on the 27th. This Lutrebois, a village east of the Arlon
time 130 cargo planes and 32 gliders highway. During the night of the 28th
essayed the mission, but by now the the 134th Infantry (Col. Butler B.
German ack-ack was alert and zeroed Miltonberger) relieved the tired troops
in on the paths of approach. Most of from the 8oth, taking attack positions
the gliders landed safely, but the cargo east of Hompré. T h e orders were to
planes carrying parapacks suffered heavi- push any German resistance to the right
ly on the turnaround over the perimeter; (that is, away from the Arlon road);
of thirteen C–47’s sent out by the 440th thus insensibly the 35th Division was
Troop Carrier Group only four returned turning to face northeast instead of north
to their base. with the 320th behind the 137th and
the 137th falling into position behind
4 Cf. Chapter XIX. the 134th. This columnar array would
610 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

have considerable effect on the conduct German drive had lost its momentum
of the ensuing battle. and that now was the moment to lash
back at the attackers, from the north as
The Opposing Grand Tactics well as the south. Field Marshal Mont-
gomery was a good deal less optimistic.
By Christmas Day it was apparent in In his view the enemy still retained the
both the Allied and German head- capability to breach the First Army front
quarters that the Ardennes battle had (a view shared by the First Army G–
entered a new phase and that events 2, who was concerned with two fresh
now afoot required a fresh look at the German armored divisions believed to
grand tactics to be applied as the year be moving into the Malmédy sector);
drew to its close. the American infantry divisions were
The Allied commanders had from the woefully understrength; tank losses had
very first agreed in principle that the been very high; in sum, as Montgomery
ultimate objective was to seize the in- saw it, the First Army was very tired
itiative, erase the German salient, and and incapable of offensive action.
set an offensive in motion to cross the Bradley was distressed by Montgomery’s
Rhine. There was division in the attitude and the very next day wrote a
Allied camp, however, as to when a personal letter to his old friend, the
counteroffensive should be launched and First Army commander, carefully under-
where it should strike into the salient. scoring the field marshal’s authority over
Beyond this, of course, lay the old argu- Hodges’ army but making crystal clear
ment as to whether the final attack across that he, Bradley, did not view the sit-
the Rhine should be on a wide or uation “in as grave a light as Marshal
narrow front, in the British or in the Montgomery.” As Bradley saw it the
American sector. 5 German losses had been very high and
On 25 December the commanders of “if we could seize the initiative, I be-
the two army groups whose troops faced lieve he would have to get out in a
the Germans in the Ardennes met hurry.” T h e advice to Hodges, then,
at Montgomery’s Belgian headquarters. was to study the battle with an eye to
General Bradley, whose divisions already pushing the enemy back “as soon as
were counterattacking, felt that the the situation seems to warrant.”
Perhaps, after Bradley’s visit, the field
5This controversy as to Allied strategy is well marshal felt that he should set the
treated in Pogue, T h e Supreme Command, pp. record straight at SHAEF. After a long
312–17. Montgomery’s strategy has had a number visit with Hodges on the 26th, he sent
of defenders, but in the main they have produced
more heat than light. One of the ablest is
a message to Eisenhower saying that
Reginald William Thompson whose T h e Battle “at present” he could not pass to the
for the Rhineland (London: Hutchinson, 1958) offensive, that the west flank of the
advances the thesis that Montgomery’s attitude
throughout the Ardennes campaign was governed
First Army continued under pressure,
by the military principle of the “maintenance of and that more troops would be needed
the objective,” that is, the retention of forces to wrest the initiative from the Germans.
(British and Canadian) in a posture which would
permit a rapid resumption of the battle for the
At the moment, however, the Supreme
Rhineland. Commander was concerned more with
T H E T H I R D ARMY OFFENSIVE 611

the slowness of the Third Army drive the classic but venturesome solution.
(earlier General Patton had called twice Arguing from the experiences of World
to apologize for the delay in reaching War I, the Third Army commander held
Bastogne) than with an enlargement of that the Ardennes salient should be cut
the Allied counterattack. In the daily off and the German armies engulfed
SHAEF staff meeting on the morning of therein by a vise closing from north
the 26th Eisenhower ruled that and south against the shoulders of the
General Devers would have to redress Bulge. Thus the Third Army would
the lines of his 6th Army Group by a move northeast from Luxembourg City
general withdrawal to the Vosges, there- toward Bitburg and Prüm along what
after joining his flank to the French the Third Army staff called the “Honey-
north of Colmar. Such regrouping, dis- moon Trail.” General Smith, the
tasteful as it was, would free two or SHAEF chief of staff, was in agreement
three American divisions for use in the with this solution, as were Hodges,
Ardennes. (It would seem that the Gerow, and Collins-in principle. T h e
SHAEF staff approved the withdrawal salient at its shoulders was forty miles
of Devers’ forces-all save Air Marshal across, however, and a successful amputa-
Tedder who did not think the with- tion would necessitate rapid action by
drawal justified and argued that Mont- strong armored forces moving fast along
gomery had British and Canadian divi- a good road net. T h e First Army com-
sions which could be freed to provide manders, as a result, had to give
the needed SHAEF reserve.) 6 over this solution because the road
T h e lower echelon of Allied com- complex southeast of the Elsenborn
manders was meanwhile stirring restive- Ridge, which would be the natural First
ly. Having reached Bastogne late on the Army axis for a cleaving blow at the
26th, Patton set his staff to work on German shoulder, could not sustain a
plans for a prompt redirection of the large attack force heavy in armor-
Third Army attack. On the 27th hence Collins’ compromise suggestion
General Collins arrived at the First for an attack from a point north of
Army command post with three plans Malmédy toward St. Vith.7
for an attack led by the VII Corps, How would the two army group com-
two aimed at a junction with Patton manders react to the pressures being
in the Bastogne sector, one with St. Vith, brought to bear by their subordinates?
deeper in the salient, as the objective. Bradley was concerned with the vagaries
Collins’ proposals posed the problem of the winter weather, which could
of grand tactics now at issue-should slow any counterattack to a walk, and
the German salient be pushed back from by the lack of reserves. He may also
the tip or should it be cut off close to have been uncertain of his air support.
the shoulders-but it remained for Bad flying weather was a distinct possi-
Patton, the diligent student of mili- bility, and the Eighth Air Force-a
tary history, to state in forthright terms rather independent command–was in-
creasingly disenchanted with its battle-
6 Robb Notes; Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, p. 480;
Hq 12th Army Group, Military Objectives, file
371.3, vol. IV. 7 Sylvan Diary; Gay Diary; Robb Notes.
612 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

field missions over the Ardennes (in- target dates. Hodges and Collins con-
deed, on 27 December the Eighth Air tinued to press for a decision to get the
Force had stated its intention of scrub- attack from the north flank rolling–the
bing the battle zone targets and going prospects for which brightened when the
after the Leipzig oil depots, weather per- British offered the loan of two hundred
mitting) . Bradley decided therefore to medium tanks. Meanwhile the new
settle for half a loaf and on the 27th Third Army attack against the south
briefed the Supreme Commander on a flank commenced. On the last day of
new Third Army attack to be mounted December, the serious prospect of bad
from the Bastogne area and to drive weather outweighed by the fact that the
northeast toward St. Vith. Bradley was Germans were thinning the First Army
careful to add that this plan was not front to face the Third, Montgomery
Patton’s concept of a drive against the gave his decision and Hodges consented:
south shoulder. the VII Corps, followed by the XVIII
There remained Montgomery’s deci- Airborne Corps, would attack toward
sion. By the 27th he was ready to con- Houffalize and St. Vith respectively on
sider definite counterattack plans. When 3 January.8
this word was relayed to Eisenhower at Eisenhower’s telephone call from
his daily staff meeting it elicited from Brussels on the 28th released the 11th
him a heartfelt “Praise God from Whom Armored and 87th Infantry Divisions
all blessings flow!” and the Supreme from the SHAEF reserve for use by
Commander set off at once to meet the Bradley. That night Patton met with
field marshal in Brussels. Hodges, Col- the VIII and III Corps command-
lins, and Ridgway did their best in the ers to lay out the new plan for contin-
meantime to convince Montgomery that uation of the Third Army attack. Mid-
the First Army attack should be initi- dleton’s VIII Corps would jump off
ated not around Celles, as the field mar- from the Bastogne area on the morning
shal had first proposed, but farther to of 30 December, its objective the high
the east. On the evening of 28 December ground and road nexus just south of
Eisenhower phoned General Smith from Houffalize. Millikin’s III Corps would
Brussels and told him that he saw great move into the attack on 31 December,
possibilities in a thrust through the driving in the direction of St. Vith. T h e
Bastogne-Houffalize area. As it turned initial pressure on the salient would
out, this would be the maneuver ulti- be exerted much farther to the west
mately adopted. Perhaps the field mar- than Patton wished. Bradley made dou-
shal had given Eisenhower reason to bly sure that the Third Army would in-
think that the First Army would make deed place its weight as planned by
its play in a drive on Houffalize; per- telling Patton that the two fresh divi-
haps-and this seems more likely-Mont- sions could be employed only by the
gomery still had not made any final VIII Corps. But the Third Army com-
decision as to the place where the coun-
terattack would be delivered. Certainly
no time had been set although 4 and 5 8 Manteuffel argues that the American counter-
attack began prematurely; see Freidin and Richard-
January had been discussed as possible son, eds., Fatal Decisions, p. 290.
T H E T H I R D ARMY OFFENSIVE 613

mander put his cherished concept into or may not have had the Fuehrer’s ap-
the army operations order by means of proval (there is no record). T h e Fifth
a paragraph which called for the XII and Sixth would seek to destroy the
Corps to be prepared for an attack Allied forces east of the Meuse while
across the Sauer River and northeast the Seventh held on as best it could; as
through the Prüm valley-ultimate ob- a first step an attack would be made to
jective the Rhine River crossings at eradicate the Americans in the Bastogne
Bonn as the entire Third Army swung area.9 Obviously the German lines
northeast. would have to be shortened somewhere,
On Christmas Day the German com- and Model, directly under Hitler’s
manders sensed, as their opponents baleful eye, dare not surrender ground.
across the line had done, that they were This responsibility fell to the Fifth Pan-
at a turning point in the Ardennes bat- zer Army commander, who on 26 De-
tle. How should the higher command- cember (with tacit approval from Model
ers now intervene to influence the at every step) set about creating a
course of battle, or, more accurately, defensive front in the west roughly fol-
could they intervene? Manteuffel’s plan lowing the triangular outline Bastogne-
was to make the suit fit the cloth: put Rochefort-Amonines. T h e battered 2d
enough new troops in to take Bastogne, Panzer Division was brought back
then swing the left flank of the Fifth through the Rochefort bridgehead and
Panzer Army toward the Meuse and troops from the 9th Panzer took over
fight the Allies east of the river–the from Panzer Lehr in the Rochefort area,
old Small Solution. Field Marshal Mo- the latter sidestepping toward the south-
del agreed that Bastogne must be taken east so that one flank finally would
and that additional troops would be lie on the Lesse River with the other
needed for the task, but the only ar-
mor immediately available was the Fueh-
rer Begleit Brigade and he had just 9 The German sources contributing most directly
to this chapter are MSS # B–23, 5th Parachute
extricated this unit from the Manhay Division, 1 December 1944–12 January 1945
fight to give added weight to the Fifth (Generalmajor Ludwig Heilmann) ; # B–041,
167th Volks Grenadier Division, 24 December
Panzer Army drive against the Ameri- 1944–February 1945, Corps Hoecker, 2–10 March
can line on the Ourthe River. As it 1945 and 59th Infantry Division, 20 March–24
turned out, Remer’s brigade arrived in April 1945 (Generalleutnant Hans Hoecker) ; #
B–068, 3 d Panzer Grenadier Division, Ardennes
the Ourthe sector only a few hours be- (Generalmajor Walter Denkert) ; # B–151, Fifth
fore the Americans broke through to Panzer Army, Ardennes Offensive (General der
Bastogne. It had time to put in only Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel) ; # B–151a,
sequel to MS # B–151 (General der Panzertruppen
one probing assault when Model, on the Hasso von Manteuffel); # B–235, Fifth Panzer
late afternoon of the 26th, sent the Army, 2 November 1944–16 January 1945 (General-
Fuehrer Begleit again on its travels, major Carl Wagener); # B–465, 3d Panzer
Grenadier Division, 16–28 December 1944 (Gen-
this time countermarching to seal the eralmajor Walter Denkert) ; # B–592, Fuehrer
gap in the Bastogne ring with a riposte Begleit Brigade, 16 December 1944–26 January
between Sibret and Hompré. 1945 (Generalmajor Otto Remer); # B–701, Army
Group E , 15 October 1944–1945 (Col Guenther
Model and Rundstedt seem to have Reichhelm); # B–799. LXXXIX Corps, 24 Janu-
agreed on a plan of action which may ary–8 March 1945 (Lt Col Kurt Reschke).
614 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

fixed at Remagne, five miles west of night of the 27th Rundstedt’s staff be-
the Neufchâteau-Bastogne highway. T h e lieved that unless Remer could make a
LVIII Panzer Corps, possibly as a sop successful attack at once it was “question-
to Hitler, was allowed to continue its able” whether the Bastogne gap could
fruitless attacks in the Ourthe sector, be sealed. Manteuffel later would say
but with the Fuehrer Begleit out of the that this job could have been done only
picture these quickly dwindled away. by counterattacking within forty-eight
Manteuffel made his old comrade Luet- hours.
twitz responsible for the defensive west- On both sides of the hill, then, the
ern front and took a new corps troops were being moved for a set
headquarters, which had been sent up piece attack on 30 December. Would
from the OKW reserve, to handle the either opponent anticipate the ensuing
Bastogne operation. This, the XXXIX collision? German intelligence officers
Panzer Corps, was commanded by Gen- did predict that the 6th Armored Di-
eralleutnant Karl Decker, a very experi- vision soon would appear between the
enced officer with a reputation for III and XII Corps. T h e OB WEST
prudence combined with determination. report of 27 December reads: “It is ex-
Decker, despite protests by Luettwitz, pected that the units of the Third Army
was placed under the latter, and for a under the energetic leadership of Gen-
few days the German order of battle eral Patton will make strong attacks
would show an “Army Group Luett- against our south flank.” Within twenty-
witz.” four hours this view altered: T h e First
Manteuffel counted on the Fuehrer Army was said to be having difficulty re-
Begleit to carry the main burden of the grouping and still showed defensive ten-
counterattack south of Bastogne. T h e dencies; therefore, even though the
brigade had about forty Mark IV tanks Third Army was in position to attack,
plus an assault gun brigade of thirty it probably would not attack alone.10
tubes, and its infantry had not been bled The American intelligence agencies
white as in the rest of the armored had practically no knowledge of any
formations. In addition, Manteuffel had German units except those immediately
been promised the beat-up 1st SS Pan- in contact. Of course some kind of
zer Division, the 3d Panzer Grenadier counterattack was expected, but this, it
Division, and the Fuehrer Grenadier was believed, would come when bad
Brigade, parts of these formations being weather cut down friendly air activity.
scheduled to reach Decker on 28 De- The weather did turn foul late on the
cember. Advance elements of the Fueh- 28th and the word went out in the
rer Begleit did arrive that morning, American camp: Prepare for an ar-
taking station in the Bois de Herbai- mored counterattack, enemy tanks are in
mont north of the Marche-Bastogne movement around Bastogne.
road, but the Allied Jabos were in full
cry over the battlefield and Remer could
not bring all his troops forward or issue 10The German estimate of the opposing forces
and Allied reserves moving into the Ardennes
from the forest cover. Time was running may be traced in the daily Ic. Feindlagekarten
out for the Germans. As early as the attached to the OB WEST K T B .
T H E T H I R D ARMY OFFENSIVE 615

T h e Sibret-Villeroux Actions the Third Army attack beyond Bastogne


and, with the memories of the traffic
While the Fuehrer Begleit Brigade congestion there early in the fight still
was assembling, General Kokott did fresh in mind, was most unwilling to
what he could to gather troops and guns drag the VIII Corps through the Bas-
in the sector west of Assenois and there togne knothole in the forthcoming ad-
make some kind of a stand to prevent vance. Middleton convinced Bradley
the tear in the Bastogne noose from un- and Patton that the VIII Corps should
raveling further. T h e key villages in make its drive from a line of departure
his original defense plans were Sibret west of Bastogne, and for this the Neuf-
and Villeroux, overwatching as they château road first had to be opened and
did the Neufchâteau-Bastogne highway. the enemy driven back to the north-
Kokott could expect no help from the west.
5th Parachute Division, originally en- When CCA started down the Neuf-
trusted with the blocking line in this château road on the morning of the 27th,
area, for on the night of 26 December it faced a catch-as-catch-can fight; no
an officer patrol reported that not a sin- one knew where the enemy might be
gle paratrooper could be found between found or in what strength. Task Force
Sibret and Assenois. Kokott’s own divi- Collins (Lt. Col. Kenneth W. Collins),
sion, the 26th Volks Grenadier, and its in the lead, was held up some hours
attached battalions from the 15th Pan- by mines which had been laid north
zer Grenadier had taken very heavy of Vaux-lez-Rosières during the VIII
losses during the western attack against Corps’ withdrawal; so Task Force Kar-
the 101st Airborne on Christmas Day. steter (Lt. Col. Burton W. Karsteter)
The rifle companies were down to twenty circled to head for Villeroux, leaving
or thirty men; most of the regimental Task Force Collins to take Sibret. Kar-
and battalion commanders and executive steter, who had two medium tank com-
officers were dead or wounded; a num- panies, got into Villeroux, but night was
ber of heavy mortars and antitank guns coming and the tanks were not risked
had been sent back to the divisional inside the village. Collins sent his single
trains because there was no more am- company of Shermans into Sibret, firing
munition; and the only rifle replace- at everything in sight. The Americans
ments now consisted of what Kokott could not be said to hold the village,
called “lost clumps” of wandering infan- however, for a small detachment of the
try. 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment was
When CCA of the 9th Armored Di- determined to make a fight of it and
vision (Col. Thomas L. Harrold) got its did. It took all night to drive the Ger-
orders on the 26th to come forward on man grenadiers out of the cellars and
the left flank of the 4th Armored and ruined houses.
attack toward Sibret, there was more at During the night of 27 December
stake than defending the corridor just the Germans put more men into Ville-
opened through the German lines. roux (the 39th Regiment was slowly
General Middleton was already busy building up a semblance of a front)
with plans for his VIII Corps to join but to no avail. American artillery and
616 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Allied fighter-bombers shattered the vil- gaged on the road to Chenogne, Task
lage, and Karsteter finished the job with Force Karsteter also was moving north,
his tanks. Task Force Collins was de- its objective Senonchamps, the scene of
layed on the 28th by a formidable hard fighting in previous days and a
ground haze which lingered around sally port onto the main road running
Sibret all morning. Halfway to its next west from Bastogne to Marche. Here
objective, the crossroads at Chenogne Task Force Karsteter was unwittingly
north of Sibret, the American column threatening the assembly area of the
came under enfilading fire from a Fuehrer Begleit which lay in the woods
small wood lot close to the road. T h e north of the highway, none too securely
tank company turned to deal with this screened by remnants of the 3d Bat-
menace and finally suppressed the Ger- talion of the 104th Panzer Grenadier
man fire, but light was fading and the around Chenogne. Remer’s brigade al-
column laagered where it was. ready had taken some share in the action
In the meantime General Kokott had against CCA and one of his 105-mm.
gathered a counterattack force, a com- flak pieces was responsible for holding
pany of the division Pioneers, to retake up Task Force Collins in the fight at
Sibret. While at breakfast on the 29th the roadside woods, continuing in ac-
eating K rations on the tank decks and tion until it was rammed by a Sherman
in foxholes beside the road, Collins’ tank.
troops suddenly saw a body of men Not far out of Villeroux, Task Force
march out of the nearby woods. An Karsteter came under hot and heavy fire
American captain shouted out and the from the Bois de Fragotte, lying over
leading figure replied, “Good morning” to the northwest. What the Americans
-in German. T h e Americans cut loose had run into was the main body of the
with every weapon, to such effect that 3d Panzer Grenadier Division. Losses
some fifty dead Germans were counted, among the armored infantry were very
lying in column formation as they had high, and that night a liaison officer
fallen. Late in the day, however, the reported that the task force front was
fortunes of war turned against the Amer- “disorganized.” Four of Karsteter’s tanks
icans. Collins’ tanks had moved through ran the gauntlet of fire from the woods
the village square in Chenogne and and entered Senonchamps, but the in-
were approaching a road junction when fantry failed to follow. T h e cumulative
high velocity shells knocked out the losses sustained by CCA in the three-
two lead tanks. Then, in a sharp ex- day operation had been severe and it
change of shots, the enemy gunners was down to a company and a half of
accounted for two more of the Shermans, infantry, although 21 medium and 17
and the Americans withdrew. They light tanks still were operable.11
could not discover the exact enemy lo-
cations in the twilight but were sure
they were facing tanks. That night, the 11During this battle Sgt. T. J. Dawson, Com-
VIII Corps artillery reported, it “blew pany C. 19th Tank Battalion, was killed by a direct
Chenogne apart.” artillery hit while attempting to rescue the crew
members from his burning tank. He was awarded
While Task Force Collins was en- the DSC posthumously.
T H E T H I R D ARMY OFFENSIVE 617

T h e T w o Attacks Collide divisions designated to make the main


effort.
T h e grand tactics of the two oppo- T h e 11th Armored (General Kil-
nents had been solved–at least on the burn) had been hurried from training
planning maps–by set-piece attacks in in the United Kingdom to shore up the
the Bastogne sector which were sched- Meuse River line if needed and had
uled to commence on or about 30 De- some cavalry patrolling on the east bank
cember. This date was firm insofar as when Eisenhower turned the division
the American Third Army was con- over to Bradley. Late on the evening
cerned. In the German camp the date of the 28th General Kilburn received
was contingent on the caprices of the orders from Middleton to move his di-
weather, traffic congestion on the roads vision to the Neufchâteau area, and two
running into the area, the damage which hours after midnight the 11th Armored
might be inflicted by the Allied fighter- began a forced march, the distance
bombers, and the uncertainty attached about eighty-five miles. T h e heavy col-
to the arrival of fuel trucks coming for- umns were slowed by snow, ice, and the
ward from the Rhine dumps. T h e two limited-capacity bridge used to cross the
attacks nevertheless would be launched Meuse, but CCA, in the van, reached
on 30 December. the new assembly area a couple of hours
before receiving the corps attack or-
der issued at 1800. CCB and the remain-
T h e Forces and the Plans der of the division were still on the
road. Some units of this green division
Middleton’s VIII Corps, scheduled to would have to go directly from the
provide the American curtain-raiser march column into the attack, set for
thrust on the left wing of Patton’s army, 0730 the next morning. There was no
took control of the 101st Airborne Di- time for reconnaissance and the division
vision and the 9th Armored Division the assault plan had to be blocked out with
evening before the attack began. Al- only the hastily issued maps as guid-
though General Taylor’s paratroopers ance.
and glider infantry would play no offen- T h e general mission given the 11th
sive role in the first stages of the Third Armored–and the 87th as well–was to
Army operation, they had to hold the swing west around Bastogne, capture
pivot position at Bastogne and provide the heights south of Houffalize, and se-
couverture as the scheme of maneuver cure the Ourthe River line. T h e first
unfolded. Of the 9th Armored com- phase, however, was a power play to
mands only CCA, already committed, drive the enemy back to the north in an
could be used at the onset of the VIII assault, set in motion from the Neufchâ-
Corps advance toward Houffalize. On teau-Bastogne road, which would sweep
the morning of the 30th, then, the corps forward on the left of CCA, 9th Ar-
order of battle (east to west) would be mored. General Kilburn wanted to
the 101st, CCA of the 9th Armored, the attack with combat commands solidly
11th Armored Division, and the 87th In- abreast, but the VIII Corps commander,
fantry Division, with these last two concerned by the thought of exposing
618 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

11TH ARMORED DIVISION HALF-TRACKS MASSED on the outskirts of Bastogne.

the relatively untested 87th without tank entruck for the 100-mile move to the
support, ordered Kilburn to divide his VIII Corps. There the 87th assembled
force so as to place one combat com- between Bertrix and Libramont in prep-
mand close to the new infantry division. aration for an advance on the follow-
Thus the 11th Armored would make its ing morning to carry the corps left
initial drive with CCB (Col. Wesley W. wing north, cut the Bastogne–St. Hu-
Yale) passing east of a large woods-the bert road, and seize the high ground
Bois des Haies de Magery–and CCA beyond. Middleton’s two-division attack
(Brig. Gen. Willard A. Holbrook, Jr.) would be well stiffened by ten battalions
circling west of the same. T h e 87th In- of corps artillery.
fantry Division (Brig. Gen. Frank L. Across the lines, on the afternoon of
Culin, Jr.) had arrived on the Continent 29 December, General Manteuffel called
in early December and been briefly em- his commanders together. Here were
ployed as part of the Third Army in the the generals who had carried the Bas-
Saar offensive. Ordered into the SHAEF togne fight thus far and generals of the
reserve at Reims on 24 December, the divisions moving into the area, now in-
division was at full combat strength cluding three SS commanders. Manteuf-
when, five days later, the order came to fel, it is related, began the conference
T H E T H I R D ARMY OFFENSIVE 619

with some critical remarks about the Bastogne. T h e timing for the arrival of
original failure to apprehend the impor- the incoming reinforcements–the 12th
tance of Bastogne. He then proceeded SS Panzer, the 9th SS Panzer, and the
to tell the assemblage that the Ardennes 340th Volks Grenadier Divisions–was
offensive, as planned, was at an end, problematical .
that Bastogne had become the “central
problem,” and that the German High T h e Contact
Command viewed the forthcoming
battle as an “opportunity,” an opportun- Generalmajor Walter Denkert, com-
ity to win a striking victory or at the least manding the 3d Panzer Grenadier Divi-
to chew up the enemy divisions which sion, planned to attack at 0730 on 30
would be poured into the fight. T h e December because of the predisposition
operation would be in three phases: the Germans had noted (and on which
first, close the ring once again around they had capitalized many times) for the
Bastogne; second, push the Americans Americans to delay the start of the day’s
back to the south; third, with reinforce- operations until about eight or nine
ments now on the way, take Bastogne o’clock in the morning. His division ex-
in a final assault. pected to move south through the Bois
Army Group Luettwitz would con- de Fragotte (between Chenogne and
duct the fight to restore the German Senonchamps) , then swing southeast to
circle with the X X X I X and X L V I I retake Villeroux. T h e attack plan was
Panzer Corps, the first attacking east intended to pave the way for Remer’s
to west, the second striking west to east. brigade (attached to the 3d Panzer
A number of the divisions en route to Grenadier Division since Denkert was
Bastogne had not yet arrived and the the senior commander) to seize Sibret
attack set for the 30th would be neither and permit the combined force to de-
as strong nor as co-ordinated as bouch against Assenois and Hompré.
Manteuffel would wish-but he was T h e Americans, as it turned out, were
under pressure from his superiors and not as dilatory as had been anticipated-
could entertain no further delay. The both their attack divisions were moving
eastern assault force comprised the much north by 0730. Remer also kept to his
understrength and crippled 1st SS Pan- time schedule.
zer and the 167th Volks Grenadier T h e Fuehrer Begleit advance was
Divisions; its drive was to be made geared for a one-two punch at Sibret.
via Lutrebois toward Assenois. T h e at- T h e battalion of Remer’s panzer gren-
tack from the west would be spearhead- adiers, which had clashed briefly with
ed by the Fuehrer Begleit advancing Task Force Collins in Chenogne the
over Sibret and hammering the ring previous evening, moved out over the
closed. T h e 3d Panzer Grenadier Divi- snow-covered fields to pry an opening
sion was to advance in echelon to the on the north edge of Sibret, while the
left of Remer’s brigade while the rem- Fuehrer Begleit tank group–carrying
nants of the 26th Volks Grenadier Divi- a battalion of grenadiers–waited in
sion and 15th Panzer Grenadier Division Chenogne to move forward on a parallel
screened to the west and north of trail which passed through Flohimont
620 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

and entered Sibret from the west. A fire set in. Task Force Poker was on its
dense ground fog covered the area for a own, well in front of the rest of the 11th
few hours, masking the opposing forces Armored, uncertain that its sister task
from one another. T h e grenadier bat- force would succeed in forging abreast
talion made some progress and drove at Chenogne, and with night coming on.
Task Force Collins back toward Sibret, Remer apparently decided to forgo a
but the battalion commander was killed test of strength with the American armor
and the advance slowed down. Remer’s moving past in the west, his mission
tank group was nearing Flohimont when being to attack eastward, but when word
the fog curtain raised abruptly to reveal reached him that the Americans had hit
about thirty American tanks. the outpost at Lavaselle he hurried in
Colonel Yale had divided CCB of the person to check the security screen cover-
11th Armored into a tank force (Task ing the western flank. Here one of
Force Poker) and an infantry task force Remer’s panzer grenadier battalions had
(Task Force Pat). Task Force Pat, es- thrown forward an outpost line extend-
sentially the 21st Armored Infantry Bat- ing as far west as Gerimont and backed
talion, had marked Flohimont on the by a concentration of flak, assault guns,
map as its line of departure but in the and mortars in the Bois des Valets to the
approach march became confused. Com- north of and about equidistant from
munications failed, and the reconnais- Houmont and Chenogne. Satisfied that
sance troops in the van of CCB got lost this groupment could hold the enemy,
and fell back on Task Force Pat. Adding Remer returned to Chenogne. He found
menace to confusion the German artil- that the village had been bombarded by
lery began to pound the Jodenville- planes and guns till it was only a heap of
Flohimont road along which the attack stones with a handful of grenadiers
was directed. Meanwhile the reinforced garrisoning the rubble. Remer instantly
41st Tank Battalion (Task Force Pok- sent a radio SOS to the commander of
e r ) , which had picked Lavaselle from the 3d Panzer Grenadier, then set out to
the map as its goal, rolled north with find his tank group.
little opposition and reached its objec- When the bombardment started at
tive about a mile and a half west of Chenogne, the German tanks still there
Chenogne. These were the American simply had pulled out of the village.
tanks seen by Remer. About the same time, Task Force Pat
Lavaselle turned out to be located in a resumed its march on Chenogne, Com-
hollow, hardly a place for armor, and pany B of the 22d Tank Battalion lead-
the task force commander (Maj. Wray ing and the armored infantry following
F. Sagaser) decided to move on to the in their half-tracks. Near the village, in
villages of Brul and Houmont which a lowering fog, the German armor sur-
occupied some high ground just to the prised the company of Shermans and shot
north. There was a creek to cross with out seven of them. T h e enemy allowed
a single rickety bridge, but the tanks the American aid men to carry away the
made it. T h e twin hamlets were de- surviving tankers and both sides fell
fended only by a few infantry and fell back. As dusk came Remer set about
easily-then intense rocket and mortar pulling his command together, and the
T H E T H I R D ARMY OFFENSIVE 621

3d Panzer Grenadier-heeding his call on the left, the 41st Cavalry Reconnais-
for assistance-moved troops into the sance Squadron moved around to the
ruins of Chenogne.12 This division had west flank in anticipation of a German
taken little part in the day’s activity, counterthrust.
probably because of the intense shelling It was midafternoon. German high
directed on its assembly area in the Bois velocity guns were sweeping the ridge,
de Fragotte by the 4th Armored and and there was no room for maneuver:
corps artillery, the cross fire laid down the Ourthe lay to the west and the Bois
from Villeroux by the tanks of Task des Haies de Magery spread to the east,
Force Karsteter, and the uncertainty of separating CCA and CCB. General Kil-
Remer’s situation. burn asked the corps commander to as-
The western advance on 30 December sign Remagne to the 87th and let CCA
by CCA of the 11th Armored met almost sideslip to rejoin CCB east of the woods.
no resistance during the first few hours, Middleton agreed and a new maneuver
in part because the 28th Cavalry was evolved for 31 December in which
Squadron had driven the German out- all three combat commands of the 11th
post line back on Remagne. T h e imme- Armored would attack to concentrate at
diate objective, Remagne, was the an- the head of the Rechrival valley, thus
chor position for the left wing of the following u p the drive made by Task
new and attenuated Panzer Lehr posi- Force Poker. An hour before midnight
tion, but this division had just completed CCA began its withdrawal.
its shift eastward and had only small On the left wing of the VIII Corps
foreposts here. One of these, in the ham- the assault units of the 87th Division
let of Rondu about a mile and a half were trucked northward on the morning
south of Remagne, seems to have flashed of 30 December to the line of departure,
back warning of the American approach. in the neighborhood of Bras, held by the
In any case the 63d Armored Infantry 109th Infantry.13 Since the first major
Battalion, leading the march as Task objective was to sever the German supply
Force White, had just come onto the route along the St. Hubert–Bastogne
crest of the ridge beyond Rondu when, road the attack was weighted on the
as the men on the receiving end vividly right, with the 345th Infantry (Col.
recall, “All hell broke loose.” T h e two
tanks at the point of the column were 13Since-the 87th Division and the 11th Armored
fought side by side during this operation, their
hit in one, two order. The armored in- journals and histories should be used together.
fantry took a hundred casualties in The 87th Division AAR is o f little value but
thirty minutes while digging madly in those prepared by the regiments are quite de-
tailed. See Also A Historical and Pictorial Record
the frozen ground. Task Force Blue (the of the 87th Infantry Division in World War II
42d Tank Battalion) was shielded by (Baton Rouge: Army and Navy Publishing Com-
the ridge and received little fire. Since pany, 1946). The records of the 11th Armored
are surprisingly complete for an armored outfit
the 87th Division had not yet come up in its first operations. See also Hal D. Steward,
Thunderbolt (Washington: 11th Armored Division
12 Remer’s operations west of Bastogne are de- Association, 1948).. The combat interviews are
scribed by Remer and some of his officers in MS very comprehensive in coverage of the 11th
# B–592 (Remer) and Die Geschichte Des Armored but have virtually nothing on the 87th
Panrerkorps Grossdeutschland, vol. II. Division.
622 T H E ARDENNES,: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Douglas Sugg) aiming for a sharp jog the scene, then began to work their
in the road where stood the village of machine guns. The artillery forward ob-
Pironpré. On the left the 346th Infantry server crawled toward the panzers to
(Col. Richard B. Wheeler) had a more take a look, and was shot. T h e Company
restricted task, that is, to block the roads C commander then called for the artil-
coming into St. Hubert from the south. lery, bringing the exploding shells with-
Earlier the Panzer Lehr had outposted in fifty yards of his own men. T h e
Highway N26, the 345th route of ad- German tanks still refused to budge.
vance, but apparently these roadblock Two men crept forward with bazookas,
detachments had been called in and only to be killed by the tank machine
Sugg’s combat team marched the first guns, but this episode apparently shook
five miles without meeting the enemy. the tank crews, who now pulled out of
T h e advance guard, formed by the 1st range. Meanwhile Moircy had been
Battalion (Lt. Col. Frank L. Bock), taken and the battalion commander told
was within sight of the crossroads village Company C to fall back.
of Moircy and less than two miles from T h e expected German counterattack
the objective when a pair of enemy burp at Moircy came about three hours before
guns began to chatter. This was only midnight. Tanks pacing the assault set
outpost fire, and the leading rifle com- fire to the houses with tracer bullets, and
pany moved on until, some five hundred the two battalion antitank guns were
yards short of Moircy, the enemy fire abandoned. Although Colonel Sugg
suddenly thickened across the open, ordered the battalion out, the company
snow-covered fields, causing many casual- radios failed and in the confusion only
ties and halting the Americans. The Companies A and B left the village.
accompanying cannoneers (the 334th Some of the machine gunners, a platoon
Field Artillery) went into action, the of Company B, and most of Company
mortar crews started to work, and both C stayed on, taking to the cellars when
Companies A and B deployed for the the American artillery–including a bat-
assault. Short rushes brought the rifle tery of 240-mm. howitzers–started to
line forward, though very slowly. By shell Moircy. By midnight the Germans
1400 the Americans were on the edge of had had enough and evacuated the vil-
Moircy, but the two companies had lost lage. Bock then ordered the remaining
most of their officers and their ranks were defenders out. This day of sharp fighting
riddled. cost the 1st Battalion seven officers and
Colonel Bock ordered his reserve com- 125 men. Most of the wounded were
pany to circle west of the village and evacuated, however; during the night
take the next hamlet, Jenneville. While battle in Moircy one aid man had twice
moving over a little rise outside Jenne- moved the twelve wounded in his charge
ville, the leading platoon met a fusillade from burning buildings.
of bullets that claimed twenty casualties
in two minutes. Nevertheless the 2d Pla- T h e much touted Fuehrer Begleit
toon of Company C reached the edge of attack failed on the 30th to dent the
the village. At this moment two enemy Bastogne corridor-indeed it can be said
tanks appeared, stopped as if to survey that it never started. What of the eastern
T H E T H I R D ARMY OFFENSIVE 623

jaw of the hastily constructed German This was a veteran division which had
vise–the 1st SS Panzer attack? distinguished itself on the Soviet front,
T h e 1st SS Panzer was still licking its The 167th had been refitting and train-
wounds after the disastrous fight as ing replacements from the 17th Luft-
advance guard of the Sixth Panzer Army, waffe Feld Division when orders reached
when Model ordered the division to its Hungarian casernes to entrain for the
move south, beginning 26 December. west. On 24 December the division ar-
Most of its tanks were in the repair shops, rived at Gerolstein on the Rhine; though
fuel was short, and some units did not some units had to detrain east of the
leave for Bastogne until the afternoon river, Hoecker’s command was at full
of the 29th. This march was across the strength when it began the march to
grain of the German communications Bastogne. A third of the division were
net and became badly snarled in the veterans of the Russian battles, and in
streets of Houffalize, where Allied air addition there were two hundred picked
attacks had caused a major traffic jam, men who had been officer candidates
that forced tank units to move only in before the December comb-out. Hoecker
small groups. It is probable that fewer had no mechanized heavy weapons, how-
than fifty tanks reached the Bastogne ever, and the division transport consisted
area in time to take part in the 30 De- of worn-out Italian trucks for which
cember attack. there were no spare parts.
T h e appearance of this SS unit was T h e 167th and the kampfgruppe from
greeted by something less than popular the 1st SS Panzer (be it remembered the
acclaim. T h e regular Army troops dis- entire division was not present on the
liked the publicity Goebbels had 30th) were supposed to be reinforced by
lavished on the feats of the SS divisions, the 14th Parachute Regiment and the
and the old line commanders considered 901st of the Panzer Lehr. Both of these
them insubordinate. Worse still, the 1st regiments were already in the line south-
SS Panzer Division came into the sector east of Bastogne, but were fought-out
next to the 14th Parachute Regiment: and woefully understrength. T h e first
the SS regarded themselves-or at least plan of attack had been based on a con-
were regarded-as Himmler’s troops, certed effort to drive straight through the
whereas the parachute divisions were the American lines and cut the corridor be-
personal creation of Goering. (It is not tween Assenois and Hompré. Just before
surprising that after the attack on the the attack this plan was modified to make
30th the 1st SS Panzer tried to bring the the Martelange-Bastogne highway the
officers of the 14th before a Nazi field initial objective. T h e line of contact on
court.) 14 the 30th extended from Neffe south into
The 167th Yolks Grenadier Division the woods east of Marvie, then followed
(Generalleutnant Hans-Kurt Hoecker) , the forest line and the Lutrebois-Lutre-
ordered to join the 1st SS Panzer mange road south to Villers-la-Bonne-
in the attack, was looked upon by Eau. T h e boundary between the 167th
Manteuffel and others with more favor. and the 1st SS Panzer ran through Lutre-
14See MSS # A–932 (Gersdorff); B–041 bois. T h e 167th, lined up in the north
(Hoecker) ; and B–799 (Reschke) . along the Bras-Bastogne road, would
624 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

aim its assault at the Remonfosse sector directly in the path of the German at-
of the highway. T h e 1st SS Panzer, sup- tack, having gradually turned from a
ported on the left by the 14th Parachute column of regiments to face northeast.
Regiment, intended to sally out of Lu- The northernmost regiment, the 134th
trebois and Villers-la-Bonne-Eau. Lutre- Infantry, had come in from reserve to
bois, however, was captured late in the capture Lutrebois at the request of CCA,
evening of the 29th by the 3d Battalion 4th Armored, but it had only two bat-
of the 134th Infantry. A map picked talions in the line. The 137th Infantry
up there by the Americans showed the was deployed near Villers-la-Bonne-Eau,
boundaries and dispositions of the Ger- and on the night of the 29th Companies
man assault forces, but either the map K and L forced their way into the village,
legend was unspecific or the word failed radioing back that they needed bazooka
to get back to higher authority for the ammunition. (It seems likely that the
German blow on the morning of 30 De- Americans shared Villers with a com-
cember did achieve a marked measure of pany of German Pioneers.) In the south
tactical surprise. the 320th Infantry had become involved
T h e 35th Infantry Division stood in a bitter fight around a farmstead out-

35TH INFANTRY DIVISION MACHINE GUN POSITION south of Bastogne.


T H E T H I R D ARMY OFFENSIVE 625

side of Harlange–the German attack and weapons had taken the same
would pass obliquely across its front but German unit under fire. It is not sur-
without impact. prising, then, that two or three units
During the night of 29 December the would claim to have destroyed what on
tank column of the 1st SS Panzer moved later examination proves to have been
up along the road linking Tarchamps the same enemy tank detachment and
and Lutremange. T h e usable road net that a cumulative listing of these claims
was very sparse in this sector. Once –some fifty-odd German tanks destroyed
through Lutremange, however, the Ger- –probably gives more panzers put out of
man column could deploy in two ar- action than the 1st SS Panzer brought
mored assault forces, one moving into the field.
through Villers-la-Bonne-Eau, the other It is unfortunate that the historical
angling northwest through Lutrebois. reproduction of the Lutrebois fight in
Before dawn the leading tank companies the von Rankian sense (“exactly as
rumbled toward these two villages. At it was”) is impossible, for the American
Villers-la-Bonne-Eau Companies K and use of the combined arms in this action
L, 137th Infantry, came under attack by was so outstanding as to merit careful
seven tanks heavily supported by in- analysis by the professional soldier and
fantry. T h e panzers moved in close, student. T h e 4th Armored Division ar-
blasting the stone houses and setting the tillery, for example, simultaneously en-
village ablaze. At 0845 a radio message gaged the 1st SS Panzer in the east and
reached the command post of the 137th the 3d Panzer Grenadier in the west.
asking for the artillery to lay down a Weyland’s fighter-bombers from the
barrage of smoke and high explosive, XIX Tactical Air Command intervened
but before the gunners could get a at precisely the right time to blunt the
sensing the radio went dead. Only one main German armored thrust and set up
of the 169 men inside the village got better targets for engagement by the
out, Sgt. Webster Phillips, who earlier ground forces. American tanks and tank
had run through the rifle fire to warn destroyers co-operated to whipsaw the
the reserve company of the battalion west enemy assault units. The infantry action,
of Villers. as will be seen, had a decisive effect at
The battle in and around Lutrebois numerous points in the battle. Two cir-
was then and remains to this day cumstances in particular would color the
jumbled and confused. There is no co- events of 30 December: because of
herent account from the German side, CCA’s earlier interest in Lutrebois, radio
and it is quite possible that the forma- and wire communications between the
tions involved in the fight did not, for 4th Armored and the 35th Division were
the reasons discussed earlier, co-operate unusually good in this sector; although
as planned. The American troops who the 35th had started the drive north with-
were drawn into the action found them- out the normal attachment of a separate
selves in a melee which defied exact de- tank battalion, the close proximity of the
scription and in which platoons and veteran 4th Armored more than com-
companies engaged enemy units without pensated for this lack of an organic
being aware that other American soldiers tank-killing capability.
626 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Lutrebois, two and a half miles east to face east in support of the 35th Divi-
of the German objective at Assenois, had sion. By 1000 General Dager was re-
most of its houses built along a 1,000- shuffling CCB to take over the CCA
yard stretch of road which runs more positions. T h e first reinforcement dis-
or less east and west across an open plain patched by CCA was the 51st Armored
and is bordered at either end by an ex- Infantry Battalion, which hurried in its
tensive wooded rise. On the morning of half-tracks to back up the thin line of the
the 30th the 3d Battalion of the 134th 2d Battalion. Here the combination of
Infantry (Lt. Col. W. C. Wood) was fog and woods resulted in a very con-
deployed in and around the village: fused fight, but the 2d Battalion con-
Company L was inside Lutrebois; Com- tinued to hold in its position while the
panies I and K had dug in during the enemy panzer grenadiers, probably from
previous evening along the road east of the 2d Regiment of the 1st SS Panzer,
the village; the battalion heavy machine seeped into the woods to its rear. T h e
guns covered the road west of the vil- headquarters and heavy weapons crews
lage. T o the right, disposed in a thin of the 3d Battalion had meanwhile
line fronting on the valley, was the 2d fallen back to the battalion command
Battalion (Maj. C. F. McDannel). post in the Losange château southwest of
About 0445–the hour is uncertain- Lutrebois. There the 51st Armored In-
the enemy started his move toward fantry Battalion gave a hand, fighting
Lutrebois with tanks and infantry, and from half-tracks and spraying the clear-
at the same time more infantry crossed ing around the château with .50-caliber
the valley and slipped through the lines slugs. After a little of this treatment the
of the 2d Battalion. As the first assault German infantry gave up and retired
force crossed the opening east of Lutre- into the woods.
bois, the American cannoneers went into During the morning the advance
action with such effect as to stop this guard of the 167th Volks Grenadiers,
detachment in its tracks. T h e next attacking in a column of battalions be-
German sortie came in a hook around cause of the constricted road net, crossed
the north side of Lutrebois. Company L the Martelange-Bastogne road and
used up all of its bazooka rounds, then reached the edge of the woods southeast
was engulfed. T h e German grenadiers of Assenois. Here the grenadiers en-
moved on along the western road but countered the 51st. Each German
were checked there for at least an hour attempt to break into the open was
by the heavy machine guns. During this stopped with heavy losses. General
midmorning phase seven enemy tanks Hoecker says the lead battalion was “cut
were spotted north of Lutrebois. A pla- to pieces” and that the attack by the
toon of the 654th Tank Destroyer Bat- 167th was brought to nought by the
talion accounted for four, two were put Jabos and the “tree smasher” shells
out of action by artillery high explosive, crashing in from the American batteries.
and one was immobilized by a mine. (Hoecker could not know that the 35th
News of the attack reached CCA of Division artillery was trying out the new
the 4th Armored at 0635, and General POZIT fuze and that his division was
Earnest promptly turned his command providing the target for one of the most
T H E T H I R D ARMY OFFENSIVE 627

lethal of World War II weapons.) stroyers took on some accompanying as-


T h e main body of the 1st SS Panzer sault guns, shot up three of them, and
kampfgruppe appeared an hour or so dispersed the neighboring grenadiers.
before noon moving along the Lutre- At the close of day the enemy had
mange-Lutrebois road; some twenty-five taken Lutrebois and Villers-la-Bonne-
tanks were counted in all. It took two Eau plus the bag of three American
hours to bring the fighter-bombers into rifle companies, but the eastern counter-
the fray, but they arrived just in time to attack, like that in the west, had failed.
cripple or destroy seven tanks and turn Any future attempts to break through to
back the bulk of the panzers. Companies Assenois and Hompré in this sector
I and K still were in their foxholes along would face an alert and co-ordinated
the road during the air bombing and American defense.
would recall that, lacking bazookas, the
green soldiers “popped off” at the tanks T h e III Corps Joins the Attack
with their rifles and that some of the
German tanks turned aside into the Despite the events of the 30th there
woods. Later the two companies came was no thought in the mind of General
back across the valley, on orders, and Patton that Millikin’s I I I Corps would
jointed the defense line forming near the give over its attack toward St. Vith,
château. scheduled to flesh out the Third Army
Thirteen German tanks, which may offensive begun by Middleton. General
have debouched from the road before Millikin would nonetheless have to alter
the air attack, reached the woods south- his plans somewhat. It had been in-
west of Lutrebois, but a 4th Armored tended that the 6th Armored Division,
artillery observer in a cub plane spotted coming in from the XII Corps, would
them and dropped a message to Com- pass through the 4th Armored (which
pany B of the 35th Tank Battalion. Lt. now had only forty-two operable tanks)
John A. Kingsley, the company com- and set off the attack on 31 December
mander, who had six Sherman tanks and with a drive northeast from the Bastogne
a platoon from the 701st Tank Destroyer perimeter. The 35th Division was to
Battalion, formed an ambush near a parallel this drive by advancing in the
slight ridge that provided his own tanks center on a northeast axis, while the 26th
with hull defilade and waited. T h e lead- Division, on the corps’ right wing, would
ing German company (or platoon), turn its attack in a northwesterly direc-
which had six panzers, happened to see tion. T h e 4th Armored expected to pass
Company A of the 35th as the fog briefly to Middleton’s corps, but the latter
lifted, and turned, with flank exposed, in agreed on the night of the 30th that
that direction. T h e first shot from Gaffey’s command should continue its
Kingsley’s covert put away the German support of the 35th Division. Whether
commander’s tank and the other tanks the 35th could shake itself free and take
milled about until all had been knocked the offensive was questionable, but Gen-
out. Six more German tanks came along eral Baade had orders to try. T h e 26th
and all were destroyed or disabled. In Division was now deployed in its en-
the meantime the American tank de- tirety on the north side of the Sure
628 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

River and its center regiment was almost net already saturated in the support of
in sight of the highway linking Wiltz two corps. T h e push planned for 31
and Bastogne (the next phase line). December turned on the employment of
Both flanks of the division were uncov- two combat commands abreast and for
ered, however, and German tanks were this reason the march north to Bastogne
observed moving into the area on the was organized so that CCA, ordered to
30th. attack on the right, would use the Arlon-
One thing the III Corps commander Bastogne highway while CCB, ticketed
sought to impress on his infantry divi- for the left wing, would pass through
sions as H-hour loomed–they must keep the VIII Corps zone by way of the Neuf-
out of time-consuming and indecisive château-Bastogne road.
village fights. This, after all, was an During the night of 30 December
order which had echoed up and down CCA (Col. John L. Hines, Jr.) rolled
the chain of command on both sides of along the icy highway, where the 4th
the line, but neither German nor Ameri- Armored had accorded running rights to
can commanders could alter the tactical the newcomers, and through the city;
necessities imposed by the Ardennes the advance guard, however, took the
geography or prevent freezing troops secondary road through Assenois be-
from gravitating toward the shelter, no cause of the German threat to the main
matter how miserable, promised by some route. By daylight CCA was in forward
wrecked crossroads hamlet. assembly positions behind the 101st
Admittedly the battle which had Airborne line southeast of Bastogne.
flared up on the left wing of the III CCB failed to make its appearance as
Corps was serious, but General Millikin scheduled. What had happened was a
expected (or at least hoped) that the fouling of the military machine which is
6th Armored Division attack would im- common in all large-scale operations and
prove the situation.15 While deployed on which may leave bitterness and recrim-
the Ettelbruck front with the XII Corps, ination long after the event. T h e 6th
General Grow’s troops had not been Armored commander believed he had
closely engaged, and the division would cleared CCB’s use of the Neufchâteau
enter the Bastogne fight with only a road with both the VIII Corps and the
single tank less than prescribed by the 11th Armored, but when Col. George
T/O&E. Its orders to move west were Read moved out with his column he
given the division at 0230 on the 29th. found the highway not only treacher-
Although the distance involved was not ously iced but encumbered with 11th
too great, the movement would be com- Armored tanks and vehicles. What Read
plicated by the necessity of using a road had encountered was the switch bringing
the 11th Armored force from the west
15 The battle fought by the 6th Armored Divi- around to the right wing. T h e 11th Ar-
sion east of Bastogne received very detailed treat-
ment in the combat interviews. The journals of
mored had not expected the 6th
the division were collected after the war and Armored column to appear before mid-
published under the title, Combat Record of the night of the 31st. An attempt to run the
Sixth Armored Division (Aschaffenburg, n.d.) .
General Grow has provided excerpts from his two columns abreast failed because the
personal diary for the author’s use. tanks were slipping all over the road.
T H E T H I R D ARMY OFFENSIVE 629

CCB later reported that the 11th Ar- prime importance in all the fighting
mored blocked the highway for six done by the 6th Armored in what now
hours, that is, until ten o’clock on the had come to be called “the Bastogne
morning of the 31st. Finally General pocket.” Not only the three organic bat-
Grow ordered Read’s force to branch off talions of the division, but an additional
and go into assembly at Clochimont on four battalions belonging to the 193d
the Assenois road. Field Artillery Group were moved into
Colonel Hines intended to postpone the pocket on the 31st, and the firing
the CCA attack until the running mate batteries were employed almost on the
arrived. There was no cover where his perimeter itself. A feature of the battle
troops were waiting, however, and as the would be a counterbattery duel–quite
morning wore on intense enemy fire be- uncommon at this stage of the Ardennes
gan to take serious toll. He and Grow Campaign–for the I SS Panzer Corps
decided, therefore, to launch a limited had introduced an artillery corps, in-
objective attack in which the two CCA cluding some long-range 170-mm. batter-
task forces would start from near the ies, and a Werfer brigade southeast of
Bastogne-Bras road and thrust northeast. Bastogne. Now and later the American
The armored task force, organized gunners would find it necessary to move
around the 69th Tank Battalion (Lt. quickly from one alternate position to
Col. Chester E. Kennedy), had the task another, none too easy a task, for the gun
of capturing Neffe and clearing the en- carriages froze fast and even to turn a
emy from the woods to the east; the piece required blow torches and pinch
infantry task force, basically the 44th bars.
Armored Infantry Battalion (Lt. Col. On the morning of New Year’s Day
Charles E. Brown), was to move abreast CCB finally was in place on the left of
of Kennedy, scour the woods south of Hines’s combat command. T h e imme-
Neffe, and seize the nose of high ground diate task in hand was to knife through
which overlooked Wardin on the north- the German supply routes, feeding into
east. The assault, begun shortly after and across the Longvilly road, which
noon, rolled through Neffe with little permitted north-south movement along
opposition. But snow squalls clouded the the eastern face of the Bastogne pocket
landscape, the fighter-bombers sent to and were being used to build up the
blast targets in front of CCA could not forces in the Lutrebois sector. CCA
get through the overcast, and the ar- would attempt a further advance to clear
mored infantry made little progress. the woods and ridges beyond Neffe.
CCA’s expectation that the 35th Division CCB, working in two task forces, aimed
would come abreast on the right was its attack on Bourcy and Arloncourt with
dashed, for the 35th had its hands full. an eye to the high ground dominating
Just before dusk small enemy forces the German road net. The 6th Armored
struck at Hines’s exposed flanks, and Division expected that troops of the
CCA halted, leaving the artillery to 101st Airborne would extend the push
maintain a protective barrage through on the left of CCB and drive the enemy
the night. out of the Bois Jacques north of Bizory,
The role of the artillery would be of the latter the first objective for CCB’s
630 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

tank force. The previous afternoon the battalion turned back for the planned
VIII Corps commander had ordered thrust at Arloncourt.
General Taylor to use the reserve battal- By this time the sun had come out,
ion of the 506th Parachute Infantry for visibility was good, and the CCB tanks
this purpose, then had countermanded were making such rapid progress that
his order. Apparently General Grow and the division artillery commander (Col.
his division knew nothing of the change. Lowell M. Riley) brought his three bat-
Communication between divisions sub- talions right up on Davall’s heels. With-
ordinate to two different corps always is in an hour the 68th was fighting at
difficult, but in this case, with an ar- Arloncourt, but here it had hit the main
mored and an airborne division German position. Briefly the Americans
involved, the situation was even worse. held a piece of Arloncourt, withdrawing
At this time the only radio contact be- at dark when it became apparent that
tween Taylor and Grow was by relay the 50th Armored Infantry Battalion
through an army supply point several (Lt. Col. Arnold R. Wall), fighting
miles south of Bastogne, but the two through the woods to the northwest,
generals did meet on 31 December and could not come abreast. As it turned out,
the day following. the 50th was forced to fall back to the
T h e morning of the attack, 1 January morning line of departure. It too had
1945, was dark with cloud banks and collided with the main enemy defenses
squalls as the 68th Tank Battalion (Lt. and was hit by a German counterattack–
Col. Harold C. Davall) moved rapidly abruptly checked when the 212th Field
along the narrow road to Bizory. T h e Artillery laid in 500 rounds in twenty
78th Grenadier Regiment, in this sector minutes. 16
since the first days of the Bastogne siege, T h e brunt of the battle in the CCA
had erected its main line of resistance zone was borne by the 44th Armored In-
farther to the east and Bizory fell easily. fantry, continuing doggedly through the
At the same time Davall’s force seized woods southeast of Neffe against deter-
Hill 510, which earlier had caused the mined and well entrenched German in-
101st Airborne so much trouble. About fantry. Whenever the assault came
noon the Americans began to receive within fifty yards of the foxhole line, the
heavy fire, including high velocity shells, grenadiers climbed out with rifle and
from around Mageret on their right machine gun to counterattack. Two or
flank. Although doing so involved a three times Brown’s battalion was
detour, the 68th wheeled to deal with ejected from the woods, but at close of
Mageret, its tanks crashing into the vil- day the Americans were deployed per-
lage while the assault gun platoon en- haps halfway inside the forest. T h e 6th
gaged the enemy antitank guns firing Armored had gotten no assistance from
from wood cover nearby. The grenadiers the 35th Division during the day, and it
fought for Mageret and it was midafter-
noon before resistance collapsed. Then 16During the battle in the woods Sgt. George P.
the 69th Tank Battalion from CCA, Rimmer of Company A led a series of combat
which was on call, took over the fight to patrols against the enemy with such daring and
success as to merit the special commendation of
drive east from Mageret while its sister his commander. He received the DSC.
T H E T H I R D ARMY OFFENSIVE 631

was apparent to General Millikin that of the SS officers present was General
Grow’s division would probably have to Priess, commander of the I SS Panzer
continue its attack alone. He therefore Corps. He was there because Manteuffel
extended the 6th Armored front to the expected to re-create this corps, as it had
right so that on the evening of 1 January existed in the first days of the offensive,
it reached from Bourcy on the north to by bringing the 12th SS Panzer Division
Bras in the south. General Grow imme- in from the Sixth Panzer Army and
diately brought his extra tank battalion joining to it the 1st SS Panzer Division,
and armored infantry battalion forward at the moment moving toward Lutrebois.
from CCR to beef up the combat com- T h e subsequent failure at Lutrebois was
mands on the line. Every tank, gun, and overshadowed by the American threat to
man would be needed. the Panzer Lehr and Fuehrer Begleit
T h e new and wider front would bring west of Bastogne, and on the last day of
the 167th Volks Grenadier Division into December Manteuffel ordered Priess to
action against the 6th Armored south of take over in this sector, promising that
Neffe. But this was not all. At the Fifth the 12th SS Panzer shortly would arrive
Panzer Army conference on the 29th one to flesh out the new I SS Panzer Corps.

BED SHEETS DONATED BY VILLAGERS camouflage 6th Armored Division vehicles.


632 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

On the afternoon of New Year’s Day Infantry Battalion to throw in on the


Priess had just finished briefing his three north wing; CCA got the two fresh bat-
subordinate commanders for a counter- talions from CCR.
attack to be started in the next few About one o’clock on the morning of
hours when a message arrived from Man- the 2d the Luftwaffe began bombing the
teuffel: the 12th SS Panzer was detached 6th Armored area. Although the German
from his command and Priess himself planes had been more conspicuous by
was to report to the army headquarters their absence than their presence during
pronto. T h e two generals met about the past days, it seemed that a few could
1800. By this hour the full account of always be gotten up as a token gesture
the 6th Armored attack was available when a large German ground attack was
and the threat to the weakened 26th forming. (For example, on 30 December
Volks Grenadier Division could be as- the Luftwaffe had supported the eastern
sessed. Manteuffel ordered Priess to take and western attacks with great imparti-
over the fight in the 26th sector at noon ality by dropping its bombs on Bastogne,
on 2 January, and told him that his corps the most concentrated air punishment
would be given the 12th SS Panzer, the the town received during the entire bat-
26th Volks Grenadier Division, and the tle. CCB, 10th Armored, was bombed
340th Volks Grenadier Division, which out of its headquarters, and a large por-
was en route from Aachen. tion of the Belgian population sought
T h e 6th Armored Division would be safety in flight.) While the German
given some respite, however. When Field planes were droning overhead, dark
Marshal Model arrived to look over the shapes, increasing in number, were ob-
plans for the counterattack, on the after- served against the snow near Wardin.
noon of the 2d, only a small tank force These were a battalion of the 167th
had come in from the 12th SS Panzer, Volks Grenadier forming for a counter-
and the main body of the 340th was pro- attack. Nine battalions of field artillery
gressing so slowly that Model set the began TOT fire over Wardin, and the
attack date as 4 January. He promised enemy force melted away. Just to the
also to give Priess the 9th SS Panzer north, but in the CCB sector, the ad-
Division for added punch. It must be vance guard of the 340th Volks Grena-
said that Manteuffel’s part in these opti- dier Division made its initial appearance
mistic plans was much against his own about 0200 on the 2d, penetrated the
professional judgment. American outpost line, and broke into
Faced with a front normally consid- Mageret. The skirmish lasted for a
ered too wide for a linear advance by couple of hours, but the Luftwaffe gave
armor, General Grow put five task forces the defenders a hand by bombing its own
into the attack on 2 January, holding German troops.
only one in reserve. T h e boundary be- In midmorning the 68th Tank Battal-
tween CCA and CCB was defined by the ion sortied from Mageret to climb the
railroad line which once had linked road toward Arloncourt, the objective of
Bastogne, Benonchamps, and Wiltz. the previous day. T h e paving was cov-
CCB now had two tank battalions (the ered with ice and the slopes were too
68th and 69th) plus the 50th Armored slippery and steep for the steel tank
T H E T H I R D ARMY OFFENSIVE 633

treads; so the armored engineers went to came forward in the morning to pass
work scattering straw on all the inclines. through Brown’s 44th Armored Infantry
Finally, Company B came within sight Battalion, but this march was a long one
of the village, but the Germans were from Remichampagne and it was nearly
ready–Nebelwerfers and assault guns noon before the 15th attack got under
gave the quietus to eight Shermans. T h e way. On the right the 9th Armored In-
enemy guns were camouflaged with fantry Battalion (Lt. Col. Frank K.
white paint and the snow capes worn by Britton) came in to take over the fight
the gunners, and the supporting infantry the 44th had been waging in the woods
blended discreetly with the landscape. near Wardin. It was planned that the
So successful was the deception that armored infantry would sweep the en-
when a company of Shermans and a com- emy out of the wooded ridges which
pany of light tanks hurried forward to overlooked Wardin from the southwest
assist Company B, they were taken under and south, whereupon the tank force
fire on an arc of 220 degrees. Colonel would storm the village from the north.
Davall radioed for a box barrage and Britton’s battalion was caught in an
smoke screen; Riley’s gunners met the artillery barrage during the passage of
request in a matter of seconds and the lines with Brown, became disorganized,
68th got out of the trap. and did not resume the advance until
Farther north, and advancing on a noon. Shortly thereafter the 9th was mis-
route almost at a right angle to that takenly brought under fire by the 134th
followed by the 68th, the 50th Armored Infantry. There was no radio communi-
Infantry Battalion pried a few grena- cation between Lagrew and Britton,
diers out of the cellars in Oubourcy and probably because of the broken terrain,
marched on to Michamps. T h e reception and Lagrew reasoned that because of his
was quite different here. As Wall’s in- own delay the infantry attack must have
fantry entered Michamps the enemy reached its objective. T h e tanks of the
countered with machine gun bursts 15th Tank Battalion gathered in the
thickened by howitzer and Werfer fire woods northwest of Wardin, then struck
coming in from the higher ground for the village, but the German antitank
around Bourcy. This time twelve artil- guns on the surrounding ridges did some
lery battalions joined in to support the expert shooting and destroyed seven of
50th. At sunset German tanks could be Lagrew’s tanks. Nonetheless a platoon
seen moving about in Bourcy and Colo- from Company C of the 9th, attached
nel Wall, whose force was out alone on to Lagrew’s battalion, made its way into
a limb, abandoned both Michamps and Wardin and remained there most of the
Oubourcy. (Wall himself was partially night. All this while the 9th Armored
blinded by a Nebelwerfer shell and was Infantry Battalion was engaged in a
evacuated.) T h e German tanks, two heartbreaking series of assaults to breast
companies of the 12th SS Panzer which the machine gun fire sweeping the bar-
had just arrived from west of Bastogne, ren banks of a small stream bed that
followed as far as Oubourcy. separated the wood lot southwest of
South of the rail line the 15th Tank Wardin from another due south. This
Battalion (Lt. Col. Embrey D. Lagrew) indecisive affair cost the 9th one-quarter
634 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

6TH ARMORED DIVISION TANKS IN SNOWSTORM NEAR WARDIN

of its officers and many men. Grow reported to the III Corps com-
Despite the heavy losses incurred, the mander that his entire division was com-
6th Armored had gained much ground mitted and that his only reserve was the
on 2 January, but it would be another single company held out by each of the
eight days and the enemy would be in two combat commands.
retreat before these gains would be du-
plicated. T h e tanks and infantry had By the close of 2 January it could be
been ably supported by the artillery, but said that the III Corps’ attack had been
the division official record is instant in carried solely by the 6th Armored Divi-
giving full marks to the fighter-bombers sion. Even though the German effort to
of the XIX Tactical Air Command, that open a path through the left wing of the
old and valued friend which together 35th Infantry Division at Lutrebois had
with the 6th Armored had patrolled the failed in its intended purpose, it had
long, open flank of the Third Army achieved an important secondary effect,
weeks before on the Loire. becoming, as it did, a true spoiling
That night, when it was clear that attack that put the 35th out of the
Task Force Brown must be thrust back running from 31 December on. T h e
into the line to assist the 9th, General main battle positions held by Baade’s
T H E T H I R D ARMY OFFENSIVE 635

division (which had nowhere been bro- In the afternoon the 2d Battalion assault
ken by the 1st SS Panzer) followed the had put Companies E and G across the
trace of a wide, lopsided V, reaching valley and into the woods, when a sharp
from Marvie in the northeast to a point German riposte struck the two compa-
west of Villers-la-Bonne-Eau, then back nies, isolating them completely by night-
southeast to Bavigne. Before the 35th fall. Next morning the two American
could regain its stride, it would be neces- companies broke loose, and the 3d Bat-
sary to reduce the opposition that had talion again attacked across the open
flared up at three points: Lutrebois, space west of the village to seize a few
Villers-la-Bonne-Eau (where the two buildings from which to build u p the
companies from the 137th Infantry had assault. Finally coming within yards of
been entrapped), and Harlange. the first house, Company K was pinned
On the left wing the 2d and 3d Bat- down by a machine gun firing from one
talions of the 134th watched through the of the windows. A platoon leader left
morning hours of 31 December while his men, climbed to the roof, and tossed
the corps artillery fired TOT’Son Lutre- down a hand grenade. With this build-
bois, then rose from the foxhole line to ing in hand the American infantry began
renew the assault eastward. As the 2d methodically to clear Lutrebois (a two-
Battalion tried to move out across the day task as it turned out) while corps
valley, it made a perfect target for the artillery put more TOT fire on the
small arms fire sweeping in from sections of the village still occupied by
the opposing wooded crest, took ninety the enemy.
casualties, and fell back. T h e 3d Bat- East of Marvie the 1st Battalion had
talion made a pass at Lutrebois, but the to delay its advance in order to dig out
fire from the woods covering the high the grenadiers who had settled them-
ground to the northeast barred entrance selves in the woods to the rear. Eventu-
to the village. ally the battalion started forward and,
T h e entire regiment joined the attack for the first time, made physical contact
on 1 January. Now it was going up with the 6th Armored-after mistakenly
against the 167th Volks Grenadier Divi- starting a fire fight with Britton’s ar-
sion, which finally had entered the line mored infantry. By the end of 2 January
in its entirety (relieving the 1st SS Pan- the left wing of the 35th Division was
zer) and was deployed on the right wing beginning to inch forward, but the ter-
of the LIII Corps opposite Marvie and rain features set for seizure by the III
Lutremange. On the left the 1st Battal- Corps commander-two 510-meter hills
ion, separated by three thousand yards on a thrust line bearing generally north-
from the neighboring 3d, set out from east from Lutrebois–would prove to be
Marvie to bring the division flank for- days away.
ward and neutralize the German hold on T h e 137th Infantry had hopes on 31
the ridges overlooking Lutrebois. T h e December that its two rifle companies
veteran 167th, however, quickly sensed still were in Villers-la-Bonne-Eau, but
the gap in the American line and cut all attempts at relief were thwarted by
through to the rear of the 1st; nor did the 14th Parachute Regiment, decimated
the 3d have any better luck at Lutrebois. though it was, in the surrounding woods.
636 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

MEDICS OF 35TH DIVISION REMOVIG CASUALTIES FROM LUTREBOIS

(Actually Companies K and L already tenacious defensive action through the


had surrendered to flame throwers and woods and the deep snow in the fields.
tanks.) That night Colonel Murray After crossing the Sure River and
wrote off the two companies, but no mat- taking Baschleiden, the 320th Infantry
ter what the case Villers-la-Bonne-Eau had continued the march north along
had to be taken before the road net to the road to Harlange, the only negoti-
the east could be opened. So it was that able avenue of advance here on the right
on 1 January the 137th Infantry com- flank of the 35th Division. On 29 Decem-
menced what its official history would ber the 2d Battalion was hit hard by fire
call the roughest battle ever fought by coming from a collection of farm build-
the regiment–ten days of bloodletting ings (Fuhrman Farm) at a jog in the
and frustration. In this the 137th would road where it ascended a ridge a thou-
have yeoman help from the troopers of sand yards southeast of Harlange. That
the 6th Cavalry Squadron, fighting dis- night the 320th reported that it was
mounted and–the GI’s accolade–“like “locked in a bitter battle” at the farm-
infantry.” T h e understrength 14th Para- stead and in the neighboring woods.17
chute Regiment had recovered suffi-
ciently from its disastrous experience at 17Sgt. H. L. Luther was awarded the DSC
the hands of the 4th Armored to fight a for personally killing or capturing the enemy
T H E T H I R D ARMY OFFENSIVE 637

Here stood the 15th Parachute Regi- River. Wiltz, the division objective, was
ment, which had come through the only a little more than four air-line
debacle south of Bastogne in good shape miles to the north. T h e immediate
and was, in the opinion of the higher objective remained the Wiltz-Bastogne
command, “well in hand.” T h e German highway, which meandered at distances
counterattack leveled against the rest of of two and three miles from the Sure
the division on 30 December did not ex- crossings. T h e approach to the target
tend to the 320th Infantry, but did re- sector of the highway south of Wiltz was
sult in delaying a full-bodied American constricted to three poor, narrow roads
attempt to break through at Harlange that near their entrance were dominated
until the first day of January. At that by the villages of Bavigne, Liefrange,
time the division commander turned the and Kaundorf respectively–this array
reserve battalion of the 320th over to the west to east–and which converged in an
137th, leaving Colonel Byrne to fight apex touching the main highway at
the battle with only the 2d and 3d Bat- Nothum and a crossroads farmstead
talions. known as Mont Schumann. T h e battle
Neither the 320th nor the 15th Para- commencing on 27 December would
chute had tank support; this would be evolve, as the division neared Wiltz, into
an infantry battle with infantry weapons a series of pitched fights for blocks of
-principally the rifle and the machine high ground, which were so sharply
gun. In the afternoon the battle flared etched by interlacing deep draws and
up around Fuhrman Farm but left the ravines that a sweep forward on a solid
attackers with nothing but their losses. division front was impossible.18 Tacti-
Another series of assaults the following cally the 26th Division faced a lone
day was equally unsuccessful. That night battle, for its western neighbor, the 35th,
the 320th got some pleasant news-nine had fed into the III Corps front in a
tanks were on their way to join the column of regiments, turning under
attack. Across the lines the German German pressure from column into line
corps commander, General von Roth- on a northwest-southeast axis instead of
kirch, was doing his best to find a few forming on the left flank of Paul’s divi-
tanks for the paratroopers. T h e two sion. T h e tie with the XII Corps on the
opposing regimental commanders must right was equally tenuous, for the 80th
have wondered which would be first to Division was forging due north while
break the infantry deadlock. the 26th would gravitate toward the
northwest. General Paul’s problem, then,
T h e Lone Battle of the 26th Division was to flesh out the III Corps attack
while at the same time guarding both of
T h e right wing of the III Corps had his exposed flanks.
been brought forward on 27 December
when General Paul’s 26th Division put 18The reports on this period of battle as found
its leading battalions across the Sure in the division and regimental AAR’s are very
sparse, but the G–3 and S–3 journals are useful.
The combat interviews give quite extensive cover-
occupants of three dugouts during the affray at age. See also the 735th Tank Battalion AAR,
Harlange. December 194.
638 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

T h e leading companies of the 101st best, however, the understrength battal-


Infantry scaled the steep slopes on the ions of the Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade
north bank of the Sure during the night could only inflict delay now that the
of 26 December, and a couple of hours American bridges were in operation.
after midnight Company I reported that By early afternoon the entire 101st
it held Liefrange, the sally port onto the Infantry was across the river, and when
center of the three cart roads leading night fell the bulk of the 104th was on
northward. Apparently the German the north bank taking position to the
Seventh Army had not yet been apprised right of the 101st on the hills east of
of the crossings at the Sure, for in the Kaundorf. T o make his left wing secure,
early hours of the 27th Major von Cour- General Paul ordered the 101st to take
biere, acting commander of the Fuehrer Bavigne during the night of the 27th
Grenadier Brigade, was dispatched with and told the commanders of the two
two rifle battalions and a few tanks to regiments on the north bank to begin
bar a crossing at Liefrange. This Ger- a co-ordinated attack at 0800 on the 28th.
man foray struck Liefrange at about Company C of the 101st did shoot its
0720 and momentarily ruled the field. way into Bavigne before midnight but
But any hope of sweeping the north took most of the next morning to root
bank clear of the Americans evaporated out the last of the German grenadiers.
when a dozen artillery battalions took Late on the 27th the 2d Battalion of
the grenadiers under fire, followed less the 101st Infantry had forged well ahead
than two hours later by the Allied of the other American units, halting for
fighter-bombers. the night outside Nothum near the apex
In the meantime the 26th Division of the secondary road net in the division
engineers rushed the last sections of a zone. At this point the battalion encoun-
vehicular bridge into position north of tered tank fire, and when it moved
Bonnal. By 0900 the bridge was ready forward for the attack on the 28th it
and tanks and tank destroyers rumbled became clear that the German tanks
across to support the riflemen. North- would have to be destroyed or driven off
east of Liefrange two companies of the before Nothum could be taken. Some
3d Battalion, 101st, climbed the hill at hours passed here while the American
Kaundorf, the highest ground in the tanks and tank destroyers maneuvered
area, but were repelled when von Cour- and dueled with the Germans, but in
biere turned his tanks into Kaundorf and the late afternoon the way was clear and
knocked out half the platoon of Sher- the infantry fought their way into and
mans accompanying the Americans. 19At through the village. Earlier in the day
the 3d Battalion of the 101sthad retaken
Kaundorf and started a drive with its
19 Capts.John J. Christy and Leland R. Dunham, companies abreast to clear the woods
commanding the two rifle companies in this fight
and the subsequent recapture of Kaundorf, re- along the road to Nothum.20 During the
ceived the DSC. During the night of 27 December
Pvt. R. L. Presser of Company K, 104th Infantry, 20During this advance 2d Lt. G . F. Pennington
swam the Sure River under fire carrying a of Company E knocked out an enemy armored
wounded comrade from a patrol on the north car with a rocket although mortally wounded. He
bank. Presser was awarded the DSC. was awarded the DSC posthumously.
T H E T H I R D ARMY OFFENSIVE 639

A TOWN
EN ROUTE TO KAUNDORF

morning the leading companies of the T h e anticipated counterattack, prob-


104th Infantry set out to seize Buder- ably conjured up by the inability of
scheid but came under extremely heavy Allied air reconnaissance to function
fire from enemy dug in on some wooded during bad flying weather late on the
heights east of the village. T h e capture 28th, failed to appear. Paul waited until
of Kaundorf, however, permitted a flank- 1015, then telephoned the two regimen-
ing move against this German pocket, tal commanders to resume the advance.
so Companies F and G, accompanied by There was no longer any possibility of
tanks, swung west and north, the enemy a full-bodied division attack. With both
decamping as the envelopment of Buder- division flanks exposed the 328th Infan-
scheid became apparent. On the whole try had to be kept in the division com-
the progress made during the day was mander’s hand as reserve, and the 101st
satisfying, but the division came to an and 104th would have to move with
abrupt halt just before midnight with battalions echeloned rearward out to the
the word from corps headquarters that wings. Furthermore, visibility on the
the enemy would launch a counterattack ground had dwindled so that visual con-
from the northeast on the morning of tact between companies was almost non-
the 29th. existent.
640 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

But the Wiltz River crossing-and the T h e two-regiment attack on the morn-
town itself–were not so far away. (At ing of 30 December got off to a fast start,
midnight on the 28th the corps and divi- the orders now to “secure Wiltz.” On the
sion artillery commenced to fire T O T ’ S left the 101st Infantry met little but
against Wiltz.) Paul ordered the two small arms fire and the 3d Battalion set
regiments to get patrols to the river but up a roadblock on the Wiltz highway.
not to descend in strength into the Wiltz T h e regiment gathered 140 prisoners
valley. T h e initial task at hand would be from the 9th Volks Grenadier Division
t o clear the enemy pockets from the in its sweep through the woods north
wooded high ground to the division and west of the highway. T h e enemy,
front and cut the highway to Bastogne. however, had no intention of allowing
This fight on the hills would be one at a parade march down into the Wiltz
close range with opposing rifle com- valley. An hour before dusk a German
panies and platoons gone to ground and counterattack drove Companies I and K,
entrenched only 75 to 150 yards apart. the leaders, back onto the hill rising at
T h e 101st began its advance at noon the junction of the Wiltz and Roullingen
on the 29th, the immediate goal being roads. There followed a period of quiet,
to take the high ground north of Berle and then in the dark the grenadiers
and the Schumann crossroads which struck again. This time they were in bat-
commanded the highway. Here, as else- talion strength and had three or four
where along the division front, the tanks to harden the blow. Companies I
enemy made up for his lack of riflemen and K took a substantial number of cas-
with constant and accurate fire from dug- ualties and were left so disorganized that
in tanks and Nebelwerfers, reinforced at the regimental commander asked Paul
likely points by a few 88’s. Despite the to delay the attack scheduled for the next
presence of the division 105-mm. howitz- morning in order to get the 3d Battalion
ers, which had been pushed to within straightened out.
fifteen hundred yards of the rifle line, T h e 104th Infantry ran into trouble
the 101st made little headway. At night- in the first minutes of its advance on the
fall Company A had reached a point five 30th. Both assault battalions were mov-
hundred yards south of Berle, but Com- ing against enemy troops well established
pany B had run into serious trouble and on the wooded high ground north of
the 2d Battalion had been pinned down Buderscheid, and both came under an
by direct fire not far from Nothum. T h e unusually heavy amount of tank and
1st and 2d Battalions of the 104th Infan- Nebelwerfer fire. Clearly enemy resist-
try, faced with direct tank fire, made no ance in this sector was stiffening. Lt. Col.
substantial progress, although patrols in
front of the attack wave did reach the could not move forward. Eastburn “borrowed”
woods southwest of Nocher and elements another platoon and wiped out the machine gun
of the 1st reached a ridge overlooking nests. He received the DSC. Pfc. S. E. Hull, a
member of the same company, broke up a German
the town of Wiltz.21 tank attack when he crawled forward with a
bazooka and, at thirty-five yards’ range, destroyed
21Sgt. B. R. Eastburn of Company C, 104th the lead panzer. Hull put in another rocket
Infantry, was leading a platoon in the attack which killed the second tank, and thus ended
which came under intense machine gun fire and the attack. Hull was awarded the DSC.
T H E T H I R D ARMY OFFENSIVE 641

Calvin A. Heath’s 2d Battalion was lized. Now the 2d Battalion took over
pinned down almost at once at a cross- the fight on the left wing of the 101st,
road and, under direct tank fire, could moving forward behind a rolling bar-
not work its way around the German rage to clear the woods north of No-
pocket. T h e 1st Battalion briefly gained thum. This attack made progress, but
control of a crest to its front but then was once again as dusk came on the enemy
driven off by a savage attack which en- counterattacked. Company G, which had
gulfed parts of Companies A and C. entered the woods to support the two
Paul ordered the 3d Battalion of the assault companies there, either ran into
328th Infantry u p from reserve to back the German advance or lost its way and
the 104th, and the Americans regained was encircled; only half the company
some of the ground lost north of Buder- escaped.
scheid. When the day ended, however, The 104th Infantry lay on 31 Decem-
the enemy intention to hold this part of ber with its right facing along the Buder-
the line was underscored by a sudden scheid-Wiltz road and its left facing
and considerable increase in artillery north along and overlooking the Roul-
fire. lingen sector of the Bavigne-Wiltz road.
T h e exposed condition of the 26th Much of its strength had been diverted
Division salient, as the year ended, is for the long north-south blocking line
accurately described in the regimental which guarded the division–and corps–
orders issued to the 101st Infantry: east flank, but a battalion of the 328th
“Each Battalion will be prepared to Infantry was moving by truck and on
meet counterattacks from the north, foot to take over this task. Although the
northwest and northeast.” T h e first of 104th Infantry had an attack mission and
these anticipated thrusts came at the did push out a little through the woods
101st roadblock about 0530 on 31 De- to the north, most of the day was spent in
cember, commencing a battle which an inconclusive fire fight.
embroiled both the 1st and 3d Battalions At the close of the year the 26th Divi-
and lasted all day long. T h e main Ger- sion lay in a wedge, the 101st Infantry
man effort seems to have been directed at the point around Nothum, the 104th
at the 3d Battalion roadblock southwest on the right facing the diagonal formed
of Roullingen, and as a result Companies by the Buderscheid section of the high-
I and K , much weakened by the mauling way, and the 328th (–) on the division
received the previous day, took the first left in the neighborhood of Bavigne.
blows. As the German attack gained Both flanks of the division still were ex-
momentum, Colonel Scott ordered the posed and the troops were deployed on a
two companies to fall back on the fox- very wide front, considering the broken
hole line dug earlier south of the Roul- character of the ground.
lingen road. Light tanks and tank de- T h e old enemy–the Fuehrer Grena-
stroyers sent forward to help the 101st dier–had withdrawn during the last
could made no headway, nor could they nights of December to go into the Sev-
maneuver. on the icy roads. T h e enemy, enth Army reserve at Wiltz, its place
however, had no tanks in action, and by being taken by the 9th Volks Grenadier
noon the 2d Battalion line was stabi- Division (Colonel Kolb) . T h e 9th had
642 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

been formed as one of the first German -and in column of companies–into the
Army divisions in 1935 but no longer triangle where Hill 490 lay.
bore much resemblance to the formation T h e 2d Battalion jumped off in the
that had fought in France and Russia. attack at daybreak and hit the German
Almost completely destroyed during the outpost line just north of Mont Schu-
withdrawal from Rumania, the 9th mann. Toward the hill objective, less
Volks Grenadier was reorganized and than a thousand yards ahead, the ad-
trained in Denmark, whence it was trans- vance could move only at a crawl, for
ferred to the Seventh Army. The very there was little space for maneuver on
first battalion to arrive in the Sure area either side of the road. Roadblock fol-
had been put into action to help the lowed roadblock, and the rifle companies
Fuehrer Grenadier and had been wiped had to squeeze past each other as the
out, a traumatic experience from which leader was pinned down by enemy tank
the rest of the division never seems to and machine gun fire. A few of the
have fully recovered. American tank destroyers were able to
With the 6th Armored advance just find firing positions from which to en-
getting under way on 1 January and the gage the forward German tanks but
35th Division grappled by the enemy in could not get close enough to blast the
a seesaw battle, General Millikin gave panzers, which had been hidden in
orders for the 26th Division to attack on “trench garages” around the crown of
the 2d and cut the Wiltz-Bastogne high- Hill 490. By noon the 2d Battalion had
way, which was supporting not only the come to a standstill and was completely
German Seventh Army but a portion of fought out. General Paul ordered up his
the enemy build-up east of Bastogne. division reserve, the 3d Battalion of the
General Paul determined to use his en- 328th, to take a crack at the enemy in
tire division in this operation. T h e two the tough triangle.
flank regiments were intended to make This abrupt renewal of activity in
holding attacks only, leaving it to the front of Wiltz had a much greater im-
101st–in the center–to thrust northeast pact on the Seventh Army than a battal-
from Nothum and seize Hill 490, the ion attack normally would occasion.
latter just beyond the wooded junction General Brandenberger and his chief of
where a secondary road from Roullingen staff, General von Gersdorff, had become
met the main highway winding up from gravely concerned lest the American
the Wiltz valley. By this time the 26th attacks around Marvie and Harlange
Division had learned the hard way what should suddenly break through and trap
an attack over hills and ravines, through the 5th Parachute Division in what the
underbrush, tangled woods, and snow- Germans now were calling “the Har-
drifts-with little room for maneuver- lange pocket.” T h e renewal of the 26th
was like. General Paul arranged for the Division attack on 2 January and the
corps and division artillery to curtain the threat to the Bastogne-Wiltz road in-
advance with a “rolling barrage of high creased this apprehension about the
intensity.” This tactic was made easier possibly precarious position of the 5 t h
because only one rifle battalion (the 2d, Parachute and the link it furnished be-
101st Infantry) would make the assault tween the Seventh and Fifth Panzer
T H E T H I R D ARMY OFFENSIVE 643

Armies. As a result General Branden- Cecil Chapman) managed to put patrols


berger asked Model’s permission to pull across the highway north of Remagne. It
his troops back from Villers-la-Bonne- had been advancing with two tanks in
Eau and Harlange, but Model gave a front of each company and the enemy
nay, reminding the importunate army reaction through the daylight hours was
commander that Germany now was confined to small arms fire and occasion-
in a battle of attrition by which al bursts of artillery. T h e 347th, how-
the Allies would become enmeshed and ever, was moving against that part of the
ground down. 902d line which was backed with armor,
for Bayerlein had put his assault guns
T h e V I I I Corps’ Attack Continues in to stiffen the Panzer Lehr western
terminus at St. Hubert and placed his
The pitched battle with the 87th Divi- few remaining tanks as backstop for the
sion’s 345th Infantry at Moircy on the eastern flank. At dusk, when the sky was
night of 30 December had involved the empty of the fighter-bombers, the enemy
reserve tanks and infantry supporting tanks struck and drove the 1st Battalion
the thin-spread 902d, which was holding back toward Remagne.
the Panzer Lehr left flank, and during The 3d Battalion (Lt. Col. Richard D.
the next afternoon the 345th captured Sutton) moved north from Moircy along
Remagne without sustaining the usual the road to Pironpré and at noon took
counterattack. For a relatively untried the intermediate village of Jenneville,
outfit that had ridden a hundred miles, where Company C of the 345th had
crowded in jolting trucks, and had gone suffered a bloody head two days before.
into an attack over unfamiliar terrain When the battalion defiled from Jenne-
all in the space of less than twenty hours, ville the German fire stepped up its
the 345th had done well. But it had cadence, and now the sharp bark of tank
taken many casualties, and now that the guns could be heard from Pironpré. T h e
fresh 347th Infantry (Col. Sevier R. road junction at the latter point was of
Tupper) had come up General Culin considerable concern to General Bayer-
turned the advance on the division right lein. He could spare only a small detach-
wing over to the latter. The 346th con- ment of grenadiers (probably no more
tinued its blocking mission at St. Hubert than thirty were inside Pironpré) , but
and Vesqueville. (Even the move into he did put a half dozen tanks into the
reserve cost the 345th lives and equip- defense. These tanks were carefully sited
ment, for the constant traffic uncovered to give maximum fire and were masked
and exploded German mines which ear- from the road by the piles of lumber
lier had lain harmless under the deep surrounding the local sawmill. The
snow.) Americans could not locate this opposi-
The morning of 1 January came with tion and halted for the night.
snow, sleet, and bitter cold. The 347th Before daybreak the two battalions
set out from Moircy and Remagne, went into attack positions close to the
plowing through the drifts, its objective road which ran diagonally from St. Hu-
to cut the Bastogne-St. Hubert road at bert to Morhet, set as the regimental line
Amberloup. T h e 1st Battalion (Maj. of departure. They left the hornet’s nest
644 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

at Pironpré undisturbed, moving around would involve clearing the troublesome


it on the right and left. This second day Bois des Valets—until it reached its ob-
of the new year the 347th made progress. jective at Mande-St. Etienne. With Fla-
T h e 1st Battalion captured Gerimont mierge and Mande-St. Etienne held in
and the 3d Battalion took Bonnerue, in force, the German line of communica-
the process losing four of its attached tions west of Bastogne would be effec-
tanks to armor-piercing fire (probably tively blocked.
from the panzers hidden in Pironpré). Now that General Kilburn had his
But by nightfall it was apparent that a whole division in hand, he took an
dangerous gap had been created between optimistic view of the power play to be
the two battalions, and Colonel Tupper made on the 31st Indeed his staff in-
ordered his reserve battalion to clean outformed the 101st Airborne Division,
Pironpré and the thick woods beyond. with what was pardonable presumption
The 87th Division now could claim that when a green division was seeking to
the Bastogne-St. Hubert road had been impress the veteran and haughty para-
pierced because the seizure of Bonnerue troopers, that Mande-St. Etienne would
had put a part of the 347th athwart this be taken by noon. In midmorning CCA
highway. passed CCB’s Task Force Poker, which
had laagered at Brul and Houmont the
T h e 11th Armored Division had re- evening before and was waiting for Task
grouped during the night of 30 Decem- Force Pat to get through Chenogne. Near
ber with the object of consolidating the Rechrival the march was interrupted by
entire division for a drive north along an enemy screening force that had been
the Rechrival valley. CCA moved over deployed by the 3d Panzer Grenadier
the icy roads south of the Bois des Haies to protect its western flank. This detach-
de Magery, which had separated it from ment, equipped with antitank and as-
the rest of the division, and onto the sault guns, was promptly reinforced by
Neufchâteau-Bastogne road, where the the 115th Regiment of the 15th Panzer
columns ran afoul of those of CCB, 6th Grenadier (reduced by the bloody attack
Armored. In the morning CCA turned west of Bastogne to battalion strength).
off the highway and assembled around Loosing a series of jabs at the head of
Morhet. T h e new scheme of maneuver the American column, the 115th used the
called for CCA to attack in the center Panzerfaust to put a number of tanks
of the valley, erupt from it at Rechrival hors de combat. T h e everready fighter-
and Hubermont, then capture Fla- bombers intervened to help CCA with a
mierge. CCR (Col. Virgil Bell) had been strike on Rechrival, but in any case the
brought up from reserve to cover the American armor carried the weight
CCA left flank in a sequence of block- necessary to push back the grenadiers,
ing positions at Magerotte and Pinsa- and after considerable reorganization the
mont where branch roads gave entrance march resumed. Rechrival was found
to the Hubermont road. CCB, still empty—apparently the Jabos had done
entangled in the Chenogne fight, had their work well—and the command out-
orders to take that village and proceed posted for the night.
along the east side of the valley—which Task Force Pat turned again to as-
T H E T H I R D ARMY OFFENSIVE 645

sault Chenogne at noon on the 31st shal von Rundstedt’s headquarters had
the armored infantry walking through agreed that any further attempt to break
knee-deep snow. T h e Sherman tanks through the Bastogne corridor via Sib-
mired in while attempting to cross a ret would have to await success by the
small creek, but the light tanks and a eastern counterattack force. Surprising-
platoon of antiaircraft half-tracks wield- ly the enemy broke the quiet on the
ing the dreaded .50-caliber quads gave 502d Parachute Infantry front with a
sufficient fire power to force entry at foray directed against Champs.22 Ac-
the edge of the village. Inside was a tually the attackers were trying to get
scratch garrison recruited from the 39th a foothold in three houses just outside
Fuesilier Regiment (26th Volks Grena- the village. T h e paratroopers reported
dier Division), the 3 d Panzer Grenadier, two hours of “bitter fighting” before
and Remer’s brigade. T h e mainstay of quiet was restored, for the enemy had
the defense in this sector, however, was been ably supported by artillery fire.
a group of twelve to fifteen tank de- Thirty prisoners were taken from what
stroyers which had Mark IV carriages the 502d reported as an “assault wave”
mounting the high-velocity, long-tube of three officers and fifty men. This mi-
L70 guns. These were brought into ac- nor affair is mentioned here only because
tion late in the day and drove the Amer- it furnishes a very revealing commen-
icans out of Chenogne. tary on the state of the German forma-
CCR carried out the first phase of its tions which had been in the Bastogne
blocking mission with no opposition, fight through all the recent days: the
scoured the woods northwest of Mager- “assault wave” was the total strength of
otte, and gained the ridge there. On the two rifle companies from the 77th Gren-
reverse slope some of Remer’s grena- adier Regiment of the 26th Volks Gren-
diers were entrenched, but the Shermans adier Division.
machine-gunned the way clear and the If the 11th Armored attack was to
attack moved on to put in the next click, the trailing right wing would have
block at Pinsamont. German mortar to break through at Chenogne. General
and artillery fire was so intense here Kilburn ruled that the main effort by
(this was a special groupment of weap- the division on 1 January would be
ons which Remer had positioned to made by and in support of CCB. This
protect his brigade’s flank) that CCR attack would be co-ordinated with that
withdrew to the Magerotte crest line. of CCA, 9th Armored, which thus far
That night Remer’s 3d Grenadier Bat-
talion essayed two fruitless counter-
22
Although the 502d had no offensive mission,
attacks. This rather minor series of the paratroopers had been involved in continuous
skirmishes on the 31st cost the 55th Ar- small-scale combat with the enemy in their sector.
mored Infantry Battalion over eighty During one such affair on 29 December a division
aid man, Pfc. Floyd P. Marquart, went forward un-
casualties. der fire to help a paratrooper who had been struck
German action on this date was not in the throat by a shell fragment and was slowly
solely directed against the 11th Ar- suffocating. Marquart performed an emergency
tracheotomy with his belt knife, then dragged the
mored. There was some fighting at wounded man back to a place of safety. He was
Sibret, although by noontime Field Mar- given the Silver Star.
646 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

was making no headway at Senonchamps the trees.


to the east. At Chenogne, on the morn- Slow in getting started on 1 January,
ing of the 1st, two medium tank com- CCA had just begun to assemble on the
panies made the assault after all the road when it was surprised by a coun-
division artillery had co-operated in terattack led by Remer. Most of the
working the village over. This time the infantry belonging to the Fuehrer Beg-
village was occupied with ease, although leit and its attached assault gun brigade
a few of the Mark IV tank destroyers were in the line screening the western
had lingered long enough to stick their flank of Denkert’s 3d Panzer Grenadier
long barrels out of hayricks and destroy Division, but on the 31st Remer’s tank
four Shermans. During the night the group and one of his grenadier battal-
commander of the 3 d Panzer Grenadier, ions had been relieved for a little rest
apprehensive lest the American thrust in the village of Fosset, northwest of
in the valley crumple his supply lines, Hubermont, there becoming the X L V I I
had withdrawn his right, leaving most Panzer Corps reserve, Whether Remer
of the large woods between Chenogne or Luettwitz saw this glittering opportu-
and Senonchamps unoccupied and re- nity to take the American columns at
ducing the garrisons in the two villages Rechrival by surprise is uncertain. In
to covering shells. any case Remer did achieve surprise by
Now for the first time Task Force circling into the Bois des Valets, then
Pat and Task Force Poker could make bursting onto his enemy.
a co-ordinated effort and employ a force Remer’s tanks and assault guns
which was balanced tactically. T h e CCB knocked out a considerable number of
fusion was aided in its sweep north American tanks, and the battle went on
through the Bois des Valets by thirteen for three hours before CCA, the 11th Ar-
battalions of artillery whose sustained mored artillery, and the fighter-bombers
fire left a great number of the enemy succeeded in crushing the counterattack.
dead in the woods. Colonel Yale be- At 1530 CCA was moving again. T h e
lieved that his combat command might fight had removed the sting from the
achieve a quick stroke out of the woods German defense and the American tanks
and seize Mande-St. Etienne or at least forged ahead rapidly, reaching Huber-
its suburb, Monty. A short distance mont at twilight. Because the armored
north of the Bois des Valets the trail- infantry had not kept pace with the
for it was little more-ran between two tanks and, for all the Americans knew,
wood lots. While passing between the another counterattack might be brew-
two woods the leading platoon of Sher- ing, CCA retired and set up its lines
mans bogged down. Just such a lapse around Rechrival and Brul.
was what the German bazooka men had That night the VIII Corps commander
been waiting for-they wiped out the visited the 11th Armored command post
platoon. CCB withdrew into a semicir- at Morhet and ordered the division to
cle following the edge of the Bois des consolidate its positions on the following
Valets, and there the armored infantry, day before it was relieved by the 17th
with no cover overhead, sweated out the Airborne Division. This word was re-
night while the German shells burst in layed to the combat commands, but
T H E T H I R D ARMY OFFENSIVE 647

Colonel Yale, whose CCB was only a uary the VIII Corps’ capture of Mande-
mile or so from its original objective, St. Etienne so endangered the three
Mande-St. Etienne, asked for and was weak divisions in the Rochefort sector
given permission to take that town on at the tip of the salient that the Fifth
2 January. Ample artillery was wired in Panzer Army commander went to Model
to support the attack—twelve battal- with a plea for a general withdrawal
ions fired 3,800 rounds on 120 targets by the two panzer armies to the line
in and around Monty and Mande-St. Eti- Vielsalm-Houffalize-Noville. This pes-
enne. For some reason the attack started simistic but realistic view of the German
in midafternoon, probably too late to situation was supported by Luettwitz,
have made a quick and thorough commanding in the west, who had
purge of the German defenders. Both expected as early as 28 December that
infantry and armored task forces got the British would mount an attack in the
into the town but were forced to fight Rochefort area. His suspicions were con-
street to street and cellar to cellar all firmed on New Year’s Day by the
through the night before securing full identification of the British 50th In-
possession. fantry Division in the Allied line.
When the 17th Airborne moved in on Model apparently gave tacit profes-
3 January to take over from the 11th Ar- sional agreement to Manteuffel’s views.
mored Division, the 11th could look But he was, quite literally, the prison-
back at a bitterly contested advance of er of Hitler and the Nazi machine–it
six miles in four days. T h e human cost may be said that Model’s life depend-
had been 220 killed and missing and ed on continuing the fiction that the
441 wounded; the cost in materiel, 42 Wehrmacht would give no ground. So
medium and 12 light tanks. the staff at Army Group B continued to
pore over maps and march tables for
T h e failure of the Fifth Panzer Army still another attack on 4 January to
to close the gap opened by Patton’s “erase” Bastogne. One may wonder what
troops at Bastogne convinced General were the private thoughts of the old
Manteuffel that the time had arrived soldier Rundstedt as he watched the
for the German forces in the Ardennes Allied divisions coming into array on
to relinquish all thought of continuing the OB WEST situation map, readying
the offensive. Withdrawal in the west for the kill. Whatever these thoughts,
and south to a shortened line was more they remained his own for he no longer
in keeping with the true combat capa- had the power or the prestige to influ-
bility of the gravely weakened divisions. ence Hitler or the course of the Ar-
At the end of the year Manteuffel had dennes battle. The last entry for the year
advised pulling back to the line Od- 1944 in the OB WEST War Diary
eigne–La Roche–St. Hubert.23By 2 Jan- simply expresses the hope that the Ger-
man initiative now lost in the Ardennes
23The immediate reason for pulling back from may be regained in the new offensive
the exposed tip of the salient was the American being unleashed that very moment
pressure on Rochefort. The 329th Infantry forced
an entry there on 29 December and, although town on this date, the enemy could not risk
the regiment failed to gain complete control of the a further defense with his depleted forces.
648 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE'

against the American and French forces great Allied counteroffensive as it moved
in Alsace. This new battle, however, into high gear to flatten the Bulge
would have little effect on the German and steamroller a path to and over the
forces which, on 3 January, faced the Rhine.
CHAPTER XXV

Epilogue
T h e Weather togne by fog and snow, and along the
German supply roads back over the Eifel
There is an axiom that weather on snow fell continuously.
the battlefield is divided equally be- T h e dramatic change of the 23d,
tween the combatants—but its impact on brought by cold, dry winds from the
military operations is not equal in east, stripped the German armies of
amount or direction. T h e German selec- their immunity to air attack. But this
tion of a target date for the commence- was not the whole story. Snow began
ment of the Ardennes offensive turned to drift in the Eifel hills, bringing traf-
on the prediction of poor flying weather. fic on the main supply roads west of the
This type of weather had a useful side Rhine almost to a standstill. Horse-
effect during the rupture of the Amer- drawn snowplows were few and ineffec-
ican lines since it veiled the attacker tive, hastily erected snow fences were
with fog and mist, a very important fea- torn down by troops scrounging for
ture of the initial German successes firewood, there was no gravel available,
just as it had been in the great offensives and a large number of the engineer
of 1918. T h e high pressure system which construction battalions had been taken
came in from the Atlantic on 18 De- west for employment as infantry. By
cember, however, worked momentarily the time power snowplows reached the
against the attacker. A thaw set in which Eifel the American fighter-bombers were
slowed his tanks and the erstwhile heavy strafing and bombing every large vehicle
ground fog began to show sudden that moved. Engineers were brought
openings, such as those which exposed into the Eifel, but their very efforts de-
the German tanks and infantry during layed the German truck columns so
the fight at Noville. On the 20th and urgently needed farther west.1
21st the higher ground began to freeze For five days the weather favored the
in patches, leaving stretches of the Ar- Americans, in the air and on the ground.
dennes roads slippery and muddy. By Superior numerically in tanks, the
the 22d competing weather systems from Americans benefited more than the Ger-
Russia and the Atlantic had brought on mans from the sure footing the big
a hodgepodge of snow, blizzards, fog, freeze provided for armor. Then, on 28
and rain. In the north the Sixth Panzer
Army was bogged by rain and mud, in
the south the Fifth Panzer Army was 1 See description in MS # B–172, Army Group B
Engineers, 1–25 January 1945 (Generalleutnant
hampered in its swing around Bas- Richard Wirtz).
650 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

December, came clouds and overcast attack, it is probable that the over-all
followed, a day later, by arctic air from ratio of German infantry to American
Scandinavia, heavy snows, blizzards, and was three to one, with a ratio of six
greatly reduced visibility at ground to one at points of concentration. Ger-
level. Vehicular movement was slow, the man armored superiority was some-
riflemen exhausted themselves wading what less pronounced during the first-
through the drifts, and the wounded- day assault, only about two to one in
those in a state of shock–died if left medium tanks. If the self-propelled guns
in the snow for half an hour or more. employed in a tank role are considered,
This was the state of the weather when, the superiority enjoyed by the attacker
on 3 January, the Allies began their was about four to one.
final counterattack. By 2 January 1945, the eve of the
Allied attack to destroy the Ardennes
T h e Opposing Troop Strengths salient, the Germans had thrown 8 ar-
mored divisions, 20 infantry divisions,
On the morning of 16 December the and 2 mechanized brigades into the Bat-
American forces in the path of the Ger- tle of the Bulge. During these eighteen
man counteroffensive comprised four days the Americans had employed 8 ar-
and two-thirds divisions with an effec- mored, 16 infantry, and 2 airborne divi-
tive strength of about 83,000 men. T h e sions in the line. 2 This tabulation of
heavy weapons then available numbered the opposing divisions, however, does not
242 Sherman tanks, 182 tank destroyers, give a true measure of the relative com-
and 394 pieces of corps and divisional bat strength deployed in what may be
artillery. These troops and weapons called the German phase of the winter
were deployed on a meandering front of battle in the Ardennes.
104 miles. T h e American rifle division in 1944
T h e enemy assault divisions posed to was organized at a strength of 14,032
the east had concentrated behind some men, and most of the divisions engaged
ninety miles of the front manned by in this operation entered the fray
Army Group B , and during the night at full complement. T h e personnel
of 15 December over 200,000 combat strength of the German infantry divi-
troops gathered in the forward assembly sions varied, at the time of their com-
area, about three miles in depth. T h e
2T h e German order of battle for the period of
German attack, as it developed during 16 December–2 January was as follows: 1st SS, 2d
the course of 16 December, was made SS, 9th S S , 12th SS Panzer Divisions; Panzer Lehr
on an assault front of sixty miles and and 2d, 9th, 116th Panzer Divisions; 3d and 5th
Parachute Divisions; 3d and 15th Panzer Grenadier
included 5 armored divisions, 12 2/3 in- Divisions; 9th, 12th, 18th, 26th, 62d, 79th, 167th,
fantry divisions, and about 500 medium 212th, 246th, 272d, 276th, 277th, 326th, 340th, 352d,
tanks, the whole supported by the fire of 560th Volks Grenadier Divisions; and the Fuehrer-
Grenadier and Fuehrer Begleit Brigades. T h e
1,900 guns and Werfers. American order of battle for the same period in-
Although it is impossible to measure cluded: the 2d, 3d, 4th, 6th, 7th, 9th, 10th, and
the exact number of rifle battalions and 11th Armored Divisions; the 82d and 101st Air-
borne Divisions; the 1st, 2d, 4th, 5th, 9th, 26th,
tank battalions committed by the Ger- 28th, 3oth, 35th, 75th, 80th, 83d, 84th, 87th, 99th,
mans during the initial breakthrough and 106th Infantry Divisions.
EPILOGUE 651

mitment, between 8,000 and 17,000, the resents a measure of the adequacy of
lower figure representing those divisions the forces employed and their operation-
which had been refitted at 80 percent al mobility. T h e German failure to
of the 1944 Volks Grenadier division break through on the north shoulder at
table of organization and equipment Monschau had considerable impact on
and the upper figure, which can be ap- the width of the planned assault front,
plied to only three or four divisions, rep- and by 18 December the base of the
resenting those, like the 26th Volks salient had stabilized at a width of forty-
Grenadier Division, which retained the seven air-line miles, narrower than de-
older, regular infantry division com- sired. T h e greatest depth of the Ger-
position. T h e strength of the Ger- man penetration, achieved on the tenth
man infantry divisions across the day of the attack, was about sixty air-
board probably averaged little more line miles. On that date, however, the
than 10,000 men. T h e normal German average width of the salient had been
rifle regiment numbered 1,868 as con- reduced to thirty miles and at its tip
trasted with the American infantry reg- measured no more than a five-mile front
iment of 3,207 officers and men. facing the Meuse. Indeed, the width of
T h e majority of the German panzer the assault front proper can be consid-
divisions had the same manpower con- ered as the range of the 75-mm. guns
figuration as the two U.S. square ar- on the 2d Panzer tanks. By this time
mored divisions (the 2d and 3d), that is, the Americans had something approach-
a little over 14,000. T h e six remaining ing a co-ordinated and homogeneous line
U.S. armored divisions had the new tri- as a retaining wall north and south of
angular organization with a roster re- the salient, with a frontage of nearly
duced to 10,666 officers and men. The seven miles per division on the north
armored weight of the opposing divi- flank and a little more than thirteen
sions, however, strongly favored the miles on the southern flank.
Americans, for the German panzer divi-
sion brought an average of go to 100 The Opposing Weapons
medium tanks into the field whereas
the American triangular division was Although winter in the Ardennes
equipped with 186 and the two square placed severe limitations on the use of
divisions had 232 medium tanks in their armor, the tank was a major weapon in
organization tables. Hitler personally the hands of both antagonists. T h e Sher-
attempted to compensate for this dis- man tank, a medium of the thirty-ton
parity by ordering the attachment of class, bore the brunt of all American ar-
separate Army tank battalions of 40 to mored action, while the light tank was
50 Panthers or Tigers to the regular pan- relegated to minor tactical tasks. T h e
zer divisions. Sherman (M4) was battle tested, and
T h e battle area during the period of most of the mechanical bugs had been
16 December through 3 January has to removed. Its major weaknesses—tank
be measured as a salient in which the gun and armor—by this time were well
relation between the width of the base appreciated by the user. A new model,
and the depth of the penetration rep- the M4A3, had been equipped with a
652 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

high-velocity, long-barreled 76-mm. gun cluding heavy top armor as protection


to replace the old, short-barreled 75- against air attack, was capable of a speed
mm., but not many of these were in the comparable to the Sherman, and mount-
European Theater of Operations. Also, ed a high-velocity 88-mm. cannon. A still
a very few Shermans had been modified heavier Mark VI, the King Tiger, had
to carry a heavier weight of armor plate an added two to four inches of armor
-the so-called Jumbo tanks. T h e Jum- plate. Few of this model ever reached
bos, which had been tried out during the Ardennes, although it was com-
the autumn fighting, proved so success- monly reported by American troops.
ful that General Patton ordered their Exact figures on German tank
use as lead tanks in the drive to Bas- strength are not available, but it would
togne—but most American tankers appear that of the estimated 1,800 pan-
never saw the Jumbo in December 1944. zers in the Ardennes battle some 250
The Germans had a family of three were Tigers and the balance was divid-
main battle tanks. T h e Mark IV, which ed equally between the Mark IV and the
received its first real combat test in Panther. Battle experience in France,
May 1940, weighed twenty-seven tons, which was confirmed in the Ardennes,
had somewhat less armor than the Sher- gave the Sherman the edge over the
man, about the same maximum road Mark IV in frontal, flank, and rear
speed, and a tank gun comparable in attack. T h e Panther often had been
weight of projectile and muzzle veloc- beaten by the Sherman during the cam-
ity to the 76-mm. American tank gun paign in France, and would be defeated
but superior to the short-barreled 75- on the Ardennes battleground, but
mm. in nearly all cases of a forthright tank
T h e Panther, Mark V, had proved it- engagement the Panther lost only when
self during 1944 but still was subject to American numerical superiority permit-
mechanical failures which were well rec- ted an M4 to get a shot at flank or tail.
ognized but which seemingly could not Insofar as the Tiger was concerned,
be corrected in the hasty German pro- the Sherman had to get off a lucky
duction schedules. This tank had a round or the result would be strictly no
weight of fifty tons, a superiority in base contest.
armor of one-half to one inch over American and German divisional
the Sherman, good mobility and flota- artillery was very similar, having fol-
tion, greater speed, and a high-velocity lowed the same developmental pattern
gun superior even to the new American during the 1930’s. Differences in corps
76-mm. tank gun. artillery were slight, although the Ger-
T h e Tiger, Mark VI, had been de- mans placed more emphasis on long-
veloped as an answer to the heavy Rus- range guns in the heavy calibers,
sian tank but had encountered numerous 170-mm. and above. T h e German Army,
production difficulties (it had over 26,- as the result of its battles on the Eastern
000 parts) and never reached the field Front and experiences with the Soviet
in the numbers Hitler desired. T h e rocket artillery, placed great faith in the
original model weighed fifty-four tons, Werfer, a multiple-tube rocket launcher.
had thicker armor than the Panther, in- This weapon was easy to produce and
EPILOGUE 653

could be easily transported, a major lem reflected the opposition of the


design feature when the production U.S. Army to dual-purpose weapons,
of heavy trucks and artillery prime and as a result the U.S. rifle ,regiment
movers began to fall off in the Reich. carried both a cannon company and
The 150-mm.version weighed only 1,200 an antitank company. On the whole
pounds and could fire a quarter-ton neither of these units performed
of high explosives in ten seconds; the as desired during the Ardennes
210-mm. model weighed about a ton battle. The howitzers of the cannon
and a half and could discharge over company seemed to fire effectively only
half a ton of high explosives per salvo. when tied with the divisional artillery,
These weapons lacked the accuracy and the 57-mm. antitank gun lacked the
fire control features of conventional ar- punch to meet German tanks, and,
tillery, and because of the blast could what was worse, most division com-
be readily spotted, but their mobility manders looked upon these weapons
seems to have been a major feature in companies as providing additional rifle-
carrying German firepower forward men to put into the foxhole line. So it
during the Ardennes offensive. was on the thinly held American front
American and German doctrine and of 16 December.
organization for the employment of in- The American self-propelled 90-mm.
fantry-support weapons had followed tank destroyer and the 88-mm. German
different paths during the development equivalent were much feared, or at the
cycle between the two World Wars when least highly respected, for they had the
the problem of the “infantry-accom- power to penetrate the armor they
panying gun” had plagued all armies. faced, they could jockey for position
The German Army ultimately opted along the winding Ardennes roads and
for a self-propelled 75-mm. assault gun defiles, and they were hard to
designed to help the infantry platoon destroy. Both antagonists used 75-mm.
forward in the assault and, at the same towed antitank weapons and both
time, to provide a real antitank capa- lost these towed weapons and other
bility. The concept and the weapon had towed artillery in large numbers. In
proved themselves on the Eastern Front, the mud and snow, and under direct fire
but the battle wastage of this weapon, and infantry assault, the task of limber-
like that of the assault infantry it sup- ing gun to truck or tractor was
ported, was extraordinarily high. In difficult and hazardous. Furthermore,
December 1944, the German infantry in heavy and close combat the tow
used a battle drill and tactics “leaning” vehicle often was shot up or immobilized
on an accompanying weapon which no while the gun, dug in, remained
longer could be issued in proper num- intact. The mobile, tactically agile,
bers to even the most favored divisions. self-propelled, armored field artil-
German battle commanders invariably lery and tank destroyers are clearly
point to the lack of this weapon in ex- traceable in the Ardennes fighting as
plaining particular failures of their in- over and over again influencing the
fantry in battle. course of battle. Their record should
The American approach to this prob- be pondered in the design of tactics
654 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

and missiles. by American field artillery accounted for


T h e difficult terrain on which the win- a large share of the kills made, although
ter campaign was fought, the prevalence the actual damage inflicted may have
of pitched battles at night and in fog, been no more than a broken track or
the tactical failure of the American 57- sprocket wheel.
mm. antitank gun, and the paucity of Mortars, machine guns, and rifles
German assault guns and self-propelled functioned in a comparable manner on
tank destroyers brought the bazooka in- both sides of the line. Here the design
to a place of prominence on both sides of the infantry weapon proved less im-
of the line. Admittedly the bazooka was portant in the bloody competition of
a suicide weapon, but there were always the fire fight than the supply of am-
brave men—mostly platoon and squad munition, the numbers employed, and
leaders—torisk its use against an enemy the small unit tactics. T h e single excep-
tank. In the autumn of 1944 the Ger- tion is the machine pistol, which had
man Army recognized that it was too been issued in large numbers to the new
late for building tank destroyers in the Volks Grenadier divisions and was very
numbers required and that in any case successfully employed by the German
fuel was lacking for their transport in- special assault companies formed in each
to battle. Therefore the decision was infantry regiment.
made to build hand rocket weapons and Weapons and fire control turned main-
rely on the courage of the “single ly on wire communications, laid forward
fighter”-a decision like that made in to observation posts and back to com-
1917–1918 when the Kaiser’s army mand posts. The vulnerability of tele-
turned to armor-piercing rifles in the phone wire was adequately demonstra-
hands of the single fighter to stop Allied ted on the morning of 16 December and
tanks. In December 1944 both sides throughout the campaign–yet it contin-
learned that infantry companies armed ued to be the primary means of tacti-
with bazookas could not do the work of cal communication. Radio, of the type
tank destroyers. used in late 1944, lacked the necessary
T h e success of field artillery as an range and constantly failed in the woods
antidote to the tank is difficult to assess and defiles. Both sides engaged in jam-
quantitatively. American and German ming, but for the most part the really
doctrine taught that long-range artil- damaging interference came from
lery could be used to break up tank friendly transmitters.
concentrations before these reached the Three additional items of equipment
infantry zone. In the Ardennes, however, deserve attention in the history of the
American artillery groupments not only December battle: the V-weapon, the
performed this interdiction role but on searchlight, and the proximity fuze. T h e
numerous occasions stopped the tank as- V-weapon turned out to have no tactical
sault right at the rifle line. Surprisingly significance, although the German high
enough, in several of those battles where command stepped up the attack on the
causative agents in tank kills could be Allied depots at Antwerp and Liège dur-
determined by postmortem possession of ing the Ardennes offensive, averaging
the battle area, the high explosives fired at least 135 firings a week against Liège
EPILOGUE 655

and 235 against Antwerp. These mostly brought forward and appeared in at-
were the pilotless aircraft or V-1 type, tacks as late as 18 December, but the
bearing 2,240 pounds of explosive. T h e ponderous 150- and 200-cm. lights seem
military casualties inflicted by this V- to have been left behind at the original
weapons attack were slight, except for line of departure.3
one strike on 16 December which de- T h e proximity fuze, a tightly guard-
stroyed an Antwerp cinema, killing 296 ed American secret design for detonat-
British soldiers and wounding 194. ing projectiles by external influence in
Searchlights had been used by the the close vicinity of a target, without ex-
Allies to illuminate the battlefield dur- plosion by contact, got its first battle test
ing the North African and Italian cam- in a ground role during the Ardennes.
paigns. However, the six battalions of This fuze, also known as the V T or
tank-mounted searchlights (Canal De- POZIT fuze, had been prepared for
fense Lights) which the Americans some 210 rounds of artillery am-
brought into Normandy had been re- munition on the Continent in December.
converted in November for normal ar- Most of this stock was antiaircraft artil-
mored use on the grounds that no lery ammunition, and the 12th Army
“operational requirement” for the Ca- Group had proposed to try it out in
nal Defense Light existed. T h e Germans the so-called Liège River Belt, the cor-
had produced a large number of search- don of antiaircraft gun battalions which
lights for use with flak batteries in the was organized to shoot down the V-
defense of major target centers in the weapons in flight to Liège. On 16 De-
Reich. In early December OB WEST cember a few field artillery battalions
ran two tests of searchlights in a ground in the First Army had small stocks of
role, with and without troops. These the new ammunition, a few had wit-
tests showed that an accidented battle- nessed demonstrations, and a very few
field could be extensively illuminated had fired it. Two battalions in the VIII
in front of attacking infantry. As a re- Corps artillery had been issued some
sult some two hundred searchlights were rounds of V T ammunition, but so far
gathered immediately behind the as- as can be determined none were fired
sault front and, on the morning of 16 on the first day of the German attack.
December, flicked on to guide the first Actually this highly secret ammunition
waves of infantry and to point targets, was employed on only a few occasions
by cloud reflection, during the artillery prior to the Allied counterattack in
preparation. Although very successful early January, and then usually at night
in assisting the assault companies over or in poor weather when the American
the first one or two thousand yards, the gunners could not get sensing for nor-
60-cm. lights (with a ground range of mal time fire missions. T h e postwar
little more than three thousand yards) claims as to the value of the much tout-
could not keep up with the attack, and
a number of German detachments, sup-
posed to guide on the searchlight beams, 3For the characteristics of this equipment, see
H. A. Koch, Flak: Die Geschichte der Deutschen
wandered away from their objectives. Flakartillerie (Bad Nauheim, Germany: Podzuhn-
Some of these smaller lights were Verlag, 1954).
656 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

ed V T fuze in halting the German ad- turned to the time-tested tactic he knew,
vance are grossly exaggerated. 4 massive artillery preparation for the
American records on the causes of ground assault. In many ways the Ger-
combat wounds and deaths are woefully man use of the artillery arm on 16 De-
inadequate and German records for cember was a carbon copy of the artil-
this period do not exist. In the Third lery preparations for the great offensives
Army it is reckoned-in a very broad in 1918. But there were some major
manner-that during the period 1 Au- differences. Intense counterbattery fire,
gust–31 November 1944 the causative a necessary feature of the artillery prep-
agent for between 27 and 30 percent arations in 1918, no longer was possible;
of the total wounded admitted to Army Germany lacked the huge ammunition
hospitals was the gunshot wound, stocks required. Captive balloons and
while high explosive agents (artillery observation planes had directed the
shell, mortar shell, bombs, mines, and movement of artillery fire in 1918. These
the like) accounted for between 50 and auxiliaries were missing in the Ar-
60 percent of the monthly rosters of dennes, and ground observation there
wounded. During December these two normally favored the Americans. Luden-
causative agents respectively accounted dorff had been able to mass ninety heavy
for 25 percent and 60 percent of the caliber guns per kilometer for the
wounded. There is no accurate account- March offensive. Model would have
ing for the causative agent in the case fewer than twenty tubes for each kilo-
of men killed in action. meter of the assault front.
Hitler, looking back to 1918, had
T h e Artillery A r m in the demanded a massive artillery prepara-
A rdennes tion lasting for two or three hours, and
this in full daylight. Probably at Man-
The dramatic and successful offensive teuffel’s instigation, he finally agreed
operations of the German Army in the that a short, sharp, predawn artillery
early years of World War I I had fea- preparation-of the sort conventionally
tured the extensive employment of as- practiced on the Eastern Front-would
sault aircraft to punch the holes through be used in the Ardennes. There seems
which the panzers poured. At the close to have been no gigantic, homogeneous
of 1944 the Third Reich lacked the artillery fire plan on 16 December, as
planes which once had provided the air- had been the practice in 1918. In the
borne “artillery” of blitzkrieg. So Hit- Sixth Panzer Army a go-minute prepara-
ler, the infantryman of World War I, tion was fired on villages and deep as-
sembly positions to the rear of the Amer-
ican line, and followed by unobserved
4A s an example see Vannevar Bush, Modern area fire along the main line of resist-
Arms and Free Men (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1949) : “The proximity fuze may well ance. T h e guns and Werfers in the
have saved Liège,” p. 31. The conclusions reached Fifth Panzer Army fired forty rounds
in the text above are based on the rigorous per tube in the first twenty minutes
analysis in Royce L. Thompson’s Employment of
V T Fuzes in the Ardennes Campaign (1950). MS against predesignated targets, then com-
in OCMH files. menced a rolling barrage, the old World
EPILOGUE 657

War I Feuerwalze, with sixty rounds at river. T h e switch southward of the


each piece. Sixth Panzer Army’s main effort on 17
There were deviations from this pat- December blocked the roads on which
tern in -accordance with the ground and Manteuffel was moving the Fifth Panzer
estimated American strength. T h e artillery. T h e artillery corps attached
26th Volks Grenadier Division, for ex- to the II SS Panzer Corps took five days
ample, advanced behind a preparation to reach firing positions east of Butgen-
fired by three hundred tubes which, for bach, just to the rear of the original
seventeen minutes, worked over targets American line.
illuminated by searchlights. T h e Sev- All these delays had a mirror-image
enth Army, which had a relatively small in the transport of ammunition. This
number of artillery and Werfer battal- resulted in an early decision by the
ions, was forced to concentrate its fire on artillery officers of the three armies to
a few selected target areas. T h e most in- leave about half of the guns and Wer-
tensive preparation fired here was in fers behind. Werfer battalions and bri-
support of the two assault regiments of gades were not moved up to share in the
the 5th Parachute Division: to smooth battle until the end of December, and
its advance seventy-two guns fired nine- only a few reached the front lines. In
ty rounds each as fast as the cannoneers the main the German assault infantry
could work their pieces. All three of were forced to rely on the fire support
the armies relied upon the speed and given by tanks and assault guns, rather
shock of the initial assault to overrun than massed artillery fire. There were
any deep American artillery groupments exceptions, however, and by dint of
which might be in position to menace great effort the Germans occasionally
the infantry and armored advance. were able to create artillery groupments
There is no doubt that the German which, following the practice learned
artillery helped the assault waves for- on the Eastern Front, became artillery
ward during the rupture of the Amer- “centers of gravity.” This was done by
ican forward defensive positions. It is the Seventh Army commander in an
equally clear that the German artillery attempt to get his flank moving on 19
failed to keep pace with the subsequent and 20 December, and a similar group-
advance, nor did it come forward rapid- ment was prepared by Model and Man-
ly enough to assist substantially in the teuffel to pave the way for the Bastogne
reduction of those American points of counterattacks at the close of Decem-
resistance which had been left in the ber.
rear of attacking echelons. T h e relative Throughout the exploitation and sta-
immobility of corps and army artillery bilization phase of the German offensive
may be ascribed to bad roads, the lack the Americans enjoyed an immense su-
of heavy, fully tracked artillery prime periority in the artillery arm. This was
movers, and traffic congestion. T h e road not true, however, during the first hours
jam at the Our bridges delayed the for- of the German attack to rupture the
ward displacement of the LVIIIPanzer American defenses. On 16 December the
Corps artillery until 19 December, and VIII Corps artillery was caught off bal-
then only a few batteries crossed the ance, since eight of its nine battalions
658 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

were positioned to support the untried every time they went into firing position
106th Division. T h e 99th Division, on (the 687th Field Artillery Battalion was
the north flank, had only one battalion overrun in front of Wiltz, in Wiltz, and
of corps artillery in support. And the west of Wiltz). Observation was very
records show only 2,500 rounds shot by poor until midafternoon on the 16th, no
American corps artillery in planned de- artillery planes got up, and unobserved
fensive and counterpreparation fires on fire on the German West Wall positions
the first day of the battle. pounded assembly areas long since left
There are a number of reasons for behind by the enemy moving west.
the American failure to apply the full The artillery fire fight on the first
weight of the artillery arm on 16 De- day of the attack and for most of the
cember. T h e initial enemy shellfire did second was carried by the divisional
severe damage to the U.S. artillery com- howitzer battalions, which began to en-
munications net. Even after repairs were gage observed targets two and a half to
made, intelligence as to the German lo- three hours after the start of the Ger-
cations and intentions moved very slowly man preparation. Many of these battal-
from command post to command post ions were firing with only one eye, since
(the 559th Field Artillery Battalion, for wire to a number of observations posts
example, received no warning of the went out by 0630, others were systema-
German force to its front until 1215). tically engulfed during the morning by
The firing battalions supporting the the German assault companies, all mi-
106th Division were hampered by “no- crophones for sound-ranging were out of
fire” lines earlier established by the operation by the evening of the 16th,
division, and there seems to have been and several of those batteries which
little or no attempt to lift these restric- were firing lost their ammunition trucks
tions as the enemy assault waves swept in the melee along the roads to the
forward to grapple the American infan- rear. Many of the forward batteries
try. Corps artillery proved quite as vul- were put out of action as soon as the
nerable to a fast-moving ground attack infantry line to their front broke; others
as the divisional gunners, and as early fired until the evening of the 17th and
as 1035 the VIII Corps artillery was dis- still were able to withdraw successfully.
placing rearward on orders. T h e towed Did the American gunners blunt or
battalions, particularly the 155-mm. and delay the first German thrust? At Mon-
8-in. artillery, took long to limber and schau the artillery stopped the attack
even longer to find a place on the cold, effectively narrowing the German
crowded roads leading west; it is not assault front. In the 99th Division sec-
surprising that they fell prey quite as tor the division artillery held its ground
often to German infantry as to panzers. until the close of the 17th when the V
A large portion of the VIII Corps artil- Corps artillery groupment at Elsenborn
lery was forced to displace so often that took over the fight with such a weight
two to four days would elapse before the of metal that one infantry battalion was
battalions finally settled long enough to covered by a defensive barrage of 11,500
engage the enemy. Other battalions sim- rounds during the night of 17 December.
ply were whittled away by enemy action The Fifth Panzer Army, on the con-
EPILOGUE 659

trary, was little impeded by the scant neuver was destroyed by American ar-
collection of American artillery to its tillery fire, even when he suffered little
front. On the German left wing the physical damage. This phenomenon be-
Seventh Army advance was damaged came even more apparent after the
considerably by the American howitzers, American spotter planes took to the air.
for the batteries here retained their The German offensive phase of the
link to the observation posts on the Ardennes operation, with its high de-
heights overlooking the Sure River and gree of fluidity and dispersion, may of-
succeeded in delaying t h e German fer profitable suggestions for the future
bridging efforts for many hours. fluid battlefield. T h e experience of the
As the American defense solidified First Army, which generously sent its
along the shoulders of the salient or at medium artillery reserves south to stif-
strong points, such as St. Vith and fen the defense, showed the hazard in
Bastogne, the artillery arm really com- moving isolated and road-bound units
menced to make its weight felt. Experi- with heavy equipment across the grain
enced German artillery officers estimate of the enemy advance, even when the at-
that their American opponents finally tack was believed to be miles away.
had a superiority in guns and ammu- Medium and heavy corps artillery units
nition of ten to one. This estimate is were quite as vulnerable to enemy
far too high: the Americans fired about ground attack as the forward divisional
1,255,000 artillery rounds during the artillery, particularly when the attacker
fighting covered in this account and by was moving cross-country and the artil-
23 December had brought a total of lery equipment was difficult to displace
4,155 artillery pieces into action. Just as and bound to the road. Displacing single
in 1918, however, the attacker had batteries by leapfrog tactics in order to
driven the defense back upon its artil- maintain unbroken defensive fires failed
lery base of fire, meanwhile progres- repeatedly during the first days of the
sively losing his own firepower. T h e Ardennes, largely because of the split-
Germans tend to characterize the ting effect of the German ground as-
American artillery fire as methodical, sault that isolated firing batteries and
schematic, and wasteful. There is con- crippled control or resupply by the
siderable indication that the German headquarters battery. Those forward
commanders quickly recognized and American batteries which worked their
made gainful tactical use of the gaps at guns, brought them off, and lived to
division and corps boundaries where the fire another day, normally owed their
defenders conventionally failed to pro- tactical survival to other arms and weap-
vide overlapping fire between zones. Al- ons. T h e artillery battalion of 1944
so, it is probable, as the enemy alleges, was not organically constructed or
that the American gunners fired a very equipped to beat off close-in infantry
considerable weight of ammunition for or armored assault, but the fortuitous
each German killed. On the other hand attachment of antiaircraft weapons sec-
the record is replete with instances in tions, although these no longer did much
which the attacker was diverted from his service in their primary role, gave the
axis of advance and his scheme of ma- gunners an antipersonnel weapon which
660 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

proved to be murderously effective. T h e sighting of only one enemy squadron.


attachment of tank destroyers to the ar- During the first ten days of the campaign
tillery battalions also paid substantial the Luftwaffe sorties sent into the air
dividends in the early days of the cam- varied between six and eight hundred
paign. The most effective defense of per day. In the last six days of December
beleaguered field artillery units, how- the Luftwaffe was driven back to the air
ever, was that provided by prompt space over the Third Reich and the num-
counterattack delivered by neighboring ber of planes actually reaching the
infantry or tanks, a tactic which turned battlefield numbered between sixty and
on accurate local intelligence, unbroken eighty a day, most of which struck under
communications, and the enemy inabil- cover of darkness, as in the case of the
ity to deflect the counterattack force 73-plane raid over Bastogne on 30 De-
with heavy supporting weapons or cember.
mines. At no point in the story of the ground
battle can any crippling impact of Ger-
T h e Air Weapon man air attack be discerned. Nor was
the Luftwaffe notably successful in de-
Postwar estimates of the Luftwaffe fending the supply lines west of the
operational strength assigned to support Rhine. T h e German fighters did exact
the ground attack on 16 December set a heavy toll from the Allied planes ham-
the number of first-line planes at about mering at rail yards, bridges, and supply
fifteen hundred.5 But German planes installations. Thus the 39 1st Bombard-
never, in the course of the campaign, ment Group, flying Marauders without
appeared over the battle area in any such escort to attack the Ahrweiler railroad
number. OB W E S T records 849 sorties bridge, was jumped by about seventy-
dispatched to assist the ground attack on five German fighters, and lost one-half
18 December, the largest Luftwaffe at- of its thirty-six planes, though it did
tempt to intervene directly in the knock out the bridge.
Ardennes battle. T h e tabulation of Ger- In the first week of the German ad-
man sorties is somewhat misleading, vance the well-established Allied supe-
however, because a relatively small pro- riority in the air hardly made itself felt
portion of these sorties ever reached the in the battle area, although two fighter-
battlefield in a ground support role and bomber groups from IX Tactical Air
most were engaged by the Allied air Command did intervene in the fighting
forces far to the east of the ground com- around Stavelot and Malmédy on 18
bat zone. On 24 December, for example, December. But the adverse weather
a day characterized by the IX Tactical which denied the tactical air forces ac-
Air Command as the heaviest Luftwaffe cess to the fight on the ground did not
effort since D-day, the Third Army- halt the bombers and on 18 December
whose counterattack obviously invited bombers from the RAF, began an inter-
retaliation from the air-reported the diction attack seventy-five miles or more
to the east of the battle line. It is diffi-
5 Office of the Director of Intelligence, U.S.
Strategic Air Forces in Europe, Allied Air Power cult to measure the damage done the
and the Ardennes Offensive (n.d.) . German rail system west of the Rhine
EPILOGUE 661

by Allied bombing during this early attack. T h e Allies put up less than a
phase because the exorbitant amount of hundred battlefield sorties on this and
military traffic moving to support the succeeding days, but even such a limited
attack resulted in severe congestion effort had an important effect on the
which, on a number of feeder lines, ground battle, as witness the interven-
forced troops and equipment to detrain tion of the 406th Bombardment Group
far to the east of their planned destina- in the Bastogne fight on the 30th.
tion. T h e direct damage inflicted on the
When the weather altered on the 23d, German ground formations by the Al-
battlefield operations started to take pre- lied fighter-bombers is difficult to gauge
cedence over the Allied interdiction ef- and, of course, varied greatly. A regi-
fort. The IX, XIX, and XXIX Tacti- mental attack set by the 26th Volks
cal Air Commands flew 294 sorties Grenadier Division on 23 December had
against targets in the forward edge of to be postponed until the Jabos quit
the battlefield, but this effort still rep- for the day; on that same date the en-
resented only a minor fraction of the tire 116th Panzer Division marched in
Allied air operations designed to stall broad daylight from Hotton to Marche
the German advance. The Eighth Air without difficulty. Yet there was a very
Force and 9th Bombardment Division appreciable increase in night attacks by
dropped 1,300 tons of bombs on the en- the German ground forces as the Jabos’
emy supply lines west of the Rhine, killing power mounted, beginning on
while the Royal Air Force Bomber Com- Christmas Day and culminating in Mo-
mand hit the Seventh Army railhead at del's order on the 26th forbidding major
Trier with 150 planes. march movements in daylight.
On 24 December T h e Allied air T h e Allied tactical air operations in
forces threw into action the greatest the main were directed against armored
number of planes employed during the fighting vehicles, motor transport, and
Ardennes. The Americans flew 1,138 tac- large troop concentrations. T h e thin-
tical sorties (of which 734 were ground skinned supply vehicles which lacked
support missions in the battle zone) and tracks to carry them off the narrow,
2,442 bomber sorties. Most of the latter winding roads presented an easy target.
were aimed at German airfields, but German tanks were another matter. T h e
1,521 tons of bombs were laid on rail IX, XIX, and XXIX Tactical Air Com-
centers and bridges. T h e 2d Tactical Air mands and 2d Tactical Air Force (Brit-
Force (British) flew 1,243 sorties dur- ish) claimed the destruction of 413 en-
ing the day. There followed three days emy armored vehicles. But a sample
of good flying weather which gave the ground count of stricken German armor
American and British fighter-bombers sets the number of kills inflicted by air
opportunity for a sustained attack attack at about a tenth the number
against German supply movement, road claimed by the fighter-bomber pilots. 6
centers, and armored vehicles. Com- 62d Tactical Air Force Operational Research
mencing on 28 December very poor Section, Report 19, T h e Contribution of the Air
flying weather intervened to give the Forces to the Stemming of the Enemy Thrust in
the Ardennes, 16–26 December 1944 (September
German divisions some respite from air 1945).
662 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Air attack against the choke points bombs per day. Yet the day before this
that developed along the main and sub- bombing campaign began, feeder rail
sidiary German supply roads seriously lines in the Eifel had been so crippled
impeded both tactical and logistic move- by air attack that through movement
ment, but much of the over-all delay from the Rhine to the army railheads
should be charged to poor German traf- was no longer possible and supplies were
fic control and road maintenance. Here being moved by truck and wagon be-
again the record of achievement by the tween the “traffic islands” where rail
air is uneven. Movement on the Kob- movement remained in effect. German
lenz-Trier autobahn, a major supply reports indicate that this transshipment
artery for the two southern armies, nev- from one mode of transport to another–
er was seriously restricted by Allied air and back again–cost at least forty-eight
attack. As might be expected, the over- hours’ delay. By the 26th railway bridges
all effectiveness of air attacks along the were out on the vital Ahr and Moselle
roads turned on the configuration of lines, supporting the two southern
the ground. T h e 9th Bombardment Di- armies, and the Seventh Army railhead
vision put 136 tons of high explosive on had been pushed back to Wengerohr,
St. Vith, which stood in the open with near Wittlich. On the 28th the rail cen-
a wealth of bypass routes around it on ter at Koblenz, supporting the German
relatively level ground, and stopped the left wing, was put out of operation. And
German traffic not at all. Even when the by the close of the year German repair
RAF dropped 1,140 tons in a carpet organizations could do no more than at-
bombing attack at St. Vith, the road cen- tempt to keep some of the railroad is-
ter was out of commission for only a land traffic moving.
day. Yet a mere 150 tons put on La In retrospect the German effort to
Roche over a period of two days stopped keep the railroads operating in support
all major movement in this sector of of Army Group B was phenomenal.
the Ardennes road net. La Roche, be it Five of the eight railroad bridges across
noted, lay at the bottom of a gorge with the Rhine were put out of service tem-
access only through deep defiles. porarily, generally by bomb damage to
The damaging effect of the Allied the bridge approaches, but all came
air attacks against rail lines, bridges, back into service. Allied air inflicted
and marshaling yards at and west of the eighty-five breaks on the Army Group
Rhine is quite clear in the history of the B rail lines west of the Rhine and fifty-
Ardennes campaign, but the time se- four of these were repaired. But in the
quence between specific rail failures last week before the Allied ground
and the resulting impact on German counteroffensive any hope of main-
front-line operations is difficult to trace. taining a satisfactory ratio between
From 25 December to 2 January the damage and repair had vanished. Of
Eighth Air Force, 9th Bombardment nine railroad bridges over the Ahr,
Division, and Royal Air Force Bomber Moselle, and Nette Rivers, which were
Command made daily attacks against designated as high priority targets for air
selected railway bridges and marshaling attack, eight were put out of operation
yards using an average of 1,800 tons of on one or more occasions, while for the
663
EPILOGUE

six restored the average repair time flying weather provided a built-in guar-
was five days per bridge. T h e cumula- antee that the minimum supply and
tive effect of this kind of damage sim- reinforcement requirements of the Ger-
ply saturated the German capabilities man armies would be met.
for rail repair. 7 Although the Allied air forces failed
Despite Allied domination of the air to isolate the Ardennes battlefield, they
over the Ardennes, the Eifel, and the did succeed in these days in dealing the
Rhine plain, the battlefield itself and Luftwaffe a mortal blow, thus making
the German armies therein never were the task of their comrades on the ground
isolated. Could the isolation of the much easier in 1945, on both the West-
battlefield have been accomplished? T h e ern and the Eastern Fronts. Generalleut-
terrain, with its sequence of river bar- nant Adolf Galland, commander of the
riers and multitude of winding, steep Luftwaffe fighter arm, has written the
gradients, was favorable to air interdic- Luftwaffe epitaph in this manner: “The
tion. But the tactical ingredients and Luftwafle received its death blow at
formula to achieve complete success were the Ardennes offensive. In unfamiliar
missing in late 1944. Sturdy rail bridges, conditions and with insufficient train-
particularly when defended by ground ing and combat experience, our numer-
to air fire, proved hard to damage and ical strength had no effect. It was deci-
even harder to destroy. Even the smaller mated while in transfer, on the ground,
bridges, such as those attacked in the in large air battles, especially during
Ahr River campaign, took some 250 tons Christmas, and was finally destroyed.” 8
of high explosive to cripple. Rail cut-
ting attacks caused traffic islands but Logistics
never succeeded in rooting out these is-
lands or the movement between them. During the years following the in-
Movement by thin-skinned vehicles on vasion of Poland the German munitions
trails, roads, and highways seemed par- of war had wasted away, so much so
ticularly vulnerable but the physical that in December 1944 the German
blockage of the roads, as distinct from armies in the Ardennes were fighting a
vehicular destruction, could be achieved poor man’s battle. T h e total stock of
only at particularly favorable points 105-mm. gun-howitzer ammunition at
and for relatively short intervals of time. the beginning of November 1944 was
Finally, the Allied inability to operate only half the size of the stock available
aircraft in a ground assault role during on 1 September 1939 and the number of
the night and the long stretches of bad 150-mm. rounds was less than a third
the number stocked in Germany at the
7 This section is based on the extensive research beginning of the Polish campaign.
done by Charles V. P. von Luttichau in his It was still possible even so to gather a
manuscript, German Rail Communications in the
Ardennes Offensive 1944-1945, and Royce L. substantial ammunition reserve for the
Thompson’s equally careful and detailed study, Ardennes offensive, and after the war
Tactical Air Phase of the Ardennes Campaign.
Neither of these manuscript studies has been
published, but both should be of great interest 8 AdolfGalland, The First and The Last (New
to students of logistics. York: Henry Holt & Co., 1960), p. 242.
664 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

the supply officers at OKW were able nition from ships in the English Channel
to say that before the U.S. counterattack and North Sea. Also, the 12th Army
on 3 January 1945 there was no short- Group had built up a very sizable re-
age of artillery ammunition in the field. serve of artillery ammunition during
This statement merely reflects the the first half of December in prepara-
rarefied and isolated view of the high tion for the Roer River attacks. Most
headquarters, for despite the 100 am- of the American ammunition stocks
munition trains of the special Fuehrer were put on wheels (trucks or railroad
Reserve the troops in the Ardennes op- cars) after 19 December. T h e Third
eration did suffer from a shortage of Army, for example, was able to move
ammunition.9 This shortage was re- an average of 4,500 tons of ammuni-
ported as early as 21 December by the tion per day during the last half of De-
divisions attacking at Bastogne. There- cember and consumed, on the average,
after, as the American front solidified, only 3,500 tons per day.
the Germans consumed ammunition at a German tank losses during the oper-
rate of 1,200 tons per day, a rate much ation are unknown but appear to have
higher than predicted by the OKW been very high, probably as much from
planning staffs but less than the tactical mechanical failure as from battle dam-
requirements of the battle. The lack of age. For the 1,700 to 1,800 tanks and
ammunition should be charged to trans- assault guns in Army Group B, there
port failure rather than to paucity of were only six tank repair companies.
artillery shells at the Rhine dumps. The Even worse was the shortage of tank re-
Panzer Lehr Division, for example, first trievers, and, after 23 December, the
reported that it had run out of gas, few available were extremely hard hit
then on 28 December reported a short- by air attack. The spare parts situa-
age of ammunition because of the “lack tion was so bad that new German tanks
of transport.” were cannibalized at a depot west of
The American troops, by contrast, Koblenz. Three hundred and forty
never suffered any notable failure of new tanks were assigned to the Western
ammunition at the guns. In fact, the Front during the campaign, but only
only munitions which appear to have 125 can be traced as actually reaching
been in short supply during the Ger- the armored divisions.
man offensive were antitank mines and The First and Third U.S. Armies had
bazooka rounds. T h e demand for these a full complement of medium tanks
items and rifle and machine gun am- when the Germans struck, that is, 1,882
munition was constant, but the supply between them. During the last half of
line was kept full by calling forward December the two armies lost a total
bazooka rockets and small arms ammu- of 471 medium tanks. These losses were
partially made up when 21 Army Group
9 This reserve was only fifty of the normal released 351 Shermans which had been
ammunition trains; each had been divided in two
for protection against air attack. On 13 December allocated for British use. A few Amer-
the ammunition on hand and in shipment for ican ordnance companies were overrun
Army Group B totaled 15,099 tons, but 5,353 tons
were allocated to the Fifteenth Army, which did
in the first hours of the battle, but
not, as planned, take part in the offensive. most of the tank maintenance person-
EPILOGUE 665

nel and equipment were moved out it may be concluded that the offensive
of enemy reach and continued to func- in the main was fed and armed by a
tion effectively. T h e losses in divisional road transport system quite unequal to
artillery pieces were replaced in part the load forced upon it.
by a British loan of 100 25-pounders When it is remembered that some of
plus 300,000 rounds of ammunition for the German divisions in the Ardennes
them. T h e 2,500 machine guns lost dur- had more horses than the German in-
ng the German attack were promptly fantry division of 1918, one has a clearer
replaced from American ordnance picture of the supply problem. Resup-
depots. ply was accomplished over very long
T h e problem of transport for supply distances, often clear back to the Rhine,
and evacuation was one which the Ger- over bad roads which could not be kept
mans failed to solve in December 1944. in repair, and with much transport
Perhaps the German staffs and com- geared to horsepower which sickened
manders had been so long on the de- and died. The heavy snowfalls on
fensive that they had forgotten the the supply roads over the Eifel,
special transport requirements engen- particularly after 24 December, coupled
dered by offensive operations. In this re- with the damage done by Allied air
spect Hitler and Jodl, in their borrow- attack at road centers and against
ing from 1918, failed to remember Lu- moving supply columns are reflected
dendorff who, when preparing to con- in German estimates that rated road
struct the mobile attack divisisions for capacities were reduced in fact by at
the German offensives, stated that the least a third. From Christmas on, some
shortage of horses was the single most of the supply trains from forward com-
important problem in mounting the bat units were going back as far as Bonn
German attacks. Truck wastage through for ammunition and supplies. On the
mechanical failure and combat attrition last day of the year the Panzer Lehr
had been extremely heavy all through commander ruefully noted that a supply
1944, and it is estimated that the new train he had sent to Merlscheid near St.
trucks coming off the production lines Vith, on 25 December had not yet re-
numbered less than half those destroyed turned.
in the field during the same period. In some respects the American trans-
Not only were there too few trucks but port system opposed an enemy system
many divisions were equipped with which had many of the outdated charac-
poor, worn-out booty vehicles that sim- teristics of 1918. Not only did the Amer-
ply fell by the wayside along the bad ican divisions have a very large num-
roads of the Ardennes and had to be ber of vehicles and trailers organic to
abandoned because there were no re- the unit, but the number of line of com-
pair parts. At one time the German munications trucks and trains available
armies had been able to rely on the in the forward area was enormous. Per-
railroad system as the backbone of army haps even more important, the move-
transport. From the beginning of good ment of American ground transport
flying weather on 23 December this was was unaffected by harassment and at-
no longer possible and by 27 December tack from the air. T h e First Army moved
666 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

more than 48,000 vehicles to the battle able to amass a POL reserve for the
zone during the period 17–26 December, Ardennes offensive which equaled that
and the XII Corps used only two roads available to the German armies on the
to move 11,000 vehicles in four days over eve of the Allied invasion, and the final
a distance of 100 miles. In contrast to figure of the POL allocated to Army
the bitter German experience, the Amer- Group B was over four million gallons.
ican tactical and supply moves seldom Using the German measure of one “con-
were beset by road stoppages and traf- sumption unit” as the amount of fuel
fic jams, except, of course, in the ini- required to move all the vehicles in a
tial hours of the German penetration. formation a distance of sixty-three miles,
Although it is manifestly true that the it may be reckoned that of the five con-
Germans made good intelligence usage sumption units requested by Model only
of the American radio traffic control net, one and one-half to two were at corps
this was balanced by the speed and cer- dumps on 16 December; yet there may
tainty with which American transport have been as much as nine or ten con-
moved. sumption units available at railheads
One may also contrast the tactical near the Rhine River.
availability of the great American sup- T h e course of the campaign showed
ply complex which had been built u p at least three errors in German plan-
east of the Meuse with that prepared ning. POL distribution failed to move
by the Germans east of the Rhine River. with the same speed as the armored ad-
T h e German offensive forced the Amer- vance. T h e bad terrain and weather en-
icans away from the forward truck- countered in the Ardennes reduced the
heads, with their limited capacity, back mileage gained from a tankful of fuel
on the almost unlimited resources avail- by one-half. And, finally, the expecta-
able at railheads. Certainly there was tion that the spearheads would move
some danger involved in the mainte- in part on captured gasoline was mis-
nance of the great supply depots so close takenly optimistic. Army Group B
to the uncertain battle line. Brig. Gen. POL consumption reached a peak of
Robert M. Littlejohn was ordered on close to 2,000 cubic meters on 18 De-
three occasions to evacuate the big cember, but by 23 December thedaily
depots at Liège, but instead simply usage rate was about half that figure.
brought in more supplies. American In other words, the supply of liquid
supply officers seem to have learned fuel failed to keep pace with the tac-
something about logistic flexibility as a tical demand.
result of the pursuit operations across There are two phases in the history
France in the summer of 1944. Finally, of German liquid fuel supply during
the much criticized weight of the Amer- the Ardennes campaign-the one be-
ican logistic “tail” paid off during the fore and the one after 23 December
Ardennes, for there always was enough when the Allies took to the air over
extra transport to meet unusual de- the battle zone. During the first phase
mands for supply and troop movement. the movement of POL was impeded by
Despite the decline in the production bad roads and traffic congestion. Vehi-
of liquid fuel during 1944, Hitler was cles failed or ran out of fuel and were
EPILOGUE 667

abandoned by the roadside, thus re- movement of traffic through the Eifel.
ducing the total transport tonnage for The POL shortage in the Sixth Panzer
bringing POL forward. The attempts Army seems to have assumed drastic
to introduce horse-drawn supply or ar- proportions in the period 23 to 25 De-
tillery columns into the stream of mo- cember. The Fifth Panzer Army was in
torized traffic during the first days of dire straits by 24 December, in part be-
the offensive greatly slowed the distri- cause of the arrival of armored and
bution system. As early as 20 December mechanized formations which had
the 12th SS Panzer Division, scheduled come into the army area without
as one of the leading formations in the reserve fuel. Even when bad fly-
Sixth Panzer Army advance, was ing weather blunted the edge of
brought to a halt because there was no the Allied air attack, the sporadic stop-
fuel except a few gallons for the mech- page of supply movement at the ground
anized reconnaissance battalion. On 21 level continued. By the end of Decem-
December the 2d SS Panzer Division ber three of the five divisions in the
was ordered to relieve the 560th Volks XLVII Panzer Corps were practically
Grenadier Division in the battle at immobile. All this while, however, the
Fraiture but was unable to move for 10th SS Panzer Division of the OKW
thirty-six hours because there was no Reserve sat in an assembly area just
POL. In the Fifth Panzer Army there west of Bonn with a total POL load
were reports as early as 19 December of eight consumption units in its train.
of a “badly strained” fuel situation. Quite obviously the German problem
Three days later Luettwitz, the XLVII had been transport rather than an over-
Panzer Corps commander, told Man- all shortage of fuel.
teuffel that the advance of his armor There is no indication that American
was “gravely endangered” because of units suffered seriously from the lack
the failure of fuel supply. During this of POL, although, of course, there was
phase there seems to have been consid- always the tactical difficulty of with-
erable pirating, in a disorderly manner, drawing from contact with the enemy
from the forward POL dumps. Eventu- at night for fuel resupply, partic-
ally German commanders learned to ularly in the more mobile phases of
send a reconnaissance detail to the the campaign. Some American gasoline
fuel dumps before they committed was lost to Peiper, but the total amount-
their supply trains in a fuel-consuming ed to probably no more than 100,000
trip to what might be a dry supply gallons. It is known that Peiper’s supply
point. It can be concluded that the Ger- officer had a map of American POL in-
man offensive already was seriously stallations, but this did Peiper little
crippled by the failure of transport and good. Between 17 and 19 December
the POL distributing system before the American supply troops successfully
Allied Jabos entered the fight. evacuated over three million gallons of
The supply phase after 23 December POL from the Spa-Stavelot area. The
is characterized by Allied fighter- biggest Allied loss to the enemy was
bombers pounding roads and supply 400,000 gallons of gasoline, destroyed
points while snowdrifts stopped the on 17 December by a V–1 strike at
668 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

Liège. staff corps as masters of supply and log-


The Germans “fueled” their horses istics, a reputation which dated as far
with greater ease than their motor ve- back as the Franco-Prussian War, the
hicles. Straw and hay were plentiful in Ardennes Campaign showed little evi-
the area, although an order had to be dence of this earlier prowess except in
put out forbidding the use of straw as the management of military rail trans-
bedding material for the troops, and port and its rapid rehabilitation under
those units which came late into an area attack. Perhaps the German staff work
found foraging sparse. Potatoes and live- in the field was as good as ever, al-
stock were taken from the local popula- though there is evidence that it had de-
tion in large quantities, but the supply teriorated in the SS formations. But
of breadstuff was barely adequate, quite clearly the wishful thinking in
chiefly because of troubles in transport- which Hitler and the OKW staff in-
ing bulk flour to the field bakery units. dulged was no substitute for rigorous
It was necessary therefore to reduce the logistical analysis and planning, and
bread ration to all but front-line troops. these higher personalities, not the field
T h e Americans, as usual, were well fed commanders, dictated the control and
during this operation. T h e only notable management of the logistic support for
change was the new demand for the the German armies in the Ardennes.
compact K ration in place of the aug- One must conclude that the German
mented ration, with its fresh meat and offensive of December 1944 lacked the
coffee beans, which had been issued materiel and service support necessary to
during the slow-moving fighting in the achieve any real measure of success and,
autumn. furthermore, that Hitler and the OKW
In transporting their wounded, the staff understood neither the importance
Germans experienced grave difficulty. of supply nor its effective organization.
By the close of December the Fifth
Panzer Army was having to haul its The Turning Point in the
casualties clear back to Andernach on Ardennes
the Rhine at the expense of those freshly
wounded in the firing line. The Amer- When did the attacking German ar-
icans lost a number of hospitals, med- mies lose the initiative in their drive to
ics, and wounded to the German spear- cross the Meuse, and why? Surprise, the
head formations, but on the whole were first element in successful offensive oper-
able to maintain a high standard of ations, had been attained by the attacker
medical care, even in this fluid battle. on 16 December. The defense had
In accordance with accepted Army prac- been surprised by the speed of the ini-
tice both the First and Third Armies tial assault, by the weight of the attack,
were equipped with hospitals to take and, later protestations to the contrary,
a peak casualty load. On 1 January the American commands-both high
1945, there were a total of nearly 9,000 and low-had been deceived as to the
vacant beds in the hospitals of the two point of the attack. T h e German as-
armies. sault forces ruptured the American de-
Despite the fame of the German Army fenses on the first day of the advance,
EPILOGUE 669

but not quite as planned. In the Sixth Hosingen road by bomb craters and
Panzer Army sector the German staffs abatis, and, when they reached the west-
had expected that the infantry assault ern ridge, the American defense of Ho-
would penetrate to a depth of three to singen forced a long halt and ultimate
five miles by noon, thus assuring a com- detour. This episode proved to be only
plete breakthrough within the first one of numerous delays on the Fifth
twenty-four hours of the offensive. This Panzer assault front, and that army, as
objective was not achieved. On the ex- a result, did not reach its first-day ob-
treme north flank the L X V I I Corps jectives until after midnight of 17 De-
made no progress in its drive to reach cember.
the Vesdre River in front of Eupen, On the German south wing the Sev-
never succeeded in penetrating the enth Army had even more trouble with
Monschau position, and eventually gave its bridges than the northern neighbor.
over this attack to bring the German The green and ill-equipped 212th Volks
north flank infantry screen forward. The Grenadier Division took forty-eight
assault to punch a hole at Losheim went hours to throw a 16-ton bridge over the
so slowly that the spearhead armor of Sure, and along the entire army front
the 1st SS Panzer Division was delayed the infantry elements were forced to
at its line of departure for at least six carry the assault for the first three days
hours longer than anticipated.10 without direct heavy weapon support.
The first-day attack by the German The LXXX Corps, fighting to bring
center had been predicated on minimal the left wing of the Seventh Army into
initial delays for bridge crossings within a favorable blocking position, did not
three or four hours; the minimum ac- reach its first-day objectives until the
tual time of construction proved to be evening of 19 December, At the close
seven to eight hours. Furthermore, no of the first day, then, it can be said
account had been taken of delays which that the German attack had ruptured
might be incurred on the west banks the American positions at a number of
as the result of American demolitions, points but had not done much to widen
bomb cratering, and the like. On top the gaps so created and had failed sig-
of this the German motorized assault, nally to destroy the tactical continuity of
as it left the river line, was forced onto the defensive positions at the shoulders
exit roads which brought the Germans of the assault zone.
squarely against organized American The exploitation phase of the offen-
strongpoints. The adverse impact of sive may be timed from the hour at
this collection of terrain and tactical which Peiper's armor shook itself loose
factors is best attested by the experience from the melee at Losheim and broke
of the armored reconnaissance battal- into the open, that is, 0400 on 17 De-
ions leading the 26th Volks Grenadier cember. Peiper's progress, therefore, is
assault: these formations were delayed a good measure of the speed, planned
at the river by ineffectual bridge build- and actual, of the German advance. The
ers, they were slowed on the Gemünd- 1st SS Panzer Division and at least one
10For these plans, see the L X V I I AK: K T B other armored division of the Sixth Pan-
Anlagen, 12 Dec 44. zer Army were supposed to be across the
670 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

rugged plateau of the Hohes Venn by tum; the greatest gains made by the ar-
the close of the second day, with their mored spearhead columns actually were
leading elements along a north-south achieved during the night of 18 Decem-
line through Spa and Stavelot. In 1940 ber. With the way west thus clearing,
a German armored column had covered the German mass maneuver behind
this distance in nine hours, albeit with the armored columns picked up speed
very slight resistance, and a second col- on 19 December, this day representing
umn, following the more circuitous the most rapid movement of the entire
route now taken by Peiper, consumed offensive. Yet even now the bulk of
only a day and a half on the road. De- German armored weight was not for-
spite all the delays on the 16th, Peiper ward nor operating with the speed and
did reach Stavelot on the night of 17 mobility expected of armor. For this
December, but at Stavelot he was forced reason the Fifth Panzer Army was as-
to halt-a marked departure from the signed the task of exploitation, in place
German experience of 1940. Recall as of the Sixth, on 20 December.
well that the second of the Sixth Panzer The offensive had gone out of con-
Army’s breakthrough armored divi- trol, and now would follow a series of
sions, the 12th SS Panzer still was in- haphazard improvisations. Why had the
volved in a bitter fight back on the line German armored mass failed to come
of scrimmage at the end of this second forward as planned? These reasons seem
day. The Fifth Panzer Army was in even paramount:
worse case: no armored exploitation 1. The initial American defense had
was yet in progress by the night of 17 been more tenacious than anticipated;
December. complete and rapid rupture of the de-
If Hitler and OKW expected the ar- fensive positions had not been achieved.
mored columns to reach the Meuse in 2. Tactical support and logistic trans-
forty-eight hours, as has been reported, port had not kept pace with the ad-
the German offensive was seriously be- vance of the combat formations.
hind schedule at the close of the second 3. Close operational control and flu-
day of combat. If, as the German idity of movement for the mass of ma-
Army commanders agree, Model’s own neuver required free use of the road net
plan called for the Meuse to be reached in the salient. This had been denied the
and crossed on the fourth day of the attacker, most notably at Bastogne and
offensive, then it seems reasonable to St. Vith but at other points as well.
assume-as the Army commanders did 4. The flanks of the salient had not
assume-that the lost time could be re- been brought forward to keep pace with
gained. The immediate problem was to the drive in the center; the shoulders of
get armored columns into the open and the salient had jammed.
into the lead-thus Rundstedt’s order 5. The operational build-up of the
on the late evening of 17 December forces in the salient had taken place
that the armor must at least keep up so slowly as to deny real depth to the
with the foot elements. attack.
On the third day of the attack the 6. The tactical reaction of the Amer-
German armor began to acquire momen- ican forces and their commitment of
EPILOGUE 671

reserves had been more rapid than antic- serves. Hitler and Jodl repeated in
ipated. 1944 the mistake made by Ludendorff
The German failure to build up the during the Amiens battle of 1918 when
attacking forces in the salient must be the latter failed to throw in the reserves
attributed to Hitler and the OKW staff needed to exploit the unexpected suc-
since they controlled the operational re- cess of the Eighteenth Army. Specifi-
serves set aside for the Ardennes offen- cally, Hitler and the OKW staff failed
sive. Nonetheless, there is some reason to recognize that the only real hope of
to believe that the German High Com- success, after the Sixth Panzer Army
mand held back the OKW Reserve divi- failure, was to reinforce Manteuffel and
sions because of the physical difficulties the Fifth.
attendant on feeding more troops and The story on the American side was
vehicles onto the crowded, tortuous, quite different, surprisingly so to Hit-
muddy roads during the breakdown of ler and his entourage who held as an
the German transport system in the article of faith that the American com-
first days of the attack. manders, for political reasons, would
Rundstedt made his first request for make no major troop movements, par-
troops from the OKW Reserve on 17 ticularly if these involved the British,
December, asking for the Fuehrer Beg- without prior reference to the White
leit Brigade, which was in readiness only House and Downing Street. This atti-
thirty-five miles to the rear. He was tude probably explains the German es-
given the 9th SS Panzer Division, which timate that no major units would be
was seventy miles from the battlefield, committed by the defense until the
and it required three separate petitions third day and that the Allied build-up
from Rundstedt to change the Fuehrer’s of a counterattack force would be made
mind. Subsequent requests by OB west of the Meuse. Not only did the
WEST for the release of two armored German planners fail to comprehend
divisions scheduled for early commit- the degree of initiative that training
ment, the 10th SS Panzer and 11th Pan- and tradition have placed in the hands
zer, produced no result until 23 Decem- of American corps and army command-
ber when two Volks Grenadier divisions ers, they also misunderstood the Amer-
were brought west in their place. Even ican doctrine, largely unwritten but
these Volks Grenadier formations had a universally accepted, that major forma-
string attached by OKW. When, on 26 tions having no prebattle relationship
December, Model asked for a free hand may, under fluid conditions, unite on the
with all OKW reserves, specifically field after the battle is joined. Hitler
mentioning the 10th SS Panzer and 11th seems to have made another and impor-
Panzer plus three or four armored divi- tant personal miscalculation, namely
sions from other theaters, he was given that the weak German forces holding
a stone-the two Volks Grenadier divi- the sectors of the Western Front
sions brought up on the 23d. north and south of the Ardennes still
The one thing that a high command retained sufficient strength to grapple
can do in modern war to influence the the American divisions opposite them,
battle once it is joined is to allocate re- and that the Allied commanders would
672 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

therefore hesitate to weaken their forces engaged in the grim business of war,
in these sectors by stripping away divi- far from home and loved ones. But in
sions to meet the German attack. the German camp the sixth Christmas
When did the German armies lose of the war seems to have made a truly
the initiative in the Ardennes? As early indelible impression. The field postmas-
as 20 December there are indications ter for Luettwitz’ corps remarks on
that small clouds of niggling doubt were the decline in the amount of Christmas
present in the minds of some of the mail reaching the front-particularly
German field commanders, this because gift parcels. The German Army news-
of the Sixth Panzer Army’s failure to paper bitterly features a story on the
adhere to the offensive timetable. By Christmas gift presented by a Spanish
24 December the crippling impact of restaurateur to Goering–a large supply
Allied air attack, resumed the previous of caviar. And the commander of the
day as the weather broke, was clearly dis- 276th Volks Grenadier Division, whose
cernible. Then, too, the course of the unit fought its hardest battle on Christ-
ground battle on that date was equally mas Day, expresses the hope that in the
adverse. The counterattack by the ultimate withdrawal to the cover of the
Third Army menaced the whole south- West Wall his troops will be able to re-
ern flank of the German salient, while capture the Christmas spirit.
the X L V I I Panzer Corps, now leading The German Christmas traditionally
the Fifth Panzer drive, was so lone and was celebrated on two days, the 25th
exposed that the corps commander rec- and 26th, and at this emotional nadir
ommended a withdrawal of his forward of war-weary soldiery the German ar-
elements until such time as the German mies in the Ardennes sustained a series
flanks at the tip of the salient could of crushing reverses: the left wing of
be covered. This combination of threats the Seventh Army was driven back to
in the air and on the ground led the the Sauer River, over which it had
Fifth Panzer Army commander to con- crossed ten days before; the German ring
clude on 24 December that “the objec- around Bastogne was broken by Patton’s
tive could no longer be attained.” 11 troops; the 2d Panzer Division received
It is a truism that morale is a govern- orders to escape from the Celles pocket;
ing factor in war. Christmas in the Ar- and throughout the day of the 26th
dennes, 1944, very clearly is a case in a developing “crisis” in supply and com-
point. Brig. Gen. S. L. A. Marshall has munications was noted in the journal
graphically described the mood of the at the headquarters of OB WEST. At
American troops in Bastogne on the 1915 on 26 December General Krebs,
Holy Evening and shown the somber Model’s chief of staff, made an apprais-
aspect of nostalgia on the part of men al of the German situation, “Today a
certain culminating point [has been
11Manteuffel in MS # B-151a, p. 160. It is reached] .” 12
significant that the OB WEST G–4, Colonel John, It may be concluded that by the eve.
also picks this date as the turning point in the ning of 26 December the initiative had
German offensive. See Headquarters 12th Army
Group, Consolidated Interrogation Report 1, 12
June 1945. 12Contained in OB WEST: KTB, 26 Dec 44.
EPILOGUE 673

passed from German to American hands. first step always taken by the Fuehrer
Before this time the American and Al- when abandoning a military venture and
lied forces had reacted to German de. denuding one fighting front to reinforce
signs and had abandoned their own. another.
From this point in time the German
attacker would be off balance and would The Place of the Ardennes Offensive
take a series of false steps (notably at in World War II
Bastogne) which were elicited by the
operations of his opponent and diver- The German attack in the Ardennes
gent from the assigned larger objective. was to be the last in the long series of
Even at the time there was recogni- great offensives and military adventures
tion in both camps that 26 December initiated by Hitler’s Third Reich in
had been the day of decision. On the September 1939. The subsequent at-
27th the German press and radio aban- tempts at counterattacks in Alsace and
doned the headline treatment of the on the Lake Balaton front were bloody
Ardennes to feature news from Greece military divertissements occasioned by
and Budapest. This same day the Hitler, nothing more. There would be
SHAEF propaganda bureau issued in- days of stubborn fighting in the
structions that Liège, obviously no Ardennes during January 1945, but the
longer in danger, should be shown as roads back over the Eifel led straight to
the goal of the German offensive. the decimation and collapse of the Ger-
There seems to have been a slight man armies on the banks of the Oder
resurgence of forced optimism in the River, along the Danube, in the Ruhr
higher German field headquarters to- pocket, and, at last, to the bunkers of
ward the end of December when the Berlin.
appearance of more troops and guns gave What was the true military purpose
some flicker of hope that Bastogne finally of the Ardennes offensive? It has been
might be captured. But this optimism, alleged by survivors of the German High
if it was anything more than a disci- Command that this operation was in-
plined and soldierly façade, quickly tended to re-establish the military pres-
faded. On the last day of December the tige of the Third Reich, carry its people
OB WEST journal notes that if Bas- through the grueling sixth winter of war,
togne cannot be taken “that is the end and win a favorable bargaining position
of the offensive operation.” Hitler, no for a suitable and acceptable peace. It
matter what exhortations he may have seems more probable, from all that is
dispatched to Model and Rundstedt, known of Hitler’s thought processes in
had turned his attention away from the these last months of his life, that, as in
Ardennes. On 29 December Rundstedt February 1918, the German decision was
received a message that sixty-three new not between war and peace but between
tanks had come off the assembly line but defense and attack. Are the military and
that OKW (for which read Hitler) political reasons set forth by Hitler for
would decide whether personnel re. his choice of an offensive on the Western
placements and artillery should be sent Front, and in the Ardennes sector, to be
OB WEST in their stead-precisely the accepted at face value? History will
674 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

never know. But there is the strong pos- What all this cost the Wehrmacht is
sibility that Hitler and his top generals impossible to say. It is known that
were motivated by the same impulse losses in materiel were very high–and
which triggered so many of the bloody these no longer could be made good.
and useless offensives of World War I– The only general indication of German
to seize the initiative for its own sake casualties is found in railroad reports
without a viable strategic objective in which show that about 67,000 troops
view. were evacuated from the Army Group
In late December German propagan- B area by rail during December. This
dists claimed that the object of the Ar- figure, of course, would include some of
dennes offensive had been to cripple the the battle casualties from the earlier
attack capabilities of the Allied armies fighting east of Aachen, as well as dis-
and chew up their divisions east of the ease cases. A number of German division
Meuse. There also is considerable evi- commanders have made personal esti-
dence that Model, and perhaps Rund- mates of the casualties suffered by their
stedt, accepted this as a reasonable own divisions during the last half of
tactical objective in the operations from December, and in the cases of those
Christmas onward. The attainment of formations continually in the line from
this goal, to chew up Allied divisions and 16 or 17 December the average is be-
dull the cutting edge of the American tween two and three thousand “combat
armies, was achieved in only limited effectives” lost per division. Whatever
fashion. The attack of twenty-nine Ger- the true number of casualties may have
man divisions and brigades destroyed been on both sides, it is a fair assessment
one American infantry division as a unit, that over-all, in this particular instance,
badly crippled two infantry divisions, the troops on the offensive sustained
and cut one armored combat command heavier losses than those on the
to pieces. The total of American battle defensive.
casualties reported for the period 16 Detailed analysis of the ebb and flow
December through 2 January (although of battle shows that the German armies
these probably were incomplete returns) in the Ardennes never came close to the
numbered 41,315 officers and men, of narrow margin between success and fail-
which 4,138 were known to be killed in ure. The fortunes of war never were put
action, 20,231 were wounded in action, in precarious balance as they had been
and 16,946 were reported missing. Dur- in the spring of 1918, and it is not sur-
ing the same period the American forma- prising that General Eisenhower refused
tions in the Ardennes received 31,505 to issue a “Backs to the Wall” order of
replacements, or “reinforcements” as the day like that wrung from Haig on
these individual soldiers now were 11 April 1918.
named. The materiel losses inflicted by Nevertheless, in December 1944 there
German action represented only a tem- was an early, emotional Allied reaction
porary diminution in the fighting to the first speedy triumphs of the Ger-
strength of a few of the American divi- man armies which conceived of the at-
sions and normally were replaced within tack as being another, albeit late,
a fortnight. irruption of the military might which
EPILOGUE 675

had reached out to the Atlantic and the Werfers, tractors, machine guns, and
Caucasus, the Sahara, and the Arctic many other items) was accompanied by
Circle. On the other hand, a decade after a reallocation of military manpower. On
the close of World War II, still living 1 December 1944, the total number of
members of the higher German com- combat effectives under OB WEST com-
mands would classify the Wehrmacht of mand was 416,713, and one month later
late 1944 as a “paper tiger.” The history 1,322,561 effectives were carried on the
of the Ardennes Campaign, as recounted OB WEST rosters. 13
in the present volume, shows that There seems to have been an early
neither one of these extremes was true. recognition on the part of the higher
Probably the American war correspond- German theater commanders that Hit-
ent, Drew Middleton, most closely ler’s “intuition” had led to a mistaken
approximated the truth when, in the choice between operations on the two
first days of the Ardennes battle, he major fronts. General Westphal later
characterized the offensive as “the In- alleged that Rundstedt personally ad-
dian summer” of German military dressed himself to the Fuehrer on 22
might. December with a plea that the Ardennes
In the long view of history the deci- offensive be brought to a halt in order to
sion to attack in the Ardennes represents reinforce the Eastern Front.14
only another-and risky-attempt to Guderian, directly charged with oper-
solve the old German dilemma of fight- ations against the Russians, used the
ing a major war on two fronts, Hitler occasion of official visits on Christmas
deliberately assumed the risk involved in Eve and New Year’s Day to petition
weakening the Eastern Front so that a Hitler for the movement of troops from
powerful blow could be struck in the the west to the east. It is said that at the
west. When, on 14 December, he told end of December, in the Ardennes head-
his generals that German industry had quarters, “everybody looked with dis-
been preparing for the Ardennes offen- may to the east where the big Russian
sive for months, he meant this quite offensive was about to begin any day.” 15
literally. Of the total production of ar- Hitler stubbornly refused to accede to
mored fighting vehicles which came out all these requests, even after the Allied
of German assembly plants in November counterattack on 3 January began to
and December 1944, the Western Front collapse the German salient. Inexplic-
received 2,277 while only 919went to ably he waited until 8 January to start
the East. As late as 5 January 1945 all the Sixth Panzer Army moving for the
the German armies on the Eastern Front east-this only four days before the com-
possessed only two-thirds the number of mencement of the Russian winter
panzers employed in the Ardennes. offensive.
Equally important, of course, was Hit- The proximity in time of the German
ler’s decision on 20 November to shift Ardennes offensive and the wholesale
the Luftwaffe fighter strength to the
Western Front. This diversion of ma- 13OKH: Org. A b t . KTB; see also Schramm,
Merkbuch.
teriel to the west (which began as early 14Heer I n Fesseln, p. 283.
as September and included artillery, 15 MS # A-874 (Waldenburg).
676 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE

offensive of the Red Armies on 12 Jan- in the Ardennes. Postwar Russian prop-
uary would have untoward results, not aganda in this same vein reached a peak
only for the Third Reich, but for the in a series of articles by Col. N. Nikiforov
relations between east and west in the alleging that the Soviet attack in Jan-
postwar era. In February 1945, Stalin uary 1945 “averted the danger of the
issued an order of the day acclaiming the rout of the Anglo-American armies.” 16
recent victories on the Oder front and Was the risk assumed by Hitler and
boasting that “The success of this his senior military advisers in the Ar-
[Soviet] drive resulted in breaking the dennes offensive a valid one? Field Mar-
German attack in the West.” Unfortu- shals Jodl and Keitel, the artisans but
nately, and unwisely, Winston Churchill not the architects of this venture, gave a
opened the door to this and a flood of joint answer shortly before their execu-
similar Russian propaganda claims by tion: “The criticism whether it would
addressing a telegram to Stalin on 6 have been better to have employed our
January 1945, in which he personally available reserves in the East rather than
asked for Soviet help by the prompt be- in the West, we submit to the judgment
ginning of a major offensive. Only a few of history.” 17
years later, representatives of the USSR
16The USSR Information Bulletin, 12 May 1948,
engaged in negotiations on American and Novoye Vremya, No. 18, 18 February 1948.
claims for the repayment of wartime The most recent of such Soviet claims is that
shipping loans would allege that these made by Marshall Grechko in Pravda, 9 May 1960.
17In answers to a questionnaire submitted by
debts had been canceled when the Rus- the Historical Section, USFET, on 20 July 1945,
sian armies “saved” the American forces which answers were signed by both Jodl and Keitel.
Appendix A
Table of Equivalent Ranks
German Army and
U.S. Army Air Force German Waffen-SS
None Reichsmarschall None
General of the Army Generalfeldmarschall Reichsfuehrer-SS
General Generaloberst Oberstgruppenfuehrer
Lieutenant General General der Infanterie Obergruppenfuehrer
Artillerie
Gebirgstruppen
Kavallerie
Nachrichtentruppen
Panzertruppen
Pioniere
Luftwaffe
Flieger
Fallschirmtruppen
Flakartillerie
Luftnachrichtentruppen
Major General Generalleutnant Gruppenfuehrer
Brigadier General Generalmajor Brigadefuehrer
None None Oberfuehrer
Colonel Oberst Standartenfuehrer
Lieutenant CoIonel Oberstleutnant Obersturmbannfuehrer
Major Major Sturmbannfuehrer
Captain Hauptmann Haupsturmfuehrer
Captain (Cavalry) Rittmeister
First Lieutenant Oberleutnant Obersturmfuehrer
Second Lieutenant Leutnant Untersturmfuehrer
Appendix B
Recipients of the Distinguished Service Cross

All pertinent Army records have been scrutinized in an effort to include


in the following list the names of every soldier who received the DSC for
his part in the operations recounted in this volume. Inasmuch as no com-
plete listing of DSC awards is maintained in any single Army file, it is possi-
ble that some names may inadvertently have been omitted.

Lt. Col. Creighton W. Abrams Pfc. O. M. Laughlin


Lt. Col. Paul Bandy Capt. James H. Leach
Sgt. James L. Bayliss Pfc. John Leinen
Sgt. William J. Bennett 2d Lt. Samuel Leo
Pfc. J. O. Bird 2d Lt. S. D. Llewellyn
Lt. Col. Barry D. Browne Sgt. H. L. Luther
Sgt. John Bueno Brig. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe
Cpl. Adam F. Burko Pfc. W. J. McKenzie
Pfc. Angelo Cestoni 2d Lt. W. D. Markin
Lt. Col. Steve A. Chappuis Capt. Gabriel R. Martinez
Capt. John J. Christy Pfc. A. G. Means
Capt. A. J. Cissna Pfc. Edwin W. Metz
Lt. Col. Derrill M. Daniel Pvt. Bernard Michin
Pvt. Albert A. Darago 1st Lt. A. L. Mills
Sgt. T. J. Dawson Pfc. Richard Mills
Pfc. Daniel Del Grippo 1st Lt. Jesse Morrow
Pvt. C. W. Dillingham Sgt. Oscar M. Mullins
Sgt. Eddie Dolenc 1st Lt. Kenneth R. Nelson
Capt. Leland R. Dunham Pfc. N. A. Osterberg
Sgt. B. R. Eastburn 1st Lt. R. A. Parker
Capt. Paul F. Gaynor 2d Lt. G. F. Pennington
Pfc. Jack Gebert Sgt. T. E. Piersall
1st Lt. Charles R. Gniot Lt. Col. Lemuel E. Pope
Capt. John W. Hall Pvt. R. L. Presser
Sgt. Lawrence L. Hatfield 2d Lt. Frederick Rau
1st Lt. Edgar C. Heist Sgt. Woodrow W. Reeves
Lt. Col. John M. Hightower Sgt. George P. Rimmer
Pfc. S. E. Hull Maj. Gen. Walter M. Robertson
2d Lt. Michael Hritsik Lt. Col. James C. Rosborough
1st Lt. G. W. Jackman Pfc. F. S. Rose
Pvt. J. W. Jones Pfc. W. S. Rush
Lt. Col. R. W. Kinney Sgt. I. R. Schwartz
Capt. Frank Kutak Private Seamon
1st Lt. George D. Lamm Sgt. M. N. Shay
APPENDIX B 679

Pfc. R. D. Smith Sgt. J. W. Waldron


Capt. Robert W. Smith S/Sgt. William Walsh
T/Sgt. Russell N. Snoad 2d Lt. R. L. Westbrook
Cpl. C . E. Statler 2d Lt. John A. Whitehill
Capt. Vaughn Swift Sgt. William J. Widener
1st Lt. R. H. Thompson 1st Sgt. Gervis Willis
Lt. Col. Paul V. Tuttle, Jr. Cpl. Edward S. Withee
T/Sgt. John Van Der Kamp Pfc. T. J. Zimmerer
Pfc. Gilbert Van Every
Bibliographical Note
Two historically valuable books deal- the Office of the Chief of Military His-
ing specifically with the Ardennes Cam- tory. Much of the source material is in
paign are: Robert E. Merriam’s Dark the form of reports made during or after
December (New York: Ziff-Davis Pub- battle by approximately 1,600 Army
lishing Company, 1947) and John To- units in the European Theater of Oper-
land’s Battle: T h e Story of the Bulge ations. T h e story of this monumental
(New York: Random House, 1959). effort in research and acquisition has
Merriam’s work subsequently was re- been written by Royce L. Thompson,
printed in a paperback edition under in his History of the Historical Section,
the title T h e Battle of the Bulge (New E T O (May 1947), a manuscript in
York: Ballantine Books, 1957). These OCMH files. T h e American combat
two interesting and useful books show interviews, on which the author has
quite different approaches to the story. drawn so freely, can be found listed in a
Merriam, while in the U.S. Army, par- manuscript Catalogue of Combat Inter-
ticipated in the task of organizing ma- views maintained by OCMH.
terials for a future Army history of the Most of the historical manuscripts
Ardennes Campaign and subsequently prepared by German officers who took
made use of these documents in his own part in the Ardennes Campaign are
work. Toland, who wrote his volume on catalogued in the Guide to Foreign Mili-
the basis of extensive interviews with tary Studies, 1945–54, published by
veterans of the campaign, stresses the Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, His-
human interest aspects of the battle. torical Division, in 1954. Since this
There is a surprising dearth of pub- publication, there have been a few addi-
lished memoir literature from officers in tions to the German manuscript col-
a position of command during this oper- lection and these are catalogued by
ation. In part this lacuna is filled by the OCMH. T h e history of the early at-
very large body of unit histories com- tempts to trace German officers who
piled by the American divisions, regi- served in the Ardennes, transfer them
ments, and even battalions, which fought from prison cells, and elicit their co-
in the Battle of the Bulge. Extensive operation as historians makes fascinating
collection of unit histories will be found reading. Brig. Gen. S. L. A. Marshall
in the New York Public Library, the has given a brief sketch of this venture
Army Library (Washington, D.C.) , and in his introduction to T h e Fatal
the Office of the Chief of Military His- Decisions, edited by Seymour Freidin
tory, Department of the Army. and William Richardson (New York:
The bulk of the American documents William Sloane Associates, 1956) . A full
used as source material in the present and dramatic account of the attempt to
volume, as well as microfilm of the obtain German co-operation has been
pertinent German documents, are in the written by one of the main actors in this
keeping of the National Archives, or in little-known episode, then Maj. Kenneth
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 681

W. Hechler. His manuscript is entitled inevitably to the Order of Battle of the


T h e Enemy Side of the Hill: T h e 1945 United States Army, World War II,
Background on the Interrogation of Ger- European Theater of Operations: Divi-
man Commanders (Historical Division, sions, prepared under the direction of
Special Staff, U.S. Army, 30 July 1949). Capt. Robert J. Greenwald and Chief
Finally, any student who delves deeply Warrant Officer Meyer M. Cahn in the
into the U.S. Army operations in western Office of the Theater Historian, ETO
Europe during World War II must come (Paris, 1945).
Glossary
A-2 Intelligence officer or section of an air staff
AAA Antiaircraft artillery
AAR After action report
Abwehr-Schlacht Im West Defensive Battle in the West
AIB Armored infantry battalion
Anlage Appendix or annex
Ann. Annex
AT Antitank
Aufmarschanweisung Revised outline plan
AW Aircraft warning; automatic weapons
BAR Browning automatic rifle
Bn Battalion
CATOR Combined Air Transport Operations Room
CCA Combat Command A
CCB Combat Command B
CCR Combat Command Reserve
Chasseurs Ardenais Belgian military unit
Christrose One of several code names for the Ardennes offen-
sive
CIC Counter Intelligence Corps
C-in-C Commander in Chief
GO Commanding officer
CP Command post
DAGGER Ninth Army operation intended to clear the Ger-
mans from the west bank of the Roer River once
the dams were destroyed.
Div Division
DSC Distinguished Service Cross
Engr Engineer
Ersatzheer Replacement Army
ETO European Theater of Operations
FA Field Artillery
Feldherr Great general
Festung Fortress
Feuerwalze Rolling barrage
Flak Fliegerabwehrkanone (antiaircraft artillery gun)
Fremde Heere Ost OKH Intelligence Section East
Frontsoldat Front-line fighter
Fuehrer Reserve Central officers’ reserve
Fusilier battalion Separate infantry battalion performing both recon-
naissance and support in German division
FUSA First United States Army
G–2 Intelligence section of divisional or higher staff
G–3 Operations section of divisional or higher staff
GLOSSARY 683

G–4 Supply section of divisional or higher staff


Greif German deception operation in support of the Ar-
dennes counteroffensive
Herbstne bel Autumn Fog (Army Group B plan)
I and R Intelligence and Reconnaissance
Inf Infantry
Interv Interview
Jabo German slang for jagd-bomber (fighter-bomber)
Jnl Journal
Kampfgruppe German combat group of variable size
K-Tag 12 December
KTB Kriegstagebuch (war diary)
L-Tag 13 December
Martin Code name applied to operations plan drawn up by
O R W E S T for Wacht a m Rhein for submission
to conference at headquarters Army Group B on
27 October 1944
N e b elw erfer Multiple rocket projector
Null T a g D-day (16 December)
Oberquartermeister General staff officer at headquarters of an army (in
charge of supply and administration)
OB W E S T Oberbefehlshaber West (Commander in Chief West
or his headquarters)
OKH Oberkommando des Heeres (Army High Com-
mand)
OKL Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (Luftwaffe High
Command)
OKW Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Armed Forces
High Command)
OMAHABeach Normandy beach assaulted by troops of US. V
Corps, 6 June 1944
Ord Ordnance
O-Tag D-day (16 December)
Panzerfaust Recoilless German antitank rocket, hand-carried
POL Petrol (gasoline), oil, and lubricants
POW Prisoner of war
RCT Regimental combat team
Regts Regiments
Reichsautobahnen The German superhighway system
Reichsbahn German state railroads
S–2 Intelligence officer or section of regimental or lower
staff
S–3 Operations officer or section of regimental or lower
staff
Sec Section
SHAEF Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
SS Schutzstaffel (Elite guard)
684 T H E ARDENNES: B A T T L E OF T H E BULGE

TAC Tactical Air Command


TC Troop carrier
TD Tank destroyer
T/E Tables of equipment
T/O&E Tables of organization and equipment
TOT Time on target, a method of timing artillery fire
from various points to fall on a given target simul-
taneously
TUSA Third United States Army
VHF Very high frequency
V-Leute German agents
Volksdeutsche Citizens of a country other than Germany who were
considered Germans racially
Volkssturm A people’s militia, partially organized in one of the
last steps of German mobilization for total war
Wacht a m Rhein Watch on the Rhine (Ardennes code name)
Waffen-SS A mechanized Army-type force originally made u p
of volunteers from Nazi party organizations
Wehrmacht German Armed Forces
WFSt Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab (Armed Forces Opera-
tions Staff)
Werfer Rocket projector
(-) Understrength
Basic Military Map Symbols*
Symbols within a rectangle indicate a military unit, within
a triangle a n observation post, a n d within a circle a supply
point.

Military Units—Identification

Airborne units are designated by combining a gull wing


symbol with the arm or service symbol:

*For complete listing of symbols in use during the World War II period, see
FM 21-30, dated October 1943, from which these are taken.
686 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE

Size Symbols
T h e following symbols placed either in boundary lines or
above the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifying
arm or service symbol indicate the size of military organization:

EXAMPLES
T h e letter or number to the left of the symbol indicates the
unit designation; that to the right, the designation of the parent
unit to which it belongs. Letters or numbers above or below
boundary lines designate the units separated by the lines:

Weapons
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes have been published or are in press:


The War Department
Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations
Washington Command Post: The OperationsDivision
StrategicPlanning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942
StrategicPlanning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944
Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943
Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945
The Army and Economic Mobilization
The Army and Industrial Manpower
The Army Ground Forces
The Organization of Ground Combat Troops
The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops
The Army Service Forces
The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces
The Western Hemisphere
The Framework of HemisphereDefense
Guarding the United States and Its Outposts
The War in the Pacific
The Fall of the Philippines
Guadalcanal: The First Offensive
Victory in Papua
CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul
Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls
Campaign in the Marianas
The Approach to the Philippines
Leyte: The Return to the Philippines
Triumph in the Philippines
Okinawa: The Last Battle
Strategy and Command: The First Two Years
The Mediterranean Theater of Operations
Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West
Sicily and the Surrender of Italy
Salerno to Cassino
Cassino to the Alps
The European Theater of Operations
Cross-ChannelAttack
Breakout and Pursuit
The Lorraine Campaign
The Siegfried Line Campaign
The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge
The Last Offensive
The Supreme Command
Logistical Support of the Armies, VolumeI
Logistical Support of the Armies, VolumeII
The Middle East Theater
The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia
The China-Burma-India Theater
Stilwell’s Mission to China
Stilwell’s Command Problems
Time Runs Out in CBI
The Technical Services
The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizingfor War
The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field
The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat
The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment
The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan
The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany
The Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United States
The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation; Zone of Interior
The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor
Theaters
The Medical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations
The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War
The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply
The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront
The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I
The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II
The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan
The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany
The Signal Corps: The Emergency
The Signal Corps: The Test
The Signal Corps: The Outcome
The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations
The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply
The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas
Special Studies
Chronology 1941-1945
Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945
Rearming the French
Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt
The Women? Army Corps
Civil Affairs: SoldiersBecome Governors
Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army AirForces
The Employment of Negro Troops
Manhattan: The U,S.Army and the Atomic Bomb
Pictorial Record
The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas
The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas
The War Against Japan
Index
Aachen: 3, 20, 24, 26, 27, 30, 31, 35, 36, 42, 45, 50, Airborne Division, 82d: 73
58, 63, 67, 274, 334, 571, 632, 674 casualties: 367
Abrams, Lt. Col. Creighton W.: 552–55 command and organization: 306, 343, 344
Abwehrschlacht im Westen. See Defensive Battle moves to the Ardennes: 269, 289, 291, 305–07,
in the West. 315, 316, 334, 336, 339, 342–44, 346–47
Achêne: 565, 568 operations in the Amblève-Salm sector: 344, 346–
Acuff, Maj. John N.: 505 47, 351–52, 359, 365–67, 371, 374, 376, 381, 386,
Adams, Col. Andrew J.: 291, 317, 355–57 388, 389–92, 395, 397, 400, 401, 409, 412, 415,
Afst: 147, 149 416, 418–21, 443, 580–81, 583–85, 587, 590,
Ahr River: 45, 663 598–601
Ahr River railroad: 67, 662 Airborne Division, 101st: 73
Ahrweiler: 660 casualties: 451, 453, 455, 461, 481, 609
Air attacks: 4, 5–6, 145, 214, 255–56, 485, 660–63, command and organization: 306–09, 459, 460, 553,
665, 667, 672. See also Air support; Air-ground 608–09, 617
co-operation; Aircraft; Weather defense of Bastogne: 298, 323, 328, 400, 445n, 448,
American-British disagreement on targets: 6, 65 449–68, 470–75, 477–80, 514, 551, 553–54, 607,
bomb tonnage dropped: 65, 661–63 609, 615, 628–30, 644
on bridges: 15, 64–66, 255, 506, 534 loss of medical company and supplies: 461, 464,
against German war production: 4–6, 12, 64–65 609
on oil production: 65, 612 moves to Bastogne: 289, 303, 305–09, 314–15, 319,
against Roer River dams: 53 329, 334, 336
on transportation: 64–67, 255, 660 Airborne Engineer Battalion, 326th: 462, 472, 480,
Air Force, Eighth: 65, 611–12, 661–62 555
Air Force, Ninth: 240, 268, 377n, 485 Airborne operations, German: 269–71, 312, 332, 374
Air forces, Allied: 65, 424, 660–61 Aircraft. See also Artillery liaison planes.
Air reconnaissance: 17, 51, 61–65, 67, 73, 144, 256, (C-47’s: 172, 468, 609
278, 332, 509 fighter-bombers: 61, 92, 202, 268, 332, 337, 424,
Air superiority: 4, 22, 64–65, 574, 660, 663 471, 475, 479, 496, 527, 534, 548, 549, 569, 584,
Air supply: 95, 172, 387, 407 597, 614, 616, 625, 626–27, 634, 638, 649, 661,
of Bastogne garrison: 172, 461, 467, 468, 468n, 667
470, 475, 526, 554, 609 German: 22, 92–93, 271, 332
German: 369, 374 Marauders: 660
promised to Schnee Eifel forces: 166–67, 171, P-38’s: 418, 441, 569–70, 573, 592
171n, 172, 289 P-47’s: 470, 474, 506, 541, 553, 590
Air support: 92, 199–202, 268, 276, 277, 337, 366, P-51’s: 441
371–72, 376, 419, 470, 474–75, 479, 496, 526, 527, P-61’s: 62
541, 548, 549, 553, 567, 568, 569, 570, 573, 590, Typhoons: 569–70
611–12, 614, 616, 623, 625, 626–27, 634, 638, Aisne River: 353–54, 380, 382–83, 580, 582, 585, 587,
649, 660–61, 663 591–95, 601
bombing and strafing errors: 376, 377, 377n, 441, Akers, Col. R. F.: 566
474, 592 Albert Canal: 75
German: 19, 22, 37–38, 67, 70, 72, 92–93, 102, 142, Alf valley: 137–38, 154
175, 178–79, 332, 475, 476, 478, 546, 632, 660.
Allen, Lt. Col. Jack G.: 96–98, 101, 117
See also Luftwaffe.
Allen, Lt. Col. William H.: 197
Air warning net: 374
Air-ground co-operation: 62–63, 128, 172, 569. See Allerborn: 294, 296, 298–99, 304, 445, 452
also Air support. Alsace: 48, 178, 487, 648, 673
Airborne division, organization and employment: Alzette River: 44, 225–26, 483, 488–89, 510, 516–17
307–08, 413, 460, 461 Amberloup: 325, 643
Airborne Division, 17th: 305, 334, 556–57, 560, Amblève River: 44, 259–60, 280, 339, 341, 342, 343,
646–47 344, 347, 361, 580–81, 604
690 T H E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE
Amblève River crossings: 265–68, 279, 335–36, 338, Arlon-Bastogne highway: 314–15, 322, 459, 462, 463,
348, 351–52, 359, 363–64, 366–72, 374, 376–77, 465, 471, 475, 480, 487, 509–11, 524–25, 532, 548,
578 551, 606, 609, 628
Ambulances. See Evacuation. Arloncourt: 629–30, 632
Ammunition: 153, 518, 468, 664, 665. See also Illu- Armed Forces Operations Staff. See Wehrmacht-
minating shell; Proximity fuze; Shortages. fuehrungsstab ( WFSt).
Ammunition, German: 22, 37, 68, 72, 663–64, 664n. Armor: 125–27, 258, 269, 365–66, 396, 452, 460, 507.
See also Shortages. See also Mechanized forces; Tanks.
Ammunition expenditure: 95, 125, 154, 161, 202–21, difficulties on soggy ground: 115, 129, 243, 370,
224, 232, 283, 338, 470, 496, 539, 577, 630, 647, 384, 409, 456
658–59, 664 German/US division organization and weapons:
Amonines: 354, 380–81, 383, 386, 582, 585, 587, 593, 365, 651
613 good going on frozen ground: 47, 416, 553, 649
Andenne: 174–75, 566 movement rates: 70–71, 264, 275, 299, 357, 669–
Andernach: 668 70
Andler: 141–42, 148–51, 156, 162, 164, 177 opposing tank strengths: 73, 260, 649–50, 652
Andromidas, T/Sgt. Stephen G.: 596n problems with roads and bridges: 176, 189–90,
Anglo-American relations: 6, 12, 17, 65, 423–24, 610, 250, 265, 267, 268, 364, 373, 590
671 Armored Division, 2d
Antiaircraft: 91, 130, 279, 340, 523, 655, 659 casualties: 574
Antiaircraft, German: 50, 65, 67–68, 72, 168, 178–79, command and organization: 434, 651
293, 367, 609 operations before the Meuse: 427, 433–36, 439–42,
Antiaircraft Artillery (Automatic Weapons) Bat- 565–66, 570, 572–74, 574n, 577
talions Armored Division, 3d: 331, 582n
203d: 278–79, 318, 357, 358, 389 command and organization: 343, 346, 346n, 353–
390th: 522–23, 546 54, 387, 427, 585, 651
440th: 286 operations before the Bastogne-Liège highway:
447th: 184n, 193, 202, 206, 210, 221 346, 346n, 347, 352–54, 356, 358, 359, 377–78,
482d: 230, 232, 234,236, 297 380–91, 397, 406, 420, 431–34, 439, 442, 580–82,
486th: 387 585–89, 591–94, 596–97, 601–02
634th: 140, 166 Armored Division, 4th: 513
796th: 464 casualties: 530
Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalions command and organization: 512, 514, 524
143d: 339 operations in the Bastogne corridor: 457, 458, 462,
413th: 113, 149 467, 472, 480, 486–87, 508, 510–15, 520–21, 523–
Antiaircraft guns 32, 535, 547–48, 550n, 551–55, 606–07, 615, 621,
37-mm: 317 625, 627–28, 636
40-mm Bofors: 193, 202, 210 Armored Division, 5th: 333
50-mm: 184n, 197, 202, 210, 221, 234, 297, 402, Armored Division, 6th: 486, 508, 614
645 command and organization: 607, 628–29
90-mm: 339, 340, 341 operations east of Bastogne: 627–35, 642
Antitank company: 653 Armored Division, 7th
Antitank guns casualties: 404–05, 412, 421–22
German: 72, 177, 645 command and organization: 273–74, 280n, 395,
37-mm: 379 400, 401, 407, 413
57-mm: 126, 220, 653, 654 defense of the St. Vith perimeter: 285–91, 339,
Antwerp: 2, 16, 17, 19, 19n, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 351, 356, 358, 359, 366, 369, 381, 389, 393, 395–
31, 75, 176, 556, 578, 654–55 402, 480
Ardennes: 39–47, 55–56, 59, 138, 141, 265. See also moves south to the St. Vith sector: 158, 265, 266,
Eifel: Road nets: Terrain. 274–80, 329, 332–34
Ardennes counteroffensive operations west of the Salm: 468, 583, 585–87,
compared with 1940 thrust: 18, 20, 38, 40, 46, 48, 589, 591–93, 596–97
72, 269, 556, 663, 670 withdrawal from St. Vith sector: 392, 405–22
compared with World War I: 6. 11, 39–40, 46, 48, Armored Division, 8th: 334
656, 665, 671, 674 Armored Division, 9th: 206, 235n
the German military “Indian summer”: 675 casualties: 160, 232, 234, 235, 258, 298n, 421, 616
Arlon: 21, 40, 42–46, 212, 238, 322, 458, 465, 483, command and organization: 225, 228, 230, 235n,
488, 508, 510–12, 514, 520, 523 617
INDEX 691
Armored Division, 9th-Continued Armored Infantry Battalions-Continued
defense of Bastogne: 298n, 450 526th: 266–67, 337, 539
Sauer River operations: 55, 213, 225–36, 238, 244, Armored Infantry Regiment, 41st: 435
245–46, 248, 252, 255, 256, 257, 483, 496 Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 82d: 568–69
Armored Division, 10th Armored Regiments
casualties: 250, 258, 303, 481 33d: 596
command and organization: 249 66th: 434, 572
moves north to the Ardennes: 206, 208, 244, 249, 67th: 568, 572–73
314, 331–32, 486
Army, First: 264, 265, 267, 363, 366, 425, 664, 665,
operations on the southern shoulder: 236, 255,
668. See also Hodges, Lt. Gen. Courtney H.
483, 488, 490n, 493–94, 496, 498, 500–501, 508
command and organization: 53, 55, 259, 400,
Armored Division, 11th: 334, 556–57, 612
casualties: 621, 645, 647 424, 426–27, 512
command and organization: 560, 617–18 and defense of St. Vith: 306, 393, 395, 401, 406,
412–13
counterattack in Bastogne sector: 617–18, 620–21,
headquarters command post at Spa: 259, 268–69,
628–29, 644–47
307, 331, 336, 341–42, 343, 349, 393, 424.
defense of the Meuse River line: 560, 617
headquarters moves from Spa to Chaudfontaine:
Armored division trains, 7th: 287, 291, 315, 317, 344, 424
318, 353–56, 356n, 358, 382, 393, 397, 399, 400, and counterattack plans for January: 610–12
412, 431 initial deployment of reinforcements: 266, 274–75,
Armored Divisions. See Combat Commands. 305, 307, 310, 318, 333, 333n, 334, 376, 423, 427,
Armored Engineer Battalion, 9th: 233, 313, 472 556, 557–58
Armored Engineer Battalion, 23d: 379 and operations on northwest front: 432, 443,
Armored Field Artillery Battalions 565–66, 586, 592n, 597, 612, 614
3d: 228, 232, 235, 236 and orders for initial delaying actions: 312, 336,
16th: 160, 279, 285, 291 341, 344, 346, 486, 552
54th: 385, 387, 602 and Schnee Eifel sector battle: 157, 166n, 171,
58th: 296–97, 297n, 298, 325, 328,466 171n
62d: 88 situation before the counteroffensive: 50, 51, 53,
73d: 294–97 55, 58, 59, 61, 62, 238, 259, 260, 267
83d: 385 Army, Third: 467, 656, 664, 668. See also Patton,
94th: 552, 554 Lt. Gen. George S., Jr.
274th: 550n command and organization: 14, 255, 400, 424,
275th: 139, 141, 149–50, 279, 283, 287, 291, 402, 487–88, 496, 512–13, 560
418–19 counterattacks to and beyond Bastogne: 423–24,
400th: 336, 340 483, 486–88, 490, 496, 508, 509–10, 510n, 512–13,
420th: 309, 454, 460, 462, 464, 466, 468, 470, 472, 515–16, 524, 526–27, 532, 534, 539, 605, 606,
474 606n, 611–15, 617, 627, 647, 672
434th: 414 sends reinforcements to the Ardennes: 244, 249,
440th: 278, 358, 421 315, 327, 332, 333, 457, 465, 482, 486–88, 513,
755th: 309 557, 563
Armored Infantry Battalions shift toward Luxembourg and Belgium: 255, 306,
9th: 633–35 480, 488
10th: 526, 528–29 situation before the counteroffensive: 30, 33, 36,
20th: 300 39, 51, 53, 55, 58, 61, 62, 176, 178, 238, 332, 333,
21st: 620 333n, 334, 485
23d: 282, 283, 404–06, 589–90 Army, Seventh: 33, 51, 53, 62, 563
27th: 159–60,285,410 Army, Ninth: 50, 51, 53, 58, 176, 273, 425. See also
38th: 283, 403–05 Simpson, Lt. Gen. William H.
44th: 629–30, 633 placed under 21 Army Group control: 424, 427
48th: 286, 408–09, 589–90 sends reinforcements to the Ardennes: 158, 269,
50th: 630, 632–33 274, 275, 305, 308, 317, 332–33, 334, 427, 557
51st: 529, 548, 607, 626 Army Group, 6th: 53, 424, 487, 611
52d: 294–95, 298 Army Group, 12th: 57–59, 61, 73, 74, 172, 255, 512,
53d: 530, 552, 554–55 655, 664. See also Bradley, Gen. Omar N.
55th: 645 command and organization: 240, 423–25
60th: 213, 228–33, 235, 258 and reinforcement of the Ardennes: 157, 274,
63d: 621 331–33
692 TH E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Army Group, 21: 17, 51, 53, 423–24, 427, 557, 560, Averill, 1st Lt. Denniston: 358
664. See also Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Aywaille: 341
Bernard L.
Army Groups, German. See German units.
Arnhem: 571 Baade, Maj. Gen. Paul: 606, 627, 634. See also
Infantry Division, 35th.
Arsdorf: 521, 544–45 Baccarat: 20
Artillery. See also Artillery support. Bahe, Maj. Gordon A.: 433, 437
counterbattery duel: 629 Baillonville: 431, 441, 565
drum fire: 373 Balkan campaign: 16, 72
fire by map: 216, 243, 309 Bande: 431, 436
fire called on own position: 116, 119, 131, 134n, Bandy, Lt. Col. Paul: 518, 518n, 536
185 BAR. See Browning automatic rifles.
on friendly troops: 106, 112, 168, 170, 247, 251, Baraque d e Fraiture: 44, 353, 357, 359, 381, 383,
418, 633 385–86, 388–92, 413, 420, 580–83, 587, 595
marching fire: 251 Barnes, Lt. Col. Hubert D.: 309
neutralization of 96, 156, 195, 213, 258 Barr, Lt. Col. Andrew: 354
precision ranging: 372 Barrier lines: 267, 287, 313, 316, 318, 320, 322, 326,
prepared concentrations: 82, 139, 173, 181, 656–57 327, 329, 355, 356, 382, 429. See also Corps,
against tanks and tank concentrations: 654 VIII; Roadblocks.
TOT: 496, 572, 632, 635, 640 Barton, Maj. Gen. Raymond 0.: 55, 238, 239, 241,
types of barrages: 283, 380, 414, 633, 642, 656 243–45,248, 2501, 251n, 25 85, 491 –
Artillery liaison planes: 160, 242, 261, 268, 336, 337, 92, 494, 507, 508. See also Infantry Division,
570, 573, 609, 627, 659 4th.
Artillery support: 87–88, 110, 115–16, 119, 124–25, Baschleiden: 607, 636
130–33, 141, 160–61, 202, 209, 234, 239, 242, Basse-Bodeux: 346
245–47, 340, 341, 373–74, 385, 387–88, 441, 494, Bastendorf: 217–18, 221, 223, 226
496, 501, 508,515, 554, 597, 629 Bastogne: 19, 22, 28, 40, 612, 615. See also Airborne
of the Bastogne sector: 309, 323, 327–29,456, 464, Division, 101st.
472, 474, 480 air attacks: 475, 476, 478, 632, 660
German: 19, 37, 68, 71–72, 77, 82, 87, 111, 143, air supply operations: 172, 461, 467, 468, 468n,
152, 173, 178, 181, 195–96,213–16, 226, 229, 231, 470, 475, 526, 554, 609
247,258, 404–05, 470, 507, 574 arrival of the 101st Airborne: 289, 307–09,314–15,
German/US comparison: 144–45, 157, 650, 652–53, 329, 336
656–60 artillery support for the perimeter: 309, 323, 327–
of the St. Vith perimeter: 277, 279, 283, 291, 396, 29, 456, 464, 472, 474, 480
398–402, 417 close air support of defense operations: 470, 474–
Assault guns. See Guns, German, SP. 75, 479, 661
Assenois: 323, 480, 553–55, 606–07, 615, 619, 623, command headquarters of VIII Corps: 161, 249,
626–29 274, 288, 306, 309, 312, 313, 393, 445
Atrocities: 260n, 261, 261n, 262–64, 364, 520 defense of: 435, 438, 440, 445, 445n, 448, 449–68,
Attacks 470–75, 477–80, 537, 539, 540, 546,572, 577, 581,
concentric: 142, 349, 381 604
double envelopment: 20, 26, 27, 29, 31–32, 143 delaying actions before: 192, 210, 225, 294–306,
“distracting”: 214 312–21, 359, 398, 445
flanking: 92, 220–21, 396 encirclement of: 323, 458–59, 462
frontal: 92 enemy ground attacks: 462, 464–68, 470–80, 563–
holding: 29–30, 34 64, 574, 601, 613–15, 617–19, 622–23, 631, 637,
Napoleonic carrè: 26 644, 647, 657, 670, 673
reconnaissance in force: 282 formation of the defense: 205, 291, 307–09, 317,
single envelopment: 142, 525 319, 329, 357, 423, 448, 449–64
spoiling: 25, 38, 58, 330, 483, 634 German initial attack plans: 174–77, 183n, 194,
Attert: 43 206, 210, 294, 298, 303–05, 356, 443, 449, 452,
Attert River: 520 454, 475n
link-up with relief forces: 480, 551, 555, 606–07,
Aubange: 425 613, 672
Auw: 139, 146, 148–51, 155–56, 163, 164, 166, 169 location and tactical importance of: 44, 45, 46, 47,
Auw Bleialf road: 140, 141, 155, 164–65, 169 306, 312, 459, 509
Auw-Schönberg road: 152, 156, 170 “relief” counterattack from the south: 509–11,
INDEX 693

Bastogne-Continued Beyer, General der Infanterie Franz: 212, 255-56,


513-15, 519, 523-27, 529-32, 547, 551-55, 563, 494
605, 607, 611, 617, 627-30 Bicycles: 154, 178, 20711, 402, 430
traffic control problems: 309, 458, 615 Biddle, Pfc. Melvin: 387
Bastogne “pocket”: 629 Bielefeld: 58
Bastogne-La Roche road: 315, 458 “Big Solution”: 21, 23, 27-29, 70, 75, 173, 443
Bastogne-Marche highway: 318, 321, 357, 429, 431-
Bigelbach: 221, 229-30, 506
32, 462, 464, 465, 471, 474, 475-77, 614, 616
Bigonville: 524, 530-32, 544, 552
Bastogne-Martelange highway: 323, 523, 530, 623,
Billingslea, Col. Charles: 390-91, 581, 590, 595, 597
626
Bastogne-Neufchlteau road: 324, 327, 461, 462, 464, Bilsdorf: 544
465, 475, 478, 480, 511, 514, 524, 552-53, 606-07, Bird, Pfc. J. O.: 539n
614, 615, 617, 628, 644 Birkelt Farm: 241, 257, 504
Bastogne-St. Hubert highway: 325, 459, 618, 621, Bissen: 226, 483
643-44 Bitburg: 45, 59, 177, 226, 228, 256, 508, 611
Batchelder Maj. Clifton B.: 568 Bittrich, General der Waffen-SS Willi: 77, 580-81,
Bates, Lt. Col. Oma R.: 243 590-91
Battlefield commissions: 84 Bizory: 303-04, 313, 450-51, 454, 456, 629-30
Battlefield illumination: 89, 128, 655. See also Black, Col. Paul J.: 490, 498-99, 504-05
Illuminating shell; Searchlights. Blakeley, Brig. Gen. Harold W.: 508
Bauvenn: 406, 410 Blanchard, Col. Wendell: 530, 552
Bavigne: 635, 637-38, 641 Bleialf: 25, 141, 143, 145, 151, 152, 154-55, 163-65,
Bayerlein, Generalleutnant Fritz: 178, 299, 326n, 167, 170
329, 437-38, 440, 450n, 451, 454, 456, 458, 463, Bleialf-Schonberg road: 165, 167-68, 170
570, 643 Boats, assault: 180, 183, 216, 229, 241, 504, 546
Bayliss, Sgt. James L.: 116n Bock, Lt. Col. Frank A.: 622
Bayonets: 97, 115, 128, 210, 463, 549 Boggess, 1st Lt. Charles: 554-55
Bazookas: 93, 98, 109, 110, 110n, 115, 117, 126, 127, Bois de Chardonne: 442
130-31, 156, 192, 192n, 220, 224, 234, 243, 247, Bois de Famenne: 569
250, 254, 273, 281, 323, 328, 340,654 Bois de Fragotte: 616, 619, 621
Beaufort: 230-32, 234, 236, 504-05 Bois de Geauvelant: 568-70
Beauraing: 433 Bois de Herbaimont: 614
Bech: 257 Bois des Haies de Magery: 618, 621, 644
Beffe: 381, 383-84 Bois des Valets: 620, 644, 646
Beho: 279, 286, 398, 413, 415-17 Bois Jacques: 629
Beiler: 204-05 Boisselles: 568
Belchem, Brig. David: 427 Bolden, S/Sgt. Paul: 375
Bollendorf: 55, 215, 229, 235, 236, 240, 495, 506
Belfort: 51
Bolling, Brig. Gen. Alexander R.: 427-28, 430-33,
Bell, Col. Robert P.: 490 438, 442, 574. See also Infantry Division, 84th.
Bell, Col. Virgil: 644 Bombardment Division, IX: 377n, 661-62
Bennett, S/Sgt. William J.: 209n Bombardment Group, 391st: 660
Benonchamps: 299, 302, 304, 632 Bombardment Group, 406th: 661
Bercheux: 552 Bombing. See Air attacks; Air support.
Berdorf: 230, 241-42, 245, 247, 247n, 249, 250, 252- Bone, Sgt. Otis: 110
54, 256, 496-97, 500, 502-04 Bonn: 45, 50, 51, 64, 69, 140, 595, 613, 665
Berens: 233 Bonn-Euskirchen railroad: 67
Berg: 122, 197 Bonnal: 544-47, 638
Berle: 640 Bonnerue: 644
Berlin: 58 Bonney, Capt. George E.: 436
Berry, Capt. James D.: 342 Boos, Col. Francis H.: 115-16, 122
Berterath: 81, 147 Booth, Lt. Col. Robert M.: 298, 448
Bertogne: 317-20, 356 Borgoumont: 348
Born: 151, 163, 281, 396
Bertrix: 618 Bottomly, Maj. Raymond V., Jr.: 450
Berwick, Capt. Lee: 153 Boudinot, Brig. Gen. Truman E.: 348, 376
Bettborn: 483 Bouillon: 326, 560
Bettel: 217 Boulaide: 607
Bettendorf: 217, 223, 501 Bourcy: 299, 629, 631, 633
694 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Bourcy-Bastogne railroad: 456, 462, 463 British units-Continued
Bourcy-Noville road: 299, 304 Division, Guards Armoured: 557
Bourdon: 438, 442, 574 Regiment, 2d Household Cavalry: 561
Bourscheid: 215, 517, 519–21, 535–39, 546 Regiment, 3d Royal Tank: 569
Bourscheid triangle: 532, 539 Yeomanry, Fife and Fofar: 574
Bovigny: 267, 413, 418–20 Britton, Lt. Col. Frank K.: 633, 635
Boxtel: 557 Brown, Lt. Col. Charles E.: 629–30, 633
Boyer, Maj. Donald P., Jr.: 273n Browne, Lt. Col. Barry D.: 462, 464, 466–67, 472,
Boylan, Lt. Col. Vincent L.: 409, 417 473, 473n
Bradley, Gen. Omar N.: 53, 55, 56, 225, 307, 316 Browning automatic rifles: 141
Allied counterattack plans: 509, 512, 610–12, 615, Brul: 620, 644, 646
617 Brussels: 22, 28, 39, 75, 176, 557, 612
and division of command with Montgomery: 423– Buchet: 166, 171
24, 426 Buchholz: 80–81, 84, 90, 94, 182, 184, 186–88
and movement of reinforcements to Ardennes: Buchholz Forest: 54
305–07, 331–34, 486–87, 510, 513 Buderscheid: 639–41
Brandenberger, General der Panzertruppen Erich: Bueno, Sgt. John: 372n
26, 75, 212–13, 226, 232, 236, 240, 465, 495, 533– Buildings, attack and defense of: 190–92, 241–42,
34, 538–41, 545, 642–43 247, 250–51, 256, 303, 324, 349–51, 365
Brandenburg: 214, 217, 220 Buissonville: 434–36, 438, 440–41, 565, 570–72
Bras: 346, 590, 621, 631 Buhle, Walter: 12
Bras-Bastogne road: 299, 623, 629 Bulgarian forces: 2
Braunlauf: 415–16 Büllingen: 91–92, 94, 99, 104–05, 108, 111, 113,
Braunlauf Creek: 272, 285, 406, 410, 414–15 128–31, 133, 261
Breitweiler: 245, 249, 458 Büllingen-Malmédy road: 80–81, 83, 90, 91, 112–
Bremen: 67 13, 120, 128
Brewster, Maj. Olin F.: 392, 584, 589–90 Büllingen–St. Vith road: 163, 403
Bridges: 66, 92, 325. See also Bridging operations; Burden ridge: 537
Engineers; and river crossings by name of Burg Reuland: 160, 195, 196, 272, 279
river. Burko, Cpl. Adam F.: 372n
air and artillery attacks on: 15, 64–66, 255, 506, Burnenville: 363
534, 660–63 Burnon: 526
Bailey: 318–20, 526, 546–47, 638 Burns, Capt. J. H.: 184
class 70 two-way: 378 Butgenbach: 25, 81, 87, 91, 105, 112, 113, 121–22,
destroyed: 83, 208, 224, 226, 244, 252, 260, 268, 128–30, 134, 332, 603–04, 667
284, 317, 318, 320, 322, 338, 343, 351, 356, 363, Butler, Lt. Col. McClernand: 87, 119
371, 373, 419, 420, 501, 518, 525, 544, 546–47, Buttlar-Brandenfels, Generalmajor Horst Freiherr
552, 560, 585 Treusch von: 27, 28
failure to destroy: 206, 207, 266, 320–21, 419 Byrne, Col. Bernard A.: 607, 637
footbridges: 348, 378, 379
German GO-ton: 178, 186, 187
“C” Route: 81, 83, 90, 91
portable infantry: 216
Callanan, Lt. Col. W. A.: 544
unsuitable for heavy traffic: 268, 343, 370
Camouflage: 50, 67, 70, 87, 144, 470, 478, 499, 505,
Bridging operations: 66, 183–84, 186, 198, 221–22, 633
232, 235, 245, 253, 260, 292, 321, 357, 370, 377, Camp Elsenborn: 54, 110, 113, 271, 331
506, 669 Camp Mourmelon: 73, 309
Briscol: 601 Canadian forces: 17, 19, 611
British units. See also Army Group, 21; Phantom; Canadian Forestry Company, 9th: 318, 318n, 321,
Royal Air Force. 356
Armored Brigade, 29th: 433, 443, 557, 561, 568– Canal Defense Lights: 655
69, 572 Cannon, Maj. Charles A., Jr.: 276
Army, Second: 53 Cannon company: 653
Corps, 30: 176, 426, 557, 561 Carnes, Lt. Col. Norman D.: 433
Division, 6th Airborne: 557 Carpenter, Lt. Leonard R.: 439
Division, 43d: 557, 561 Carr, 1st Lt. Walter P.: 551 .
Division, 50th: 647 Casualties: 116, 125, 273, 530, 549, 593, 656. See
Division, 51st: 443, 557 also Evacuation; Losses, summary of.
Division, 53d: 557, 574, 577 civilian: 262, 364, 376, 377
INDEX 695
Casualties-Continued Ciergnon: 569
German: 37, 89, 97, 120, 127, 132, 147, 184n, Cierreux: 418–21
203, 211, 221, 244, 247, 252, 258, 361, 506–07, Ciney: 434–35, 440–41, 565, 567–68, 587
570, 595, 615, 668, 674 Cissna, Capt. A. J.: 544
nonbattle: 123–24, 141, 238, 495, 503, 507, 607 Civilians: 4, 6, 226, 254, 262, 364, 370, 372, 376, 377
officers: 104, 129, 154, 168, 220, 253, 351, 367, 410, Clarke, Brig. Gen. Bruce: 275–76, 282, 290, 405–07,
451, 548, 594 409–10, 412, 414, 416–17
CATOR. See Combined Air Transport Operations Clausewitz: 11
Room (SHAEF) . Clay, Lt. Col. Roy Udell: 139, 279
Cavalry Groups Clerf: 174, 179, 181–85, 187–92, 205, 206, 294–96
2d: 494, 496, 499 Clerf River: 44, 331
4th: 436, 441, 570–72, 574 Clerf River crossings: 176–79, 181, 185–92, 205–07,
14th: 55, 80, 81, 85, 90, 136, 136n, 137–41, 144–51, 222, 294, 298, 312–13
156, 161–64, 279, 281, 288, 330, 397, 422 Clerf-Bastogne highway: 179–81, 183, 183n, 187–88,
102d: 330 189–90, 206, 210, 312–13, 315, 628
Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons Clochimont: 470, 553, 629
4th: 441 Cobreville: 552–53
6th: 606, 636 Cochenhausen, Major von: 567, 569–70
18th: 138–39, 145–49, 149n, 150–51, 154, 162, 163, Cohen, Lt. Col. Harold: 528
165–66, 281 Colbet: 246, 497
24th: 441, 570–71 Collier, Brig. Gen. John: 434–36, 440–41, 571–73
25th: 525 Collins, Maj. Gen. J. Lawton: 385, 387, 427, 431–34,
28th: 621 565–66, 566n, 568, 587, 587n, 591, 597, 611–12.
32d: 91, 139, 148, 150, 162–64, 273, 277, 281 See also Corps, VII.
38th: 79, 87–88, 102 Collins, Lt. Col. Kenneth W.: 228, 230, 235, 615
41st: 621
Colmar: 51, 611
87th: 276, 279, 282–83, 358–59, 389, 397, 403–05,
409 Cologne: 27, 36, 42, 45, 50, 51, 58–59, 65, 69, 74
89th: 230–32, 234, 273, 284–85, 403n Cologne-Düren railroad: 67
90th: 236, 300, 501 Combat Commands of Armored Divisions
Cavender, Col. Charles C.: 138, 154, 166–68, 171 CCA, 2d Armored Division: 434–36, 440–41, 570–
Celles: 441, 565, 568–72, 574, 591, 612, 672 72
Cestoni, Pfc. Angelo: 98n CCB, 2d Armored Division: 441, 443, 567–70, 572
Chamberlain, Lt. Col. Thomas C.: 249 CCR, 2d Armored Division: 572–73
Champlon crossroads: 429, 436 CCA, 3d Armored Division: 346, 352, 381–82, 384,
Champs: 462, 474, 476–79, 645 385, 433, 585, 594, 601
Chance, Col. Robert H.: 238, 243–44, 254, 257 CCB, 3d Armored Division: 346–49, 352, 359,
Chapman, Maj. Cecil: 643 374, 376–77, 385, 582n, 592
Chappuis, Lt. Col. Steve A.: 307, 479, 479n CCR, 3d Armored Division: 353, 377–79, 381,
Charles XII (Sweden) : 10 382, 384, 386–88
Charleville: 212, 560 CCA, 4th Armored Division: 524–26, 529–31, 548–
Chaudfontaine: 344, 427 51, 607, 609, 624–26
Chaumont: 526–29, 529n, 530–31, 548–49, 551 CCB, 4th Armored Division: 457, 512–14, 525–29,
Chemical Mortar Battalion, 87th: 602 531, 548–54, 607, 626
Chemical Mortar Battalion, 91st: 503 CCR, 4th Armored Division: 530–32, 544, 552–55,
Cheneux: 268, 348, 351–52, 366–67, 599 607
Chenogne: 325, 616, 619–21, 644–46 CCR, 5th Armored Division: 431
Chérain: 395, 397–98, 400 CCA, 6th Armored Division: 607, 628–30, 632
Cherry, Lt. Col. Henry T.: 296, 300–303, 448, 449, CCB, 6th Armored Division: 628–30, 632, 644
450–51 CCR, 6th Armored Division: 631–32
Cheston, Lt. Col. Elliott B.: 518 CCA, 7th Armored Division: 279, 286, 290, 408–
Chevron: 268, 343 09, 417–19, 585–89, 589n, 590, 593
CCB, 7th Armored Division: 158, 275, 279, 282,
Chiers River: 560
285, 287, 290–91, 396, 403–06, 408–10, 412, 414–
Chifontaine: 299 18, 593
Christnach: 230, 236, 483, 494, 498–99 CCR, 7th Armored Division: 274, 278–82, 286,
Christrose: 176 290, 418–19
Christy, Capt. John J.: 638n CCA, 9th Armored Division: 225, 230, 233–35,
Churchill, Winston: 676 488, 494, 500, 508, 607, 615–17, 645–46
696 THE A RDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Combat Commands of Armored Divisions– Corps, III: 327, 489–90. See also Millikin, Maj. Gen.
Continued John
CCB, 9th Armored Division: 157–60, 228, 265, command and organization: 487–88, 508, 510,
273, 275, 279, 282, 284–85, 290–92, 331, 392, 393, 512, 514, 539
395–97, 400, 403, 405–06, 410, 412–16, 418, 421, counterattack toward Bastogne and St. Vith: 487,
583, 587, 589 510–16, 519–20, 523–26, 532–33, 541–42, 543n,
CCR, 9th Armored Division: 157, 190, 199, 206, 544, 547, 607, 609, 612, 614, 627–28, 634–35, 637
294–304, 311, 313, 315, 316, 331, 448, 460, 464, Corps, V. See also Gerow, Maj. Gen. Leonard T.
473 command and organization: 53–55, 120, 134, 228,
CCX, 9th Armored Division: 500–501 331, 343
CCA, 10th Armored Division: 249–52, 254–55, holds the salient north shoulder: 80, 86, 91, 103–
256–57 04, 113, 120, 134, 137, 161, 306, 316, 330–32,
CCB, 10th Armored Division: 300, 303, 309, 315, 335, 337, 345, 426, 431, 443, 580, 603–04, 656
448, 448n, 449, 451–52, 454, 457, 459–61, 463–64, situation before the counteroffensive: 53, 59, 77–
467, 468, 472–75, 481, 488, 513–14, 632 80, 95, 140
CCA, 11th Armored Division: 617–18, 621, 644, Corps, VII: 53, 55, 86, 113, 238, 611–12. See also
646 Collins, Maj. Gen. J. Lawton.
CCB, 11th Armored Division: 617–18, 620–21, command and organization: 387, 411n
644–47 operations west of the Ourthe: 385, 387, 427–28,
CCR, 11th Armored Division: 644–45 431–34, 436, 438, 441–43, 565–66, 572, 577, 580,
Combat teams. See Task Forces; Teams. 585, 587, 591, 592n, 597, 603
Combined Air Transport Operations Room Corps, VIII. See also Middleton, Maj. Gen. Troy H.
(SHAEF) : 171–72 command and organization: 55–56, 255, 288, 315,
Command. See also Tactical control. 400, 457, 487, 512–14, 560, 612, 617
air resupply co-ordination problems: 171–72 counterattack northeast in the Bastogne sector:
in the Bastogne sector: 460, 464, 475 612, 615–18, 621, 627–28, 643, 647
Bradley-Montgomery split of forces: 423–26 and defense of Bastogne: 457, 459, 460–62, 464,
confusing and contradictory orders: 117–18, 161, 466, 472, 474–75, 511, 512, 514
163–64, 167, 205, 336, 392, 424, 489–90, 490n, and defense of St. Vith sector: 273, 275, 289,
512, 513–15, 587, 630 393, 395
decision left to “man on the ground”: 28, 161, delaying actions before Bastogne: 206, 210n, 254,
162, 166, 225, 289, 420, 452, 671 294–95, 307, 329, 346, 359, 377, 400, 513
initial reactions to German attack: 80, 272, 311– initial attacks all along the front: 104, 157–58,
12, 330–33, 333n, 334–35 161, 163, 184, 187, 274, 305–07, 330–33, 335,
in the St. Vith perimeter: 288–91, 395, 401, 403, 345, 486, 488, 557, 657–58
406–07, 412–13 operations on the southern shoulder: 226, 255,
Commando operations. See Greif (Operation) . 428, 508, 512–13, 524, 560–61, 607
Commanster: 413, 416–17 preparation of barrier lines: 287, 310–15, 318–19,
Communications: 124–25, 249, 401, 424–25, 461–62, 322–23, 326–27, 359, 423, 429, 523, 525, 532, 552
625. See also Radios; Telephone communica- and the Schnee Eifel sector battle: 161, 170–71,
tions. 289
German: 231, 240, 252, 269, 322, 337, 368 situation before the German attack: 54–56, 59–
jamming: 391, 654 63, 73, 78, 137, 139–41, 227–28, 238, 310, 556
problems of: 117–18, 132, 158, 165, 167, 193, Corps, XII. See also Eddy, Maj. Gen. Manton S.
204–06, 240–41, 242–43, 251n, 254, 280, 289, command and organization: 485–86, 488, 539
298, 311–12, 331, 393, 395n, 405, 420, 554, 587, operations in the Sauer River sector: 488–89,
592, 630, 654, 658 490, 493–94, 496, 501, 507–08, 515, 535, 539, 613,
Communications Zone: 172, 305, 557, 559–60 614, 627–28, 637, 666
Condor. See Greif (Operation) Corps, XIII: 273, 274, 333
Condroz: 42 Corps, XV: 37, 488
Congressional Medal of Honor. See Medal of Honor. Corps, XVIII (Airborne) : 305, 612. See also Ridg-
Coningham, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur: 424 way, Maj. Gen. Matthew B.
Conjoux: 440–41, 568–70 command and organization: 336, 342–44, 427
Connaughton, Maj. George W.: 548 operations on First Army northwest front: 344–
Conneaux: 567 46, 346n, 351, 352–54, 356n, 357, 359, 366,
Connor, Lt. Col. Robert E.: 497 371, 376, 382, 385, 387, 389, 393, 395, 400–
Consdorf: 231, 243, 245–47, 249, 254, 257, 313, 484 401, 406–07, 411, 413, 422, 426, 427, 428, 431–
Consthum: 181–82, 185–86, 192–93, 205–06 33, 566, 579–81, 583, 585–87, 589n, 590, 592n,
Cook, Lt. Col. Julian A.: 367 598–99, 603
INDEX 697
Corps, XIX: 334, 433 Descheneaux, Col. George L., Jr.: 138, 156, 167–68,
Corps, XX: 487–89, 493, 496, 508 171
Corps, provisional (Third Army) : 255 Deserters: 51, 60
Cota, Maj. Gen. Norman D.: 55, 180, 182, 184, 187– Desobry, Maj. William R.: 449, 452, 454
88, 190, 193, 199, 202, 203–06, 208, 210, 217–19, Devers, Lt. Gen. Jacob L.: 53, 424, 487, 611
225, 323–24, 327–28, 457–58, 460. See also In- Devine, Col. Mark: 136n, 137–39, 147–48, 150–51,
fantry Division, 28th. 162–63, 281
Counter Intelligence Corps: 240 Dickweiler: 241–45, 248, 251–52, 254, 257, 488
Courbiere, Major von: 638 Diekirch: 21, 43, 214, 216–19, 221, 223–27, 234–36,
Cowan, Pfc. Richard E.: 99n 312–13, 487, 501, 516
Craig, Lt. Col. William: 167n Dietrich, Generaloberst der Waffen–SSJosef “Sepp”:
Crete: 270 26, 31, 34, 75–77, 112, 120, 121, 262, 270, 435,
Croatian forces: 2 444, 578–79, 598, 603
Crombach: 407, 409, 414–16 Dillingen: 230, 495, 501, 505–46
Crossroads, tactical importance of: 43, 388, 511 Dillingham, Pvt. C. W.: 574n
Culin, Brig. Gen. Frank L., Jr.: 618, 643 Dinant: 42, 44, 75, 428, 433–35, 437–38, 440–41, 557,
Cureton, Capt R. W.: 219 561, 564, 566–67, 574
Currey, Pfc. Francis: 362 Distinguished Service Cross: 85n, 94n, 98n, 101n,
Custinne: 569–70 107n, 111, 116n, 117n, 119n, 132n, 149n, 155n,
167n, 198n, 209q 218n, 221, 225n, 234, 234n,
“D” Route: 81, 83, 91 247n, 285n, 300n, 319n, 340, 350, 362, 366, 367,
Dager, Brig. Gen. Holmes E.: 512, 514, 525–26, 553, 372n, 375, 419n, 439, 455n, 460n, 471n, 473n,
626 479n, 485n, 518n,521n, 523,529, 538n, 539,539n,
DAGGER (Operation) : 273 543, 544, 550, 550n, 555, 573, 574, 574n, 596n,
Dalessandro, Sgt. Peter J.: 134n 616n, 630n, 636n, 638n, 640n
Danahy, Lt. Col. Paul A.: 468 Distinguished Unit Citation: 93n, 100, 119n, 125n,
Daniel, Lt. Col. Derrill M.: 113, 129, 132, 132n, 133 268n, 318n
Darago, Pvt. Albert A.: 340 Divisions. See Airborne Divisions; Armored Divi-
Dasburg: 34, 174, 178–79, 183–84, 186–87, 198, sions; British units; German units; Infantry
204 Divisions.
Daun: 45, 293 Doan, Lt. Col. Leander L.: 582n
Davall, Lt. Col. Harold C.: 630, 633 Dochamps: 353–54, 358–59, 377, 380–86, 389–90
Davidson, Lt. Col. Henry E., Jr.: 243 Dolenc, Sgt. Eddie: 85, 85n
Dawson, Sgt. T. J.: 616n Dom Butgenbach: 113, 128, 130–33
Deception: 27, 50, 64, 67, 70, 73, 91, 98, I I I , 151–52, Donnange: 179, 187, 192
184m, 203, 228, 269–71, 361, 363, 379, 406, 489, Doster Farm: 497, 502
551, 558–59, 561, 571, 588–89. See also Cam- Douglas, Lt. Col. Robert H.: 85
ouflage; Surprise. Drauffelt: 181, 186, 207
Decker, Generalleutnant Karl: 614 Duffner, Col. Carl F.: 594
Deckert, Colonel: 476–77 Duggan, Lt. Col. Augustine: 281–82
Defense. See also Barrier lines; Obstacles. Dunham, Capt. Leland R.: 638n
blocking position: 107, 115, 175, 212, 229, 248, 369 Dupuis, Capt. Paul H.: 251, 251n
in depth: I28 Dupuy, Col. R. Ernest: 136n
linear: 139, 141, 239, 311 Durbuy: 318, 581, 591
perimeter: 165, 166, 193, 336, 380, 390, 409, 418 Duren: 26, 42, 58, 62, 433
“scratch forces”: 92, 97, 185, 202, 206, 221, 246, Dusseldorf: 58, 64
282, 286–87, 310, 314–15, 322–23, 328, 356, 392, Dwight, Capt. William: 554–55
397, 398, 460, 464, 513, 607
screening operations: 235, 236, 311, 327, 432–33 Earnest, Brig. Gen. Herbert L.: 524–25, 529, 609, 626
Defensive Battle in the West: 21, 26, 33, 49 Eastburn, Sgt. B. R.: 640n
Deifeld: 397–98 Eastern Front: 72, 173, 195, 239, 263, 293, 675. See
Del Grippo, Pfc. Daniel: 367 also Soviet offensives.
Echternach: 19, 44, 212, 213, 228, 240–43, 245, 247–
Dellen: 523, 540
51, 253–54, 256–57, 332, 482–83, 490, 492, 494,
Dellert, Lt. CoI. Howard C.: 543 496–97, 500, 503–04
Demolitions: 235, 250, 253, 254, 256, 316, 318–21, Echternach-Luxembourg road: 242, 249, 484, 491
322, 326, 329, 356, 669 Eddy, Maj. Gen. Manton S.: 485–86, 488, 490–92,
Dempwolff, Col. Hugo: 235–36, 501, 566 496, 503, 506, 508. See also XII Corps.
Denkert, Generalmajor Walter: 619, 646 Edingen: 242, 253
698 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE
Eibertingen: 81 Engineer Combat Groups-Continued
Eifel: 20, 39–40, 42–48, 50–51, 62, 64–65, 69, 74, 1107th: 271n
137, 141, 177, 178, 649. See also Schnee Eifel. 1111th: 267
Eigelscheid: 152–53 1128th: 271n, 310, 312–13, 317
Eisenborn: 257 Engineer General Service Regiments:
Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D.: 58, 412, 674. See also 341st: 332
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary 342d: 560
Forces (SHAEF) . 354th: 559
and Bradley-Montgomery command arrange- 366th: 560
ment: 424, 426 392d: 560
conferences with top commanders: 51, 53, 332, 1308th: 560
486–88, 509–10, 611, 612 1313th: 559
and constraints on General Patton: 485, 509 Engineer Light Equipment Company, 626th: 313
and differences with Montgomery on future strat- Engineer Light Ponton Company, 527th: 327
egy: 53, 333 Engineers: 123, 186, 267, 310, 327, 329, 329n, 351,
and possibility of German counteroffensive: 56 351n, 380, 545, 649. See also Barrier lines;
and reinforcements and the SHAEF Reserve: Bridging.
305–06, 332–34, 556 Epinal: 20
and rumored German plan for capture of: 270, Eppeldorf: 232, 235, 500–501
558 Erezée: 378, 591, 593–96, 598, 601–03
and T h i r d Army counterattack: 423, 509, 512, Erlenbusch, Lt. Col. Robert C.: 406
515, 610–12, 617 Ermsdorf: 226, 231–32, 234–35, 500
Ekman, Col. William E.: 351n, 352, 370–71, 581, Esch-sur-Sure: 545–47
599–600 Eschdorf: 520–22, 534, 536–37, 540–43, 543n, 544–45,
Elcherath: 159–60 Ettelbruck: 45, 214, 216, 218–19, 224–27, 236, 482-
Elsenborn: 77, 86, 104–07, 109, 112, 117–18, 120, 83, 489, 501, 516–17, 520–22, 532–35, 537, 540,
122, 126, 128, 270, 580 548, 628
Elsenborn ridge: 96, 103–04, 109, 112, 113, 115, Eupen: 42, 45, 77, 86–87, 89, 102, 120, 270–71, 274,
120, 122, 125, 133, 134, 374, 578–80, 603–04, 278, 335–36, 352, 579, 604, 669
611, 658 Euskirchen: 45, 62, 64, 65, 67
Elverfeldt, Brig. Gen.: 571 Euskirchen-Kall-EhrangTrier railroad: 68
Engeman, Maj. Leonard E.: 283 Evacuation: 99, 106, 222, 235, 250, 254, 300, 370,
Engineer Base Depot Company, 724th: 325 372n, 453, 609, 668, 674
Engineer Combat Battalions Ewell, Lt. Col. Julian J.: 307, 445–48, 448n, 449–51,
1st: 133 463
2d: 94 Ezell, Capt. Bert: 457, 457n, 514–15, 515n
4th: 244–45
35th: 313, 315, 325–26, 456–57, 462 Fairchild, Lt. Col. John C.: 199–200
44th: 206–10, 313 Fallschirm Armee Wagen (school) : 270
51st: 267–68, 268n, 318, 318n, 351, 355, 378, 379, Famenne Depression: 42, 44, 579
429–31, 436 Fanzel: 591, 594
81st: 151, 155, 165–66, 273, 403–05 Faymonville: 81, 147, 158
103d: 181–82, 192, 218 Ferry operations: 66, 215, 219, 253, 489
105th: 372n Feuerwalze: 657
158th: 299, 313, 315, 319, 319n, 321, 325, 355–56, Feulen: 518
429, 450–51 Fichtenhain: 26, 36
159th: 243, 250, 313, 484, 492 Fickessen, Maj. Jack W.: 379
168th: 273, 275, 277, 279, 283, 312, 331, 403 Field Artillery Battalions
178th: 515 5th: 130
202d: 266 14th: 434
249th: 544 15th: 109–10, 125
254th: 91, 94 22d: 554
291st: 263, 265, 268, 359 33d: 113, 129
299th: 312, 313, 315, 319, 322 37th: 110
309th: 437 38th: 125
324th: 101, 112 42d: 242,244
1278th: 315, 318–19 62d: 102
Engineer Combat Groups 90th: 538
1102d: 271n, 314 92d: 434
INDEX 699

Field Artillery Battalions–Continued Fighter Squadrons-Continued


102d: 523 402d: 419
107th: 214, 218–19, 221, 223, 226 430th: 592
108th: 214, 217–18, 221, 226 474th: 592n
109th: 182, 185, 188 485th: 419
113th: 375 506th: 337
118th: 338 512th: 474
176th: 252 513th: 474
177th: 552 514th: 474
188th: 388 Fisher, Lt. Col. Henry G.: 517, 538
196th: 88, 119 Fitzgerald, Lt. Col. Roy G.: 339
197th: 340–41, 365 Flak. See Antiaircraft, German.
212th: 630 Flame throwers: 187, 197, 573, 636
229th: 194, 196, 199–202, 205 Flamierge: 470-71, 474, 476, 644
253d: 554 Flamizoulle: 476-77, 479
285th: 261 Flares: 153, 156, 194, 210, 216, 301, 303, 321, 335,
314th: 516 340, 386, 405, 414, 421, 456, 589
315th: 537 Flohimont: 619-20
326th: 577 Fords: 316, 318, 321-22, 325, 356, 363, 369, 371
333d: 141n Forest of Ardennes: 40, 42
334th: 622 Forward observers: 94, 97, 98n, 119, 125, 152, 182,
370th: 97, 98n 196, 223, 241, 391
371st: 105 Foxhole lines: 94, 194, 196, 199, 256, 283, 328
559th: 141n, 658 Foy: 297, 301, 313, 400, 450, 455-56, 462, 463, 475
561st: 141n Foy-Notre Dame: 565, 567-69, 574
578th: 141n, 161 Fraiture: 388, 390-91, 581-82, 585, 588, 590, 599, 667
589th: 151, 155–56, 164, 166, 389 Francorchamps: 266, 337, 360
590th: 151, 164–66, 168 Frankland, Lt. Col. Ernest: 337
591st: 151, 153–54, 161 Fraser, Lt. Col. Harvey R.: 318, 355, 429
592d: 151, 155–56, 164 Frederick the Great: 9-10
687th: 193, 206, 209, 209n, 210, 219, 658 Freesland, Capt. Joseph: 153
740th: 141n, 314 French forces: 51, 560
755th: 459, 464, 478-79 Freyneux: 386, 582, 583, 585-87
770th: 141n, 400 Fridline, Maj. Gaylord D.: 168
771st: 141n, 324, 464 Friedman, Maj. Albert: 542
776th: 554 Führen: 214, 217-21, 223, 223n
905th: 519 Fuhrman Farm: 636-37
965th: 141n, 291, 398 Fuller, Col. Hurley E.: 179, 182, 184-85, 188, 190-91
969th: 309, 459, 464, 470 Fuller, Lt. Col. William H. G.: 283, 403-06
991st: 385
Field Artillery Groups Gaffey, Maj. Gen. Hugh J.: 512, 514, 524-25, 527,
193d: 629 530-32, 548, 551, 553, 627. See also Armored
333d: 323 Division, 4th.
402d: 327 Galhausen: 411, 414–15
406th: 132 Galland, Generalleutnant Adolf: 663
422d: 239 Gardner, Lt. Col. Glenn H.: 548
Fighter Command, IX: 171 Garvey, Capt. Jack J.: 116
Fighter Groups Gavin, Maj. Gen. James M.: 306-07, 336, 343–44,
362d: 541, 553 352, 367, 371, 390-91, 590, 599-600. See also
365th: 337 Airborne Division, 82d; Corps XVIII
366th: 92, 337 (Airborne).
370th: 418-19, 568-69, 573 Gay, Brig. Gen. Hobart R.: 488, 510n, 606n, 609
404th: 337 Gaynor, Capt. Paul F.: 225n
405th: 496 Gebert, Pfc. Jack: 366
Fighter Squadrons Geilenkirchen: 29, 176, 427, 428
377th: 548 Gemiind: 174, 178, 180, 186, 669
379th: 541 Gentingen: 216, 222, 534
389th: 92, 590 Gercke, General der Infanterie Rudolf: 66
390th: 92, 337 Gerimont: 620, 644
700 THE AR DENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
German Air Force. See Luftwaffe. German Units-Continued
German Army: 7–8, 13, 675 Corps-Continued
German General Staff: 6–7, 11, 18–20, 31, 49, 64, 76, X X X I X Panzer: 614, 619
128, 675 X L V I I Panzer: 174, 176-81, 194, 195, 198, 207,
German Navy ground troops: 8, 63, 143, 177, 215, 216, 298, 303-05, 317, 320-24, 328, 393, 435-
260 36, 443, 459, 465, 477, 511, 567, 570-71, 574,
German units 577, 619, 646, 667, 672
Army Groups XLVIII Panzer: 37
B : 21–24, 26, 29, 32–37, 49, 64, 68, 70, 71 ,73, LIII: 635
81, 82, 180, 474, 486, 604, 647, 650, 662 LVIII Panzer: 174, 194-96, 204, 272, 319-20,
664, 664n, 666, 674 329, 356-57, 359, 378, 380-82, 385, 393, 398,
Center: 7 400, 401, 417, 429, 456, 576, 580, 614, 657
G: 33, 35, 37, 482, 486 L X V I : 14245, 152, 156-57, 165, 168, 170, 175,
H. See Student. 187, 277-78, 283, 284, 292-93, 393, 396, 400-
Luettwitz: 614, 619 401, 403-04, 410, 414, 580
Student: 27, 33, 34, 37 LXVII Artillery (Corps Monschau) : 76, 86–
Armies 87, 89, 135, 579-80, 604, 669
Parachute: 208n LXXX: 212, 229, 240, 255-56, 482, 491, 494,
Replacement: 7, 37, 63 503, 506-07, 669
Reserve: 36 L X X X V : 181, 207, 212-13, 216, 255, 482, 522,
First: 37, 240 533-35, 537, 540
Fifth Panzer: 14, 14n, 15, 22, 25–26, 29, 33- 766th Volks Artillery: 178
34, 59, 67, 69, 75, 120, 135, 142, 143, 145, X C : 486
147, 173, 175, 175n, 176, 180, 213, 229, 264, Divisions
293n, 316, 317, 320, 323, 327, 356, 401, 428– Adolf Hitler: 76
29, 435, 441, 443–44, 454, 465, 474–75, 480, Brandenburg: 270n
482, 557, 563–65, 567, 574, 578, 580–81, 585, Grossdeutschland Panzer: 292-93, 401, 533,
591, 603–04, 613, 631, 642, 647, 649, 656, 545
657, 658, 667, 668, 669–72 Panzer Lehr: 37, 39, 174, 174n, 175, 178, 186,
Sixth SS Panzer: 16, 22, 25, 26, 29, 33, 37, 50, 207, 299-304, 320, 323, 325-26, 328-29, 429,
58–59, 62, 65, 67, 69, 73–77, 80–81, 86–87, 435-38, 440, 449-52, 454, 456-59, 463, 465-
89, 102, 112, 119–20, 123, 128, 130, 134–35, 66, 470, 565, 567, 569-70, 570n, 571-72,613,
145–47, 162, 175, 260, 269, 270, 278, 292, 621-23, 631, 643, 664, 665
293n, 332, 337, 339, 361, 369, 374, 401, 411, 1st SS Panzer: 76-77, 82, 90-91, 112, 120, 128,
428, 435, 444, 480, 563–64, 578–81, 590–91, 130, 133, 149n, 150, 175, 260-62, 264-66,
595, 598, 601, 603-05, 613, 623, 631, 649, 269, 278, 280, 282, 290, 314, 316, 318, 335,
656, 657, 667, 669-72, 675 338-39, 347, 359, 363, 366, 368-70, 372-74,
Seventh: 22, 25, 26, 29, 33-34, 50, 67-70, 75, 376–77, 393, 397, 443, 557, 560, 578, 580,
175-76, 212-13, 215, 218, 222, 226-27, 229, 590, 599-600, 605, 614, 619, 623-27, 631,
231-32, 235, 237, 240, 245, 251, 258, 262n, 635, 669
327, 465, 474, 482-83, 488, 494-95, 506, 511, 2d Panzer: 39, 144, 175, 177-78, 180, 183-84,
517, 519, 521-22, 532-33, 537, 540, 564, 606, 186-92, 264, 295, 298-99, 301-04, 317-18,
638, 641–42, 657, 659, 661, 669, 672 320-21, 323, 325, 357, 382, 390, 420, 428-30,
Fifteenth: 25, 29, 33-35, 59, 63, 69-71, 75, 579, 435-38, 440-41, 443, 448, 449, 452-55, 463,
603, 664n 563-65, 567-70, 570n, 571-72, 613, 672
Nineteenth: 25, 37 2d SS Panzer: 77, 382, 385-86, 388-90, 392,
Twenty-fifth (ghost) : 50 406, 412, 415, 420, 429, 574, 580-81, 583-84,
Corps 587, 590-93, 595, 598-99, 601, 667
Rothkirch: 537 3d Panzer Grenadier: 121, 133-35, 580, 604,
I SS Panzer: 76, 77, 80-82, 89, 90, 96, 120, 121, 614, 616, 619-21, 625, 644-46
129, 144, 147, 264, 272, 280, 369, 374, 400, 3d Parachute: 76, 77, 81-82, 85, 90, 130, 135,
580, 629, 631-32 145, 146–47 150, 163, 261, 264, 337, 339,
II SS Panzer: 77, 81, 130, 369, 374, 565, 580- 369, 374
82, 585, 590-91, 595, 599, 601, 657 5 t h Parachute: 186, 207-09, 213-17, 219-23,
X I I SS: 29, 32 322, 324, 327-28, 465, 470, 476, 480, 511,
XVII SS: 176 521, 529, 531, 533-35, 549, 555, 615, 642, 657
XXXVII: 356 9th Panzer: 474, 563-65, 567, 569, 571-72, 613
INDEX 701
German Units-Continued German Units-Continued
Divisions-Continued Brigades-Continued
9th SS Panzer: 74, 77, 290, 374, 393, 409, 418- 575-77, 580-81, 584-85, 599, 613-16, 619–
19, 580-81, 590, 592, 595, 598-99, 601, 603, 22, 631, 645-46, 671
619, 632, 671 Fuehrer Grenadier: 521-22, 530, 533-34, 536-
9th VG: 640–42 37, 540-41, 543-46, 614, 638, 641-42
10th SS Panzer: 35, 667, 671 11th Assault Gun: 214, 215, 528
11th Panzer: 671 15th Volks Werfer: 178
12th SS Panzer: 74, 76-77, 82, 90-91, 98, 115, 150th Panzer (Brandenburgei) : 270, 270n,
121-22, 125, 129-31, 133-34, 261, 264-65, 360-61, 363
369, 374, 578, 580, 598, 601, 619, 631-33, Regiments
667, 670 1st SS Panzer: 90, 105, 260, 339, 368, 377.
12th VG: 76, 81, 83, 92-93, 122, 130, 135, 260, See also Kampfgruppe Peiper.
604 2d SS Panzer Grenadier: 339, 343, 352, 588
15th Panzer Grenadier: 474-79, 563, 607, 615, 3d Panzer: 187, 191-92, 295-96, 386, 438, 452,
619, 644 456, 570, 583, 587, 592, 595, 597
17th Luftwaffe Feld: 623 4th Panzer Grenadier: 390-91, 583, 585-86,
17th SS Panzer Grenadier: 35 588-90, 595, 597
18th Air Force Field: 143 10th Panzer Grenadier: 572
18th VG: 80, 142–45, 150, 152, 154-55, 157, 12th SS Panzer: 131-32
162-63, 165, 277, 282-84, 292, 396, 403-04, 13th Parachute: 215, 222, 531
407-08, 418-19, 603 14th Parachute: 209, 215-16, 219, 222, 328,
21st Panzer: 33, 35 527, 552, 623-24, 635-36
26th VG: 145, 177-78, 180-82, 186-87, 191, 15th Parachute: 209,214-17,219,222,525,529,
207-08, 299, 301-02, 304, 323, 449-51, 454, 607, 637
456, 458-59, 463, 465-66, 470, 475, 480, 528, 16th Panzer: 358, 575
555, 615, 619, 632, 651, 657, 661 19th Panzer Grenadier: 599–601
49th Infantry: 35 25th Panzer Grenadier: 115, 129, 131, 601-02
62d VG: 143–45, 152-54, 157, 159-60, 284-85, 26th Panzer Grenadier: 133
292, 396, 402, 403, 407, 410-11, 414-15, 417, 27th, 12th VG Division: 83, 85,92, 94, 129, 604
420, 603 29th Panzer Grenadier: 134
79th VG: 522, 533–41 39th, 26th VG Division: 180-82, 186, 207, 323,
89th Infantry: 35 458-59, 470, 475, 478, 480, 615, 645
116th Panzer: 69, 153, 175, 195, 196, 198-202, 48th, 12th VG Division: 83, 85, 92, 94, 604
204, 291, 317-20, 354, 357-59, 378, 380-85, 60th Panzer Grenadier: 145, 153, 197-98, 358,
395, 397-98, 428-30, 435, 437, 441–42, 565, 380, 442, 575
567, 574, 577, 580, 661 77th, 26th VG Division: 180-82, 186, 301-02,
167th VG: 619, 623, 626, 631-32, 635
304, 456, 463, 476-78, 480, 645
212th VG: 213, 229, 239–40, 244-45, 248, 252-
78th, 26th VG Division: 180, 186, 301-02, 304,
53, 257-58, 484-85, 490-92, 494, 496, 499-
501, 503, 506, 507, 511, 669 456, 463, 475, 630
246th VG: 35, 76, 87, 604 89th, 12th VG Division: 122
272d V G : 90, 103 104th Panzer Grenadier: 615-16
276th V G : 213, 220, 222, 228-29, 231-32, 234- 115th. See Kampfgruppe 115th.
37, 240, 245, 256, 258, 483, 494-95, 501, 503- 156th, 116th Panzer Division: 197-99, 380–81
04, 50607, 511, 672 164th, 62d V G Division: 154, 159-60, 284, 292,
277th VG: 76, 80-83, 87, 94-98, 103, 115, 121, 397, 414
134, 135 182d Flak: 178
326th VG: 61, 76, 80, 87-89, 102-03, 119-20, 183d, 62d VG Division: 152-53, 161, 292, 403,
134-35 405
340th VG: 619, 632 190th, 62d V G Division: 152-54, 292, 397, 402,
352d VG: 213,215-16,218-20,222,224-27,235, 410, 414
236, 483, 511, 516, 520-22, 533-35, 537 208th, 79th VG Division: 534
560th VG: 195-96, 198, 204, 354, 358-59, 380, 212th, 79th V G Division: 534
382-86, 388-90, 395, 397-98, 574, 580-81, 266th, 79th V G Division: 538
583, 585, 592-93, 595, 598, 667 293d, 18th V G Division: 145, 154-55, 165, 168,
Brigades 292, 404, 418-19
Fuehrer Begleit: 170, 174, 174n, 175, 278, 292, 294th 18th VG Division: 80, 145-46, 150,
293n, 396, 401-04, 407-10, 416–21, 480, 533, 155-56, 162-63, 165, 277, 283, 292, 404-05
702 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
German Units-Continued German Units-Continued
Regiments-Continued Battalions-Continued
295th, 18th VG Division: 145–46, 150,292,396, 116th Panzer Reconnaissance: 356, 380-81
404 212th Fuesilier: 257, 484
304th Panzer Grenadier: 183, 187, 436, 438, 506th Panzer: 162
455, 570 519th Heavy Antitank: 393
316th, 212th V G Division: 240, 245, 251-53, 600th Army Engineer: 178
494 669th Ost: 168
320th, 212th V G Division: 240–44,247–48,251, 999th Penal: 494
253, 484, 494, 496 Detachments
352d, 246th V G Division: 604 501st SS Panzer: 260
423d, 212th V G Division: 240-43, 245, 254, Gerolstein: 623
256, 484, 494 Gerolstein Forest: 81
751st, 326th VG Division: 89, 103 Geronsweiler: 571
752d, 326th V G Division: 89 Gerow, Maj. Gen. Leonard T.: 53-54, 78, 103-04,
753d, 326th VG Division: 89, 119 120, 134, 330, 335, 339, 611. See also Corps, V.
901st Panzer Grenadier: 206, 304, 457, 463, Gersdorff, Generalmajor Rudolf Freiherr von: 212,
465, 471, 475-76, 480, 623 642
902d Panzer Grenadier: 207,299,304,326,437, Geyershof: 252
440, 456, 458-59, 463, 643 Gibb, Col. Frederick W.: 130
903d Panzer Grenadier: 438 Gilbreth, Col. Joseph H.: 295-97, 297n, 448, 473-74
914th, 352d V G Division: 216, 219-20, 222, Gilsdorf: 500-501
483, 516 Ginder, Col. Philip D.: 107
915th, 352d V G Division: 216–19,221-22, 225, Girst: 245
516, 520-23, 535 Givet: 21, 28, 42, 45, 69, 424, 426, 434, 439, 443, 557,
916th, 352d V G Division: 216, 218, 220-22, 559-61
225-26,483 Givry: 474, 476
986th, 276th V G Division: 229-31, 234 Gladding, Maj. Leon D.: 542
987th, 276th V G Division: 231, 236, 245–46, Glider Infantry Regiments
252, 504 325th: 346, 390-91, 581, 585, 590, 595-97
988th, 276th V G Division: 230, 232, 236, 484, 327th: 307, 456, 459, 462-64, 466-68, 470-72, 474,
499, 503-04, 507 478-80
989th, 277th VG Division: 96-98, 115-16 401st: 307
990th, 277th V G Division: 82, 96-98, 103, 119 Glider operations: 468, 609
991st, 277th V G Division: 97 Gniot, 1st Lt. Charles R.: 529
1128th, 560th VG Division: 198, 204, 357, 380, Goehbels, Reich Minister Joseph: 8, 8n, 63, 623
383 Goering, Reichsmarschall Hermann: 1, 72, 208n,
1129th, 560th VG Division: 383 672
1130th, 560th V G Division: 196, 199, 203-04, Corn, Maj. John W.: 243, 246
386, 398, 583 GOUVY:291, 395, 397-99, 401, 406
Kampfgruppen Gouvy Station: 286, 398-99
Bayer: 378, 380, 384 Gramm, Maj. Albert L.: 546
Krag: 420-21, 599, 602 Grand Halleux: 370, 373, 581
Kunkel: 324-25, 464-66 “Grand Slam”: 20
Peiper: 90-92, 260-61, 261n, 262-64, 264n, Grand Trisogne: 569
265-69, 307, 318, 335–43, 347-49, 351, 353, Grandménil: 381, 386, 583, 587, 590-97, 601
355, 359-60, 363-69, 372-77, 385, 401, 418, Greece: 2, 269
428, 578, 581, 599-600, 669, 670 “Green” troops: 55, 59, 90, 123, 141, 144, 154, 196,
115th: 474, 477-79, 644 198, 204, 523, 534, 591n, 592, 594
Battalions Greif (Operation) : 269-71, 360-61
3d Grenadier: 645 Grenades: 110, 111, 115, 128, 192, 218n, 224, 236,
5th Parachute Engineer: 214-15 253, 256, 303, 362, 367, 371
12th Fuesilier: 129 Grevenmacher: 34
18th V G Mobile: 277, 282, 292 Grevils-Brésil: 522, 534
18th VG Replacement: 143, 168 Grindhausen: 181
23d Festung: 245 Griswold, Lt. Col. George M.: 450-51
26th Reconnaissance: 302, 323-25, 476-77, 669 Grosbous: 226, 236, 520-23, 540-41
28th Panzer Engineer Battalion: 183 Grosskampenberg: 151, 153
INDEX 703
Grosslangenfeld: 138, 143, 166 Haute-Bodeux: 346
Grow, Maj. Gen. Robert W.: 607, 628-32, 634. See Haversin: 433
also Armored Division, 6th Havrenne: 440, 570-72
Grufflange: 291, 396-97, 402, 403n, 410, 414 Heath, Lt. Col. Calvin A.: 641
Guderian, Generaloberst Heinz: 1, 675 Hebronval: 401, 412
Guns. See Antiaircraft guns; Antitank guns; Artil- Heckhuscheid: 143, 152-54, 157, 159, 161, 197, 284
lery; Howitzers; Mortars; Tank destroyers; Hedree: 571
Tanks; Weapons Heerlen: 274, 603
Guns, British: 665 Heiderscheid: 508, 516-19, 522, 534-38, 540–41, 543,
Guns, German 545
multiple 20-mm: 185 Heiderscheidergrund: 518, 532, 536, 540, 543, 543n,
40-mm SP: 386 544–47
88-mm: 192, 302, 328, 653 Heilmann, Col. Ludwig: 207-09, 214-15, 322-23,
120-mm: 213 327-28, 529, 531
170-mm: 629 Heinerscheid: 175, 181, 184, 185, 188, 191, 198, 204
SP (assault): 71-72, 77, 156, 220, 235, 240, 328, Heinsberg: 53
528, 653 Heist, 1st Lt. Edgar C.: 485n
Hemmeres: 292
Habay-la-Neuve: 525 Hemroulle: 477-80
Habiemont: 343 Henbest, Lt. Col. Ross C.: 181, 188
Habscheid: 141 Hendrix, S/Sgt. James R.: 555
Haid: 436 Herbomont: 307
Haig: 674 Herborn: 240, 243, 247–48, 251-52
Haislip, Maj. Gen. Wade H.: 488 Herbstnebel (Plan) : 26
Halenfelder Wald: 164 Herdrick, 1st Lt. Lorenz: 149
Half-tracks: 184n, 210, 234 Herlong, Lt. Col. Robert: 341–42, 349
Hall, Capt. John W.: 233 Herresbach: 150, 162
Haller: 228-30, 232, 234, 236, 496, 499, 501, 503–44 Hertgrund (ravine) : 246
Hallerbach: 505 Herve: 42
Hallschlag: 137, 141 Heuem: 150, 163, 273, 277
Hamilton, Lt. Col. Paul: 541–43, 543n Heydte, Col. Friedrich A. Freiherr von der: 270-71,
Hamm Farm: 504 271n
Hampteau: 378, 431, 575, 577 Hickey, Brig. Gen. Doyle: 585, 587, 591-92, 601-02
Han: 382 Hierheck: 542
Hansen, Lt. Col. Harold D.: 361 Higgins, Brig. Gen. Gerald J.: 453, 455
Hardigny: 298-99 High Ardennes: 42–44
Hardt woods: 501, 503 Hightower, Lt. Col. John M.: 86, 94, 94n, 95, 105-06
Hardthof: 499, 503 Highway N4: 428, 431
Hargimont: 433, 436, 567, 569, 573 Highway N12: 294-96, 298-99, 445–448
Harlange: 209, 606, 625, 635-37, 642–43 Highway N15: See Liege-Bastogne highway.
Harmon, Maj. Gen. Ernest N.: 434, 440–41, 565-66,
Highway N26: 205n, 622
568-73, 591. See also Armored Division, 2d. Highway N28: 353-54, 385, 388-89, 413, 581
Harper, Col. Joseph H.: 307, 468 Highway N46: 319
Harper, Lt. Col. Ralph S.: 295-96
Hills
Harperscheid: 80
313: 243, 247, 250, 254, 257, 484, 496-97, 499, 501
Harrison, Lt. Col. Willard E.: 352
329: 250, 254, 256
Harrison, Brig. Gen. William K., Jr.: 335, 364-65, 402: 229
372-73, 376 490: 642
Harrold, Col. Thomas L.: 230, 233, 615 510: 450-52, 630
Harsin: 433, 436, 438 612: 151
Harspelt: 194, 197, 199, 203 Hillyard, Lt. Col. Harry: 568
Hartman, Lt. Col. William F.: 309
Harwick, Maj. Robert F.: 454-55 Himmler, Heinrich: 7, 263, 623
Hasbrouck, Brig. Gen. Robert W.: 273-75, 279, 282, Hinderhausen: 402, 407, 409, 416–17
285-90, 393, 395, 397-98, 400, 406-07, 411-15, Hinds, Col. Sidney R.: 572
418-21, 585, 593, 597. See also Armored Divi- Hines, Col. John L., Jr.: 628-29
sion, 7th. Hirschfelder, Col. Chester J.: 95, 105, 107
Hasselt: 426 Hitler, Adolf: 9-10, 12-15, 17, 64, 174n, 178, 292-93,
Hatfield, Sgt. Lawrence L.: 521n 482, 533, 580, 614, 651-52.
704 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Hitler-Continued Hohes Venn: 42, 44, 46, 76-77, 259, 270, 361, 368,
and assassination attempt, July 1944: 6-7, 11, 579, 670
292n Holies Venn (Operation) : 270-71
and capture of Antwerp as final objective: 2, 16- Hohwald (hill) : 499, 503
17, 19, 19n, 20, 22, 27, 28, 31, 75 Holbrook, Brig. Gen. Willard A., Jr.: 618
and the capture of Bastogne: 475, 475n, 477, 564, Holdingen: 395, 397
613, 647 Holland: 29, 48, 176, 274, 305, 334
and counteroffensive planning and timing: 19-24, Hollange: 548, 551
26-32, 33-39, 63, 68-72, 75, 135, 142, 173, 175, Hollerath: 89, 95-96, 98
195, 212, 435, 443, 486, 579, 603, 604, 656, 665, Holzheim: 148-51, 162
666, 668, 670, 671, Holzthum: 181-82, 185-86, 192-93, 207
decision for counteroffensive in the Ardennes: Homan, Maj. Sammie N.: 450
1-7, 10-18, 20, 39, 48, 673-75, 676 Homprk: 459, 470, 551, 607, 609, 613, 619, 623, 627
Fuehrer Conferences: 1-2, E n , 13, 21-22, 31 “Honeymoon Trail”: 611
and manpower “comb-out”: 8-9, 15, 63 Honsfeld: 81, 83, 90-91, 94, 162, 261
and Meuse bridgeheads as initial objective: 19, 22, Honsfelder Wald: 93, 106
69, 75, 563 Hoover, Lt. Col. Phillip F.: 161
and the 1940 Ardennes thrust: 18, 20, 38n, 40, Horrocks, Lt. Gen. Brian G.: 426, 557, 561
269 Horses: 40, 70, 82, 177, 194, 214, 215, 229, 260, 284,
and the OKW Reserve: 474, 671 292, 299, 396, 414, 665, 667, 668
and Operation Greif and Skorzeny: 269-70 Horthy, Admiral Miklós von Nagybánya: 270
orders to take no prisoners: 262, 262n Hoscheid: 181, 215, 219-23, 255
relationship with staff and field commanders: Hosdorf: 216, 218
6-7, 11, 14, 1618, 23-24, 30-32, 33, 35-36, 76, Hosinpen: 175. 180-82. 185-87, 192-93, 205, 207, 669
173, 402, 647, 675 Hospitals and hospital trains: 61, 223, 668
security measures for counteroffensive: 11, 15, 19, Hotton: 318, 339, 345–46, 353, 355-56, 371, 377-82,
21, 23, 48-51, 58, 61, 66, 70-71 383-86, 391, 401, 429-31, 566, 575-77, 581,
sole commander for counteroffensive: 11, 18, 30, 583, 587, 601. See also Soy-Hotton road.
57 Hotton-Marche road: 438, 441, 442, 565, 574-75,
turns attention from Ardennes: 673 581, 661
and use of paratroops: 269-70 Houffalize: 296, 306, 307, 312, 315-18, 320, 344, 345,
views on American-British co-operation: 12, 17, 18, 347, 352, 354, 356-57, 359, 381, 389-90, 393, 397,
671 401, 452, 605, 612, 617, 623, 647
Hitzfeld, General der Infanterie Otto: 76, 86-87, Houffalize-Bastogne road: 304, 307, 315, 317, 318,
604 319, 452, 456
Hobbs, Maj. Gen. Leland S.: 334-36, 341, 359, 363, Houmont: 620, 644
365-66, 371-74, 376, 401. See also Infantry Divi- Howitzers: 149, 164, 202, 204, 218, 221, 232, 251-52,
sion, 30th. 295, 297-98 387, 658, 659
Hodges, Lt. Gen. Courtney H.: 53, 306, 315, 344, pack: 308
411n, 424, 426-27, 433-34, 513, 566, 587, 610-12. 75-mm: 149
See also Army, First. 105-mm: 182, 186, 219, 239, 308, 466-67
and deployment of reinforcements: 305, 306, 331, 155-mm: 125, 156, 388, 398, 459-60, 478
333, 336, 346, 431, 565, 583 8-inch: 161, 281
and V Corps request for Wahlerscheid with- Howze, Col. Robert L., Jr.: 353, 378, 379, 382, 384
drawal: 103, 104, 330 Hoy, Lt. Col. Charles E.: 430
problems with the fall of Manhay: 590, 597 Hritsik, 2d Lt. Michael: 518, 518n
and St. Vith defense and withdrawal: 395, 406, Hubermont: 644, 646
412, 413, 443 Huddleston, 1st Lt. Jarrett M., Jr.: 159
Hodges, Capt. Preston C.: 378 Huebner, Maj. Gen. Clarence R.: 103, 443
Hodgson, Lt. Col. Reginald H.:291 Huldange: 205, 290
Hoecker, Generalleutnant Hans-Kurt: 623, 626 Hull, Pfc. S. E.: 640n
Humain: 433, 440–41, 565, 570-74
Hofen: 78-79, 87-89, 102-103, 119-20, 133, 134, 579
Hungarian forces: 2
Hoffmann-Schonborn, Generalmajor: 142, 396 Hunningen: 86, 92-95, 106, 126, 279-80, 282-83, 285,
Hogan, Lt. Col. Samuel M.: 353, 387 396, 404, 408
Hoge, Brig. Gen. William M.: 158-60, 273, 284-85, Hürtgen Forest: 26, 30, 42, 53, 55, 129, 179, 238
290, 392, 400, 406, 410, 412-15 Hustead, Maj. Charles L.: 454-55
Hogne: 431, 572, 574 Hutton, Col. Carl I.: 435n, 441, 572
INDEX 705
Hyduke, 1st Lt. Edward P.: 300-302, 448 Infantry Divisions—Continued
Huy: 25, 69, 264, 265, 342, 426, 434, 557, 561, 566, 30th—Continued
578 578, 580, 582n, 592, 597
moves south from Ninth Army area: 130,
Ihren Creek: 151, 167 269, 289, 333-35,427
Illuminating shell: 89, 128, 129, 130, 380, 602-03 35th: 486, 488-89, 539, 606, 606n, 607, 609, 624-27,
Imgenbroich: 102 629-30, 634-37, 642
Infantry: 239, 258 66th: 334
German/American strength ratio: 252, 650-51 75th: 73, 334, 385, 387-88, 427, 433-34, 442, 582,
German/American support weapons: 653, 654 591n, 594
Infantry Battalion, 99th: 359, 361 78th: 54, 103
Infantry Divisions 80th: 225, 483, 486-87, 489-90, 493
1st: 86, 129, 335 casualties: 517, 538, 548-49
casualties: 129, 133 command and organization: 490, 508, 510-12,
reinforces at Butgenbach: 113, 128, 130, 131, 515-16, 539
134, 360, 604 counterattack toward Bastogne: 515-21, 523,
2d: 55, 138-41, 156-57 532-41, 543n, 548, 609, 637
casualties: 104, 116, 123-24 83d: 55, 238-39, 574
command and organization: 54, 120 84th: 176, 571
defense of Rocherath-Krinkelt sector: 95, 98, casualties: 428, 577
105-12, 114-18, 120-25, 126-27, 128-29, 270, command and organization: 427, 431
604 operations on the Ourthe River line: 321,
Wahlerscheid attack and withdrawal: 54, 79- 379, 381, 427-42, 566, 570, 574, 577, 582n,
80, 82, 86, 87, 89, 91, 101-04, 107-12, 113, 585
158, 330, 335 87th: 334, 486, 612, 617-18, 621-22, 643-44
withdrawal to Elsenborn ridge: 131-34 95th: 489
4th: GO, 73, 458 99th: 54-56, 59, 73, 78-81, 126, 137, 138, 260,
casualties: 55, 252, 253, 258 330, 658
command and organization: 55, 238, 508 casualties: 98, 99, 106, 123
defense of the Sauer-Moselle sector: 213, 227, command and organization: 77-79
230, 231, 236, 238-58, 313, 484, 488, 490-94, defense of the northern shoulder: 80-102,
496, 499, 507-08, 511-12 104, 105-06, 107, 109, 111-13, 115, 117-20,
5th: 489-90, 490n, 492-94, 496-508 129, 131-34, 149, 150, 152, 161, 162, 270.
8th: 54 332, 335, 604
9th: 133-34 102d: 427
26th 104th: 334
casualties: 512 106th
command and organization: 488, 510-12 casualties: 166, 168, 421-22, 593
counterattack toward Bastogne: 515, 518, command and organization: 138, 205, 273-74,
520-23, 530, 532, 534-35, 537, 540-11, 543n, 395, 401
544-46, 606, 627, 63742 battle of the Schnee Eifel sector: 136, 136n,
28th: 59, 73, 137-38, 152, 157-58, 460, 519 145, 154-57, 161-71, 275, 282-84, 289, 292,
casualties: 55, 179, 179n, 192n, 193, 204, 210, 331
219, 220, 224, 421 initial attack of: 85, 120, 148-50, 152-54,
command and organization: 55, 179, 214, 290, 158-61, 196-97, 272, 274, 330, 658
309, 508, 522 St. Vith defense and withdrawal: 205, 273,
defense of the Our and Clerf crossings: 1 7 6 275-77, 281-84, 288, 290, 312, 331, 357,
77, 179-202, 203-06, 208-10, 279, 289, 294, 389, 392-93, 395, 401-02, 412-13, 583
312-15, 331 situation before the counteroffensive: 55, 59,
defense of the Sauer-Our sector: 213-27, 229, 60, 73, 137-41, 144, 144n, 145, 151-52,
241, 249, 488, 515, 521 194-95
operations in the VIII Corps barrier lines: Infantry Regiments
322-24, 38-28, 393, 457, 552, 607 2d: 489, 493, 497-99, 501, 503-04
30th 8th: 238, 246, 253, 262n
casualties: 340, 377 9th: 94-95, 101, 103-04, 106, 107-10, 110n, 115-17,
command and organization: 334-35, 342 122-23
engagement with Kampfgruppe Peiper north 10th: 489-90, 490n, 491-93, 496-97, 499, 501-04,
of the Amblève: 268-69, 335-45, 347-51, 506, 508
353, 359, 364, 366, 371, 374, 376-77, 401, 11th: 489-90, 493, 498-99, 502-06
706 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Infantry Regiments—Continued Infantry Regiments—Continued
12th: 213, 230, 238, 240-52, 254, 256-58, 484, 424th—Continued
490-92, 504 289, 290, 291, 393, 407, 410, 415-16, 418, 421,
16th: 130 590, 593
18th: 133, 134, 335 Infantry-tank-artillery teams: 124-25, 133, 185, 202,
22d: 238, 244, 248, 251-52, 257, 484, 494, 501 243, 249, 341, 375, 375, 460-61, 503 552, 625.
23d: 86, 92-94, 99-101, 104-06, 109, 115, 117, 122, See also Task Forces; Teams.
123, 140 Infiltration: 78, 93, 173, 175, 209, 231-32, 269, 290,
26th: 86, 113, 113n, 128-34, 313 297, 331
29th: 437, 561 Infrared: 178
38th: 103, 108-12, 115-18, 122-24 Ingendorf 226
39th: 134 Inspector General investigations: 136n, 166n, 263-
47th: 102, 133, 134 64, 589n
101st: 521, 544, 546-47, 638-42 Intelligence: 50, 157, 252, 255, 288, 292, 401, 511, 614
104th: 520-23, 541-43, 543n, 544-47, 638-41 from captured documents: 401, 527, 624, 667
109th: 179, 180, 185-87, 206, 213-23, 223n, 224- from civilians: 59, 351, 370
26, 227, 229, 231, 234, 236, 255, 258, 483, 488, concerning German counterattack intentions: 5-6,
500-501, 508, 515-16, 521, 621 56-57, 57n, 58-61, 61n, 62-63, 74, 80, 152, 180,
110th: 177, 179-92, 192n, 193, 195, 198-99, 205, 239, 333, 496, 668
208-11, 213, 216, 218, 219, 221, 295-96, 304, German: 13, 73-74, 112, 176, 216, 240, 255, 346n
327, 458 511, 515, 562, 579, 614, 614n
112th: 153, 154, 158-59, 179, 187-88, 193-202, from prisoners: 60-61, 332, 343, 374, 401, 406,
20346, 279, 289-90, 393, 395, 398, 407, 417-21, 442, 539, 558
583, 598-99, 602-03 from radio and telephone intercept: 73-74, 269,
117th: 335,337-39, 347-48,360, 363-64, 372, 373, 346n, 378, 449, 482, 666
377 from rail and vehicular activity: 59, 61-62, 144,
119th: 335-36, 339-45, 349-51, 364-65, 372-73 144n, 152, 194, 332
120th: 335-36, 359, 363, 372, 377 International Highway: 80-83, 95
134th: 609, 624, 626, 633, 635 Irwin, Maj. Gen. S. LeRoy: 489-92,496, 503, 506-08.
137th: 607, 609, 624-25, 635-37 See also Infantry Division, 5th.
289th: 587, 591-92, 594-96, 601-03 Irzyk, Maj. Albin: 528
290th: 388, 594 Isle-la-Hesse: 477, 480
317th: 517,535-36,538-39
Italian front: 3
318th: 516-17, 520, 531, 535, 539, 548-50, 550n,
Ives, Lt. Col. Hiram D.: 536
551, 607
319th: 516-19, 535-36. 538-39, 539n, 543-54
320th: 607, 609, 624, 636-37 ]abos. See Aircraft, fighter-bombers.
328th: 264n, 520-23, 541, 543-46, 639, 641-42 Jackman, 1st Lt. G. W.: 98n
329th: 647n Jacobs, Col. Ben R.: 520
333d: 431,433,436,438-39,575-76 Jameson, Capt. Joseph: 97
334th: 427, 430-31, 442, 575, 577 Jamodenne: 431
335th: 431, 433. 437, 442 Jansbach Creek: 97
345th: 621-22, 643 Jaques, Lt. Col. George: 552, 554-55
346th: 622, 643 Jemelle: 425, 433
347th: 643-44 Jenneville: 622, 645
393d: 80, 81, 83, 86, 90, 95-98, 98n, 99, 101, Jodenville: 620
106, 109, 115, 117, 120, 330 Jodl, Generaloberst Alfred: 1, 11, 12, 15, 23, 69
394th: 80-86, 90, 92-93, 95, 97-99, 101, 105-06, 75n, 444, 475, 562, 564, 671, 676
and planning for the counteroffensive: 16-17, 19-
117-18, 120, 330
21, 23, 27-28 33-35, 173, 212, 443, 665
395th: 79-80, 87-89, 95, 101-02, 107, 109, 112, relationship with Hitler: 11, 16-17, 27
117-19, 119n 120, 122 John, Generalleutnant Friedrich: 23
422d: 136n, 138, 141, 145, 151-52, 155-56, 161, Johnson, Col. Walter M. 335, 373
164-71, 282, 289 Jones, Maj. Gen. Alan W.: 138, 140. See also
423d: 136n, 138, 145, 151-52, 154-57, 159, 161, Infantry Division, 106th.
164-71, 282, 284, 289 and St. Vith operations and withdrawal: 205, 273,
424th: 136n 138, 140, 145, 151-54, 156, 158-61, 275, 276, 279, 285, 288, 289, 290, 294, 395, 407,
165, 197, 197n, 203, 205, 273, 279, 284, 285, 412, 413
INDEX 707
Jones, Maj. Gen. Alan W.—Continued Krag, Maj. Ernst: 601-02
and Schnee Eifel operations and withdrawal: 148, Krebs, General der Infanterie Hans: 21, 22, 26, 33,
150, 151, 156, 157, 158, 160, 161, 163, 167, 171, 672
331 Krefeld: 23, 53
Jones Pvt. J .W.: 218n Kreipe, General der Flieger Werner: 1
Jones, Lt. Col. Robert B.: 397-98 Krewinkel: 76, 81, 89, 138, 145-49, 261
Jordan, Capt. John W.: 349, 596 Krinkelt. See Rocherath-Krinkelt.
Joubiéval: 420-21 Krueger, Generaloberst Walter: 174, 175 194, 198,
Jülich: 50, 53, 87 319, 320, 356, 357, 359, 378, 380, 382, 429,
Junglinster: 240-41, 244, 493 456, 576-77
Juseret: 553 Kunkel, Major: 324
Kutak, Capt. Frank: 555
Kahler, Col. Hans-Joachim: 534 Kyll River: 45, 54
Kaiserslautern: 62
Kyllburg: 176
Kalborn: 194-95
Kalkesbach: 497 La Fosse: 595
Kall: 68 La Gleize: 268, 336-37, 339, 343, 346-49, 351, 359,
Kalterherberg: 87, 134 363-64, 366, 368-69, 371-73, 375-77, 443, 582n.
Kane, Lt. Col. Matthew W.: 354 592, 597, GOO, 605
Karsteter, Lt. Col. Burton W.: 615 La Neuville: 371
Kaschner, Generalmajor Erwin: 87, 102, 119, 120 La Roche: 44, 46, 287, 291, 316-18, 344, 346, 353-56,
Kassel: 67 358, 378, 380-82, 393, 400, 431, 433, 647, 662
Kaundorf: 547 637-39 La Roche-Salmchlteau road. See Highway N28.
Kautenbach: 222-23 Lagrew, Lt. Col. Embrey D.: 633
Kean, Maj. Gen. William G.: 393, 426, 565-66, 592n Lake Balaton: 673
Kehmen: 518-19, 523, 536-38 Lamm, 1st Lt. George D.: 419n GOO
Keitel, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm: 1, 11, 12, 19, Lammerding Generalleutnant Heinz: 583-84, 587,
19n, 22, 23, 676 590, 592, 595, 598
Kenan, Lt. Col. Thomas A.: 248 Lammersdorf: 54
Kennedy Lt. Col. Chester E.: 629 Lamormenil: 383, 386, 582, 583, 585-87
Kennedy, Capt. John J.: 113 Landrecis: 42
Kesselring, Generalfeldmarschall Albert: 3 Langhaeuser, Generalmajor Rudolf: 195
Kesternich: 54, 87 Lanzerath: 78, 80, 83, 85, 90, 138, 147-50, 260-61,
Kilburn, Brig. Gen. Charles S.: 560, 617-18, 621, 368
644-45. See also Armored Division, 11th. LaPrade, Lt. Col. James L.: 453-54
Kiley, Lieutenant: 514 Larochette (Fels) : 498
Kimbro, T / 4 Truman: 111 Lascheid: 175
Kingsley, Lt. John A.: 627 Lauchert Colonel Meinrad von: 177, 180, 191, 295,
Kinnard, Lt. Col. Harry W. O.: 472 298, 299, 302, 304, 317, 321, 382, 429-30, 437-38,
Kinney, Lt. Col. R. W.: 523 448, 449, 452, 454, 456, 567-70, 570n
Kittel, Generalmajor Frederich: 143, 153 Laudesfeld: 164
Kjeldseth, Lt. Col. Clarion J.: 206 Lauer, Maj. Gen. Walter E.: 77, 80, 85, 86, 90, 91,
Kleist: 40 93, 98, 101, 105, 109, 112, 113, 118, 118, 120.
Klinck, Lt. Col. Earl F.: 168 See also Infantry Division, 99th.
Kluge, Generalfeldmarschall Guenther von: 13, 24 Laughlin, Pfc. O. M.: 550
Kniess, General der Infanterie Baptist: 212, 533-34, Lausdorn: 194, 204, 205
537, 539 Lauterhorn: 241-43, 247, 250-51, 254, 257, 484, 496
Knives: 115, 336 Lavaselle: 620
Koblenz: 42, 45, 59, 64, 65, 662 Leach, Capt. James H.: 550n
Kobscheid: 138, 146, 148-50 Leake, 1st Lt. John L.: 241, 242, 256
Kochem: 45 Lee, Lt. Gen. John C. H.: 172, 559
Kokott, Generalmajor Heinz: 177, 180-81, 186, 301, Legler, Maj. Matthew L.: 97, 101
323-24, 449-50, 450n, 451-52, 458, 463, 465, Lkglise: 523
470, 474, 476-80, 527, 615, 616 Leidenhorn: 197
Kolb, Colonel: 641 Leignon: 435, 568
Kolinski, Sgt. J. C.: 251 Leiker, Capt. Victor C.: 232
Konz: 68 Leimerdelt draw: 501, 503
Konzen station: 87-88 Leinen, Pfc. John: 350
Kraemer, Brigadefuehrer der Waffen-SS Fritz: 591 Leipzig: 612
708 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Leithum: 205 Losses, Summary of—Continued
Lellingen: 187 28th Division delaying action before Bastogne:
Leo, 2d Lt. Samuel: 218n 210-12
Leonard, Maj. Gen. John W.: 225-27, 230 236. Louvain: 426
See also Armored Division, 9th. Lovelady, Lt. Col. William B.: 348
Lesse River: 44, 428, 434, 568, 572, 578, 613 Loveless, Col. Jay B.: 115
L’Homme River: 44, 428, 437, 572, 578 Lovio, Capt. Denny J.: 297
Liaison planes. See Artillery liaison planes. Lucht, General der Artillerie Walther: 142-45, 150,
Libramont: 45, 315, 322, 325, 326, 328, 618 157, 159, 175, 277, 283, 292-93, 396, 401, 404
Liefrange: 547, 637-38 Luckett, Col. James S.: 246, 253
Liege :19, 19n, 25, 27-29, 39, 40, 42, 44, 46, 75, 77, Ludendorff: 11, 48, 656, 665, 671
259, 260, 265, 312, 317, 341, 363, 385, 423, 425, Luettwitz, General der Panzertruppen Heinrich
426, 428, 443, 556-57, 560-61, 565-66, 578-79, Freiherr von: 174-80, 187, 298, 301, 303-04,
589-90, 654-55, 656n, 666, 668, 673 320-21, 323, 429, 436-38, 443, 452, 454, 456,
Liege River Belt: 655 458-59, 465, 468n, 474-75, 480, 567, 571-72, 574,
Liège-Bastogne highway (N15) : 268, 345, 352-54, 614, 6467, 667, 672
357, 377, 385, 389, 391-92, 458, 566, 581 Luftwaffe: 1, 18, 19, 22, 63, 64, 72, 142, 178-79,
Lieler: 187, 194, 196, 204 369, 374, 465, 478, 526, 632, 660, 663, 675
Lienne Creek: 268, 336, 342, 343, 345, 584, 590, 595 Luftwaffe ground troops: 8, 22, 63, 77, 143, 208,
Lierneux: 415 215, 260
Ligneuville: 261, 264-65, 360-61 Lullange: 294, 304
Limburg: 77 Lunéville: 14
Lindquist, Col. Roy E.: 581 Luther, Sgt. H. L.: 636n
Lindsey, Capt. Franklin P., Jr.: 415 Lutrebois: 606, 609, 619, 624-27, 629, 631, 634-35
Lines of communication, German: 272, 292, 339, Lutremange: 623, 625, 627, 635
342, 348, 351, 367, 369, 373, 393, 422, 517, 519, Lutzkampen: 26, 138, 153, 194-202
533, 540, 595, 606, 644, 662 Luxembourg: 20, 27, 4346, 238, 249, 257, 425, 488,
Lipperscheid: 219 490, 512
Littlejohn, Brig. Gen. Robert M.: 666 Luxembourg City: 43-45, 75, 180, 212, 214, 239,
Livarchamps: 607 240, 249, 306, 312, 313, 322, 331, 332, 424, 465,
Llewellyn, 2d Lt. S. D.: 119n 483, 486-90, 493, 511, 515, 607, 611
Logistics: 22, 63, 66, 68, 71-73, 661-68, 670. See also Luxembourg-Namur highway. See Highway N4.
Motor transport: Railroads; Supply. Luzery: 301, 449, 456
Lohse, Maj. Leslie A.: 416
Lommersweiler: 285, 292 Maastricht: 29, 53, 75, 274, 556, 561, 603
Longchamps: 455, 462, 478 Mabry, Lt. Col. George: 253, 262n
Longsdorf: 217-18, 220-21, 223 McAllister, Capt. Reid: 548
Longvilly: 296304, 313, 315, 317, 328, 448, 449-52, McAuliffe, Brig. Gen. Anthony C.: 306, 307, 309.
466 See also Airborne Division, 101st.
Longvilly-Bastogne road: 297, 450, 451, 607, 629 command of Bastogne sector: 445, 446n, 451,
Longwy: 20, 45, 487, 512 453-63, 467-68, 471-74, 514, 531, 555, 606-07
Lopez, Pfc. Jose M.: 100 reply to Bastogne surrender ultimatum: 468
Lorraine: 37, 178, 487, 512 McBride, Maj. Gen. Horace L.: 490, 512, 515, 517,
Losange: 626-27 519-20, 535, 537-39. See also Infantry Division,
80th.
Losheim: 83, 92, 139, 150, 260-61, 669
McCown, Maj. Hal D.: 343, 365
Losheim Gap: 45, 55, 78, 137-40, 142, 150, 260 McCoy, Lt. Col. Jim H.: 214
Losheimergraben: 80-81, 83, 85, 90, 92-94, 129 McDannel, Maj. C. F.: 626
Losses, summary of. See also Casualties. MacDonald, Col. John C.: 441, 571-72
Allied November offensive: 37, 51, 55 McGarity, Sgt. Vernon: 99n
Ardennes counteroffensive: 674 McGee, Capt. Robert: 106
defense of St. Vith: 421-22 McGeorge, Maj. K. T.: 348
defense of the Sauer River sector: 258 Machine guns: 88, 128, 141, 224, 273, 408, 436, 665
German, 1939-1944: 2, 6 Machine pistols: 156, 208, 654
initial attack on the northern shoulder: 123-24 Macht, 1st Lt. Walter D.: 340
matériel: 224, 376-77, 422, 574, 665, 674 McIntyre, Capt. Frederick J:: 99
Schnee Eifel encirclement: 170 Mackenzie, Col. Alexander J.: 101, 118
2d Division operations east of the Meuse: 574 McKenzie, Pfc. W. J.: 539
INDEX 709
McKinley, Lt. Col. William D.: 109, 116 Maubeuge: 39, 42
McLain, Maj. Gen. Raymond S.: 335 Maucke, Col. Wolfgang: 477, 479
MacSalka, Lt. Col. J . L.: 196 Maurer, Capt. Norman G.: 182
McVickar, Col. Lansing: 516 Mayen: 45, 69, 178
Mageret: 297, 299-304, 313, 448, 449-52, 454, 630, Mayes, Maj. J . L.: 149, 281
632 Means, Pfc. A. G.: 550n
Magerotte: 644-45 Mechanized forces: 40, 46, 59, 72, 173, 175, 551.
Maisons Lellingen: 251-52 See also Armor.
Maldingen: 396, 404, 410, 413, 415 Mechernich: 68
Malempré.: 354, 392, 583, 585-86, 588-90 Medal of Honor: 99n, 100, 110n, 111, 131n, 134n,
Malmédy: 42, 44, 45, 130, 163, 260, 261, 264-67, 362, 375, 387, 403n, 549, 555
270, 274, 278, 288, 335-37, 359-61, 363, 369, Medernach: 232, 234
374, 376-77, 377n, 395, 401, 413, 605, 610, 611, Medical aid: 99, 106, 166, 167, 168, 182, 223, 234n,
660 439, 455, 461, 467-68, 609, 668
Malmédy massacre: 260n, 261, 261n, 262-64 Medical Battalion, 331st: 166
Malscheid: 205 Melick Farm: 503
Mande-St. Etienne: 307, 461, 465, 474, 644, 646-47 Mendez, Lt. Col. Louis G.: 600
Manderfeld: 90, 139, 141, 145-50, 280, 368 Ménil: 576-77
Manderfeld ridge: 139-40, 148-50 Menzerath: 102
Manhay (crossroads) : 344, 34647, 352-54, 381, 383, Merlscheid: 147, 665
390-92, 443, 566, 581, 583-86, 586n, 587-89, Mersch: 45, 226, 229, 249
589n, 590-99, 601, 613 Mersch-Arlon road: 515
Mannerheim: 10 Merzig: 508, 516, 518, 520
Manpower, German: 6-9, 28, 63. See also Reinforce- Metz: 20, 30-31, 36-39, 63, 274, 465, 487-89, 508,
ments. 510-12, 520, 560, 606
Manstein, Generalfeldmarschall Fritz Erich von: 18 Metz, Pfc. Edwin W.: 596n
Manteuffel, General der Panzertruppen Hasso-Ec- Meuse River: 39, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 53, 259, 423,
card von: 19n, 26, 135, 380, 465, 612n 428, 434, 509, 556, 617
and the capture of Bastogne: 475, 475n, 563-64, German attack toward: 264, 264n, 265-67, 293,
613-14, 618-19, 623, 631-32, 647 298, 342, 368, 374, 381, 429, 435, 437, 440, 442,
and the Meuse advance: 293n, 401, 435, 437, 441, 443, 449, 454, 456, 459, 465, 475, 560, 562-64,
443-44, 454, 459, 564, 564n, 565, 567, 657, 667, 574, 578, 581, 590, 613, 651
671 initial counteroffensive objective: 19, 19n, 22, 25,
and tactical plans for the counteroffensive: 31, 75, 27, 28, 31, 38, 69, 75, 77, 149, 174, 176-77,
142, 173-76, 178, 180, 269n, 656 194-95, 556, 670
Map exercises: 176, 604 planned raids to seize crossings: 269, 360-61, 558,
Maps: 142, 260, 300 559n
Marche: 42, 45, 321, 378, 379, 382, 427-38, 442, protection of bridges: 433, 443, 557-61, 561n, 566
561, 565, 567, 571, 574-75, 577, 579, 591 strengthening of the defense: 426, 443, 482, 556-
Marche plateau: 475, 562, 564, 570, 579 63
Marche-Hampteau road: 442 Meyerode: 162
Marche-Rochefort road: 176, 436, 438, 440 Michamps: 633
Marcouray: 381, 384, 387, 593 Michelshof: 484-85, 492-94, 496
Markin, 2d Lt. W. D.: 98n Michin, Pvt. Bernard: 319n, 450
Marloie: 431, 433, 571 Middleton, Drew: 675
Marnach: 181, 183-85, 187-91, 204, 205 Middleton, Maj. Gen. Troy H.: 55-56, 488. See
Maroney, Maj. William J.: 214 also Corps, VIII.
Marquart, Pfc. Floyd P.: 645n concern over possible Meuse valley thrust: 556,
Marshall, General of the Army George C.: 56 560
Marshall, Brig. Gen. S. L. A.: 445n, 450n, 468n, and defense of Bastogne: 307, 319, 445-48, 448n,
479, 672 450, 452, 453, 457-58, 460, 460n, 461, 466, 470,
Martelange: 21, 315, 319, 322-23, 327-28, 465, 518, 524, 526
523, 525-26, 528-29, 533, 540 and defense of St. Vith: 205n, 273-75, 288, 290,
Martin (Plan): 23, 25-27, 34 400
Martinez, Capt. Gabriel R.: 550n and delaying actions before Bastogne: 206, 210n,
Marvie: 299, 451, 457, 462-63, 470-72, 474-75, 623, 225, 294-95, 300, 306-07, 309, 512-13
635, 642 and initial attacks on VIII Corps front: 157, 158,
Maspelt: 397 187, 190, 202, 236, 241, 295, 310, 312, 330-32
Matthews, Col. Church M.: 280, 280n and operations and counterattack on the south-
710 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Middleton, Maj. Gen. Troy H.—Continued Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L.—
ern shoulder: 243, 244, 249, 250, 607, 615, 617, 621, Continued
627, 630, 646 and orders for withdrawal of St. Vith defenders:
and preparation of barrier lines: 311-13, 315-17, 411-13, 597
322-23, 327, 329 and reinforcement of Meuse defense: 433-34, 443,
and the Schnee Eifel salient: 140, 161, 167 557-58, 56061, 561n
Mildren, Lt. Col. Frank T.: 109-10 and resumption of the offensive: 509, 610, 610n,
Military police: 275, 292, 307, 411 612
Miller, Lt. Col. A. A,: 358 Monty: 646-47
Miller, Lt. Victor L.: 100 Moody, Lt. Col. George K.: 490n
Millikin, Maj. Gen. John.: 510-11, 514, 516, 520, Moore, Maj. Norman A.: 83
523-24, 531-32, 544, 627-28, 631, 634, 642. See Morale: 141, 193, 250, 406, 467, 597, 672
also Corps, III. Morale, German: 4, 6, 235, 240, 551, 672
Mills, 1st Lt. A. L.: 149n Moressée: 431
Mills, Pfc. Richard: 119n Morhet: 553, 643-44, 646
Milton, Maj. Harold F.: 181, 209 Mormont: 596
Miltonberger, Col. Butler B.: 609 Morris, Maj. Gen. William H. H., Jr.: 225, 249,
Mine fields: 82, 127, 133, 134, 170, 183, 193, 210, 255, 258, 486. See also Armored Division, 10th
266, 280, 325-26, 349, 368, 375, 518 Morrow, 1st Lt. Jesse: 111
Mines: 109, 110, 123, 126-27, 141, 198, 226, 268, Mortars: 85, 132, 167, 196, 224, 399, 508
313, 316, 318, 322, 450, 503, 551, 643 4.2-in: 110
Model, Generalfeldmarschall Walter: 15, 292, 293n, 60-mm: 128, 131
401, 411, 437, 443, 474-75, 480, 579n, 580, 585, 81-mm: 89, 97, 110, 182, 224, 541
603, 604, 605, 643, 647, 672 German: 234, 386
as Commander in Chief West: 13, 24 Moselle railroad: 67, 662
and the Meuse advance: 563-64, 579, 657, 671, Moselle River: 40, 42-46, 55, 64, 74, 213, 238, 240,
673, 674 487, 496, 549
and order to capture Bastogne: 563, 613, 623, 632 Motor transport: 5, 72, 305, 657, 664-67, 671
and planning for the counteroffensive: 13, 26-27, Mud: 115, 126, 129, 164, 178, 222, 243, 252, 261,
29-36, 38-39, 49, 74, 77, 135n, 173, 212, 656, 661, 281, 299, 336, 407, 410, 416, 417, 454, 527
666, 670 Muesch: 68
relationship with Hitler and Rundstedt: 23-24, Mullerthal: 231-32, 236, 245-48, 250, 252, 253, 257,
24n, 27, 30-31, 564 497, 499, 502
saves Monschau from destruction: 86, 86n, 89 Mullins, Sgt. Oscar M.: 596n
and use of paratroops: 214-15, 270 Mnnchen-Gladbach: 64, 69
Moderscheid: 261 Münshausen: 181, 184-85, 188, 190, 192, 207
Moehring, Generalleutnant Kurt: 228-29, 231-32, Murray, Col. William S.: 607, 636
234-35 Mürringen: 86, 93-95, 105-06, 117, 122
Moestroff: 501 Mussolini: 270
Mohnke, SS-Oberfuehrer Wilhelm: 260, 369-70, Mützenich: 77, 87-88, 102
373-74, 376
Moircy: 325-26,438, 622,643 Nagle, Lt. Col. Frederick W.: 154
Moltke the Elder: 11, 20 Namur: 19, 45, 75, 174, 176, 298, 425, 426, 428-29,
Mompach: 240 433-34, 443, 556-57, 561, 566
Monschau: 19, 29, 42, 43, 45, 54, 64, 74, 76-78, Nancy: 20, 486, 488
86-89, 102, 103, 119-21, 133, 134, 271, 273, Napalm: 470
330, 332, 579, 603-04, 651, 658, 669 Napoleon: 10
Nazi party: 8, 31, 76, 128, 623
Monschau Forest; 54, 78-79
Nebelwerfer. See Rocket projectors.
Mont: 303, 449, 451
Neffe: 300-01, 303-04, 313, 326, 449-52, 456, 458,
Mont Rigi: 271 462, 463, 475, 623, 629-31
Mont Schumann: 637, 642 Neffe-Wardin road: 456
Montbtliard: 20 Negro troops: 210
Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L.: 53, Nelson, Col. Gustin M.: 193, 199, 202, 203-05, 290,
333, 411n, 487. See also Army Group, 21. 420, 583
command of Allied forces on the north flank: Nelson, 1st. Lt. Kenneth R.: 362
411, 413n, 423-24, 426-27, 565-66, 586, 586n, Nette River: 662
590, 603 Neubrueck: 410, 414
INDEX 711
Neufchâteau: 21, 40, 45, 46, 212, 288, 315, 322, 323, O’Hara, Lt. Col. James: 451
328, 400, 433, 457, 458, 465, 466n, 470, 487, Oise Intermediate Section: 305, 559
510-11, 524, 552, 617. See also Bastogne-Neuf- OKW Reserve: 15, 22, 27, 69-71, 178, 332, 444, 474,
château. road. 521, 533, 614, 667, 671
Neuhof: 80, 82, 93, 144 Operation Alsace: 20
Nidrum: 81 Operation Holland: 20
Nieder-Emmels: 402, 406 Operation Liège-Aachen: 20
Niedercolpach: 525 Operation Lorraine: 20
Niederfeulen: 516, 522 Operation Luxembourg: 20
Niederwampach: 299 Order of battle, Allied: 51, 53-56, 213, 650n
Niederweiss: 68 Order of battle, German: 7, 9, 33-37, 63, 69-70,
Night operations: 50, 61, 70-71, 77, 113, 115, 125-26, 71, 75-77, 81, 145, 174-75, 212-13, 650n
178, 191-92, 194, 219, 228, 296, 309, 357, 410, Ordnance Maintenance Battalion, 129th: 291, 317
434, 531, 601, 661 Ormont: 144
Nikiforov, Col. N.: 676 Orr, Lt. Col. William R.: 354, 383
Nives: 514 Ortheuville: 44, 318-21, 323, 325, 357, 429, 435, 458
Nocher: 193, 208, 640 Ortho: 317
Norris, Lt. Col. Jack K.: 117 Osterberg, Pfc. N. A.: 471n
Norway: 3, 15, 195 Osweiler: 241, 243, 245, 248, 251-52, 254, 257, 484,
“Norwegians.” See Infantry Battalion, 99th. 492, 496
Nothum: 545, 637-38, 64042 Oubourcy: 633
November offensive (Allied) : 30, 36-38, 49-50, 51, Ouellette, Maj. Albert A.: 170
54-55, 57, 68-70 Ouffet: 265
Noville: 141, 299, 304, 309, 317-21, 429, 449, 452-56, Our River: 44, 46, 55, 137, 146, 149, 156, 157, 161,
463, 472, 474, 647, 649 166-67, 179, 192, 194,272, 289, 331, 356, 398, 546
Noville-Bastogne road: 301, 449 Our River crossings: 137, 141, 142, 143, 148, 149,
Nugent, Maj. Gen. Richard E.: 424 158-60, 166, 174-80, 183, 185, 187, 195-98, 202,
Nungesser, Lt. Col. W. L.: 273, 283 203-04, 213-22, 279, 284, 314, 534-35, 657
“Nuts”: 468 Ouren: 174, 195-96, 198-202, 203-04
Ny: 594 Ourthe River: 42, 44, 46, 259, 287, 316, 326, 344,
353, 379, 380, 385, 387, 389, 428, 433, 435,
Ober-Emmels: 396 437, 564, 565, 567, 574, 580, 613-14, 621. See
Oberfeulen: 516 also Salm-Ourthe sector.
Oberhausen: 196 Ourthe River crossings: 25, 308, 315, 316-21, 326,
Oberlascheid: 151, 166-67, 169 355-57, 371, 378, 380, 382, 429-30, 433, 441, 577-
Oberwampach: 294, 301 79, 581, 591, 617
OB WEST: 11, 13, 21, 21n, 22-38, 49, 51, 68, 72-74,
120, 128, 232, 269, 378, 449, 464-65, 482, 562-63, Paderborn: 271
578, 601, 605, 614, 647, 655, 660, 671-73, 675. Palatinate: 49, 58
See also Rundstedt, Generalfeldmarschall Gerd Palladino, Lt. Col. Ralph A,: 520-21, 546-47
von. Palmaccio, 1st Lt. Charles P.: 474
Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL) : 1-2 Palmer, Brig. Gen. Williston B.: 565-66
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) : 1, 11, 13, Panel markers: 592n
21, 23-24, 27-29, 33-38, 48, 63, 69, 74, 142, Panic: 106, 116, 361, 377, 405
329, 374, 664, 668, 670. See also OKW Reserve. Panther tanks. See Tanks, German.
Oberkomnkando des Heeres (OKH): 1, 11, 40, 66 Panzerfausts: 231, 234, 365, 644. See also Bazookas.
O’Brien, Lt. Col. Robert E.: 87 Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, 456th: 370
Observation: 46, 144, 218, 221, 247, 331, 379. See Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, 463d: 479
also Farward observers. Parachute Infantry Battalion, 509th: 385, 392, 602
Obstacles: 82, 83, 88, 138, 144, 146, 159, 162, 186, Parachute Infantry Regiments
194, 196, 197, 198, 222, 253, 266-67, 316, 321, 501st: 303, 307, 309, 319, 445-48, 449-56, 459,
322, 325-26, 341, 349, 352, 359, 372, 416, 421, 462-63, 465
525, 669 502d: 307, 455, 462, 472, 478-79, 645, 645n
Odeigne: 386, 583-84, 587-88, 590, 647 504th: 345-46, 351-52, 366-67, 581
Oden, Lt. Col. Delk: 529 505th: 345-46, 351-52, 370-71, 373-74, 397, 581,
Odrimont: 600 599-600
Officers. See Casualties; Command; Tactical control. 506th: 307, 453, 455-56, 462-63, 472, 630
Officers, German: 143, 173, 177, 232, 240, 436. See 508th: 346, 419n, 420-21, 581, 600
also Casualties; German General Staff. 517th: 379, 381-82, 384-85, 594, 597
712 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF T H E BULGE
Parapacks: 172, 468, 609 POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants) —Continued
Paratroops, German: 214-15, 264n, 269-71, 271n, 374, 378, 468, 666-67. See also Shortages.
312, 558, 623 Pont: 280, 401
Parc Hotel (Berdorf) : 242, 247, 250, 256 Pope, Lt. Col. Lemuel E.: 572-73
Paris: 332, 424, 556, 559 Poteau: 279-82, 285-86, 290, 314, 393, 397, 407-09,
Parker, Maj. Arthur C. 111: 357, 389, 390 418-19
Parker, Lt. Harry: 97 Poteau-Vielsalm highway: 409, 413, 416, 418
Parker, Col. Hugh C.: 431 POZIT fuze. See Proximity fuze.
Parker, 1st Lt. R. A.: 117n Pratz: 520
“Parker’s Crossroads.” See Baraque de Fraiture. Presidential citation. See Distinguished Unit Cita-
Patch, Lt. Gen. Alexander M.: 53 tion.
Pathfinder teams: 468 Presser, Pvt. R. L.: 638n
Paton, Lt. Col. Walter J.: 328-29, 466 Prickett, Maj. Gen. Fay B.: 594
Patrols: 51, 80, 138, 144, 179, 194, 215, 216, 235, Priess, Generalleutnant der Waffen-SS H e r m a n :
389, 390 76, 121, 369, 374, 631-32
Patton, Lt. Gen. George S., Jr.: 14, 31, 55, 255, Prisoners
485, 490, 513, 532, 560. See also Army, Third. captured American: 170, 261, 325, 377, 403, 404
and “around the clock” attack to Bastogne: 475,
captured German: 197, 203, 226, 258, 286. 377,
526, 526n, 531 399, 503, 506, 555, 570, 574, 577, 609
and request for T h i r d Army assistance: 331, 333, orders to shoot: 261, 261n, 262, 262n, 263-64, 264n
334, 457, 486-89
Pronsfeld: 137, 141, 143, 154
and Rhine crossing as objective: 333, 485, 510, 613
Propaganda: 8, 12, 240, 674, 676
and Third Army counterattacks: 327, 509-10,
Proximity fuze: 361, 363, 375, 501, 504, 626, 654-56,
515-16, 524-26, 539, 606n, 607, 611-12, 614-15,
656n
627, 652
Paul, Lt. Col. Donald: 181, 184 Prüm: 45, 68, 137, 141, 143, 293, 403, 611
Paul, Maj. Gen. Willard S.: 511-12, 521-23, 541-42, Prüm River: 45, 613
544, 637-42. See also Infantry Division, 26th. Prümerherg: 405
Peale, Lt. Col. James N.: 546 Puett, Lt. Col. Joseph F.: 156, 165, 167
Pedley, Col. Timothy A., Jr.: 431, 576 Putscheid: 215
Peer, 1st Lt. E. L.: 221
Peiper, Obersturmbannfuehrer Joachim: 90, 260- Quartermaster Truck Company, 3967th: 358
61, 261n, 262-69, 337, 339-40, 342, 964, 365, Quatre-Vents: 530
367, 373, 376, 377, 600, 667 Quesada, Maj. Gen. Elwood R.: 424
Pennington, 2d Lt. G. F.: 638n
Pessoux: 441
Petit Coo: 375 Radio Luxembourg: 240
Petit Han: 594 Radios: 89, 96, 101, 117, 147, 154, 181, 184, 209,
Petit Thier: 282, 286 221, 240-41, 242-43, 249, 252, 254, 289, 332, 341,
Petite Trisogne: 569 369, 386, 434, 461, 602, 633, 654. See also
Phantom: 411n, 586n Intelligence.
Phelps, Sgt. Donald: 575 Radscheid: 165, 167
Philbeck, Maj. Tommie M.: 233 Rahier: 346
Phillips, Sgt. Webster: 625 Raids. See Sabotage.
Photo Reconnaissance Group, 10th: 61 Railroads: 5, 40, 4243, 61-62, 64-69, 660-63, 665,
Photo Reconnaissance Squadron, 30th: 61 668
Piburn, Brig. Gen. Edwin W.: 249 Ralingen: 240
Piersall, Sgt. T. E.: 119n Rambrouch: 521, 521n
Pillboxes: 199, 203-04 Rammeldange: 490, 490n
Pinsamont: 466n, 644-45 Ramscheid: 97
Pironprk: 643-44
Rath Hill: 112
Plank, Brig. Gen. Ewart C.: 561
Plankers, 1st Lt. Dewey: 92-93 Rations: 250, 668. See also Supply.
Planning, German: 19-36, 38,46, 75, 173-76, 194-95, Rau, 2d Lt. Frederick: 550n
212-13, 269-72, 656-57, 665-71. See also Hitler, Read, Col. George: 628-29
Adolf; Strategy; Tactical plans. Rechrival: 621, 644, 646
Plateau des Tailles: 44 Recht: 163, 272, 274, 279-81, 283, 285, 291, 339, 359,
POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants): 22, 38, 64-65, 369, 393, 397, 407-09, 418, 458
68, 72-73, 113, 260, 261, 265, 266-67, 358, 359, Recogne: 327, 463, 475
INDEX 713
Reconnaissance Troops Riley, Lt. Col. J. R.: 250, 257
4th: 244-45 Riley, Col. Lowell M.: 630, 632
26th: 520-21 Rimmer, Sgt. George P.: 630n
28th: 206 Ringel: 536, 538-39
30th: 335 Ringel Hill: 535, 538-39
83d: 353 Ringhuscheid: 180
99th: 79, 134 River crossings. See Bridges; Bridging; Ferry opera-
106th: 136n, 138, 151, 165-66 tions; Fords; rivers by name.
Red Cross: 461, 537 Roadblocks: 235, 253, 265, 266-67, 282, 291, 294-300,
Reed, Col. Charles H.: 499 304, 307, 317, 323, 324, 325, 341-42, 348, 354,
Reeves, Sgt. Woodrow W.: 149n 356, 359, 360, 361, 364, 382, 389, 392, 397, 408,
Regné.: 584-85 432, 445, 451, 452, 462, 466, 474. See also Bar-
Reichsbahn (German State Railroads). See Rail- rier lines; Obstacles.
roads. Roads and road nets: 42, 45, 51, 78, 80-81, 120-21,
Reid, Col. Alexander D.: 138, 153, 158-60 128, 137, 141, 176, 179-80, 187, 194, 258, 260,
Reims: 14, 305, 424, 556-57, 618 261, 267, 272, 280, 292, 306, 378, 389, 403, 407,
Reineke, Sgt. E. T.: 575 411, 412, 440, 445, 459, 509-11, 520, 540-41, 611,
Reinforcements: 55, 86, 129, 134, 157, 193, 214, 239, 657, 665, 670. See also Ardennes; Mud; Terrain.
243,266, 269, 288-89, 312, 327, 332-34, 369, 460, Robb, Air Marshal James M.: 424n
482, 511-13, 556-57, 674 Roberts, Cpl. Charles: 110
Reinforcements, German: 22, 37-38, 77, 177-78, 239, Roberts, Col. William: 300, 303, 309, 451-52, 454-55,
272, 339, 401, 494-95, 533 457, 460-61, 466, 468, 473, 474-75, 514
Reisdorf: 220, 231
Remagen: 67, 69 Robertson, Maj. Gen. Walter M.: 99, 101-04, 107,
107n, 108-09, 112, 118, 120, 125, 139, 140. See
Remagne: 614, 621, 643
also Infantry Division, 2d.
Remer, Col. Otto: 292, 292n, 293, 293n, 396, 402,
404, 407-09, 417, 584-85, 613-14, 619-20, 645-46 Robertville: 113
Remichampagne: 553, 633 Rochefort: 42, 44, 45, 428, 432-40, 442, 561, 567,
Remonfosse: 459, 624 569-72, 574, 579, 613, 647, 647n
Remonville: 552 Rocherath-Krinkelt: 78-79, 81, 86, 94-96, 98-102,
Remouchamps: 336 104-113, 115-29, 131, 133, 134, 270, 369, 603, 604
Rendulic, Generaloberst Dr. Lothar: 3 Rocket projectors: 19, 22, 70-72, 507, 652-53, 657
Replacements. See Reinforcements. Rodenhof: 484
Reserves: 56, 73, 244, 295, 310-11, 313, 331, 332, Roder: 175
405, 420, 424, 427, 670-71. See also SHAEF Rodt: 402, 407-09, 412, 416-18
Reserve. Roer River dams: 53, 63, 78-79, 140, 158, 273-74
Reserves, German: 36, 37, 38, 58, 68, 251, 277, 278, Roer River sector: 40, 53, 58, 62, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73,
671. See also OKW Reserve. 129, 269, 333, 334, 427, 664
Reuland: 490 Roermond: 25, 26, 64
Reuler: 185, 189-91 Roffe, Col. A. Worrell: 497, 504
Rhea, Lt. Col. Robert L.: 406, 589-90 Rogers, Sergeant: 569
Rheinbach: 68 Rogery: 418-19
Rheydt: 50 Rohren: 87, 89, 119
Rhine River: 15, 21, 30, 39, 40, 45, 50, 51, 57, 64-68, Rolle: 478
255, 333, 485, 486, 510, 557, 610, 613, 648, 662 Rollesbroich: 54
Rice Maj. Herman R., Jr.: 243 Rondu: 621
Richardson, Lt. Col. Walter B.: 391, 392 Rosborough, Lt. Col. James C.: 221
Richthofen: 39-40 Rose, Pfc. F. S.: 574n
Ridge 536: 168 Rose, Capt. L. K.: 295, 296
Ridgway, Maj. Gen. Matthew B.: 305-07, 365-66. Rose, Maj. Gen. Maurice: 346, 353-54, 377, 379,
See also Corps, XVIII (Airborne). 382, 385-88, 390-91, 442, 582, 592. See also
and operations on northwest front of First Army: Armored Division, 3d.
346, 366, 371, 376, 377, 379, 382, 385, 392, 395, Rosebaum, Col. Dwight A.: 286,409,585-87
401, 432-33, 583, 585, 590, 592-93, 597, 603, Rosenthal, Pfc. Paul C.: 153, 197n
612 Rossignol: 555
resumes command of XVIII Airborne Corps: 344 Rotation of troops: 238-39
and St. Vith withdrawal: 406-07, 412-13 Rötgen: 77, 431
Riggs, Lt. Col. Thomas J.. Jr.: 405 Roth: 137, 138, 141, 143, 146, 148-50, 155, 215, 217,
Riley, Col. Don: 80, 86, 95, 105 221, 534
714 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Rothkirch, General der Kavallerie Edwin Graf von: St. Vith—Continued
328, 637 initial reinforcements sent: 158, 159, 273, 274-79,
Roullingen: 640-42 288-89, 369
Royal Air Force: 65, 485, 660-62 location and tactical importance: 42, 44, 45, 46,
Group 83: 569 137, 141, 205n, 272, 312, 458
2d Tactical Air Force: 424, 661 traffic control problems: 158, 164, 275-77, 279,
“Rubber duck” operation: 73 281, 292
Rubel, Lt. Col. George K.: 342 St. Vith–Bastogne highway. See Highway N12.
Rudder, Lt. Col. James E.: 214, 217-20, 223, 225-26 St. Vith–Diekirch highway: 179, 181-82, 184-85, 188,
Ruhr: 12, 17, 18, 21, 25, 36, 49, 53, 58 192, 219
Rumanian forces: 2 St. Vith–La Roche highway. See Highway N28.
Rumors: 61, 108, 257, 263-64, 280, 296, 316, 320, 327, St. Vith–Schonberg road: 150, 156, 157, 162, 167,
345, 356, 363, 374, 377, 493n, 520, 558-59, 561 272-73, 275, 277, 279, 283, 292, 332, 396, 403-05
Rundstedt, Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von: 3, 11, St. Vith–Vielsalm road: 164, 286, 292, 402, 407, 409,
15, 19n, 21, 58, 443, 605. See also OB WEST. 417
and fear of Allied air intelligence: 61, 73 Salle: 319, 321
order to capture Bastogne: 464-65, 613-14, 647 Salm River: 44, 259
and the Meuse advance: 563-64, 579, 670, 673, 674 Salm River crossings: 267, 268, 336, 344, 347, 352,
and planning for the counteroffensive: 20, 23-31, 367, 369, 370, 373, 376, 377, 401, 407, 409, 412-
33-38, 49, 57, 69, 74, 135n 13, 415-17, 419-21, 578-79, 581, 590, 595, 597,
recalled as Commander in Chief West: 14, 23-24 599-600, 604
relationship with Hitler and German General Salm-Ourthe sector: 580-81, 590-91, 599, 601, 603
Staff: 14, 19-20, 23-24, 24n, 27-31, 33, 564, 647, Salmchlteau: 287, 357, 359, 412, 413, 415-21, 581,
671, 675 584, 598-99, 601
reputation as a soldier: 23, 57-58
Sambre River: 428
“Rundstedt Offensive”: 20
Samrée: 353-54, 356-59, 377-78, 380-82, 389, 397,
Rush, Pfc. W. S.: 198n
399, 400, 401, 429
Ryan, Col. John L., Jr.: 280n, 282, 400, 413
Ryerson, Capt. William F.: 300-303, 448, 454 Sart-lez-St. Vith: 402
Sauer River: 44, 46, 55, 234, 238, 240, 243, 256, 257,
Saar River sector: 51, 62, 482, 485-87, 489, 513, 618 485, 488, 532, 539
Saarbrucken: 36 Sauer River crossings: 213, 214, 216, 218, 220, 224,
Saarlautern: 488-89 225, 227, 229-30, 232, 236, 241-42, 245, 249, 252,
Sabotage: 269, 461, 558-59, 559n, 561 258, 470, 491, 495, 500, 504-06, 508, 535, 537-40,
“Sad Sack Affair”: 601 613, 672
Sadzot: 601-02 Sauer-Moselle sector: 492-508
Sagaser, Maj. Wray F.: 620 Sauer-Our triangle sector: 214, 216, 218, 220-22,
Sainlez: 607 227-30
St. Avold: 512 Savelborn: 232-34, 494, 496
St. Hubert: 319, 321, 322, 325-26, 329, 382, 400, 428, Saverne Gap: 37, 50, 53
433, 437, 459, 487, 622, 643, 647 Savy: 480
St. Trond: 426 Sawmills: 267, 312, 313, 318
St. Vith: 487, 510, 515, 580, 605, 611-12, 627, 662 Schalles, Capt. John W.: 231n
accomplishments and losses of the defenders: 422 Scheidel: 538
artillery support: 277, 279, 283, 291, 396, 398-402, Scheidgen: 245, 247-52, 254,484-85, 491-92, 497, 501
417 Schelde estuary: 25
capture important to German plans: 142, 143, Schieren: 488
152, 175, 272, 277-78, 401-04, 580, 670 Schlammbach: 240
capture of and withdrawal operations: 385, 392, Schlausenbach: 151, 155-56, 166
405-13, 417, 421, 443, 581, 582, 585, 593, 597, Schleiden : 68
598-99
Schlieffen: 11, 13, 39-40, 170
command post of 106th Division: 148, 152, 158,
161, 164, 171, 281, 285, 331 Schmidt: 193
delaying actions before: 160, 163-64, 166, 171, 273, Schmidt, Generalmajor Erich: 215, 225, 516
275, 277, 306, 316, 389 Schnee Eifel: 40, 42, 45, 55-56, 136-45, 151, 154-55,
German occupation of: 407, 410-11, 414, 417, 421 157, 161, 165-66, 168, 170-71, 175, 260, 272, 275,
initial attack, and perimeter defense: 193, 205, 283, 284, 292, 389, 411
265, 272-73, 279-92, 306, 329, 366, 371, 393, 395, Schonberg: 141-43, 150, 156-59, 162-70, 272, 275,
396-405, 423, 480 277, 283, 285, 289, 292
INDEX 715
Schoppen: 81, 91, 133, 261 Shortages, German—Continued
Schramm, Maj. Percy E.: 16, 20 signal equipment: 72, 215
Schroeder, Lt. Col. Frederic: 393 spare parts: 72, 664
Schumann crossroads: 640 tank retrievers: 72, 664
Schuster, Dr.: 22 tanks: 1, 664
Schwartz, Sgt. I. R.: 132n transport: 72, 178, 195, 214, 657, 664-67, 671
Schwarz Erntz gorge: 229-32, 245, 249-50, 252-53, Sibret: 208-09, 322-25, 327-28, 454, 457, 459, 464,
494-97, 499 465, 553-54, 613, 615-16, 619-20, 645
Scott, Lt. Col. Jean D.: 95, 99 Sierck: 44
Scott, Maj. W. J.: 278 Silesia: 12
Scott, Col. Walter T.: 546, 641 Simmerath: 25, 77, 90
Scratch forces. See Defense. Simpson, Lt. Gen. William H.: 53, 305, 333-34, 424,
Seamon, Pvt.: 340 427. See also Army, Ninth.
Searchlights: 61-62, 82, 89, 96, 126, 156, 159, 195-96,
Sink, Col. Robert F.: 307, 453, 463
196n, 199, 209, 225, 245, 301, 654-55, 657
Sinzig: 45
Sedan: 327, 428, 556, 560
Sittard: 28, 29
Seeley, Lt. Col. George W.: 160
Skaggs, Col. Leland W.: 123
Seitz, Col. John F. R.: 113
Skorzeny, Lt. Col. Otto: 270, 270n, 360-61, 363
Semois River: 21, 42, 44, 75, 327, 560
“Skyline Drive”. See St. Vith–Diekirch highway.
Senonchamps: 324-25, 464, 466, 468, 470-71, 475,
477, 616, 619, 646 Slayden, Lt. Col. W. M.: 158, 273
Small arms: 128, 197, 210, 224, 242, 350, 379, 551,
Sensfuss, Generalmajor Franz: 239, 248, 257, 494, 654
499-500
Seny: 265 “Small Solution”: 27-28, 30-31, 38, 613
Setz: 275, 277, 292 Smith, Col. Douglas B.: 591
Sevenig: 194-96, 198-99, 398 Smith, Pfc. R. D.: 98n
SHAEF. See Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expedi- Smith, Capt. Robert W.: 538n
tionary Forces. Smith, Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell: 306, 423-24, 611-12
SHAEF Reserve: 305-06, 333-34, 336, 611-12, 618 Smoke, tactical use of: 83, 102, 110, 134, 168, 223,
Shanley, Lt. Col. Thomas: 600 250, 284, 295, 365, 383, 439, 497, 503, 528, 584,
Shay, Sgt. M. N.: 300n 633
Sherburne, Col. Thomas L., Jr.: 307 Snoad, T/Sgt. Russell N.: 375
Sherman tanks. See Tanks, medium. Soderman, Pfc. William A.: 110n
Shinn, Capt. Roger L.: 231n Solis, Maj. Paul J.: 266
Shipley, Lt. Col. Alden: 501 Sonne: 462
Shortages Sorinne: 568
ammunition: 141, 166, 168, 184-85, 188, 192, 208- Soviet offensives: 2-3, 7, 12, 38, 57, 675-76
09, 219, 220, 341, 467 SOY:353, 378-81, 384-85, 386, 581
antitank mines: 141, 664 Soy-Hotton road: 378-79, 381-84, 386, 441, 582, 585,
BAR’S: 129 593-94, 598
bazooka rounds: 141, 664 Spa: 42, 44, 259, 260, 265, 268, 307, 331, 336, 341-42,
gasoline: 208, 224, 384, 387 348, 349, 351, 385, 393, 424, 667, 670
grenade launchers: 129 Spaatz, General Carl: 377n
medical supplies: 166, 384, 467 Special Air Services (British) : 557
medium tanks: 513 Special troops: 73
rations: 166, 220 Speer Reich Minister Albert: 4, 5, 9, 13
replacements: 239, 332, 513 Spriggs, Capt. Robert E.: 318
tank crews: 513 Sprimont: 320, 341
Shortages, German SS troops: 75-76, 108, 135, 263-64, 264n, 411, 520,
ammunition: 1, 68, 72-73, 258, 369, 531, 595, 664 623, 668
antitank guns: 72 Stadtkyll: 68, 144, 272
assault guns: 77, 654 Stalin: 676
bridging equipment: 222, 226, 235, 258, 357 Standish, Lt. Col. Miles L.: 250
engineers and equipment: 72, 77 Statler, Cpl. C. E.: 149n
heavy weapons: 1, 215, 247, 258 Stavelot: 47, 260, 264-68, 274, 278, 280, 335-39, 347-
POL: 63, 64, 72-73, 204, 267, 271, 321, 338-39, 48, 351, 359-61, 363-64, 368, 369, 374, 376, 395,
342, 348, 367-69, 390, 420, 429, 435, 442, 564, 401, 581, 660, 667, 670
568-69, 583, 664, 667 Stegen: 226, 234, 236
prime movers: 72, 657 Steinbach: 315
716 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Steinebriick: 141-43, 151, 153, 155, 158-60, 279, 284- Tactical Air Commands
85, 292 IX: 61, 171, 337, 424, 568, 592n, 660-61
Stephens, Col. Richard W.: 339, 341 XIX: 61, 424, 474, 496, 526, 625, 634, 661
Ster: 372 XXIX: 337, 424, 661
Stokes, Col. John H., Jr.: 107, 122 Tactical control: 91, 99, 111, 117-18, 166, 168, 196,
Stolzembourg: 177, 213, 215 208-09, 289, 297, 304, 411, 419, 425, 492, 497-98,
Stone, Lt. Col. Robert O.: 286, 398-99 589
Stoumont: 128, 268, 336, 339-43, 346-49, 351, 359, Tactical plans: 139-40, 385, 423, 427, 487, 493, 509-
363-66, 368-69, 371-74, 377 12, 515, 611-12, 612n
Stoumont Station: 341-42 Tactical plans, German: 86-87, 95-96, 128, 142-45,
Stragglers. See Defense, scratch forces.
152, 156-57, 177-79, 195, 198, 214-15, 229, 240,
Strasbourg: 51
292-93, 323-24, 381-82, 401-04, 476-77, 581
Strategy, Allied: 48, 51, 58, 605
bulge containment doctrine: 334, 480, 611 Tactical Reconnaissance Group, 67th: 61-62
controversy re Rhineland drive: 53, 610, 610n Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, 109th : 337
transportation vs. oil as air targets: 65 Tactics, German. See also Infiltration; Sabotage.
Strategy, German: 170. See also Planning. armored vs. infantry spearheads: 76-77, 81, 122,
strategic surprise: 48, 51, 330, 668 177
war on two fronts: 11-13, 28, 38, 675-76 bypass of defended towns: 175-76, 181, 186, 209,
Strickler, Col. Daniel: 193, 208, 209, 209n 215, 216, 258
Strong, Maj. Gen. Kenneth W. D.: 423, 509 close formation and frontal attacks: 197, 199, 211,
Student, Generaloberst Kurt: 208 397
Sugg, Col. Douglas: 622 disregard for flank security: 175-76, 212-13, 264,
Supply: 3, 461, 560, 665-66. See also Air supply; 322, 369, 380, 437-38, 475, 578-79
Ammunition; Lines of communication; Logis- penetration along boundary lines: 198, 330, 388,
tics; POL; Shortages. 442, 659
depots and dumps: 113, 152, 259-60, 265, 266, piecemeal troop employment: 277, 331, 348, 401,
286, 355-58, 398-99, 666 456, 574
German: 255-56, 321, 495, 665 Tadler: 518, 536, 538
rationing: 399-401 Tandel: 217-18, 220, 223
resupply problems: 141, 194, 222, 235, 370, 407, Tank Battalions
412 2d: 190, 294-96, 298n
Supreme Allied Commander. See Eisenhower, Gen. 3d: 300, 303
Dwight D. 8th: 513-14, 526, 548
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary 9th: 528
Forces (SHAEF): 58, 62, 63, 65, 171-72, 423, 509, 14th: 159-60, 283, 392, 585
55657, 610-11, 673. See also Eisenhower, Gen. 15th: 633
Dwight D.; SHAEF Reserve. 17th: 279-80, 291, 406
Sure River: 44, 322, 331, 501, 508, 510, 520 19th: 230-31, 233, 244, 245, 248, 616n
Sure River crossings: 215, 517-18, 521-23, 525-26, 22d: 620
532-33, 535-47, 606-07, 627-28, 636, 637-38, 642, 31st: 282-83, 406
659, 669 35th: 529, 627
Surprise (tactical) : 19, 143, 145, 176, 180, 182, 195- 37th: 530, 552, 554-55
96, 241, 242, 248-49, 251, 264-65, 269, 391, 402- 40th: 286, 291, 588
03, 434, 477, 516, 624. See also Strategy, 41st: 620
German. 42d: 621
Surré.: 607 68th: 630, 632-33
Surrender operations: 149, 166, 168, 170, 192, 193, 69th: 629-30, 632
257 70th: 239, 243, 245-47, 258, 485n
Surrender ultimatums: 183, 387, 468 702d: 518
Susteren: 29 707th: 182, 184-91, 199, 206-08, 217-20, 222, 313
Sutherland, Col. Edward M.: 336, 339-42 735th: 489, 521, 523
Sutton, Lt. Col. Richard D.: 643 737th: 497, 503
Swift, Capt. Vaughn: 543 740th: 341-42, 349, 360, 365, 372
Symbol, Lt. Col. Paul H.: 325, 456 741s: 100, 113n, 115-16, 123, 125
743d: 338, 340-41, 363
745th: 113n
Tabets, Lt. Col. Sam: 319, 450 771st: 431, 442, 575
INDEX 717
Tank Destroyer Battalions Tanks, German—Continued
602d: 327 Mark V I (King Tiger) : 66, 652
609th: 452, 471, 474 Tarchamps: 625
612th: 87, 91, 113, 115, 119 Targnon: 341-42, 349
613th: 133 Task Forces. See also Teams.
629th: 596n A (CCB, 2d Armored Division) : 568-69
630th: 181, 183, 191, 199, 206, 218,221,296, 323-24 B (CCB, 2d Armored Division) : 568
634th: 113n, 132 Blue: 621
638th: 437 Booth: 298-99
643d: 384, 390 Boylan: 416-17, 419
644th: 91, 104. 109, 111, 115, 123, 126 Brewster: 392, 584-87, 589-90
654th: 626 Brown: 634
701st: 627 Caraway: 322
703d: 113n Chamberlain: 249, 253, 255, 483
704th: 551 Collins: 615-16, 619-20
705th: 308-09, 317-19, 453, 455, 456, 458, 460, 472, Doan: 582n
474,479 Erlenbusch: 406,416
801st: 91, 94, 113n, 115, 126 Ezell: 457, 514-15
802d: 239 Hall: 233-34
803d: 239, 246 Hamilton: 541-44
811th: 159, 199, 230-31, 283, 298, 301-02 Harper: 295-96, 299
814th: 287, 396-97, 405 Harrison: 364, 372-73, 376
818th: 489, 523
Hogan: 353, 378, 380-81, 384, 387, 593, 593n
820th: 136n, 138, 140, 145, 147, 151, 153, 166, 281 Jones: 397-400, 406, 417-21, 599
823d: 337, 339-40, 360 Jordan: 349, 364
893d: 88 Kane: 354, 381, 383-84, 386, 390-91, 583-84, 587,
Tank Destroyer Group, 7th: 327 591
Tank destroyers: 119, 153, 321, 379, 396, 405, 453,
Karsteter: 615-16, 621
455, 660
Lindsey: 415, 417
76-mm SP: 230, 236, 309, 328
Lohse: 416-17
German: 645, 654
Lovelady: 348, 351, 364, 370, 372, 376
self-propelled: 126, 132-33, 191, 199, 653
Luckett: 246, 248, 250, 253
towed: 94, 126, 138, 147, 191, 199, 266, 337, 340,
Lyon: 515
653
McGeorge: 348, 364, 373, 592, 592n, 596
Tanks: 223, 372, 513, 633. See also Armor.
Mayes: 149-50, 281
Crocodile (flame-throwing): 573
Navaho: 282n
guns: 652
Orr: 354, 377-78, 380-81, 383, 386, 389, 391, 582,
Jumbo: 503, 525, 652
585, 593, 601
light: 89, 146, 188, 302
losses: 125, 188, 190, 234, 296, 364, 384, 386, 405, Pat: 620, 644, 646
513, 574, 647, 664 Philbeck: 233
medium: 116, 125-26, 190-91, 192, 239, 283, 296, Poker: 620-21, 644, 646
302, 341, 405, 408-09, 466, 525, 583, 651-52, 664 Richardson: 383, 391-92, 591
tank duels: 100, 125, 190, 193, 302, 366, 409, 652 Riley: 250-51, 253-54, 257
used for resupply and evacuation: 222, 254, 340 Rose: 295-96, 304, 315
Tanks, German: 71-72, 127, 264, 340, 642, 643. See Rudder: 501
also Armor. Standish: 250, 253-54, 256, 500
flame-thrower: 197 Thrasher: 559
losses: 92, 93, 94, 98, 104, 110, 111, 112, 115-17, Tucker: 353-54, 358
117n, 125-27, 129-30, 131-32, 153, 164-65, 190, White: 621
199-200, 203, 209, 261, 268, 283, 302-03, 340, 574, Taylor, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D.: 306, 553, 607, 630.
654, 661, 664 See also Airborne Division, 10lst.
Mark IV: 166, 178, 190, 191-92, 195,260,292, 295- Taylor, Col. William N.: 516, 536-37
96, 652 Teams
Mark V (Panther): 115, 125-26, 133, 178, 192, Anderson: 472, 474
195, 199, 260, 296, 302, 340-42, 396, 405, 409, Arnsdorf: 473
417, 452, 525, 651-52 Browne: 462, 464, 466-67,470-72
Mark VI (Tiger): 61, 77, 110, 115, 125-26, 162, Cherry: 296, 300, 303-4, 448, 450, 454, 471, 472-
223, 260, 268, 328, 337, 339-40, 405, 651-52 74
718 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Teams—Continued Troop Carrier Group, 435th: 172
Desobry: 449, 452-53, 455 Troop Carrier Group, 440th: 609
Hyduke: 30-302, 448 Troop strength, Allied: 1, 25, 55-56, 650, 671, 674
O’Hara: 451, 456-57, 471-72 Troop strength, German: 1, 7, 9, 19, 22, 28, 71, 145,
Palmaccio: 474 252, 533n 650, 671, 675
Pyle: 464, 466 Truppner, Lt. Stephen P:: 116
Roberts: 472-74, 479 Tucker, Maj. John: 353-54
Ryerson: 300-303, 448, 452, 454 Tucker, Col. Reuben H., 3d: 352, 367, 581
SNAFU: 460, 460n, 467, 473-74 Tunnels: 66, 67
Van Kleef: 466 Tupper, Col. Sevier R.: 643-44
Watts: 467 Tuttle, Lt. Col. Paul V., Jr.: 99, 101n
Yantis: 466, 466n
Tedder, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W.: 53, 509, Udenbreth: 77, 95-97
611 Ulm: 67
Telephone communications: 74, 83, 96, 101, 140, Urspelt: 188-91
147, 152, 154, 181, 221, 229, 288, 321, 425, 654
Templeton, Lt. Col. Clifford: 308 V-Leute: 255
Tenneville: 321, 429 V-weapons: 19n, 561, 654-55, 667
Terrain: 78, 142, 189-90, 194, 241, 249-50, 259-60, Van Der Kamp, T/Sgt. John: 362
265, 267, 272, 353, 388-89, 428, 507, 510-11. See Van Every, Pfc. Gilbert: 455n
also Ardennes; Eifel. Van Kleef: 466
Thackerary, Lt. Col. Donald W.: 490n Vandenberg, Maj. Gen. Hoyt S.: 485
Theux: 346 Vandervoort, Lt. Col. Benjamin H.: 370
Thionville: 244, 249, 489-90 Vaux Chavanne: 587
Thommen: 414 Vaux-lez-Rosières: 210, 324, 327-28, 514, 533, 551-
52, 615
Thompson, Capt. Frederic C.: 498
Venlo: 20, 25, 27, 29
Thompson, 1st Lt. R. H.: 167n
Verdenne: 442, 565, 574-77
Thorne, Cpl. Horace M.: 403n Verdun: 486-88, 509-10, 557, 560
Tiger tanks. See Tanks, German. Verschneid: 148
Thrasher, Brig. Gen. Charles O.: 559 Verviers: 45, 77, 96, 259, 260, 274, 278
Tillet: 325, 328-29, 466 Vesdre River: 75, 87, 669
Tillison, Lt. Col. Arthur C.: 544 Vesoul: 20
Tintange: 54849, 607 Vesqueville: 643
Todt Organization: 128, 222 Vianden: 43, 214-15, 219, 221
Toppe, Generalmajor Alfred: 68 Vichten: 515-16
Tosi, Lt. Col. A. S.: 517 Viebig, Oberst Hans: 95
Towne, Lt. Col. Josiah T.: 171 Vielsalm: 139, 162, 205, 265, 273, 274-82, 285-87,
Traffic and march control: 50, 260, 275, 277, 278, 289-91, 381, 390, 397, 399, 401, 402, 407, 409,
283, 292, 299, 302, 307, 309, 335, 396, 404, 410- 413-21, 579-81, 598-600, 647
11, 419, 436, 458, 490, 534, 623, 628-29, 657, 662,
Villages and village strongpoints: 42-43, 111, 116,
666. See also Withdrawal operations.
137-38, 182-83, 192-93, 241, 247, 250, 253-54,
Train, Col. William F.: 202, 420
256, 258, 272, 286, 324, 337-38, 340, 352, 366-67,
Training: 140, 193, 273, 512, 513 379-80, 408-09, 416, 437-39, 451, 531, 542-43,
Training, German: 77, 128, 177, 208, 215, 270-71,
552, 628
271n
Villeroux: 309, 464-66, 514, 615-16, 619, 621
Travalini, Sgt. Savino: 84 Villers-la-Bonne-Eau: 623-25, 627, 635-36, 643
Trench foot: 123, 141, 238, 258, 495, 503 Villettes: 600
Tri-le-Cheslaing: 590, 595 Virton: 40, 45
Trier: 45, 61-62, 68, 212, 236, 240, 256, 661, 662 Volksdeutsch: 51, 143
Trois Ponts: 25, 259-60, 265, 267, 318, 336, 337, “Volkssturm”: 56
342-44, 346-18, 351-52, 355, 359, 364, 366, 369- Vosges: 611
72, 374, 376, 391, 395, 397, 401, 581, 587, 599-601 V T fuze. See Proximity fuze,
Trois Vierges: 157, 199, 205, 294
Troop movements: 50, 61-65, 70-71, 228, 240, 274- Waal River: 51
75, 309, 333n, 334, 357, 410, 434, 515, 601, 659, Wacht a m Rhein: 21-22, 28, 30-32, 34-39
661, 665-66 Wagener, Generalmajor Carl Gustav: 475n,564
Troop Carrier Command IX: 172, 468 Waha: 431, 574
lNDEX 719
Wahlerscheid: 78, 86, 90, 101-04, 107-09, 111, 116, Werbomont: 25, 265, 267-68, 289, 307, 316, 336,
123, 216 342-43, 345-46, 346n, 347, 351, 378, 589-90, 597
Wahlhausen: 180, 182, 186 Wereth: 150, 161-63
Waimes: 360, 569, 374, 603 Werfer. See Rocket projectors.
Waizenegger: 74 West Wall: 3, 13-15, 36, 40, 51, 55, 57, 78, 80, 82, 87,
Waldbillig 230-32, 234-37, 248, 250, 252-53, 255- 95-96, 101, 103, 108, 137-38, 140, 142, 144, 148,
57, 483-84, 499, 503 151, 177, 180, 194-95, 198, 330, 428, 485-86, 489
Waldenburg, Generalmajor Siegfried von: 195, 197, 504, 506, 508, 512,658,672
357, 441-42, 575-77 Westerwald: 40
Waldron, Sgt. J. W.: 439 Westbrook, 2d Lt. R. L.: 285n
Walker, Maj. Gen. Walton H.: 487, 489 Westphal, General der Kavellerie Siegfried: 21-23,
Wall, Lt. Col. Arnold R.: 630, 633 25, 29, 33, 36, 675
Wallace, Capt. Claude D., Jr.: 451 Weyland, Brig. Gen. Otto P.: 424, 496, 625
Wallendorf: 213, 228-29, 232, 235, 501 Weywertz: 81
Wallerode: 163, 167, 264, 277-78, 282-83, 292, 396, WFSt. See Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab.
403-04 Wheeler, Lt. Crawford: 154
Walsdorf: 217 Wheeler, Col. Richard B.: 622
Walsh, S/Sgt. William: 367 White, Brig. Gen. Isaac D.: 441, 568-69
Wanlin: 433 White phosphorus: 129, 296, 340, 399, 496, 546
Wanne: 370 Whitehill, 2d Lt. John A.: 550n
War crimes trials: 260n, 262 Whiteley, Maj. Gen. J. F. M.: 423
War economy, German: 3-6, 8, 8n, 9, 12, 15, 66, 68, Widener, Sgt. William J.: 350
675 Wiedorfer, Sgt. Paul J.: 549
Wardin: 325, 451, 456, 629, 632-33 Williams, Lt. Col. Earle: 273
Wark Creek: 227, 483, 522 Williams, Lt. Col. H. R.: 214
Warnach: 529-31, 548 Williams, Cpl. Hale: 130
Warner, Cpl. Henry F.: 131n Willis, 1st Sgt. Gervis: 247n
Warren, Lt. Col. Fred M.: 280 Wiltz: 184, 188, 191-93, 206-10, 215, 219, 221-22,
Wasserbillig: 21, 43, 44 313, 315, 323, 328, 457-58, 508, 513, 520, 522,
Watch on the Rhine. See Wacht am Rhein. 541, 545, 547, 628, 632, 637, 640-42
Watts, Maj. Eugene A.: 467 Wiltz River: 44, 206-07, 215, 219, 294, 299, 312, 454,
Weapons. See also entries by weapon type. 457, 510, 520, 522, 640, 658
comparison of US and German: 651-56 Wiltz-Bastogne highway: 637, 640, 642
dual-purpose: 653 Wilwerwiltz: 181, 187, 206, 312-13
towed: 653, 658 Winterscheid: 155
Weather: 46-47, 649-50 Winterspelt: 151, 152-54, 157-61, 284, 292
effect on air operations: 18, 22, 38, 38n, 39, 61, 67, Winterspelt-St. Vith highway: 137, 141, 275, 285
69, 142, 171, 366, 371-72, 467-68, 495-96, 660, Wire. See Obstacles; Telephone communications.
663 Wirtzfeld: 104-09, 112-13, 115, 117, 120, 122-23, 128,
effect on ground operations: 146, 193, 229, 495, 604
61 1 Wischeid: 149
Weber, Col. Alois : 534, 537-38 Withdrawal operations: 93, 99-101, 104-06, 107-12,
Weckerath: 144, 146, 148, 155 116, 122-23, 133, 148-50, 160-61, 162-69, 191-
Wehrmacht. See German Army. 92, 202, 203, 209-10, 223-26, 232, 234-35, 254,
Wehrmachtfuehiungsstab (WFSt): 11, 11n, 17, 19, 256-57, 297, 297n, 298, 30243, 370, 376, 443,
23, 27, 34-35, 128, 381 455, 589, 593, 599-600. See also St. Vith.
Weidingen: 207 Withee, Cpl. Edward S.: 155, 155n
Weiler: 182-83, 185-86, 192 Wittlich: 45, 177
Weiler-les Putscheid: 181 Wolf’s Lair: 1, 15-16, 21, 24, 27, 31
Weismes: 129-30, 134-35 Wollenberg, Pvt. Richard: 130
Weissenhof crossroads: 153-54 Wood, Maj. Gen. John S.: 512-13
Weiswampach: 187, 203, 205, 219, 289 Wood, Lt. Col. W. C.: 626
Welchenhausen: 194, 197, 202 Woodruff, Capt. Junior R.: 390
Welford: 172 Woods fighting: 78, 230, 234, 290, 402-03, 407, 493,
Wellin: 433 497-98, 532, 548-49
Welscheid: 517, 535, 537 Woodward, Maj. Walden F.: 196, 203
Wemple, Lt. Col. John P.: 280-81, 406, 414-16 World War I: 6, 11, 39-40, 46, 48, 64, 480, 611, 649,
Wengerohr: 662 654, 656
Weppler: 160, 167, 284-85 Wurtich, Lt. Jake: 370
720 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Yale, Col. Wesley W.: 618, 620, 646-47 Ziegenberg: 23
Yantis, 1st Lt. Ray J.: 466n Zimmerer, Pfc. T. J.: 234n
Yates, Maj. Robert B.: 267-68 Zimmermann, Generalleuthant Bobo: 23
Yeomans, Lt. Col. Prentice E.: 353-54 Zweibrucken: 512

is U S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1993 333-169

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