FRENCH MOBOCCO

Combat

5. Equipment .
a. Individual Clothing and Equipment.
(1) Clothing.
(a) Foreign Legionnaires .
The dress of these men is
the kepi (cap) with curtain in back, blue coats > white trousers, low
"boots. /

(b) White troops* The Foreign Legion and colonial

troops wear the ordinary khaki uniform, with the addition of a "blue
sash, or cummer "bund in the case of the former. Worth African troops,
other than Algerian light cavalry (Chasseurs d'Afrique), wear the fez
or turban ....'.
In the case of officers, the service jacket is of
the British type, "but with a collar only just low enough to reveal an
inner white collar and "black tie. Either "breeches or trousers may "be
worn. Mounted officers wear spurs. With "breeches, cavalry officers
wear field-boots, other officers ankle-hoots with leggings or puttees.

armored car units and fortress troops

-
The headdress is the "kepi", or, in the case of light infantry, tank,
.
the ""beret"
Other ranks. The service jacket has a close fitting
collar. The greatcoat, in the case of infantry, is worn with the
bottom ends folded back. Breeches only are worn,, no trousers. Mounted
soldiers wear leggings and spurs; dismounted soldiers; puttees* The
steel helmet, with a white cloth cover to reflect the heat of the sun
from the wearer's head, is worn for guard duties, maneuvers and
exercises other than drill parades, /
Extreme simplicity and utility is the principal
attribute of French uniform.
(°) Native troops. The Tirailleurs are dressed like
the European infantry. The Spahis wear long loose trousers gathered
into their boot tops. A blouse, single breasted, is also worn.
Around their waist, they wear a leather belt supported by bandoleers
over their shoulders. Instead of greatcoats, they wear long capes.
In action, they wear their belts and bandoleers over their capes, so
the cape becomes a long tunic. A turban is vorn on the head.
(2) Personal equipment. Organizational and tactical equip­
ment is lacking in quantity.
The total weight in personal equipment carried by a
French infantryman is 73-1/2 pounds.
The total weight carried by a French cavalry horse,
including rider, is approximately 375 pounds.
Supplies to the army have been curtailed by the Germans.
In some cases, the Germans have even requisitioned supplies directly
from the troops themselves. The Air Force troops around Marrakech

from them
-
in 19^1 had two of their winter issue of three blankets requisitioned
leaving them but one apiece for the approaching winter.
The French infantryman is armed with a rifle or. carbine
which fires an 8 mm.' bullet and is equipped with bayonet. Officers
carry an automatic pistol firing a: 7- 65 caliber bullet. The rifles

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and carbines weigh about seven pounds. The pistol weighs. .a little
over two The rifle and carbine have a practical range of
1,200 feet; the pistol, 150 feet. A rifleman can fire with accuracy
eight to ten rounds per minute, depending, of' course, on his degree
of skill.
Both rifle grenades and hand grenades are carried, The
former has a. range of 15Q yards and the latter 30 yards.
Bayonets of the long French type are carried by foot
soldiers with rifles or carbines. ,
Cavalry and artillery are armed with the same types of
personal weapons. Other branches are armed with pistols or rifles as
described above.

"b* Organizational.
. (l; Tanks So far as known there are no tanks with the
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'
.
units stationed in Morocco. , \u25a0

(2) Armored cars. There are believed to be about 25 Laffly

armored cars of the 1930 type in Morocco.

c. \u25a0 \u25a0

Tactical Equipment.
JTy Artillery. French artillery in Morocco is composed of
(al
Modern 155 m. Howitzers;
105 mm. guns;
75 J^o1* horse drawn;­
65 mm. horse drawn.
These guns include one mountain or pack artillery

(b) C.A.
group .
155 mm* long and marine guns;
7.6-inch (19^ mm.) guns;
5.^- inch (138 mm. ) guns ;
Two 155 mm.. R.R. guns, suspected;
3.9-inch (100 mm.) guns;
2. 95- inch (75 mm. ) guns
(c). A_._A L
90 mm. long A.A. guns;
37 mm. long A.A. guns;
13.2 mm. machine A.A. guns
The 13.2 mm. A.A. is mounted on a tripod with a seat for
the gunner on one leg. The piece consists of two identical barrels
laid parallel so that one gun is really two.
Many of the coast defense guns are in naval gun turrets
with all around traverse or in concrete emplacements.
The coast defense has recently been improved with all
guns being put into shape, new ones set up, and all concrete requisi 7 \u25a0

tioned for emplacements, etc, •

 FRENCH MOROCCO

Combat

16

(2) Anti-tank Guns.

(a) 25 mm. guns (Canons de 25:38)
ment is one to a "battalion and three to a regiment..
.
The standard equip­
These guns did
excellent service during the invasion of France In 19^0. They were
particularly effective against the German tanks of the type PZKW -.
!

1 and 2, against light tanks and ,armored cars up to a. range of 2,000

yards; and against heavy tanks up to 1,000 yards. It was found very
difficult to camouflage these guns in the Flanders campaign, as the
gun flashes were very "brilliant and immediately gave away' the
positions. ,\u25a0.\u25a0•'\u25a0 \u25a0"\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0':.'\u25a0'•.'
The gun is mounted on pneumatic tires and has a
shield. Fire is "by direct laying:. \u25a0

(3) Machine Guns. Besides the heavy ,13.2. mm. machine guns

guns -
mentioned a"bove, the army in Morocco has a number of Hotchkiss
8 mm. "bullets. This gun- is also mounted. on a tripod with a 1

wide traverse and is of the air cooled type. The gun and stand to­
gether weigh ahout 10 U pounds, the gun a"bout 53 pounds. The gun fires
200 rounds per minute and can "be laid directly or indirectly. When
laid, "by the former method, it is effective up to 1,600 yards, and when
laid "by the latter method, it is effective up to 3>SQO yards. It
can also "be use,d against airplanes up to 1,000 yards away.
It is thought that there are not over 500 machine guns
in all Morocco at present, including those which have "been overhauled
and those which are to "be overhauled, according to unconfirmed data*:.'
{k) Automatic Rifles. There are thought to "be between 900
and 1,000 automatic rifles in all French Morocco.
These guns weigh approximately 20 pounds and fire a.
7.65 calrber "bullet. The magazine contains 25 rounds. Their fire
is effective up. to 1,200 yards and their rate of fire in "bursts is
150 rotmds per minute. A "burst of six to seven rounds is the usual
method of fire.
Direct and indirect fire is possible and a front of from
"between 50 to 1,000 yards can "be interdicted.
The gun has two short legs near the muzzle for support,
as it is usually fired from the prone position. However, it can "be
fired at airplanes up to 600 yards away. There is a cone shaped
shield, over the muzzle to camouflage the flash.
(5) Heavy Weapons , other than Machine Guns
(a) 37 ffon° gun. This is a close support weapon and
\u0084
.
is mounted on wheels with a trail piece, like a miniature French
75 mm., model 1897* The piece, recoil mechanism and "breach are the
same as the 37 mm. sub-cairber piece it is the custom to attach
to the "barrel of our 75' s for sub-caliber practice; (i.e., there is
a self-cocking mechanism operated "by the recoil action,' and the gun
is single loading). It has a flash camouflaging cone over the muzzle.
The gun itself weighs 88 pounds, the carriage v

88 pounds and the shield 66 pounds, giving the complete piece a total
weight of 2*4-2 'pounds. . .
 FRENCH MOROCCO

Combat

17

Effective fire is possible up to 1,500 yards, but

it is a poor "weapon when used against tanks and armored cars due to
awkwardness in firing at moving targets "because of old type trail
piece. .
(Id) 60 and 8l mm. mortars.
The first of these throws
a 2.8 pounds projectile 1,000 yards at a rate of 18 rounds per minute,
ifnecessary. The 8l mm. mortar has a range of 2,000 yards and a
projectile of great destructive capacity.
The 60 mm. mortar is carried "by one man. The
8l mm. is "broken up into three pieces: "barrel, kO pounds; tripod,
k-0 pounds; and "base, 46 pounds.
(6) Ammunition. It is thought there is only enough ammuni­
tion at hand in Morocco for a very short period of actual fighting '"by
the whole Moroccan Army. However, there have "been repeated rumors to
the effect that in the Azrou region of the Middle Atlas Mountains at
El Haji"b, quantities of ammunition (artillery and rifle) have "been
placed in storage vaults tunneled out of the mountainside. Trucks
loaded with ordnance have, at various times, "been observed moving
to and fro in this region in large numbers.
There have also "been rumors about another secret depot
of this type in northern Morocco.

6. Training, Efficiency and Morale.

a. Training
(l) Schools.
.
(a) French officers receive their training in France
at the military school of St. Cyr.
1. Officers of the Metropolitan Army Serving out
side France. Allofficers theoretically have to serve abroad accord­
ing to a roster kept at the Ministry of War. Therefore, some Metro­
politan Army officers from St. Cyr. and other schools are always on
duty in French Morocco. \u25a0

2. Officers of the Colonial Army. These officers

come from the same source as the Metropolitan Army officers. They
must have completed six months of commissioned service before being
sent abroad. After two years abroad, they return to France to command
a colonial unit there and undergo more advanced training.
3. Native Officers, Metropolitan Army. In the
North African Regiments, belonging to the Metropolitan Army, natives
may become officers but unless naturalized cannot rise above the rank
of captain and it is only very rarely that they reach that rank.
k. Colonial. Army. At present no native of the
colonies can become an officer unless he first, by naturalization,
becomes a Frenchman. Naturalized natives have been known to attain
comparatively high rank, but such cases are very exceptional, and
as yet natives of the colonies are not usually considered suitable
for commissioned rank. It is the intention, however, to train
 FRENCH MOROCCO

Combat

18

specially selected native N.C.O's as an experiment, with a view to

their 'becoming officers.
.5 • Officers of "Service de,s Affaires Indigenes".
In each Worth Africa province there are civil and military zones,
the former having grown gradually at the expense of the latter as
pacification progresses. In the civil zones, administration is
carried out "by civil officials, in the military zones "by officers of
"The Service dcs Affaires Indigenes", who are specially selected army
officers. The standard attained "by the "Service" is very high, . and
the officers are all picked men. In general, their duties entail the
maintenance of order, administration of justice and the general
politico-military control of the native tribes inhabiting these re­
gions which have not yet come directly under civil administration.
Officers are each responsible for a certain district within which
they have very wide powers and much is left to their own initiative.
Control is only handed over to the civil
authorities when there is no longer any fear of disturbance and when
the natives have had many years of practice in self -administration
under the strict supervision of the "Service dcs Affaires Indigenes".
Officers also act in the capacity of intelli­
gence officers; they are further responsible for recruiting of natives
in their district and for the collection of taxes. They officer the
various irregular forces.
(b) French privates and N.C.O's used to be trained by
the traditional two years service, to which every man on reaching
twenty years was liable.
This compulsory service has been abolished since
the Armistice of 19^6.. To get around this, the Government at Vichy
organized the "Chantiers de la Jeuness". It provides -a way of giving
military training and still abiding by the law.'
It is patterned much like our own CCC camps. Every
Frenchman on becoming twenty years old must serve eight months in it.
The organization is officered by carefully selected
French Army officers with a good deal of war experience and outstand­
ing records. Enlisted pay corresponds approximately to that of a
soldier of the old army; officers, ' the same as their corresponding
pay in the old army.
There is an "esprit de corps" of the men and
officers which was never before known in the old army.
A daily routine of army life is followed. Military
drill by the company- is on a small scale at the camps but is
thoroughly carried out in maneuvers, in small groups.
These camps are pro/bably the most important insti­
tution of the "New Order",
For the moment, the "Chantiers" are absolutely
under the control of Vichy, but they are doing good work in reviving
the spirit of work and patriotism amongst the younger generation and
should the attitude of Vichy change, &h,©y would probably give a good
account of themselves. Theirleaders^Jrpj^'^^a^il^^ClaiblLa^
 FRENCH MOEOCCO

Combat

19

(2) Unit and Combined- Training. Because of the use of the

troops as garrisons in "widely separated parts of the country, there
can "be no large scale maneuvers as .we know the term. Tactical train­
ing is limited to regiments at the most. Usually it takes the form
of marches and simulated campaigning with smaller units.
Of late, there has "been much firing of coastal defense
and antiaircraft guns for practice.
Troops have teen moved to strategic positions for the
defense of the protectorate. This has necessitated a greater grouping
of large numbers of trcops and no- doubt combined training has taken
'
•place. .
\u25a0•

b. System of Promotion for Officers. In peace promotion from

lieutenant through the various ranks to lieutenant- colonel is partly
"by seniority and partly "by selection. Promotion £0 higher ranks is
entirely "by selection. In war, all promotion is "by selection.
The list for promotion, etc., for native officers is entirely
separate from that for French officers.

c. . Efficiency.
(l) Officers. Generally speaking, officers are keen and
zealous and take a great interest in the welfare of their men. Rela­
tions "between officers and men are excellent* They are not strict
disciplinarians of the Prussian type. Officers are professionals
and know their "business on the whole.
Officers of the "Service dcs Affaires Indigenes" are
particularly well trained and the standard of discipline and efficiency
in their commands is excellent. They must "be "both excellent military
men and good civil administrators. Observers who have reported on
their work-in the unpacified parts of the country are full of praise.
(2) Men.' In general, the army of North Africa, including
Morocco, Is an efficient and well organized fighting machine. The
troops have repeatedly proved their worth, 'both In Morocco, which
they may Justly claim to have conquered, and in the European wax of
191^-18. They have always distinguished themselves.
A war-like existence hag endowed the Mo ores and Berber
with excellent military qualities. They are warriors "by nature and
possess in a high degree the characteristics of the perfect infantry­
man: sobriety, endurance, stamina, agility, discipline. They have
natural ability for surprise attacks, are stubborn at defense, Impet­
uous in attack, and furthermore, they have an admirable Instinct to
take the best advantage of -cover, both In advance and retreat. Troops
formed of such soldier material are excellent, provided, they -are
commanded by experienced officers with distinct leadership ability.
They are best handled, through personal influence and. prestige of .their
leader which is obtained by constant display of ability, fairness
and above all, courage.
The black soldier is treated with great patience and
indulgence, more like a child, than a grown- up human being; in fact,
 FRENCH MOROCCO

Combat

20

it may "be said, that patience is the keynote of the French method of
dealing with the natives, soldiers and civilians alike. As a result,
desertions are few and the men appear contented.
The Foreign Legion supplies the "best troops in Morocco.
At present their -well known efficiency has .'"been slightly reduced "by
the exodus of German N.C.O's from their ranks. However, the French
and Spanish refugees who now swell their ranks make good fighters
and the above handicap is fast "being overcome.
The French soldiers in-Morocco are very much like their ,
counterparts in France. They are excellent and efficient soldiers
but lack the supplies and equipment necessary to make an excellent
army.
(3) Combat Efficiency and. Value as a Whole.
(a) Native Troops.
1. Moroccan units are considered best for shock
troops. They are composed of Berbers, who the French consider the
best soldier material to be found in their entire empire. They are
natural fighters like the Senegalese, but without the complete de­
pendence on the white officers that marks the latter. Their value
as a whole is high, but they have had little or no experience with
or against armored units. This is an important factor and must be
considered so.
2. Senegalese or colored troops: These men are
noted for their bravery, fidelity and natural soldierly qualities.
They are extremely willing, fairly intelligent, and get on well with
other types of native regiments. Their weak points appear to be
inability to grasp or master anything intricate, a natural addiction

usual weakness of negro troops

-
to drink, which if indulged in makes them highly dangerous > and the
a pathetic dependence on the white
officer in action. They shoot well, learn French fairly easily,
and in a few cases, become' able to read and write.
(b) The Foreign Legion is famous for its combat
efficiency and bravery in the face of the enemy. Their discipline
is excellent and the small amount of punishment necessary to maintain
it is in marked contrast with the popular views on the subject.
(c) French troops are also to be given good ratings
as to combat efficiency and value. They are intelligent, brave and
make excellent fighters when well led. However, their personal
initiative is not as high as American troops.
In the last World War, I9IU-18,. all the various
types of troops listed above acquitted themselves very well. They
are excellent troops for the area they are supposed to be used in-­
French North Africa. In France against the Germans during 19^0,
the native and black troops did not stand, up well under tank and. dive
bombing attacks, however. They are so poorly equipped and have had
so little training in this type of warfare, that it is believed, they
could do little to protect Morocco from a serious attempt at invasion,
especially one by land and air over the northern- frontier .
 FRENCH MOROCCO

Combat

21

An Invasion from the sea would "be another matter.

Even with the small amount of artillery available to the defenders,
it is thought that a force would have to have marked superiority in
arms and men in order to "be successful if the Moroccan Army was
ordered to resist an invasion.

d. Morale and Outlook. In spite of the excellence of the army

noted above, its morale Is low. It is divided within itself, especially
among the officer personnel. -i

The army, as a whole, does not want to fight. They know that
they lack the arms and supplies to put up anything "but a futile
resistance to German armored divisions. However, it is felt that
if ordered "by Vichy to defend North Africa, they would do so against
all attackers.
As regards loyalty to Vichy:

(l) Older officers from lieutenant -colonels up are in

favor of Petain or whoever is head man at Vichy, and are inclined to
wait and see what happens rather trhan risk their person, pensions
or careers.
(2) Younger officers up the rank of major are very
impatient, even disgusted, with the policy of Vichy. They may or
may not "be pro- de Gaulle, "but they are not anti-British and are
anti-German and eager. Many of them would welcome the opportunity
to take up arms again on the side of the allies.
(3) In contrast with the Navy, the army flyers in
Morocco are violently pro-British, and greatly admire the R.A.F.
with whom they flew In the Battle of France. At the orders of the
German Armistice Commission, they are only allowed two hours supply
of gas when they fly, for fear they will take their planes and fly
to Gibraltar to join the British.
(k) French troops have experienced a slackening in
morale due to division of thought and more and more acquiescence to
"collaboration". Their attitude can "be summed up In a few words-­
"What's the use? There is little we can do. Let us make the "best
of a "bad bargain."
• (5) Native troops have kept up their morale very well.

\u25a0

They willno doubt follow their officers and fight whom they are

directed to fight.

Any marked weakening of the German military situ­

ation would undoubtedly have considerable effect on the attitude and

morale of tho Northwest African garrisons, as they would then consider

that the Vichy Government, being held prisoner by Germany, would not

be in a position to make decisions and that Northwest Africa would

be loyally trying to shake off the German yoke if they took up arms

and received help from the Anglo-Saxon peoples.

 FRENCH MOEOCCO

Combat

22

7. Mobilization Plan.

a. Method of Recruitment.
(l) Officers. French officers are sent out from France and
are either Metropolitan or Colonial officers. The latter group,
while coming from the same schools as the Metropolitan, form a dis­
tinct and autonomous corps. Allofficers theoretically have to
serve abroad according to a roster kept at the Ministry of War. The
period of service in a colony or protectorate varies from two to
three years. Students at military schools apply for the Colonial
Army at the end of their course but may not "be sent abroad till they
have completed six months commissioned service.
Natives can become officers in Metropolitan North
African regiments but cannot rise above the rank of captain unless
they become Frenchmen by naturalization.
At present no native can become an officer in a Colonial
regiment unless he is naturalized* Naturalized natives have been
known to attain comparatively high rank but such cases are very
exceptional and, as yet, natives are not usually considered suitable
for commissioned rank. It is the intention, however, to train
specially selected native N.C.O's, as an experiment, with a view to
their becoming officers.
There are some officers In Morocco, demobilized since
the Armistice, who will undoubtedly be mobilized to officer men
returned to the army in the event of war.
(2) Men. There is no conscription in Morocco; all troops
therefore, are volunteers. These serve two, three or four years in
the active army and eight, seven or six in the reserve, making a
total of ten years. Extension of service is permitted for a further
four years, and in exceptional cases, for one, two or three years.
Natives are liable for service overseas.

b. Mobilization of Manpower. There are two possibilities for

mobilization of manpower to augment the French forces in Morocco.
(l) Calling back to the colors of men who have been demobi­
lized by tfie Armistice and calling up- the reserve.

(2) Transportation of troops from Algeria into Morocco by

railroad through the Taza Gap between the Atlas and Riff mountains
in the north.
The objection to the first method is that there are
not the necessary arms or supplies in Morocco to equip these men once
they are called in the army.
The second method offers the greatest possibilities.
Strong reinforcements could be brought in this way. However, the
railroad facilities are limited, so that it would take considerable
time to noticeably bolster the Moroccan army. There are also several
very vulnerable places on the railroad which, if cut, would hold up
traffic for weefcs.
 L>­

N*
ika

FEENCH MOEOCCO

Combat

23

c. Eeserve Supplies. As has "been mentioned^ there are practically

no supplies, necessary to an army, in reserve. With what is available .
to them, the troops in Morocco could fight for a very short time.
Fuel, and storage and transportation available for it, will
"be discussed in another part of this estimate.
The Germans have requisitioned practically all available
supplies for their army. Much of the food and especially the wheat
grown in Morocco, is shipped out , of the country by order of the
Germans. In fact, the food and clothing situation has become so
serious that the Sultan is reported to have persuaded the French to
suspend shipments of wheat out of the country.
Much of the shortage of wheat and farm grown products is
due to the extreme shortage of gasoline to supply tractor fuel. It

equipment .
is necessary to do the .harvesting now by teams and old fashioned

. Mechanized harvesting has been in use now for a number of

years, and the old equipment has been exposed to the weather. As a
result, its usefulness has 'been impaired and smaller amounts of crops
are harvested.
There is some corn growing and ripening, but the soil is
unsuited to raise the kind of corn produced in the United States.

&» Method and Rat e of Procurement of Supplies .-.. Supplies of

equipment and pertain quartermaster stores -originate from France.
They are under the supervision of the German Armistice Commission.
There are, however, a number of .machine shop and repair
-depot s- in Morocco for the repair and. maintenance of machine; guns and
automatic rifles. There are reasonably well equipped shops at
Cas ab lane a and Mekn© s .
It wouId, be p.o ssible to manuf ac tur c bar reIs
;

and rifles, in some of these places, and it is reported that some

experimental models: were made' prior to the war. At present there,
is no known arsenal or post of maniifacture for either machine guns
or automatic rifles in this area, .; ;
There is thought to be a small plant for the assembly of
airplanes a few miles out of Casablanca at the town of Mediouna.
,.
However nothing is being done there at present, as the crated
American planes still'in Morocco 3_ack certain \u25a0\u25a0vital parts such as
'
carburetors, -etc.: V . '-.\u25a0'\u25a0\u25a0' \ :. '.\u25a0 \u25a0'. '\u25a0 -..\u25a0-• '\u25a0'.
\u25a0\u25a0 . \\
Eate of procurement is very slow, for even when the French .
are given permission to requisition supplies, it is usually found
that they are unobtainable due to previous German requisitions - in
France. . \u25a0\u25a0-'\u25a0 -
-.•\u25a0'\u25a0 : ":*; \u25a0-'•\u25a0\u25a0"\u25a0. "'\u25a0
-\u25a0\u25a0 ,'.\u25a0-,'\u25a0;\u25a0;" ." ;
\u25a0. '\u25a0'\u25a0.'"\u25a0:\u25a0 .
\u25a0.

. There is some requisitioning of local available '

supplies
usable by the Army. /: ': .; ; . i
: ;
. '\u0 84 .

c. System of Mobilization of Industry. The basic source of

supply, France, is mobilized, but, as mentioned above, most of her
products are consigned to Germany.
 FRENCH MOROCCO

Combat

2k

There is some, manufacturing, in Morocco /but on a very small

scale* Undoubtedly, these are being used by the military.

8. Theory of Combat.

a. Conception of Conduct of War. There are two possible avenues

of attack possible against Morocco: (l) an attack launched from the
Spanish Zone to the north, and (2) a landing somewhere on the Atlantic
Coast.
(l) It is felt, "bj the French, that any attack from the
Axis will simultaneously hit Morocco and Tunisia and then try to join
the columns, moving east and west in Algeria.
The principal objective in the Moroccan attack will be
Casablanca, and therefore, the first aim of the French defense
must be to secure Casablanca and keep the Atlantic ports open. It
is felt that with good intelligence cooperation, there will be fifteen
days time to organize the defense.
Against panzer divisions, the old type cavalry and.
infantry are useless in average terrain, even with antitank weapons.
They can, however, delay the advance of the panzers by
threatening their lines of communication and cause them to wait for
the arrival of their own infantry. This delaying maneuver can be
carried out only by the organic units in Morocco, established in
mountainous areas, threatening the main highways and controlling the
defiles and valleys least favorable to the advance of the armored >
units.
During the early months in 19^1* there were some
mechanized and a small armored unit in North Africa. Since then the
armored unit and some mechanized units have been sent to Dakar. It
was thought that when the invading infantry came up this armored
force would attack it and render untenable the advanced position of
the panzers. However,, the mechanized units available to them now are
of little use. Main reliance willbe placed on infantry and artillery
to cut the panzers up in the mountains and delay their advance. The
counter-attack maneuver willhave to be given up and after the panzers
and infantry have passed through the mountains, if Morocco has not
surrendered, defensive positions willbe taken up in the favorable
terrain between Rabat and Casablanca, where the wooded country facil­
itates surprise and the "oueds-" (river beds) divide the terrain into
compartments.
(2) Defense against a coastal landing can be more success­
fully carried out.
Since the Syrian campaign in April 19*H> attention has
been dra,wn to the defense of the coast, and' coastal batteries have
been re-equipped and given considerable firing practice. A list of
the coastal defenses was included in the first parts of this estimate,
'
and they are to be respected.

Apportioned as Morocco is, perpendicularly from the

shore by roads and valleys, the strategic movements of the French

 FRENCH MOEOCCO

Combat

25

troops are to "be maneuvered from the interior. In order to provide

for reserve concentrations, Meknes, Oued Zem, or Marrakech will"be
chosen as the headquarters for the divisions. The^se divisions can
then be sent to the parts of the coast subject to invasion.
The object will"be to prevent the enemy from gaining
control of the strategic and vital coastal zone. There are onljr a
few possible places where a landing in force could "be effected, and
the French think they can concentrate their men in numbers suf ficent
to stand off a landing at these places.

"b. Role of Different Arms in Battle. This subject has "been

• discussed in a general way in paragraph "a." above. Greatest reli­
ance is placed on the infantry- artillery team. What mechanized they
have will not "be wasted against modern' armored vehicles "but will "be
used with infantry and cavalry against the enemy infantry, after the
artillery has stopped the panzers; or against any "beach head the
enemy secure, in the event of a coastal attack.

c. Method of Conducting Combat.

(l) Defense of Coastline. The garrisons in the interior
will"be supported "by mobile forces consisting of one infantry "battal­
ion and two squadrons of cavalry with a proportion of moMle field
artillery. These will take advantage of the good road net to move
about and engage the enemy.
The element of surprise will"be the keynote of the
defending units.

9. The Air Army

a. Organization. In France the Air Force constitutes an inde­

pendent arm. Metropolitan France is divided into Air Regions. The
Moroccan Air Forces "belong to the 6th Air Region with headquarters
in Algiers. The general officer in charge of the Region appears to
"be responsible to "both the Commander of the Land, Sea,, and Air Forces,
Admiral Darlan, and to the Secretary of State for Air, General
Jennequin. The Superior Air Commander, General Mendigal,, commands
the Air Army units in the three North African colonies. Under him
are three general air officers, who command the units in Morocco,
Algeria and Tunisia, respectively. Their authority, of "both tactical
and administrative command, embraces the control of all troops,
services and other activities of the Air Army, as well as the air
combat units, within their territorial jurisdiction. They are the
immediate commanders of the largest air combat unit stationed in the
areas for which they are responsible.
Each military air establishment of any size is considered
an air "base,, each having its own commander, who, in the case of "bases
located in Morocco, are directly responsible to the Air Commander of
Morocco. The Air Base commander is normally the commander of the
largest combat unit permanently stationed at his "base. He is the
 FRENCH MOROCCO

Combat

26

compulsory Intermediary "between the regional commander and the comman­

ders of air -combat units only temporarily stationed at his "base. If
the "base is too small to have a full complement of services, it Is
attached to a more important base for administrative purposes.
The normal organization of the Air Army is given in graphic
form on the next page. In practice this scheme is not strictly fol­
lowed. An Air Division may "be composed of only one Air Brigade and
other units not included in a Brigade. The Air Brigade may "be com­
posed of only one Air Wing_ and other units included in a Wing, and It
may exist independently of a Division. Groups may, in like manner,
exist independently of a Brigade. A regrouping of aerial units for
the purpose of forming specialized fighter and bombardment commands
in French Morocco is now taking place. In general, however, Wing,
Group and Squadron identity has been preserved.
The usual aircraft strength of the smaller units is as
follows :

Unit Fighters Bombers Reconnaissance

Group 26 13 13
Squadron 12 . 6 6
 v
FRENCH MOROCCO
Combat
n
ORGANIZATION OF THE AIR ARMY IN MOROCCO
(Since April 18, 19^2)

Commander of the Land, Sea and Secretary of State for

Air Forces, Admiral Darlan. Air, General Jennequin,

:
—
Eesponsfble to Chief of State
" -*J
Besponsi"ble to Chief
of Gov't.
~J—

Navy Army Air

i ~i t r~~i
i

__—_ i .-•\u25a0\u25a0..
\u25a0

Superior Air Command (The Air Begions of Unoccupied

of North Africa
r .
(Algiers)
; , — I
France and the other Colonial

Air Commands)

Air Command Air Command Air Command

of Morocco* of Algeria
of Tunisia

Air Division (2 or 3 Brigades)

Air Brigade ~** (2 or 3 Wings)

Wing (2 or 3 Groups)

Air Group (2 or 3 Squadrons)

Squadron
* Note: The general officer having territorial
- command of the area is
&lso the immediate: coajimamder' of. the' Alt*Ddvisdon'locateTd. •
-
titererj Ifav&j oar. of the largest =anit in tike area;, \u25a0: aueii.*as
•
•
.
tiie; Air Brigade.
** Note: All troops, services and operational units, stationed at a
military airdrome are commanded "by an Air Base Commander, who
is also the immediate commander of the largest air unit there.
 FRENCH MOROCCO

Combat

28

"b* Personnel. The total number of the military personnel in the

Air Army in Morocco is thought to lie "between 3>ooo and, k9O O.k 9 000. There
are estimated to "be a"bout 600 commissioned and non-commissioned pilots,
only a small number of whom are fully qualified to fly modern aircraft.
The naval air service strength is "believed to "be a"bout one- sixth as
large as that of the Air Army.

c« Equipment . (April 27, 19^2)

•
Air Base No. A/C Type Group /Wing

Casablanca
'.
' 13 Douglas DB-7 l/32

Casablanca / 13, Curtiss 75-A (l) 11/5

Casablanca (Supply Depot) 18 Glen Mar tin- l6j (l)

Casablanca (Supply Depot) ik Douglas DB-7 (3)

Casablanca (Supply Depot) 2i+ CUrtiss . 75-A W

Fez ' 13 Curtiss 75-A 11/5 (Sq.#2)

Rabat 15
24
L.E.0.-i+s
Curtiss 75-A (l)
l/22
Rabat
•
1/5
Marrakech \u25a0

7.. L.E.G. I/23 (Sq.#l)

Marrakech 13 Potez 63/H 1/52
Marrakech (Supply Depot)
'
kO. Trainers
Ksar-El-Souk 6 L.E.O. h$ l/23 (Sq..#2)
\u25a0

Meknes 13 L.E.O. U5 11/23

Meknes (Supply Depot) 30 (5)
Meknes (Supply Depot) 12 Curtiss 75-A (6)
Agadir
Port Lyautey (Navy)
13 Douglas DB-7 11/32
6 Glen- Martin-167 Unit IB
Port Lyautey (Navy) 6 Glen Martin- 167 Unit 3B

Notes: (l) Being re -equipped 'with Dewo itine 520 T s.

(2) Some of these are undergoing overhaul.
(3) Four of these have "been test flown.
(k) Seven of these have "been test flown.
(5) Chiefly Potez -63 and Potez-s^+o/ also two or- three
Anyot-350. These planes would require at least
three months to repair.
(6) All of these have "been test flown. .

Total number of aircraft in French Morocco, "by types:

In Tactical Units In Depots

' 50 Fighters 36 Fighters

67 Bombers 32 Bombers
13 Reconnaissance aircraft 30 Miscellaneous
12 Nava.l "bombers
 FRENCH MOEOCCO

Combat

29

Immediate reinforcement of aircraft strength in Morocco could

"be obtained from the other two areas. Aircraft
'
in Algeria are as
follows : \u25a0

102 Fighters
\^h."Bombers

28 Reconnaissance aircraft

15 Transport aircraft

36 Naval aircraft, all types

Aircraft in Tunisia are as follows:

60 Fighters
26 Bombers

15 Eeconnaissance

33 Naval aircraft

(Reported 120 naval aircraft dismantled and stored

at Bizerte.)

Q- Fuel* Aviation gasoline stocks in North Africa, as of the

middle of January, 19^-2, were estimated as follows, given in tons:

Morocco Algeria Tunisia Total

7,375 11,113 1,767 20,255

These figures are thought to be high. Definitely some of

this fuel now has been shipped to Li"bya. One source estimates the
supply in Tunisia and Algeria to "be sufficient only for two days 1
operations. Aviation gasoline stocks in Morocco are stored mostly
at Fedalah, and would "be completely exhausted by full scale operations
lasting more than one month, according to other reports/ The latter
reports are, thought to "be more accurate.

c. Airdromes and Landing 'Fields. The principal military air

fields in Morocco are at or near the following places: Oujda, Fez,
Meknes, Kasba-Tadla, Casablanca, Marrakech, Agadir, and Rabat.- An
extremely large number of other fields also exist. Generally through­
out the colony new air fields could be constructed with a minimum of
effort.

f• Combat Efficiency. Notwithstanding the fact that most of

the military aircraft in Morocco, such as the Martin- 167's, the
Douglas-DB-7 Is, the Curtiss 75-A's, and certain of the French types,
are of comparatively modern design, the combat efficiency of the Air
Army and of the naval air forces in Morocco appears to be comparatively
low. The same may be said of the other two subdivisions . of the
Superior North African Air Command. The absolute necessity of conserving
 FRENCH- MOROCCO
Combat
30
the small aviation fuel stocks on hand has reduced flying to the
point where a great many pilots fail even to meet the modest require­
ments for their monthly flying pay. Squadron and group training and
maneuvers have "been largely impossible. A large percentage of the
pilots do not possess the ability to handle modern aircraft, nor are
any steps "being taken to qualify them. The standard of aircraft main­
tenance is said to be extremely inferior. Spare parts are lacking. A
large construction program at the main overhaul depot at Casablanca,
however, Indicates that plans are under way to correct this defect.
The morale of the air personnel Is not thought to be particu­
larly high. The large majority of the air officers are said to favor
the cause of the United Nations, or, at least, to be pro-American.
Under present conditions, however, their very existence' is dependent
upon obedience to Vichy. An Allied force of sufficient strength to
indicate : its ability to successfully oppose any Axis cbuntermeasures
would probably not be confronted with very serious resistance from the
military air units in Morocco.

111. NAVY

10. General. Casablanca is the only naval operating base in French

Morocco, Any force contemplating the occupation of Morocco would have
to take the Vichy French Navy stationed at Casablanca into serious
consideration. With the exception of the "JEAN BART", .and certain
ships now under .repairs the naval, units stationed here are tp fair
fighting and cruising shape,

11. Personnel.
\
'
a# Naval effectives vary according to the number of
Active.
ships in port. The. latest estimate as of March 18, 19^2, Is that
there are a.bout 11,500 men of the French navy manning ships and coast
defenses in Morocco.

b. Reserve. French merchant sailors form the reserve of the

French navy. However, the forces at Casablanca are thought to be up
to full strength, - and it is doubted if there is any appreciable
reserve element in Morocco.

c. Recruitment. There has been no naval recruitment in Morocco

since the Armistice.

12. on ,
Organ! zat i

a. An anomalous situation prevails in the present organization

of the French Navy in that Admiral Darlan, as Commander- in-Chief of
all armed forces, is responsible only to Marshal Petain, while a
Secretary of the Navy is answerable to Laval, A possible source of
 FRENCH MOROCCO

Combat'

31

friction has thus "been created. At Casablanca, a dual command exists:.

(1) 2d Squadron, comprising 2 light cruisers and 6-8 destroyers;
(2) Casablanca Naval Base, including the "battleship "JEAN BART", sub­
marines, and other naval vessels. An admiral commands each organization

b. Fleet Organization and Distribution. The naval vessels in

Morocco, including the 2d Squadron of the French Fleet, are all "based
at Casablanca and must "be considered as a unit.
(l) Equipment. -
(May 1, 19te)
1 Battleship
only k of proposed 8
-
"JEAN BART"; incomplete; 35,000 tons;
15" guns have "been in­
stalled, and some, "but not all of the 15-6" guns,

2 Light Cruisers
-
are installed, k planes.
"GLOIRE"; completed 1935; 7,600
tons; 51 knots; 9-6" guns, 8-3.5" A.A., k tor­
pedo tubes; k planes .' "PRIMAUGUET" ; completed.
1926; 7,2^9 tons; 33 knots; Q~6% \ guns, U-3" guns;

3 Destroyer Leaders
-

12 torpedo tubes; 2 planes.

"EPERVIER", "MILAN" arid
"ALBATROS"; completed 1938, 1933, 1931; 2,1+00
tons each; 5~5" guns and torpedo tubes.
h Destroyers.
10 Submar ine s •
5 Avisos and numerous armed trawlers and patrol vessels.
Woi*k is "being carried out on the "JEAN BART" . Her
antiaircraft defenses have /been augmented by the installation of
12-37 mm. A.A. guns; 12-13.2 A.A. guns; and some 90 mm.. A.A. guns.
Fire control is incomplete. There are no facilities at Casablanca
for completing the vessel and it is stated that there is no intention
of moving it back to France. The present speed would not exceed
20 knots.
There is a small floating repair dock in Casablanca
which will take destroyers and very small cruisers.

13- Training, Efficiency and Morale. The enlisted men and officers
are well trained and efficient and should not be underestimated. They
are frequently called upon to convoy merchant ships to Dakar and to
France. Submarine personnel are kept up to maximum efficiency by the
patrol operated along the coast, four of which are usually engaged in
this work at a time.
The higher ranking officers of the French Navy, while not pro-Axis,,
are definitely anti-British. They are Darlan men and can be counted
upon to obey the Admiral's orders and would no doubt attempt to repel
an allied threat of occupation in Morocco, Lower ranking officers and
the enlisted personnel, while perhaps sympathetic to the Allied cause,
'
\u25a0would probably obey the orders of their superiors.

I^. Naval Air Force. .As this force is small, it has been combined
with the Army Air Force under that heading in this estimate.
 FRENCH MOROCCO

Combat

32

IV. GEOGRAPHIC

15. Geographic Features Affecting Strategy.

a. General Strategic Location. French Morocco has several

Atlantic ports and a port on the Mediterranean. The principal port,
Casablanca, with modern facilities and equipment and large capacity,
-
is the main gateway through which supplies from overseas enter Worth­

corridor
-
west Africa, and is connected "by road and railroad
with the western Mediterranean ports of
through a natural
Oran, Algiers,
Bizerte and Tunis, as well as with the smaller eastern ports of Sousse,
Sfax and Gates.
French Morocco to the north is vulnerable to land attack from
Spanish Morocco around the eastern and western ends of the practically
impassable Rif Mountain range. The threat at the eastern end of these
mountains would be especially serious if the Mediterranean entrance
at Gibraltar were to be denied to supplies from overseas, as the vital
overland communications between the Atlantic ports of Morocoo and the
Mediterranean areas of Algeria and Tunisia can be decisively cut in
the vicinity of Oujda.

"k* Mountains .From the sea at Agadir and Tiznit in the south,
in a northeasterly direction to the borders of Algeria on the north,
Morocco is divided by the great chain of the Atlas mountains. This
chain is divided into three main parts: the Anti-Atlas, the High
Atlas, and the Middle Atlas, in that order from south to north. The
Anti-Atlas and the High Atlas run inland from the sea, the former
from Tiznit and the latter from Agadir. Between them lies the valley
of the Sousse river. -The valley gradually narrows as it proceeds in­
land until itbecomes a mere pass at high altitude leading to. the
Sahara Plateau. The Middle Atlas branches off from the north side
of the two ranges mentioned before they join the plateau. The Middle
Atlas then proceed northeastward until they reach the Taza Valley, in
the north, which separates them from the Rif Mountains which proceed
southward over the border from Spanish Morocco. This narrow valley
is the main corridor of communication between Morocco and Algeria and
Tunisia.

c. Rivers .
There are numerous small rivers originating in the
Atlas watershed, which flow across the coastal plain to the sea. The
two most important are the Sebou and the Sousse. The former runs
down the western end of the Taza valley and separates the Middle Atlas
from the Rif Mountains, finally flowing into the Atlantic Ocean at
Port Lyautey. The latter flows down the Sousse Valley between the High
and Anti-Atlas Mountains, through Taroundant and flows into the sea a
few miles below Agadir.
d. Valleys and Plains .
(l) The coastal plain extends from Mogador on the south to

Larache in the Spanish zone on the north. It rolls gently eastward to

 FRENCH /MOROCCO-

Combat

\J^*- . 33

the foothills of the. Atlas Mountains and * northeastward to the foothills

of the Eif Mountains.'..
It is a gently
'
rolling country with various
types of terrain. [' : ;

(2) The Sebou is a typical river valley,. In addition to it,

there are various "Oueds" (Wadis ) or dry river "bottoms running usually
from east to west. These are sometimes quite deep and tend to cut the
country near the coast into compartment s, as far as any military opera­
tions are concerned. Near their southwestern extremity, where they
approach the sea, the Atlas Mountains split into the High Atlas and
Anti-Atlas ranges. The valley formed, "broadening as it approaches the
sea, contains the cities of AgacLir, Tiznit, and Tarqudant and the
Sousse Elver.
c. Coastline. The coastline of French Morocco north to south is
as follows: From the Spanish frontier a little south of Larache" to
Port Lyautey the ground tends to "be swampy. From Port Lyautey to
Rabat, the coast is wooded and presents admirable possibilities for
defense "by automatic weapons.
South of E ab at we come to the "Zaer" region. This is hilly
and cut into "by the "Oueds" or dry river "beds. These valleys are
steep and run directly down to the sea. They form natural avenues
of approach to the hinterland. This Zaer might "be a tactically
difficult region especially for mechanized units.
The Zaer region extends south of Eabat to Casablanca where
it flattens out into the "bled" or coastal plain. This country is, .
considered the best terrain for operations by the French and of fers
evident possibilities for the development of a mechanized struggle.
This "bled" region of the coastline extends as far as Safi where the
foothills of the Atlas mountains begin to make their appearance toward
the coast. :
South of Safi to Mogador, the coast becomes increasingly
hilly and cut "by valleys. From Mogador to Agadir the country is almost
entirely mountainous. This area is where the Atlas mountains reach
the sea. However, there are some level places, where if the terrain
could.be cleared of stone, landing fields for aircraft might be
constructed.
The terrain between Agadir and Tiznit crosses the mouth of
the valley formed by the Atlas mountains- on the north and the Anti-Atlas

Tiznit
—
on the south. Only two rivers need be crossed, between Agadir and
the Oued Sousse and the Oued Massa. The soil in this area is
of reddish color and said to be of very firm consistency.
South of Tiznit, inland, from Spanish Ifni, to Goulimine, the
landscape is veined and threaded by a network of dried-up river beds,
cactus plant growth,, etc. Great difficulty would be experienced in
establishing landing fields for aircraft in this area. Directly south
of Tiznit, the Anti-Atlas approach the sea. South of these mountains
the terrain becomes flat and arid with many dry river beds with no
bridges. The surface is solid, however, and. would support the largest
motor trucks of a meehaaized'colikHisi*