Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Quartermaster Corps
Organization,
Supply, and Services
D 114,7;Q2/V,2/995
Volume II
.•.>sas»'is.'j
Sff
cgSSmniffiS^^i^Sy ^ ^'^^^^^'^
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
by
Etna Risch
and
Chester L. Kieffer
Advisory Committee
(As of 1 January 1954)
*General Editor for Technical Service volumes, Lt. Col. Leo J. Meyer, Deputy Chief
Historian.
**Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward was succeeded by General Smith on 1 February 1953.
Ill
. . . to Those Who Served
—
Foreword
This volume is the second in a series which records the experiences of the
Quartermaster Corps in World War II. Instead of the single theme of supply,
emphasized in Volume I, a variety of activities are discussed, some of which
conservation, reclamation, and salvage operations, and industrial demobiliza-
tion— are related to supply. Others such as laundry operations, training of dogs,
and care of the dead, are wholly unrelated to the Quartermaster supply func-
tion but are nevertheless important to the Army. The volume stresses the
multiplicity of the Corps' duties and, in the complexities of modern warfare, the
Army's need for trained Quartermaster and units to support combat
specialists
troops. The and problems involved in procuring
narrative sets forth the policies
and training Quartermaster personnel and the manner in which the Quarter-
master Corps operated in the zone of interior.
The authors of this volume are both members of the Historical Section of
the Office of The Quartermaster General. Erna Risch, whojoined the section
in 1943, has written a number of monographs published by the Quartermaster
Corps, as well as Volume I of this series. She holds the Doctor of Philosophy
degree from the University of Chicago. Chester L. Kieffer, coauthor, who is
a graduate of the University of Illinois and a former journalist, worked on
the historical program of the War Production Board before joining the staff of
the Historical Section.
ORLANDO WARD
Washington, D. C. Maj Gen. U.S.A.
. ,
Vll
—
Preface
This volume continues and rounds out the narrative of Quartermaster
operations in the zone of interior during World War II that was begun in
Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I. The variety of Quartermaster activi-
ties made desirable a functional treatment discussing first supply operations,
then personnel and training duties, and finally the special services performed
by the Corps for the Army. Each function was dealt with chronologically insofar
as possible. Volume I, after discussing administrative activities, related the story
of supply ojjerations, the major function of the Quartermaster Corps. The
account of supply operations, because of its length, was arbitrarily concluded
in Volume I with the discussion of stock control operations.
The first four chapters in this volume complete the supply story, describing
The manuscript volume was circulated before final editing and was
for this
greatly benefited by the frank criticism accorded it by Lt. Gen. Edmund B.
ix
Gregory (Ret.), The Quartermaster General during the war years, and by
various administrators and technical experts in the OQMG. They were most
generous in reading relevant portions of the text and in commenting by letter
or in personal interview. Their assistance enabled the authors to correct
inadvertent errors of fact and omission and to make such revisions as were
warranted by re-examination of the record.
Throughout the preparation of this volume the authors relied heavily upon
the scholarly advice and assistance offered by the Chief of the Historical Sec-
tion, Dr. Thomas M. Pitkin. Under his genereil direction work has been in
progress since 1947, not only on this volume and its companion, which cover
Quartermaster activities in the zone of interior, but also on two other volumes
on Quartermaster operations overseas. Throughout their years of association
with the program, the authors have been indebted to their colleagues for their
unfailing co-operation and help in problems relevant to their specialized fields.
The authors also appreciate the work of the innumerable assistants who made
available the records in the OQMG central files as well as those in storage at
the Departmental Records Branch, Adjutant General's Office. Final editing
was carried out by Helen McShane Bailey and copy editing by Loretto Carroll
Stevens. Margaret E. Tackley, photographic editor, selected the pictures, and
Anne Blair Mewha typed the copy for the printer.
and private agencies and individuals to stimtilate interest and study in the field of
military history. The Center is located at 1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
20005-3402.
1
Contents
Part One: Supply*
Chapter p^ge
I. SALVAGE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 3
Administrative Organization 5
Relations With the Services of Supply 6
Relations With Civilian Agencies 9
Relations With the Field 1
Clarification of Procedures 15
Transfer of Responsibility Army Service Forces
to the 20
Conservation Programs and Command Responsibilities 23
Quartermaster Salvage Program 26
xiii
Chapter Page
Chapter Page
XII. CARE OF THE DEAD 361
Growth of Functions 361
Administrative Organization 363
National Cemeteries 369
Headstones and Markers 373
Disposition of Remains 377
Graves Registration Service 384
Planning for the Final Disposition of Remains 392
Statistics on the Return of the Dead Program 402
INDEX 415
Tables
No.
1 Summary of Quartermaster Contract Terminations 90
2. Estimated Value of ASF Procurement Deliveries: January 1 942-December
1945 121
3. Value of QMC Procurement Deliveries by Major-Item Group: 1942-
1945 121
4. Deliveries of Selected Clothing, Equipment, and Supply Items 124
5. Deliveries of a Fevk' Selected Subsistence Items 127
6. Purchases Directed by Quartermaster General of Petroleum
Office,
Products by Major Commodities: 1 June 1943-31 August 1945. . . . 128
7. Value of Quartermaster Lend-Lease Shipments 129
8. Distribution of Quartermaster Lend-Lease Shipments 130
9. Quartermaster Civilian Supply Shipments to All Liberated Areas: 1 July
1943 Through 31 August 1945 131
10. Net Usable Storage Space Operated by the Quartermaster Corps in the
Continental United States 132
11. Tonnage Received and Shipped by Depots: September 1942-August
1945 133
12. Quartermaster Personnel and Work Load Per Employee in Storage
Operations: September 1942-June 1945 135
13. Grov^thof the QMC and the Army: Actual Strength 140
14. Separations of Enlisted Men From the QMC 159
15. AccessionsofQMCOfficersDuringWorld War II 177
16. Separations of Quartermaster Commissioned Officers 202
17. Types of Quartermaster Units in World War II 279
18. Units Trained by the Office of The Quartermaster General 290
19. QMC
Fixed Laundry and Dry Cleaning Plant Activities: Fiscal Years
1940-1945 353
Charts
No. Page
1. Stop- Work Stages for Clearing Machinery Under JTR 241.3, Worsted and
Woolen Manufacturing Industry 84
2. Stop- Work Stages for Clearing Machinery Under JTR 241.3, on the
Combed and Carded Systems of the Cotton Textile Manufacturing
Industry 86
3. Growthof the Quartermaster Corps: 1939-1945 141
Illustrations
XVI
PART ONE
SUPPLY
CHAPTER I
for industry. To Quartermaster personnel 42, p. 2, remarks of Col Robert M. Falkenau, Chief of
directing salvage operations during World OQMG Salv Br, 337.
Col. John V. Rowan, "Salvage, The World's
-
War II, the line of demarcation between Greatest Business," QMR, XXII (November-Decem-
conservation and salvage was a very in- ber 1942), 50.
THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
materials was held to a minimum by the matters had always characterized the
use of substitutes in the research and de- Army. Confronted by evidence of the un-
velopment of suitable military equipment,' avoidable waste inherent in war and sur-
and conservation purposes also were served rounded by mountains of equipment from
by the elimination of excess stockages seemingly inexhaustible stores, the soldier
through inventory control.^ Economy in did not readily acquire an active concern
the care and disposition of materiel, how- and respect for military property. Indoc-
ever, provided the most effective means of trination and training were therefore
limiting total military requirements and fundamental in obtaining his co-operation
conserving resources. in the proper care and use of materiel. At
Unfortunately, the average American the same time, Quartermaster conserva-
soldier was convinced that the capacity of tion efforts also required the development
the nation to produce commodities was
unlimited. He was accustomed to relative For QMCactivities in this field, see Erna Risch,
carelessness and extravagance rather than The Quartermaster Corps: Org^anizatioti. Supply, and Serv-
frugality in his handling of material goods.
ices, Vol. I, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD
WAR II (Washington, 1953), Ch. II.
In fact, a lack of discipline in supply '
Ibid., Ch. X.
SALVAGE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 5
andJ
• ^1 ^1 ^
in the theater of
r '
For discussion of QMC responsibility for repair
, ^ c»»
i ,
andj reclamation otr c^
Quartermaster items,
, ,
see k»i^,
below, .
the Salvage, Reclamation, and Surplus tion. The result was a considerable re-
Property Branch, was supervising Quar- orientation of the OQMG organization to
termaster conservation and reclamation the purposes of conservation.
activities.^ It was transferred to the newly
created Service Installations Division Relations With the Services of Supply
when the OQMG was reorganized along
functional lines early in 1942."' The sal- Before March 1 942 The Quartermaster
vage function, however, was not com- General had dealt directly with the field
pletely centralized in this division, for cer- and had issued directions on both policy
tain of the major commodity units, notably and procedure, particularly in reference
those in charge of subsistence and of fuels, to matters of general salvage. His responsi-
assumed and retained full responsibility bilities and authority were changed when
for the conservation of their respective
During World War II,
classes of supply. ^^
'(1) AR 30-2145, 28 Apr 3 1, sub: QMC —Un-
serviceable Prop, Including Waste Material. (2) AR
important responsibilities wer© therefore 30-2110, 27 Apr 31, sub: QMC— Salv and Laundry
Activities.
carried out by commodity divisions as in-
tegral phases of their activities, while
Ml) WD Cir 143, Sec. I, 15 Jul 41, sub: Disposal
of Scrap. (2) Min of Salv and Reclm Conf. p. 7. re-
others were necessarily discharged by marks of Col Falkenau.
collaboration of two or more units under
'
(1) OQMG OO 25-F, 15 May 41, sub: Orgn of
Sup Div. (2) This unit had also handled laundry ac-
executive supervision. tivities, but in July 1941 a separate Laundry Branch
the Services of Supply (SOS) was estab- parently ignored the existing Quarter-
lished. A salvage unit within the Distribu- master salvage organization.
tion Division, SOS, became responsible for The chief of the Service Installations
formulating policies pertaining to salvage Division, OQMG, reminded Headquar-
operations, for co-ordinating and super- ters, SOS, that no change had been made
vising all salvage operations involving in Quartermaster responsibility for han-
more than one military agency, for con- dling salvage and that the QMC, as re-
sulting and co-ordinating with the various quired by Army Regulations, had had for
salvage sections of the War Production many years a completely functioning or-
Board (WPB) on Army salvage problems, ganization, plan, and procedure for the
and for conducting inspections of salvage handling of salvage, which included a sal-
operations at large scrap-generating in- vage officer in every post camp, and sta-
,
stallations under Army jurisdiction.^- tion and a corps area salvage officer as
From March 1942 until the summer of assistant to the corps area quartermaster.
1943, The Quartermaster General func- The latter was charged with the super-
tioned as a staff officer of the SOS in vision of all salvage activities throughout
supervising salvage activities, and clearly the corps area. He went on to add that it
defined relationships with the SOS and was generally understood at a conference
with the field were only gradually at- held in the SOS on 28 May that salvage
tained. officers were to be appointed in each sup-
Although in the spring of 1942 a regula- ply service only for the purpose of main-
tion had reaffirmed the traditional respon- taining liaison with Quartermaster officers
sibility of The Quartermaster General for in order to facilitate the flow of dormant
the handling of all Army salvage with the scrap to them, and for supervising the
exception of exchangeable property and handling of industrial scrap. '^ It seemed
of scrap resulting directly from manufac- to him that SOS instructions tended "to
turing operations, difficulties soon de- create multiple authority as to salvage be-
veloped.'^ On 8 June Headquarters, SOS, tween the Quartermaster Corps and other
directed each of the corps area com- services and to provide for the formulation
manders to designate and report to the of entirely independent plans -and pro-
Salvage Section, SOS, the name of one cedures for the handling and disposition
officer who would be directly responsible of salvage in the Zone of Interior."'"
for salvage operations in his corps area. Headquarters, SOS, confirmed the inter-
They were also ordered to establish at pretation made by the OQMG
of the in-
each post and station under their jurisdic-
tion a suitable organization to insure cfose
'-
See SOS Orgn Manual, 30 Sep 42, p. 302.1 1.
'
'•
the zone of interior.'^ These directions lations at posts, camps, and stations."
'" Memo, Col Charles
S. Hamilton, OQMG, for
caused immediate confusion, both in the Chief of Distr Br, SOS, 15 Jun 42, sub: Salv Proce-
fieldand in Washington, since they ap- dure, 400.93.
8 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
tent of the conference on 28 May and re- nounced by the SOS, should issue from his
quested that all necessary co-operation office and that the actual direction of field
and liaison be established by The Quar- salvage was an operating function that
termaster General with other supply serv- should be handled at the supply service
ices and field agencies of the QMC
in level. As a result of his complaint. Head-
order that salvage might move promptly quarters, SOS, agreed that salvage direc-
into productive channels.'" tives to the Army
whole would be
as a
To eliminate the confusion that had re- published only after the concurrences of
sulted from the 8 June order, a new direc- the General Staff' and the commanding
tive clarified the division of responsibility generals of the Army Air Forces (AAF)
between the SOS Salvage Section and the and the Army Ground Forces (AGF) had
supply services. been obtained, and after consultation with
Only matters affecting policy, controver-
the chief of the supply service concerned.-"
sial matters that involve more than one mili- At the same time, the division of re-
tary agency, and matters that should be sponsibilities for salvage operations was
brought to the attention of the Commanding restated. The SOS Salvage Section, oper-
General, Services of Supply, will be referred
ating as a policy and control unit of the
to the Salvage Section, Distribution Branch,
Procurement and Distribution Division, Commanding General, SOS, was to for-
Services of Supply. Matters pertaining to mulate policies pertaining to salvage oper-
technical advice will be referred to the War ations, co-ordinate and supervise salvage
Production Board or to salvage technicians
,
activities of the supply services, and, when
employed by the Supply Services.'^
necessary, deal directly with the com-
While technical advice was to be pro- manding generals of all service commands
vided by the QMC and the other supply on salvage matters, keeping the appro-
services, the SOS Salvage Section began priate chief of supply service informed.
at this time to employ its own staff'of sal- The Quartermaster General remained re-
vage technicians to assist field salvage sponsible for general salvage at posts,
all
officers where unusual difficulty was en- camps, and stations, while the chiefs of the
countered in moving scrap.'" The section supply services continued to supervise the
took legitimate measures to co-ordinate salvaging of industrial scrap resulting
the action of the supply services and that from manufacturing operations. The
of the servicecommands. In addition it Quartermaster General and the other
had authority to deal directly with field chiefs of the supply services were author-
units, and in an increasing number of •'
Ind. Chief of Distr Br, SOS, to
1st 18 TQMG.
cases the SOS Salvage Section issued di- Jun on memo cited above, n. 16.
42,
rectives to these agencies on its own initia-
'-
Ltr, TAG
to CGs of All CAs, 27 Jun 42, sub:
ized to prepare all technical and training chinery for handling salvage matters in
manuals dealing with salvage procedure 1943.
and operations and to issue directives The Army-WPB administrative system
based on policies of the SOS. Until the for handling salvage, as well as many
''
summer of 1943, when complete staff re- basic policies, stemmed from decisions
sponsibility was transferred to Headquar- made at a general conference held late in
ters, SOS, which by that time had been May 1942 and attended by representatives
renamed Army Service Forces (ASF), this of the WPB and its Bureau of Industrial
division of authority governed the rela- Conservation, of SOS headquarters, and
tionship between the SOS and the QMC. of the chiefs of the Army supply services.
The directive issued by the Army follow-
Relations With Civilian Agencies ing this conference not only provided for
the installation of an integrated adminis-
During World War II certain civilian trative system throughout the Army but
as well as military agencies had important also defined the services that the WPB
responsibilities for directing unserviceable would furnish.-' The WPB was to provide
supplies and scrap into the proper chan- technical assistance to Army salvage
nels of civilian and industrial consump- officers, follow up Army salvage in the
tion. It was some time before the need for hands of civilian dealers to see that it was
central governmental co-ordination be- not hoarded, and control by allocation the
came acute, and not Bureau of flow of material into proper industrial
until the
Industrial Conservation was organized in channels.
the Office of Production Management In general, dormant scrap was to be
(OPM), later transferred to the WPB, was handled by the Bureau of Industrial Con-
there a central agency definitely charged servation, which at the time of these ar-
with the development of national pro- rangements was establishing regional
grams of conservation.'- Although the offices and making their consultatory serv-
bureau had developed plans for civilian ices available to all corps areas and supply
participation in salvage activities by the services. Since dormant scrap was usually
fall of 1941, it did not establish regional sold to scrap dealers rather than con-
machinery to supervise the scrap industry sumers and the WPB expected to com-
and co-operate with military field agencies plete the licensing of such dealers by 1
until the summer of 1942. June, SOS ordered sales to be made only
The direct concern of the WPB and the
Office of Price Administration (OPA) '-'
Memo cited above, n. 20(3).
with problems of allocations to consumers, -- The sponsorship of organized conservation by the
government had its beginning in the Advisory Com-
prices, and other matters having a bear-
mission to the Council of National Defense. Later a
ing on salvage activities, led to close co- —
number of special corporations the Rubber Reserve
operation between these agencies and the Company, the Metals Reserve Company, the Defense
Supplies Corporation, and War Materials Incorpo-
QMC. Moreover, .he early arrangements rated —
under the direction of the Reconstruction
made by Headquarters, SOS, with the Finance Corporation rendered invaluable assistance
WPB were an important factor in develop- to the Army in utilizing and disposing of certain
salvage materials.
ments leading to the reorganization of the - Ltr, TAG
to TQMGet al., 8 Jun 42, sub: Salv
to licensed dealers. Where any consider- Army with the WPB drive for collection
able accumulation of miscellaneous scrap of civilian scrap. Initially,Army salvage
or dormant scrap of one classification was operations were to be directed toward
to be sold, SOS directed Army salvage utilization of materials accumulated by
officers to report it to the bureau or its military agencies, but accumulations of
nearest regional office before disposal. In materials discovered away from military
the case of industrial scrap, SOS directed reservations were to be reported to the
that contacts be made with pertinent scrap Bureau of Industrial Conservation or its
units of the Materials Division, WPB, in regional representatives. On 27 June 1942,
Washington, D. C, prior to disposal of SOS directed The Quartermaster General
ferrous materials of carload lot, or greater to publish instructions to all salvage offi-
quantities of nonferrous and other mate- cers outlining the procedure for reporting
rials important for war production.'^ Ac-
-' Chiefs of supply services and the WPB were to
tual control of the movement of scrap from determine these amounts by agreement. When sale
dealers to industrial consumers was the of either dormant or industrial scrap was made to
any foundry, or other consumer, the
dealer, mill,
responsibility of the Allocation Section of
WPB scrap units were to be informed of the name of
the Materials Division, WPB. the purchaser, the type and tonnage of material, and
The arrangement with the
original the date of transaction in order to enable the WPB
to follow up on disposition. This information was
WPB also produced a tentative statement vital to the WPB in allocating materials to con-
of policy regarding co-operation by the sumers.
SALVAGE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 11
and the OQMG co-operated closely with pair of suitable articles, and the distribu-
this agency during the war. tion and reissue of renovated property.
It was at this point that interdepend-
Relations With the Field ence of action between troop unit com-
manders and Quartermaster supply agen-
The conservation of Army materiel was cies was greatest, and divergent responsi-
a field activity carried out largely in lower bilities produced conflicting points of view.
echelons of the War Department and the Army Regulations prescribed that articles
Army in many and widely dispersed geo- of unserviceable property were to be
graphical locations. The success of the turned over by using organizations to the
Quartermaster program depended upon QMC
for salvage.-' In the process, officers
effective supervision, but this was difficult receiving the property were empowered
to achieve because in the conduct of con- to return to the using unit any articles
servation programs through supply and considered fit for continued use ,to stipu-
command channels The Quartermaster
General acted as a special staff agent of
Ltr, TAG to Chiefs of Sup Svs et al., 27 Jun 42,
-''
the SOS, with varying powers of super-
sub: Info on Salv Procedure, SPX 400.7 (6-23-42)
vision.
MO-SPPD-TS-M.
-«
AGO Memo S30- 14-43, 6 Apr 43, sub: Policy
Relating to Domestic Salv.
Command Agencies -"
(1) AR 20-35, sub: IGD— Insp of Prop for Con-
demnation. (2) AR 35-6640, sub: Finance Dept
The Quartermaster conservation pro- Lost, Destroyed, Damaged, or Unserviceable Prop.
gram was promoted in two ways. First, (3) AR 30-2145, sub: QMC— Unserviceable Prop,
Including Waste Material. (4) AR 30-2110, sub:
were concentrated on fostering the
efforts QMC— Salv and Laundry Activities. (5) AR 615-40,
proper upkeep, care, and use of Quarter- sub: Enlisted Men — C&E.
12 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
late that property in need of repair be re- becoming unserviceable in all echelons of
turned to the unit after processing by the the Army , other than that actually con-
nearest available repair shop, or to rec- sumed or maintained in combat areas.
ommend that an individual be assessed for The QMC arranged for local repair of
damage or loss of property resulting from Quartermaster items used by troops sta-
negligence or more culpable action. tioned in the zone of interior, and for the
On the other hand, troop unit com- renovation, reissue, and disposal of vast
manders were concerned with obtaining quantities of articles turned in by them in
the best possible and most presentable the course of their training and on their
equipment for their men. In the past, in departure for overseas duty. It also made
fact, their reputations, as well as those of arrangements for handling the ever-in-
their supply officers and sergeants, had creasing volume of materiel returned from
been enhanced by their ability to obtain theaters in the form of usable goods and
suitable supplies and replacements. Quar- salvage.
termaster responsibility for conservation Although subject to the supervision of
encountered directly the insistence of The Quartermaster General, such salvage
many commanders upon independence and reclamation activities were carried on
with regard to supply of their troop units. in the post, camp, and station installations
Attempts by Quartermaster representa- of the service commands, which had re-
tives through vigorous and conscientious placed the corps areas in the summer of
administration of inspection to bring pres- 1942.-'^ The corps areas had long exercised
sure upon unwilling commanders to retain general supervision over these activities,
usable equipment often caused them to although commanders were responsible
resort to various subterfuges, such as muti- only for "the collection of all salvageable
lation of equipment to insure condem-
its property and material at each post, camp,
nation or to prevent its repair and return and station under their jurisdiction." Such
to the user. This area of intermingling re- salvage was turned over to the for QMC
sponsibilities was later to be thoroughly disposal by procedures determined by The
examined and modified so as to encourage Quartermaster General, but corps area
command responsibility and respect for commanders were responsible for "prompt
property. disposal" by agencies under their super-
"''
vision
Service Commands New and broader control, however, was
commanding generals of the
vested in the
The most important contribution commands. Under policies pro-
of the service
Quartermaster program lay in promoting mulgated by SOS and directives on pro-
conservation among the troops, who used cedure issued by The Quartermaster Gen-
the great bulk' of materiel, but the success eral, they exercised "supervision and con-
of the program depended on the effective- trol of all salvage activities (including
the attention of the service commands to less adequate supervision was provided.
the fact that directives were not reaching Efforts were therefore made to bring
the operating agencies where they were service command activities under more
needed.'' This was particularly serious effective supervision. The OQMG became
when local officers received binding '"egu-
lations of WPB, OPA, and other govern- " AGO Memo W30-3-42, 15 Sep 42, sub: Au-
thority and Responsibility of CGs of SvCs on Salv
ment agencies only after infractions had Matters.
already occurred. To eliminate this diffi- " Col Falkenau to Dir of Sv Instls Div, OQMG,
culty it was necessary for the OQMG
to 27 Jul 42. sub: Manual for .SvCs.
Chief of Salv and Surplus Prop Br to
)
officer as a "peculiar individual." ^'" Re- 30 Jan 43, sub: Elimination of Unnecessary Over-
lappings and Duplications of Functions. (2) Brig
gional responsibilities obviously needed Gen Harold A. Barnes, DQMG,
to Sv Instls Div,
clarification. OQMG, 10 Feb 43, sub: Decentralization of Action.
SALVAGE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 15
While several specific salvage controls had OQMG representatives visiting service
already been delegated to the service com- commands to advise commanders of the
mands, The Quartermaster General felt purpose and nature of their visits and to
that others should be retained because of confine their activities to those arranged
the lack of personnel in the service com- for unless otherwise requested by com-
mands. ^^ In particular, he objected to manders.^'
delegating authority to approve indefinite- Most service commanders were con-
quantity contracts for the disposal of cer- sidered co-operative in administering
tain waste materials, the supervision and Quartermaster programs, and many sal-
approval of which required knowledge of vage and reclamation officers rendered
fluctuating market conditions. Supervision oustanding service under Quartermaster
by the OQMG of these long-term con- direction despite being handicapped by
tracts had increased the revenue from lack of personnel.^" On the other hand,
them by many thousands of dollars per those service commanders who were skep-
month, and he argued that delegation of tical of the value of salvage work or who
this authority could not be justified on the were not disposed to be helpful were able
basis of economy to the government. at times to rely upon a literal interpreta-
Headquarters, ASF, agreed to his reten- tion of the command prerogative to ob-
tion of this control, but only until such struct the exercise of necessary supervision
time as sufficient qualified salvage per- by The Quartermaster General.
sonnel became available to the service Although the need for closer supervision
commands.^" of Quartermaster conservation activities
A similar problem arose in the summer wasclear, little could be done to clarify
of 1943. The Deputy Chief of Staff" for the responsibilities of the QMC and the
Service Commands, ASF, proposed that service commands until the established
technical maintenance inspectors attached regulations and procedures covering the
to the OQMG be assigned to the service disposition of unserviceable property,
commands to conduct "continuing inspec- usually referred to simply as the "salvage
The Quartermaster
tions" from that level. procedure," were revised.
General objected to this proposal because
he had not been able to find enough quali- Clarification of Procedures
fied inspectors for service in all areas An attack upon the inherited salvage
under the projected decentralization. system materialized in the fall of 1942.
More fundamentally, he opposed the Col Falkenau to Dir of Sv Instls Div, OQMG, 13
'"
move on the ground that, as long as direc- Feb 43, sub: Decentralization of Action.
^"
(1) Memo, Hq ASFforTQMG, 18 Mar 43, sub:
tives charged him with insuring the effec-
Indefinite Quantity Contracts for Sale of Waste Ma-
tiveness of Quartermaster operations, cen- terials. (2) Memo, Col Hamilton, OQMG, for ACofS
tral inspections by the OQMG and other for Opns, ASF, 24 Mar 43, same sub. (3) Memo,
legitimate working contacts with local ac- ACofS for Opns, ASF, for TQMG, 2 Apr 43, same
sub.
tivities were necessary. A small group for
(1) Chief of Maint Br to Dir of Sv Instls Div,
^'
supervision and inspection was retained in OQMG, 25 Aug 43, sub: Decentralization of Con-
the OQMG, but General Gregory agreed tinuing Insps. (2) Memo, TQMG for DCofS for
SvCs, ASF, 30 Aug 43,same sub.
to eliminate certain sources of irritation to '-
Interv, OQMG historian with Lt Col John P.
service commanders by instructing all Loomis, Exec Off, Sv Instls Div, OQMG, 22 Feb 44.
16 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Late in November the Chief of Staff, SOS, visory functions as were required.
expressed the developing concern in staff To initiate the necessary changes. Head-
circles: quarters, SOS, arranged a conference of
representatives of the interested agencies
The salvage activities of the Army are in a
confused and disorganized state. Terms have on 2 December. " In preparation for this
not been assigned definite meanings. A large meeting, the head of the Salvage Branch,
number of agencies are involved. Paper work OQMG, drafted an analysis of the chief of
is excessive. A great mass of Army Regula-
staff's directive, which was defensive of
tions, War Department Circulars and memo-
randa have been issued.
^^ the existing salvage system. His analysis
was obviously influenced by the direct and
He went on to add that "the importance of implied criticisms of the work of the QMC
salvage activities increases in direct pro- and the suggestion of reorganization. He
portion to the increasing difficulty in meet- felt that the confusion and abuses had
ing the requirements of the Army." Fur- been greatly overemphasized, and that
thermore, while many of the War Depart- "considering the rapid expansion of the
ment circulars and memoranda empha- Army and the tremendous influx of inex-
sized the importance of conservation, they perienced oflficers and enlisted personnel,
continued to require actions inconsistent an organization job on salvage has been
with the existing stringency of raw mate- done which compares favorably with any-
rials because they had been written before thing which would have been accom-
the war. plished in an industrial organization or
He directed the Assistant Chief of Staff elsewhere under parallel conditions."
^°'
'
established clearly and" that operating for TQMG et a/., 28 Nov 42, sub: Conf on Activities
functions be decentralized to the field, as- and Regulations Pertaining to Sal\-.
Col Falkenau to Dir of Sv Instls Div. OQMG,
'
1
signing to SOS agencies only such super- Dec 42, sub: Analvsis of 21 Nov Memo.
SALVAGE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 17
accountability and "regularity" in the for the clearing of papers and the approval
handling of military property were of pri- of applicable policies and procedures.
Both the Chief of Finance and The In-
mary interest/*^ Enforcement of these regu-
lationswas generally deemed sufficient to spector General, in addition to The Quar-
accomplish such conservation as was termaster General, had important and
needed. In the course of time, numerous often controlling responsibilities in the dis-
amendments had been added to the regu- position procedure.^' This fact alone pre-
lations on the theory that while property vented The Quartermaster Corps from ex-
,
accountability and liability should be en- ercising real control over the conservation
forced and property disposition controlled of most of its supplies in the field and
by the survey officers and inspectors, their tended to hinder the speedy and efficient
actions should be so circumscribed and salvaging for which The Quartermaster
defined that the barrier against malprac- General was held responsible. Because of
tices would be "air-tight" and the observ- the many agencies involved and because
ance of official policies automatically in- of the time-consuming process required to
sured. The resulting regulations were so amend Army Regulations, a simple pro-
complex as to be almost impossible of in- cedure, useful for wartime purposes, did
terpretation and administration. not emerge until two years after Pearl
At the same time, these regulations Harbor.
called for practices not adapted to an When military property became unserv-
emergency and wartime situation in which iceable at any time,'*" it could be retired
the emphasis had shifted from the main- from property accounts only by an inven-
tenance of property accountability to an tory and inspection report or a report of
expeditious processing of materiel for fur- survey, the procedures for which involved
ther military and industrial uses. Probably a "long, complicated, burdensome series of
the most important and controversial of steps." ^' The surveying officer or inspector
these practices was the one requiring muti- had to decide upon the method for the dis-
lation or destruction of property submitted posal of the unserviceable property, and
for condemnation, in order to prevent its no less than eight alternatives had been
being resubmitted to an inspector to make added to the regulations in the years fol-
up shortages in accounts or in order to se- lowing World War I.'" The formality of
cure unauthorized replacement issues. the screening procedure and the necessity
Although this practice had been adopted
^'M AR 35-6640, sub: Finance Dept — Lost, De-
1 )
not only the functions of local officers who clothing and equipage issued to the enlisted man. See
were permitted to act upon instruments of AR*' 615-40.
Memo, Gen Styer for ACofS for Opns, SOS, 21
property disposition, but also those of the Nov 42, sub: Salv Activities.
(1) AR 20-35, par. 7. (2) AR 35-6640, par. 10.
^0
overhead agencies having responsibilities
18 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
of clearances from higher authority caused means whereby the technical services
delays and tied up great quantities of could exert a real and systematic control
equipment awaiting disposition. More- over the utilization and disposal of prop-
over, the physical disposition of unserv- erty.
iceable articles usually awaited the full Instead of making use of repair shops,
consummation and approval of formal which would have strengthened the re-
proceedings. sponsibilities of the chiefs of the technical
The established procedures were also services. Headquarters, SOS, proposed to
inadequate in that technically competent expedite the processing and disposal of
individuals were not necessarily appointed equipment by establishing in the service
to act in the disposition of various classes commands special salvage and reclama-
of equipment. Numerous communications tion centers located "along the line of flow
to the field urged competent inspection of of property requiring repair" and of sal-
technical supplies, but it was difficult to vage material.''- This proposal was ap-
obtain qualified personnel. Moreover, ap- parently influenced by the movement then
parently no effective steps could be taken under way at Headquarters, SOS, to con-
to counteract the tendency of com- centrate the administration of all field ac-
manders to assign "miscellaneous" duties tivities on a functional basis under the
of this kind to transients or to already busy service commands.
oflficers to be accomplished on a part-time
""^
The OQMG
objected to the establish-
basis. ment of such centers because it believed
The establishment of an organization that there was no such thing in the various
staffed by interested personnel trained to service commands as a general line of flow
handle property turned in for disposal of property requiring repair or of salvage
would afford the most effective means of material. Furthermore, it felt that the plan
promoting conservation. From a technical would result in a great deal of unecessary
standpoint, at least, such an organization transportation and rehandling of material.
was already available in repair shops. These considerations dictated against the
Even when unserviceable property was plan's adoption, but one of its features was
not shipped to shops for processing, all but utilized. The original plan had suggested
the simplest questions of reparability and that the proposed centers process both sal-
disposition had to be determined by rep- vage generated domestically and that re-
resentatives of repair shops or by personnel ceived from overseas bases and theaters.
with comparable experience. With the With the first major expansion of combat
possible exception of salvage officers and operations, the necessity of planning for
specialists, personnel managing repair and the latter became critical. Salvage centers,
reclamation activities were as a group located near ports and receiving for segre-
probably the most "conservation minded" gation all salvage material returned from
among technical service representatives. overseas, were established and became
Another necessary phase of their duty was ^' See Min of Salv and Reclm Conf, p. 3, remarks
to decide whether the condition of equip- of Col Falkenau.
ment turned in was the result of normal ^-
Col Hamilton, OQMG, for Chief, Distr
Memo,
Div, SOS, Dec 42, sub: Disp of Unserviceable Prop
14
wear, negligence, or more culpable action.
and Salv Opns, and appended plan submitted by SOS
The repair shop systems were the logical at 10 December conference.
SALVAGE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 19
permanent features of wartime salvage 1943 did include a provision that defi-
operations. nitely forbade the mutilation or destruc-
In the early spring of 1943 procedures tion of property, except in those instances
for declaring equipment unserviceable where it was patently necesesary and ap-
were simplified by revoking most of the propriate as, for example, the destruction
authority of inspectors and surveying offi- of unsafe subsistence, and medical stores or
cers.''^ Instead, responsibility was placed the mutilation of "distinctive" articles of
on the using unit. The inventory and in- the uniform. Considerable controversy
spection report was eliminated entirely, had arisen over the tendency of certain in-
except for use in the disposition of govern- spectors arbitrarily to order the destruc-
ment-owned animals. A report of survey tion of "worthless" articles out of igno-
was substituted as the one means of clear- rance of the market potentialities of the
ing unserviceable items from the property items or their further use within the Army.
accounts of the accountable officers, but Actually official policy had provided that
many troublesome procedural provisions inspectors, where feasible, mark items
were eliminated since alternatives for dis- "IC" (inspected and condemned) rather
position that might be recommended by than order mutilation or destruction. At-
the surveying officers were now reduced tention had repeatedly been given to
from eight to four. '^ formulating instructions for the marking
The War Department further directed: of goods. Inspectors, however, had justi-
It will be axiomatic that disposition of un- fied their course of action on the ground
serviceable property, that is, whether it shall that it prevented abuse and protected the
be repaired and continued in service, or
government against fraud, despite the fact
turned over to a salvage officer after the
spare parts and other components have been that it interfered with economical repair
removed, will be determined by repair shops of and salvaging. Many months had been re-
various echelons operating under technical instruc- quired even to secure agreement on the
tions furnished by the chief of service to which the
necessity of forbidding the practice of
property pertains:'^
mutilation, alone actually stopping it.
let
In furtherance of this principle standard The elimination of all unnecessary mark-
arrangements were established for the ing and mutilation had been first agreed
shipment of equipment to repair shops for upon in July 1942 in a conference between
inspection and processing, or for the on- The Quartermaster General and The In-
siteinspection of equipment by shop offi- spector General.The OQMG Salvage
cers in appropriate cases. Thus the repair Branch had thereupon issued instructions
shops became actual administ'^ators, to the field, but the practice had con-
rather than mere adjuncts, of the inspec- tinued.^'' It was late in 1942 before mutila-
tion and disposition process.
^'WDCir 75, 16 Mar 43.
But if the principle of technical control >^
(1) Memo, Col Hamilton, OQMG, for Chief of
through repair echelons was now clearly Distr Div, Dec 42, sub; Disp of Unserviceable
SOS, 14
Prop and Salv Opns. (2) Memo, Col Falkenau,
established, neither the simplification of OQMG, for Col Hamilton, 8 Dec 42, sub: Disp of
1
improper disposal practices. Although ar- were later introduced, this general restric-
ticles rendered unserviceable by normal tion on the use of surveys virtually com-
use or deterioration in service were turned pleted the separation of accountability
in to the supply officer by means of a and control of the disposition of property.
simple certificate executed by the unit
commander or responsible officer, the pro- Transfer of Responsibility to the
cedure from that point on remained cum- Army Service Forces
bersome. Property could also be submitted
to repair echelons and returned after proc- Although no change was made in the
essing without undue red tape or delay, assignment of responsibility for various
but the authority that at any stage con- conservation functions in March 1943,
demned articles was required in all cases simplification of procedures helped to pre-
to execute a report of survey. A sem- pare the way for a final settlement of
blance of the former control procedure responsibility for salvage as a matter of
was preserved in the requirement that staff supervision. Many special factors,
each survey be submitted to a "disinter- however, affected the actual decision that
ested" officer, who would examine the ar- was made.
ticles and ascertain that they had not been Under broad, general policies estab-
improperly disposed of as a result of pres- lished by the Distribution Division, ASF,
sure from troop units or because of other
reasons.
'''
(1) WDCir
393,Sec. I, 4 Dec 42, sub: Mutilation
and Marking of Salvageable Materials. (2) Cir WD
Experience soon demonstrated that in 75, 16 Mar 43. This circular rescinded AR
20-35,
most localities the volume of property ac- which had previously provided inspectors with direc-
cumulating to be processed was so great tions on mutilation.
routine cases thereafter, .either a brief was required to appoint a disinterested officer to re-
'''
ceive property and determine by physical check that
"turn-in slip" or an exchange document, the number and description of articles to be sahaged
on which the responsible officer had exe- were as listed.
SALVAGE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 21
primarily to the failure of the Ordnance "- Memo, Col John S. Raaen, Ord Dept, for CG
SOS, 22 Oct 42, sub: Sales of Scrap and Salv.
Department to adhere to the regulations. «' 2d Ind, Col Hamilton, OQMG, to Distr Div,
(1)
Directives of that agency designated as in- SOS, 31 Oct 42, on memo cited above, n. 62. (2) 3d
dustrial scrap many items, such as packag- Ind, ACofS for Opns, SOS, to CofOrd, 14 Nov 42,
on same memo.
ing materials, rags, paper, and r'.ibber, '' Memo, Col Falkenau for Col Hamilton, OQMG,
that should have been handled under 4 Jul 42, sub: Relation of POEs to CA QMs Re Salv.
procedures established for dormant « AGO Memo S30-1-43, 2 Jan 43, sub: Policy for
scrap."'
Handling Oversea Salv.
'•"
(1) Memo, Gen Styer for ACofS for Opns, SOS,
Conflict had also developed over the 21 Nov 42, sub: Salv Activities. (2) Chief of Salv Br
conduct of salvage activities at ports. The to Dir of Sv Insds Div, 1 OQMG,
Dec 42, sub:
Chief of Transportation had insisted upon Analysis of 2 1 Nov Memo.
''~
Under toll contracts, current production scrap
keeping the ports of embarkation entirely was sold directly to contractors furnishing fabricated
independent of corps areas and any local items or materials to the Army.
22 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
tionshad eliminated such contracts, it was mands under direct, but minimum, super-
unnecessary to continue this confusing vision by the ASF Salvage and Redistribu-
division of responsibility. tion Branch.'" Back of it, too, was the
This proposal was officially advanced record of difficulties encountered in distin-
by The Quartermaster General six months guishing between staff and operating
later, but at that time Headquarters, ASF, responsibilities for salvage and the emer-
saw no reason to disturb the existing ar- gence of new problems that pressed for
rangements on salvage responsibilities settlement. Thus, when General Gregory
since studies concerning the entire salvage had suggested clarification of service com-
system were in progress/'** These studies mand responsibilities in regard to the flow
covered not only the disposal of scrap and of salvage returned from overseas. Head-
surplus property, but also the redistribu- quarters, ASF, had undertaken the devel-
tion and utilization of materials and opment of administrative procedures for
equipment. In order to tighten controls in that purpose on the ground that other
these fields, ASF had vested authority for considerations in addition to those of tech-
staff supervision of the disposition of scrap nical control were involved and that the
and surplus property in a new Redistribu- operations of many agencies, including the
tion Branch, organized in the Production ports of embarkation and theater organ-
Division of the Office of the Director of izations, were The Quartermas-
affected.
Materiel in May 1943. The Director of ter General,on the other hand, had
Operations, ASF, as before, continued to steadily maintained that the matter was
exercise staff supervision over reclamation entirely one of operations rather than gen-
and maintenance activities.'''' eral policy.
These developments culminated in a The desire of Headquarters, ASF, to re-
final proposal to eliminate overlapping organize the arrangements for supervising
and duplication of responsibility and to salvage activities seems to have been stim-
provide for more effective staff supervision ulated also by the reports critical of Quar-
of salvage activities by transferring all such termaster administration submitted by
responsibility from The Quartermaster ASF representatives who had made in-
General to the Production Division, ASF. spection trips through the service corn-
Despite the objections of General Greg-
(l) Memo, Col Hamilton, OQMG, for Chief of
s'*
mands during the spring and summer of ingly valuable clues to conditions in main-
1943. Although these inspections were tenance and supply, along with the utility
often conducted hurriedly and without of equipment designs, and served as a basis
adequate attention to the causes of condi- for corrective action by various agencies.^
tions observed, they invariably resulted in In addition, the analysis of data on quan-
vigorous indictment of the activities sur- tities and potentialities of salvage was to
veyed.'^ Many of these criticisms reflected assume increasing importance in supply
conditions that had been aggravated by computation. For the Corps, moreover,
inadequate supervision of local activities. there was to develop a special need for
While the criticisms did not take into ac- close contact with the administration of
count either the inability of The Quarter- salvage activities because of Quartermas-
master General to secure the authorization ter responsibility for civilian supply pro-
of necessary supervisory personnel for the curements in support of theater operations.
service commands or the limitations A large part of these procurements were
placed upon direct Quartermaster super- estimated and secured from salvage stocks
vision of activities, this omission served of clothing and other articles. The QMC
merely to emphasize the dilemma that had still had vital interests in salvage, though
responsibilities for salvage, which were so the OQMG had given consideration to the
closely related to those of reclamation, development of a broad program of indoc-
would "retard the supply objectives within trination. The Quartermaster General had
the Army, and more especially within the "'
(1) See for example. Memo, ACofS for Opns,
Army Service Forces," he was anticipating ASF, for TQMG, 15 Apr 43, sub: Insp Rpt of Salv
and Reclm Activities in Third SvC. (2) [1st Ind], Col
problems that might arise. '^ Thus, the
Rudolf W. Rien<ohl, Third SvC, to TQMG, 14
study and improvement of the interrelated May 43.
activities of conservation and salvage held
''
Memo, TQMG for CG ASF, 28 Jul 43, sub:
Transfer of Staff Supervision of Salv Activities.
special interest for the QMC. Studies '
Rpt. Dir of QM Bd to TQMG, Rpt of the
made by the Quartermaster Board of ar- Quartermaster Board, Camp Lee, Va., 1 Feb 42-30
ticles received in salvage furnished increas- Jun 44, pp. 110-18.
24 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
called attention to the difficulty that an announced policies for which called for
unfavorable Army record in the conserva- priority to beaccorded to the consumption
tion of essential items, such as food, cloth- of used, renovated, and limited-standard
ing, and gasoline, might create in securing articles.'**
the co-operation of the civilian population Soon after Pearl Harbor basic proce-
in the prosecution of the war.''' dures were modified to the extent that
He had suggested initiation throughout troop commanders were relieved of the
the Army of a "public relations" campaign duty of preparing surveys in the disposi-
to impress upon every individual the need tion of equipment. Each station com-
for conservation. To achieve this end, mander was instructed to appoint one or
slogans, publicity in camp newspapers, more local boards of property adjustment,
and competitive awards granted to organ- composed of officers of suitable experience
izations with good conservation records from the station complement.''' They were
might be used. He had further proposed authorized to act as surveying officers and
the establishment of a single agency with inspectors for all property submitted by
comprehensive responsibility for carrying units, to prepare papers at the request of
out this program. Although a broad pro- units, and to take final action for the sta-
gram did not materialize, the OQMG tion commander on all papers. At the
Salvage Branch had continued to urge the same time, the War Department directed
use of educational programs and publicity that the amount of evidence supporting
through established channels as the most surveys, and all other red tape incident to
effective means of promoting conservation this procedure, be reduced to the mini-
among the troops.' At the same time, it
' mum absolutely necessary to establish facts
had recognized the limitations of direct in each case.
enforcement methods. These modifications led to a simplifica-
Early in the war unit commanders were tion that was much needed, but many
generally dilatory in pursuing their re- criticized them because they fostered a ne-
sponsibilities for promoting conservation glect of the investigative function of the
activities among their troops and for co- surveying officer, and, by relieving unit
operating with the supply agencies. At the commanders of the duty of preparing sur-
same time, local salvage activities were veys, resulted in deterioration of supply
especially hampered by unclarified ad- discipline among troops. Relieving the
ministrative responsibilities, as well as by troop commanders of a feeling of property
a lack of experience and a shortage of '•
Memo, 1st Lt John S. Hayes, OQMG,
for WD
manpower. Neither the quality nor the ef- Dir of Bureau of Public Relations, 14 Feb 42, sub:
Proposed Campaign for Waste Prevention.
ficiency of service in local repair shops had ' (1) Ltr, Chief of Salv and Surplus Prop Br,
improved sufficiently to bring about a OQMG, to Chief of Public Relations Bureau, 13 Apr
ma.ximum recovery of articles or the full 42, sub: Tng Films, Posters, Etc. for Salv Indoctrina-
co-operation of unit commanders in the tion. (2) Charles R. Van Etten, Salv Specialist, to
Chief of Salv and Surplus Prop Br. OQMG, 21 Feb
reuse of these items and the enforcement 42, same sub.
of conservation policies. For the OQMG, "'
See below. Ch. II.
the most complex and difficult problems
""
(1) WD
Cir 105, 10 Apr 42, sub: Simplified Ac-
various materials or projects to be used for Some divisions of the were OQMG
educating and indoctrinating the troops in critical of this major change in policy,
the need for and the objectives of conser- fearing that it would "provide a means for
vation. It further directed them to engage promiscuous turning in of property by
in extensive publicity eflforts in installa- units" in the zone of interior in the same
tions directly under their jurisdiction. manner that supplies were turned in by
While the objectives were phrased mainly alerted organizations."'' The con- OQMG
in terms of action within troop organiza- curred in the change nonetheless, for it be-
tions, the program also called for maxi- lieved that this policy, based on the integ-
mum participation by the technical serv-
^" Min of Conf of CGs of SvCs, Ft. Leonard Wood,
ices and improvement of their functions in
Mo.. 27-29 Jul 44, pp. F13-14.
assisting troops in the conservation of "(1) Memo, Deputy Dir of Opns, ASF, for
equipment. TQMG, 18 Aug 43, sub: SOP
Promulgation of
for
A proposal in the summer of 1944 to re- Army Conserv Indoctrination Program. (2) The
program was not officially initiated until October.
turn to troop commanders the processing WD Cir 240, Sec. V, 4 Oct 43, sub: Army Conserv
of survey reports in order to emphasize Program.
^- Min of Conf of CGs of SvCs. Ft. Leonard Wood,
supply discipline was rejected as unsound
Mo.. 27-29 Jul 44. F13-14.
and inconsistent with the purpose under- ^^
TM 38^403. 1 Aug 44. sub: Station Sup Pro-
lying the formation of the ASF —
that of cedure.
providing service to free the other two
^'
(1) Col Hamilton to C&E Br, S&D Div. OQMG,
21 Aug44, sub: Proposed Revision of AR 613.40. (2)
commands from as much of the adminis- Chief of Stock Control Br. Div. to S&D DQMG for
trative and supply burden as possible.'' .Sup Ping and Opns, 2H Aug 44. same sub.
26 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
rity and honesty of all officers of the Army, nese struck in December 1941, the salvage
was a rational approach to the problem of of most basic materials was well under
accountability and responsibility.^^ The way.
importance of this policy trend on com- In addition to collection of scrap accu-
mand responsibility is emphasized by the mulating from the training and mainte-
fact that the new procedure was adopted nance of troops and from operations at the
in conjunction with a general review of various manufacturing establishments, a
procedures for handling separations of clean-up campaign was undertaken. All
personnel from the Army and in anticipa- metal items that were no longer of use on
tion of the problems incident to processing posts were turned in to salvage and sent
property turn-ins and personnel separa- through channels of industry to mills for
tions during demobilization.^'^ remelting and refabrication. Such accu-
mulations of "junk" on Army, reservations
had been augmented by the prewar lack
Quartermaster Salvage Program and the ban
of markets for scrap materials
placed upon its sale to avoid glutting
By the time Headquarters, ASF, as- available markets.'^'* These accumulations
sumed the supervision of general Army had also grown larger through the proc-
salvage in the summer of 1943, the QMC, essing of nonstandard, used, and other-
which had administered a salvage pro- wise deteriorated stocks available from
gram, since World War I, had developed a war reserves or received from military and
system that compared favorably with simi- government agencies, such as the National
lar civilian efforts in preserving and sal- Guard, the Citizens' Military Training
vaging materials for essential uses. As Camps (CMTC), and the Civilian Con-
early as July 1941, The Quartermaster servation Corps (CCC), whose activities
General inaugurated a broad program of were suspended or discontinued because of
conservation and reclamation of vitally the war. The largest transfers of material
needed materials. Communications to the were made by the CCC. As a result of the
field issued by the Salvage, Reclamation,
and Surplus Property Branch of the "•
[1st Ind], Brig Gen Herman Feldman, DQMG
OQMG or by higher authority at its in- for Sup Ping and Opns, to CO ASF, 29 Aug 44. See
stigation emphasized the contribution that also attached memo for. record.
the Army could make to its own supply ef-
-"[3d Ind], Dir of Control Div, ASF, to TQMG,
forts by the reuse of materials, and the
15 Jul 44, sub: Changes to AR
35-6560 and AR
615-40. (2) [5th Ind], Dir of Control Div, ASF, to
savings that would result from salvaging TQMG, 10 Aug 44, same sub. (3) [7th Ind], Dir of
materials for industrial use. Regular col- Control Div, ASF, to TQMG, 28 Aug 44, same sub.
tinning purposes was also studied in order Sale of Scrap Iron and Steel. (2) Memo, for ASW
to overcome certain obstacles, such as un-
TQMG et cil., 8 Mar 38, no sub. (3) Memo, ASW
for TQMG, 2 Nov 40, sub: Recision of Memo of 8
favorable freight rates.**' When the Japa- Mar 38.
SALVAGE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 27
f>>
clean-up campaign, old guns, war relics of scrap rubber, which was then and con-
all types, old rails, and many other items tinued for some time to be of special
found their way from Army posts to the interest to the public.
scrap heap for conversion into modern While carrying out its own collection
weapons of war. program for scrap metals, the Army also
Shortly after Pearl Harbor the first of co-operated in the civilian scrap drive.
several comprehensive directives was Before Pearl Harbor there had been no
issued, calling attention to the tremendous pressure for a national campaign to collect
production burden being placed upon the salvage materials. Once it was revealed
country's industries and the resultant that a real scrap famine threatened unless
shortage of scrap metal and other mate- extraordinary measures were taken, such a
rial.*'* Post commanders were ordered to campaign was instituted by the WPB
take immediate steps to survey their in- early in January 1942. Several months
stallations for material and to speed the were required for the program to get into
processing and sale of material to civilian
Ltr, TAG to all WD Agencies and Army Com -
**"
scrap dealers. Particular reference was mands, 7 Jan 42, sub: Handling of Salv Activities,
made to the salvaging of scrap metals and AG 400.74 Ft. Knox (12-10-41) MO-D-M.
28 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
swing and
full for special arrangements to to getting these materials into industrial
be concluded for Army installations to channels quickly and efficiently."
handle civilian scrap. In many remote
areas where transportation was not avail-
able and there were no local scrap dealers, Facilities and Labor
Army facilities provided the only means
by which accumulations of civilian scrap The increased activity caused by the
could be returned to industry. As a gen- clean-up campaign and co-operation with
eral rule, delivery of civilian scrap to mili- civilian programs aggravated difficulties
tary installations from concentration points experienced in the acquisition of suitable
was undertaken by the Army only in those storage facilities, equipment, and labor for
cases where local committees were unable salvage operations. While open storage
to consummate sales to dealers or to make space was satisfactory for many materials,
delivery to the nearest military establish- regular warehouse space was needed for
ment."" A procedure was developed where- those which deteriorated if exposed to the
by Army officers inspected reported accu- weather. The segregation and proper stor-
mulations that could not be disposed of age of salvage involved problems similar
through regular channels to insure that to those in the warehousing of regular
their movement to an Army installation merchandise. Adequate space for salvage
was necessary or advantageous. Repre- had to be camps, unsatisfac-
provided at
sentatives of the OQMG
Salvage Branch had to be cor-
tory storage conditions
worked closely with WPB officials, who rected, and information had to be fur-
eventually adopted and applied to their nished on the best methods of warehousing
civilian drive several features of the Army salvage materials."' Furthermore, a cer-
salvage system, particularly those in refer- tain amount of equipment for handling
ence to the segregation and preparation of salvage was needed at most Army installa-
materials.-" tions. The Salvage Branch, OQMG, au-
The effect of the national program was thorized the supply of all baling and other
to intensify the Army's own house-clean-
(1) AGO Memo S30-4-42, 18 Sep
"" For policy see
ing drive at all posts and abandoned sta- 42, sub: Co-operation with Civilian Scrap Collecting
tions. Not only had very few stations been Agencies. (2) AGO Memo
S30-14-43, 6 Apr 43, sub:
put in order, but the constant accumula- Policy Relating to Domestic Salv.
•"
('l) Charles Van Etten to Col Falkenau, OQMG,
tion of current scrap threatened to swamp 31 Aug 42, sub: Household Salvaging of Critical Ma-
local salvage facilities unless this and the terials. (2) Ltr, Van Etten to Raleigh K. White, Chief
backlog were cleaned up rapidly. Late in of General Salv Sec, WPB, 31 Oct 42, no sub.
cumulations of unserviceable clothing, OQMG. 25 Nov 41. no sub. (2) Memo, TQMG for
TAG. 10 Dec 41, sub: Salv.
shoes, and other Quartermaster equip- " AR 30-2145, par. 16, 2 Sep 42, sub: QMC—
ment before its reclamation or disposal. Unserviceable Prop Including Waste Materials.
30 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
scrap metals were used for the production machinery in factories, and fired cartridge
of hardware and similar items. and shell cases for which manufacturers
The OQMG Salvage Branch encour- had an established practice permitting ex-
aged local salvage and shop officers to use change. In the QMC
this practice was
ingenuity in devising methods of utilizing confined to the exchange of old typewriters
materials. Many specific proposals were for new, but this became inconsequential
circularized, such as the suggestions that during the war because of the restrictions
5-gallon oil cans and other metal con- imposed upon their manufacture.'"'
tainers turned in to salvage be converted Another alternative open to the salvage
into metal pails for fire protection and officer was that of donating property for
other purposes, and that unserviceable use in vocational training. During its ex-
blankets, pads, and mattresses be used on istence, the National Youth Administra-
rifle ranges.'** In some cases field installa- tion (NYA) was the principal agency with
tions developed methods of converting which the OQMG
collaborated in making
materials that promised to become perma- its salvage available for this purpose. When
nent, profitable enterprises. For example, the ASF assumed responsibility for the
the Jeffersonville Depot, which had been supervision of salvage, it continued the
accumulating great quantities of corru- program of donating such property, with-
gated board from old cartons in the course out reimbursement except for the costs of
of repacking operations, developed a meth- packing, handling, and transportation, to
od for shredding it. The resultant product, schools for use in vocational training. The
it was claimed, possessed considerable policy was further broadened to permit
superiority over excelsior, since it con- the. transfer of any type of salvage to a
tained little moisture and was very charitable or tax-supported institution
resilient."'* upon the approval of the Commanding
General, ASF. '"-
Disposal of Salvage Other Than by Sale
Disposal of Salvage by Sale
The salvage officer had other alterna-
tives in disposing of articles besides that of In addition to the reclamation and
sale to regular commercial and industrial utilization of equipment no longer service-
agencies. The shipment to manufacturers able in its original form but valuable none-
of old articles to be exchanged for new theless, the function of salvage involved
ones of identical or like design, under the ^'^
Col Hamilton, Chief of Sv Instls Div, to GAS Div,
direction and supervision of the chief of OQMG, 4 Jul 42, sub: Ltr of Info.
service concerned, continued to be per-
•'"
Rpt, Col Falkenau to TQMG, Mar 43, sub: Insp
of Activities atJQMD.
missible under certain conditions.^"" Ex- '"" AR 30-2145, par.
17, 2 Sep 42, sub: QMC—
change had long been used, under specific Unserviceable Prop, Including Waste Materials.
authorization by Congress, not only to '"'
1st Ind, Col Francis H. Pope, toOQMG,
effect the familiar trade-in of motor ve-
OUSW, 9 Jul 41, on Memo, OUSW
for TQMG, 1
Jul 41, sub: Filing with GAO
Contracts Involving
hicles, engines, parts, and similar items, Exchange.
but also from time to time to secure re- '"-
(1) Ltr, TAG toChiefs of Sup Arms and Svs
placement of typewriters and other office et al., 10 Nov 38, sub: Transfer of Supplies and
Equip to NYA, AG 400.703 (11-9-38) (Misc) D-M.
equipment, sewing machines and other (2) PR 7, par. 743.
SALVAGE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 31
two other phases. Strictly speaking, these Negotiation contributed to the successful
comprised the disposal process and in- prosecution of the war because it permitted
volved installing controls for segregating awards to be made to those producers of
and making available for absorption by war materials who were in the greatest
the war-starved civilian economy items —
need of scrap, and also in the interest of
that had utility for nonmilitary purposes. conserving transportation and gasoline, oil,
It also involved the disposal of scrap and and rubber — it allowed contracts covering
waste materials for reprocessing by indus- entire lots of materials to be made to single
trial agencies that had priority in essential bidders who were the highest bidders on a
uses. This disposal process required the majority of items although low on a few of
application of many special techniques in them.^"^
the preparation and marketing of mate- The general use of negotiation was
rials. The industrial utility of scrap and authorized in the spring of 1942, based on
waste and financial returns from their sale the assumption that the First War Powers
were in general determined by careful Act of 1941 gave the Secretary of War full
preparation and segregation of materials power to authorize the use of negotiation
according to a list prepared by the in making war contracts. Later, it was de-
OQMG, which conformed as nearly as cided that reference to this act was inap-
possible to OPAclassifications and those propriate, since it affected only contracts
used in the waste material industry. ^"^ The for procurement of supplies and services
Army usually accomplished only primary whereas other statutes governed disposal
segregation, leaving the final preparation of property. As a result of this misunder-
to qualified and equipped trade agencies. standing with respect to the legal basis for
Marketing of both second-hand and waste sales of property, there was some disagree-
materials was a complex undertaking for ment whether various contract provi-
as to
the salvage officer, requiring dealings with sions required by public contract law were
an industry characterized by the opera- applicable to sales. The Salvage Branch,
numbers of dealers, including
tions of large OQMG, believed that procurement regu-
numerous small and marginal firms, many lations should not be applied to sales,
of whom engaged in competitive and sharp although some provisions could be used,
trade practices. when appropriate, as a matter of policy.
Procedures for the sale of salvage mate- This view prevailed and a provision was
rials at Army field installations underwent inserted in the Quartermaster Supplement
some changes analogous to those that oc- to the Procurement Regulations that these
curred in procurement operations. There regulations would not apply to sales except
was a gradual move toward negotiation of
sales in lieu of the formal, sealed bid pro- 10^ OQMG Cir 1-8, 23 Feb 40, sub: Condemned
cedure of peacetime. ^"^ This was necessi- Prop and Waste Material. This circular was revised
tated not only by the need for dispatch in on 10 December 1942.
(1) Ltr, Col Hamilton, OQMG, to Dir of Pro-
'<>'
processing salvage but also by the advent curement and Distr Div, SOS, 17 Apr 42, sub: Au-
of WPB allocations, the automatic sale of thority for Negotiated Sale of Salv Prop. (2) PR 18-T,
many and the
materials at ceiling prices, 19 May 42. (3) AR
30-2145, par. 21, 2 Sep 42, sub:
Army entered into two kinds of contracts posal of Waste. (2) AR30-2145, par. 6.
""list Ind], Col Falkenau, OQMG, to Seattle
an agreement covering the sale of definite POE, 26 Mar 42, no sub.
SALVAGE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 33
Since indefinite-quantity contracts were expert review of contracts, but it took issue
made on a yearly basis or for shorter pe- with arguments against the feasibility of
riods of time, they created a governmental decentralization. Until qualified personnel
obligation that lasted for many months. became available in the field, however, it
The control exercised by the OQMG
over permitted OQMG instructions to remain
these contracts was therefore a matter of in effect." In the meantime, the Salvage
'
considerable importance and ran counter Branch modified its policy to the extent of
to the decentralization advocated by the exempting certain indefinite-quantity con-
ASF. When, in the spring of 1942, the tracts from OQMG
approval.'" Greater
Salvage Branch, OQMG, found that in- decentralization occurred after the transfer
definite-quantity contracts were being of salvage responsibility to Headquarters,
closed at figures far below those which ASF.
should have been obtained, it instructed In order to promote co-operation with
the field to submit all such contracts cover- dealers and to expedite the sale of mate-
ing a period of more than three months, rials, local salvage officers were allowed in
together with an abstract of bids, to the many cases to mitigate the rigid legal re-
OQMG for approval before execution.'" quirements of both the bidding and con-
In answer to ASF criticism of this policy. tractual procedure. In response to pressure
The Quartermaster General pointed out to discontinue altogether the requirement
that the disposal of waste materials was in of deposit or bond, the Salvage Branch
no sense parallel to the procurement of indicated that, even though a sale was
Army supplies, which was decentralized to usually viewed as a purchase in reverse,
the field. Disposal was carried on by a rela- procurement regulations did not apply. If
tively large number of installations, and, deposits were not required, it could be
unlike procuring depots, they were not assumed that some waste dealers, because
under the direct supervision of the OQMG. of their manner of operating, would bid on
In contrast to the procurement of supplies materials in order to secure supplies for
of standard quality on more or less rigid
specifications, the disposal of waste mate-
'" (1) Ltr, Col Falkcnau to QM
Second CA. 13
May Quantity Contracts for Sale
42. sub: Indefinite
rials involved dealing with a mass of mate-
of Salv and Waste Materials. (2) Ltr, Falkenau to CG
rials far from uniform in quality, constantly First SvC, 8 Mar 43, same sub.
changing in character, and marketed "-•(1) Memo, Chief of Salv and Reclm Br, SOS,
for TQMG, 18 Mar 42, sub: Indefinite Quantity
under conditions that fluctuated and
Contracts for Sale of Salv and Waste Materials. (2)
varied widely from area to area. Under Memo, Col Hamilton, OQMG, for ACofS for Opns,
these conditions, the average post salvage ASF, 24 Mar 43, same sub.
" Memo, Maj Gen LeRoy Lutes, ACofS for Opns,
officer had neither the information nor the
ASF, for TQMG, 2 Apr 43, sub: Indefinite Quantity
experience to make proper term contracts, Contracts for Sale of Salv and Waste Materials.
nor was it possible for the Salvage Branch '" These contracts covered arrangements for the
disposal of tin cans, egg crates, and agricultural con-
to follow the normal procedure of issuing
tainers, and, later, for the disposal of food waste and
instructions sufficiently applicable to all waste paper if sold at prices within prescribed limits,
situations to guide the exercise of local and scrap lumber, glass and glassware, and any other
item when sold at the ma.ximum price permitted by
'
discretion.'
OPA. Ltr, Col Falkenau, OQMG,
to CG Second SvC,
Headquarters, ASF, was willing to 21 May 43, sub: Indefinite Quantity Contracts for
admit the existence of conditions justifying Sale of Salv and Waste Materials.
34 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
sale but would remove only that portion tor the discard of the Army, substantial quan-
which they could find a ready market or tities of salvaged clothing and other articles
which they could sell at a profit. This were sold intact to dealers, who showed
would result in a high ratio of nonperform- great ingenuity in reclaiming them for sale
ance on contracts."' In most respects the on the civilian market. However, the mis-
Salvage Branch endeavored to secure full leading advertisements of some second-
compliance with and performance under hand dealers brought unfavorable pub-
contracts. licity to the Army by claiming that articles
The necessity of using marginal outlets were "new" or "perfect" when in fact they
for salvage created a problem of prevent- were specially fabricated garments similar
ing irregularities in the administration of to but not Army goods.
"
local sales. Ignorance of marketing condi- Regulations urged the exercise of special
tions and methods on the part of untrained caution to prevent the placing of new
salvage officers in specific instances resulted articles in salvage, either through fraud
in the sale of considerable quantities of and collusion or inadvertence.""* The pos-
goods that should not have been salvaged, sibilityof collusion was to be guarded
and in loss to the government through against particularly where abnormally low
marketing of articles in improper classifi- bids were made in salvage sales, but collu-
cations and at low prices. During the early sion among bidders was naturally hard to
emergency and first year of war especially, detect. Lowprices bid and received were
there were serious difficulties of this sort to most often due to the inexperience of sal-
be overcome.'"' vage officers, who were ignorant of market
The general policies with respect to dis- possibilities and who were, in some cases,
posal of usable articles as distinct from imposed upon by dealers though not nec-
scrap and waste were open to various in- essarily under circumstances of collusion.
terpretations, for there was an element of Eventually salvage officers were given
contradiction present. While urging that standard instructions to suspend sales when
full use be extracted from every article of prices offered were not in line with market
supply and equipment before its discard in conditions or when evidence of collusion
salvage, official publications at the same existed, and to forward a statement of
time required that, as an aid to the civilian reasons for the action to the OQMG."''
economy, articles be sold in their original Special precautions were taken against
form whenever possible under the descrip- other dishonest practices of contractors,
tion "unserviceable for Army use." The "^ Min of Salv and Reclm Conf. p. 72.
interplay of these two policies had mixed '"' In July 1942, for example, an investigation of
the eastern market in salvaged Army clothing re-
effects. In some cases of critical shortage, it
vealed that a number of large dealers were carrying
resulted in articles being used or worn be- on a thriving business in the sale of new and repaired
yond possible reclamation, but in other garments bought as "rags." Rpt, Loyola M. Coyne to
cases, it resulted in the availability of rela- TQMG, 23-26 Jul 42, Insp Rpt of QM Activities in
NY Area.
tively large quantities of usable items for "' (1) Chief of Sv Instls Div to Congressional Br,
sale, as for example, when combat stand- General Sv Div, OQMG, 17 Jun 42, sub: Communi-
ards prevented the use of deteriorated cation from Representative John Taber. (2) Rpt
cited above, n. 116.
equipment. Before the demands of over- "^AR 30-2145, par. 22.
seas civilian relief absorbed a large part of ""TM 38-505, par. 56.
SALVAGE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 35
and spot checks of contract performance direct allocation orders as the WPB ex-
were urged, especially for dealers in food tended its controls over the consumption
waste. The most common practices en- of scrap and waste in 1942. Under these
countered were the use of trucks with false orders, sales directly to the designated con-
bottoms or weighted trucks used only on sumer or his agent were automatically
first runs, and the removal of containers of negotiated by the salvage officer, usually
cooked grease topped with trap grease, at ceiling prices.'
''
which was of lesser value. When dealers Salvage officers were directed to report
were discovered engaging in such practices, large accumulations of scrap to the WPB,
they were penalized by being placed on the or the nearest regional office, to enable it
official list of debarred bidders, but for to control the movement of scrap by allo-
such action to be taken it was necessary cations. The original intention was to ar-
that there be evidence of fraud or at- range formal clearances with the WPB
tempted fraud against the government.'-" only in respect to materials suitable for
direct allocation to consumers, with the
Impact of WPB and OPA Controls local salvage officer specifically required
to request the issue of an allocation order.
WPB allocation and limitation orders Because of the ambiguity of early direc-
and OPA price ceilings had their impact tives, many officers were under the im-
on the QMC salvage program just as they pression that they were required to secure
did on Quartermaster procurement of clearance from WPB
regional offices for all
supplies. It was Army policy to sell mate- sales of scrap. In the case of allocated sales
rials through regular trade channels as the this caused particular confusion and delay,
most economical and efficient method of since allocation orders were issued only by
securing the proper utilization of scrap and the central office of WPB. Later directives
waste. The great mass of unprepared to salvage officers emphasized that the
materials could be handled only by dealers. WPB regional offices functioned only to
In the case of iron and steel scrap, most render advice and assistance to Army
large consumers placed their orders for installations, although they were avail-
scrap through scrap brokers who were able able for consultation on any sale. Large
to arrange for the necessary preparation of accumulations of waste were reported to
the scrap as well as to guarantee its supply the service command headquarters, which
by dealers and broker-dealers. transmitted the report through the
Not all waste materials, however, were OQMG to the WPB in Washington.
'--
posed an undue and unwarranted admin- been before the General Maximum Price
istrative burden on salvage officers. This Regulation was issued. As a result of con-
would have been true even if the salvage ferences between representatives of the
personnel at Army installations had re- OQMG and the OPA, policy was modified
mained more or less constant instead of to the extent of relieving the Army of the
undergoing a rapid turnover. The neces- responsibility of policing OPA price ceil-
sity of applying price ceilings complicated ings in salvage sales. Salvage officers were
and slowed the work of local salvage of- no longer required even to check price
ficers. They were apt to hold up sales until ceilings except in the case of sales to con-
satisfied by higher authority that the ceil- sumers. This was accomplished by extend-
ing price was being correctly applied. But ing the use of the dealers and consumers'
any delay in sales meant a delay in the affidavits to the sale of all scrap and waste
flow of salvaged property into civilian materials except industrial scrap.'-'' In
channels. The OQMG therefore sought to order that OPA might itself police the ap-
simplify the problems of the salvage officer plication of these ceilings, copies of Army
by seeking agreements with the OPA that salvage contracts were made available to
would relieve him of the necessity of study- that agency.
ing and digesting OPA's various price The QMC viewed these arrangements
regulations.
'- Procurement Cir 27. 10 Apr 41.
Early difficulties centered around the '-' Col Falkenau OPACS,
7 Jul 41, sub:
(1) Ltr, to
application of ceilings in the sale of unpre- Sale of Iron and Steel Scrap. (2) OQMG
Cir Ltr 141,
pared mixed iron and steel scrap, which 9 Jul 41, sub: Sale of Waste Materials.
'
' Amendment 8 to OPA
Supplementary Regula-
involved an extremely intricate computa- tion 1.
as granting it full administrative relief ex- exemptions was to relieve the War Depart-
cept for the necessity of checking sales to ment of compliance with all price controls,
consumers. Several months later the OPA except in certain minor instances, in its
and salvage of supplies and equipment of (1) ASFCir 140, 6 Dec 43, sub: Reclm. (2) ASF
-
however, its attention was largely centered nance Division, see Hist Rpt, Maintenance Problems,
on the problem of scrap disposal with the A History of the Maintenance Division, Headquar-
ters, Army Service Forces, April 1943-1 September
eventual result that OQMG responsibility
1945, OCMH. (Hereafter cited as Hist Rpt, Mainte-
for staff supervision of salvage activities nance Problems.)
RECLAMATION AND CONSERVATION ACTIVITIES 39
Money Allowances Versus Issues in Kind an expanding army would have been pro-
hibitive.Furthermore, the additional wear
The operation of shops, when necessary, and tear on clothing resulting from battle
for thepurpose of altering and fitting uni- training and maneuvers would have made
forms at the time of issue and for the repair the existing money allowances unfair to
and upkeep of equipment had been a re- the soldier and would have allowed no
sponsibility of the QMC
since World War early basis for the calculation of a fair
I, but the Corps operated no repair shops money allowance. Early in the emergency,
in the fall of 1940. No reclamation prob- there was unanimous agreement that a
lem existed at the time because before the system based on issues in kind, similar to
national emergency enlisted men were re- that used in World War I, wotild have to be
sponsible for the maintenance of their adopted in the event of war, and that in
clothing under a system of money allow- where formal prop-
theaters of operations,
ances. This arrangement, which had been erty accounting would have to be held to
in effect since shortly after World War I, a minimum, a system of money accounts
allowed the War Department to allot to would be completely unworkable.^
each enlisted man initial and maintenance Nevertheless, when the expansion of
quotas expressed in monetary values, training operations during the months be-
within the limits of which he was per- fore Pearl Harbor forced consideration of
mitted to draw clothing from government extensive revisions to the peacetime meth-
stocks.' Each man's clothing account was od of issue, numerous misgivings were
settled periodically and at the end of his voiced. It was anticipated that when cloth-
enlistment. On discharge he received in ing was issued in kind all restraints would
cash any balance that had not been drawn be removed from overzealous commanders
in clothing. His ability to stay well within who could hardly be expected to be cost
his money allowance and yet care for his conscious. Since great emphasis was
'^
clothing and equipment was deemed the placed on the physical appearance of
mark of a good soldier. In the event the troops in evaluating the efficiency of com-
enlisted manding officers, it was argued that issues
man exceeded his allowance, he
had to reimburse the government for thekind would lead to replacement of par-
in
excess. Ahhough articles in stock and the tially worn garments that should have
trickle of reclaimable articles turned in by been retained in service, and would result
menat the end of their enlistment period in conflict with conservation measures,
or on earlier discharge might require reno- The purposes of official policies would
vation, no reclamation problem arose un- thereby be defeated. Various suggestions
der this system. Each enlisted man was re- were made for coping with these prob-
quired to arrange and pay for the cleaning
and upkeep of all clothing issued to him ^
AR 615-40, 30 Jun 25, sub: EM Clo— Allow-
ances Accounts and Disp For the officiallist of cloth-
under his money allowance, except for
{ 1 •
r 'ng allowances and established prices ol clothing, see
necessary alterations made I
at the time oi ^^j^ 30-3000.
issue. Memo,
'
TQMG for Gen Corbin, OQMG, 1 Jul
^0. sub: Change in System of Clo Allowances.
This peacetime system could not be ap-
,. ,
^ , .
c ,
plied during war, however, tor the clerical
1-1 '
Memo, Col Edward B. McKinley, Chief of Fiscal
TQMG, 12 Aug 40, sub: Cost Rpts on Clo
^yw, for
work of administering money accounts for Issued in Kind.
40 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
lems," but late in the summer of 1940 The obsolete classification, including, for ex-
Quartermaster General appointed a board ample, large quantities of World War I
of officers to draft regulations for changing spiral leggings, knee breeches, and coats
to a simple system of issues in kind, retain- with standing collars, as well as web equip-
ing only those checks on extravagance or ment and tentage of various designs, tex-
dishonesty that could be enforced through tures, and shades. Much of this materiel
command relationships, or, in individual had long been in closed storage under im-
cases, through the medium of reports of proper conditions and was consequently
survey and other disciplinary action. The in various stages of disrepair. The QMC
new system was promulgated early in Sep- placed in service considerable amounts of
tember/ The change involved the as- deteriorated and nondescript clothing and
sumption by the government of responsi- equipment, and it authorized various
bility for the repair and reclamation of special uses for obsolete articles.'"
clothing issued to the enlisted man and By March 1941, production of clothing
consequently resulted in the initiation of a had reached a point where most articles
repair shop program. of obsolete clothing could be withdrawn
from the troops," and stocks of these arti-
Utilizntwn of Obsolete and cles could be returned to regional and cen-
tral storage pending disposition to meet
Class B Clothing
various special needs or as salvage. During
The procedures of the repair shop pro- the eight months when these substandard
gram were greatly influenced by the early stocks were issued, comparatively small
need to conserve clothing and equipage. inroads had been made on the total re-
In June 1940 stocks of practically all items sources of this kind, and the utilization
of clothing were very low. Furthermore, and disposal of obsolete items became at
since approximately nine months were re- once a major problem.
quired to convert dollars into appreciable In the meantime, there had been reper-
quantities of clothing and equipage, cussions from fieldcommanders who not
enough time had not elapsed by fall for unnaturally resented being obliged to sup-
stocks to be procured in sufficient quanti-
ties under new appropriations to meet re-
See, for example. Chief of Sup Di\' to Chief of
quirements resulting from the mobiliza- Adm Div, OQMG, 27 Jun 40, sub: Change in System
tion of the National Guard and the induc- of Clo Allowances.
^
WDCir97, 7 Sep 40.
tion of large numbers During
of selectees. '
the initial period of mobilization, it was 5 Sep 40, sub: Use of Substitute Items of Clo for Tng
absolutely essential to utilize so-called con- Program. (2) WD
Cir 98. 9 Sep 40, sub: Issues of Sub-
stitute Items of Clo.
tingent stocks, that is, stocks held in stor- '" For example, olive drab cotton breeches, of
age as war reserves and for the National which there were large quantities on hand, were
Guard and the Reserve Officers' Training authorized for issue as work garments, in addition to
denim trousers. WD Cir 11. 16Jan41. Sec. II. sub:
Corps (ROTC). These were further sup- Issue of Cotton Breeches.
plemented by transfers of excess stocks Exceptions v\ere obsolete overcoats, which were
''
from the Civilian Conservation Corps." A not replaced until the fall of 1941, and the remainder
of some 2,000.000 pairs of trousers, manufactured
large proportion of this clothing was of from melton cloth and acquired from the CCC, which
limited standard, substitute standard, and were issued until stocks were exhausted.
RECLAMATION AND CONSERVATION ACTIVITIES 41
ply their units with a motley array of gar- as a result of the early pressure of hasty
ments and equipment. Although the mobilization.
OQMG viewed the use of such articles as Early difficulties in utilization of obso-
an emergency measure to be discontinued leteand substandard articles were hardly
as soon as the status of supply permitted, overcome and a system outlined for issues
the consistent and determined objection in kind and renovation of articles, when a
on the part of the troops to the use of obso- special problem loomed that promised to
lete clothing was so strong that the QMC test many related policies. Toward the
and other War Department agencies had close of the first year of national selective
to take definite and continued action to service, the Army faced
the prospect of re-
see that such clothing was actually issued using or disposing of relatively large quan-
to the soldiers.'"' tities of clothing and equipage to be turned
The policy of enforcing the consump- in by men discharged after the designated
tion of stocks of renovated clothing and year of service. Although this problem
equipment, designated as Class B, prior to never materialized on a large scale since
the issue of new items. Class A, was by no most of the men were actually retained in
means new and had been a source of con- the Army following Congressional exten-
troversy under peacetime conditions. After sion of their term of service, the anticipa-
World War I, efforts to issue renovated tion of it caused a general examination, in
clothing had produced unsatisfactory re- the light of early experience, of existing
sults. At that time the problem had been basic policies that called for the utilization
partially solved by the return to the of renovated clothing.
money-allowance system.' Since the be-
'
their obsolete equipment condemned and upon the adverse effect of renovated clothing on troop
turned in for salvage in order to secure morale and consequently upon discipline and effi-
ciency. See, for example 1) Ltr, Maj Gen Kenyon A.
replacements.^^ The special uses later
(
were not issued when reclaimed ones were Chief of C&E Branch, OQMG, 7Jul41,sub: Disp of
Clo Turned In (study on same sub enclosed).
available. One concession was made to the
(1) Ibid. (2) See earlier comments, Chief of Salv
'^
critics of renovated clothing. Each enlisted Br to Chief of C&E Br, OQMG, 24Jun 41, sub: Disp
man was to have at all times one present- of Clo Turned In.
though enlisted men would continue to capacity.-^ For the most part these shops
pay for laundry and dry-cleanirfg service were established in existing structures at
as they had in the past and would also be Army camps in order to hold new con-
responsible for minor repairs to clothing, struction to a minimum. Floor layout
such as mending rips and replacing but- plans therefore varied considerably, since
--
tons. only a small portion of reclamation activi-
At that time there were no Army cloth- ties in the field was housed in buildings
workmanship had
services, but, in general, OQMG, 6 Nov 40, sub: Activation of QM
Units. (2)
Ltr, Gen
Corbin, OQMG,to QM
First CA, 20 Nov
been poor, materials inferior, and return 40, sub: Establishment of C&E Repair Shops. (3) Min
of repaired articles had been unduly de- of Salv and Reclm Conf, OQMG, 5-9 Oct 42, p. 11.
44 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
,4. i . 's:
REPAIRING MESS KITS, Fort Devens Repair Shop, Fort Devens, Mass.
Clothing and equipment repair shops shoe repair section was usually found at
were organized into various sections ac- stations serving 10,000 to 20,000 men.
cording to the type of work to be done. A Later a miscellaneous repair section was
complete reclamation shop included a also deemed necessary. Any combinations
clothing and textile repair section, a shoe of sections could be established to furnish
repair section, a canvas and webbing re- stations with all necessary facilities.
pair section, a mattress and pillow reno- It was the policy of the OQMG to re-
vating section, and a miscellaneous repair pair and reclaim clothing and equipment
section designed to accomplish repair of in all instances possible in government-
metal goods and other items that could operated shops, but the accomplishment of
not be repaired in the other sections. this work was not limited to the use of
Complete reclamation shops were intended reclamation shops. If existing government-
to be established only at installations re- operated facilities were insufficient, the use
quiring one-unit or larger shops. Shops of additional facilities might be obtained
serving 5,000 troops or less originally con- by means of commercial contract. This
tained only shoe repair sections. A cloth- method was used particularly for the re-
ing and textile repair section as well as a pair of shoes and tentage and was adopted
RECLAMATION AND CONSERVATION ACTIVITIES 45
primarily to take care of peak loads that clothing for return to the original wearer,
could not be handled in the reclamation to repair and reclaim clothing (except
shops. shoes) and equipment for return to stock,
The repair and reclamation of clothing and to alter clothing to provide proper fit
and equipage by commercial contract, whenever necessary.
however, was not recommended. Addi- The in the fall of 1940 had pro- OQMG
tional facilities for th.is work were avail- posed establishing some forty reclamation
able in Work Projects Administration shops and had called upon the corps area
(WPA) sewing rooms, quartermasters for reports on available
located in every
area, which were intended to be used as
space and personnel that could be utilized
"subsidiary facilities to take care of the for the purpose. By the end of June 1941,
overflow from reclamation shops."-'' it had established only twenty-five recla-
These arrangements were the result of a mation shops at cantonments throughout
plan of operation worked out by agree- the Army." The delay in swinging the
ment between representatives of the program into high gear was attributable
OQMG and the WPA
in the summer of largely to the lack of funds for construc-
1942.-' As the year drew to a close, the tion. Shoe repair shops could be estab-
Deputy Commissioner of the WPA
noti- lished only where existing space was made
fied the OQMG that "the increasing de- available, and in the beginning "there was
mand for manpower and the consequent a general lack of interest locally and a dis-
decrease in persons for whom WPA needs . inclination to make existing space avail-
to find employment makes it appear im- able." After some months of experience
'-
considered the disposition of WPA sewing - (l) Ltr, Gen Corbin. OQMG. to Actg Commis-
equipment.. •. f ™
Its transfer to Army reclama-
. ^ A 1 sioncr
^'""'^r WPA
vrrv, ./ Feb 42.
27 r^ no sub. (2) Ltr, Florence
kerr. Asst Commissioner, WPA. to oo\4r d OQMG.
^
.^ r" T,,n
4 Jun
'
-I !•c J- r
tion shops, and the possibility ot finding 42 rfosub. (3) Ltr, Col Hamilton, to Flor- OQMG.
suitable experienced personnel for these ence Kerr. WPA. Aug 42. no sub, and reply 14
l 1
shops among
operators released by the "^"^
l,, Cc-orge H. Field to OQMG, 5 Dec 42, no
WPA.-" Similar action to acquire equip- sub.
ment that could be utilized in reclamation '" (
1 ) Ltr. Col Falkenau. OQMG, to CG First SvC,
... u o 23 Dec 42, sub: Transfer of WPA Equip. (2) Ltr,
activities was taken later when Congress
. 1 1
""
civil service registers. It was the primary Cen^'corbin to DQMG, 24 Jun 4 1, sub: QM
function of these shops to repair shoes and c&E Repair Shops,
46 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
shops could not be opened until existing amended to require the issue of only Class
commercial contracts had expired. A
clothing and individual equipment as
After Pearl Harbor the repair shop pro- replacements for troops alerted for over-
gram expanded rapidly. This development seas movement."' The
was to in- effect
was stimulated by a reduction in the cloth- crease tremendously the work load of
ing allowances to enlisted men, a move de- clothing and equipment repair shops. The
signed to enable the War Department to inspection of items in the hands of troops
meet requirements for initial issue created alerted for overseas movement was ex-
by the accelerated induction program. ^^ pected to lead to the replacement of only
As a result it was estimated that 3,000,000 those "unsuitable for extended field serv-
cotton khaki shirts, 3,000,000 cotton khaki ice" rather than to a complete re-equip-
trousers, 1,000,000 each of denim or her- ping of alerted units with new articles,
ringbone twill jackets and trousers, 500,000 This directive, however, was subject to dif-
overcoats, 1,500,000 pairs of service shoes, commanders
ferent interpretations. Unit
as well as wool underclothing and hand- naturally applied it in such a way as to
kerchiefs, would be turned in as excess. It enable them to obtain new equipment,
was extremely important that all these Quartermasters, on the other hand, bound
items, except the underclothing and hand- by conservation policies, were inclined to
kerchiefs, be renovated and reissued with- keep equipment in the hands of the units
out delay. '^ if the items possessed serviceability or
The chief of the Salvage Branch, could be repaired for extended field use.
OQMG, reported that the facilities of only Later, efforts were made to define more
twenty-six complete clothing and equip- precisely standards of serviceability for
ment repair shops, with thirty-one addi- equipment retained by alerted units. Re-
tional shoe repair sections at smaller pair service for alerted units had priority
camps, were immediately available. Sev- over all other work in repair shops, and
eral other shops had been authorized and the OQMG
took action to see that such
were under construction, but these were shops were established at all staging areas
''
not sufficient to take care of all local re- as they were activated.
quirements and would have to be supple- Originally repair of shoes and clothing
mented by commercial contracts. By the was directed toward keeping these items
use of both government and commercial in the hands of the user. As the war pro-
facilities, the backlog of used garments
awaiting renovation could be handled.^'' '
WD
Cir 74, 13 Mar 42, sub: Instructions Gov-
•
Expansion of the repair shop program erning Issue, Conserv, and Disp of C&E.
was cfurther
^^ 1^1 rn o
stimulated early m 1942 by
^- 1 • 1 I
" Mai France, C&E Br, to Chief of Salv Br,
oQMG, ll Feb 42, sub: Renovation of Clo to be
another change in policy. Immediately Turned in by EM.
after PearlHarbor the War Department Chief of Salv Br to Chief of C&E Br,
•
OQMG,
11
had announced ^1 1 ^ -^i ^ ^-
that without exception ,
3 Feb 42, sub: Renovation of Clo to be Turned in
1
^j^
renovated clothing and equipment would "'(l) WD Cir 74, 13 Mar 42, sub: Instructions
be issued prior to Class A items. Within Governing Conserv, and Disp of C&E. (2)
Issue, WD
,._, L r I- • Cir 15, Sec. II, 20 Apr 42, same sub.
1
gressed and as troops moved to overseas 1942 the War Department entered into a
theaters, requirements for initial issue and contract with Bona Allen, Inc., for the
replacements of Quartermaster clothing rental of certain lands, buildings, and
and equipment reached tremendous pro- equipment. Actual operations did not be-
portions. The necessity of repairing Quar- gin until June, but from then until 31
termaster property for return to stock for August 1943 the QMC
operated this
reissue became increasingly obvious. The plant, which was attached to the Atlanta
number of clothing and equipment repair Quartermaster Depot under the imme-
shops at posts, camps, and stations ex- diate command of the Quarterm.aster sup-
panded from the 25 in operation by July ply officer.^'
1941 to 368 shops by the end of the war. It was estimated that when the Buford
'*"
They repaired millions of items of clothing, plant reached its maximum operating
shoes, and equipment, and, together with capacity (about 1 December 1942), it
other Quartermaster repair facilities, con- would produce 5,000 pairs of rebuilt serv-
tributed effectively to the reduction of new ice shoes per eight-hour shift. The shop
procurements of Quartermaster items. could not accomplish the rebuilding of
1,500,000 pairs of shoes within a year, let
Shoe Rebuilding Program alone within the three months suggested
The reduction in the clothing allowance by the Clothing and Equipage Branch.
problem with
early in 1942 posed a special Since it was also considered desirable to
reference to the shoes that were to be provide for the rebuilding of shoes in sal-
turned in. It had been Quartermaster vage and shoes that could not be repaired
policy to repair shoes only when they by the facilities available in the clothing
could be returned to the original wearer. '" and equipment repair shops, the War De-
Otherwise they were disposed of without partment negotiated a contract with the
repair by sale as salvage. This policy was International Shoe Co. of St. Louis for the
abandoned in January 1942 when the rebuilding of Army service shoes in its
issue of Class B clothing, including shoes, Bluff City factory at Hannibal, Mo.^- This
was made mandatory under all conditions. factory would also have a maximum ca-
In order to avoid any possibility of disease pacity of 5,000 pairs per eight-hour shift.
or injury to the new wearer's feet, shoes In the summer of 1943 the War Depart-
could not be reissued without sterilization, ment made another contract with the In-
complete rebuilding, and refinishing. As a ternational Shoe Co., effective 1 Septem-
consequence, the OQMG decided to ber, which transferred the operation at the
establish one or more fully equipped shoe
rebuilding factories to take care of the im-
"* QM Manual, QMC 14-3, August 1945, sub: QM
Installations in Continental U.S., pp. 56-66.
mediate accumulation of excess shoes '" WDCir 126, 28Jun 41, sub: Insp of Shoes for
caused by the revision of Table of Basic Repair.
Allowances 21 and to continue their oper-
'" Col Falkenau, OQMG, to
Ltr, QM First CA,
6 Apr Renovation of Class B Shoes.
42, sub:
ation as a permanent part of the program ^' For a detailed account of operations at Buford,
in order to conserve shoes and leather.''" see T. E. Downey, U.S. Army Shop, Buford, Georgia
Atlanta QMD, Aug 43), Hist Br, OQMG.
(hist rpt,
The first was estab-
of these factories
Salv Br to Dir of Sv Instls Div, 18 Jul 42, sub:
^-
But'ord factory to that company. By that under direction of the International Shoe
time the volume of shoes to be rebuilt war- Co., (eight months) 1,1 18,652 pairs of re-
ranted the addition of another plant, and paired shoes were produced.'^
a supplemental agreement was made with
the company for the operation of a third Regional Repair Shops
shoe rebuilding factory at Quincy, 111." Repair shops at posts, camps, and sta-
As a result of the 1 February 1944 tions functioned as reclamation centers for
downward revision of the Army Supply clothing and equipage intended for return
Program, which necessitated a cutback in
' '
Sv Instls Div to Procurement Div, 24 Nov 43,
production of rebuilt shoes, it became nec-
sub: Expansion of Shoe Rebuilding Facilities.
essary to terminate the contract for the "(1) Memo, Col Hamilton, OQMG, for Readj
operation of the Buford factory, effective Div, ASF, 2 1 Mar 44, sub: Cutback in Production of
Rebuilt Sv Shoes. (2) Audit Rpt, Chief of Cost and
30 April, but the other two plants con- TQMG,
26 Jun 44, sub: Final
Price Analysis Br to
tinued to function until the end of the war. Audit Rpt. This report showed that a total of 2,624,
During the period of QMC operation of 24 pairs of service shoes were rebuilt at a total cost of
1
'
„ r- c r- mid c
[1) Ltr, Hq highth S\C to .All Posts, Camps, Stations,
, . r^ .
tion of plans
" for the establishment of a ,,,, ..^ ^^ n a-,-
.
c ^ i? •
materiel shipped from overseas theaters By mid- 1943 the repair shop system had
and that accumulating in the several serv- thus been expanded to take care of the tre-
commands served by such subdepots.
ice mendous volume of clothing and equip-
Two principal reasons determined the ment that needed repair. It consisted of
adoption of the policy of authorizing re- reclamation shops at posts, camps, and
gional and central shops to repair for re- stations, engaged primarily in repairing
turn to depot stock and limiting reclama- articles for return to the original user or
tion shops at posts, camps, and stations to the using organization, and, to a limited
repair for return to the user or, to a limited extent, in making minor repairs in quan-
degree, for return to local stocks only. In tities that could be issued locally at the
the first place, a large installation operat- post. Regional repair shops, established
ing with production-line methods could within the service commands, repaired for
produce much more work per employee return to stock at the nearest distributing
than a number of small shops that were depot, while repair subdepots handled any
forced to interrupt their production for excesses that could not be repaired at other
special jobs for individual wearers. This shops. In addition, there were a number of
resulted in the conservation of critical repair shops at Quartermaster depots and
manpower. Second, quality control of the Quartermaster sections of ASF depots that
product and development of uniform re- were engaged in the maintenance of spe-
pair standards for Class B issue could not cific items. For example, it was decided
be attained when such reclamation work early that while tentage issued to organ-
was done by hundreds of shops, many of
which were unable to provide the kind of ^'
Ltr, Col Thomas E. Whitehead, OQMG, to CG
SOS, 18 Feb 43, sub: Allotment of Offs.
supervision that large installations used ^-^
(1) Memo, TQMG for CG noASF, 24 Sep 43,
effectively.^* sub. (2) [1st Ind], Col Hamilton, to OQMG,
ASF, Hq
As the need to promote technical uni- 21 Jun 44. For a detailed account, see C.Gregory
Compton, History of the Quartermaster Repair Sub-
formity and effective management of all Depot (hist monograph, CFQMD, Jul 45), Hist Br,
repair shops increased, the OQMG cre- OQMG.
^•'
(I) OQMG Cir 41, 14 Aug
44, sub: Establish-
ated new regional agencies to supervise
ment of Fid Reclm Offices. (2) OQMG Cir 54,
25 Sep
the work of the many central and local 44, sub: Establishment of Fid Maint Offices.
RECLAMATION AND CONSERVATION ACTIVITIES 51
izations would be repaired by reclamation shops was necessary and ended by for-
shops and by means of local contract when mulating a plan for consolidating repair
necessary, tentage repair shops at the facilities in the zone of interior that broke
Philadelphia and Jeffersonville Quarter- down technical service differentiations in
master Depots would continue to repair favor of a functional shop organization.
tentage that could not be handled by these The plan provided for a combined shop
means and to take care of all tentage is- consisting of an automotive shop, an ar-
sued for maneuvers.''" Similarly, band in- mament and instrument shop, a clothing
struments were repaired at designated and equipment shop, an electrical equip-
depots, as were typewriters and other of- ment shop, a machine shop, and a paint
fice equipment. In 1944 a program was shop — co-ordinated under the supervision
initiated to establish a base maintenance of a maintenance shop officer for oper-
shop at the Jeffersonville Depot to handle ation, to receive, inspect, and repair all
fifthechelon maintenance and reclama- Army materiel of all technical services.
tion on all materials-handling equipment This combined shop, the ASF urged,
within the zone of interior,'' while another would offer "unification of command, the
base shop was established at Camp Lee to interchangeability of skilled and versatile
recondition all Quartermaster special-pur- personnel, the supply of replacement parts
pose and mobile equipment.^" through controlled supply point and the
uninterrupted control of the entire activity
Combined Shops by a central ofBce."'^^ Tried out first at
Fort Knox in July, the plan was then sent
In the fall of 1943 a number of clothing to the commanding generals of the service
and equipment repair shops became parts commands in September with instructions
of combined shops that were established to put it into effect as expeditiously as pos-
in the service commands. This develop- sible.^' Later it was extended to integrate
ment grew out of action taken by the maintenance activities at ASF depots and
Maintenance Division, ASF, to integrate ports of embarkation.
maintenance activities. When the division The plan was not received enthusiasti-
was established in April, it found that over
'» Chief of Sup Div to Chief of Depot Div, OQMG,
650 repair shops were being operated by 20 Oct 41, sub: Policy Re Salv of Tents.
the technical services for the repair of '•'
In the over-all maintenance plan for the zone of
Army equipment. It concluded that this interior, all using organizations performed first and
second echelon maintenance on equipment assigned
wholesale establishment of repair facilities
to them; service command shops performed third and
throughout the zone of interior needed a fourth echelon repairs on equipment assigned to using
co-ordinated system of centralized oper- organizations; and technical service shops performed
fifth echelon maintenance.
ation. The division immediately prohib- - ( )
1
OQMG Daily Activity Rpt, Jan 44. (2)
1 1
ited the activation of any new shops with- QM Training Service Journal, 2 Jun 44.
out the prior authorization of the Com- " Ltr, Dir of Opns, ASF, to TQMG, 23 Jul 43, sub:
Establishment of New Maint Shops.
manding General, ASF, and required full •^ Memo, Dir of Opns, ASF, for TQMG
et a/. 3 ,
justification for expansion of any existing Jul 43, sub: Combined Shops at Posts, Camps, and
shops. ^^ Stations.
quartermaster serviceable articles that had serviceable through fair wear and tear.®^
been issued on the money allowance. Pro- The classification officer classified all items
vision was also made for inspection of as reparable or irreparable, with the ex-
worn-out clothing by a commissioned of- ception of certain technical items — band
ficer before credit was allowed on the instruments, typewriters, 55-gallon drums,
clothing account, and by a disinterested and Ml 937 which spe-
field ranges — for
*^^
officer after its receipt in salvage. More- cial disposition instructionswere issued.
over, the requirement that property be Irreparable items were turned in to sal-
marked and mutilated to preclude various vage; reparable items, except shoes, which
improper practices applied especially to were sent to the rebuilding factories, were
clothing. These provisions, only slightly repaired in the clothing and equipment
changed, were retained even after the sus- repair shops or by such other means as the
pension of money accounts in 1940 as a service command quartermaster directed.
relatively convenient means of controlling
irregularity. ^^ AR 30-2145, par. 4c.
through repair and other processes was by means other than fair wear and tear had, of course,
soon given to a disinterested officer, ap- to be acted on by survey as in the case of other classes
of equipment. The classification officer was originally
pointed by the local commanding officer.
authorized to direct that surveys be made on items
He inspected and classified clothing as that in his opinion were not worn out by fair wear
reparable or nonreparable and furnished and tear. Later he was given the powers of a survey-
ing officer (AR 615-40, par. 14b, 24 Apr 43). These
the quartermaster with a certificate cover-
powers were subsequently adjusted to recognize
ing nonreparable clothing worn out command responsibility for turn-ins.
through fair wear and tear. The latter was •^^
(1) WD Pamphlet 38-1, 1 Mar 43, sub: SOP for
by The Quartermaster General.*'*^ Prop- (1) WD Cir 75, Sec. II, 16 Mar 43, sub: Dispof
«•'
erty repaired at a regional repair shop was Unserviceable Prop. (2) WD Cir 7, 5 Jan 44, sub:
for and Disp of Unserviceable Prop.
returned to stock at the nearest distribut- Repl« WD SB 10-156, 31 Oct 44, sub: Return of Un-
ing depot, except that Class X
clothing serviceable QM Prop to Sup Channels.
was disposed of by the shop to troops in •^Ml) Ltr, Col Falkenau to All SvCs, 14 Dec 42,
the area served by it as directed by the sub: Class B and X Clo. (2) Change 4 to AR 615-40,
29 Jan 44.
commander. By the fall of 1944 provision ""
(1) Originally regulations required that the clas-
had been made for automatic shipment of sification officer be a Quartermaster officer of suitable
property repaired at regional shops to the grade or experience. At posts, camps, and stations
where Quartermaster repair shops were established,
Quartermaster depot or Quartermaster the station commander was required to appoint to the
RECLAMATION AND CONSERVATION ACTIVITIES 55
position was made entirely independent, mand responsibility was stressed and
and any officer associated with shop or special training programs were developed,
maintenance activities could not be as- the local classification officer emerged as a
""
signed to the position. control point for the disposition and utili-
This step was taken primarily to avoid zation of clothing and individual equip-
impeding the operations of shops unneces- ment. He was given authority not only to
sarily with segregation and salvage func- inspect and segregate articles but also to
tions, and especially to avoid the expense classify all clothing and equipment turned
and congestion that would result from in or to supervise these operations." As a
hauling nonreparable property to and result, the classification officer assumed
from shops.'' A considerable amount of important responsibilities in the Quarter-
segregation and salvage activities was nec- master conservation program. Moreover,
essarily carried on in shops, particularly in
subdepots processing property returned " (1) Change 4 to AR 615-40, 29 Jan 44. (2) At this
time it was also directed that classification officers act
from overseas. Failure of local classifica-
only upon Quartermaster items of clothing and
tion officers to segregate articles properly equipage listed in AR
30-3000, or on similar articles.
or in accordance with shop standards re- Some classification officers had been interpreting their
authority as covering items of individual equip-
all
mained a source of criticism and of some
ment and even articles from other services that were
disagreement between shops and local submitted to Quartermaster repair shops. See AGO
supply officers. The move to separate the Memo S30-10-43, 1 Mar 43, sub: Authority of C&E
1
Classification Offs.
classification position from shop activities "'
Ltr, TQMG to CO Seventh SvC, 29 Aug 44, sub:
was also influenced by the emphasis being Revision of AR 615-40.
placed upon command responsibility for -(1) Chief of Stock Control Br, S&D Div, to
conservation activities in all units. At the
DQMG for Sup Ping and Opns, 26 Aug 44, sub: Pro-
posed Revision of AR 615-40. (2) Memo, forDQMG
same time, station supply procedure was Sup Ping and Opns for CG ASF, 29 Aug 44, same sub.
being changed to require classification of- '
the expansion of his duties reflected the in- need to improve this system, reaflfirmed its
creasing attention being given to the in- policy, which had been announced earlier,
terrelation of repair, classification, and of requiring the highest standards of work-
salvage standards and the need for some manship." Attainment of this objective
agency to co-ordinate the development of was conditioned by many operating diflfi-
these standards in operation. culties and was especially dependent upon
a degree of standardization in shop opera-
Classification and Serviceability tions that was most difficult to achieve in
Standards the case of clothing repairs and virtually
impossible, generally, until repairs for
Prescribed standards for the classifica- stock were centralized. In the meantime,
tion of used and reclaimed articles became the quality of the output of the shops
indispensable guides for the activities of varied greatly, and many shops returned
the expanded classification organization, inferior articles to troop units or to stock.
as well as for shops and other agencies par- It soon became clear that control of
with regard to the type and extent of re- veloped for bringing the use of this cate-
pairs permitted in order to conserve and gory of articles under control. With basic
use garments then being discarded in sal- allowances of clothing and equipage re-
vage under existing standards. This move- duced, the availability of a special form of
ment for refinement of standards devel- gratuitous issue without accountability
oped immediately out of the desire to find and without allowances being affected was
some way of avoiding the use of new a source of temptation to many com-
clothing in training activities, where it was manders. More serious than excessive use
subjected to excessive wear and tear. To of such special issues was a general trend
prolong the wear of uniforms, the War De- toward misclassification that resulted
partment at first instructed troop com- from placing large quantities of high-qual-
manders to use fatigue clothing for drill, ity garments in Class X. Reports from
work, and for all duties where the wearing service commands in 1943 particularly re-
vealed misuse of Class X issues in this
'''
of the uniform was not necessary.
Various alternatives were proposed for way.'^ This practice resulted partly from
the further differentiation of issues, and in the general difficulty experienced in estab-
August 1942 the OQMG established an lishing efficient classification activities at
additional classification for repaired cloth- stations,and particularly from the classifi-
ing." Known as Class X, this category was cation of garments by inexperienced per-
defined simply as "clothing and equipage sonnel outside local repair shops and sub-
which is reparable but not suitable for depots.
issue as class B." '^ It was issued without For many months stocks of Class X
charge to authorized allowances and with- clothing remained inadequate for Army
out accountability for use in special field needs. Eventually they accumulated until
exercises,maneuvers, landing operations, the distribution and utilization of these
or other training, and for such fatigue garments caused concern. Quartermaster
duties as were destructive to clothing and depots were then permitted to establish
equipment. The War Department directed stock levels for Class X clothing in order to
that Class X clothing be repaired repeat- meet sudden demands from the Interna-
edly until beyond serviceability, the mate- tional Division, ASF. Co-ordination be-
rials required for its renovation to be se- tween the depots and the service com-
cured where practicable from salvaged
garments. To prevent misuse by exchange
'" WD Cir 257, Sec. IV, 3 1 Jul 42, sub: Conserv of
Wool and Cotton Uniform Clo.
or turn-in, all such garments were to be "'
(1) Ltr, Hq First SvC to TQMG, 23 Jul 42, sub:
marked with the letter "X" in nonremov- Classification of Reclaimed C&E. (2) C&E Br to Salv
able ink in places not in evidence when and SurplusProp Br, OQMG, 31 Jul 42, same sub. (3)
Salv and Surplus Prop Br to C&E Br, OQMG, 5 Aug
worn. 42, same sub.
The savings accomplished through issue •'*
WD Cir 287, Sec. VI, 27 Aug 42, sub: Instruc-
of worn clothing for these purposes were tions Governing Exchange of Class C and Class D
C&E.
incalculable, despite early difficulties in Ml) Memo, Col George W. Cocheu, for OQMG,
distributing Class X clothing and in fa- Dir of Control Div, ASF, 29 May 43, sub: Erroneous
Classification of Clo. (2) Ltr, Col Falkenau, OQMG,
miliarizing troops with its use. Conversely,
toCG Second SvC, 23 Jun 43, same sub. (3) Memo,
however, as turn-ins and accumulations of Falkenau for Col Robert H. Fletcher, IGD, 6 Jul 43,
renovated property increased, a need de- same sub.
58 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
mands also enabled the reclamation shops ment of embarking troops. The failure to
to curtail their repairs of Class X clothing clarify the expression "in complete state of
when excesses of these items existed. The repair," caused difficulties and variations
OQMG found a convenient outlet for ex- in repair methods. The shortcomings of
cesses through issues to prisoners of war classificationwere increasingly apparent
and for overseas relief. as troops were moved rapidly overseas in
preparation for the invasion of Europe,
Class CS (Combat Serviceable) and as used articles poured from the stag-
ing areas and other sources. It became evi-
Until the impact of accumulations of dent that the problems of classification,
renovated stocks forced attention to fur- serviceability, and standardization of re-
ther differentiation of issues, particularly pair methods would have to be treated as
with reference to issues to troops going an integrated whole.
overseas, instructions for classification of During the summer of 1943 inspectors
clothing and equipage remained relatively from the Maintenance Division, ASF, re-
general. As a result of reports of misclas- ported that unserviceable clothing and
sification and continued complaints from equipage were being accumulated in large
commanders receiving inferior Class B is- quantities at repair shops, that troops de-
sues, the Salvage Branch formulated ten- parting for overseas were turning in large
tative instructions for the classification of quantities of used clothing and equipage,
clothing in the spring of 1943.^° These in- that there was a lack of competent person-
structions emphasized that Class B gar- nel to identify, classify, and repair this
ments should be serviceable in point of materiel, and that more standardized
wear, in complete state of repair, clean, methods of processing it were needed.^' As
with no noticeable spots of paint or grease, troop units were alerted for overseas move-
approximately of the original shade, not ment, particular difficulties were experi-
darned or patched conspicuously except in enced with commanders who insisted on
the case of herringbone twill garments, turning in combat serviceable equipment
and with buttons of matching shade and in order to replace it with new, or later
in correct position if these bore distinctive model, items. In many cases such replace-
markings. Class X garments were required ments were effected without an inspection
only to be serviceable, clean, and in com- to determine combat serviceability, de-
plete state of repair. Further instructions spite regulations to the contrary.*- This re-
limited the repair of Class X by cannibali- sulted in the publication of new instruc-
zation of parts from other garments. These tions that made such inspection manda-
instructions revealed an effort to maintain tory. The War Department further
the high standards of repair that the Sal- directed that nothing short of a complete
vage Branch had established as its objec- physical inspection of each item would
tive at the beginning of the repair pro- constitute compliance. The instructions
gram. They made no attempt, however, to
define the expression "serviceable in point 8" Ltr, Falkenau to CG First SvC, 22 May 43, sub:
the garment was completely repaired, had 15 Sep 44, on Ltr, Col C. W. Woodward, CO Char-
no stains, darns, or patches to cause an un- lotte QMD, to OQMG, 4 Sep 44, sub: Equipping of
Certain Units. (2) No matter how carefully the QMC
sightly appearance, and was not exces-
defined its standards on clothing, there were bound
sively faded, it was classed as combat serv- to be differences of opinion. Until agreement was
iceable.**^ However, the question of accept- reached with the ground troops and the air troops
who had to accept the garments, the problem re-
ability to the troops remained. This was a
mained. "You can classify a garment combat service-
never-ending problem, for, regardless of able, but if the man who has to take the garment
instructions, "the subject of combat serv- doesn't agree, what's the use?" What was needed was
a standard approved and accepted by all elements of
iceability is and always will be a matter of the War Department. Extracts of Min of Sixth Semi-
personal opinion. "^"^ Annual SvC Conf, 1-3 Feb 45, p. A 10.
60 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
procedures for classification as well as Improvement of Repair Shop Production
material for inclusion in a
illustrative
manual.'*^ Backlogs
The second phase of the training pro-
gram was initiated when these officers From the beginning, the em- OQMG
were assigned groups of three to teach
in phasized the importance of capacity op-
at three central repair shops operated by erations in Quartermaster repair shops.
the Jersey City, Kansas City, and Califor- Until troops were sent overseas in large
nia Quartermaster Depots. ^^ The instruc- numbers, reducing the over-all troop
tion was offered for the benefit of classifi- strength in service commands and thus
cation officers from the headquarters of producing excess capacity in various cloth-
the service commands, the AAF com- ing and equipment repair shops, the im-
mands, and the ports of embarkation; mediate problem was the elimination of
from Quartermaster regional supply de- backlogs of repairs. These backlogs accu-
pots; from central repair shops and service mulated as a result of fluctuations in troop
command regional repair shops; and from strength, personnel shortages, and other
those posts, camps, and stations where factors.As the facilities of the clothing and
staging areas, personnel replacement de- equipment repair shops became overtaxed,
pots, and aerial ports of embarkation were a system of transferring excess reparable
operated. The Quartermaster General equipment to the next higher echelon of
had been made responsible for the train- repair was instituted. In turn, excesses be-
ing of key personnel assigned to clothing yond the capacity of the regional shops to
and equipage classification duties at these handle were shipped to repair subdepots.^'-
installations. The commanders of such in- In the fall of 1944 this procedure was
stallations were responsible for instructing further clarified by directions that repara-
all other personnel engaged in classifica- ble equipment which had accumulated at
tion duties.*-' a post, beyond the capacity of the cloth-
The third phase of the training program
rested with the headquarters of the service " Gen Feldman,
Ltr, OQMG,
to Dir of Bd, QM
commands and of the AAF commands. Camp Lee, Va., 6 Jun 44, sub: Tng Plan for Instruc-
tion in Classification of Used C&E.
When their representatives returned from -^^
Ltr, TAG
to AAF Commands et al., 23 Jun 44,
attending the central repair shop course in sub: Instruction in Classification of Used C&E.
-*•'(!) WDCir 296, 14 Jul 44, sub: Establishment of
classification, they in turn gave instruction
Standards of Classification of C&E. (2) The Quarter-
in the classification of used clothing and master General was also responsible for training clas-
equipage to post, camp, and station per- sification officers at Quartermaster depots and Quar-
sonnel within their commands.^" termaster sections of ASF depots, and, accordingly,
instruction was provided at those installations. Ltr,
In its program of training, the OQMG Brig Gen Wilbur R. McReynolds, OQMG,
to CO
centered immediate attention upon the Atlanta ASFD et al. 26 Jul 44, sub Tng of Depot Pers
, :
in Classification.
problem of classifying clothing. Equipage '"'
See, for example, Ltr, Hq Eighth SvC to TQMG,
and general supplies also required repair, 14 Aug 44, sub: Conf on Classification of C&E.
and by the fall of 1944 training had been " Ltr, Gen McReynolds, OQMG, to CG CFQMD,
7 Sep 44, sub: Course in Classification of General Sup
extended to include instruction in the Items.
classification of these items. ^' •- WD Cir 329, Sec. IV, 20 Dec 43, sub: C&E.
RECLAMATION AND CONSERVATION ACTIVITIES 61
ing and equipment repair shop to repair capacity. Action was also taken to speed
within sixty days, was to be reported to the up classification by increasing both the
commanding general of the service com- number of shifts in operation and the
mand for redistribution to other facilities number of personnel engaged in classify-
under his control. A sixty-day limit was ing unserviceable property. ^*^
also established for the shop production
capacity of all repair installations under Production Scheduling
his control. Backlogs in excess of this
capacity were reported to The Quarter- A series of conferences conducted by the
master General for shipment to central re- Maintenance Division, ASF, with repair
pair shops. In order to expedite the repair shop personnel early in March 1944 de-
of items in short supply, The Quartermas- veloped suggestions for improving produc-
ter General might require service com- tion in repair shops and curtailing over-all
mands to report backlogs of such items procurement by establishing for each cen-
amounting to less than sixty days' shop tral repair shop production schedules of
production capacity of all service com- required clothing and equipment as set
mand repair installations.^^ forth in the Army Supply Program. These
On the other hand, by the fall of 1944 facilities could then concentrate on their
the sharp reductions in troop strength quotas in order to reduce over-all require-
within certain service commands made ex- ments for designated items.
cess capacity available in clothing and The Salvage Branch, OQMG, took steps
equipment repair shops. It was therefore to make practical application of the sug-
directed that when backlogs at such shops gestions offered by the repair subdepot
dropped below forty-five days' capacity, personnel. It was anticipated that produc-
the commanding general of the service tion scheduling, when fully effected, would
command was to be informed in order that permit a closer tie between repair activities
he might allocate additional items to the and new procurements in the development
shops for repair. Similarly, he advised The of the Army Supply Program. The OQMG
Quartermaster General when the backlog hoped to reduce new procurements of tex-
of all clothing and equipment repair in-
stallations under his control fell below »^ WD Cir 4 1 I, 20 Oct 44, sub: C&E.
1 , Sec.
forty-five days' production capacity.
^^ «' Col William J. Gainey, OQMG,
(1) Ibid. (2) Ltr,
to CG Seventh SvC, May 44, sub: Rpt of Insp of
1
To reduce the backlogs that accumu- C&E Repair Shops. (3) Memo, Dir of Sup, ASF, for
lated rapidly in 1944, the service com- TQMG, 13 Jun 44, sub: Utilization of C&E Shops.
"* The Fourth Service Command, for example, re-
mands took prompt and energetic action.
ported that duringjuly and August it was shipping
In addition to shipping excess repairs to excess clothing and equipment repairs at the rate of
central repair shops, ^^ production in re- two carloads of clothing per week to fifth echelon re-
pair shops was increased by establishing pair shops, and two carloads of canvas and webbing
per month to the Memphis Repair Subdepot. 1st Ind,
second shifts when it was possible to em- QM, Hq Fourth SvC, to TQMG, 8 Sep 44, on Ltr,
ploy additional civilians. Furthermore, use TQMG to CG Fourth SvC, 4 Sep 44, sub: Backlog of
was made of prisoners of war who were C&E.
(1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, TQMG to CG Eighth SvC, 4
«'•
trained for repair shop work. It was possi- Sep 44, sub: Backlog of C&E, and 1st Ind, Hq Eighth
ble in some instances to increase machine SvC to TQMG, 12 Sep 44.
62 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
tile items during the next twelve months quired responsibility under this system for
by about $200,000,000 through the use of estimating the amounts of materiel to be
items returned by repair installations to returned to stock through repair channels,
stock for reissue. ^^ Production schedules the division was more than ever concerned
that included the major items processed with the development of an adequate sys-
by depots were forwarded to repair subde- tem of reports.
pots. The latter were advised each month Estimating the amounts of materiel that
with regard to items on which to concen- would be reclaimed in Quartermaster re-
trate their efforts.^* pair facilities in turn necessitated the
By the spring of 1944 the Quartermas- preparation of forecasts of the quantities
ter repair activities, carried on in its sub- that would be repaired and returned to
depots, service command regional shops, stock. These quotas for repairing items for
and clothing and equipment sections of return to stock were prepared for Quarter-
combined maintenance shops, had reached master repair installations on the basis of
such proportions that the production of information developed by field reclama-
Class B items had to be considered in the tion offices, data assembled on capacities,
preparation of the Quartermaster section schedules, work loads, and output of
of the Army Supply Program. The OQMG shops, machine capacities, and the quan-
complained, however, that it was receiv- tities of articles that would become avail-
ing inadequate data for the purpose of es- able for repair. These quantities consti-
timating requirements. It indicated that tuted a backlog for production and con-
many of the figures reported for repairs on sisted of the items on hand in repair shops,
hand, for example, included only materiel those awaiting repair but not yet located
physically located in the shop and gave no at the shops, and those, not yet classified,
consideration to the backlog of reparable which it was estimated would become
items held by the quartermasters at posts, available for repair. Based on the pre-
camps, and stations. By way of illustrating scribed quotas established by the OQMG,
the discrepancies that existed, the OQMG the QMC
took maximum credit in supply
pointed out that Headquarters, Ninth control for such repairs, thereby decreas-
Service Command, reported that as of 29 ing the amount of new procurement esti-
February 1944 there were 2,678,743 mated to be necessary. '°°
pieces of clothing and equipment awaiting
repair in that service command. On the "' Address, Maj Jacob Haas, OQMG, at Confof
other hand, the figures obtained by con- Key Pers, Kansas City QM Repair Subdepot, 1 Sep
44.
solidating reports sent in to the office from "* Hamilton, OQMG, to
See, for example, Ltr, Col
individual stations showed a backlog of CG Calif QM Repair Subdepot, 29 Aug 44, sub: Pro-
duction Schedules for Sep, Oct, Nov, and Dec 44.
517,433 pieces. Such data were useless in «« Memo, Col Georges F. Doriot, OQMG, for CG
determining requirements, and more ade- ASF, 3 Apr 44, sub: Relation of Repair Activities and
quate reports were needed. ^^ the ASP.
20 May 44, sub: Tng of Key C&E Repair Pers. (2) 1st
that the individual worker at each repair
Ind, Col Hamilton, OQMG, to Hq ASF, 12Jun 44,
installation might be thoroughly trained on above memo.
in the proper performance of his job. (1) Memo, Gen Barnes, OQMG, tor Maint Div,
'«'
"Quality control of the training program ASF, 3 Jul 44, sub: Tng Plan for Instruction of Key
1
matic shipment to the specialized shops of Rpt, Maintenance Problems, pp. 33-38.
""' ASF Cir
excess serviceable property on hand at sta- 234, Sec. I, 22 Jun 45, sub: Excess Sta-
tion Stock.
tions that did not constitute a standard >"« Memo, TQMG for CG ASF, 15 May 45, sub:
pack or that had been removed from the ASF Cir 156, 1 May 45.
RECLAMATION AND CONSERVATION ACTIVITIES 65
QQQ 109 -pj^g total value of items repaired regular quantities. The War Department
in Quartermaster fifth echelon mainte-
nance during 1945 amounted to $161,- '""
(1) Ibid. (2) Memo, Brig Gen Alexander M.
699,000. Clothing and textiles represented Owens, OQMG, for CO ASF, 5 May 45, sub: Ade-
quate Backlog for Fifth Echelons.
the largest part of the total value of items '"" Memo. Col Joseph H. Burgheim, OQMG,
(1)
repaired, with petroleum containers and for CG ASF, ASF Cir 156, May 45.
13 Jul 45, sub: 1
equipment, and metal and woodworking (2) 1st Ind, Hq ASF to TQMG, 18 Jul 45, on above
memo.
items constituting the second and third '0^ Statistical Handbook of the QMC, 1943, p. 29.
^^°
largest groups. "" Statistical Yearbook of the QMC, 1945, p. 140.
66 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
considered conservation a normal con- sent to the Subsistence Branch in the
comitant of Army feeding, and there were OQMG."- The menus showed great vari-
various rules and regulations aimed ation in the amounts of food issued for
at en-
forcing moderation in the purchase and each 100 men at different posts. For effec-
preparation of food. Responsibility for tive conservation, menus at posts, camps,
eliminating waste was vested in the com- and stations had to be standardized in
manders of the corps areas. order that menu planning could be co-
It was not until the summer of 1943 ordinated with procurement of perish-
that centralized control of food conserva- ables, large-scale carlot purchases could
tion was established. In the meantime the be arranged, and advantage could be
rapid expansion of the Army after the pas- taken of seasonal production and price
sage of the Selective Service Act and the differences."^
impact of military procurement on the These ends were promoted by close co-
food supply of the country caused the War operation between the market center sys-
Department and the QMCto take steps to tem and the menu-planning section of the
conserve food. In the spring of 1941 the OQMG.
The latter developed a master
War Department substituted the field ra- menu by means of which similar meals
tion for the garrison ration, and the QMC, could be served to all Army organiza-
which procured all food for the Army, es- tions."^ The master menu was intended as
tablished a centralized system for food a guide to bring about more uniformity in
purchase and distribution."^ Army units the amounts of food components issued per
thereafter acquired their nonperishable 100 men, to demonstrate a menu that was
foods through the three Quartermaster de- adequate for good nutrition, to offer a pat-
pots where this procurement was cen- tern for conserving critical food items, and
tralized.They obtained their perishable to suggest menus that did not include any
foods by means of a market center system food more times than the national supply
that the Corps established in March. By would permit."^
the end of 1941 some thirty Quartermas- Further advantages beneficial to the
ter market centers had been planned, or conservation program in general accrued
were already in operation on a small scale. from the establishment of the market cen-
These developments had broad implica- "' The field ration is an issue of food in kind, while
tions for conservation. For example, the the garrison ration is a monetary credit. See the dis-
Field Headquarters of the market center cussion of these rations in Risch, The Quartermaster
Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, I, 174-75.
system, as the central purchasing agency "- WD Cir 195, 18 Sep 41, sub: Sales Commis-
for perishable foods, was in the best posi- saries, Fid Commissaries, and Rations.
"^ For a more detailed discussion see Herbert R.
tion to discover what perishables could
Rifkind, Fresh Foods for the Armed Forces: The Quarter-
and ought to be used at the posts, camps, master Market Center System, 1941-48, QMC
Historical
and stations. Yet in the beginning, the Studies, 20 (Washington, 1951).
"^ The master menu, a monthly publication, con-
market centers were hampered in procure-
tained a complete menu for each day of the month
ment by the lack of uniformity in the and a list of the items that comprised each menu. See
amounts of perishable foods requisitioned Risch, The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply,
by individual messes. This resulted from and Services I, 234.
,
ter system. Large savings were effected in Despite the steps taken, The Quarter-
transportation, while the use of fresh fruits master General early in 1942 found that a
and vegetables, so desirable in the soldier's great deal of food was being wasted either
diet,reduced the quantity of canned goods through lack of planning or because of im-
required and thereby furthered the con- proper preparation. Food was being pre-
servation of tin. pared by partially trained cooks under the
Soon after the United States entered the supervision of inexperienced mess ser-
war, General Gregory declared that the geants, and since the Army was increasing
use of the field ration by nearly all major would only grow
in strength this condition
Army units had not only proved econom- worse. Furthermore, under the stress of
ical but had also simplified accounting wartime expansion, organization com-
procedure and the problem of post storage manders could not devote time to mess
and issue. Furthermore, the system of food supervision although they were charged
procurement, storage, and distribution with responsibility for it by regulations.^^*
that had been placed in operation was as- The solution, proposed by The Quarter-
suring to all organizations a continuous master General in a staff study submitted
supply of a "wide variety of fine quality to G-3 early in 1942, was "a system of
food."'"^ supervision by trained personnel." This
On the other hand, he found the prep- anticipated in many respects the later
aration of food and the supervision of mess Food Service Program. His proposal em-
operations unsatisfactory. Skillful prepara- phasized continuous training for cooks,
tion of food that was palatable to the sol- mess sergeants, and mess officers within
dier as well as nutritious was even more their own organizations, but it did not go
important in the promotion of conserva- as far as the later provision for centrally
tion than centralized purchase of sub- controlled training, subject to periodic in-
sistence. This could be accomplished only vestigation. The plan called for the devel-
by training competent cooks, bakers, mess opment of a heightened sense of respon-
sergeants, and mess officers. But there sibility — which
became the basis of the
were not nearly enough trained mess per- Food Service Program and aimed to —
sonnel early in 1941 to keep pace with the create a regular source of information on
augmented requirements of the rapidly the best methods of food preparation and
expanding Army. This was true even to "assure continuous good mess operation
though training programs conducted in whether the organization happens to be
the nine corps area schools for bakers and located in camp or in the field, in the Zone
cooks had been expanded by establishing of the Interior or the Theater of Oper-
some forty-nine subschools under their ations."^'^
jurisdiction and curtailing the regular four
months' course of instruction to two "« Memo, Gen Gregory for ACofS G-3, 24 Feb 42,
months' intensive training in an eff^ort to sub: Tng and Supervision of Mess Pers.
'" (1) Rogers W. Young, Inspection of Military Train-
furnish even partially trained personnel. ing by The Quartermaster General, QMC
Historical
The OQMG sought to provide technical Studies, 15 (Washington, 1946), pp. 17-18. (2) See be-
low, Ch. VIII.
assistance and co-ordination in the organ- • "*
Memo, Gen Gregory for ACofS G-3, 24 Feb 42,
ization, operation, and training activities sub: Tng and Supervision of Mess Pers.
'^
of these schools and their subschools.^ ''"Ibid.
68 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
No immediate action was taken by the eliminate the effects of absenteeism, was a
General Staff to strengthen controls over fundamental change in the basis of ration
food distribution and use. In the mean- issue. After 1 February 1943 daily ration
time, The Quartermaster General was allowance returns were to be based on "the
taking other steps designed to provide the average number expected to be present for
necessary information for a food conserva- the three daily meals." It was recognized
tion program. Late in December 1941 that more persons would be present for
General Gregory directed the Quan-ter- some meals than the number estimated,
master Board to initiate a field study at but "experience has proved that the diet
Camp Lee to determine the adequacy of will be adequate." ^" The responsibility
the authorized ration and the existence or of commanders for supervising the cook-
nonexistence of food wastage. This study, and conserving of food for
ing, serving,
begun in February 1942, was widened into their commands was again emphasized.
a field survey at other posts and produced About the same time, the chiefs of the
a vast amount of valuable information supply services and the commanding gen-
that enabled the Corps to save millions of erals of the service commands were di-
pounds of food and to divert millions of rected to appoint mess supervisors at all
dollars to other war uses.^^° posts, camps, and stations under their ju-
Investigation revealed that one fifth of risdiction. This marked a sharp change in
the food prepared at the Quartermaster policy. ^"^ Within the framework of decen-
Replacement Training Center at Camp tralized administration, the War Depart-
Lee, Va., was not consumed by the soldiers ment was taking steps to enforce conserva-
but was actually thrown into the garbage. tion.
The same tremendous wastage, resulting During the first six months of 1943 the
from four specific causes, was shown to efforts made by the War Department to
exist at other posts. The first of these clarify and implement conservation meas-
causes, and the most easily corrected, was ures and make them more effective added
absenteeism. In compliance with a War up to a full-bodied but loosely controlled
Department directive, one ration was conservation program that laid the
drawn for each man appearing on the groundwork for the Food Service Program
morning report of ration strength, even established in July. The measures taken
though he might be at home, on pass, eat- included poster campaigns, educational
ing a meal in town, or absent from one or courses, and lectures to sharpen under-
more meals for other reasons.'"^ Because of standing of conservation objectives. Regu-
the absence from table of what was esti- lations revised distribution and accounting
mated to be 13 percent of the reported procedures and provided for turning in
number, much more food was ordered and '-" Rpt, Dir of QM Bd to TQMG, sub: Rpt on the
prepared than there were men to eat it. In Quartermaster Board, Camp Lee, Va., Feb 42 to 30 1
QMC was conscientious in trying to track cago, 111., p. 17, address by Lt Col Charles F.
down and ascertain the basis for these Kearney, Subsistence Br, OQMG.
'" (1) See, for example, Ltr, Lt Col Clarence F.
rumors, which reached a high point early Murray, Asst SvC IG, to CG Fourth SvC, 15 Mar 43,
in the spring of 1943. Investigations by the sub: Rpt of Investigation of Alleged Waste of Food
Inspector General's Department disclosed by Troops Stationed on Granny White Pike near
Nashville, Tenn. (2) Ltr, Col C. W. Mason, IG, to
that there was a startlingnumber of mis- CG Third Army, Ft. Sam Houston, Tex., 31 Dec 42,
conceptions and baseless rumors and that sub: Investigation of Alleged Wrongful Disp of Army
Army officials were far from willing to Food. (3) Senate Rpt. 77th Cong., 1st Sess., Hearings
Before a Special Committee Investigating the National Z)^-
countenance wanton misuse of food sup- Pro^raw (Washington, 1941).
/f725f
plies. The strong defense and clarifying '-«
(1) Memo, Gen Somervell for TQMG, 1 Jun 43,
rebuttal of Army authorities succeeded in sub:Mess Supervision. (2) Memo, TQMG for CG
ASF, 26 Jun 43, sub: QM
Food Sv. (3) For adminis-
turning a serious misunderstanding into trative developments, see Risch, The Quartermaster
an opportunity for educating the public. Corps: Organization Supply, and Services, I, Ch. I.
,
70 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
work that would have to be carried on by rect amount had been prepared, to list
service commanders and their directors of edible and over-all waste, and to show the
food service if the program was to succeed. disposition of leftovers. For an eight-month
Theoretically all administrative ele- period beginning in October 1943, the fig-
ments of the Food Service Program were ures on the reduction of edible waste
in existence before its creation. The differ- revealed a saving of 10,709,510 pounds of
ence between early messing operations and edible food in ASF installations alone.
those instituted by the program lay in the Weekly drives, of great importance in
fact that food service activities were now the education of mess sergeants and cooks,
co-ordinated and centralized, with a staff were conducted to improve certain phases
authority set up in Washington. New em- of mess operations, among them the stor-
phasis was placed on providing trained age and care of meats, the use of leftovers,
mess personnel, standardizing proceed- the making of coffee, the preparation of
ings, and popularizing methods of saving vegetables, and the elimination of bread
food. An educational program was insti- waste. The drive conducted on meat cook-
tuted in which conferences became the ve- ing alone demonstrated that it was pos-
hicles for transmitting the data developed sible to save as much as $20,000,000 a year
by the Food Service Section (later Branch) by roasting meats at proper temperatures.
of the OQMG, and studies of messing Furthermore, conservation efforts reduced
procedure and continuing reports of op- the issue of shortening in most service com-
erations provided the basis for conserva- monds by at least 50 percent.
tion doctrine. The Army program for The Food Service Program also effected
preventing food wastage was centered on other savings. The food service directors in
careful training in food conservation for the service commands and the personnel
every Army cook and baker. This was ac- of the Food Service Branch, OQMG, care-
complished through the system of bakers' fully screened requisitions submitted for
and cooks' schools, which was expanded the construction of new mess halls and the
until reached a peak of ninety-nine
it acquisition of new equipment at desig-
schools. In addition to this training, dem- nated They surveyed feeding
installations.
onstration teams gave refresher courses to operations at the installations and pro-
show the latest and most efficient methods posed plans for the reorganization and ex-
of preparing and handling foods. pansion of existing serving facilities that
Within a year after its establishment the saved the government not only money but
Food Service Program had accomplished also critical materials.'-*
considerable improvement in food prep- Although much had been accom-
aration and and a reduction of food plished, the
service QMC had to continue and
waste.'" This had been achieved as a re- even broaden its efforts to save food, for
sult of the many projects conducted by the the need to conserve food increased
Food Service Branch. Among these was
the introduction of the "Cooks' Work- '-' A Review of Activities and Accomplishments,
sheet," which contained complete instruc- Food Service Branch, Office of The Quartermaster
tions to cooks on methods of preparation General, address by Maj John W. Ebersole, OQMG,
3d Annual Wartime Conf, National Restaurant Assoc,
and the amounts of food to prepare. It also Chicago, 111. [circa August 1944), pp. 16ff.
required them to report whether the cor- '-'s
Ibid.
RECLAMATION AND CONSERVATION ACTIVITIES 71
rather than decreased. In March 1945 the World War I, and the doughboy of that
food supply was found to be "more critical war had participated in a "clean-plate"
than at any time during the present campaign, but this was fundamentally dif-
war." *-" New conditions, such as the ferent from the practical steps taken by the
growing demands of hospitals, compelled Food Service Branch to assure conserva-
and new recommenda-
fresh investigations tion during World War II and after. Con-
any event, the tendency toward
tions. In trols had had to be developed, extended,
waste was constant; it could not be elim- strengthened, and implemented against
inated entirely but could only be held in waste, unsanitary conditions, poor food
check. When the war ended, food conser- preparation, and other undesirable condi-
vation overseas had to receive greater at- and
tions, these controls, in many cases,
tention, and at home and overseas messing had been vestigial or nonexistent before
operations had to be evaluated from the the war. Long before the end of the war,
point of view of economy and conserva- food service had become a major oper-
tion. The activities of the Food Service ation of the QMC.^^"
Program were thus carried over into the
postwar period. '-" Memo, Gen Barnes, OQMG, for CO ASF, 29
The Army's food conservation program Mar Food Sv Program.
45, sub:
'
'" For a more detailed analysis of the Food
Service
was a relatively novel activity. To be sure Program see Louis Filler, The Food Service Program,
posters had urged food conservation in draft of typed monograph in Hist Br, OQMG.
CHAPTER III
Problems of Industrial
Demobilization
In the midst of mobilizing the country's contractors were involved in manufactur-
resources for war, various government ing supplies for the War Department
dur-
agencies, including the War Department, ing World War Cancellations on V-J
II.
had to give thought to the problems of Day of the undelivered balances on con-
industrial demobilization. The need to tracts were more than ten times the value
anticipate the economic impact of peace of such balances at the end of World War
upon the country had been amply demon- I. The far-flung operations of World War
strated by the industrial dislocations that II necessitated longer supply lines and
followed World War I. Only by advance many more installations to maintain
planning could an orderly transition from them. The increased size and complexity
a war to a peacetime economy be assured. of the military organization for this war
Hence, even as the Quartermaster Corps and supporting industry made impera-
its
the question of demobilization, and it in- technical services and that various phases
augurated an official program of demo- would have to be discussed with repre-
bilization planning in the spring of 1943 sentatives of industry. At that point the
when the Chief of Staff directed the Com- ASF advised the chiefs of the technical
manding General, Army Service Forces, services to establish demobilization units
to "initiate preliminary studies exploring and arranged a meeting for 31 August, at
the field of basic policy and broad plan- which time it reviewed the organization
ning for demobilization of our military for demobilization planning at head-
organization after the cessation of hos- quarters and the work accomplished by
^
tilities." that date.'
The Quartermaster General had already
Demobilization Planning Organization established a committee composed princi-
pally of the chiefs of the divisions within
A thoroughly integrated organization the OQMG
in order that complete co-
for demobilization planning took shape in ordination might be effected throughout
the War Department during 1943. At its the Corps in exploring the field of demobi-
head was the Special Planning Division, lization planning.^ A formal organization
which was established in July as a special was not set up in the OQMG
until the fall
staff division of the General Staff, replac- when Headquarters, ASF, impressed with
ing the Project Planning Division created the complexity and scope of the demobi-
in April by the Commanding General, lization problems, directed The Quarter-
ASF, in the office of the Deputy Chief of master General to establish a demobiliza-
Staff for ServiceCommands.'^ The Special tion planning unit. Although experience
Planning Division supervised and co-ordi- had shown that it was best to assign for de-
nated all postwar planning activities in the mobilization planning personnel who were
War Department and maintained liaison employed on the current duties of their
with other governmental agencies engaged offices, the ASF felt that supervision and
in similar planning. In carrying out its direction of such planning in each staff
duties, the division called upon existing echelon required "the undivided attention
War Department staff and operating agen- of competent personnel.""
cies for exhaustive study and solution of As a consequence, the OQMG estab-
specific demobilization problems it as- lished a Demobilization Planning Branch
signed to them.
Early demobilization plans were made - Memo, CofS for CG
ASF, 14 Apr 43, sub: Demob
in secrecy lest the public be misled into Ping. (File numbers for documents referred to in this
chapter are omitted since all can be found in the 370.1
thinking that the end of the war was im-
and the 380 series.)
minent and that production levels did not Memo, Actg
'
SW
for Dir of Special Ping Div, 22
need to be maintained. As a consequence, Jul 43, sub: Orgn and Functions.
the QMC and the other technical services
^
TQMG,
(1) Memo, Dir of Industrial Demob, ASF, for
23 Aug 43, sub: Ping for Industrial Demob.
were not brought into active participation (2) Memo Col Lawrence Westbrook, Exec
for File,
in the program until late in the summer of Secy, Special Committee on Mat Demob Ping, ASF,
1943 when it became apparent that indus- 31 Aug 43, no sub.
" OQMG OO 40-4, 3 1 Jul 43, sub: Demob Ping.
trial demobilization would have to be Memo, CofS ASF,
' for TQMG et al., 16 Nov 43,
highly decentralized for execution in the sub: Demob Ping.
74 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
in the Organization Planning and Control Materiel Demobilization Plans
Division in November. It functioned in a
staff capacity to supervise, co-ordinate, When
the Project Planning Division,
and control demobilization planning
all ASF, analyzed the problems of de-
first
within the QMC/ The branch also acted mobilization in April 1943, it divided
as the liaison office for contact with all them into two broad categories: man-
other echelons on matters pertaining to de- power and industry. '° The latter included
mobilization. At the same time, a demobi- a wide range of problems, such as contract
lization planning unit was set up in each termination, disposition of government-
of three staff and six operating divisions owned and sponsored plants, and disposal
within the OQMG.^ These units were re- of surplus materiel.
sponsible for specific phases of planning As the problems of materiel demobiliza-
assigned to them and for co-ordinating all tion became clearly defined, they were as-
planning within their respective divisions. signed to appropriate War Department
The demobilization planning units in agencies for study and solution, and a
and the Demobilization Plan-
the divisions statement of the premises and assumptions
ning Branch constituted the two higher to be used as the basis for planning accom-
echelons of planning within the QMC. A panied each assignment. The Project Plan-
third echelon existed in the depots, for at ning Division assumed that existing agen-
the direction of The Quartermaster Gen- cies and machinery would be used as
eral a demobilization planning unit was much as possible; that demobilization
established at each of the Quartermaster would be decentralized to the greatest ex-
depots and Quartermaster sections of ASF tent practicable; that plans would be flexi-
depots.^ These units initiated, supervised, ble and subject to constant review; and
and co-ordinated all planning within the that curtailment of wartime production
depots.
The operating units accomplished the
' OQMG OO 25-57, 27 Nov 43, sub: Industrial
Demob Ping.
detailed planning required to implement **
The included the Fiscal, Personnel,
staff divisions
demobilization plans, while the higher and Military Planning Divisions. The six operating
divisions were the Military Training, International,
echelons of authority in the War Depart-
Procurement, Service Installations, Fuels and Lubri-
ment General Staff developed over-all cants, and Storage and Distribution Divisions. Later
and procedures. The Special Plan-
policies changes in office organization, such as the establish-
ning Division reviewed the reports or ment of the Subsistence Branch as a division, brought
some additional demobilization planning units.
studies made by the operating units on " Ltr, TQMG to CG PQMD, 30 Nov 43, sub: In-
specific demobilization problems and, dustrial Demob Ping.
when necessary, forwarded them to ap- '"Demobilization of manpower involved consid-
eration of the immediate problems relating to the re-
propriate General Staff divisions for clear- deployment of troops war ended in Europe
after the
ance and then to higher authority for as well as analysis of the long-range problems con-
cerning the size and composition of the postwar Mili-
approval. Once approved, these reports
tary Establishment. Troop redeployment and demo-
became part of the final demobilization bilization were largely governed by plans formulated
plan after the implementing regulations or by the General Staff. Quartermaster contributions in
this field were limited to aiding in the development of
legislation, where indicated, had been
plans for the physical plant of the postwar Military
drafted and approved. Establishment.
PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION 75
and release of facilities for conversion to ance of contractors' plants to allow rapid
peacetime production would be accom- reconversion to civilian industry, and the
plished as rapidly as the military and disposal of property, including raw mate-
economic situation would permit." At the rials, completed articles, and
partially
same time, demobilization plans were to finishedend items. The plan was intended
be phased by periods, with Period I cover- to be so comprehensive and so workable
ing the interval from the defeat of Ger- that, with its accompanying drafts of di-
many to the cessation of all hostilities; rectives, could be applied without modi-
it
United States and supplied to the con- Demobilization, ASF, instructed The
tractors from Army stock, would be re- Quartermaster General to refine this skele-
turned to the nearest Quartermaster depot. ton plan into a concrete Materiel Demobi-
(2) Materials and supplies of all kinds pro- lization Plan, Period I, and to carry out its
nical services, who were responsible for al., 1 Jul 43, same sub.
ment at, or en route to, ports in this coun- tive to Implement WD Plan for Disp of ASF-Supplied
Mat.
try and the repair and disposition of sup- Memo, Gen Feldman, OQMG, for CG ASF, 14
-'
plies and equipment in the theaters in- ASF Sup Demob Plan for Period I.
Jul 44, sub:
-^ Memo, Gen Heileman, Dir of Sup, ASF, for
volved in the war with Germany. To
implement a War Department plan,
TQMG et al., 4 Sep 44, sub: ASF Basic Sup Plan,
Period I.
PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION 79
view it and take action to insure compli- was to be made to the responsible port
ance with the provisions of the Quarter- commander with the theater
for clearance
master plan.-^ concerned.-' This policy was to cover all
The keynote of the supply plan for subsequent requests for exceptions.
Period I was simplicity, and accordingly To implement the supply plan, provi-
existing policies and procedures in refer- sion was made advance marking of
for the
ence to levels of supply and supply pro- overseas shipments. Overseas requisitions
cedures were to be used to the maximum. edited in the zone of interior and requisi-
On V Day, unless specifically directed by tions initiated there, directing shipment of
appropriate authority, all supplies at sea supplies and equipment to the European
en route to the European and North Afri- and North African theaters, the United
can theaters and to the Middle East in- States Army Forces in the Middle East,
cluding the Persian Gulf Command were and the Persian Gulf Command, were to
to be delivered as scheduled. All supplies be marked "STO" for stop, to indicate the
in the United States en route to these embargo was to apply to these shipments,
areas were to be directed to the designated or "SHP" for ship, to indicate that the ex-
depots and returned to the jurisdiction of cepted items were to proceed to their over-
the chief of the technical service of origin, seas destination. On the day the embargo
except subsistence, Quartermaster indi- was put into effect, the "STO" marking
vidual clothing and equipment, medical was to be discontinued inasmuch as only
supplies and equipment, all supplies and requisitions for items to be marked "SHP"
equipment distributed by the Morale would be processed.-* Later revisions of
Services and the Special Services Divisions, the supply plan refined its details and
and supplies for civilians in the liberated widened its application by including ship-
areas. All edited requisitions and shipping ments to other command areas.
orders covering the above exceptions were By the fall of 1944 considerable progress
to be honored, but all others were to be had been made in planning, and all plans
canceled. had been consolidated under the broader
Later the OQMG requested so many of Plans for Period I (Redeployment,
title
exceptions — such as coal, maintenance and Readjustment, and Demobilization).
operating supplies for overseas can and Quartermaster Corps materiel demobili-
drum plants, spare parts, repair supplies zation and supply plans were similarly
—
and equipment, and the like from the V " Ltr, TQMG to COs QM Depots et al., 25 Sep 44,
Day embargo provisions that Headquar- sub: V-E Day Sup Demob Plans.
ters, ASF, instead of repeatedly changing -6(1) Memo, Col Oliver E. Cound, OQMG, for CO
the plan, called attention to the fact that ASF, 30 Sep 44, sub: Basic Sup Plan and Implemen-
tation. (2) Memo, Cound for CO ASF, 16 Nov 44,
upon request of the theater commanders sub: Exception of Repair Supplies and Equip. (3)
shipment of additional items might be Memo, Gen Barnes, OQMG, for CG ASF, 22 Nov
and
specially authorized.'*' In the absence of 44, sub: Exception of Certain Spare Parts, Tools,
Supplies.
such requests by the theater commanders, 1st Ind, Dir of Plans and Opns, ASF. 2
- Nov 44,
1
shipments could be made when, in the on Memo, Col Cound, OQMG, for CG ASF, 16 Nov
opinion of a chief of a technical service, an 44, sub: Exception of Repair Supplies and Equip.
Ltr, TAG to CG ASF el al., 12 Oct 44, sub: Ad-
-»<
exception to the V Day embargo would be vance Marking of Overseas Shpmts, AG 400. 6 (30 1 1
sion, OQMG, would then transmit this Downward Revision of the Production
notice of activation to all OQMG divisions Program
and field installations. Certain actions be-
came effective automatically while others Special Army Supply Program
needed no formal implementation inas-
much as they required Planning for the downward revision of
continuous oper-
ations prior to Period II or production, the core of the materiel demo-
were standing
operating procedures. bilization problem, was based on the
The OQMG Interim Plan for Period II, Special Army Supply Program. In this
like that for Period I, placed primary em- program, requirements personnel esti-
phasis upon supply and materiel demobi- mated the amounts of materiel needed by
lization, and the implementing procedures the Army in accordance with troop bases
were carried over from the earlier plan- projected by higher authority to show the
ning. The readjustment of production size and distribution of the Army during
was the heart of materiel demobilization Periods I, II, and III. For planning pur-
planning in both periods. Requirements poses they compared the Special Army
had been revised downward following the Supply Program with current procure-
defeat of Germany, and, in anticipation of ment plans to determine the approximate
the defeat of Japan, the ASF initiated a effect of V-E Day on current operations,
computation of a supply program for that is, the extent of decreases or increases
Period II. Procurement programs were re- in the procurement of individual items as
viewed, and the ASF directed the chiefs of of a particular date. Planners then esti-
the technical services to review and submit mated from this comparison the work load
a list of all items, both principal and sec- to be expected, the personnel required to
ondary, for which continued procurement handle it, the items affected, and the num-
after V-J Day would be necessary. ^^ As a ber of contractors to be released by termi-
consequence, it was possible to reduce re- nations. In turn, the contractors could be
quirements to zero for practically all sec- advised of the expected effect of V-E Day
ondary and most principal items, except on their operations so that they could
such items as subsistence, petroleum, spare make their own reconversion plans. The
parts, medical supplies, and housekeeping was to permit reconversion
basic objective
items necessary to sustain the Army during to normal, peacetime operations with the
the period of occupation and demobiliza- minimum amount of shock to the civilian
tion. These advance preparations, includ- economy and at the same time provide
ing the preparation of telegrams that could adequate protection for the government's
be dispatched to war contractors in a interests.
matter of hours, permitted production, im- The ASF called for the first Special
mediately upon the President's announce- Army Supply Program in the fall of 1943.
ment of Japan's surrender, to be cut back Utilizing a troop basis furnished by the
to levels needed for Period II operations. Special Planning Division, the OQMG
Thus the detailed planning engaged in
during the war years in anticipation of V-E " Memo, Dir of Reqmts and Stock Control Div,
Day and Day promoted orderly
ASF, for TQMG et al.. Aug 45. sub: Preparation
1 1
ters was not possible and recommended Committee on Mat Demob Ping, ASF, 14 Oct 43,
sub: Potential Recovery of Surplus Stocks Overseas.
that overseas stocks be adjusted by a per- " ) Memo, Gen Feldman, for Dir of OQMG,
( 1
centage, such as 50 percent, in order to Mat, ASF, 1 7 Feb 44, sub: Computation of Special
estimate stocks in the theaters that were ASP for Demob Ping. (2) See also Chief of Reqmts
Br, Mil Ping Div, to Chief of Demob Ping Br, OP&C
available for issue. Div, OQMG,
10 Feb 44, sub: Directive on Computa-
Although Headquarters, ASF, agreed tion of Special ASP for Demob Ping
equipment in the
that a percentage of the
'^
Memo, Dir of Reqmts Div, ASF, for Dir of Indus-
trial Demob, 25 Feb 44, sub: Conf with Rep- OQMG
hands of troops who were to be demobi- resentatives Demob Ping.
on
lized should be discounted as an asset to •'
(1) Memo, Gen Feldman, OQMG, for Dir of
allow for salvage and repair losses, it did Mat, ASF, Feb 44; Computation of Special ASP
1 7
for Demob Ping. (2) Memo, Dir of Reqmts Div, ASF,
not concur in the Quartermaster sugges- for TQMG et al., 15 Apr 44, sub: Special ASP for
tions and particularly rejected the 50 per- Demob Ping, Sec. I, Period I, 15 Jul 44.
PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION 83
This first Special Army Supply Program item to be procured, approval for the pro-
was revised as policy decisions were made posed changes had to be obtained from
by higher echelons. Even while the Re- Headquarters, ASF, within forty-eight
quirements Branch, OQMG, was revising hours after V-E Day was announced.
the program, it was also considering
methods which late in the summer of 1944
resulted in the establishment of a proce- Facilities Plans
dure whereby that program could be kept
up to date to reflect major influences, such One of the most useful ends served by
as factors and allowances and latest avail- adequate estimates of requirements was
able on-hand figures, in order that a cur- the development of facilities plans fore-
rent revised Special Army Supply Program casting the economic impact of V Day on
requirement could be reviewed continu- the production facilities of the United
ously in the light of the regular Army Sup- States. Such plans were based on the as-
ply Program. With such comparison as a sumption that designated sections of the
basis, items could be classified in one of Special Army Supply Program were to
four categories, giving the Requirements become the basis for procurement as of a
Branch an indication at any time of those given date. This assumption enabled the
items which required various types of planners to determine the effect of large
action in the event that the Special Army cutbacks on facilities that could not be
Supply Program was activated. The absorbed immediately into civilian pro-
^'^
Special Army Supply Program thereupon duction. While production scheduling was
was revised to account for major changes important to the QMC, practically all of
in factors for selected items and adjust- its items were produced by facilities that
ments of net requirements to reflect latest could be converted quickly and with little
available stocks actually on hand. effort to the production of civilian items.
With the introduction of the supply con- This fact was partially recognized by elim-
trol system, the Requirements Branch, inating items of clothing, subsistence, and
OQMG, began to prepare revised Period fuels and lubricants from the analysis
I requirements on a supply control basis made in the first facilities plan. Later the
for all Quartermaster principal items. QMCwas permitted to omit textiles,
These computations in the form of Supply paper products, and post-exchange (PX)
Control Reports served the purpose of and items in the preparation of new facilities
superseded the Special Army Supply Pro-
gram. Collectively they were referred to as
MPR-20X. When the end of the war in (1) Chief of Methods and Factors Sec to Chief of
"^
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PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION 85
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86 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Chart 2 Stop- Work Stages for Clearing Machinery Under JTR 241.3, on the
Combed and Carded Systems of the Cotton Textile Manufacturing Industry
Stage
Stop-Work Stage* Inatructiont
No.
* Special instructions relative to stock-dyed cotton: (1) unopened bales shall not be opened; (2) all open stock and stock in process in
openers shall be continued through openers, and then packaged and weighed; (3) all stock actually in process of being dyed shall be com-
pleted, dried, packaged, and weighed; and (4) all dyed stock in process in pickers (or in form of picker laps), or on cards (or in form of card
sliver), or in sliver lap, ribbon lap, or comers shall be completed into combed sliver, packaged and weighed, where combed sliver is the speci-
fied item, or shall be spun into single yam, where yam is the specified item, and then packaged and weighed.
** Where the contractor is required under these regulations to package varns, by reason of his nonretention of same for his own use,
such packaging shall be in a form and manner most conducive to ready transfer and disposition, in accordance with his available facilities.
PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION 87
plans. ^^ These plans were modified as the less of the state of completion of the items
Special Army Supply Program was concerned. ^^ The OQMG
deemed this
revised. policy too rigid for application to Quarter-
The last revision of the facilities plans master items, though it conceded that the
was most fortuitous for the War
Depart- policy was probably a suitable one to
ment since it was made so shortly before apply to military supplies, the continued
V-E Day. In the spring of 1945 the QMC
production of which would result in an
had no facilities plans, for they were re- excess of unusable items.
quired only in those instances where cut- Despite the arguments that the OQMG
backs of $500,000 or more were indicated advanced, War Department policy was
for any one month in 1945 for clothing, modified only to the extent that work in
textiles, and paper items. No cutbacks of process might be carried to the next stage
that size were indicated in the MPR-20X. of production if its removal would be
The OQMG, however, was making a re- destructive to machinery and if the cost to
view to ascertain those items of procure- remove would be greater than the cost to
ment for which prime contractors should continue. Work in process might also be
be informed as to tentative plans following continued to a stage at which it could be
V-E Day. Revised Master Production handled, and at which immediate spoilage
Schedules were being prepared, and, could be prevented, providing it had a
^"
where necessary, contracts were to be definite commercial value.
terminated or rescheduled, thereby put- Most Quartermaster production was of
ting into effect the procurement program such nature that exceptions permitted by
of Period I.^« the ASF to complete stoppage upon termi-
nation did not apply. Nevertheless, even
Work-Stoppage Points under this restricted policy the OQMG
found it advantageous to undertake certain
In any revision of the production pro- advance planning, particularly the devel-
gram, one of the most important problems opment of stop-work plans that were
was the determination of the point at
'
which work in process of manufacture on (1) Memo, Dir of Production Div, ASF, for Chiefs
of Tech Svs, 2 Mar 44, sub: PreUminary Procurement
V Day ought to be stopped. This problem Ping— Special ASP for Mat Demob Ping. (2) 1st Ind,
had engaged the attention of the OQMG
Dir of Production Div, ASF, 25 Jul 44, on Memo, Col
quite early. In its first skeleton plan for Cound, OQMG, for CG ASF, 22 Jul 44, sub: Com-
ments on Draft for Completion of Rpt from Mat
materiel demobilization of 20 December Demob Ping, Production Facilities Plan, Period I.
1943, the OQMG had laid down general "< Memo, Actg Dir of Mat for TQMG et al. 29
( 1 ) ,
principles for determining when it would Mar 45, sub: Mat Demob Ping, Facilities Plan, Period
I. (2) Memo, Gen Barnes, OQMG, TQMG et al., 4
be most economical and feasible to termi- Apr 45, same sub. (3) Memo, Gen Corbin, OQMG,
nate work in process in reference to certain TQMG et al., 10 May 45, sub: Advice to Prime Con-
broad categories of Quartermaster items. tractors as to Tentative Procurement Plans Following
V-E Day.
On the other hand, War Department Memo, Dir of Production Div, ASF, for Chiefs
'•'
policy required that all work in process, of Tech Svs et al., Apr 44, sub: Mat Demob Plan,
1
(OWM), by the publication of the Baruch- tion of costs. The OWM made the board's
Hancock report, and by the enactment of decisions effective by issuing directives,
legislation providing for contract termina- and early in 1944 it authorized the use of
tion. an approved termination article, which
Initially, the basic authority for contract had been agreed to by all the agencies
termination was found in the First War concerned.^'' Industry, however, did not
Powers Act, approved by the President consider an administrative directive on
ten days after Pearl Harbor. This author- such an important matter suflficiently
ity was redelegated through the various authoritative.
echelons of the War Department until, by In the meantime, Bernard M. Baruch,
means of the Quartermaster Supplement chairman of the War Industries Board in
to Procurement Regulation 15, it reached World War I, had been added to the staff"
the procuring depots where actual Quar- of the OWM as an adviser on postwar
termaster contract terminations occurred. problems. He and Hancock prepared a re-
Even before Pearl Harbor, War Depart- port embodying the ideas, which had been
ment contracts had carried a termination developing since 1918, of both industry
clause, and by 1943 enough contracts had and the procurement agencies of the gov-
been terminated for one reason or another ernment.^'' This report, together with the
to emphasize the need for scrutinizing the experience of the War and Navy Depart-
government's policy on termination to be ments, became the basis for the enactment
used at the end of the war.^^ The War De- of the Contract Settlement Act of 1944,
partment had been gaining experience in which codified or placed Congressional
termination procedures since 1941, but sanctionon existing War Department
when it came to the final contract settle- methods of contract termination settle-
ment in which payments were made, the ment.^'
department became cautious. It preferred
to seek legislation to back up specific oper-
much uncertainty existed
ations, since too Organization for Handling Terminations
about the legality of negotiated settle-
ments, and termination personnel feared The over-all supervision of contract ter-
liability in settling contracts and disposing mination operations in the was QMC
of the property involved. directed by a Contract Termination
The first major administrative move to Branch established early in 1944 in the
unify the government's policy came on 12
November 1943 with the creation of the
Joint Contract Termination Board in the " The old War Department Supply Contract 1
—
92 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Procurement Division, OQMG/^ It car- termination branches were later set up in
ried out the policiesand procedures devel- the other twelve smaller procuring depots.
oped by the Readjustment Division in the Since curtailment of industrial production
Office of the Director of Materiel, ASF. It of Quartermaster items was their first con-
on contract termination policy. the depots were not responsible for per-
From an organization of three officers forming dual functions, that is, buying and
and three civilians the branch was ex- terminating, which required different
panded into a staff of twelve officers and points of view that might conflict with
fifteen civilians that assumed responsibility each other. Termination activities neces-
for directing and administering the termi- sitatedan increase in personnel at the five
nation of about 20,000 contracts, involving procuring depots from about 400 at the
almost $1,500,000,000 commitment value beginning of the program to a peak of
of the terminated portion of the contracts 3,200 by V-J Day when mass terminations
and $300,000,000 worth of termination occurred. A year later the number of per-
inventory.^^ Attorneys, accountants, per- sonnel had been reduced to about 200.^^
sons with administrative experience in
various fields, and individuals who had Termination Procedure
previously been engaged in the textile,
steel, or other industries were selected so The Contract Settlement Act imposed
that their varied business experience might no new procedures in contract termination
be drawn upon to carry out the functions and enunciated no new objectives. Termi-
of the Contract Termination Branch. By
the end of the first fiscal year after V-J ^**
OQMG OO 25-43B, Jan 44, sub: Contract
1 1
Day, with its mission for the most part Termination. The Contract Termination Branch was
activated on 1 February, taking over functions per-
accomplished, the organization had lost its formed previously by the Contract Modification
status as a branch and its personnel had Branch.
" (1) Procurement PoHcy Br, Sup Div, OQMG,
dwindled to two civilians responsible for
Summary Rpt of Contract Termination Activities
the supervision of the remaining termina- 1943-46, p. 1. (Hereafter cited as Summary Rpt.) (2)
tion activities. See Table 1.
^^ (1) Dir of Procurement Div to Deputy Dirs for
Of the seventeendepots involved in pro-
TQMG, Mar Orgn and Procedure
2 44, sub: for
curement operations, five major depots Handling Contract Termination Within and OQMG
Boston, Chicago, Jeffersonville, Jersey at Depot Level. (2) Ltr, TQMG
to CG PQMD, 23
nation claims were still to be settled fairly the Army Supply Program, The Quarter-
and quickly; termination inventory was to master General sent a teletype to the depot
be cleared from war plants promptly; and directing that a given number of units of
adequate interim financing was to be pro- an item be terminated, an action that later
vided for war contractors pending settle- was confirmed by a change in the procure-
ments.The Joint Termination Regulation ment directive. In deciding which con-
(JTR) issued by the War and Navy De- tracts to terminate, the depot contracting
partments provided the instrumentality officer took into consideration various fac-
through which speedy and equitable settle- tors governing the distribution of cutbacks.
ments might be reached, while at the same A primary consideration was the retention
time the government's interests were safe- of facilities with capacity to produce
guarded.^^ known and contingent future require-
In accordance with the provisions of the ments. Where other factors were equal,
JTR, The Quartermaster General could those contracts aff'ording lower unit costs
terminate any prime contract under his to the government were retained. Facilities
administration. The uniform contract ter- that could be used for other war produc-
mination article developed by the Joint tion or for essential civilian production
Contract Termination Board was included were released in preference to terminating
in every fixed-price contract — the type war contracts at plants not readily adapt-
most widely used by the QMC. It was not able to such production. Upon the defeat
used in contracts of less than $50,000, in of Germany the contracting officer had to
those of less than $500,000 providing for consider giving first priority of release from
delivery within six months, nor in service war production to privately owned plants
contracts. A different article was used in not normally engaged in production of a
cost-plus-fixed fee contracts. The termina- military character in order to facilitate
tion article provided for the discontinuance their reconversion to civilian production.
of all work upon notification by the con- These factors and many others had from
tracting officer, both on the part of con- the beginning been considered by Quar-
tractors and subcontractors, and imme- termaster depot contracting officers in the
^^
diate transfer to thegovernment of title to selection of contracts to be terminated.
all partially completed and completed Once the decision had been made, a
supplies, work in process, materials, fabri- telegram, followed by a registered letter,
cated parts, plans, drawings, and any was sent to the contractor, constituting his
information acquired or produced by the officialnotice to stop work. This letter
contractor for the performance of the con- notice of termination was given wide dis-
tract. The contractors could retain any tribution within the depot since every
accrued supplies at an agreed price or sell branch of the depot was affected. The fis-
them upon direction of the contracting of- cal division, for example, was required to
ficer, crediting the government for their
^- First issued on November 1944, the JTR was
value. The article also provided for pay-
1
revise its estimates of funds; the inspection pended on the prompt removal and dis-
branch had to see that the contractor posal of completed articles, component
stopped work; the government-furnished parts, work in process, raw materials, and
materials branch had to supervise the re- equipment in the possession of the con-
government-furnished materials;
call of all tractor at the time of cancellations. The
and the commercial warehouse officer had clearance of his plant was of immediate
to provide the necessary storage space. concern to the contractor whether he
Since War Department policy called for wanted to convert to other war work or
settlement of a terminated contract within essential civilian production during the
sixty days, the work involved had to be war or return to civilian production after
done athigh speed. Within a few days the war. At the time his contract was ter-
after the letter had been sent, a negotiator minated the contractor was compelled to
assigned to the case arranged for an initial stop all work under the contract. His pro-
conference with the contractor. As many duction line was stopped, his labor was
technical people as the negotiator thought idle, his machines were cluttered with
necessary participated, and such matters work in process, and, in many instances,
as the reasons for termination, the con- all of his available factory space was occu-
tractor's rights under the termination ar- pied by raw materials and purchased parts
ticle, the nature and status of each subcon- allocable to the contract. Conversion was
tract, and the need for interim financing impossible until the plant had been
were covered in detail. Interim financing cleared of termination inventory. Clear-
was the financial aid the government gave ance was equally important from the gov-
to a contractor during the period between ernment's point of view because during the
the date of termination and the date of war materials no longer required to fulfill
final settlement of a terminated contract. one particular contract had to be diverted
Interim financing, however, was not a to other war production.
matter of major concern to Quartermaster The preparation of an inventory by the
suppliers at any time during the war. By contractor was the first step in property
V-E Day there had been almost no appli- disposal. It was the policy of the govern-
cations for advance payments. Not until ment to encourage contractors to retain
after V-J Day did these payments become termination inventory or dispose of it
appreciable in amount. Then, in August themselves, providing the government had
1945, partial payments of approximately no specific requirement for the property.
$500,000 were made against contracts The QMC disposed of government-fur-
''
totaling about a billion dollars. nished materials unless it had specifically
In the course of the conference with the authorized their retention. Even then,
contractor, the negotiator and his assist- such materials might be sold to a contrac-
ants established a schedule that the con- tor if he needed them to complete work in
tractor could meet for taking an inventory, process that he intended to retain. While
and they discussed clearance of plant, dis- an inspector made a spot check to deter-
posal of inventory, claims from subcon-
" (1) Contract Termination Br, Procurement Div,
tractors, preparation of a settlement
OQMG. Monthly Rpt of Contract Termination Ac-
proposal, and final settlement. To a large tivities, August 1945. (2) SeeJTR— Revision 1, Sec.
extent the termination of a contract de- Ill, Pts. 2-6, 20 Apr 45.
PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION 95
mine the accuracy of the contractor's in- tions within the sixty-day disposal period
ventory, personnel of the depot property fixed for plant clearance, then theOQMG
disposal section, who were merchandisers became responsible for providing them.
and salesmen experienced in particular When it became apparent that pro-
items, assisted the contractor in making longed storage would be necessary before
plans for disposal. They were expected to final disposition and that space was not
use ingenuity in devising methods that available in government facilities, the
could be suggested to prospective t^uyers OQMG negotiated a storage agreement
for converting to civilian uses materials with the war contractor or provided stor-
developed exclusively for military use. If age in commercial warehouses. Account-
after these steps had been taken termina- ability for such stored property was vested
tion inventory remained at the plants, a list in accountable property officers appointed
of materials was to be sent to the OQMG at the procuring depots.
for determination of its possible use else- There was no set time in the procedure
where in the Corps. In the event no such when the proposal for settlement had to be
need existed, the availability of the inven- prepared. It might be sent in when the in-
tory was supposed to be brought to the at- ventory was filed or, depending upon the
tention of other War Department agencies, complexity of the case, it might be made
but in actual practice the sixty-day clear- up in the period between the submission of
ance period allowed by the Contract the inventory and its disposal. The con-
Settlement Act permitted little time for tractor was responsible for preparing the
such efforts. proposal for settlement, but he could call
If at the end of thirty days, termination upon the contracting officer's staff^for aid
inventory had not been disposed of by the in determining what costs to include in
contractor, the OQMG initiated steps to submitting the claims for payment due
remove the property from the contractor's him because of cancellation. When his pro-
plant or otherwise take title. An agreement posal was received in the depot, account-
might be made with the contractor to ex- ants of the cost and price analysis branch
tend the removal period in order to allow examined it and determined whether an
the depot time for further attempts to dis- office review would be sufficient or whether
pose of the material. If no agreement could a field examination would be necessary. In
be made, the Corps had to provide for re- either case they prepared a report that was
moval or storage. Some items in termina- submitted with the proposal to the negoti-
tion inventory, such as stockpile and war ator. He could then negotiate the proposed
reserve materials, required special treat- final settlement, which was tentative until
ment and plans had to be made for their reviewed. Depending on the amount of the
proper handling. All other materials, how- payment involved, the settlement agree-
ever, were declared surplus to the regional ment was subject to review and recom-
office of the Reconstruction Finance Cor- mendations by the depot review board, the
poration (RFC) having jurisdiction over OQMG Settlement Review Committee, or
the area in which the materials to be the review board of the ASF.
stored were located, and the OQMG asked The objective was to provide war con-
the RFC for shipping instructions. If that tractors with fair compensation for their
agency could not provide shipping instruc- termination claims as expeditiously as pos-
96 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
sible in order to facilitate maximum war Advance Planning for Mass
production during the war and later to ex- Terminations
pedite reconversion from war to civilian
production. Settlement might be accom- While current terminations furnished
plished by means of a negotiated agree- Quartermaster contracting officers with
ment, by use of a formula method, or by practical experience, one of the most
any combination of the two methods. The urgent tasks of the in preparing OQMG
OQMG preferred the negotiated settle- for demobilization was planning in ad-
ment, a method favored by industry and vance for the wholesale terminations that
the procuring agencies of the government would inevitably follow the defeat of
generally. It was the only way in which Japan. The Contract Termination Branch
settlements could be expedited, since this was responsible for such advance plan-
method permitted the use of independent ning. It made every effort to anticipate the
judgment by the contracting officer and problems that would occur and "to arrive
considerably more flexibility in adaptation at some workable formula for terminating
to specific problems. Only where a nego- the contracts for all the major commodi-
tiated agreement was impossible did the ties purchased by the Quartermaster
-^-^
contracting officer resort to settling a claim Corps."
by determining by formula the amount Certain advantages accrued from pre-
due the contractor. If dissatisfied, the con- planning. It speeded the transition from
tractor had the legal right to appeal to the terminated war production to other war
Appeal Board of the Office of Contract production on V-E Day and to civilian
Settlement, or he could bring suit against production upon the final cessation of hos-
the government in the Court of Claims or tilities. It made for prompt diversion of
in a United States District Court. personnel, inventory, and facilities to other
Since a settlement was made in accord- war production or civilian production, and
ance with the terms of a contract, the it also facilitated interim financing, plant
agreement was a legal document that pro- clearance, and prompt settlement of termi-
vided for the payment of the agreed nation claims, thereby lessening the likeli-
amount. Hence the legal branch of the hood of unemployment. In working out
depot prepared all such supplemental preliminary agreements, contractors be-
agreements, which were signed by the con- came more familiar with the information
tractor and the contracting officer, thereby requirements of the government and fre-
becoming the authority for actual pay- quently were able to improve their or-
ment. The final step in termination settle- ganizations, records, and facilities for ter-
ment was taken when the contractor mination. In the meantime, the OQMG
forwarded invoices to the depot. These, profited by the development of more ac-
together with the supplemental agree- curate field information, which could be
ment, were sent to the fiscal division, and used in over-all planning. Even when it
the voucher for payment was prepared. did not eventuate in formal, final agree-
When this voucher was given priority,
payment could be made within four days
^'^
Contract Termination Br to Control Br, F&L
after receipt of the invoice. To all intents
Div, OQMG, 1 1 Mar 44, sub: Termination of Con-
and purposes, the case was then closed. tracts.
PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION 97
ment, pretermination planning was highly supplemental agreement would afford the
valuable in itself as training. government relief from some of the burden
Preplanning included three types of of taking title to materials allocable to a
preparations: (1) discussion with contrac- contract and, at the same time, relieve
tors regarding anticipated terminations both the government and the contractor of
and the preparation by contractors of in- the necessity for extensive posttermination
ternal termination plans and procedures; accounting, audits, and negotiations.
(2) tentative understandings or informal The program began in a tentative and
arrangements embodied in memoranda experimental way. Among the early agree-
not binding upon the government or the ments presented for approval by the
contractor; and (3) formal, binding pre- OQMG and the first consummated by the
termination-settlement agreements cover- War Department was that negotiated be-
ing elements of the termination settlement. tween the Botany Worsted Mills, Inc., and
—
Various specific matters stop-work points, the Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot on
methods of taking inventory, factory over- a current contract for 18-ounce wool serge.
head and general and administrative ex- This agreement, acceptable to both the
penses, starting-load costs, and tooling ex- contractor and the depot, was established
penses —could be made the subject of on a unit-cost basis, with an inventory to
either informal arrangements or binding be taken upon termination a procedure —
settlement agreements. which it was estimated would take only
In one sense, almost all the activities of two days, would protect both the govern-
contract termination, until V-E Day at ment and the contractor, and would elimi-
least, consisted of planning, but until the nate the necessity for any options. ^^ Using
middle of 1944 such planning did not in- this agreement as a test case. Headquar-
volve a program to settle many points in ters, ASF, submitted it to the Director of
advance of termination. Then, based on Contract Settlement and to the Surplus
the broader latitude permitted by the War Property Administrator for approval
Contract Settlement Act, a pretermina- of the principles used. Certain adjustments
tion planning program was initiated in were made and by mid-September the
the QMC, reaching its peak in November OQMG forwarded information concern-
and December. '" The plan proposed by ing this agreement to other depots, author-
Headquarters, ASF, in July called for izing the extension of the principles in-
"predetermination of some part or the volved to similar contracts. Whenever
whole of the price to be paid by the available data permitted a reasonable
Government for the right to cancel the business forecast, the same type of agree-
contract at any given stage of completion" ment was authorized for use in the textile,
and offered suggestions as to the methods
of determining fixed charges according to
the general type of costs to be taken into Contract Termination Br, OQMG, Progress Rpt
of Contract Termination Activities, 1944, p. 9.
account.^* It was anticipated that this at- "* Memo, Asst Dir of Mat, ASF, for TQMG, 24 Jul
tempt to simplify procedure by prede- 44, sub: ExperimentalProgram for Simplifying Ter-
termining termination allowances in the mination Procedures and Predetermining Termina-
tion Allowances.
original contract at the time it was '
uniform termination article, but with the Div, OQMG, to CG JQMD, 6 Sep 44, sub cited n. 1
58.
passage of the Contract Settlement Act «' ASF Cir 325, Sec. IV, 28 Sep
44, sub: PR 5- 1
(2) See also ASF Cir 375, Sec. VI, 4 Oct 45, sub: Con-
The consolidated termination program
tract Termination.
was established by the War and Navy De- «M1) Ltr, Chief of BuSandA, Navy Dept, to
partments for selected contractors, who TQMG, 15 Feb 46, sub: Administration of Termina-
tion Proceedings with Clark Equipment Co. (2) Ltr,
were assigned to a particular service of the
JQMD to TQMG, 9 Aug 46, sub: Final Agreement
War Department or office of the Navy De- with Clark Equipment Co.
PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION 99
beginning of 1944.'''^ The OQMG felt to the War and Navy Depart-
that mended
the resulting plan would have only limited ments the designation of contractors for
application in the Corps and that it would the consolidated termination program,
be "the exception and not the rule," since The Q,MC was represented on eleven of
the problems involved were far less acute these committees and held the chairman-
in the QMC
than in other services. Quar- ship of the Philadelphia committee.''"
termaster items, for example, either were,
or closely approached, standard com- Impact of Developments in the ETO
mercial items and could be readily dis-
posed of in the civilian trade, while sub- Stimulated by the conviction that the
contracting was a relatively small problem war in Europe would end shortly, the
in the procurement of clothing, equipage, major Quartermaster procuring depots
and general supplies. Termination of sub- made strenuous efforts in 1944 to accom-
sistence contracts was omitted entirely plish as much of the preplanning program
from consideration since, according to the as possible. By the end of 1944 many con-
Director of Procurement, there would be tractors had been interviewed, a few in-
virtually no contract termination problem formal understandings had been reached,
"for reasons too obvious to enumerate." and one pretermination settlement agree-
In fact, in the course of conducting its con- ment had been approved. This activity
tract termination activities after the war was just beginning to gain momentum
ended, the QMCwas involved in only two when the Battle of the Bulge in December
company- wide settlements, both of which called for renewed procurement to refill
were handled for the Corps by the AAF."'' supply pipelines. Personnel who were be-
Where it was not feasible or desirable to ing trained for termination activities were
pool personnel under the consolidated ter- suddenly reassigned to other branches of
mination program or the company-wide depot procurement divisions, with the re-
settlement plan, a certain measure of co- suit that, in some instances, the termina-
ordination by the field representatives of tion organization was almost completely
the War and Navy Departments was ob-
tained through the establishment of local Memo, Dirof Readj Div, ASF, for TQMG, 15
'''
them were established with offices in CG ASF, 29 Jan 44, sub: Proposal for Over-all Com-
"'''
twenty-seven large cities, covering all areas PfAL^n"r'"'p"'i^
c
OQMG, for Readj Div, ASF, 25 ^^^'J'^'k
n'^'T^p'^o^ Mar 44, sub: 'n
Over-
of the United States. They acted as clear- all Settlement of Terminated Contracts. (3) Ltr,
ing houses for local termination activities ATSC, Eastern District, Office of Resident Adjust-
"^^"' to TQMG. 28 Jan 46, sub: Supplemental
^^'
and made possible a free interchange of in- Settlement Agreement with Aluminum Go. of
.
f.
formation between members. They co- America. (4) Ltr, Same to TQMG, 30 Jan 46, sub:
ordinated the activities of the services in Transmittal of Supplemental Agreement with Rey-
"°
trainingo contractors in termination mat-
.
!,,
(1)
T/ ^ °r^
Memo, Dir ofe v>
^-
Readj r.
Div, acp
ASF. r
for QMG
-rr^\/fn
I
ters, in disseminating public information et ni, 25 Sep 44, sub: Co-ordinated Termination
on termination procedures, and in making Program. (2) JTR— Revision i. Sec. Vlll, Pt. 3, 20
-1 Contract Termination Br, Procurement
Apr 45. (3)
1
advance preparations
y r
^
With contractors
_
cJ.
tor ^r ^'^'
Div, OQMG, „
Progress v> ^t -r^.^,;,.,.;^,,
Rpt of Contract iermination
, m ,
ing months of 1944 the depot procured the Progress Br, OP&CDiv, OQMG,
13 Feb 45, sub:
largest quantities of shoes of all kinds ever Pretermination Ping Program Conf. (2) Ltr, Dir of
tors were not longer satisfied with assur- Brooks, Problems of Shoe Procurement: A Study in
Procurement at the Boston Quartermaster Depot
ance of completion of work in process nor During World War II (BQMD hist monograph, 10
with mere advance notice of termination. May 45), pp. 397ff, Hist Br. OQMG.
PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION 101
to ease the termination of contracts with The stop-work plan proved of great
the textile industry. It was definitely to the value both to the Army and to industry. It
advantage of the depot that reconversion was timesaving and enabled the mills to
in the textile industry involved no major proceed to a given point without the ne-
problems of retooling or other radical cessity of working out further agreements
changes in the shift from wartime to with the QMC. The flexibility of the plan
peacetime production. There were few un- also permitted the OQMG
to direct proc-
usual or special types of termination essing of certain standard items beyond
charges and only negligible charges for the designated stopping points, either be-
special facilities. Production costs were cause these were still needed in consider-
generally well established in the textile in- able volume by the armies of occupation
dustry, and therefore no particular costing or because the QMC found it desirable to
problems were encountered. Pretermina- anticipate requirements rather than stop
tion agreements could be made to cover all production and place new contracts
numerous points, such as retention offers later when the mills had returned to civil-
for termination inventory, rates of general ian production.
and administrative overhead costs, and Once stop-work stages were established
similar problems.
^°
woolen and cotton industries, the
for the
The point of departure for all pretermi- QMC had to determine the cost at each
nation planning at the Philadelphia De- stop-work stage. This required a knowl-
pot was the agreement with the Botany edge of the contractor's commitments.
Worsted Mills, Inc. From that point depot Costs could be arrived at more easily in the
planning progressed through retention of- woolen than in the cotton industry, for
fers to the development of agreements on wool was less speculative in nature than
stop-work points that were industry-wide cotton, acommodity that is traded in daily
in their application to the woolen, worsted, on the exchange. Cotton manufacturers
and cotton textile industries. The question customarily traded in futures, agreeing to
of retention sales of termination inventory take delivery at a later date on a certain
was the biggest problem in the depot's number of bales of cotton, and they ob-
planning program. When manufacturers tained a large measure of protection by
made retention offers, the distribution of hedging.'- To protect the cotton manufac-
end items was the main consideration. turer from loss on termination, the Phila-
The large woolen and cotton houses had delphia Depot worked out an agreement
potential sales outlets that the smaller
manufacturers did not possess. The larger " 1st Ind, Donnell K. Wolverton, Chief of Legal Br,
the organization, therefore, the better the PQMD, 17 Dec 46, on Ltr, Harold W. Thatcher,
Chief of Hist Sec, OQMG, to CG PQMD, 26 Nov 46,
retention offers made. To get all mills,
sub: Preparation of Hist Account of Demob Period.
both small and large, in line on certain re- "'
An integrated mill is one that starts with the raw
tention values was a tremendous problem material and runs its production through to the
finished fabric. A partially integrated mill might begin
involving many factors, among them the with the yarn and carry its production to the finished
degree of integration of the mills. ^^ Agree- cloth.
'-
Hedging the practice of buying or selling com-
ment on retention values was the goal to- is
termination settlement agreements with action by pointing to its heavy work load
wool manufacturers and contractors in for procurement, which was not appreci-
other textiles and in the clothing industry; ably slowed after V-E Day, and the conse-
of these, 98 were applied after V-J Day.' quent temporary reassignment of termina-
Under these agreements termination tion personnel to buying activity.
claims were settled promptly. V-J Day occurred before any planning
The failure to include subsistence in the could be accomplished, and the Chicago
preplanning program at the Chicago Depot was ill prepared for the avalanche
Quartermaster Depot had unfortunate re- of terminations of subsistence contracts
sults. Although the negotiators at the de- that followed. Little contractor education
pot were called upon to handle the termi- and no pretermination settlements had
nation settlement of subsistence contracts been accomplished, nor were the depot's
for both perishable and nonperishable personnel versed in the problems involved
foods, they found it difficult to appraise
the changes that might occur because By totaling the prices for the ten different cotton
' '
aside from a few dehydrated products and gher, negotiator at PQMD, NYPO, 2 Jan 47, and with
William A. Dittie, negotiator, PQMD, 16Jan 47.
special rations, the Subsistence Division, '''
1st Ind, Donnell K. Wolverton, Chief of Legal Br,
OQMG, did not anticipate any termina- PQMD, 17 Dec 46, on Ltr, Harold W. Thatcher,
tion of contracts for nonperishable sub-
Chief of Hist Sec, OQMG, to CG PQMD, 26 Nov 46,
sub: Preparation of Hist Account of Demob Period.
sistence. Generally speaking, it was as- '•'
For a detailed account see Marion Massen, Cen-
sumed that the Army "could eat its way tral Procurement Operations at the Chicago Quarter-
master Depot: The Demobilization Period (CQMD
out" of subsistence stocks. Since the sub-
hist monograph, Jun 46), Hist Br, OQMG. (Hereafter
sistence personnel both at the OQMGand cited as Massen, Central Procurement Operations.)
PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION 103
in the termination of subsistence contracts. banking institutions offered credit and as-
Consequently they were not ready to as- sistance to prime contractors to enable
sist and advise contractors. Even if the de- them to harvest and store the crops. The
pot had received advance notices of ap- lack of knowledge on the part of the con-
proaching terminations, difficulties would tractors, combined with the inadequacy of
have developed, for the JTR did not make the JTRin reference to subsistence, con-
adequate provisions for terminating sub- tributed to the difficulties of settling sub-
sistence contracts, especially those cover- sistence contracts. Subsistence, then, was
ing perishable foods. As a result, negotia- a field in which planning for termination
torswere required to interpret the JTR on activities was inadequate.
the basis of their judgment and business
experience.The termination of contracts Development of Training Programs
for dehydrated foods, for example, in-
volved thousands of acres of crops and A program of education and training in
hundreds of farmers who were unfamiliar termination procedures for both Quarter-
with the JTR and their rights under the master personnel and Quartermaster con-
Contract Settlement Act. tractors supplemented the Corps' efforts
Subsistence contractors were unpre- to reduce the work load on V-E and V-J
pared to handle problems pertaining to Days by negotiation of pretermination
raw materials, or to finance themselves. agreements. The immediate task was to
Many dehydrators incurred delays in the acquire and train the additional civilians,
handling of the raw materials claimed enlisted men, and officers needed by the
under their terminated contracts because procuring depots and to make certain that
of the inexperience of growers in the personnel so allotted were used to admin-
proper packing of fresh vegetables for sale ister contract termination. They were, first
through commercial channels. Dehy- of all, to handle actual contract termina-
drators and growers were not familiar tion cases, and secondly, to engage in pre-
with the proper storage of certain types of termination planning activities. They
raw materials, a situation made more could be assigned to other jobs in a depot's
acute by the general inadequacy of the procurement division if these tasks pro-
facilities for storing perishable items until vided experience beneficial to termination
arrangements could be made for their dis- work, but in any case training took pre-
position. Contractors also experienced dif- cedence over any immediate assignment
ficulty in financing farmers. The latter to jobs."Some five hundred officers QMC
made raw materials during
deliveries of and civilians were trained in termination
the harvesting season when the depot was work at the Army Industrial College, the
restricted from making shipments into Army Finance School at Fort Benjamin
commercial channels. Financial difficul- Harrison, and the Judge Advocate Gen-
tiesdeveloped when storage could not be eral's School at Ann Arbor, Mich.^^ The
furnished promptly. The JTR made pro- courses at these schools emphasized the
vision for partial payments, but unfortu-
Ltr, Dir of Procurement Div, OQMG, to CO
nately the delay in receiving funds under
'
Government- Furnished Materials the item under contract, the allowance for
and the means by which
loss or spoilage,
Possibly the most complicated aspect of the contractor would pay for or replace
Quartermaster contract terminations re- any material for which he could not
lated to accountability for government- account.
furnished material (GFM) that was used Government-furnished material in ter-
in the production of Quartermaster mination inventory included bulk or un-
items/^ The increase of terminations dur- processed GFM, work in process, and
ing 1943 suggested the desirability of re- clippings, as in the case of textiles, which
ducing credit transactions to a minimum had only a poundage value. The OQMG
and of keeping records with contractors in prepared a current list of essential indus-
order. Furthermore, the shortages of raw trial materials that it retained in the dis-
materials impelled the QMCto make all posal of termination inventory.^* All others
possible savings. Investigation had shown it sold or disposed of, and even material
that GFM was being released to contrac- marked for Quartermaster retention could
tors in excess of needs for current produc- be sold to the contractor provided the
tion and had raised doubts of the protec- quantity so released would be required by
tion being afforded the government him to complete work in process that he
against the misuse of GFM in the hands of wanted to retain for his own account.
contractors. Without this provision, many contractors,
Out of a survey of this problem by the especially those producing clothing and
Organization Planning and Control Divi- equipage items, would have been unable
sion, OQMG, there developed in the sum- to convert promptly to civilian production
mer of 1944 the GFM plan, containing a since they had little, if any, materials of
framework of policies, principles, and their own on hand at the time their con-
procedures.**- At the same time, the depots tracts were terminated. This procedure
were directed to review contracts involv- raised some questions on pricing policy,
ing GFM and establish audit sections to but a ruling of the Surplus War Property
audit contracts involving GFM. A GFM Administration was interpreted to exempt
branch was established in the procure- from pricing policies the sale of ac- GFM
ment division at each depot, the officer in complished in a predetermined settlement.
charge being designated as the account- The GFM in termination inventories sold
able property officer responsible for main- after termination had taken effect could
taining the required property accounting *'
See Risch, The Quartermaster Corps: Organization,
records.**^ I, Ch. VIII.
Supply, and Services ,
Government-furnished material ranged "-'(1) OQMG OO 25-89, 8 Jul 44, sub: Industrial
into the procurement contract, which Oct 44, sub: Industrial Materials and GFM Plan.
**M 1 ) OQMG Cir 34, Supplement 3, 2 Nov 44, sub:
specified the quantity and methods of de- Industrial Materials and GFM
Plan. (2) /6z</. , Supple-
livery of GFM, the use of the material in ment 16, 12 Oct 43, same sub.
106 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
not be exempted from the pricing policies might, for example, have production going
established by the Surplus War Property on and shelter-half
duffel bags, leggings,
Administration.^^ same time, to which he
tents at the
The QMC did not retain GFM being diverted GFM intended for any one of the
processed in items under manufacture. items. Such diversion was common and
Such materials were disposed of as termi- resulted in confusion in recording GFM.
nation inventory in the same manner as Whether it was GFM fabrics supplied for
contractor-owned material contained in the production of Army clothing, duck for
work in process. In the case of unprocessed tents,webbing for equipage, or com- GFM
GFM sold to the contractor, the sale price ponents supplied to the assemblers of
was treated as a disposal credit in reduc- special rations, discrepancies occurred and
tion of the amount of the final settlement accounting difficulties hampered the
payment to the contractor. The GFMin- settlement of claims.**
ventory not otherwise sold or disposed of Possibly no claims were more trouble-
was cleared from the contractor's plant some to settle than those at the Chicago
and declared surplus to the RFC regional Depot involving special rations. The num-
oflfice in the same manner as contractor- ber of contracts involving was fewer GFM
owned property.**' for special rations than for other supplies
Since GFM, on the whole, represented at the depot, but the problem of account-
critical materials for which a ready market ing was complicated by the fact that as
existed, few special problems were en- many as fifty ration components might be
countered in their disposal. ^^ Difficulties supplied to one contractor.*^ These com-
did arise in accounting for GFM
as a ponents tended to be more difficult to
prerequisite to contract termination settle- handle than the GFM
furnished for cloth-
ment. All depots experienced considerable ing and equipage items, because, consist-
trouble in obtaining from the contractors ing of foodstuffs, they were subject to
satisfactory inventory schedules of GFM ^" Memo, Gen Corbin, OQMG, for CO ASF, 30
(1)
on hand. Inventories submitted were Sep GFM to Contractors. (2) 1st Ind,
44, sub: Sale of
usually inaccurate. In part, inaccuracy re- Office of Dir of Mat, ASF, to OQMG, 6 Oct 44, on
sulted from the fact that, although the above memo. (3) Chief of Contract Termination Br
to Legal Br, Procurement Div, OQMG, 23 Oct 44,
government demanded that such inven- sub: Sale of GFM to Contractors. (4) Legal Br to Con-
tories specify sizes, types, and quantities of tract Termination Br, OQMG, 9 Nov 44, same sub.
issued for the production of a given item erty off, PQMD, 1 7 Jan 47.
**"
Included in the various menus of the ten-in-one
on a contract, it did not necessarily follow ration were 17 meat items, 5 different canned vege-
that the contractor observed this rule. He tables, 7 types of candy bars, 4 kinds of puddings, 4
types of beverage powders, and numerous separate
could and did apply GFM to any of a
items, such as canned Army spread, biscuits, evapo-
number of contracts that he had running rated milk, sugar, salt, cigarettes, chewing gum, toilet
simultaneously. In his plant a contractor soap and paper, and water purification tablets.
PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION 107
peared because of the temptation to Contracts might, with the approval of The
employees when these items were scarce, Quartermaster General, include a provi-
or to the jam manufacturer to show claim sion granting an option to the contractor
for loss that occurred in the partial thaw- to buy the equipment after the completion
ing of frozen fruits transferred from stor- of the contract if this action was to the in-
age. Reconciling the resultant discrepan- terest of the government. All the equip-
cies later proved exceedingly troublesome. ment specified in the contract had to be
Ultimately, to expedite contract termina- purchased as a unit except when items
tion settlement, the Chicago Depot worked were withdrawn by contracting officers
out a procedure for closing 1945 GFM because they were needed for other war
accounts according to a plan agreed to by work.
the OQMG, providing for reconciliation Government-furnished equipment was
of the discrepancies between contractor acquired by the contractor under a War
inventories and government charges of Department facilities contract. This was a
GFM.^° lease or rental agreement governing the
use, retention, storage, maintenance, or
ment from war contractors' plants as sold for junk. The average offer for the
quickly as possible and to have the govern- salvaged parts was $150 a machine, and in
ment bear the cost of dismantling plant most cases, the contractor was the buyer.
equipment, preparing and preserving it At both the Jersey City and the Chicago
for storage, and preparing it for shipment Quartermaster Depots about ten cents on
and removal from the plant, except insofar the dollar was realized in the disposal of
as the facilities contract required the con- equipment that ranged in value from
tractor to bear such expense. On the other Sl,500to$l0,000.^«
hand, the government, except in a few in- The settlement of special facilities claims
stances, did not bear any part of the cost became one of the outstanding problems
of reconverting the contractor's plant to in terminating contracts for dehydrated
commercial production. ^^ products. In part this problem arose be-
Subsistence contracts accounted for the cause there had been numerous verbal
largest part of the GFE used in the Corps. authorizations by the procurement spe-
For example, canners and some independ- cialists to permit special facilities for
ent procoaters were encouraged to build dehydrated vegetables in connection with
and install procoating equipment under the awarding of 1945-46 contracts. There
GFE arrangements. Procoating was used had been considerable experimentation on
to inhibit rust on Army canned goods dehydrated vegetables during the 1944
under long and exposed storage overseas production season with the result that
and to camouflage cans in open storage depot field supervisors instructed dehy-
dumps or in discard. After V-J Day all pro- drators that new kinds of equipment to
coating operations were ordered stopped improve the final product would be neces-
and thinner
as soon as supplies of paint sary. Thus, drying bins were recommend-
had been used up. The Army then re- ed to make possible lower moisture content
turned to the use of plain cans in all export and so improve the storage life of a
pack. Disposing of procoating equipment product; the use of chlorinators was en-
posed quite a problem since there was couraged as a sanitary measure; and pre-
little or no commercial demand for pro- conditioning equipment for treating raw
coating cans. After disposal agents had material to improve color in storage was
exhausted the possibility of adapting the required for sweet potatoes and its use en-
equipment to other uses, the Chicago couraged for white potatoes.
Depot submitted a typical case to the These special facilities had been in-
Chicago Regional Office of the RFC to stalled by dehydrators in some cases to-
determine the "unserviceability" of the ward the end of the 1944-45 season and in
machine so that all procoating equipment others after this producing season had
ended. To keep the special facility claims
could, if necessary, be disposed of as scrap
or salvage. The Chicago Regional Office within the bounds of the termination regu-
decided that the procoating machinery lation, the depot determined to reimburse
was "one-purpose" and so could be de- (l)JTR — Revision 1, par. 861.1, 20 Apr 45. (2)
'>-
clared unserviceable. The depot there- PR 10, par. 1003. (3) For the few exceptions to the
rule, see PR 10, par. 1003- A.
upon directed that parts of the machinery, general
^'
(1) Massen, Central Procurement Operations, p.
such as electric motors, gears, fans, and the 197. (2) Interv, OQMG historian with Roger Merrill,
like, might be salvaged and the remainder property disposal agent, JCQMD at NYPO, 2 Jan 47.
PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION 109
the dehydrators whose contracts were ter- dehydrated potatoes for the 1945 season
minated only those facility expendi-
for was canceled, the firm claimed that over
tures made for the 1945-46 producing the entire period of operations an operat-
season. Expenditures made before 1 July ing loss had been assumed in excess of
1945 were generally to be considered as $63,700 and that the unamortized special
operating costs of the contracts for the pre- facility was worth $7 1 ,882. A claim for a
vious year's operations. The special equip- total of $87,003 related to emergency facil-
ment on which the depot paid claims was ities was filed under the Contract Settle-
varied, including asteam boiler purchased ment Act, and the net settlement paid to
dehydration of rutabagas, drying the contractor totaled $40,1 14.^-
for the
bins, sulfiting equipment, and cyntron Wherever the depots disposed of GEE,
feeding screeners.^^ was sold under the Clayton formula,
it
The fact that most of the dehydrating which provided a method of selling GEE
plants had operated only three years, based on depreciation of a certain per-
whereas the certificate of necessity under centage for each month's usage. Facilities
which they were built was for five years, sold under this formula brought from 50 to
led some of the contractors to seek allow- 75 percent of cost. Equipment not sold to
ance in termination settlements for amor- war contractors was declared surplus by
tization that normally would have the War Department and turned over to
the War Assets Administration (WAA).
'"^
occurred over the remaining two years.
Although contractors felt they should be The Clayton formula furnished a guide for
reimbursed for the expenditures made, the disposal of equipment, but disposing
these claims could be paid only if, accord- of special facilities provided to leaseholds,
ing to the Contract Settlement Act of 1944, such as installing an elevator in a build-
contractors supplied the name of the Army ing, or adding a new floor or new windows,
agent with whom they dealt to support the proved troublesome when it came to the
Such information
validity of their claims. settlement of claims. Few contracts made
could not always be furnished, and conse- provisions for the disposition of such facil-
quently in the long run only two or three ities, and it was difficult to secure the
such claims were filed on dehydrated veg- residual value of them. The most involved
etable contracts. One, for example, cov- were those wherein ex-
cases for settlement
ered the erection of a plant to produce pansion had been forced on the contractor
dehydrated potatoes for the duration of '^
Massen, Central Procurement Operations, pp.
the war only. The dehydration plant, 176, 178.
financed by a company already in exist- '^
The vegetable dehydration industry was so lim-
ence, was built in July 1942 and fulfilled ited in size before the war that it did not begin to
meet expanded wartime demands. At the beginning
its first contract in the following month. of World War II, therefore, numerous dehydrating
When the contract for the previous year firms sprang up, financing building by loans granted
either by the government or by private banks under
had been completed in May 1945, the
"certificates of necessity," which entitled them to
company, in order to prepare the plant for amortization over a five-year period, or a shorter
operation in the 1946 producing season, period if the emergency ended sooner. Massen, Cen-
made extensive repairs upon the advice of tral Procurement Operations, p. 179.
"'Ibid., pp. 180-81. For other cases of subsistence
the OQ.MG. At the end of August 1945, claims see Risch, Demobih'zatwn Planning and Operation
when a contract for 1,500,000 pounds of m the Quartermaster Corps, pp. 67-68.
no THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
since they involved starting load costs. Be- also had a drastic effect upon settlement.
cause of the huge procurement orders In August and September little processing
many plants were compelled to expand. had occurred under the rather large con-
They were also required to produce items, tracts for the fiscal year 1946, and most of
such as the intrenching shovel, that were the fresh vegetables being grown for dehy-
foreign to the commercial market. The dration were still in the ground. The dis-
critical supply of certain materials forced position of this inventory — vegetables in
the use of substitutes, which, in turn, com- various stages of growth and harvested
pelled the contractor to work with an un- vegetables —
constituted one of the chief
known quantity and raised anew the problems in the termination settlement of
question of starting load costs. When ter- contracts for dehydrated vegetables.
minations occurred, the depots had to take In the main, disposal of the fresh veg-
cognizance of new equipment and new as- etables was arranged by consultation
sembly lines established as well as addi- among representatives of the Field Head-
tional plant space acquired. Making quarters of the Market Center Procure-
allowance for such new equipment and ment Program, the OQMG, and the De-
facilities always involved controversial ele- partment of Agriculture. Eventually a
ments, but the greatest problem was procedure for disposal was established
ferreting out starting load costs.
^^
which provided that, if no market at full
cost could be found for the matured crops
Inventory
inform the Market Center Headquarters
of their availability. If the latter did not
The disposal of contractor-owned ter- desire the items for Army menus, then the
mination inventory, in most cases, posed crops would be declared surplus to the
no special problems. In some instances Department of Agriculture.^^ The decision
where the depot had to dispose of surplus as to whether crops in the growing stages
standard items, such as Gillette razor should be permitted to mature or should
blades or Squibb toothpaste, when con- be abandoned was made by the depot and
tractswere terminated, it had to take pre- confirmed by the OQMG.
cautions against glutting the market. Sweet and white potatoes, carrots, cab-
Otherwise one of the policies underlying bages, rutabagas, beets, and onions were
theJTR would have been defeated. the principal raw materials for which dis-
On the other hand, the disposition of posal had to be arranged when dehydrated
termination inventory in subsistence con- vegetable contracts were terminated. The
tracts was not without its difficulties. The difficulties encountered can best be dis-
most unusual and unexpected problems cussed by illustration. For example, almost
occurred in disposing of raw materials all of the carrots and cabbages for Army
when contracts for dehydrated vegetables dehydrated vegetables were grown on the
were terminated. A large part of these dif- "'
Intervs, OQMG historian with Adam Michals,
ficulties were attributable to the inade- procurement speciahst in hardware; with Collings
quacy of the JTR in making provision for Downes, Legal Sec; and with WilHam Lawson, pro-
curement speciahst, JQMD, 6 Feb 47.
the disposition of perishable items. The '"*
Massen, Central Procurement Operations, pp.
time of year when terminations occurred 122-23.
PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION 111
Pacific coast, the carrots being produced vested carrots valued at $21,719 made a
entirely in California. These crops were in retention offer of only $1.00 an acre. Ap-
various stages of growth at the time of con- proved by the depot, this offer was
tract termination. When stop-work notices accepted under protest by the Depot
were sent out to the dehydrators, the farm- Property Disposal Board when it was
ers had to cease cultivating, irrigating, and shown that it would cost the Army $25.00
tending their crops. The problem of dis- a ton to harvest the carrots and that only
posal therefore demanded immediate at- those desirable for commercial purposes
tention. The varieties of cabbage being could be sold. It was cheaper to settle this
grown, however, were not suited to com- claim on a cost basis than on an abandon-
mercial channels outside dehydration nor ment basis, for in the latter case the gov-
was commercial disposition possible for ernment would also have had to pay
the variety of carrots grown. On the other destruction expense as well as the value of
hand, the Market Center Program could the potential harvest. ^^
accept only a few carloads of carrots and The cost of disposing of the cabbage
none of cabbage, since spoilage in trans- crop on the west coast was not so high as
portation of the latter commodity was very that for carrots, although abandonment
high. The Subsistence Division, OQMG, had been authorized for all crops that had
instructed the Chicago Depot to dispose of not reached maturity at the time of con-
matured cabbage and carrots, for either tract termination. The cabbage ready for
animal or human consumption, at the best market was in some cases sold to other de-
price obtainable. To keep the claims at a hydrators at contract price. With the ap-
minimum, the growing crops were ordered proval of the Depot Property Disposal
abandoned in the field. It was also decided Board, four contractors abandoned about
to pay the grower for the cost of produc- 1,000 acres of unmatured cabbage. The
tion to whatever stage the crop had settlements with the grower subcontractors
m.atured and for the cost of destroying the included cultivating claims, which in some
crop. Because fields had to be cleared be- cases amounted to $95.00 an acre. Even
fore other crops could be planted, the when the profit to growers was counted in,
question of posttermination expense arose. the cost of abandonment, though sizable,
The cost of discing the fields where crops would probably be less than the amount
were abandoned was deemed a legitimate of the loss risk with sale upon harvest, since
expense and was paid by the government. the harvest in some cases was months
A small acreage of the carrot crop was away. On the other hand, the Depot Prop-
purchased by other dehydrators but the erty Disposal Board accepted a retention
remainder was retained by the contractors offer for twenty contracts for cabbage
at a loss to the government. One of the growing made by one of the large dehy-
largest contractors, whose termination of drators. Up to termination the cost of
fresh carrots amounted to 6,912 tons, dis- raising the crops totaled $63,000 and the
posed of 1,500 tons at no cost to the gov- total contract price of the completed crops
ernment. He offered S5.00 a ton on the was $145,000. The dehydrator was willing
remainder, of which he expected to freeze to handle the completed crop for two-
a part and to sell the rest as cattle feed.
Another grower with 123 acres of unhar- Ibid.,p. 134.
112 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
thirds value, making a retention offer of May, for the War and Navy Departments
$15,000 on the $63,000, which left a net and the United States Maritime Commis-
cost to the government of $48,000. Had sion, designating the Procurement Divi-
the offer not been accepted, the cost to the sion, Treasury Department, as the dis-
government on the basis of abandonment posal agency for consumer goods; the
would have been $63,000 plus the profit RFC, for producer and capital goods; the
allowed the contractor and abandonment War Food Administration (WFA), for
costs; hence the government gained by food; and the Foreign Economic Adminis-
^"^
this settlement. tration (FEA) as the agency for handling
the disposition of surpluses outside the
Disposal of Surplus Property United States.
Public interest in the disposal of surplus
Military property and salvage as well as property culminated in the enactment of
contractor termination inventory required the Surplus Property Act of 1944, which
disposal. The disposition of excess and sur- established a Surplus Property Board to
plus military property involved the redis- replace the Surplus War Property Admin-
tribution of excess property, that is, sup- istration on 3 October 1944.^"" This board
plies in excess of local needs in a specified in turn gave way to a Surplus Property
area and hence available for transfer; the Administration, which was established in
determination of excess property as sur- the Office of War Mobilization and Recon-
plus to the needs of the War Department; version (OWMR)
under an adminis-
^°^
and the disposal of surplus property. trator.
Aware of the difficulties that had devel- Meanwhile, the responsibility for dis-
oped in surplus disposal after World War posing of consumer goods, assigned to the
I, the War Department had given early Office of Surplus Property in the Treasury
consideration to this problem. ^"^ Department on 19 February 1944, was
Department of Com-
transferred to the
Disposal Problems merce, effective 1 May 1945. About six
months later this office was again trans-
By the fall of 1944 the War Department ferred, along with its activities and person-
had made sufficient strides in estimating nel, to the RFC, where it continued as the
requirements and defining redistribution War Assets Corporation.^''^
and disposal levels to eliminate some of Approximately two months later, effec-
the difficulties that the OQMGhad been tive as of the close of business 15 January
encountering in the disposal of surplus 1946, the War Assets Corporation was
property, but others quickly arose from the designated by the Surplus Property Ad-
relationships with disposal agencies out-
War Department. Between 1944
side the '""/6z«/.,pp. 135-36.
""" Risch, The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Sup-
and 1946 these agencies succeeded each
ply, and Services I, Ch. X. For a discussion and defini-
,
other with great rapidity. tion of redistribution and disposal levels, also see
Originally, the Surplus War Property Chapter X.
•"- U. S. Statutes at Large, Vol. 58, pp. 765-84.
Administration was established in the
OWM by Executive order in February
•"^
12145.
(\)Ibid., Vol. 59, p. 533. (2) Federal Register, IX,
ministrator as the disposal agency for all The troubles experienced by the dis-
types of property for which the RFC was posal agencies grew out of the differences
formerly the disposal agency. The follow- between commercial and Army proce-
ing month by Executive order the domes- dures resulting from utilization of a system
tic functions of the Surplus Property Ad- of issue in the Army as compared with
ministration were merged with those of the sales in commercial channels. ^°^ In the
War Assets Corporation, and its foreign case of issued items it was unnecessary to
functions were transferred to the Depart- distinguish in great detail between items
ment of State. By the same order, but ef- carrying substantially similar specifica-
fective 25 March 1946, the War Assets Ad- tions.Clothing, for example, manufac-
ministration was established to administer tured from GFM
by different companies
the domestic surplus disposal functions of and at different costs was nonetheless car-
the War Assets Corporation and the former ried under a single stock number. Simi-
Surplus Property Administration. '°^ These larly, a certain type and weight of type-
kaleidoscopic changes in the administra- writer paper was carried under a given
tion of surplus property disposal necessi- stock number and used to fill requisitions
tated frequent reorientation in Quarter- under a standard nomenclature, although
master relationships with the disposal stocks might be made up of the products
agencies and accounted in part for the dif- of several different manufacturers, and
ficulties the Corps met in disposing of its some of the paper might be of a quality
surpluses. varying from the specification standard.
In addition, earlier difficulties relating Speed, efficiency of operation, and econ-
to nomenclature and description persisted, omy were the factors that had
determined
for the type of information sought by dis- Army's adoption of this practice.
the
posal agencies was quite different from thatAlthough recognition of this practice was
normally maintained in Army records. fundamental in building disposal pro-
When the Department of Commerce as- grams, it was largely ignored by the suc-
sumed responsibility for the disposal of cessive disposal agencies in the months
consumer goods, part of the original basis immediately following the end of the war.
of understanding was that "the Army Much of the difficulty experienced by the
would in effect guarantee the quantity, early disposal agency could be attributed
quality, and description of articles to be to its failure to distinguish between an "is-
declared surplus in response to our request sue" status and a "sales" status. ^°^ The
that priority in this respect be given to OQMG was willing to provide commercial
articles in short supply or in danger of breakdowns where feasible, but in many
early price deterioration in view of rapid
Ibid.,Xl,W8, 1265, 3301.
'<>'
reconversion." ^"'^
The
Director of the Ltr, Dir of Office of Surplus Prop, Commerce
^"'^
Office of Surplus Property felt there was Dept, to Surplus Prop Administrator, 15 Oct 45, no
sub.
no lack of co-operative spirit but that the "' Memo, Gen Feldman, OQMG, for CG ASF, 26
problems were attributable to the physical Oct 45,sub: Commerce Rpt on Problems En-
and administrative difficulties that the countered in Disposing of Surplus Mil Prop.
'"**
See Ltr, Dir of Office of Surplus Prop, Com-
Army was encountering in its lower eche- merce Dept, to Administrator, SPA, 15 Oct 45, no sub,
lons and in its inventory and records and Incl, sub: Nation-wide Sales Program Difficulties
system. Chargeable to Reliance on Army Info and Sv.
114 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
changes in requirements might occur
instances obtaining such information in-
volved prohibitive costs. The speed with
necessitating withdrawals that should re-
which essential declarations were proc-ceive priority over any disposal program.
essed beginning on 15 August 1945 also The OQMG
urged that under no circum-
contributed to inaccuracies, as did the stances should the Army be put in the po-
constant and increasingly heavy turnover sition of entering the open market to pro-
in depot personnel, which led to the use of cure items in order to "make good" on a
many inexperienced employees. surplus declaration, which, as a result of
The lack of co-ordination between the subsequent study or changed conditions
OQMG and the disposal agencies that was revealed to be no longer surplus.'^"
had existed during the formative stages of It became established Quartermaster
the disposal program contributed to the policy that the Stock Control Branch of
difficulties experienced in the disposal of the OQMG controlled all requests for
surplus property. Because liaison had not withdrawals of surplus Quartermaster
been established, the OQMG failed to ad- property at the depot level. ^" Such with-
vise the disposal agencies concerning the drawals could be effected only as specifi-
type of information available so that sales cally directed by the OQMG
and with the
programs could be built accordingly and concurrence of the disposal agency. The
methods developed to dispose of products withdrawals were directed only after
in the most economical manner permitted studies had been made within the OQMG
under the Surplus Property Act. This situ- and it had been definitely determined that
ation was remedied in September 1945 by such items were needed to meet immediate
the appointment of liaison officers by each and future War Department requirements.
technical service.^"" In the spring of 1946 an excessive number
Withdrawals from Quartermaster prop- of withdrawals from surplus property of
erty that had already been declared sur- small quantities of items, however, neces-
plus also caused persistent difficulties and sitated reiteration of War Department
—
became one of the biggest problems con- policy that withdrawals should be initi-
fronting the OQMG. If the depots had as- ated or approved only if it could be shown
sumed originally that they were free to that a withdrawal would prevent procure-
^^-
take whatever action they wanted in re- ment.
gard to property declared surplus until it As the months passed requests for with-
was taken over by the disposal agencies, drawal of many surplus items nevertheless
these agencies, on the other hand, tended became quite numerous, a situation read-
in the beginning to oppose any with-
drawals. The OQMG agreed that with- Sep
•"« Memo,
45, sub:
Dir of Readj Div, ASF, for TQMG,
Appointment of Liaison Offs.
8
drawals of declarations were undesirable "" Memo, Gen Feldman, OQMG, for CG ASF, 26
and were to be avoided as much as possi- Oct 45, sub: Commerce Rpt on Problems Encountered
Surplus Mil Prop.
ble. The over- all objective of the disposal in Disposing of
'" (1) Ltr, Col Cound, OQMG, to CG ASF, 6 May
program was to serve the public interest 46, sub: Withdrawals of Surplus Prop. (2) Ltr, Cound
by diverting to civilian channels items not to CGs or COs of All QM Depots el al., 3 May 46,
required by the Army. The disposing same sub.
'-
Ltr, TAG to Chiefs of Tech Svs, 26 Apr 46, sub:
'
agency had to recognize, however, that er- Withdrawals from Declared Surpluses, SPXAM-PM
rors in declarations were possible or that 400.703 (25 Apr 46) AC-C-SPDDL
PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION 115
ily understandable when viewed against with disposal agencies, the OQMG
com-
the background of conditions immediately plained of the delays experienced in ob-
after V-J Day. Then every effort was be- taining approval by regional offices of the
ing exerted to make available items that WAA of requests for withdrawals submit-
were needed in civilian markets, and to ted by Quartermaster field installations."^
this end drastic reductions were made in The OQMG felt that such approval or
In anticipation of V-J Day Headquarters, erty was consumer goods. Prompt dispos-
ASF, made its assuming that issue als could fill civilian shortages, whereas
plans,
demand for Periods II and III would be delays would throw supplies on the market
one third that for Period I. The disposal in competition with normal civilian pro-
level for civilian-type items was to be re- duction. At the end of the war, therefore,
duced to one third of that established for the OQMG
attacked this problem ener-
such items in Supply Control MPR-20, 30 getically. In the first week after Japan's
June 1945. Quantities of stock on hand in surrender the OQMG
cleared for disposal
excess of the reduced redistribution and 146 items, having a total value of
disposal levels were to be declared surplus 000,000.''' After an initial spurt of
immediately without approval of Head- 000,000 in the first three days, the rate of
quarters, ASF. Furthermore, circulariza- clearance averaged only $2,000,000 per
tion to other components of the War day, partly because a policy was adopted
Department and to the Navy was to be of holding some actions in suspense until
discontinued immediately in order to firm requirements could be fixed for Period
make such items available as quickly as II, an objective that was accomplished by
possible for the civilian market. ^^* 25 August. Subsequently the use of special
The OQMG did not acquiesce in the procedures establishing priorities by the
disposal agencies for the declaration of
disposal level established, inasmuch as
unauthorized items became the major fac-
Army demands some items, as, for
for
tor retarding declarations. As the backlog
example, clothing, would not be reduced
of goods determined to be surplus but not
by two thirds as of V-J Day. In any event, agencies
yet declared to the disposal
Quartermaster clothing items were appli-
mounted, these special procedures were
cable to civilian requirements only as
abandoned, and the returned toOQMG
normal civilian-type items
substitutes for
practice of declaring unauthorized
its
when these were unobtainable or obtain- items for disposal without awaiting the re-
able only at inflated prices. They did not
quest of disposal agencies. By the end of
represent generally satisfactory civilian-
1945 the OQMG
had declared surplus
type supplies. The OQMG requested
goods to the disposal agencies to the value
exceptions to the disposal level for various
of$281,000,000.'''
items, such as nurses' clothing, laundry
To speed the disposal of surplus prop-
items, and barracks equipment, because
the requirements for them would not be
reduced by two thirds if authorized for the
"*'
Memo,Dir of Reqmts and Stock Control Div,
ASF, for TQMG
el al., 14 Aug 45, sub: Redistr and
use of occupational troops."'' The release Disposal Levels and Disposal Action for Civilian-Type
of surplus items that would have imme- Items on V'-J Day.
The QMC was particularly vulnerable Disp of Surplus Civilian-Type ASF Mil Prop in the
Continental U.S.
to criticism for delays in disposal because '-' SR99, 23 Aug 45.
was retained for future Army use. In ad- WDGS, 13 Jan 47, sub: Problems and Plans of QM
Surplus Disposal, pp. 1-2. (2) Lt Col W. C. Strum,
dition, although the choice of the location "Disposition of Surplus Property," QMR, XXVI
of surpluses to be disposed of was usually (May-June 1947), 35-36.
PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION 119
declarations during the last half of 1946 appreciable dent in this backlog and by
came from one source, namely, surplus the end of the year had reduced it to
authorized items that did not meet the $50,400,000. By the close of 1948 it was
standards for Army stocks. It was antic- virtually eliminated.'"^
ipated that future declarations would con- During the years 1941-45 such factors
tinue to come from this source.'"^ as changes in the strategic situation, tech-
Quartermaster declarations of surplus nological improvements, blind buying
from the beginning of disposal activity had early in the war, and the difficulties in de-
exceeded removal or delivery orders issued termining precise needs months in advance
by the disposing agencies. The failure to were responsible for the creation of surplus
remove surplus property promptly caused property. After V-J Day the difficulty of
a huge backlog to accumulate in Quarter- estimating precise requirements for an
master depots, posing problems not only of Army whose size was subject to change as
space but also of care and handling. Each a result of the shifting political and inter-
installation having custody of surplus national developments, as well as the effect
property was required to submit monthly of future technological improvements,
reports to the Chief of Finance on the costs assured a continuing trickle of surplus
of the care and handling of such property property. Thus it could never be elim-
in order that reimbursement might be se- inated entirely, although for all practical
cured from the disposal agencies. Approxi- purposes the disposal of surplus property
mately one year after the end of the war, had been reduced to normal operating
surplus property occupied 14 percent of status three years after World War II had
QMC net usable warehouse and shed ended.
space and 1 1 percent of net usable open
space.'-''
'-^Address, Col Strum, OQMG,
to Liaison Offs,
The backlog of Quartermaster property WDGS, 13 Jan 47, sub: Problems and Plans of QM
awaiting removal by disposal agencies ^ vas Surplus Disposal, p. 7.
valued at $341,000,000 on 31 January '-^SR350, 19 Aug 46.
'•-''SR 466, 20 Feb 47.
1947. It constituted one of the largest '-' Statistical Yearbook of the Quartermaster Corps, 1948,
backlogs among the technical services, pp. 81-82. The backlog amounted to $1,400,000.
CHAPTER IV
Statistical Review of
Quartermaster Supply
Operations
The importance of the supply function vehicles, as well as ammunition of all
of the Quartermaster Corps is indicated kinds. In contrast, the QMC was called
by the fact that of the seven technical serv- upon to provide in enormous quantities
ices under the jurisdiction of the Army thousands of types of small and relatively
Service Forces, the Corps ranked second inexpensive articles, such as socks, shirts,
only to the Ordnance Department in the shoes, undergarments, canned goods, per-
dollar value of supplies procured for and ishable foods, shaving brushes, sleeping
delivered to the Army in World War II. bags, knives, canteen cups, soap, and
Procurement deliveries represented a paper. At the same time the did QMC
major part of the expenditures by ASF procure many kinds of expensive service
agencies, whose chief task was to provide and warehouse equipment mobile repair—
and maintain the materiel required by the units, fumigation chambers, mobile bath
Army. The estimated value of these sup- units, tractors, cranes, and fork-lift
plies, exclusive of petroleum products, trucks —
but their total cost of $35 1,1 36,-
totaled $69,248,874,000 for the period 000 amounted to only a fraction of the
from January 1942 through December aggregate value of Quartermaster pro-
1945. The value of QMC deliveries curement."
amounted to $21,711,572,000, or nearly The provision of food for the Army was
one third of the Army supply program.^ the most costly of all the supply functions
Procurement activities were centered performed by the QMC, subsistence pro-
largely in theOrdnance Department and curement amounting to $ 1 1 ,392,689,000,
the QMC, and these two technical services
or more than 52 percent of the total Quar-
delivered more than 80 percent of the sup- termaster deliveries shown in Table 3. The
plies required by the Army. That the cost of clothing the Army was less than
Ordnance Department procured the half that of feeding the men, procurement
larger dollar volume is accounted for deliveries of all clothing items aggregating
primarily by the fact that it supplied such $5,452,286,000. The value of clothing, in
large and costly munitions items as tanks, '
See Table 2.
artillery, self-propelled guns, and motor -
See Table 3.
STATISTICAL REVIEW OF SUPPLY OPERATIONS 121
Excludes |}etroleuin and petroleum products, coal and other fuels, and building and construction materials.
Calendar Year
122 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
tures of only $200,000,000, including months later, in the second half of 1944,
operating costs, for the fiscal year 1940 they both began to climb again, as illus-
the last complete fiscal year before the trated in the following quarterly break-
United States undertook extensive mobi- down of deliveries:*
lization under the Selective Service Act of
Quarter Clothing Equipage
September 1940.^ (Thousands of Dollars)
The first year after Pearl Harbor was a
period whenthe procurement efforts of the 1942
ed to decline simultaneously early in 1943 obtainable with reasonable effort and research.
^ Statistics, a volume in preparation for the series
after reaching their wartime peaks in the UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II,
fourth quarter of 1942, but eighteen April 1952 draft, Procurement Sec, MS in OCMH.
STATISTICAL REVIEW OF SUPPLY OPERATIONS 123
scheduled to meet estimated replacements and 2 million yards respectively." The de-
and operational requirements, was begin- cline in the deliveries of all types of tents
ning. The higher echelons of the War "slipped off to the vanishing point by the
Department became more aware of the end of the year."^ Similarly, production
serious repercussions that could arise from of worsted and woolen fabrics for the
the accumulation of excess goods, particu- Army was cut in half by the spring of
larly when it was at the expense of civilian 1944.'^
production, and they placed greater em- This downward trend was further stim-
phasis on minimum inventories. Increas- ulated in the summer of 1944 by the gen-
ingly, they felt the need to correlate erally accepted belief that the war in
procurement more closely with consump- Europe would end shortly. In terms of this
tion. To promote this correlation, the shortened-war thinking, stock levels were
OQMG initiated studies that resulted in a considered adequate and the accumula-
more realistic estimation of requirements tion of surplus stocks was deemed undesir-
as well as a more accurate establishment able. The pressure for smaller inventories
of stock levels. These developments cul- was thereby increased.
minated in a more effective stock control Contributing to the downward trend
system. was the introduction of new items of cloth-
In effect, the OQMG
took steps to ing and equipment developed to replace
schedule deliveries to correspond more old items —
for example, the use of the
closely with actual requirements. For this wool sleeping bag in lieu of two woollen
purpose it established a Master Produc- blankets. Procurement deliveries declined
tion Schedule that set an upper limit on because, on the one hand, old items were
purchases and controlled the rate at which cut back sharply in production, while, on
required production was to take place. the other, the shift to the manufacture of
Furthermore, the Quartermaster depots new items required time to build up de-
made efforts to reduce buying not con- liveries. Thus the introduction of the wool
trolled by such schedules. sleeping bag resulted in very small require-
The net result of all this was a down- ments for woolen blankets, and deliveries
ward revision of requirements and a cut- dropped abruptly during the summer of
back in the procurement of most Quarter- 1944. Depot stocks, however, were con-
master items, particularly clothing and sidered adequate to meet all requirements
equipage items. For example. War from the field, but a precarious stock-level
Department apprehension over the size of position by mid-September
developed
the duck and webbing inventory —
textiles when huge requisition, soon to be sup-
a
used in the production of tents and various plemented by others, was received from
items of personal equipage —
resulted in a the ETO as a result of the slow shipments
sharp curtailment and cancellation of of wool sleeping bags and the necessity for
duck and webbing contracts late in 1943. conducting a strenuous winter campaign.
From approximately 72 million yards in '
Rpt, Col. Robert T. Stevens and Ralph A. Rut-
the fourth quarter of 1942, the duck and Aug 45, sub: Supplement to QMC Duck and
land, 20
webbing pool "pulled down the duck de- Webbing Pool Rpt of Feb 44, p. 3.
1
'*
Memo, Col Stevens, Deputy Dir of Purch, Pro-
liveries for the second, third and fourth
curement Div, OQMG, for CG ASF, 10 May 44, sub:
quarters of 1943 to 37 million, 8 million Brief Picture of Worsted and Woolen Industry.
124 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Table 4 Deliveries of Selected Clothing, Equipment, and Supply Items
[Thousands of Units] '
Item 1941
Clothing
Belt, waist web, M1937
Coat, wool serge, o. d.
Equipage
Bag, barracks
Bag, dufile
Bag, sleeping, wool
Belt, cartridge, .30-cal., dismounted, M1923
Belt, pistol or revolver, M1923
Blanket, wool, o. d., M1934
Canteen (all types)
Shovel, intrenching, M1910; M1943
Tent, shelter-half
Tent, squad, M1942; M1945
General Supplies
Can, water, 5-gallon
DDT, 100% Technical Grade (lb.)
Deliveries of woolen blankets had to be clothing and equipage, however, was the
stepped up sharply at that time, and they higher rate of replacements necessitated
continued at a high rate to the end of the by the commitment of a much larger pro-
war in order to provide for the increasing portion of the armed forces to battle fol-
numbers of displaced persons and prison- lowing the invasion of Normandy. The
ers of war as well as to meet the needs of greater attrition of clothing and equipage
the armed forces." items in battle —
that is, the more exten-
another factor influencing the
Still sive wear and tear and losses — resulted in
downward trend was the effect of the an increased rate of replacements that was
greatly expanded program of conservation reflected in larger requistions. The ETO
and reclamation on procurement. Once demands for woolens and worsteds brought
initial issue had been accomplished, cloth- a sharp rise in the delivery of these textiles
ing and equipage items could be re- and the end items manufactured from
claimed, repaired, and returned to use, them.^ At the same time, experience re-
thus saving millions of dollars that other- vealed that cotton fabrics did not have as
wise would have had to be spent for the long a life in the damp and heat of the
purchase of replacement items. In con- tropics as they did in other areas occupied
trast, the reclamation program had no by American troops, and the rate of issue
application to food and other expendable had to be increased.
in the Pacific also
items, such as soap, paper, insecticides, or It was primarily the ever-increasing de-
repellents. Their consumption necessitated mand accounted for
for subsistence that
new purchases to meet Army demands. the steady Quartermaster
rise in total
Procurement deliveries of clothing and procurement deliveries through the war
equipage began to rise sharply in the years. Deliveries of general supplies also
fourth quarter of 1944. It had become ob- contributed in part to this trend. While
vious by then that the war in Europe was both of these major groups of commodities
not going to end in 1944, and that not only were affected in the first half of 1943 by
would supply lines have to be maintained the cutbacks that resulted from War De-
but requisitions would have to be revised partment efforts to correlate procurement
upward in the light of the tactical situ- more closely with consumption, the up-
ation. For example, on the assumption swing in deliveries was halted for only a
that housing on the Continent would be brief period. After mid- 1943 deliveries of
practically nonexistent for American both began to rise sharply again, a full
troops as a result of bombings and the Special Rpt, Statistics Br, Div, to OP&C
'
(1)
need to provide shelter for displaced per- TQMG, Nov 45, sub: Wool Blankets: Supply Sum-
sons, the Chief Quartermaster, ETO, mary, World War II, pp. 4A,6, 2 (2) For annual
1 .
[Millions of Pounds]
Item 1942
128 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Table 6 Purchases Directed by Office, Quartermaster General of Petroleum
Products by Major Commodities: 1 June 1943-31 August 1945 "
Value, Quantity, and Commodities Total Jun-Dec 1943 Jan-Dec 1944 Jan-Aug 1945
Value
Total 3337, 579, 573 380, 265, 463 3127,872,445 3129,441,665
Gasoline for Internal Combustion Engines 212, 500,251 40, 286, 403 87, 335,600 84, 878, 248
Burning Fuels. 11, 718,919 932, 157 4, 765, 393 6, 021, 369
Diesel Fuels 9, 745, 194 2, 626, 669 4, 539, 594 2, 578,931
Automotive Engine Oils 73, 291, 772 30,795,733 20, 248, 880 22, 247, 159
Gear Lubricants 11, 836,511 2, 791, 176 3, 982, 352 5, 062, 983
Solvent, Dry Cleaning 1, 878, 955 125, 109 1, 550, 676 203, 170
Fuel Oils 622, 698 172,311 442, 605 7,782
Other Lubricating Oils and Specialties 6, 823, 803 330, 659 1, 749, 950 743, 194
Automotive Greases ^. 6, 338, 377 1, 459, 342 2, 508, 301 370, 734
Other Lubricating Greases and Specialties 2, 823.093 745, 904 749, 094 328,095
Quantity
Gasoline for Internal Combustion Engines, gallons 427, 550, 953 485,616,210 954, 309, 338 987, 625, 405
Burning Fuels, gallons 173,819,015 17,015,487 70, 077, 445 86, 726, 083
Diesel Fuels, gallons 187, 203, 291 49, 583, 075 97,481,833 40, 138, 383
Automotive Engine Oils, gallons 149,044,551 52, 447, 426 45, 822, 996 50, 774, 129
Gear Lubricants, gallons 22, 258, 530 4,431,959 8, 127, 102 9, 699, 469
Solvent, Dry Cleaning, gallons 16,650,096 861, 661 14, 144, 654 1,643,781
Fuel Oils, gallons 14, 307, 576 2, 586, 354 11,636,218 85,004
Other Lubricating Oils and Specialties, gallons 35,719,257 1, 104, 982 10, 159, 752 24, 454, 523
Automotive Greases, pounds 89, 050, 299 23,095,221 32,677,177 33,277,901
Other Lubricating Greases and Specialties, pounds 41.128.339 12, 842, 395 11,309,135 16, 976, 809
» Represents purchases for overseas shipments only; does not include those of posts, camps, and stations in zone of interior.
Source: Compiled from data submitted to Hist Sec by Statistical Sv Sec, Purchase Br, Fuels and Lubricants Div, OQMG, 3 Dec 45.
ture of such equipment. They were finally time expenditures, are omitted from Quar-
overcome when the growing manpower termaster procurement deliveries shown in
shortage underscored the urgency for Table 3, primarily because complete and
higher priorities that resulted in increased adequate statistics are not available. It was
production of such mechanical handling the spring of 1943 before the be- QMC
equipment as fork-lift trucks, cranes, ware- came responsible for the purchase of most
house trailers, and conveyors of various petroleum products used by the Army,
types. More than 75 percent of the deliv- with the notable exception of fuels and
eries of service and warehousing equip- lubricants for aircraft. ^^ Before that time
ment were made in the two years 1943 and each supply service purchased its own
1944. By 1945 the requirements for items petroleum products, a procedure that re-
in this major group had largely been met.
Other exceptions were recoil and hydraulic oils,
'
'
Petroleum products, while constituting purchased by the Ordnance Department, and asphalt,
another major commodity group in war- procured by the Corps of Engineers.
STATISTICAL REVIEW OF SUPPLY OPERATIONS 129
"
Table 7 Value of Quartermaster Lend-Lease Shipments
[In Thousands of Dollars]
Calendar Year
130 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Table 8 Distribution of Quartermaster Lend-Lease Shipments "
Calendar Year
STATISTICAL REVIEW OF SUPPLY OPERATIONS 131
Shipments
Total Tonnage
Year and Month Received and Receipts
To Ports of
Shipped Total
Embarkation
Total 39, 587, 270 20, 549, 785 19, 037, 485 9, 774, 704
1945 (Firsts months). 11,219,868 5, 841, 030 5, 378, 838 3,617^ 212
January 1,382,457 650, 054 732,403 505 475
February 1, 359, 696 695,431 664,265 463 381
March 1, 592, 472 847, 812 744,660 548 117
April 1, 574, 825 802, 601 772, 224 549, 781
" Includes QM Depots and QM sections of general depots only. Excludes rewarehousing and intra-depot tonnage.
' Data not available.
' Includes shipments to ports of embarkation, depots, and other places.
Source: (1) 1949 Statistical Yearbook of the QMC, p. 44. (2) ASF Monthly Progress Rpt, Sec. 2H, 30 Sep 42-31 Aug 4S, sub: Supple-
ment, Storage Operations, p. 38.
134 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
hurriedly constructed or acquired to meet 550,000 tons in April 1945, shortly before
the emergency need for storing surpluses. V-E Day. These did not comprise, of
Statistics on the trend of receipts and course, all shipments to ports, since large
shipments of Quartermaster supplies at quantities of Quartermaster supplies went
depots are not available before September directly from manufacturing plants to
1942. In the thirty-six-month period from ports of embarkation. Statistics on these
that date to the end of August 1945, Quar- direct shipments are not available. It was
termaster depots and Quartermaster sec- early in 1944 before supplies shipped to
tions of general depots handled nearly ports by the depots began to exceed in ton-
40,000,000 tons, excluding supplies re- nage the volume furnished to troops in the
warehoused within the depots and those zone of interior. Shipments to ports
transferred from one depot to another.-' averaged about 500,000 tons per month
The greatest volume during the war years during the eight-month period from No-
was recorded in 1944 when the depots re- vember 1944 through June 1945, account-
ceived and shipped a combined total of ing for nearly two thirds of the total
more than 14,000,000 tons. The average tonnage shipped by the depots during that
monthly tonnage handled in the fourth interval."'
quarter of 1942 was larger than the The development of mechanical ma-
monthly average in 1943. Beginning in equipment and the im-
terials-handling
March 1944, however, the trend was provement in warehousing techniques
sharply upward; from approximately enabled the depots to accomplish two
867,000 tons in February 1944 the volume highly important objectives. One of these
had nearly doubled by May 1945, when a was a better utilization of existing storage
peak of more than 1,626,000 tons was space. The most significant factor here was
reached. the greatly increased use of fork-lift trucks
Depot receipts followed a generally up- and the palletization of supplies. During
ward trend during the war, but the the early part of the war, when the depots
progress from month month was quite had to depend largely upon manual labor
to
erratic, particularly in1942 and 1943. and hand-operated equipment, the height
Thereafter they rose more steadily, reach- to which supplies could be piled was
ing a peak of approximately 878,000 tons severely restricted. The situation changed
in May 1945. Depot shipments followed a about the third quarter of 1943, when pro-
somewhat more uniform course, climbing duction of fork-lift trucks began to match
to a high of more than 772,000 tons in demand. By mechanizing storage oper-
April 1945, a month ahead of the peak in ations and using palletized loads, it
receipts. Shipments exceeded receipts in became possible to pile supplies all the
only ten of the thirty-six months. These way up to the roof beams and trusses in the
temporary net declines in depot stocks warehouses, and thus make use of what
occurred generally at scattered intervals formerly had been enormous quantities of
November 1942; June,' July, and October waste space. Depot operations were rev-
1943; August, November, and December olutionized and cubic space rather than
1944; and January and July 1945.
Depot shipments to ports of embarka- -' See Table 11.
tion reached a peak of approximately --
Ihid.
STATISTICAL REVIEW OF SUPPLY OPERATIONS 135
Storage Division
Year Employees •
and
Month
1942
September.
October..
November.
December.
1943
January. .-
February..
March
April
May
June
July
August
September-
October. __
November.
December-
1944
January...
February.
March
April
May......
June
July
August
September.
October...
November.
December.
1945
January..
February.
March...
April
May
June
136 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
square footage became the basis for com- tonnage was nearly 100 percent greater
puting capacities of warehouses. Moreover, than it had been when there were approxi-
the rapidity with which Quartermaster mately 30,000 storage employees.
items could be moved in and out of depots Except for a small increase toward the
by the use of labor-saving devices resulted end of the war, the number of personnel
in a much faster turnover of supplies and engaged in actual shipping and receiving
contributed to more effective utilization of activities at the Quartermaster depots and
storage space. Quartermaster sections of general depots
Of perhaps even greater importance was was reduced while the total tonnage han-
the conservation of manpower achieved dled was increasing.-^ There were nearly
through the use of mechanical equipment, 9,300 shipping and receiving employees in
which enabled the depots to handle the October 1943, when the depots handled
huge increase in tonnage with fewer em- approximately 872,000 tons. In the peak
ployees. At first, when fork-lift trucks and month of May 1945, when the depots
other labor-saving devices were difficult tohandled 1,626,000 tons of supplies, the
procure, the number of personnel engaged number of shipping and receiving em-
in storage operations at Quartermaster ployees had been reduced to fewer than
depots and Quartermaster sections of gen- 7,200. During that interval the number of
eral depots mounted steadily — from abouttons handled per man-day of shipping and
21,000 in September 1942 to a peak of receiving employees more than doubled.
nearly 30,000 in February 1943.'^ After The figure was 4.1 tons per man-day in
mechanical equipment finally became October 1943 and 9.19 tons per man per
available in sizable quantities, the number day in May 1945. The record of the QMC
of storage personnel dropped sharply to for tonnage handled per man-day was
less than 17,000 by September 1944. The consistently higher than for the technical
big increase in tonnage that occurred in services as a whole, which handled only
the late months of the war resulted in a 2.9 tons per man-day in October 1943 and
slight upward trend in storage personnel, 6.14 tons per man per day in May 1945.
but the total never exceeded 19,200 de-
'See Table 12.
2
.
The Procurement of
Quartermaster Enlisted
Personnel
Although the Quartermaster Corps ex- reach a peak strength in August 1944 of
panded same proportion 502,265. This was more than double the
in relatively the
as the entire Army during World War II, Corps' World War I peak strength of
the expansion was not parallel because of 240,000 and nearly triple the size of the
the nature of the functions performed by entire Army in August 1939.^ Of the
the Corps. Itstroop units increased as the Army's seven technical services, only the
Army increased, but its activities pertain- Corps of Engineers and the Medical De-
ing to construction, transportation, and partment were larger than the QMC. The
procurement and storage of supplies ex- others — Signal Corps, Ordnance Depart-
panded well in advance of the general in- ment, Transportation Corps, and Chem-
crease in the Army. The peak of the ical Warfare Service — were considerably
Quartermaster load "comes at the begin- smaller.
ning of mobilization when food, clothing, During the emergency period the QMC
housing and transportation must be pro- was responsible for a wider range of duties
vided immediately." Consequently,
^ than it had performed in World War I or
Quartermaster personnel constituted be- was to exercise after the United States
tween 7 and 8 percent of the Army during entered World War II. The National De-
the early months of the war, but only 6 fense Act of 1920 had restored to the Corps
percent by March 1945. Likewise, the the functions of construction, transporta-
peak in QMC strength came nine months tion, and real estate service, which had
ahead of that of the Army as a whole, been transferred elsewhere in the Army in
which was not reached until May 1945.- World War I. These activities, however,
When the German Army invaded
Poland in 1939, the QMC consisted of 718 '
Deputy
Lecture,
TQMG,
AIC, Brig Gen Frank F. Scowden,
4 Feb 4
1 sub: The QMC.
,
Strength
Percent
Date QMC to
QMC' Army Army
" Figures for QMC strength represent personnel who wore QMC insignia or were accounted for as QMC on Machine Records Unit status
cards. They do QMC commanders.
not necessarily represent military personnel performing Quartermaster duties, nor personnel under
' Peak.
Source: (1) Annual Report of the Secretary of War, for 1939-41. (2) Monthly Rpts, AGO to WDGS. Strength of the Army, 1942-45.
(3) Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army, 1948, pp. 292-93.
were only routine in nature in periods of time Quartermaster military personnel in-
peace. Thus the declaration of the limited creased to more than 124,000, a large pro-
national emergency and the passage of the portion of whom were required to carry on
country's first peacetime draft act in 1940 the functions of Army construction and
placed the QMC in a unique position: it transportation.^ The War Department late
suddenly was faced with the task of pro- growing bur-
in 1941 took steps to ease the
viding shelter, hospitals, and other facil- den of the QMC
and prevailed upon Con-
ities, and transportation by motor, rail, gress to pass the law that transferred
and water, for a sizable Army not at war. construction, real estate, and utilities func-
The performance of these duties, in addi- tions to the Corps of Engineers, effective
tion to that of supplying sharply increased 16 December 1941. This transfer eventu-
quantities of food, clothing, and personal ally involved about 2,100 officers, al hough
equipment, required the hurried transfor- some were not transferred until early in
mation of the Corps from a small organ- 1942.''
ization to one of tremendous proportions.
The Corps retained all of these func- ^ Data obtained from unpublished report of the
tions throughout the emergency period Secretary of War, FY 1942, in Strength Accounting
Br, AGO.
when the Army grew from less than 200,- Data obtained from Statistics and Rpts
''
Sec, Pers
000 men to over 1,500,000. During that and Tng Div, OQMG, 9 Dec 48.
THE PROCUREMENT OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL 141
' '
I I I I I I I
'
r-i
30JUN 31 DEC
142 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
year.^ The rate of expansion slackened to and plans pertaining to the organization
an average of 15,165 a month late in the of Quartermaster units, to the mobilization
summer of 1942, after it was decided to and movement of troops, and to all phases
postpone the invasion of western Europe of training. This same organization had
and to confine immediate ground oper- been in effect since 1937.^"
ations against Germany to an invasion of The Personnel Branch was transferred
North Africa. A large requirement for from theAdministrative Division and
Quartermaster troops still existed, how- raised to the status of a division with the
ever, both for the North African campaign spurt in the growth of the Corps during
and for the build-up in the British Isles for the latter half of 1940 —
the grave period
the eventual invasion of the Continent. following the fall of France. This was the
The monthly expansion rate rose to first of a series of administrative changes
18,175 during the first half of 1943 when affecting personnel activities that were
plans began to take shape for the main made within a period of five months. In
Allied offensive in Europe. It leveled off', October, after the passage of the Selective
however, in the second half of that year Service Act, the personnel training func-
and never increased substantially there- tions of the War Plans and Training
after. The succession of Allied victories had Branch were grouped in a separate Train-
turned the tide of war and overseas re- ing Branch and transferred to the Per-
quirements had begun to ease. The sonnel Division. Then, late in December
strength of the Corps declined steadily 1940, civilian and military personnel func-
after November 1944 and was down to tions were separated. The Personnel Divi-
about 440,000 in August 1945 when the sion was redesignated the Military
war ended. Personnel and Training Division and
placed under the direction of Brig. Gen.
Administrative Organization Henry D. F. Munnikhuysen. The Civilian
Personnel Branch of the former Personnel
The tremendous expansion of the Corps Division became the Civilian Personnel
between 1939 and 1944 brought corre- Division, with Lt. Col. Henry Hockwald
^'
sponding increases in the scope and com- as chief.
plexity of the problems of the administra- The Military Personnel and Training
tive organization in the OQMG re- Division directed all activities relating to
sponsible for the supervision of personnel officers and men, including train-
enlisted
functions. At the beginning of the period ing, throughout 1941 and the early months
of limited national emergency in Septem- of the war. The initial reorganization of
ber 1939, requirements for personnel were the OQMG along functional lines in
sufficiently limited and routine that super-
vision of both procurement and training of **
Computed by author from Annual Report of the
personnel was handled by the Administra- Secretary of War to the President, 1941, (Washington,
relating to personnel, both military and OQMG OO 4, Jan 37, sub: Office Orgn.
'" 7
" (1) OQMG OO 49, 26 Jul 40, no sub. (2)
civilian, while its War Plans and Training OQMG OO 97, 4 Oct 40, no sub. (3) OQMG OO
Branch established and directed policies 144, 27 Dec 40, sub: Office Orgn.
THE PROCUREMENT OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL 143
March 1942, following the creation of the more vulnerable as a result of the develop-
SOS, did not alter the basic structure of ment of aerial bombing. Furthermore,
the division, but the second major reor- Quartermaster troops were subject to at-
ganization of the Corps in July 1942 tack from fast-moving mechanized forces,
reunited civilian and military personnel and endangered by mines and booby
functions under the same jurisdiction, this traps. They had to be mentally stable to
time in the Personnel and Training Divi- withstand the shock of battle and capable
sion. The final major change affecting per- of defending themselves.
sonnel functions took place a month later. The basic mission of the QMC was to
Personnel and training activities had procure, store, and distribute food, cloth-
grown to such proportions that they were ing, and individual and organizational
—
separated and placed in two divisions the equipment, as well as general supplies and
Personnel Division and the Military Train- all fuels and lubricants except aviation —
ing Division.
^-
gasoline —
used by all of the armed forces.
Both the Personnel Division and the Moreover, the QMC procured and trained
Military Training Division continued in horses, mules, and dogs for the Army. In
existence throughout the remainder of the addition to all of this, it provided special
war. General Munnikhuysen, who had services to all troops in the field. For ex-
headed the Military Personnel and Train- ample, it operated field bakeries; provided
ing Division, became director of the Per- laundry, bathing, and related sanitary fa-
sonnel Division, a post he held until after cilities; collected and disposed of salvage;
V-J Day. Col. Wilbur R. McReynolds opperated repair shops for the mainte-
was appointed director of the Military nance of shoes, clothing, and equipment
Training Division and served in that ca- issued by the Corps; and cared for the
pacity until November 1944, when he was dead.
'-^
succeeded by Col. Lloyd R. Wolfe. These functions, highly diversified in
nature, created the need for a wide variety
Qualifications of Enlisted Men of specialists. Cooks, bakers, meat cutters,
in the QMC mess sergeants, oven firemen, laundrymen,
tailors, shoe repairmen, coopers, packers,
Quartermaster troops had to possess the warehousemen, longshoremen, mechanics
same general qualifications and be given of various kinds, chemical engineers, re-
the same basic military training as other frigeration experts, and many other spe-
soldiers in the Army. In addition, they had cialists were required to carry on Quar-
to have — or be taught —
some trade or termaster supply services. Plumbers, pipe-
specialty that would make them useful to steam engineers, car-
fitters, electricians,
the Corps. They were soldiers first, sup- penters, and painters were needed to
plierssecond. The supplies they handled maintain installations. Truck drivers, elec-
were the lifeblood of the Army, and Quar-
termaster troops had to learn to protect
•-
(1) OQMG OO 184, 31 Jul 42, sub: Reassign-
ment of QMC Functions. (2) OQMG OO 25.1, 31
them. The supply lines, because of the Aug 42, sub: Establishment of Mil Tng Div. (3) For
world-wide scope of the war, were many administrative developments in reference to training,
see belovs/, Chapter VII.
times longer than they had ever been in " OQMG OO 30-53, 16 Nov 44, sub: Assignment
any previous conflict, and were much of Key Pers.
144 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
trical and motor mechanics, sheet-metal and requirements. Otherwise, the Corps
workers, and body repairmen were neces- would have faced a hopeless task in at-
sary in the operation and maintenance of tempting to train wholly inexperienced
motor vehicles. men in the many required military oc-
Enlisted personnel at Quartermaster cupational specialties. Certain types of
depots included not only truck drivers, Quartermaster technicians, such as the
motor mechanics, and clerks, but also highly skilled mechanics and chemical
supervisors of warehouse and salvage- engineers needed to operate petroleum
repair activities, and procurement per- laboratories, could not be taught in the
sonnel trained for contract negotiation, time that was available. For these the
renegotiation, and termination. All of Corps had to depend entirely upon civil-
these men had to be skilled technicians. ian-trained men. As General Munnik-
The supervisors, for example, had to be huysen declared in a speech, not to be
capable of instructing, training, and super- taken too literally: "The Army can teach
vising large numbers of personnel, and a man to handle a gun and make a fairly
qualified by long training and experience decent shot out of him in 13 weeks, but it
to judge commodity values, or skilled in takes from 4 to 6 years to really produce a
reclaiming salvage. Other personnel as- top-notch mechanic." ^*
signed to depots were dog trainers and Most of the major difficulties encoun-
handlers, photographic laboratory per- tered by the QMC
in procuring adequate
sonnel, and subsistence and laboratory military personnel can be traced to certain
technicians. At remount depots, personnel fundamental factors. One of these was that
had to be capable of breaking horses and all of the arms and services were in compe-
mules and training them for field duty. tition for men, and their requirements for
The QMC, in expanding its organiza- many types of specialists overlapped.
tion to care for the needs of an Army of Moreover, civilians who possessed the oc-
more than 8.000,000 men, had to rely cupational skills the QMC
could utilize
heavily upon the occupational experience with only a minimum of additional train-
that the inductees assigned to it had ac- ing were not inducted into the Army and
quired in civilian life. Although most men assigned to the Corps in proportion to and
without any particular skills could be simultaneously with its need for them.
readily taught to perform most house- Another factor was that a large per-
keeping duties or to work in service units centage of the inductees were improperly
that did the manual labor jobs for the classified at reception centers in regard to
Army, the other services that comprised their occupational experience or poten-
the bulk of Quartermaster responsibilities tialities, and thus the failed to re- QMC
generally required tradesmen and skilled ceive the various types of specialists in the
technicians. proportions called for in quotas estab-
The requirements for specialists were so lished by the War Department. Further-
extensive that the Corps had to conduct more, the Corps had no priority on in-
courses in which more than seventy dif- ductees in the higher brackets of intelli-
ferent trades were taught. Many of the gence and aptitude, as rated by Army
men assigned to schools, however, had had tests, and was allotted an unusually large
civilian experience in similar vocations '^ Speech. PQMD, Gen Munnikhuysen, OQMG,
and needed only to learn military methods 28 Aug 41, sub: RollUp Your Sleeves.
THE PROCUREMENT OF ENIJSTED PERSONNEL 145
proportion of men with inferior intellec- for three years in the branch of service
tual capacities. they selected. Thus the 30,000 enlisted
The extensive competition that existed men who were in the QMC
at the end of
between the QMC and the other branches that period were there by their own choice.
of the Armyfor the inductees who pos- The Army continued until the end of
sessed skills indicated by a classification
is 1942 to accept men of draft age as volun-
procedure published by the War Depart- teers and permitted them to choose their
ment in the fall of 1942.^^ This publica- own branch of service, but the great ma-
tion listed the 420 occupational skills that jority signed up for the Air Corps, and
were considered most useful to the Army, comparatively few for the QMC. Conse-
and, as a guide to classification officers at quently the personnel composition of the
reception centers, suggested the most ap- Corps began to change rapidly after No-
propriate arm or service to which in- vember 1940, when the first selectees were
ductees with specific civilian occupational inducted. By the end of June 1941 selec-
experience should be assigned. An analy- tees comprised more than half of the en-
sis of the guide reveals that the QMC listed men in the QMC, and by 30 June
could utilize 190 of the 420 skills. Of these, 1942 they represented about two thirds, as
however, 78 could also be used by all of shown in the following table
:^*^
34 6,542
petition with nearly all of the
other National Guardsmen 8,582 6,867
branches of the Army for experienced Selectees 48,969 141,706
cooks, general clerks, shipping clerks, stock
clerks, machinists, stewards, and utility re-
The Selective Service System brought a
pairmen. It had to compete with at least
marked change in the method of personnel
procurement. operated on the theory
It
one and usually more of the arms and
that military authorities could best deter-
services for such specialists as accountants,
buyers, economists, packers, labor fore-
mine where a man might serve most effec-
tively. In contrast to volunteers, selectees
men, salvage engineers, warehouse fore-
had choice as to where they would
little
men, and many others who conformed to
serve. The Army classified them in three
the types urgently needed by the QMC.
788 in the Transportation Corps, 725 in ters within its jurisdiction. These schedules
the Corps of Engineers, 641 in the Ord- or quotas were established in such a way
nance Department, and 579 in the Signal that each training center and unit received
Corps. This disparity was due to the fact personnel from several service commands
that the QMC had far greater need for in an effort to insure an equitable distribu-
laborers than any other service —268 out tion of the skills and abilities of the
of each 1,000 men— as contrasted with trainees. The requistions informed the re-
182 for Chemical Warfare Service, which ception centers of the number, color
ranked second in these requirements, and (white or Negro), and military require-
none for the Signal Corps and the Medical ments of the men needed, the organization
Department. ^^
to which they were to go, and the time
From the beginning of selective service they were to be sent.
until about the middle of 1943, The Adju- Trainees for units were requistioned on
tant General's Office (AGO) distributed the basis of Table of Organization (T/O)
trainees, as directed by the War Depart- requirements. As a guide to the composi-
ment General Staff, from reception centers tion of shipments to replacement training
to replacement training centers and di- centers, the War Department published re-
rectly to units. From then until the end of quirement and replacement rate tables,
the war, the AGO allotted trainees, as in-
which specified the number and types of
structed by the War Department General specialists needed per thousand men for
Staff and Headquarters, Army Service each arm and service. These tables were
Forces (which acquired responsibility for formulated from an analysis and consoli-
the administration of Army-wide functions dation of Tables of Organization, indicat-
pertaining to personnel in the March 1942 ing the types of jobs required for each mil-
reorganization of the War Department), itary unit, and from the Troop show-
Basis,
to the three major commands — Army ing the proposed total number of each type
Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and of unit. The requirement and replacement
Army Service Forces. Each command rate tables were revised periodically as the
became responsible for the redistribution Army grew and conditions and require-
of these allotments to its replacement ments changed. Actually, because of the
training centers and units. The distribu- constantly changing requirements, recur-
tion of personnel from reception centers rent personnel shortages, competition
was made primarily in accordance with among the major commands for personnel
MOS classification until May 1944,when with the same occupational specialties, and
physical qualifications rather than occupa- other factors, the number and types of
tional specialtiesbecame the basis for as- specialists sent to the replacement training
signment from these centers.-" centers rarely coincided with the require-
The AGO, as the operating agency for ment and replacement rate tables.
assigning personnel to training centers, Requirements during the emergency
schools, and units, published schedules of
(1) Ibid. (2) For a general discussion of manpower
'^
the personnel requirements of the various in relation to the Army, see Jonathan Grossman, In-
arms and services and transmitted them to dustrial Manpower Policies and Problems of the War
the service commands. Each service com- Department, a volume in preparation for the series
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.
mand then converted these requirements -" WD Memo W40-44, 18 May 44, sub: Physical
ments for specialists and notified the AGO and Repl Rates of Occupational Specialists for WD
of the specific types it wanted, it had little PMP, 1940, p. 11.
technical services often were designated Department quota in the clerical, admin-
for combat training when requirements of istrative, and supply group revealed a 25-
the arms were particularly urgent or seri- percent overload in this group that had to
ous shortages existed. Officers in charge of be trained under their second occupa-
classification at reception centers could tional specialty number or some other SSN
change the recommendations of classifiers in which a full quota had not been re-
when it was necessary to meet current ceived, such as bakers, automobile me-
shortages.-^ chanics, or truck drivers. The number of
The crux of the situation was that recep- butchers, carpenters, plumbers, and
tion centers had to meet the quotas for the painters received ran far in excess of
AGE, the AAF, and the ASF with what- quotas, while only 7 percent of the mess
ever types of men they had on hand at the sergeants, 20 percent of the bakers, 45 per-
time assignments were made, regardless of cent of the truck drivers, and 87 percent of
whether their qualifications conformed to the cooks called for in the quotas had been
the specifications. The steady flow of in- assigned to Camp Lee. These conditions
ductees and the shortage of housing facili- forced the reclassification of many men
ties prevented the reception centers from from skilled specialists in certain fields to
retaining men in an attempt to adjust sup- semiskilled specialists in others.-^
ply to requirements. Consequently, when The adjutant at the Quartermaster Re-
the supply of specialists did not meet MOS placement Training Center at Fort Warren
requirements, the only alternative was to stated that 400 out of 1,400 selectees re-
substitute other personnel. Army regula- ceived there in October 1941 were im-
tions specified that the men who were sub- properly classified, and that the situation
stituted should have the required "poten- had been growing progressively worse. "In
tial aptitude" to meet the needs, but such our first group we found 85% correctly
men were not necessarily available classified. That was pretty high. The
either.-^ second group ran about 75% correctly
The QMC could never be sure ihat the classified. Now it is getting worse. It is
qualifications of the men received from re- going up to 30 and 40% erroneously
ception centers would even approach con- classified." -''
formity to the ratios established in its re- Brig. Gen. John A. Warden, command-
quirement and replacement rate table. ing general at the Fort Warren QMRTC,
The Quartermaster Replacement Train- pointed out that the improper classifica-
ing Centers (QMRTC's) at Camp Lee tion of selectees created training problems.
and Fort Francis E. Warren reported in He criticized the War Department for its
1941 that they received too many men in
certain categories and too few in others,
-'AR 615-25, Sec. Ill, par. 10, 3 Sep 40, sub:
while as many as half of the men had been EM — Classification.
classified as basic, indicating that they had Ltr, AGO to CG
-' SOS, et al., 3 Aug 42, sub:
Reqmt and Repl Rates for Occupational Specialists,
no classifiable skills.
AG 201.5 (9-3-42) UP-PS-M.
During the second training cycle at Ltr, Brig Gen Charles D. Hartman, CG Camp
•'"
Camp Lee, 14July-ll October 1941, a Lee QMRTC, to TQMG, 24 Sep 41, sub: Occupa-
tional Specialists for QMRTCs, 353 (Camp Lee).
comparison of the number of trainees re- -'5
Min of Conf, Ft. Warren QMRTC, 6 Nov 41,
ceived with the number set up in the War 353.
150 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
classification procedure at reception of men it needed was an apparent miscon-
suited in his center getting a dispropor- example, it received only 100 automobile
tionately small number of civilian-trained mechanics against a requirement of 1,872,
mechanics, while the preponderance of and 5 motorcycle mechanics as compared
selectees from cities along the east coast with the required 193. Similar shortages of
gave Camp Lee a high proportion of men specialists existed throughout the mechan-
with "white collar" backgrounds. He rec- ical and automotive fields.^- About 65 per-
ommended that the location of reception cent of all selectees received at Fort War-
centers sending personnel to Camp Lee be ren were being trained as motor operators
shifted to industrial centers of the automo- or mechanics. Furthermore, officers at
tive industry, and that the QMC be given Fort Warren had the same complaint as
high priority in the assignment of mechan- those at Camp Lee that they were receiv-
^^
ics and other specialists in the motors field. ing "far too many clerks."
General Hartman's recommendations Inasmuch as there was a large general
were forwarded to the War Department surplus of clerical workers, reception cen-
General Staff, which rejected them. The ters apparently were not at fault in sending
General Staff pointed out that reception more of them to the QMC
than were
centers had to allotments for all arms
fill needed. Neither could they be blamed for
and services, and declared that the skills the shortage of men with mechanical back-
required by the QMC
would be found in ground. The difficulty was that the Army's
all geographic areas. It stated further that need for mechanics was much greater than
nearly 100 percent more clerical workers the supply of civilian-trained mechanics
were being inducted than were needed by being inducted. General Somervell, com-
the Army, and the excess had to be trained manding general of the SOS, pointed out
in other fields. The request that the Corps in 1942 that in the field of automobile
be given high priority on men in the mechanics alone there was a shortage of
motors group was turned down "because of 34,790 in each ,000,000 men being taken
1
the tremendous shortage existing for this into the of 47,148 white men
Army." Out
specialty in all Arms and Services." received at the Camp Lee be- QMRTC
Although the General Staff admitted that tween 1 September 1941 and 31 August
the QMC was "undoubtedly losing the 1942, only 1,412, or 3 percent, had a back-
proper service of many men with potential ground of mechanical work, yet during
skills," it declared that the discrepancy that period the center was required to
was not the fault of the initial classification train 35 percent of all incoming selectees
at reception centers "but rather the lack of for mechanical and allied occupations.
a properly co-ordinated assignment pro- The problem was complicated further by
cedure." It also felt that the proper place the fact that more than one third of the
for picking up men with many of these po- ' 2d Ind, AGO to TQMG, 10 Dec 41, on Memo,
tential skills was in the classification and ACofS G-1, for TQMG, 12 Nov 41, sub: Occupation-
assignment sections of the replacement al Specialist Rate for QMRCs, 353 (Camp Lee).
^^
Capt George A. Berger,Jr., to Maj Albert N.
'-
was general rather than geographical. For Education, Washington, D. C, 28 Aug 42.
152 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
men being received at the QMRTC at of 1943. Inasmuch as mobile laundries
that time were classified as basics, indicat- were new to the Army, no MOS had been
ing that they had no special training as set up for men trained as laundry mechan-
mechanics. ^^ During the first six months of ics. They were classified merely as utility
1942, approximately 82 percent of the repairmen, SSN 121, thereby creating
trainees enrolled in the motor mechanics considerable confusion, and many of the
courses at the Camp Lee QMRTC were men were assigned in fields other than
men who had no previous experience in laundry, thus tending to increase the
mechanical work.^*^ shortage. Candidates for training as laun-
The QMC could not hope, of course, to dry mechanics were required to have a
make skilled mechanics in thirteen weeks background of laundry repair experience,
out of men who had had no civilian ex- pass an aptitude test, possess at least a
perience in that field of work. It had to do fifth-grade education, and show an interest
the next best thing: teach the trainees the in the work. The Camp Lee re-QMRTC
fundamentals so that they could be as- ported that between 1 September 1941
signed as helpers and gradually become and 31 August 1943 it received only 938
sufficiently skilled to perform their duties men with any experience in the mainte-
adequately.^' nance of laundry equipment, while it was
Despite the scarcity of men with me- called upon to supply many times that
chanical background, the QMC during number of laundry specialists.^^ Similarly,
the emergency period and the early part of mechanics were in demand for maintain-
the war was able to obtain a fair percent- ing and repairing all mobile and fixed re-
age of civilian-trained skilled mechanics, frigeration units except those at permanent
who, when given additional technical installations, which were under the juris-
training, could perform eflficiently in units. diction of the Corps of Engineers, and for
The supply of civilian-trained mechanics servicing the heavy-duty stitching ma-
dwindled, however, as the war progressed chines used by mobile shoe repair units.
and was virtually nonexistent as early as In addition to mechanics and automo-
April 1943.^^ By then, though, transporta- tive specialists, other types of Quartermas-
tion functions had been transferred from ter specialists whose skills were high on the
the QMC and there no longer was a de- list of classifications in which there were
mand for the Corps to supply automobile
'" 1st Ind, Lt Col James L. Whelchel, Hq QMRTC.
mechanics except for the maintenance of
its own vehicles. Camp Lee. to TQMG, 9 Jan 43, on Ltr. Lt Col Ross
W. Mayer, OQMG, to CO QMRTC, Camp Lee,
The principal remaining requirements Jan 43, sub: Qualifications of Students, 000.8.
1
maintenance and repair of laundry and - Min of Conf, Ft. Warren QMRTC, 6 Nov 41,
refrigeration equipment and shoe-repair 353.
stitching machines. Laundry mechanics, ^* Memo, Col Mayer, Deputy Dir of Mil Tng Div,
had 240 mobile laundry units in Septem- of Enlisted Pers (Pts. I and II and Apps., n. d.), Pt. I.
Midwest Moti\ e Trades Institute Sec, pp. 1-4. (Here-
ber 1942, and plans called for adding them after cited as Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Schooling of Enlisted
at the rate of 191 per month until the end Pers.)
THE PROCUREMENT OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL 153
training program carried on as the war bution was the short time allotted at the
progressed. The supply of cooks, for ex- reception centers for ascertaining the
ample, caught up with requirements as qualifications of the men. Selectees were
early as October 1942, when the number kept at the centers an average of only
was reduced by 50 percent. ^^
of trainees seventy-two hours because of the rapid
By the middle of 1943 the supply of shoe rate of induction and the limited housing
repairmen far exceeded the requirements, facilities, and only a small portion of each
and the surplus was used to fill requisitions man's processing time —
usually from
for other specialists.^- eighteen minutes
fifteen to —
was allotted
On the other hand, new shortages de- to an interview. ^^ The information that
veloped. One of the most important was could be obtained from the men in this
that of petroleum technicians needed for short time concerning their work histories
Quartermaster petroleum laboratories. often was insufficient to establish an ac-
These laboratories were specialized troop curate basis for assignment. Consequently
units organized in the latter part of 1943 many of the men were assigned to types of
and in 1944 to test and analyze gasoline, work for which they were not suited, in-
fuel oil, and lubricants in theaters of oper- stead of to the jobs for which they might
ations. Assignment to these units required have been better qualified.
qualifications of experience in the petro- The War Department realized that the
leum industry and a knowledge of chem- ^»
(1) Capt Berger to Maj Stubblebine, Ft. Warren
istry.Although fewer than 300 enlisted QMRTC, 5 Nov 41, no sub, 353 (Camp Lee). (2) Ltr,
men were needed, the background require- AGO to TQMG, 6 Jan 42, sub: Experience Tables for
Calculation of Tng Ratios of the QMC, AG 353
ments were such that even that number (1 1-13-42) EC-C-M. (3) Incl, Ltr, AGO to CG SOS,
could not be found within the Q.MC and a 18 Apr42, samesub, AG 353 (11-13-41) EV-C-M.
"'
Ltr, Col McReynolds, Dir of Mil Tng Div, to
large percentage of the personnel needed
CGs QMRTCs, 13 Oct 42, sub: Tng of Cooks.
had to be transferred from other branches '- 2d Ind, AGO to TQMG, 25 Jun 43, on Ltr, Lt
of the Army. Furthermore, those who Col Charles S. Gersoni, Ft. Warren QMRTC, to
possessed the necessary background had to TQMG, 8 Jun 43,
sub: Clarification of Shipment of
EM, 220.63 (Ft. Warren).
be given additional training before they ^Ml) Ltr, TQMG to AGO, 1 1 Aug 43, sub: En-
could be assigned to the laboratory units. ^^ listed Pers for QMC Petri Products Laboratory Units.
The reason for the shortage of petro- Memo, Col Wilbur R. McReynolds, Dir of Mil
(2)
Tng Div, for CG ASF, 14 Aug 43, sub: Use of Civ
leum technicians and mechanics at the Institute for Tng of Petri Technicians. (3) Ltr, Brig
QMRTC's was simply that induction of Gen Wilbur R. McReynolds, Dir of Mil Tng Div, to
ASF, 12 Feb 44, sub: Continuation of Tng of Petri
men with these skills did not occur in pro- CG
Technicians.
portion to military requirements. There '^ Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Repls, Fillers, and
were other valid reasons why men were Cadres, Pt. I, App. 4, p. 5.
154 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
reception center system of distributing per- were given to determine the proficiency of
sonnel was not infallible, and that the ini- men in their civilian trades. Much need-
tial classification, because of the speed less repetition of training could be avoided
necessary in processing inductees, amount- a man was designated to pursue in the
if
ed to only a coarse screening of the skills Army the same trade he had followed in
and potentialities of the men. Therefore it civilian life. A cobbler, for instance, would
had made provision to extend the Army not require as much training as a salesman
classification system beyond the reception if both were assigned to repair shoes. The
centers. Replacement training centers cobbler could forego much of the technical
were directed "to assign each enlisted man training and thus become available for
to that type of training which he can duty earlier than if he had to take the full
readily absorb and thereby be of greatest training course. This procedure saved
value to the service." " Thus the first func- much time and effort.'^
tion of the QMRTC's was to reclassify per- Although QMRTC interviewers sought
sonnel received from reception centers. to conserve training time through the uti-
The QMRTC's then had an opportunity wherever possible,
lization of civilian skills
to correct mistakes in the initial classifica- they also had to take into account the ca-
tion at reception centers and to make any pacities and requirements of the various
additions necessary to the soldier's classi- The fact that the skills of
technical schools.
fication card. This opportunity was lost the men varied so greatly from specialist
when men were assigned directly to units requirements made it highly important to
from reception centers, as was done fre- discover and take advantage of potential
quently in 1942.''' aptitudes for MOS's in which shortages
Classification procedure at the existed.Thus while the civilian experience
QMRTC's was rather rudimentary in the of the man, his occupational preference,
first few months of their operation. Se- and his educational background were
lectees were merely allocated to either usually primary considerations, aptitude
supply training or motor training, and the as demonstrated by aptitude tests was
assignment to specialist training within often a vital criterion for the interviewer in
these broad fields was left largely to the making his recommendations for assign-
commanders of the training regiments. ment.
Later on, after the centers had become Even after a man had been assigned to
work was centralized
better organized, the a QMRTC training unit he could be re-
with the establishment at each of the two classified if found unfit for the type of
QMRTC's of a Classification and Assign- training he was undergoing, or if it was de-
ment Section, which became responsible
for the co-ordination of all reclassification. '" AR
615-28, Sec. I, 28 May 42, sub: Classifica-
Interviewing became a regular part of tion, Reclassification,Assignment, and Reassignment.
the process of receiving selectees. Classifi- "^ Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Repls, Fillers, and
( 1 )
signed to Quartermaster regional motor Rpt, Lt Col Gustave H. Vogel, to TQMG, 9 Mar
'"
group were to be conserved for the theaters of Quartermaster and other service per-
of operations. sonnel because the 1942 Troop Basis had
underestimated overseas personnel re-
Limited-Service Personnel quirements for them, and many combat
troops were required to perform supply
During the eighteen months the Se-
first duties.''^ In its efforts to make more men
lective Service System was in operation, available for overseas duty, the as- QMC
the manpower supply was considered signed many limited-service men to units
plentiful and the great majority of selectees being trained during the first half of 1943
who had physical defects were rejected. for service in the theaters. it was While
Early in 1943, when the Army began to common regiment
for a unit as large as a
induct limited-service men in sizable num- to include between 100 and 200 such men,
bers, it specified that they should be used the roster of the 475th Quartermaster
to fulladvantage "without retarding the Truck Regiment at Camp Blanding, Fla.,
training of combat troops." ^* Inasmuch as listed 1,209 limited-service personnel. Of
Quartermaster troops were classed as non- this number, 453 men, classified as chauf-
combatant, the QMC
apparently made feurs, were found to be unfit and had to be
little distinction at first among limited- transferred from the unit.^^ The had QMC
service men for many positions in the zone to gamble on whether the limited-service
of interior and, for a four-month period, personnel assigned to units could overcome
20June-4 November 1942, it could even their defects and be reclassified as general
send them overseas for duty in port bat- accompany their
service so that they could
talions, base hospitals, and communication organizations abroad. Those who failed to
zone units. After that brief period, how- qualify had to be replaced, and this de-
ever, shipment of limited-service men layed shipping dates of the affected units.
overseas for any type of duty was, in prin- Many general-service men were being
utilized as operating personnel in the zone
"^^
ciple, prohibited.
In the fall of 1942 the War Department of interior despite the severe shortage of
established the policy that limited-service men physically qualified to serve overseas.
men "will be assigned initially to non- As an illustration, QMC
operating person-
combatant organizations," but specified nel on 30 June 1943 comprised 7,055 gen-
that it was the duty of all unit command- eral-service men in contrast to only 1,416
ers to attempt to fit them through training
and remedial measures for general service. "^ AR 615-28, Sec. I, par. 2a, 28 May 42, sub:
The early correction of dental defects and EM — Classification and Assignment. Conscientious
objectors were classified for limited service.
fittingof glasses will be a matter of routine in
organizations. Commanders will utilize to
'"'
(1) WD
Cir 198, Sec. Ill, 20 Jun 42, sub: Ship-
all
ment of EM
Overseas. (2) WD
Cir 363, Sec. I, 4 Nov
the fullest extent those who have noncorrect- 42, same sub.
ible defects in positions which are predomi- *«
WD Cir 327, Sec. I, 27 Sep 42, sub: Utilization of
nately noncombatant; an individual with Limited Service Enlisted Pers.
defective hearing may function well as a ''
Memo, Brig Gen Robert M. Littlejohn, Actg
cook, and one unable to march because of CofS, SOS ETO, for CO SOS ETO, 1 7 Nov 42, sub:
flat feet may be fully qualified as a Subjects Discussed with Gen Somervell.
chauffeur.'^"
'*"
Insp Rpt, Lt Col Edgar A. Hendershot and Mr.
J. A. Grey to TQMG, 10 May 43, sub: Insp of QM
All of the theaters were extremely short Activities.
158 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
limited-service enlisted men.^^ In a con- servicewho failed to meet minimum phys-
certed move to make more men available ical standards were to be discharged.*^^
for the theaters, ASF directed the service Shortly before, the Army had lowered its
commands in June 1943 to replace gener- personnel requirements for 1943 and thus
al-service personnel in zone of interior lessened the need for limited-service men.
installations with limited-service men. The Furthermore, the War Department in Au-
replacement was to take place at the rate gust published a list of defects that were to
of at least 5 percent a month, and by 31 disqualify men for service overseas. These
August 1943 instructor staffs and overhead defects included such common
ailments as
at replacement training centers, unit train- hernia, perforated eardrums, and missing
ing centers, and schools were to comprise a teeth, as well as neuropsychiatric condi-
minimum of 80 percent limited-service tions of any kind.'^^
men. This replacement program was ex- The directives appear to have been in-
pected to release 21,000 general-service terpreted generally as a desire on the part
men for overseas duty.^° The program had of the War Department to get rid of phys-
been more than a
in operation only a little ically limited men. The net result, at any
month when the War Department ordered rate, was a flood of discharges. The QMC
limited service abolished as a classification during the three-month period, September
category. In that brief period the number through November 1943, released because
of limited-service men in the QMC oper- of physical and mental defects more than
ating strength had increased to 1 ,586 — 17,000 men as compared with only 14,000
—
gain of 170 while the number of general- for the entire previous fiscal year.*'*
service men had declined to 6,956 —
a loss Alarmed by the many discharges, the War
of only 99. This release of general-service Department rescinded Circular 161 in
men fell far short of the projected replace- November and replaced it with Circular
ment rate, but still could be considered 293, which formulated the basic policy for
moderately successful in the light of the the remainder of the war. This revised
fact that Headquarters, ASF, had allowed policy prohibited, "as a waste of military
forty-five days to train each limited-service manpower," the discharge of a man for
man replacement, and there had as
as a physical reasons because he was "incapa-
yet been time for this training.^'
little ^" ASF Monthly Progress Rpt, Sec. 30 Jun 43,
5,
War Department Circular 161, which sub: Pens, p. 12. Quartermaster Corps operating per-
eliminated limited service effective 1 Au- sonnel included instructors and other personnel assist-
ing The Quartermaster General in carrying out his
ban physically limited
gust 1943, did not mission.
men from serving in the Army. It merely '^"
(1) Rpt, conf conducted by Brig Gen Walter L.
provided that assignments were to be Weible, Dir of Mil Tng Div, ASF, Pentagon, 7 Apr
43. (2) ASF Cir 39, par. 17,11 Jun 43, sub: Method
made on the basis of individual capacity of Authorizing, Reporting, and Controlling Pers.
rather than by type. Men who did not «'
(1) Cir cited n. 60(2). (2) ASF Monthly Progress
meet physical standards for general mili- Rpt, Sec. 5, 31 Aug 43, p. 12.
lar emphasized that men already in the and Nov 43. (2) See Table 14.
THE PROCUREMENT OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL 159
Fiscal Years
Total Net Loss * 10, 862 54, 878 47, 903 41, 765 16,949
" Figures in this table include enlisted men who were in the QMC at the time of their separation, regardless of other branches of the
Army in which they may have served previously.
' Minor causes for separations are not included. Consequently, columns do not add up to total net losses.
^ Includes those discharged for reasons other than honorable, involving moral turpitude.
• Includes those discharged for all types of disability, from those not adaptable to military service for physical or mental reasons to those
who were assigned to QMC but later were found to be unable to meet minimum physical induction standards.
also reported that individuals with mental April 1944 the number of these men in the
abnormalities who had been designated QMC totaled 3,098, or nearly 35 percent
by Army psychiatrists for light duty were of its 8,884 enlisted operating strength.
handicapping the training program. Per- About the same number were either per-
sonnel of this type, he declared, "grow by manently or temporarily disqualified for
leaps and bounds, as they learn that they service in the theaters because they were
can be excused from training, or dis- physically or mentally limited, were over
charged by 'having' some eccentricity." thirty-eight years of age, or had been in
This situation resulted in an increased rate the service less than twelve months. Thus
of discharge of men from the QMCfor only 2,692, or 30 percent, of the en- QMC
physical and mental defects in the latter listed operating personnel were available
part of 1944. immediately for overseas assignments.
Physically and mentally limited men This was a rather poor showing, as five of
accumulated in the QMC in various ways. the six other technical services were send-
Many were newly inducted men directly ing proportionately large numbers of their
from reception centers; some were debili- operating personnel abroad, as shown in
tated personnel returned from overseas; the table on page 161.*^^
others were men who failed to meet phys- The QMC, however, overcame this dif-
ical and mental requirements when their ficulty rapidly in the next few months. By
units were assigned to theaters; and still training physically limited men, including
others were from units cannibalized to fill debilitated personnel returned from over-
vacancies in other units. Considerable seas, to fill jobs held by men formerly con-
shifting of personnel was taking place sidered "irreplaceable," the Corps reduced
among the various branches of the Army the number of key technicians tem-
in the attempt to get all physically fit men porarily disqualified for overseas duty
overseas. Many general-service men who from 3,098 in April to about 1,700 by the
had been trained specifically for Quarter- end of May. A month later it had trimmed
master duties had to be reassigned to com- the number to approximately 1,200 and,
bat units to fill vacancies. Likewise, many by the end of October, to a mere 77. Dur-
were transferred to the QMC, particularly ing the same period the QMC
eliminated
from combat units, and these generally many unnecessary jobs and combined
were men unqualified to serve overseas. others in its efforts to conserve manpower,
"^^
Quartermaster Corps efforts to release with the result that it reduced its enlisted
general-service enlisted personnel from op- operating personnel from 8,884 to ap-
erating jobs for overseas assignments en- proximately 6,000, about 99 percent of
countered considerable difficulty early in which were men who either were perma-
1944, This difficulty was not due to any nently disqualified for overseas assignment
scarcity of physically limited men to re- or had already served abroad. Thus the
place them but rather to the fact that such QMC had accomplished its objective of
manders as irreplaceable in their zone of Camp Lee, 2-4 Oct 44, sub: Current Pers Problems of
the QMC.
interior jobsand therefore temporarily dis- '''
Compiled from ASF Monthly Progress Rpt, Sec.
qualified for overseas duty. At the end of 5, 30 Apr 44, sub: Pers, p. 29.
THE PROCUREMENT OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL 161
making virtually all of its general-service fied for rigorous combat duty. Inductees
personnel available for duty in the thea- who were placed in Profile B qualified for
ters.^" less strenuous combat duty and for service
in or near battle areas, while those in Pro-
Quartermaster Corps 25 55 25 15 50 30
Corps of Engineers 65 20 10 60 25 20
Chemical Warfare Service 10 65 75 25 25
Medical Department 35 25 20 30 45 45
Ordnance Department 5 45 10 50 90
Signal Corps 25 30 50 55 25 15
Transportation Corps 5 40 70 55 30
over, the distribution was broken down downward after the fall of 1944, these re-
into whites and Negroes, and the percent- quirements were comparatively small.
ages of these varied extensively. Only 25 Moreover, any specialists critically needed
percent of the whites were to be in Profile by the Corps could be obtained outside the
A, 25 percent in Profile B, and 50 percent profile plan.
in Profile C, compared with 55 percent, 15
percent, and 30 percent, respectively, of Classification by Intellectual Capacity
the Negroes. Thus only half of the QMC
whites were to be in the two top cate- The QMC
was more directly concerned
gories, in contrast to three fourths in the with the intelligence of its personnel than
Corps of Engineers, the Chemical Warfare it was with their physical capacity. Occu-
Service, and the Signal Corps. In the case pational skill, of course, was of first impor-
of Negroes, the QMC was to get 70 per- tance since every man in the Corps, unless
cent in the two top profiles, but even in assigned to perform manual labor, had to
this regard it fared little if any better than be a specialist of some sort. A large propor-
most of the other services, except for the tion of the men received from reception
Ordnance Department, which was to get centers, however, either possessed no skill
only 10 percent in these two categories, at all or no skills that could be utilized.
and 90 percent in Profile C, as shown in Both kinds had to be trained for jobs that
the table at the top of the page.'^ would make them useful to the QMC, and
Owing to peak strength
the fact that its it was necessary that the men have suffi-
was attained nine months ahead of that of cient intelligence to absorb this training in
the Army as a whole, the QMC probably the time that could be devoted to it.
was the least affected of all the arms and An index of a man's intellectual capac-
services by the profile plan. When the ity or ability to learn was provided by the
plan went into operation the Corps Army General Classification Test (AGCT)
already had more than 496,000 personnel, given at the reception center. Through
which was within 6,000 of its top strength. this test, devised in collaboration with ex-
Thus most of the men assigned to it by perts in psychology and personnel man-
profile were for replacements, and, since ''
Based on ASF Cir 175, Sec. VIll, 10 Jun 44, sub:
the trend in the strength of the Corps was Physical Profile Plan.
164 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
agement, the Army sought to determine a men sent to the QMC
from reception cen-
man's native intellectual endowment and ters were in Grades IV and V. This figure
the effects of education and social experi- represented nearly 53 percent for the
ence upon his practical intelligence. Se- QMC as contrasted with an average of
lectees were grouped into five grades on about 32 percent for the other six technical
the basis of their AGCT scores. Grade I services and only 27 percent for the AAF.^^
designated men in the highest bracket of Conversely, the QMC
received a
intellectual capacity, while Grade V
indi- smaller proportion of men of above-aver-
cated those in the lowest group. Men rated age intelligence than any other arm or
as having average intelligence were placed service except the Transportation Corps.
in Grade III. Only men in Grades I or II Only 21 percent of the selectees assigned
were eligible to become officer candi- to the QMC
during 1943 were in Grades I
dates.^^ and II, as compared with 42 percent to the
Despite an Army Regulation that no AAF, 58 percent to the Signal Corps, and
unit was to be "unduly burdened with the an average of about 30 percent to the
training of a disproportionate number of other five technical services.^® This alloca-
men in the lower brackets of mental abil- tion imposed another severe handicap on
ity/' ^'^ the QMC did receive an unusually the QMC, inasmuch as these two top cate-
large percentage of men in Grades IV and gories were the source of its officer candi-
V, a situation that handicapped training dates, the majority of its noncommissioned
and operations. Records compiled at the oflficers, most of its highly skilled techni-
Camp Lee QMRTC revealed that 36 per- cians, and many of its enlisted instructors.
cent of the 87,325 white selectees received The commanding general of the Camp
there between 1 September 1941 and 28 Lee QMRTC
protested as early as Sep-
February 1943 were below average in in- tember 1941 that too many men with low
telligence as rated by the AGCT. White intellectual capacities were being received
selectees constituted 72 percent of the total from reception centers. He reported that
number of trainees sent to the QMRTC half of the men in the two lower grades
during this period. Similar records are not had been classified as basic, meaning that
available on Negro trainees. The fact that they did not possess usable skills, and that
the proportion of Negroes falling in these their limited mental abilities made it un-
two lower grades was normally greater likely that they could become specialists in
than that of whites would indicate that the the normal time allotted to training. Many
over-all average was probably higher than of these men, he pointed out, "were out-
36 percent." standing physical specimens and could
The situation became worse as the war
progressed and the caliber of selectees
'^
AR 615-25, Sec. VII, 3 Sep 40, sub: EM— Classi-
fication.
declined. During the six-month period "' AR 615-28, Sec. I, par. 2, 29 May 42, sub: EM—
creased still further in 1943 when more bat Troops, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD
WAR II (Washington, 1948), tables, pp. 17, 18.
than 87,000 out of a total of about 165,000 '>
Ibid.
THE PROCUREMENT OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL 165
sion of the Army "it may become increas- struction quickly and advance rapidly to
ingly necessary to absorb larger numbers the point where they could be reclassified
*^
of these men." and reassigned to training as specialists.
Apparently the QMC received an un- Some could qualify only for manual labor
usually large number of men in Grades IV tasks, while others were so mentally inept
and V on the assumption that most of or unstable that they had to be discharged
them could be absorbed in service units. It as useless to the Army.
was true that a sizable number of men in This problem was only a minor one dur-
the lower grades could be so used. Person- ing the emergency period and the early
nel requirements for the service units, how- months of the war. Mobilization Regula-
ever, accounted for only about one fourth tions then in effect authorized the Army to
of the total QMC more reject men who did not have "the capacity
needs, whereas
than half of its assigned personnel were in of reading and writing the English lan-
the two lower categories. Thus the Corps guage as commonly prescribed in the
was confronted with the necessity of train- fourth grade in grammar school." Never- **"
ing the major share of its Grade IV and V theless, the two QMRTC's were giving or
men for specialized occupations that nor- had given special schooling and training to
mally called for a higher degree of intel- a total of approximately 500 inductees by
lectual capacity. January 1942.*^ The bulk of these were in
the illiterate, non-English-speaking, and
The Problem of Illiterates Grade V categories, but also included
were some men with physical limitations
While below-average intellectual capac- who were unable to undergo normal
ity in itself presented a training problem,
the most serious difficulty stemmed from «" Ltr, Gen Hartman, CG QMRC,
Camp Lee, to
TQMG, 24 Sep 41, sub: Occupational Specialists Rate
illiterates, non-English-speaking person- for QMRTCs.
nel, and Grade V men. Personnel in these >"'
2d Ind, AGO to TQMG, 10 Dec 41, on Memo,
categories were not immediately capable ACofS G-1 for TQMG, 12 Nov 41, sub: Occupa-
tional Specialists Rate for QMRTCs.
of undergoing normal QMRTC
training. •*-
MR 1-7,Change 9, 18 Apr 41, sub: Reception of
They had to be assigned to special training Selective Sv Men.
units and given elementary schooling in
^'
(1) Rpt. Camp Lee QMRTC to TQMG, 23 Jan
42, sub: Special Tng Units. (2) Rpt, Ft. Warren
such subjects as reading, writing, spelling, QMRTC to TQMG, 29 Jan 42, sub: Special Tng Co,
English, and arithmetic to enable them to 353.
166 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
training. The number of illiterates and For example, an inspection late in 1943 of
non-English-speaking personnel in the the 558th Battalion, Headquarters and
QMC increased rapidly after the summer Headquarters Detachment, and four at-
of 1942 when the War Department tached companies in training at Fort
adopted new induction standards based Leonard Wood, Mo., revealed that 580 of
on intelligence rather than literacy. Induc- the 813 enlisted men in these units were in
tion stations were authorized to accept 10 Grade V.
percent each of the white and Negro se- Similarly, the personnel consultant at
lectees processed daily who were unable to the ASF Unit Training Center at Fort
read or write English at a fourth-grade Devens, Mass., estimated that during the
standard, provided they were able to un- period March through June 1944 about
derstand simple orders given in English 25 percent of all incoming troops QMC
and possessed "sufficient intelligence to and 50 percent of the men received from
absorb military training rapidly." ^^ With- special training units were below the mini-
in three months, however, the greatly in- mum literacy standards of the Army. The
creased influx of inductees of this type was low state of morale and mental adjustment
overtaxing the capacities of the training of these men constituted a serious training
centers of all the technical services. The problem, as illustrated by the fact that
re-
sult was that SOS headquarters reduced there were more than 175 court-martial
to 31/3 percent the ratio of illiterates who cases in less than four months. The situa-
could be assigned to the QMC and most of tion at Fort Devens, however, was an ex-
the other technical services.*'' treme example inasmuch as the majority
Despite this restriction, enrollment in of the units trained there were service
QMC special training units continued to companies and were comprised of Negro
show a marked increase. The number of personnel whose educational background
men requiring special training at the Camp and intelligence were far below average.
Lee QMRTC, for example, averaged Furthermore, a large portion of the men
nearly 1,100 a month during the first half had been transferred from the AGF and
of 1943, in contrast to less than 450 a represented the least desirable element in
month in the second half of 1942.***^ The that command.**
QMC was relieved of the responsibility for Upon completion of instruction in a
the initial training of such personnel after special training unit the trainees were in-
did not reduce the proportion of Grade V OQMG, for ASF, Tng of Units (Pts. I, II, and III,
Jul 39-31 Dec 44, n. d.) Pt. I, Ft. Devens Sec, pp.
personnel assigned to the QMC nor the
1
terviewed by classification oflScers who de- tions and were never available to the
termined whether the men had advanced Army for distribytion to the arms and
sufficiently to begin normal training for services. The AAF too, until 1943, was
specific jobs in the QMC. Personnel who able to operate pretty much outside of se-
had progressed satisfactorily were reas- lective service as a result of the Army
signed to either basic or technical training. policy in effect at the time, which permit-
Men who had learned to read and write ted men of draft age to volunteer for a
to such an extent that they could under- specificbranch of service. The glamorous
stand and follow instructions but who aspects of the air service plus the higher
showed no aptitude for other than man- pay attracted the great majority of the
ual-labor jobs were assigned to service volunteers to the AAF. These volunteers
units. Illiterates and men with mental had to meet exceptionally high intellectual
handicaps who had not reached the de- and physical standards on the assumption
sired level of proficiency within three that they were to be trained as pilots. Not
months were subject to discharge. all of the men, of course, qualified for fly-
Disposition records at the Camp Lee ing positions. Most of them, nevertheless,
QMRTC during the period from the ac- remained in the AAF, and many were as-
tivation of special training units there in signed to menial tasks far below their
May 1942 until 15 January 1943 show capabilities, despite the fact that they
that 60 percent of the enrolled personnel might have been utilized for higher-grade
were sent to technical schools for training jobs in the QMC
or elsewhere in the
as specialists and 31 percent to service Army. The net result was that the Navy,
were discharged and
units, while 5 percent Marine Corps, and the AAF had their
4 percent were given jobs as furnace pick of men from civilian life throughout
tenders.**'* most of the mobilization period at the ex-
pense of the QMC, the other technical
Preferential Assignment to the Navy services, and the AGF.
and the Army Air Forces The availability to the QMC of men
with above-average and even average in-
There were several reasons why most of tellectual capacity was restricted still fur-
the men available to the QMCwere of ther by the War Department's priority
relatively low intellectual caliber. One system of distributing personnel to the
was the lack of a central classification and arms and services. In the favored position
assignment system whereby men from again was the AAF, which had top priority
civilian could be distributed more
life on assignment of men by intellectual ca-
equitably between the Army and the pacity from early in 1942 until 1944,
Navy. The Navy, including the Marine when the AGF finally was given first call
Corps, obtained all of its personnel from on men of high intelligence because of the
volunteers until the end of 1942. increasing difficulty experienced by com-
Thus many thousands of better-edu- bat units in obtaining high-grade men.
cated, top-quality men, mentally and The QMC
was virtually at the bottom
physically, who volunteered or were com- of this priority list, primarily because one
missioned in the Navy or Marine Corps, ''•'
Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Repls, Fillers, and
remained outside selective-service opera- Cadres, Pt. I, App. 5, p. 19.
168 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
of its functions was to operate the service less than one fourth as many.^^
units that could utiHze men of low intelli- This heavy coQcentration of Negroes in
gence. Inasmuch as the Army's supply of the QMC
was inconsistent with the policy
Grade I and II men was limited to begin laid down by Mobilization Regulations
with, it was inevitable that comparatively and a War Department directive that all
few top-quality men would still be avail- arms and services absorb Negro personnel
able when the War Department got generally on the basis of the proportion of
around to filling the requirements of the Negroes in the population of the country,
QMC. which was 10.6 percent.^" It created a seri-
ous difficulty for several basic reasons. One
The Number and Quality of Negro Troops of these was that while some of the Negroes
in the QMC possessed outstanding ability, most of them
were in the two lowest grades be- AGCT
While the general quality of Negro sol- cause of limited educational opportunities
diers in the QMC did not vary to any sig- and deficiencies in environmental back-
nificant extent from that of those in the ground. Approximately 85 percent of all
Army as a whole, their training and utili- Negroes sent to the by reception QMC
zation presented a special problem pri- centers between September 1941 and May
marily because the Corps had far more of 1944 were classified in AGCT Grades IV
them than any other arm or service. The
peak Negro strength of the Corps was '"'
( 1 ) Monthly Rpt, AGO to WDGS, Strength of
slightly more than 221,000 on 31 Decem- the Army, 1 Aug
Monthly and Quarterly
45, sub:
ber 1944. The number of Negroes in the Negro Strength of the Army, p. 53. (2) For a general
discussion of the utilization of Negroes in the Army,
entire Army at that time was approxi-
see Ulysses G. Lee, The Employment of Negro
mately 692,000. Thus the QMC, although Troops, a volume in preparation for UNITED
comprising only a little more than 6 per- STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.
^' Rpt cited n.
90(1), 1 Jan 45, pp. 38-39. The
cent of the total personnel of the Army,
following table shows how the Negro strength of the
had nearly 32 percent of all the Negroes.'"' other technical services and the principal combat
The only other arm or service with a arms compared with that of the on 31 Dec 44: QMC
Negro strength even approaching that of Negro Personnel
the QMC was the Corps of Engineers. Yet Arm or Service
Enlisted
the Engineers had fewer than 137,000 Ne- Total Officers
Men
groes out of a total personnel of nearly
700,000, while the QMC had more than Quartermaster 221,211 682 220. 529
tion Corps was third with 85,000 Negroes, Infantry 54, 189 1,123 53.066
Ordnance 29.160 151 29,009
it ranked second in percentage of Negro
Medical 19, 929 342 19, 587
or V.^^ Atotal of 36.5 percent were in tion centers as basics. This created a par-
Grade which meant that an average of
V, ticularly acute problem since there were
365 out of each 1,000 Negroes allocated to shortages of so many skills among the Ne-
the QMC needed special instruction be- gro trainees and such a large proportion
fore they could undertake regular training. of the men were of below-average intelli-
It usually required about twice as long gence that it was difficult to convert them
to prepare Grade V men for service in into skilled technicians. Negroes with me-
units as it did those who were capable
im- chanical experience or aptitude were in
mediately of undergoing normal training. shortest supply, and this was a handicap
The fact that a man was classified in in organizing Negro mobile units that re-
Grade Vdid not mean necessarily that he quired mechanics.
lacked native intelligence; rather, it some- An additional reason for the difficulty
times indicated the lack of an opportunity stemmed from the fact that relatively few
to develop latent ability. Many of the of the Negroes possessed the qualities nec-
V
Grade men were able to assimilate train- essary for assuming leadership. Only 15
ing after preliminary instruction in the percent of the Negroes shipped to the
special units and eventually became effi- QMC from reception centers between
cient soldiers. At the same time, there was September 1941 and May 1944 were in
always a sizable number of Grade V men the three upper brackets of the AGCT.-'^
in each special training unit white as — Less than 3 percent were in Grades I and
well as Negro —
who did not have the men- II eligible to become officer
and therefore
tal capacity to learn and had to be dis- candidates.The QMC had to rely pri-
charged. The significant difference was marily upon the other 2 percent for its 1
that among the whites the proportion of noncommissioned officers, instructors, and
Grade V men was small enough that the supervisors. Thus there was a critical
problem could be solved without too much shortage of Negroes with the leadership
difficulty, but among the Negroes the per- qualifications necessary for establishing
centage was so high that it presented a the large number of Negro units required
serious obstacle in organizing effective to utilize Negro personnel in separate
units. organizations.
Another reason for the seriousness of the The OQMG considered this problem so
problem was that the work of Negroes in serious early in 1943 that it declared in a
civilian life had been generally of a less memorandum to the Commanding Gen-
skilled nature than that of whites, and eral,SOS, that the situation would im-
comparatively fewer of them had acquired pede the QMC
in carrying out its func-
occupational specialties —
even the more tions in the field.
commonplace ones. For instance while the
supply of white clerks far exceeded QMC
requirements, among the Negroes there " [1st Ind], AGO to CG USASOS, c/o Postmaster
San Frapcisco, Oct 44, no sub, inclosing a sta-
Cal., 16
was even a shortage of men with clerical tistical rpt, sub: Percentage Distribution of AGCT
aptitudes.^* The civilian background of a Scores of Negro EM Forwarded from RCs to RTCs
large portion of the Negroes fitted them and Units, AG 220.01 (26 Jul 44).
Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Repls,
"" Fillers, and
for classification only as laborers. The ma- Cadres, Pt. 1, App. r, p 5.
jority of the others were classified by recep- ''
Ind and rpt cited n. 9,3.
170 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Difficulty is being experienced in obtaining During the emergency period and the
sufficient colored personnel of the required early nionths of the war, the Army fell far
ability and leadership qualifications. A high
short of taking prescribed quota of Ne-
its
percentage of inductees having classifications
groes, primarily because of the shortage of
[grades] of 1 and 2 are being assigned to the
Army Air Forces. The qualifications of the Negro housing and training cadres. In
personnel being assigned to the Quartermas- spite of this, the Negro strength of the
ter Corps are such that they cannot be used QMC increased at a relatively faster rate
as superintendents, foremen, or in very many
than did the white strength. The peace-
positions except positions of unskilled labor.
In all Quartermaster Corps organizations time organization of the Corps in mid-
such as laundry companies, bakery com- 1939 included only 89 Negroes out of a
panies, salvage repair companies, gasoline total enlisted personnel of about 10,500,
supply and railhead operations there are yet by June 1940 the number had grown
many positions in all grades which require a more than 14,000 and represented
to
higher degree of intelligence, schooling, edu-
cation, and skill than is found among the nearly 22 percent of the enlisted personnel
colored selectees being assigned to the Quar- in QMC units. ^^
termaster Corps. By requiring the Quarter- Taking cognizance of this situation, the
master Corps to absorb this high percentage Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, declared: "It
[of Negroes] the result will be that the Quar-
termaster Service will not be able to main- isapparent that an undue proportion of
tain its place in the team with other Services, Negro personnel is assigned to units of the
and the accomplishment of the Service's mis- Engineers and the Quartermaster Corps,
^'^
sion on the field of battle will be impeded. while other arms and services either have
This problem never was resolved satis- no colored units or have a disproportion-
factorily,but it was alleviated to some ex- ately small number of them." ^°° He rec-
tent in several ways. One of these was to ommended that all arms and services,
put white officers in charge of Negro units with the exception of the Air Corps and
and then replace them as extensively as the Signal Corps, be required "to accept
possible by Negro officers as soon as the forassignment in appropriate units a rea-
latter could qualify. Another remedial sonable proportion of Negro personnel."
measure consisted of concentrating the Both the Personnel and the War Plans
bulk of Negroes into a relatively few types Divisions of the General Staff objected to
of units.'*' "« Memo, Maj Gen Corbin, Actg TQMG, for CO
Despite the steps taken to solve the SOS, 25 Jan 43, sub: Pens, 1943 TrB, 320.2.
^' The Protective Mobilization Plan of 1940 re-
problem, considerable difficulty was ex-
stricted the utilization of Negroes in the QMC to serv-
perienced in finding qualified personnel ice, remount, and truck regiments; service and port
for the many Negro units, in maintaining battalions; railhead and salvage companies; and pack
the units at T/O strength, in training the trains. This 1940 plan was soon abandoned, and the
Troop Bases of the war period called for Negroes in al-
required number of specialists, and in get- most every type of unit, but the QMC restricted their
ting the units to the theaters of operations use to a comparatively few types.
on schedule. Overseas shipment dates of Memo, Gen Feldman, DQMG for Sup Ping, for
^"^
deferred because the units could not com- OQMG. The 89 Negroes constituted one truck unit
and one detachment.
plete training and pass the required in- '""
Memo, ACofS G-3 for CofS, 3 Jun 40, sub: Em-
spection in the allotted time.^* ployment of Negro Manpower, AG 322.97.
THE PROCUREMENT OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL 171
exempting the Air Corps and the Signal This office is in receipt of an advance copy
Corps. They insisted that both of these of the 1943 Troop Basis for Quartermaster
Units, comprising a strength of 56,456 of
branches should also employ Negro per-
which 33,619 are colored enlisted personnel.
was sustained and
sonnel. Their objection
Your attention is invited to the fact that this
theWar Department policy, adopted in allocation requires 60% of this year's Troop
October 1940, provided that "Negro or- Basis to be colored personnel, with Quarter-
ganizations will be established in each master troops in the entire Army totaling only
major branch of the service,combatant as approximately 6%; and places upon the
Quartermaster Corps the responsibility for
well as non-combatant," and that Negroes activating Quartermaster Units destined for
"will be utilized on a fair and equitable operation with the armed forces in the field
'"'
basis." with a higher percentage of Negro troops
This policy led to a somewhat more than allocated to any other service in the
Army. This is more striking when we con-
equitable distribution of Negro personnel
sider that Negro personnel in Quartermaster
among the other branches of the Army, Units ( 1 1 1,962) will represent 14.83% of all
but the proportion of Negroes to total Negro enlisted personnel in the entire Army,
strength in the QMC continued to grow and again the Quartermaster Corps is re-
and remained far greater than that for any quired to operate its highly specialized and
technical units with 33.39% of its personnel
other arm or service. By the end of 1942
Negro enlisted men. ... It is therefore ur-
they represented more than 28 percent of gently recommended that the 1943 Troop
'"-'
the Corps' strength. Basis be revised accordingly and that allot-
This growing concentration of Negroes ments and percentage of colored Quarter-
in theQMC had already become a matter master Corps personnel be in keeping with
that assigned to other Arms and Services.'""
of concern to its top-ranking officers, but
they became alarmed late in 1942 when General Corbin's recommendation was
the War Department made known its forwarded to the General Staff^for a deci-
plans for 1943. The 1943 Troop Basis, sion. The prompt reply was that the QMC
which called for a sharp increase in the request for a decrease in allotment of
number of Negro inductees in an attempt Negroes "cannot be favorably considered
to bring the proportion up to the specified at this time due personnel
to the fact that
10.6 percent of total Army personnel, pro- so rendered surplus would have
to be ab-
vided that Negroes were to comprise 60 sorbed by combat units." The General
percent of the men assigned to the QMC Staff" admitted that the proportion of
during 1943. Brig. Gen. James L. Frink, Negroes assigned to the Corps was high,
the Deputy Quartermaster General for but stated that "the type of units to which
Supply Planning and Operations, sent a it has been allocated are those wherein
Itwas becoming evident that the War Lee center revealed that there were nearly
—
Department contrary to its declared 600 Negroes at this one installation alone
policy of equitable distribution —
had de- for whom no suitable assignments existed,
termined to a large proportion of the
allot and that it had become necessary to dis-
Negro inductees to the QMC
for the charge a large portion of them. ^'^^
simple reason that it believed that the Utilization of Negroes in the QMC
Corps, presumably because of its ser\ice varied from utilization of whites primarily
units, was in a better position to absorb in that the ratio of Negroes used as laborers
Negro personnel than any other branch of was much larger; that the proportion
the Army. This policy prevailed through- trained for motor-maintenance work was
out the remainder of the war. and the smaller; and that no Negroes were utilized
OQMG was forced to resign itself to mak- in certain types of units, notably remount,
ing the best of the situation. The policy led war dog. petroleum laboratories, sales, and
to a steady increase in the ratio of enlisted graves registration. Appro.ximatelv 25 per-
Negro personnel to total enlisted personnel cent of all the Negroes received at the
in the Corpw. The proportion rose to more Camp Lee QMRTC during the five-year
than 33 percent by reason of the 1943 period June 1939 through June 1944
Troop Basis allocations, and before the end were trained as laborers, in contrast to
of the war it had reached approximately onlv 7 percent of the whites. The differ-
49 percent. ^^'^ ence was less marked in motor-mainte-
The net result was that Negroes accu- nance instruction, with 1 1 percent of the
mulated in the QMC
faster than they Negroes and 15 percent of the whites
could be utilized. General McReynolds. trained for this tvpe of work,
director of the Military Training Division. More Negroes were trained as truck
OQMG. reported in January 1944 that drivers 27 percent than for any other — —
Negro personnel were being sent to the job. though the proportion was only
QMC in excess of theater requirements, slightly higher than for laborers. Clerks,
He complained that, while new units were cooks, mess sergeants, laundry operators,
being activated which might absorb this and salvage collectors as a group account-
surplus personnel, no authority could be ed for another 25 percent. Relatively few
obtained from the War Department to were trained as bakers, carpenters, shoe
transfer these men to the new units for the repairmen, machinists, operators of fumi-
reason that the units had been directed to gation and bath units, blacksmiths, weld-
obtain their personnel directly from recep-
^°"
tion centers '
'"^ Memo. Brig Gen Idwal H. Edwards. ACofS
Shipments of Negroes to the con- QMC G-3. for CG
SOS. 26 Jan 43. sub: TrB. 1943. 320.2.
tinued to run ahead of requirements in '"^ Monthly Rpts. AGO to WDGS. Strength of the
1945. During March. April,
". and Mav. for '^'^'-'V^^V^x, „ ,^ n- Mil
xt-, Tng n-
^. Rpt. Gen McRevnolds.
'
Dir -r Div. to
example, arrivals at the Camp Lee ASF OP&C Div. OQMG. 18Jan 44. sub: Major Problems
Training Center of Negro inductees as- Confronting the QMC.
QMC ^- ?"" "
signed
^ t^o the ^^- exceeded quotas
" bv - ^
R. L^'^^^hMp-^f
Adams to Q.\1G. lojun 4o,
I "t h'
sub: ov^TV'v
Q.M Activities,
.
Ground force type 1,565 724 74, 699 841 83, 843
The Procurement of
Quartermaster Officers
In the earlier American wars, Quarter- missioning civilians when they possessed
master were line officers
officers generally the technical skills needed by the QMC
detailed to Quartermaster duties. They The problem of procuring Quartermas-
rarely had any special instruction for the ter officers W21S far greater in World War II
particular type of work they were expecf^d than it had been in 1917-18. In the first
to do, and usually became qualified for place, operations were on a much larger
their tasks through experience gained on scale and a greater number of officers was
the job. It was not until World War I needed. More important, however, was
when the Army increased enormously in the fact that the increasing complexity of
size and Quartermaster activities expand- activities —
due to such factors as the com-
ed proportionately —
that officers began to plete motorization and mechanization of
be trained as Quartermaster specialists. It the Army and the development of new
was then that the Corps, for the first time, types of Quartermaster units —
had created
was permitted to organize units to carry the need for a much wider variety of
out its increasing variety of specialized ac- specialists.
tivities in the field such as salvage collec- Another reason for the increased diffi-
tion, graves registration, and provision of culty in procurement was that the Quar-
bathing and delousing facilities. Moreover, termaster officer in World War II had to
larger-scale operations, extended supply be a combat leader as well as a technical
lines, and the trend toward mechanization specialist. Modern warfare on a global
and motorization had made warfare itself scale accounted for this development. In
more complex. As a consequence, the World War I the action had been concen-
QMC not only required many more offi- trated on a single front that remained
cers but also had to establish a program for fairly stable, with the result that the Quar-
training them as Quartermaster special- termaster officer was generally able to
ists. Furthermore, its operations became so direct supply and service activities in rear
highly specialized and diversified that the areas protected by combat troops. In
Corps had to turn to private industry for World War II, however, the fighting took
men with valuable civilian experience who
could help to direct its activities and train See Maj Claude M. Fuess and Capt Hardin Craig,
'
One of the major procurement problems Memo, Gen Feldman, OQMG, to CG ASF, 28
Jan 44, sub: Current and Anticipated Problems Con-
was the difficulty encountered in deter- fronting the QMC.
THE PROCUREMENT OF QUARTERMASTER OFFICERS 177
Source
178 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
ments had been estimated far too low, and been given their commissions in peacetime
on the other, the prescribed sources failed proved to be misfits.
to produce as many qualified officers as The Quartermaster Corps has long suffered
had been anticipated. The estimated re- from the fact that many of the Reserve offi-
quirements fell far short of actual needs cers now commissioned in this Corps are
because they were based primarily on totally unfit for the duties they will be called
that initial appointments in the Quarter- and objected to the transfer of officers
master Reserve Corps be suspended and from their branches. Thus the QMC ex-
that vacancies be filled by the transfer of perienced difficulty in obtaining its full
qualified officers from other branches in quota of professional officers, particularly
which surpluses existed/ desirable ones, since nearly all who re-
This procedure was adopted because the quested transfer did so not because of in-
QMC had no ROTC or Citizens' Military terest in the QMC
but rather because of
Training Camp units to provide good offi- dissatisfaction with their own branches.
cer material for its Reserve Corps, and the The result was that the number of Regu-
transfer of officers from the Reserve units lar Army officers in the QMC usually was
of the other Army branches would help to inadequate to meet requirements. Fur-
reduce their surpluses as well as make thermore, since a great many of the offi-
available to the QMC a source of procure- cers allotted to the QMC had been com-
ment that would produce many competent missioned in other branches they had no
officers.Thus the QMC, in its procure- Quartermaster training. On 30 June 1940,
ment of Reserve officers, had to depend to for example, of the 830 officers allotted to
a considerable extent upon commissioned the QMC, more than 230 were on detail
personnel trained originally for other arms from other arms and services.*"
and services. This helped to ease but did Col. Edmund B. Gregory, Acting The
not eliminate the shortage of officers in the Quartermaster General, protested early in
QMC because requirements were increas- 1940 that the policy of assigning West
ing steadily and other branches of the Point graduates was, in effect, barring
Army later began to experience shortages from the QMC
"suitable young men who
of their own. are anxious to join it," because "when
The number of Regular Army officers officers are assigned directly to a combat-
in the QMC was relatively small at the be- antarm they acquire acquaintanceships
ginning of the emergency primarily be- and knowledge which makes them loath
cause for a number of years the Corps had to leave their surroundings for another
not been receiving its proportionate share branch of the service." Although he ad-
of graduates of the U.S. Military Acad- mitted the desirability of assigning pros-
emy. Since 1933 none of the graduates pective Quartermaster officers to prelimi-
had been assigned directly to the QMC. nary duty with line troops, he contended
War Department policy require! that thatit was "illogical and wasteful to train
they spend at least two years in one of the officers for a number of years as Infantry-
arms to gain experience in the line before men, Cavalrymen and Field Artillerymen
they became eligible for transfer or detail if the remainder of their service is to be in
to the QMC. Even then these officers the Quartermaster Corps." ** The short-
could be transferred only upon their own age of officers in the QMC, he said, had
request, and, after two years of indoctrina- created a grave situation, and he urged
tion in a particular arm, they were gen- ^ Ibid.
erally reluctant to make a change.'' "^
Memo, ACofS G-1 for CofS, 6 Feb 40, sub: Pro-
Moreover, when the Army began to ex- curement of QM and Ord Offs.
'" Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1940 p. 28.
,
pand, the chiefs of the arms also became " Ltr, ActgTQMG to AGO, 24 Jan 40, sub: Short-
hard,-pressed for commissioned personnel age of Offs in the QMC.
180 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
that the policy be revised to permit West any marked degree even after the War De-
Point graduates, who so desired, to be as- partment modified its policy late in De-
signed directly to the Corps. cember 1940 to the extent of requesting
The War Department expressed opposi- that the various ROTC units be canvassed
tion at first but finally agreed to the pro- for qualified officers willing to accept com-
posal and announced that, beginning with missions in the QMC rather than in the
the class of 1940, the QMC would receive branch in which they had been trained. ^^
its pro rata share of the graduates, pro- Although earlier attempts to secure ap-
vided they "express a desire for such as- proval for a Quartermaster ROTC unit
signment." Only thirty members of the had been unsuccessful, The Quartermaster
class did so. A year later the War Depart- General revived these efforts in February
ment eliminated this restriction and au- 1941 in the belief that the emergency war-
thorized the QMC to receive its full pro ranted a change in policy. The War De-
rata share of the graduates regardless of partment promptly rejected his applica-
their individual preferences. As a result tion. Four months later, however, it re-
the Corps received sixty-five members, or versed its decision and authorized the
13.41 percent, of the 1941 graduating establishment of a unit at the Harvard
^-
class. Graduate School of Business Administra-
Another handicap faced by the QMC tion, provided at least fifty students were
in its officer procurement program was willing to enroll.^'' Membership was re-
that the Corps had no ROTC units until stricted to graduate students under
the fall of 1941. The plan of procuring offi- twenty-six years of age who had com-
cers through ROTC units in universities pleted ROTC senior division basic courses
had been utilized by most of the other or the equivalent. The number of applica-
branches of the Army for many years. The tions far exceeded the maximum quota of
War Department, however, had consid- 50, making it possible to select those
]
ered it unnecessary for the QMC to have with the better qualifications, and since all
such units of its own. Instead, corps area of the applicants were graduate students
commanders had been authorized since the men selected were of exceptionally
1937 to allot to the QMC up to 5 percent high caliber.
of the graduates from units of other The Harvard ROTC Unit was organ-
branches. ^^ ized at the beginning of the school's fall
This procedure proved far from satisfac-
'-
(1) Ltr, AGO to TQMG et ai, 13 Apr 40, sub:
tory because graduates who had been
Procurement of QM and Ord Offs, AG 210.1 (11-27-
trained in another ROTC branch rarely 39) M-A. (2) Memo, ACofS G- for CofS, 3 Mar 4
1 1
1
volunteered to transfer to the QMC, and sub: Distr and Allotment of RA Offs to Brs, FY 1942.
This revision was approved by the Chief of Staff on
the War Department had instructed corps
14 April 1941.
area commanders to make no "extraordi- " Ltr, AGO to TQMG <?/«/., 22 Jul 37, sub: Pro-
nary effort" to encourage. them to do so. curement of QMC Reserve Offs, AG 062.12 ORC
Res A.
Consequently the number commissioned (4-5-37) " Ltr, AGO to TQMG et ai, 23 Dec 40, sub: Pro-
in the QMC fell far short of the specified curement of QMC Reserve Offs, AG 062. 1 2 ORC
5 percent,and those who did transfer had (12-5-40) R-A.
'Ml) Ltr, AGO to TQMG, 27 Feb 41, sub:
had no training in Quartermaster func- ROTC — Harvard University. (2) Ltr, AGO to First
tions. The situation failed to improve to CA, 12 Jun 41, same sub.
THE PROCUREMENT OF QUARTERMASTER OFFICERS 181
term in 1941 and had been in operation or procedure. Many are too [sic] poor in this
only about three months when the United respect that they do riot even know how to
dress in a military uniform. It has been
States entered the war. Thus the only offi-
amazing to all of the faculty members of the
cers obtained by the QMC through the school to note how prevalent is the thought
ROTC during the emergency period were that the act of commissioning is the end, not
those assigned to it from units of other the beginning, of their training, and how
branches. They were commissioned in the strong is the conception that they should im-
mediately step into important administrative,
Quartermaster Reserve Corps immedi- executive, and research direction positions.
ately following their graduation from col- It is believed most emphatically by all faculty
lege, without ever having had any actual members that the present idea of rotating
Army experience or Quartermaster train- these young men through centers where they
will learn military fundamentals, team play,
ing, and it was necessary to give them
and obtain contacts with real military life is
special instruction in QMC functions be- correct, advisable and most necessary. Nearly
fore they were assigned to duty. all are strongly individualistic, lack compre-
The ROTC officers commissioned in hension of moral responsibilities to others,
the QMC from 1937 through 1940 had and a sense of cooperation and team play.
They regard formations as something to be
been so few in number that they had pre-
"cut" like a college class, and orders are
sented no serious problem. The situation something to be analyzed, dissected, criti-
changed in the spring of 1941 when the cized and obeyed only after discussion and
Corps received its first big allotment of final individual approval.''
graduates, approximately 350, all of whom
Most of the ROTC graduates, largely by
were detailed to the Quartermaster School reason of
their educational background,
at Philadelphia for a special three months'
were able to overcome their early deficien-
course of training.''^ The results of this
cies as they acquired additional training
course brought into sharp focus the fallacy
and experience, and, when finally ori-
of commissioning ROTC graduates di-
ented, often proved superior to many offi-
rectly from college. Their lack of military
seasoning proved an initial handicap to
cers obtained from other sources particu- —
larly those who had had less education.
them embarking upon careers as offi-
in
When the Army construction program
and, more important,
it was discov-
cers,
ered too late that some of them were en-
was launched in July 1940, the QMC
needed a large number of officers experi-
tirely unqualified for Quartermaster enced in construction work. The Quarter-
service.
master General requested an immediate
As a group, according to the comman-
allotment of 300 Reserve officers to get the
dant of the Quartermaster School in a
program under way, but by the time con-
letter to The Quartermaster General on 2
struction activities were transferred to the
October 1941, they still had an inherent Corps of Engineers in December 1941 this
civilian outlook and suffered a definite
shock and temporary maladjustment upon "' Memo, Lt Col Harry M. Andrews, OQMG, for
ACofS G-1, 29 May 4 1, sub: Increase in Allotment
entering actual military service.
of Reserve Offs.
''
See Rpt, MilTng Div, OQMG, for ASF, School-
The experience of this school had been ing of Commissioned Offs (Pts. I, II, and III, and
that very few of the ROTC graduates, com- App., Jul 39-31 Dec 45, n. d.), Pt. I, pp. 7-8. (Here-
1
missioned directly from college, know any- after cited as Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Schooling of Com-
thing whatsoever about military life, customs missioned Offs.
182 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
number had increased to include more ment only a month earlier, on 7 Novem-
than 1,800 Reserve officers and 150 Regu- ber 1941. Before that time all civilians ap-
lar Army officers.^" To fill this need the pointed as officers in the QMC
directly
Corps drew upon its supply of Reserve offi- from civilian life had been commissioned
cers, requested and obtained authority Reserve Corps. The total number
in the
from the War Department to select quali- was Thus one out of about every
875.-''
fied officers from other branches of the nine officers procured by the duringQMC
Army to be detailed to the Corps, and in the emergency period was appointed di-
addition found it necessary to commission rectly from civilian life. Although civilians
a large number of construction specialists had been commissioned for many different
directly from civilian life. types of Quartermaster duties, particularly
During 1941 the most acute shortage construction, it was 1942 before they were
experienced by the QMC was in officers appointed in any sizable number for motor
technically trained in various phases of transport activities. The ban on passenger-
motor transportation. Late in October of car production early in that year resulted
that year the number of officers assigned in unemployment for thousands of special-
to motor transport activities totaled fewer ists of all kinds in the automotive industry
than 950, while requirements called for and simplified the problem of procuring
about 1,500 in field organizations alone. qualified officers in that field. Procure-
Furthermore, less than one third of the 950 ment of motor transport officers, however,
were considered fully qualified. The others ceased to be a responsibility of the QMC
had to be sent to school for further train- soon after, for the function was trans-
ing, thereby increasing the shortage of of- ferred to the Ordnance Department on 1
ficers available for active duty. The big August 1942.
need was for specialists in motor manage- The QMC experienced considerable
ment, fleet operations, automotive repair, difficulty in finding a sufficient number of
maintenance, and inspection, as well as officers qualified to command the hun-
supply and distribution of spare parts. A dreds of field units being organized under
survey made by the QMC revealed that the emergency expansion program. For
Reserve officers with qualifications in years the Corps had trained most of its
these fields were not available in sufficient young officers for duty as post quartermas-
numbers in other branches of the Army to ters, and only a few had had any field
alleviate the situation, nor was there time training. Participation of Quartermaster
to train them. The one source from which units in the Army maneuvers in the sum-
fully qualified men could be obtained was mer of 1941 revealed the omission of field
the automotive industry, and The Quar- training as one of the major weaknesses of
termaster General took steps to obtain
them by offering commissions in the Army 'Ml) Ltr, TQMG to TAG, 18 Jul 40, sub: Allot-
of the United States (AUS). His request ment of Reserve Offs to the QMC, 326.21. (2) Rpt,
Chief of Constr Div to TQMG, 21 Nov 41, sub: Ac-
do this was made to the
for authority to
tivities of Constr Div During Period Jul 40-1 Nov
1
the QMC training program. Consequently hausted. The Corps faced a grave situ-
steps were taken to revise the courses of in- ation, even thgugh its officer strength had
struction and to devote more attention to grown to 5,675 by 30 June 1941, as shown
field training, but it was months before the in the following table: -^
full effects of the new training program
Component QMC Officers
were felt in the units. Another limiting fac-
tor was that many of the officers were Total 5,675
over-age for duty with units. "^
Regular Army 904
War Department policy required The Reserve 4,013
Quartermaster General to assign as many National Guard 758
of his Regular Army officers as possible to
units. It was then the responsibility of the Adding to the seriousness of the situa-
corps area commanders to provide the re- tion was the
fact that the twelve-month
mainder of the officer complement for the period of service authorized by Congress
units from their allotments of Reserve of- for National Guard and Reserve officers
ficers. The number who qualified for such was nearing an end, and at that time there
assignment, however, was so small that the had been no assurance that the period
War Department in the fall of 1941 estab- would be extended. The procurement ob-
lished a rotation system whereby all Quar- jective late in July 1941 called for approxi-
termaster Reserve officers of company mately 1 1,800 officers in the QMC, where-
grade were to complete a course of instruc- as the allotment of Regular Army officers
tion at the Quartermaster School and was only 945, and the available supply of
another at one of the QMRTC's before Reserve officers was estimated at about
being assigned to units. The objectives 7,000, leaving a potential over-all shortage
were to provide better-trained officers for of nearly 4,000 officers. In an attempt to
units and to replace troop-age officers on help fill this big gap. The Quartermaster
duty at permanent installations with those General appealed to the War Department
who were over-age or otherwise unquali- to raise the allotment of Regular Army of-
--
fied for field service. ficers to 1,37 1 an increase of more than
,
The summer of 1941 was a critical pe- 45 percent. He proposed that the addi-
riod in Quartermaster officer procure- tional 426 officers be detailed from the
ment. The need for commissioned person- other arms and services "in grades of
nel was increasing while the supply of Major, Captain, and First Lieutenant . . .
qualified Reserve officers was running to fill the vacancies of one grade higher in
low, with more than 4,000 already on ex-
tended active duty in the QMC. Reserves
-' Col James C. Longino,"A Few Observations on
of the other branches of the Army had the Third Army Maneuvers," QA1R, XXI (January-
been quite thoroughly combed for special- February, 1942), 19-20.
ists who could be utilized to carry out
--
( 1 ) Ltf , AGO
to CGs of All CAs el al. , 1 7 Feb 4 1
been in the service at least six months. 15 Jan 41, sub: OCS. (2) 1st Ind, AGO to TQMG, 17
Feb 4 on Ltr, TQMG to AGO, 25 Jan 4 sub OCS.
Two of these classes were begun before 1 ,
Pearl Harbor, but there was time to grad- Apr 41, sub: OCS.
THE PROCUREMENT OF QUARTERMASTER OFFICERS 185
combat. The only difference Pearl Harbor officers, however, he lost some of those he
and the war have made in the Quartermas-
had.
ter Corps was to enlarge the numbers of those
engaged in field-type work. It does not We recently received a radiogram from
change the fundamental functions which the your office that five of the seventy [officers]
Corps must perform and for which officers we now have are to be transferred immedi-
must be trained. Supply functions are basi- ately and five more as of February 1st; and,
cally the same, whether they are performed from all indications, we stand to lose more
in a depot or in a field installation. . . . and more as time goes on. This Depot has re-
although we are at war the Quartermaster ceived no definite assurance of any sort re-
Corps has not thrown away its subsistence garding replacements for officers already lost
and its clothing and taken up a rifle. ''
or for the ten we are about to lose; much less,
Difficulties encountered during the for the difference of fifty-eight between the
seventy we have and the one hundred and
emergency period in procuring an ade- twenty-eight required.-'^
quate number of officers for units mounted
in 1942 in proportion to the increase in the The officer shortage at the depots and
rate of mobilization. The rotation policy other Quartermaster installations was re-
established late in 1941 had been designed lieved to some extent after the in OQMG
to overcome the shortage by channeling February 1942 requested and obtained
all company-grade oflficers of troop age to permission to utilize 1 ,060 branch imma-
field units, but this objective was never terial Reserve officers who had not yet
fully attained. One of the reasons was that been assigned to extended active duty in
there were not enough over-age and lim- their own branches. In approving the re- ^"^^
ited-service officers to take over the duties quest, the War Department restricted the
being performed by troop-age officers at selection to over-age Reserve officers of the
permanent installations, and those holding Infantry, Cavalry, and Field Artillery on
key positions could not be relieved for field an inactive status. Many of these over-age
duty when no replacements were avail- officers, after they had undergone training
able. Another reason was that many of the in specific Quartermaster duties, were able
troop-age officers, particularly those com- to replace troop-age officers and make
missioned directly from civilian life, were them available for field units. ^^
found to be unsuited for assignment to Despite frantic efforts to obtain addi-
troops. Because an officer was of troop age, tional officers from all other possible
it did not necessarily follow that he was of sources —
assigning Reserve officers, com-
troop type.^* missioning enlisted men and civilians, and
The transfer of qualified troop-age offi- -'
Ltr, Col Horace L. Whittaker, Comdt QM
cers to field units increased the shortage of School, to Gen Scowden, 19 Mar 42, sub: Comments
commissioned personnel at Quartermas- on Rpt of Professors Smith and Mace, 353.
1st Lt William O. Antozzi to Chief of Tng Br,
-'*
70 officers, and the commander put in a missioned officers not assigned to any particular arm
request for an increase to 128, which he or service.
the number of officers rose from 7,800 to of the major reasons was that there was a
only about 12,400, and most of that in- limited number of men in the QMC under
crease occurred during May and June.''- the maximum age of thirty-six, who were
It was obvious that the officer shortages mentally and physically qualified and had
could never be overcome until the OCS been in the service long enough to be eli-
could train a sufficient number of quali- gible. Many more men became available
fied enlisted men. after February 1942 when the War De-
partment raised the age limit to forty-six,
The Role of the Officer Candidate School and reduced to three months the length of
time in service required for eligibility.^^
It was from the enlisted ranks that the Another reason for the difficulty was that
QMC obtained the great portion of its many potential candidates who were oc-
new during the war years. About
officers cupying relatively important key positions
1,400 were commissioned in the field on in units and installations were hampered
the basis of their experience. But the in their efforts to enroll in the OCS by the
bulk— more than 23,000 of the nearly 30,- lack of co-operation on the part of their
000 officers obtained from all sources commanding officers who did not want to
were graduates of the OCS who were com- lose them. Reports indicated that the
missioned as second lieutenants. Most of policy being pursued by the commanders
these were inductees who were enrolled in was to let the men seek admission to the
the OCS after completing their basic OCS on their own initiative without offer-
training. Only 5,000 new officers acquired ing them any encouragement. This situa-
in 1942 and thereafter came from all other War Department directive
tion led to a
sources, including the ORC, specialists making commanders in all echelons re-
commissioned directly from civilian life, sponsible for seeing that every qualified
and former officers recalled to duty. (See enlisted man was afforded an opportunity
Table 15.)
Enrollment at the Quartermaster OCS '-
Unpublished rpt of Secretary of War, 1942, App.
early in 1942 increased as rapidly as facil- B, Table D, in Strength Accounting Br, AGO.
and encouraged to apply for entrance to with units was twenty-eight, yet many of
an OCS.^^ themen were past thirty-five upon gradu-
With the ehmination of these early dif- ation, and some were as old as forty-five.
ficulties, theQMC had no further trouble Many of the older graduates were so far
in filling its OCS quotas during the mobi- over-age in grade that they could never
lization period. In fact, a surplus of candi- qualify for field duty. They could, how-
dates developed as early as April 1942, ever, be assigned to zone of interior instal-
and the War Department suggested that lations where they could relieve troop-age
men on the waiting be given an oppor-
list officers for field duty. Those who were
tunity to enroll in schools of other branches over-age as second lieutenants but still
that still had serious shortages. ^^ Conse- young enough to become eligible for troop
quently the QMC had little if any need for duty at a higher grade were given ad-
the Volunteer Officer Candidate (VOC) vanced training so that they could qualify
plan that had been adopted by the War for promotion.
Department in March 1942 to open up a The time required for this additional
—
new source of officer material men de- training and the fact that requirements
ferred because they had dependents. This were mounting rapidly through most of
plan permitted any qualified man who 1942 were among the principal reasons
had been deferred from the draft for de- why it took so long to overcome the short-
pendency only to volunteer for officer age of officers, despite the sharply in-
training, with the understanding that if he creased output of the OCS. Paradoxically,
was not selected at the replacement train- the OCS itself helped to increase the
ing center to which he was sent for basic shortage because it had to have such a
training, or if he was not commissioned at large staff to provide supervision and in-
an OCS, he could return to civilian life struction for the expanded program, and
and his former draft status. The Camp Lee outstanding students from some of the
QMRTC reported to the War Depart- earlier classes had to be retained as in-
^^
ment in July 1942 that no more than 10 structors instead of being sent to the field.
percent of the 600 VOC's it had on hand By the fall of 1942 the most pressing
could possibly be selected for officer train- needs for Quartermaster officers finally
ing under the existing OCS quota, and re- were being met and the OCS began to un-
quested either that fewer VOC's be sent or dergo drastic changes. Seeking to prevent
that the OCS quota be increased so that a surplus of officers, the War Department
more of them could be utilized. The out- reduced the quota for each new Quarter-
come was that the War Department issued master class from 1,200 to 600 beginning
orders in August that no more VOC's in October, and then to 300 effective in
were to be accepted at the Quartermaster
OCS.^^ '>
Ltr, AGO to CofS GHQet al., 27 Jan 42, sub:
such assignments, chiefly because of age Jul 42, sub: VOC. (2) AGO Memo W350-65-42, 1
Quartermaster OCS was in violation of was due more to the raising of standards
Army Regulations. The AGO
acknowl- than to any other factor.
edged this and beginning in February Another important change in the OCS
1943 specified that only candidates classi- program was brought about by the deci-
fied for general service could be assigned sion of the War Department in March
to the Quartermaster OCS.^^ 1943 to train graduates within the ROTC
The relaxation of pressure for new offi- quotas set for the OCS, instead of in addi-
cers permitted the OCS to devote more at- tion to them as in the past. Summer camps
tention to the quality of graduates. Previ- had been discontinued for the duration of
ously, volume and speed had been of the war, and during 1942 Quartermaster
utmost importance because requirements ROTC graduates who had completed all
were immediate. It had become a rather requirements for a commission except at-
common practice to commission indi- tendance at summer camps had been
viduals in advance of graduation, particu- given a basic course of training at the
larly if they had had any previous military Quartermaster School before being com-
experience, in order to meet the urgent missioned as second lieutenants. Under
need for officers, and two entire OCS the revised procedure of March 1943, the
classes with a combined enrollment of Quartermaster OCS began to train the
more than 2,400 candidates had been ROTC graduates along with the regular
commissioned two weeks ahead of sched-
ule after only eleven weeks of training.
'"
(1) AGO Memo W350-74-42, 5 Sep 42, sub:
Quotas for QM OCS. (2) Ltr, AGO to All Command-
Moreover, in the rush to produce the re- ers to Whom Quotas Are Allotted, 24 Mar 43, same
quired number of new officers, many sub, AG 352 (3-19-43) OB-D-SPGAO.
candidates of questionable suitability were
'" WD Cir 358, Sec. II, 28 Oct 42, sub: OCS.
^
' ( 1 ) Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Off Candidates, Pt.
enrolled and graduated. This situation be- I, p. 22. (2) Ltr, AGO to All Commanders to Whom
gan to change late in 1942 when standards Quotas Are Allotted, 27 Feb 43, sub: Quotas for QM
OCS, AG
352 (2-22-43) OB-D-SPQTA.
for admission and graduation were raised. *- Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Off Candidates, Pt. II,
An indication that the efforts to improve pp. 21-22.
THE PROCUREMENT OF QUARTERMASTER OFFICERS 189
courses of military value, such as science, them in the Reserve Corps following
engineering, or medicine, but only after
they had received basic military training, " (1) Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Schooling of Commissioned
which was to be continued under a cadet Offs, Pt. I, pp. 1-12. (2) Rpt, Maj Ross W. Mayer to
Col Wilbur R. McReynolds, OQMG, 1 1 Feb 42, sub:
organization while they were in college. ROTC Summer Camps and Other Matters. (3) For
The QMC participation in the ASTP location of the nine Quartermaster ROTC units, dates
was quite limited. No Quartermaster per- of establishment, and number of graauates from each,
sonnel —
other than the ROTC students
see below, p. 264, n. 28.
^^ AGO
Memo W145-4-42, 23 Dec 42, sub:
included originally were — selected for ASTP— ROTC Instructions.
ASTP training during the first seven ^=' AGO Memo W145-12-43, par. 4, 4 Aug 43, sub:
Disp of First-Year Advanced Course ROTC Students.
months that the program was in operation. '" Ltr, ACofS G-1 to CG ASF, 16 Feb 44, sub: Re-
Finally, however, inAugust 1943, the War duction in ASTP.
190 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
graduation, place them on the inactive Thus the problem was no longer
sources.*^
list,then assign them to positions of re- what to do about the men who had been
sponsibility as noncommissioned officers in crowded out of the OCS by ROTC per-
the theaters of operations. There they sonnel, but rather where to get the addi-
could be called to active duty as second tional candidates needed to meet the in-
lieutenants as the need arose. He expressed creased requirements.
the opinion that the men deserved "the The difficulty in filling the suddenly in-
democratic chance to attain at least the creased OCS quotas in 1944 was due pri-
opportunity for officer training." ^^ marily to the fact that the number of men
This proposal was rejected by the Di- still in the zone of interior who were quali-
rector of Personnel, ASF, who contended fied to enroll was comparatively small.
that to train an individual as an officer Most of the general-service personnel who
and then force him to continue to serve in could be made available for overseas duty
a noncommissioned status "would be in- had already been sent abroad. It became
advisable and have as harmful an effect on necessary to bring some of them back and
morale as the present limited number of enroll them in the OCS in order to fulfill
opportunities to attend officer candidate the requirements. Before the end of 1944
school." Moreover, he added, the capac- the supply of qualified candidates had be-
ities of the OCS had been adjusted to meet come so small that the quota had to be re-
all current and future requirements for duced, and for nearly three months begin-
officers, and that to increase these capac- ning early in November no new classes
ities "to train additional men who will were started because the was un- QMC
probably never have the opportunity to able to obtain a sufficient number of suit-
serve as officers during the war" could not able candidates. ^"^ During the first half of
bejustified.^® 1945 the situation became so acute that
The assumption in January 1944 that the QMC
resorted to reviewing applica-
the OCS was operating at a level sufficient tions of men who had been rejected from
tomeet future requirements proved to be the OCS's of other branches of the service
As a matter of fact,
entirely fallacious. "on the theory that if rejected for technical
even before The Quartermaster General reasons only, the applicants may be ac-
^^
received the reply to his proposal the ceptable for the Quartermaster Corps."
Corps was again faced with a critical One of the serious results of the desperate
shortage of officers. Sudden unexpected search for officer candidates was that the
demands from overseas for more Quarter-
master officers not only wiped out the sur- *' Memo, TQMG for CG ASF, 26 Nov 43, sub:
plus of officers, which had been a matter Use of OCS forReserve Off Tng.
^« 1st Ind, DirofPers, ASF, to TQMG, 26 Jan 44,
of concern in 1943, but made it necessary on memo cited n. 47.
to expand sharply the capacity of the OCS ^«
(1) Ltr, Gen Wilbur R. McReynolds, OQMG, to
in order to produce 3,000 more graduates Dir of Mil Tng Div, ASF, 7 Jan 44, sub:
1 Increase in
best sources of good noncommissioned of- of them were graduates of the OCS who,
ficers for Quartermaster units were largely because the need for officers usually was
depleted in the attempt to fill the OCS urgent and immediate, frequently had to
quotas. be sent overseas before they had had an
The acute shortage of OCS candidates opportunity for additional training. The
led to the granting of authority to theater OCS was not designed to turn out special-
commanders 1944 to commission in
late in ists. Its mission was "to equip candidates
the field enlisted men whose experience with the basic knowledge needed to begin
and leadership qualities entitled them to their careers as second lieutenants."^^
promotion. During 1945 approximately Thus the candidates merely acquired the
800 Quartermaster enlisted men received background for specialization in the par-
their commissions in this manner without ticular fields to which they were assigned
any formal training as officers. This was after graduation. The general procedure
nearly as many as were graduated from was to send the graduates directly to the
the Quartermaster OCS during the same Quartermaster School or to depots for this
period.^- specialized training. Often, however, the
Undoubtedly the operations of the OCS need for officers was so urgent that the
would have followed a different pattern OCS graduates had to get the additional
had it been possible for the War Depart- training after they arrived overseas. Dur-
ment to determine further in advance just ing the rapid mobilization in 1942, when
what would be needed to win a global so many new units were being activated
war. Quotas would not have been reduced and pressure was great from all directions,
so sharply as they were in 1943, and thus there was not suflficient time to give com-
the officer shortage of 1944 and 1945 pletely adequate training to either officers
might have been avoided. In the light of or men before they were sent to the thea-
developments as the war progressed and ters. A somewhat similar situation devel-
all of the theaters went into action, the so- oped on a smaller scale in 1944 when
called officer surplus of 1943 actually was requirements for overseas replacements
not a surplus at all. It is true that there suddenly were found to be much greater
were more Quartermaster officers in 1943 than had been anticipated.
than were called for in the Troop Basis, It could hardly be expected that all
but, as it turned out, the Troop Basis graduates of the OCS would become
underestimated requirements. Theater thoroughly qualified and competent
commanders complained almost constant- Quartermaster officers, even after addi-
ly that they were not getting a sufficient
number of Quartermaster officers or men, --
( 1) Ltr, Dir of Mil Tng Div, OQMG, to Comdt
even when they were receiving the full
of QM School, 28 Nov 44, sub: OCS Class No. 49.
(2) See Table 15.
quotas assigned to them. Moreover, they ^'^
For some examples of complaints see (1) Memo,
complained that some of the officers were CQM ETO to DQMG,27 Jun 43, sub: Qualifications
of QM Offs Assigned to ETO; (2) Ltr, CQM
not well qualified and that many had not USASOS SWPA to TQMG, 1 Jul 43, no sub; (3) Ltr,
^^
had suflScient training. CQM ETO to CO Advance Sec ComZ, 5 Jan 45, no
The primary reason why many of the sub; and (4) OCQM USASOS SWPA, Mil History,
QMSec, USASOS, 7 Dec 4 1-30 Jun 45 (7 vols.), V,
Quartermaster officers were inexperienced 55-56, and VL 53.
upon arrival in the theaters was that most " ASF Manual M3, Nov 44, p. 69.
192 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
tional trainingand experience. Candidates dry operations, refrigeration, salvage col-
varied widely as to their educational back- lection, shoe and textile repair, bakery,
ground, occupational experience, and and sales commissary. The needs were im-
mental capacity. Many who were obvi- mediate and technicians could not be
ously unqualified were screened out, but trained quickly enough in sufficient num-
among those who received their commis- bers to meet the urgent requirements. It
sions there was a great difference in ability was necessary, therefore, to commission
and proficiency. Many of the men had competent civilians who, if they were not
been experts in their civilian occupations qualified to serve with units, could at least
but had never had any military training, relieve experienced officers for duty in the
and while some of these could readily theaters.
adapt themselves to Army Hfe, others Civilians up to sixty years of age could
found it difficult to do so. A candidate be commissioned in the Army of the
such as a petroleum engineer or a certified United States, even though they had no
public accountant could possess a high previous military experience, provided
degree of skill and still lack leadership they possessed the special technical, ad-
make ministrative, or scientific ability needed by
ability or other qualities necessary to
him a good officer. On the other hand, the Army. All appointments were subject
some of the candidates who had been non- to approval by the War Department. The
commissioned officers with extensive Army various arms and services were required to
training and good military bearing pos- submit procurement objectives along with
sessed no particular skills to make them explanations of why the men were needed,
useful as Quartermaster officers. Still and allotments were made on that basis.
others were just out of school and had During most of 1942 regulations prohib-
neither civilian occupational experience ited the commissioning from civilian life of
nor previous military training. men under thirty years of age without pre-
As in the case of enHsted personnel, the vious commissioned service, unless they
skills possessed by the graduates did not possessed extraordinary professional or
occur in direct proportion to the needs of technical qualifications. The minimum
the QMC, which were complicated by the age restriction was raised to thirty-five in
wide variety of functions the Corps had to November, and no men between thirty-
perform. The problem was to try to fill all five and forty-five without previous com-
of these requirements at a given time with missioned service could be appointed if
the particular types of officers then avail- they were in selective service Class I-A or
able. This resulted in officers being as- II. The maximum age for men in these
signed to jobs for which they were not par- groups was lowered automatically in De-
ticularly qualified. cember from forty-five to thirty-eight
when the Army stopped drafting men
The Commissioning of Civilians thirty-eight and over. Civilian appointees
were assigned originally to overhead in-
In the rapid expansion of the QMC fol- where they served under Regu-
stallations
lowing Pearl Harbor, a critical shortage of lar Army officers. Regulations provided at
qualified officers developed in such fields first had to be in active service at
that they
as motor supply and maintenance, laun- least six months before they could be as-
THE PROCUREMENT OF QUARTERMASTER OFFICERS 193
signed to duty with field units. This provi- quirements for Quartermaster officers
sion was changed later to four months. were being met by the fall of 1 942 as a re-
Civilians with minor physical defects that sult of the heavy output of the OCS, and
would have disqualified them for perma- there were fears that a surplus of officers
nent rank in the Regular Army could be would develop. Still another factor was the
commissioned in the AUS because their confusion over civilian appointments that
assignments generally were of a limited- grew out of the creation of the Army Spe-
service nature. ^^ Corps (ASC).
cialist
Until late in 1942 the Military Person- The ASC was established by Executive
nel and Training Division, OQMG, had order on 26 February 1942. This new
the responsibility for obtaining and proc- corps was created in the belief that it
essing applications of civilians and making would be able to supply all branches of the
recommendations for their appointment Army and other War Department agencies
as oflficers in the QMC. Although the divi- with professional, scientific, and adminis-
sion was literally swamped by applications trative personnel who could not readily
from civilians, it found that comparatively qualify for commissions in the AUS, and
few of them possessed the necessary quali- thus relieve many additional officers for
fications. For example, the biggest need duty in the theaters. These civilian experts
was for men experienced in motor trans- were to be recruited through the Civil
port activities, such as specialists in motor Service Commission but would have
repair, maintenance, inspection, and fleet neither civil-service status nor Army com-
operations, yet most of the men who ap- missions. They were to wear uniforms
plied from the automobile industry had similar to those of the Army but with dis-
been salesmen without any technical ex- tinctive insignia. They were to exercise
perience. Approximately 90,000 applica- administrative and supervisory functions
tions were received during the first six only, but would have authority over any
months of 1942, but only 1,832 applicants Army personnel assigned to duty under
were recommended for appointment, and them.^**
the number actually commissioned was The OQMG
had high hopes that the
1,066, including 629 in the motor trans- ASC would provide the with a large QMC
port service. This number was far short of
the QMC procurement objective, which •"
(1) WD Cir 37, 29 Jan 42, sub: Appointment of
had been set at 1,840 for the first half of Commissioned OfFs in the AUS, Changes in AR 605-
1942.'^ 10. (2) Ltr, TAG to TQMG et al., 7 Jan 42, sub:
Waiving of Physical Defects of Limited Sv Offsofthe
The OQMG estimated about the mid- Sup Arms and'Svs, AG 210.31 (12-19-41) RP-A. (3)
dle of 1942 that it would require 1,860 of- AR 605-10, 30 Dec 42, sub: Offs Appointed in the
AUS.
ficers from civilian during the second
life ^'"'
(1) Data submitted bv Pers and Tng Div for An-
half of the year.^' Actually, less than half nual Rpt of TQMGto SOS for FY 942, 2 Aug 42. 1 1
of that number were commissioned. One (2) Ltr, Lt Col Roy C. Moore, OQMG, to TAG, 3 Jul
42, sub: Procurement Objective, 210.1. (3) Memo for
of the reasons for this was that motor trans- Maj W. F. Hellman, OQMG, 2
Files, 1 Jul 42, sub:
port activities, for which most of the civil- Mil Pers.
ians were being appointed, had been
^'
Ltr, Gen Munnikhuysen, OQMG, to TAG, 20
Jul 42, sub: Forecast of Off Reqmts, 1 Jul-3 1 Dec 42,
transferred to the Ordnance Department. 210.1.
Another reason was that most of the re- '^
OQMG OO 1 1 1 . 24 Mav 42, sub: ASC.
194 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
number of specialists who would help to stricted the opportunities forpromoting
relieve the shortage of officers, but some AUS Moreover, the procedure
officers.
uncertainty existed as to just how they for procuring officers for the ASC was
would fit into the organization. none too clear, and misunderstandings
arose with the Civil Service Commission
It is evident that the ArmySpecialist
through which ASC officers had to be ob-
Corps is being organized to be able to place
in uniform a great many prominent civilians tained. The upshot was that procurement
who are unable, at the present time, to get by machinery slowed down, and pro- QMC
the surgeons and also to provide a corps of curement officers, in their eagerness to re-
specialists who do not come under the Civil
lieve the shortage of officers, continued to
Service Regulations nor the present per diem
method of securing experience in certain make the bulk of their appointments in the
fields of endeavor. No doubt a great many AUS. This tendency was so prevalent
civilian experts who are at the present time among the arms and services that the War
hired as civilians could be transferred to this Department in September attempted to
organization, in which they would have ad-
ministrative and supervisory control over
clarify the mission of the ASC and to curb
military personnel, which fact is not always the practice.
the case at present. In other words, instead of It is apparent that many officers have been
their positions being advisory in nature, their appointed in the Army of the United States
positions under the Army Specialist Corps who should have been appointed in the Army
would be, more or less, in a chain of com- Specialist Corps. It is believed that this is due
mand.^'' to a lack of understanding of the mission of
the Army Specialist Corps and the procedure
The program got under way in May necessary to secure an appointment in the
1942 when The Adjutant General author- Corps [ASC]. Steps are now being taken to
ized the QMC to recommend the appoint- eliminate the unnecessary and objectionable
processes in order that the appointments may
ment of 1,493 civilians as officers in the
be expedited.''-
ASC.''" In keeping with the new War De-
partment policy, the director of the Mili- A few weeks later, however, the War
tary Personnel and Training Division, Department abandoned its unsuccessful
OQMG, announced that all future ap- experiment with the ASC. It announced
pointments of civilians would be made, on 4 November 1942 that the ASC was be-
"in practically all cases," in the ASC ing abolished, that effective immediately
rather than in the AUS.*^' Despite this, no more appointments were to be made in
considerable reluctance to make ASC ap- it, and that officers who had been ap-
pointment developed on the part of pro- pointed would be permitted to apply for
curement officers in the QMC
and commissions in the AUS. Those who failed
throughout the Army. The fact that the to submit their applications on or before
ASC officers would be neither flesh nor
fowl raised serious questions as to the de- "> Memo, Col David H. Cowles to TQMG, 27 Apr
gree of authority they could assert over 42, sub: ACS Appointments, 2 0. 1 1
in each grade, and any appointments port Sv, OQMG, 28 May 42, sub: ASC Appointments,
210.1.
made in the ASC automatically reduced «- AGO Memo W900-5-42, 28 Sep 42, sub: Ap-
thenumber of existing vacancies and re- pointments in the ASC.
THE PROCUREMENT OF QUARTERMASTER OFFICERS 195
either as officers or as civilian employees. «M1) AGO Memo W900-6-42, 4 Nov 42, sub: Ap-
The QMC and the other arms and serv- pointments in the ASC. (2) Capt H. W. Druehl to Col
Whitehead, OQMG, 13 Jan 43, sub: Annual Rpt. The
ices, however, had already set up their 98 officers commissioned in the ASC included colo- 1
own procurement organizations and made nel, 18 majors, 37 captains, 32 first lieutenants, and
10 second lieutenants.
little use Personnel Placement
of the "-'
(1) WDCir 367, 7 Nov 42, sub: Off Procurement
Agency, primarily because the War De- Sv. (2) Statement, Lt Col H. L. Swift, Chief of Pro-
partment had made no adequate provision curement Br, Mil Pers Div, SOS, at conf, Jun 42,
1 1
General became quite annoyed when he RJ. (3)AGO Memo S605-5-42, Sep 42, sub: Off 1
came to light early in the mobilization pe- cers were assigned to jobs corresponding as
riod when so many civilians were being
converted into officers and it became im- '" (l)'Ltr, Gen Munnikhuysen, OQMG, to TAG,
perative to take full advantage of their 25 Nov Off Reqmts from Civil Life
42, sub: Estimated
in QMC for 1943, 210.1. (2) Ltr, Actg TQMG
to CG
civilian experience and to utilize them SOS, 17 Feb 43, sub: Procurement Objective for Ap-
where they could perform the greatest pointments from Civil Life, 210.1. (3) See Table 15.
' AR 605-90, 21 May 42, sub: OfTs and Warrant
service with the least additional training.
OfTs Classification.
The War Department adopted a more 'Ml) AR 605-95, 19 Jan 43, sub: Off Job Classifi-
practical system for classifying commis- cation. (2) Supplement to same, 18 Mar 43.
198 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
closely as possible to their civilian occupa- training in other types of duties has been neg-
tions. In order to fill requirements in lected to the extent that he reaches field
grade lacking in knowledge of the broader
scarce categories, however, it was fre-
aspects of the Quartermaster Corps so essen-
quently necessary to assign them to types tial to efficient performance of duty in the
of work in which they had had compara- higher grades. Obviously, this practice is not
tively less experience. For this reason, they only an injustice to the officer concerned but
were classified as to both their main and also reveals a failure to make the best use of
the personnel available."
their secondary occupations.
Inasmuch as the classification system Officers were classified not only by their
was not infallible, officers were sometimes specialties, but also according to age, as
assigned to jobs for which they were not troop age or over-age in grade, and ac-
qualified and had to be reclassified. More- cording to physical capacity, as limited
over, quite a few officers who proved en- service or general service. Army Regula-
tirely proficient in their original assign- tions restricted the appointment of limi-
ments were later reported as unsatisfactory which there
ted-service officers to fields in
after being promoted and transferred to were scarcities of professionally qualified
new assignments. The OQMG called at- men, and at first they could be assigned
tention to this situation in the spring of only to overhead positions in the War De-
1943, when it suggested that officers at the partment or in the corps areas. Beginning
Camp Lee QMRTC be rotated in order early in 1944, however, they were permit-
to give them the widest experience possible ted to go overseas if their defects were
while in training, and warned against pro- "static in nature and not subject to the de-
motions being "so rapid as to result in velopment of complications." ^^
placing officers in positions of major re- The Quartermaster General had the re-
sponsibility before they are equipped by sponsibility for assigning and reassigning
training and experience to successfully the officers under his control and for filling
carry these responsibilities." The OQMGrequisitions submitted by all commands to
also pointed out: the AGO. His office checked each requisi-
Frequent instances have come to the atten- tion f6r accuracy, made
the decision as to
tion of this office in which an exceptionally whether all could be filled,
or part of it
promising officer suddenly is reported as un- specified the number and grades of officers
satisfactory. His record shows a series of ex-
to be furnished, and then redelegated au-
cellent or superior efficiency reports and
thority to the commanding generals of the
promotions at close intervals. Then, closely
following a promotion and transfer to a new QMRTC's to select the required number
assignment, an unsatisfactory report is re- of qualified officers in the available grades
ceived and even on occasion a recommenda- and to issue the orders for their transfer.^''
tion for reclassification. Most frequently these
adverse reports appear in cases where promo-
'
' Ltr, Col Whitehead, OQMG, to CG Camp Lee
tion to field grade has been rapid. In the typ- QMRTC, 21 May 43, sub: Promotion of Offs.
junior grades. The conclusion is that an in- for Oversea Assignment of Offs.
telligent, basically well-equipped officer has ''
Ltr, Gen Munnikhuysen, OQMG, to CG Camp
been kept on one assignment in which he has Lee QMRTC, 30 Mar 42, sub: Assignment of Offs,
become exceptionally proficient, and that his 210.31.
THE PROCUREMENT OF QUARTERMASTER OFFICERS 199
Operation of the Officer Pool lected to attend various service schools for
advanced training. The composition
Unassigned officers were placed in the changed considerably late in the war when
Quartermaster replacement pool. An offi- many officers returned from overseas un-
cer replacement pool had been established der the War Department rotation plan
in each of the arms and services in Decem- were sent to the pool for redeployment
ber 1941 shortly after Pearl Harbor, and training and reassignment.
the system was widely used throughout the The size of the Quartermaster pool
war. Officers were assigned to the pool varied widely in accordance with the fluc-
either when no assignment was available tuating relationship between the supply of
for them or when they were not available officers and the requirements for them.
for assignment for any reason, such as be- During the acute officer shortage of 1942
ing in a hospital or awaiting discharge. the number in the pool usually averaged
Newly commissioned officers were sent to between 200 and 300. Late in 1942, how-
the pool unless it was necessary to assign ever, it suddenly increased to approxi-
them immediately to duty in a unit or at mately 1,000 when the supply of officers
an installation. The purpose of the pool became more plentiful. During the officer
was to give suitable preparatory training surplus of 1943 the average number in the
to each officer before his permanent as- pool was about 1,500, although at one
signment and to serve as the primary time there were more than 3,700. The size
source of officers for the activation of new of the pool declined sharply to about 500
units and for overseas assignments. Regu- during the officer shortage in 1944."
lations specified that all officers in the pool Officers of all ranks up through that of
were to be kept in readiness for permanent colonel were assigned to the pool, but the
duty and that they could not be employed great majority were second lieutenants,
on operatingjobs while awaiting assign- most of whom were sent there directly
ment. The pool was also utilized in rotat- from the OCS. The length of stay in the
ing officers qualified for troop duty who pool varied greatly. Sometimes an officer
were serving in zone of interior installa- could complete a particular type of train-
tions and had never had any field training. ing in about a month and then, before
Before being shipped overseas, such offi- leaving the pool, could spend another week
cers were transferred to the pool and given or so observing operations of a unit or in-
appropriate training for duty with a truck stallation of the kind to which he was as-
company, a bakery outfit, or some other signed. In many instances, however, the
field unit.''' need for officers was so urgent that they
Quartermaster pools were operated at were assigned to duty before they could
the QMRTC's, the Quartermaster School, complete any training. On the other hand.
and at the various depots and other Quar-
termaster installations where specialized
'« Ltr, TAG to TQMG et al., 19 Dec 41, sub: Off
training was conducted. Early in the war Filler and Loss Repls for Ground Arms and Svs, AG
the pool was comprised primarily of Re- 321.2 (12-15-41) OP-A-M.
(1) Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Schooling of Commis-
'"
serve officers ordered to active duty, grad-
sioned Offs, Repl Pool Sec, Chart I, facing p. 54. (2)
uates of the OCS, personnel commissioned Ltr, Gen Munnikhuysen, OQMG, to CG ASF, 24 Jan
directly from civilian life, and officers se- 44, sub: Off Repl Pool, 210.21.
200 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
officers occasionally remained in the pool and forth between the pool and the center
as long as six months. The average length cadre and to fill requisitions and other re-
of time spent there, however, was less than quirements for officers either from the pool
two months. ^^ or from the cadre as he saw fit. He was in
Graduates of the OCS generally were a position to ascertain quickly the qualifi-
processed through the pool except when cations and status of all officers available
the shortage of officers made it necessary for assignment and could fill urgent re-
to assign them directly to units or installa- quests for those with special skills by tele-
tions, as was the case during much of 1942. phone. He sent copies of all transfer orders
They were assigned to training in the pool to The Quartermaster General and sub-
in accordance with quotas established by mitted weekly strength reports showing
the OQMG, which designated the num- the status of all officers available in the
ber to be given advanced training in each pool.
technical field, such as motor transport, This system of decentralized operation
bakers and cooks, administration, depot, was abandoned temporarily in February
laundry, salvage, refrigeration, and sterili- 1943. The pool had grown so large that
zation and bath. However, before the the Personnel Division, OQMG,
decided
graduate was assigned to a specific type of that it should exercise a greater degree of
training, the usual procedure was to inter- control. Consequently a directive was is-
view him personally and permit him to ex- sued prohibiting transfers to and from the
press a preference, which was given as pool except when approved by the divi-
much consideration as possible in the light sion. The procedure of making all assign-
of his particular qualifications and the ex- ments from the OQMG
level ran into dif-
isting requirements. The personal contact ficulty primarily because the Personnel
established through this interview tended Division possessed no up-to-the-minute
to give the new officer the feeling of being information on the status of officers in the
treated as an individual and sent him into pool. Frequently the officers who were as-
his training with more enthusiasm than if signed proved to be unavailable because
he were simply handed an order specifying they were in the hospital, on emergency
the type of training he would receive. The leave, or on temporary duty elsewhere.
pool's practical training course afforded This created much confusion, involved a
an opportunity to determine the best qual- a considerable amount of long-distance
ifications of each officer and thus provided telephoning, and required extensive sub-
a sound basis for his ultimate assignment. stitutions. The commanding general of the
Consequently there was less opportunity Camp Lee QMRTC found the procedure
for improper assignment than in the case highly unsatisfactory and protested "that
of the OCS graduates, who were assigned you can't control the movements of indi-
directly to field or tactical units on the vidual officers by long distance telephone."
basis of their academic records alone.'" The outcome was that the original system
Throughout the greater part of the war
the commanding general of the Camp Lee ''*
Rpt, Schooling of Commissioned Offs, Repi Pool
QMRTC, who supervised the pool, was Sec, p. 57.
permitted to transfer officers freely back " Ibid., pp. 49, 52.
THE PROCUREMENT OF QUARTERMASTER OFFICERS 201
of operation was reinstated in the summer with "the least qualified if not actually un-
of 1943.^" satisfactory officers" and that pool officers
During the early part of the war there were being used on operating jobs in lieu of
was a marked tendency on the part of being assigned within existing ceilings.
commanders in the QMC to transfer to The ASF directed that prompt measures
the pool any officers they wanted to get rid be taken to separate from active duty any
of for one reason or another, and to use the unsatisfactory or surplus officers in the
pool assignment as a punishment or as a pool.^-
threat of punishment. This created a The OQMG, in reply, admitted that
rather general impression that the pool the condition of the pool "for a period of a
was merely a dumping ground and that an few months during 1943" had not been
assignment there constituted a black mark "entirely satisfactory." The difficulty, it
on an officer's record. Actually, of course, stated, had been caused by the excessive
many excellent and superior officers were size of the pool, which had created a hous-
sent to the pool for additional training or ing shortage that could be resolved only
in preparation for an anticipated assign- by placing the pool officers in the installa-
ment. The abuse of pool assignments by tions where housing was obtainable, with-
commanders was finally stopped when out consideration as to the appropriate
The Quartermaster General directed that number at any particular installation. The
only his headquarters would issue orders Inspector General's investigation, the
assigning officers to the pool.^^ OQMG pointed out, had been made
Another shortcoming of the pool was the when the pool was near its peak during
generally low morale among the officers that period. Since then, it declared, the
assigned to it. This resulted primarily size of the pool had been reduced from
from the fact that, having no assignment, nearly 3,800 to 1,245, the situation had
officers were inclined to feel that they "vastly changed," and if another investi-
were wasting their time, were contributing gation were made it would reveal an "en-
nothing toward winning the war, and were tirely satisfactory" condition. The OQMG
losing out on an opportunity for promo- stated further that the greatest care was
tion. Experienced officers of higher rank being exercised "to prevent the accumula-
often looked upon assignment to the pool tion of unsatisfactory, or barely satisfac-
^^
as a form of degradation. tory officers."
Officers assigned to the pool varied ^" Ltr, Gen Munnikhuysen, OQMG, to CG
{\)
greatly as to their capabilities. Those of QMRTC, 17 Feb 43, sub: Transfer of Offs from Pool
top quahty were usually the first to get as- to Cadre. (2) Ltr, Brig Gen Guy I. CG Camp
Rowe,
Lee QMRTC, Gen
Barnes, Deputy
to 3 Jun TQMG,
signments and normally stayed in the pool 43, sub: Difficulty in Pers Control of Pool Offs. (3) Ltr,
a comparatively short time, while those of TQMG to CG
Camp Lee, 10 Sep 43, sub: Commis-
poorer quality tended to remain there. The sioned Off Reqmts in the Camp Lee QMRTC,
1944 that The Inspector General had Oflfs, Repl Pool Sec, p. 8.
^- Ltr, Maj Gen Joseph N. Dalton, Dir of Pers, ASF,
found the condition of the Quartermaster
to TQMG, 8 Jan 44, sub: Off Repl Pools.
pool unsatisfactory. The major criticisms 8
' Ltr, Gen Munnikhuysen, OQMG, to CG ASF,
were that the pool was becoming filled 24 Jan 44, sub: Off Repl Pools.
202 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
"
Table 16 Separations of Quartermaster Commissioned Officers
Calendar Year
Cause Total
1942 1943 1944 194S
" Figures in this table represent men who were separated while in the QMC but who did not necessarily serve there throughout the
war. Separations do not include Regular Army officers assigned to the QMC.
' Figures audited as of 30 June 1946 and not available separately by month or year.
' Release essential to national health, safety, or interest; or because of undue hardship or over-age.
Source: Rpt, Strength Accounting Br, AGO, to Hist Sec, OQMG, 6 Jul 48, sub: Statistical Data on QMC Commissioned Male Offis.
The order to rid the pool of unsatisfac- only 500 in 1 943. In 1 945 about
trast to
tory and surplus officers was one of the more were discharged in addition to
1,300
reasons for a sharp increase in the number the 2,800 who were demobilized. (See
of officers discharged from the QMC. Table 16.)
Another was an ASF directive issued in
the fall of 1 944 that only officers who could Officers for Negro Troops
qualify for overseas service were to be kept
were being trained
in the pool, unless they While the total peak officer strength of
such as depots, or
for specific installations the QMC
was nearly 31,000, the number
inspection agencies.**^ More than 500 of Negro officers was only 700. Thus while
Quartermaster officers were separated Negroes comprised nearly half of the en-
from the service for physical disabilities listed men in the Corps, Negro officers
alone in 1944. All told, 1,200 officers were '^^
ASFCir413, Sec. II, 20 Sep 44, sub: Off Repl
discharged by the QMC
in 1944, in con- Pools.
THE PROCUREMENT OF QUARTERMASTER OFFICERS 203
Field Artillery, and in 79 in the Air through transfer from other branches of
1
Corps. The proportions were higher also the Army. Comparatively few of them ad-
in the other technical services except the vanced beyond the rank of captain. One
Corps of Engineers and the Transportation of the reasons for this was that they were
Corps, where the ratio was in 341 and1 assigned to small units where the oppor-
1
first call on all men with previous military Except for the small number he was per-
training as well as those who displayed mitted to assign to the permanent training
qualities of leadership. These priorities regiments at the Camp Lee QMRTC, The
severely restricted the supply of good Quartermaster General had no direct con-
Negro officer material in the An- QMC. trol over the assignment of Negro officers.
other factor was that there were no Negro They could be assigned only to such units
officers in the Corps during the emergency and agencies and in such grades as author-
period, and after Pearl Harbor the pro- ized by the War Department. The OQMG
gram for enrolling enlisted Negroes in the notified the AGO
when new officers be-
OCS was slow in getting under way. Only came available for assignment and some-
four Negroes were graduated from the times made recommendations as to their
Quartermaster OCS during the first six use, but the decision as to their utilization
months of 1942. The situation changed rested with the General Staff". The War
radically in the second half of the year Department delegated authority to The
when approximately 300 were enrolled Quartermaster General early in 1944 to
and most of them received commissions.^'' '*"'
Computed by author from Monthly Rpt, AGO
When the OCS program was cut back to WDGS, Strength of the Army, Jan 45, pp. 16,
1
in the QMCwere being met, quotas for 43, sub: Reduction in Available Off Candidate Ma-
Negroes were reduced along with those for terial.
204 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
assign Negro officers to any units or instal- in the zone of interior that were partially
lations under his control that were com- or entirely staffed by Negro oflficers had in-
prised of Negro enlisted personnel. In creased to 25 percent and by July 1945 to
effect, however, this gave him control over nearly 40 percent.^"
the assignment of only ten officers, all of By the fall of 1942 the Quartermaster
whom were attached to the training units OCS was commissioning Negroes faster
at the Camp Lee QMRTC.^' than they were being assigned by the War
The need for Negro officers in Negro Department. This situation arose because
units exceeded the number available for no provision had been made in the existing
the positions allocated in the Troop Basis Troop Basis for absorbing all of them with-
by such a wide margin that few were ever out replacing white oflficers in well-estab-
assigned to jobs other than those in units lished units and disrupting the training
and the training centers/'' During the program. Consequently The Quartermas-
early part of the war Negro officers in the ter General requested and obtained per-
QMC were assigned only to truck units mission to assign a 25 percent overstrength
and service companies. Later the War De- in lieutenants to units in which Negro of-
partment, on the recommendation of the ficers were then assigned. Under this
OQMG, altered its policy to permit as- policy he was allowed to assign an addi-
signment to some other types of units, in- tional lieutenant to a company even
cluding car and railhead companies and though the unit previously had been
gas supply battalions, but most of the authorized only two Negro oflficers. By
Quartermaster Negro officers continued to October 1942 the QMC
had sixty-nine
be concentrated in truck and service out- truck companies with four Negro lieuten-
fits. ants and one white captain each, and forty
Throughout the emergency period and service companies with three Negro lieu-
during the early months of the war before tenants and one white captain each.^'
the OCS began turning out Negro oflficers, The overstrength of officers in units had
the Negro units in the QMC had only a number of advantages. One was that
white officers. Although the policy was to Negro oflficers could be sent to units in-
replace white officers as rapidly as quali-
fied Negro oflficers became available, the **'<
( ) Ltr,
1
TAG
to CG
SOS et al. 28 Apr 42, sub: ,
the end of November 1943 only 76 of the Nov 43, Nov 44, and Jul 45, sub: Colored Pers in
1 1
AAF and in staging areas, had Negro of- signment of Negro OfTs. (2) DF, ACofS G-1 for TAG,
29 Aug 42, same sub. (3) Memo, Col Whitehead,
and many of these had only one. A
ficers,
OQMG, for ACofS G-1, 15 Oct 42, same sub. All in
year later the percentage of Negro units 210.31.
THE PROCUREMENT OF QUARTERMASTER OFFICERS 205
stead of to the officer pool and thus gain date. Moreover, the War Department
valuable on-the-job training and experi- ordered that vacancies in units "be created
ence that would enable them eventually for Negro officers, as they become capable
to relieve white officers and possibly take of duties and responsibilities of higher
over the command. Another advantage grades, by the transfer of white officers to
was that the officer overstrength tended to other units and installations." ^'
overcome the ineffectiveness of Negro Inasmuch as Negro units usually had a
units, which usually were comprised pre- preponderance of low-grade personnel,
dominantly of Grades IV and V enlisted officers with strong qualities of leadership
men and often had weak noncommissioned were needed to train them and maintain
officers. Moreover, the overstrength fre- discipline. Lt. Gen. Joseph T McNarney,
quently prevented units from falling below Deputy Chief of Staff, declared in August
authorized strength through officer attri- 1942 that an investigation into incidents
tion, which was particularly heavy among involving alleged undisciplined conduct
Negro units. on the part of Negro units had revealed
Although adequate provisions were that they were invariably the outgrowth of
made in the Troop Basis in 1943 and there- the tendency to assign officers of mediocre
after for the increasing number of Negro caliber to such units. He pointed out that
officers, the policy of assigning over- Negro troops expected strong, capable
strength in officers not only was continued leadership and were "quick to sense its ab-
but was broadened to permit the assign- sence." Accordingly he ordered corrective
ment of additional lieutenants to units measures taken to insure the assignment to
without any Negro officers, to units not yet Negro units of "officers of especially high
activated, and to overhead positions. Dur- qualities, particularly judgment and com-
ing 1943 the officers assigned to units as mon sense, tact, initiative and leader-
overstrength sometimes accompanied their ship."^'^
units overseas, but more often were re- Difficulty was encountered in carrying
moved before the units left the country out this order because officers with the de-
and sent to other units. This removal be- sired qualities were not always available.
came mandatory in January 1944 when As late as February 1944 the Command-
the assignment of an overstrength in offi- ing General, ASF, announced that viola-
cers to overseas units was forbidden.
'-
tions of this order were coming to his
Under the general revision of policy at attention and directed each commander
that time the War Department lifted some to make a survey to determine whether the
of the former restrictions on the assignment officers inNegro units under his command
of Negro officers and made the system were fully qualified. Those who were found
more flexible. Commanders were author- to be unqualified were to be replaced by
ized to waive age-in-grade restrictions to qualified officers "with the least practica-
permit the assignment of qualified over-
age Negro officers to troop units, and new «= Ltr, TAG toCG ASF et al., 7 Jan 44, sub: Policy
unitswere given high priority in the assign- on Promotion and Assignment of Negro Off Pers, AG
ment of officers in order to get the best 210.31 (3 Jan 44) OS-A-M.
" Ibid.
ones available and thus lessen the need for ""Ltr, DCofS to CG
SOS, 10 Aug 42, sub: Profes-
replacement of white officers at a later sional Qualities of Offs Assigned to Negro Units.
206 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
ble delay." This directive was followed a
^^ Pearl Harbor and V-J Day was approxi-
month by an order that no white of-
later mately 850. About 650 of these were
ficer with an efficiency rating lower than graduated. Thus the proportion of Negro
excellent could be assigned to a Negro candidates who failed to receive their com-
unit. Such a rating did not necessarily missions was less than 24 percent as com-
mean that an officer possessed the proper pared with failures of more than 18
leadership qualities. Consequently Head- percent of the combined total enrollment
quarters, ASF, finally issued instructions of the OCS
during the war.^^ Much if not
on 1 November 1944 that the demon- all can be accounted for
of this difference
strated leadership ability of an officer by the fact that most of the Negro candi-
rather than his efficiency rating would be dates were graduated after the standards
the requisite for assignment to Negro units of the school had been raised and the pro-
undergoing training in the technical serv- portion of those who failed was much
ices.Other factors to be taken into consid- greater than it had been during the early
eration in making these appointments months of the OCS when virtually all of
were "mature judgment and common the officer candidates were white.
sense, even disposition and patience, The Negro officer strength in the QMC
demonstrated ability under pressure and increased more rapidly during the last
ability to handle emergency situations, year of the war than in any other twelve-
and ability to organize and foster athletic month period, despite the fact that the
total number of Negro personnel was then
'*^
and recreational programs."
This new policy of selecting officers for declining and many officers were being
Negro units on the basis of their demon- separated from the service. As late as 31
strated leadership ability was extended by August 1943 there were only 625 Negro
the ASF to Negro noncommissioned offi- Quartermaster officers. By 30 June 1945,
cers insofar as it was possible to do so. The after the war had ended in Europe, the
objective was to improve the effectiveness number was still only 749. Yet by 31 Au-
of Negro units by strengthening the qual- gust 1945 the number had jumped to 900,
ity of their noncommissioned officers. of whom nearly 700 were overseas. Thus
Earlier in 1944 a troop leadership train- most of the increase took place in the thea-
ing course had been established at the ters during the redeployment period when
Camp Lee QMRTC for the purpose of there were extensive transfers of both of-
training potential noncommissioned offi-
^^ Ltr, Hq ASF to Chiefs of Tech Svs, 1 Feb 44, on
cers, both Negro and white, selected from sub cited n. 94.
among the outstanding trainees who had «''(!) Ltr, Hq ASF to TQMG et al. , 1 Nov 44, sub:
completed their basic training. The short- Assignment of White Offs to Colored Units Under-
going Tng. (2) Ltr, Hq ASF to et al., Apr TQMG 1
age of noncommissioned officers was par- 44, sub: Qualifications of Offs Assigned to Negro
ticularly acute among the Negroes because Units.
ficers and enlisted men among the various in the early stages of mobilization to base
arms and services.
^^
requirements on World War I experience
and from the slow awakening to the fact
Summary that the QMC would play a more impor-
tant role in a modern war conducted on a
The QMC was at a serious disadvantage global scale than it ever had in the past. It
in theprocurement of officers at the be- became apparent fairly early that the in-
ginning of mobihzation for World War II creased complexity of warfare had made it
because of the early restrictions that the necessary for the Corps to have many
War Department had placed upon its more officers with a much wider variety of
sources of commissioned personnel. In technical skills than had been previously
contrast to thearms and most of the other anticipated, but it was 1943 before it was
services, the Corps was not permitted to fully realized that the Quartermaster offi-
conduct Quartermaster ROTC classes to cer would have to be a combat leader as
develop officer material, nor to participate well as a technical specialist.
directly in the distribution of the graduates The extended duration of the emer-
of the U.S. Military Academy. Thus thegency was a vital period of adjustment for
additional officers required by the QMC the Corps during which The Quartermas-
to meet its expanding needs at first could ter General by determined efforts gradu-
be obtained only by calling Reserve offi- ally won approval of his program for
cers to extended active duty, by requesting widening the scope of officer procurement.
the transfer of officers from other branches The most important development, of
of the Army, or by commissioning civil- course, was the establishment late in 1941
ians. The difficulty was that many of the of the Officer Candidate School, which
Reserve officers were either unqualified or eventually furnished the great bulk of the
not immediately available for duty; that nearly 30,000 additional officers procured
officers acquired from other branches were by the Corps during the war.
generally unfamiliar with Quartermaster The need for competent Quartermaster
operations, and moreover the commanders officers was particularly urgent because an
of those branches frequently protested the unusually large percentage of the enlisted
transfers on the ground that they needed men in the QMC were rated in the lower
the officers themselves; and that officers grades on the Army General Classification
commissioned directly from civilian life Test. Upon the ability of its officers to
usually were completely lacking in mili- train and lead these men effectively in the
tary training and experience. performance of their duties rested the suc-
The restrictions on procurement of com- cess of the Corps in carrying out its mission.
missioned personnel in the Corps resulted, ^^ Monthly Rpts. AGO to WDGS, Strength of the
undoubtedly, from the general tendency Army, 31 Aug 43, 30Jun 45, and 31 Aug 45.
CHAPTER VII
trained as truck drivers, mechanics, and courses for officef candidates, commis-
for other jobs in the automotive field. Mo- sioned officers, and noncommissioned offi-
torization also created the need for new cers at the Quartermaster School.
types of Quartermaster units, such as gaso- In order to standardize Quartermaster
Hne supply companies, drum repair units, training and to make it conform with ex-
and petroleum laboratories. Moreover, the isting War Department and Quartermas-
widespread use of mobile units and mech- ter training doctrine, the Military Train-
anized equipment greatly increased the ing Division and its predecessors prepared
need for maintenance, repair, and sal- nineteen separate Quartermaster mobili-
vage personnel. zation training programs between July
The magnitude of the training task is 1940 and September 1945. These pro-
exemplified by the fact that most of the grams served as general guides for all
500,000 men needed by the Corps to carry Quartermaster enlisted replacement and
on its numerous functions had been civil- unit training. The many revisions that
ians before the war and had had no pre- were made reflected the continuous de-
vious military experience. A large propor- velopment in fundamental doctrine and
tion of them had followed entirely different were necessary to meet the changing
types of work in civilian life, or had had no training requirements in the transition
occupation at all. They had to be trained from peacetime and early mobilization
quickly and efficiently to do the specific training to realistic preparation of troops
jobs assigned to them. The training was for overseas operations and for redeploy-
not only difficult and highly diversified ment from the European to the Pacific
but, for the most part, it was also prosaic theater in the final phase of the war.^
and utilitarian. The emphasis upon speed and effective-
While the general policies for training ness in training made it necessary to re-
in the various arms and services were for- vamp completely the method of instruct-
mulated at higher echelons, the responsi- ing trainees. The lecture system was virtu-
bility for implementing these policies with- ally discarded, textbooks and training
in the QMC and preparing the detailed manuals were revised, and the most
Quartermaster training doctrine rested modern teaching techniques were adopted
with the Office of The Quartermaster in order to produce the greatest number of
General. During the course of the war the trained Quartermaster personnel in the
Quartermaster administrative agencies shortest possible time. The new method
had staff supervision and responsibility for employed the widespread use of training
organizing and operating two replacement films, film strips,- and numerous other
training centers, three unit training cen- visual aids such as miniature models, tran-
ters, six war dog training centers, courses
in twenty-two civilian trade and factory '
For a detailed study of the genesis, content, use,
and significance of the Quartermaster mobilization
schools, special training programs in three
training programs, see Rogers W. Young, Mobiliza-
civilian educational institutions, training tion Training Plans and Programs for the Quarter-
programs for nine Quartermaster ROTC master Soldier, 933- 1945 (QMC hist monograph,
1
units in colleges and universities, and nu- 1946). (Hereafter cited as Young, Mobil Tng Plans
and Programs.)
merous other special schools and courses. -'
A film strip is a series of still photographs or other
were in addition to the regular
All of these reproductions.
210 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
TRAINEES REPAIRING SHOES at the post shoe repair shop, Camp Lee, Va.,
June 1941.
scribed records, charts, graphs, dramatiza- duction of 184 motion pictures and film
demonstra-
tions, as well as practical field stripsunder the direction of the OQMG.^
tions, as a means of reducing the gap The new training techniques were not
between theoretical classroom instruction perfected overnight. Most of them were
and actual field conditions. It stressed developed and improved as the war pro-
learning by doing. The men were in- gressed. Many problems had to be solved.
structed in basic principles, shown the cor- For one thing, there was at first a serious
rect way of doing their jobs, and then shortage of competent instructors and it
given an early opportunity to perform the took time to train an adequate number.
tasks themselves. In this way their mis- For another, modern equipment was ex-
takes could be pointed out, and they could tremely scarce during the early part of the
gradually acquire the necessary skill war, and the training camps had to wait
through practice. Their instruction was until the nation's production lines could
standardized and expedited through the provide a reserve that could be used for
preparation of more than 260 manuals, training purposes.
bulletins, regulations, pamphlets, and '
Rpt, Mil Tng Div to TQMG. Sep 45. sub:
1 1
other training publications, and the pro- Outstanding Accomplishments in World War II.
THE TRAINING OF ENLISTED REPLACEMENTS 211
June 1941.
The
training mission of the Corps was technical schools where each man was in-
to prepare its officers, enhsted personnel, structed in one of the particular skills re-
and units to carry out their assigned duties quired by the Corps. Inasmuch as the ma-
in such a manner as to increase the com- jority of the men were classified as mili-
bat efficiency of the Army as a whole/ tary specialists in fields related to trades
The first step in the training process was they had followed in civilian life, their
to transform raw recruits into soldiers in technical instruction could be restricted
the shortest possible time by means of a primarily to training in Army methods of
course in basic military training similar to handling their jobs. On the other hand,
that given other enlisted men in the Army. those assigned to specialized training in
This training was designed to make them fields in which they had had no previous
physically fit, indoctrinate them in Army training required more elementary in-
procedure, impress upon them the value struction. Since these men could learn
of teamwork, and teach them how to take only the fundamentals of their specialties
care of themselves in the field. Upon com- in the allotted training time, it was usually
pletion of their basic military training.
Quartermaster soldiers were assigned to ^ FM 10-5, p. 10, 29 Apr 43, sub: Opns.
212 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
necessary to assign them as helpers and let cruits were processed through the replace-
them gradually acquire skill through on- ment training centers, thousands of them
the-job training. were not. Enlisted volunteers and selectees
The normal procedure during World who came into the Corps before the estab-
War II was to give Quartermaster recruits lishment of the QMRTC's in March 1941
their basic militaryand technical training were trained in units. Recruits assigned to
at one of the two QMRTC's. These cen- the Corps during the remainder of 1941
ters operated as the intermediate stage in were usually sent to the QMRTC's, but
the personnel processing plan. They ob- beginning early in 1942 the Corps ex-
tained the recruits directly from the recep- panded so rapidly that the centers were
tion centers, where the men had been clas- unable to accommodate all of the men as
sified and had received their clothing, and fast as they were inducted. So many new
then turned them out as individual spe- units were being organized that it was fre-
cialists. The bulk of these men were then quently necessary to bypass the QMRTC's
assigned as filler or loss replacements to entirely by sending filler replacements to
units where they received additional units directly from reception centers. In
training.^ Some were assigned to installa- the fall of 1942 a definite policy was estab-
tions or were selected to continue their lished whereby these untrained fillers were
technical training at one of the advanced sent only to units with a low priority rat-
schools operated by the Corps. Those who ing." This policy was abandoned early in
qualified as officer candidates were gen- 1944 with the adoption of the preactiva-
erally sent to the Quartermaster Officer tion plan, which provided that all recruits
Candidate School as soon as they had would be given individual training before
completed their basic military training at being assigned to units. This plan relieved
the QMRTC. After being commissioned, all units of the burden, which many of the
they were either sent to an advanced earlier ones faced, of having to convert
school or depot for specialized officer themselves into schools for the purpose of
training or assigned directly to a unit. giving elementary instruction to their en-
The system of training recruits as en- listed personnel.
listed replacements was analogous to the The Quartermaster General had full
mass-production, interchangeable-parts responsibility for preparing the training
technique widely employed in industry in doctrine for all Quartermaster units, just
that the men were trained as individual as he did for enlisted men and oflficers in
specialists in accordance with the varied the Corps, yet he had direct control and
requirements and then assembled else- training supervision over only a small pro-
where into units to perform their specific portion of those units. Quartermaster units
functions. This method of operation made
it possible to concentrate the best training The Army defines a replacement as an individual
^
assigned to the AGF generally were acti- sion, and then three months later, effective
vated and trained by various army com- 2 January 1941, to the newly created Mili-
manders under the direction of the Com- tary Personnel and Training Division. The
manding General, AGF. Similarly, Quar- both training and Re-
responsibilities for
termaster units serving in the AAF were serve personnel were combined in one
trained under the direction of the Com- branch, but before the end of 1941 these
manding General, AAF. Even the ASF functions had increased to such an extent
units, except those activated at installa- that they were divided by the creation of
tions under the control of The Quarter- separate Reserve and Training Branches.^
master General, were trained by the com-
manders of the various corps areas or Conflict Over Training Responsibility
service commands. Yet no matter who had
trained the units, any adverse criticism of In order to obtain the technical data
them in the theaters of operations was and assistance required in carrying out the
likely to be directed at The Quartermaster training functions, it was necessary for the
General. Training Branch and its predecessors to
work in close collaboration with the vari-
The Development of Administrative ous operating divisions and branches in
Controls the OQMG. These divisions and branches,
however, were not content to confine their
Responsibility for the supervision and activities solely to co-operating with the
co-ordination of all Quartermaster mili- Military Personnel and Training Division,
tary training during the first year of the but attempted openly in 1941 to retain
emergency was vested in the War Plans partial, if not full, control over Quarter-
and Training Branch of the Administrative master training pertinent to their opera-
Division. The training functions of this tions.
branch, however, were subordinate to its This situation resulted in much confu-
planning activities, as the number of in- sion, created diflficulties, and seriously
stallations under the control of The Quar- handicapped training activities within the
termaster General at which training was Corps. Moreover, it caused embarrass-
being conducted was quite limited. They ment to the War Department because the
were the Quartermaster School then lo- various divisions and branches continued
cated in Philadelphia, the Motor Trans- to maintain personal contact with, and to
port School in Baltimore, and nine bakers' send their training plans and requests di-
and cooks' schools, one in each of the nine rectly to. The Adjutant General or some
corps areas. division of the General Staff. The Quar-
Following the adoption of the Selective termaster General found it necessary in
Service System and the calling of the Na- October 1941 to issue a memorandum to
tional Guard into active service, the first all OQMG divisions, re-emphasizing that
of a series of administrative reorganiza- the Military Personnel and Training Divi-
tions required meet the expanding
to sionwas charged with supervision and co-
needs of the QMCoccurred early in Oc- ordination of all training in the Corps for
tober 1940. Training functions were trans- (l)OQMG00 99, 10 Oct 40,no sub. (2) OQMG
ferred at that time to the Personnel Divi- OO 144, 27 Dec 40, sub: Office Orgn.
214 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
which he was responsible to higher au- OQMG
to cope with them led the Com-
thority. He pointed out that it was the manding General, SOS, in the summer of
function of this division to maintain liaison 1942 to order The Quartermaster General
with the War Department General Staff to organize a training division to replace
as well as with the other arms and services, the Training Branch. He directed that the
to initiate plans and obtain approval for new division be established along lines
activation or augmentation of training es- similar to those of the Training Division,
tablishments, to provide necessary equip- SOS, in order "to emphasize training to
ment, to co-ordinate the training programs the proper degree and to make possible a
with the available facilities, and to deter- more efficient cooperation in training mat-
mine quotas and allotments of students ters" between the two divisions.'"
and other personnel based on planning The Military Training Division took
charts or records approved by G-3.^ over training activities in the Corps on 4
Even with this reaffirmation of policy September 1942 and continued in exist-
and persistent efforts as late as 1943 to en- ence until after the war ended. Its mission
force it, the Military Personnel and Train- was "to establish policies, prepare plans,
ing Division (later the Military Training and to supervise and coordinate training
Division) was not wholly successful in ob- in reception centers, replacement training
taining full control in the OQMG over all centers, schools and units assigned to the
segments of Quartermaster training. Dur- Quartermaster Corps."" Although in-
ing the course of the war the Subsistence ternal readjustments were necessary from
Branch (later Division), exercised a large time to time in the number and the duties
measure of control over the training of of its various branches, the division's re-
bakers and cooks and bakery units, as did sponsibilities were not altered.
the Remount Branch over the training of
dog handlers. In both of these instances, Relationships With Other Echelons
however, the division co-ordinated and
scheduled the training within the operat- Fundamental policies for training in all
ing branches, prepared the training man- of the arms and services were formulated
uals in collaboration with them, and dealt by the G-3 Division, War Department
with higher echelons. In contrast to this General Staff. The Training Branch and
situation the Motor Transport Division its predecessors in the OQMG
dealt di-
engaged in a bitter fight to prevent the rectly with G-3 in carrying out these
Military Personnel and Training Division « Memo, TQMG for All OQMG Divs, 14 Oct 41,
policies within the Corps throughout the over both the Camp Lee and Fort Warren
emergency period and the first three centers until August 1942. At that time the
months of the war. After the reorganization War Department redesignated the corps
of the War Department on 9 March 1942, areas as service commands and assigned
The Quartermaster General and the them the administrative duties ^t the cen-
chiefs of the other supply services became ters. Under this change in regulations, the
subordinates of the Commanding General, Commanding General, SOS, was made
SOS. Within this new framework, the responsible for training at the centers, but
Training Branch in the OQMG —
and inasmuch as he delegated this authority to
later on the Military Training Division The Quartermaster General, the latter's
was under the direct control of the Train- control over the training was not affected.
ing Division in the SOS headquarters, The same relationship was established and
which in turn was responsible to G-3. This maintained in regard to Quartermaster
same relationship existed when SOS be- schools located in areas controlled by the
came the ASF in March 1943. service commands, as well as in reference
At the beginning of the emergency pe- to Quartermaster unit training centers
riod, corps area commanders were fully when they were organized in 1943 and
responsible for training of individuals
all 1944.^^
and units command except at
under their The administrative supervision at the
installations specifically exempted by the Camp Lee QMRTC was again vested in
War Department. In the case of the QMC, The Quartermaster General early in May
the exemptions were the Quartermaster 1943, and he continued to exercise com-
School and the Motor Transport School, plete control over operations until after
its
over which The Quartermaster General V-J Day, even though the installation was
had complete control, and the nine bakers' redesignated as an ASF training center in
and cooks' schools, for which he was re- April 1944. On the other hand, the Fort
sponsible only for furnishing the personnel Warren center — which was inactivated as
and conducting the training, while each a QMRTC in the fall of 1943, designated
corps area commander exercised the ad- a Quartermaster unit training center in
ministrative supervision over the school September 1943, and redesignated an ASF
under his command. The Quartermaster training center in April 1944 continued —
General supplied the doctrine for other under the administrative control of the
Quartermaster training in the corps area, Seventh Service Command from August
but he had no further authority, not even 1942 through V-J Day. Throughout that
to conduct inspections.
'-
period The Quartermaster General was
When the QMRTC's were established responsible for the conduct and supervi-
early in 1941, they were placed under the sion of training, the promulgation of train-
administrative control of the corps areas
in which they were located, but The Quar-
•-(1) AR 170-10, 10 Oct 39, sub: CAs and
termaster General was given the responsi- Depts— Adm. (2) AR 350-105, 17 Dec 40, sub: Mil
bility for conducting all training. Shortly Education.
(1) Ltr of Instruction No. 1, Dir of Mil Pers and
'
after Pearl
TngDiv, OQMG,
to CGs Camp Lee and Ft. Warren
function was shifted to The Quartermaster QMRTCs, 13Jan41,sub: RTCs. (2) 170-10, 10 AR
General, and he retained complete control Aug 42, sub: SvCs and Depts — Adm.
216 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
ing doctrine, and the scheduling of pro- spections of Quartermaster training under
grams at Fort Warren/* his control. This period of confusion lasted
As in the case of commanding officers of throughout the first five months of 1943.
all arms and services, the authority of The Finally, early in June, the situation was
Quartermaster General to conduct inspec- clarified when Headquarters, ASF (for-
tions of training was limited until the mid- merly SOS), issued orders that inspections
dle of 1942 to the schools, training centers, of training of ASF units conducted under
and field installations under his direct con- the control of the service commands were
trol, when temporary responsibility
except to be made by The Quartermaster Gen-
was delegated to him by higher authority. eral and the chiefs of the other technical
Although he provided the doctrine for services only upon the direction or with
other Quartermaster training, the deter- the permission of the Commanding Gen-
mination of how that training was being eral, ASF, or upon the request of the serv-
conducted rested solely with the corps ice commanders. Such inspections were to
area commanders. During the latter half cover only technical training. Inspections
of 1942 The Quartermaster General was of ASF units were carried out on this basis
given more latitude in the matter of in- until 1 December 1944, at which time
spections. The changes in Army Regula- Headquarters, ASF, transferred the full
tions early in August of that year made the responsibility for inspections to the service
servicecommands the field agencies of the commands. From then until the end of the
Commanding General, SOS, and inas- war, inspections of Quartermaster training
much as the latter retained control over all in ASF units in the service commands
training activities he could delegate such were made by The Quartermaster Gen-
authority as he desired. On this basis he eral only upon the request of the service
extended The Quartermaster General's commanders and they were restricted to
responsibilities to include inspection of technical training. ^"^
Quartermaster technical training con- The Quartermaster General had virtu-
ducted under the control of the service allyno authority over the training of
commands and the AGE whenever these Quartermaster units in the AGE and the
commands considered such inspection AAF, other than to supply the doctrine.
necessary.'^
Late in December 1942, however, the 'Ml) AR 170-10, Change 5, 12 May 43, sub: SvCs
War Department shifted the responsibility and Depts — Adm. Cir 28, 12 May 43, sub:
(2) ASF
Designation of Tng Activities and Regulations Under
for making inspections to the service com-
Provisions of AR
170-10.
mands. This action cast considerable '^ For a detailed account of how The Quartermas-
doubt upon the authority of The Quarter- ter General's inspection authority changed during the
war years, see Rogers W. Young, Inspection of Military
master General to conduct any training
Training by The Quartermaster General, Historical QMC
inspection other than at the installations Studies, 15 (Washington, 1946), pp. 1-4, 38-40, 47-
under his direct control. Nevertheless, act- 4 9, 7 1-99. (Hereafter cited as Young, Inspection of
Military Training.)
ing under instructions from the Command- '«
( 1 ) AR 1 70- 1 0, par. 4, 24 Dec 42, sub: SvCs and
ing General, SOS, he continued to make Depts — Adm. (2) Young, Inspection of Military Train-
inspections of technical Quartermaster ing, pp. 47-49, 71-99. (3) ASF Cir 37, 4 Jun 43, sub:
Designation of Tng Activities and Installations Under
training carried on in SOS units by the
Provisions of AR
170-10. (4) ASF Cir 393, Sec. H,
service commands, as well as complete in- 1 Dec 44, sub: Tng Insp.
THE TRAINING OF ENLISTED REPLACEMENTS 217
The which most of these sion to make such inspections and were in-
installations at
units were trained were exempted from clined to consider them as intrusions into
the control of the service commands, and their responsibilities. Consequently only a
consequently neither the service com- few of these inspection trips actually ma-
manders nor the ASF headquarters could terialized and none were made after the
authorize The Quartermaster General to middle of 1944.^^
carry on inspections at them. Although
The Inspector General, beginning in the Quartermaster Replacement
upon The Quarter-
spring of 1943, called Training Centers
master General from time to time for as-
sistance in inspecting the steadily increas- The general procedure followed in
ing number of units being prepared for World War II of giving recruits their basic
movement overseas, it was late in Septem- military and technical training at replace-
ber of that year before any specific provi- ment centers rather than in units was not
sion was made for The Quartermaster entirely new. While all infantrymen and
General to inspect Quartermaster units in most of the other enlisted men in 1917-18
the AAF and the AGF. At that time the were trained in units, the QMC
and some
War Department authorized the chiefs of of the other arms and services operated
all the technical services to visit troops and schools where the men were frequently
installations of the AGF, AAF, service given special training before being as-
commands, and defense commands within signed to units.
the United States "in order that the Chief In the case of the QMC, this special
of Staff may obtain up-to-date information training during World War I took place at
concerning the technical training of per- what came to be known as the Quarter-
sonnel and the suitability of weapons and master University at Camp Joseph E.
equipment to meet the needs of the using Johnston, Jacksonville, Fla. Although used
arms and services." ^^ These visits were to for this purpose and to some extent also as
be made only by arrangement with the a center for training units, Camp Johnston
commanding general of the major com- was primarily a mobilization center. Dis-
mand concerned, and the inspection was tinct areas were set aside for the different
to be confined to technical matters. functions. Moreover, since the men there
The Military Training Division, were sometimes organized into special
OQMG, anticipated that these visits would companies to receive training as enlisted
prove valuable "in developing material replacements. Camp Johnston bore some
for changes in training doctrine, and in parental resemblance to the replacement
making detailed observations on the use training centers of World War II, though
and operation of Quartermaster clothing it differed in organization, method of op-
and equipment." But none of these in-
'*
notable results. Both the AGF and the khuysen, Pers Div,OQMG, 25 Sep 43, sub: Tech Tng
Teams.
AAF displayed a marked reluctance to '" For
a more detailed account, see Young, Inspection
give The Quartermaster General permis- ofMilitan Training, pp. 90-92, 1 17-120.
218 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
and purpose. Often the term re-
eration, plea that the plans be modified and that
placement center was even used in refer- he be permitted to centralize all Quarter-
ring to that part of the installation devoted master training in one center, which, he
to this special training, but officially pointed out, would result in a material re-
it was
called a replacement depot and was uti- duction in overhead. He proposed Belton,
lized principally for holding rather than Mo., near Kansas City, as the site because
training replacements. -° it was "very close to the geographical cen-
One of the shortcomings of the World ter of the country," and suggested that the
War I plan of training men in units was Administration and Supply School at
that no adequate provision was made for Philadelphia, the Motor Transport School
enlisted replacements. By the summer of at Baltimore, and the Subsistence School
1918 it had become necessary to skeleton- at Chicago be moved there so that all of
ize seven divisions in order to obtain the these training activities, as well as unit
necessary replacements for the ones training, could be consolidated at a loca-
already in the line. Shortly before the end tion where there would be plenty of room
of the war General John J. Pershing de- for expansion. He argued that because of
clared in a cable to the War Department the "specialized and diversified nature of
that to "send over entire divisions, which Quartermaster instruction, one Replace-
must be broken up on their arrival in ment Training Center simplified the prob-
France so that we may obtain replace- lem of coordinated training of the many
ments that have not been sent as called for, different types of Quartermaster units,"
isa wasteful method. ." -Mn mobiliza-
. . and added that "officer candidate and en-
tion planning after World War I, special replacement training can be utilized
listed
efforts were made to provide a sound re- to the best advantage in conjunction with
placement system for any future emer- unit training." -^ The General Staff, how-
gency. ever rejected his recommendation on the
Replacement centers, as they were orig- grounds of the additional cost involved in
inally called, became an accepted part of the purchase of the land and the possible
training plans early in 1924, but the ques- loss of time in construction and in train-
tion of how many Quartermaster centers ing.-''
there should be and where they should be Construction of the twenty-one Army
located remained unsettled until late in replacement training centers was author-
1940. At that time it was finally decided to ized following the enactment of the Selec-
concentrate Quartermaster training at '-"
Joseph J. Mathews, The Development of the Qiiar-
two "replacement and training centers," termaster Replacement Training Centers. QMC Historical
one at Camp Lee, Va., and the other at Studies, 3 (Washington, 1943), pp. 4-5. (Hereafter
Fort Francis E. Warren, Wyo. During 1941 cited asMathews, Development of Q_MRTCs )
'-'
Final Report of Gen. John J Pershing, Commander in
.
and Fort Warren, he made a last-minute 20 Nov 40, .sub: Repl and Tng Centers for the QMC.
THE TRAINING OF ENLISTED REPLACEMENTS 219
tive Service Act in September 1940. The near Cheyenne, Wyo. The fort, originally
Quartermaster centers at Camp Lee and named in honor of a Civil War hero,
Fort Warren were placed in operation David A. Russell, was established in 1867
about the middle of March 1941 even to protect workers on the first transconti-
though work on the installations was still nental railroad, the Union Pacific, and
in progress. Cadremen as well as military had been in continuous existence there-
and civilian instructors were sent to the after as an Army post. It was renamed in
centers a month earlier to receive instruc- honor of Senator Francis E. Warren in
tions and to prepare for the arrival of the 1929. The Fort Warren QMRTC
was
men from the reception centers. Selectees smaller than the one at Camp Lee, having
inducted before the opening of Camp Lee an initially authorized capacity of 7,000.
and Fort Warren were trained in units, but It was greatly enlarged, however, by addi-
instructions were issued that their training tional construction in the latter half of
was to follow the methods and doctrine 1941 and again in 1942. Moreover, the
prepared for use in the QMRTC's. center absorbed facilities at the Old Post
Camp Lee was situated near Peters- early in 1942 when they were vacated by
burg, Va., on a site that had been utilized Artillery units that had used the fort as a
in World War I for one of the sixteen Army training center until after the attack on
cantonments, but all of the old buildings Pearl Harbor. Then in March 1942, when
had been dismantled. When the installa- a branch of the OCS was established at
tion was reconstructed in World War II, it Fort Warren to take care of the overflow at
was planned that it would serve not only Camp Lee, still further housing was pro-
as a QMRTC but also as a replacement vided by the conversion of stables and gun-
center for the Medical Department and as sheds into barracks and mess halls to ac-
one of twenty-nine Army reception cen- commodate enlisted trainees who were
ters. Later on, near the end of 1941, the moved to make room for the incoming of-
Quartermaster School and the Officer ficer candidates. As a result of these vari-
Candidate School were moved there from ous measures to increase housing, the en-
Philadelphia. The portion of Camp Lee listed strength of the center rose to a peak
reserved at first for the QMRTC had a ca- of about 20,000 by the end of 1942, but it
pacity of only 12,000 men. In the spring of declined from then until the Fort Warren
1942, however, the Medical Replacement QMRTC was inactivated.'*'
Training Center was transferred to Camp Provisions were made early in 1941
Pickett, and the absorption of the vacated that, with few exceptions. Camp Lee would
facilities, together with additional con-
struction and the utilization of tents, in- -' For
a more detailed account of the background,
creased the capacity of the Camp Lee construction, and expansion of Camp Lee, see two re-
ports by Lt. Arthur M. Freedman, Bacl<ground and
QMRTC to 29,000 before the end of Construction, Camp Lee, ^ a. (Camp Lee hist rpt, Apr
1942. The number of trainees stationed 44), and Expansion of the Center, Camp Lee, ^"a.
there reached a peak of about 25,000 in (Camp Lee hist rpt. May 44), both in Hist Br,
OQMG.
October of that year and remained near -'^
For a more detailed discussion of the background,
that level until July 1943.'^ construction, and expansion of Fort Warren, see two
The other QMRTC was located on the reports by Lt. Arthur M. Freedman. The "Old Fort"
(Ft. Warren hist rpt, Jun 43) and Construction of the
large reservation attached to Fort Warren, Replacement Training Center (Ft. Warren hist rpt
commonly referred to as the Old Post, Jun 43), both in Hist Br, OQMG.
220 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
train personnel for all Quartermaster separate directors. Camp Lee had separate
units to be activated and assigned to the directors for basic military and supply
First, Second, Third, and Fourth Corps training, but combined all motor training
Areas. Most of the installations where the under one director. The training directors
units were being trained were located in at each center supervised and co-ordi-
these areas, which included the South- nated the various schools that each estab-
eastern, Middle Atlantic, and New Eng- lished for technical training. They also
land States. Enlisted replacements for supervised the operations of the training
Quartermaster units in the other corps regiments, whose headquarters, in turn,
areas were to be supplied by Fort Warren."^ were charged with organizing, supplying,
and directing the basic military and tech-
-'^
throughout most of the war, that recruits the situation varied at the two centers. At
at these installations were to be organized Camp Lee, where most of the Negroes in
into regiments for training purposes. The the Corps were trained, Negro and white
tables called for the establishment at each trainees generally attended the same tech-
center of a headquarters, to consist of the nical schools and were given their instruc-
commanding general and his staff depart- tion together. At Fort Warren, on the
ments, and the required number of regi- other hand, separate schools were estab-
ments, which were to be broken down into lished to give Negro trainees technical in-
sent to the Fort Warren QMRTC during 1943, the peak at Camp Lee was under
the first half of 1941, and the maximum six thousand Negroes and the two regi-
number in training there at any time dur- ments were adequate to accommodate
ing its existence was below twenty-four them.^'
hundred. Consequently, the center found Both the Camp Lee and Fort Warren
it necessary to organize only one Negro QMRTC's were confronted early in their
training regiment. Camp Lee in the begin- existence with problems common to most
ning also had only one Negro regiment, newly established emergency military
—
but it comprised more than two thousand training installations construction de-
trainees even during the first training lays, confused and embryonic administra-
cycle. By the summer of 1942 the number tive and training organizations, serious
of Negroes undergoing replacement train- shortages of training facilities and equip-
ing at Camp Lee had more than doubled ment, inadequate instructional staffs, and
and it became necessary to establish a sec-
" (1) Lt Arthur M. Freedman, Activation and Ex-
ond Negro regiment. Although the num- QMRTC (Ft. Warren hist rpt, Aug
pansion of the
ber of these trainees continued to increase 43), App. A, in Hist Br, OQMG. (2) Freedman, Ex-
throughout 1942 and the early part of pansion of the Center, Camp Lee, App. A.
222 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
an untried program of instruction. How- procedure was to group the men who were
ever, the lengthy duration of the emer- to be trained in similar fields into the same
gency period provided the opportunity to company or companies. ^-
solve most of these problems and to get the Shortages of facilities and instructors
QMRTC's out of the experimental stage during the early days made it impossible
before the outbreak of actual hostilities. to give recruits all of their basic military
The first training cycle or phase of re- training before they started their technical
placement training, which began in training. Instead, the balanced system was
March and continued through June 1941, used in which both types of training were
was unique in several important respects conducted concurrently and the time was
as compared with later training oper- divided, about equally between the two.
ations. One of these was that most of the Certain units were given their basic mili-
men trained during that thirteen-week tary instruction in the morning while
period were present when the cycle began, others were using the technical training
were given their training simultaneously, equipment. In the afternoon the schedule
and then were moved out in a wholesale was reversed, and the company that had
fashion when the cycle ended. This uni- been on the drill field in the morning spent
formity was impossible later on because the afternoon in the classrooms or in the
the recruits arrived at varying intervals shops. ^^
and began their training at different times. With the completion of the first training
The first cycle was different also in that cycle, replacement training was separated
its mission was to train a definite number completely from unit training, and the
of filler replacements for about a hundred QMRTC's assumed the role for which
Quartermaster units that were scheduled they were established. That is, instead of
to be activated at the end of the period. training men already organized in units,
Moreover, the men were assembled into they began to train individual specialists
units at the centers before they were to serve as fillers for units that were to be
moved out to other stations for activation assembled and trained at other posts,
of their units. Thus the first cycle approxi- camps, and stations. This meant that the
mated unit training, even though the centers were faced with the problem of
centers were concerned primarily with the training a sufficient number of replace-
training of individuals. Thereafter the ments of all types without knowing specifi-
Army expanded so rapidly and conditions cally how many of each type would be re-
changed so often and so quickly that the quired.
number of replacements for the many The only method available at that time
Quartermaster units being activated in all for determining future requirements in the
parts of the country could never be deter- various specialties was that based on the
mined accurately. occurrence rates per thousand men that
Inasmuch as Camp Lee and Fort War- had been established for distributing
ren had to train approximately a hundred selectees to the Corps from reception cen-
different types of Quartermaster special- ters. The problem was solved temporarily
ists, it was not practical for them to estab- by the expedient of training specialists of
lish separate technical schools for each
'-
Mathews, Development o/QMRTCs. p. 19.
specific type. Consequently, the original '•'
Ibid.
THE TRAINING OF ENLISTED REPLACEMENTS 223
the various types in the same proportion lished these schools, with separate Negro
as the number called for in the Quarter- and white was given
sections. Instruction
master units set up in the Troop Basis for in reading, writing, simple arithmetic, and
1942. As an aid in solving the problem, current events. The program called for
The Quartermaster General prepared a eight weeks of this special schooling. At the
table showing just how many specialists of end of that time most of the trainees had
each type there were in existing units. The acquired a sufficient understanding of
table, which also showed a percentage English to follow directions and perform
^*^
breakdown of whites and Negroes, af- their military duties.
forded a mathematical basis for computing The shift in training emphasis in the
replacement requirements. It was realized QMRTC's from units to individuals at the
that these rates would not be precise guides end of the first cycle did not result imme-
for determining the correct ratios to be fol- diately in any fundamental changes in or-
lowed in training specialists, but it was ob- ganization or procedure. The tendency,
vious also that, since the centers were however, was to make the training a little
confronted by a growing Army with un- more general since the specific assignment
known requirements, they would have to of the individual was less certain than it
^^
operate with elasticity. had been for the first increment of trainees.
The QMRTC's encountered other In general, the plan of conducting basic
problems in their efforts to balance the military and technical instruction concur-
training of replacements with the require- rently, with one half of each day devoted
ments for them. It was found, for example, to each type of training, was continued
that the tentative classification given the until after Pearl Harbor. However, it was
trainees at reception centers was frequently found impractical to train some specialists,
in error. Inasmuch as it was highly im- such as cooks or personnel for bakery units,
portant that the trainees be classified cor- in half-day periods. Special programs,
rectly so that training time could be con- therefore, were arranged for such special-
served by utilizing the existing skills of the ists, who were permitted to complete their
men to the fullest extent, it became the basic military training during the first half
first function of the QMRTC's to reclassify of their thirteen-week training period and
recruits. The classification task at first was then to devote the second half to their
^^
performed in the individual training regi- specialist training.
ments, but later on it was centralized in a More flexible organizational arrange-
each center.^'
single organization at ^^ TAG TQMG,
et al., 2Jun 41, sub:
(1) Ltr, to
Another problem arose from the dis- Tng of Second Increment of Selectees at RTCs, AG
covery that a large number of trainees 320.71 (5-28-41) MT-C. (2) M&xhe\N%, Dei elopment of
OMRTCs, pp. 25-26. (3) Freedman, General Aspects
were unable to grasp even the most simple of the Training Program, Camp Lee, pp. 18-19.
technical instruction, principally because '
training. Full-time schools for this purpose (1) MTP 10-2, 25 Jul 41, sub: MTP for
QMRTCs. (2) Freedman, General Aspects of the
were authorized in the summer of 1941. Training Program, Camp Lee, p. 23. (3) Mathews,
Both Camp Lee and Fort Warren estab- Development of QAi RTCs, pp. 26-27.
224 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
ments became possible at the centers be- Impact of the War Upon the
ginning in the fall of 1941 when the War Training Program
Department rescinded the original T/O
and delegated authority to the chief of The entrance of the United States into
each arm and service to prepare his own the war created many additional problems
T/O for the replacement training centers for the QMRTC's. The most critical one
in his command. Under the new system, concerned the question of how to meet the
the General Staff allotted officers and en- sharply increased requirements for re-
listed personnel to the QMRTC's for placements without materially lowering
training overhead on the basis of their training standards. One solution, as pro-
training capacities, and each center deter- posed by the War Department in a plan-
mined, subject to the approval of The ning project drawn up three months before
Quartermaster General, how they could Pearl Harbor, would have been to increase
be utilized to the best advantage.^* the number of replacement training cen-
The fact that the arrival of recruits from ters. This would have required additional
the reception centers was staggered com- administrative and instructor personnel
plicated the training problem and made it and would have resulted in delay until the
necessary to start new technical training new centers could be built. Consequently
classes at frequent intervals. Fort Warren when the crisis actually arose this proposal
adopted the procedure of starting a new was rejected on the grounds that it was es-
training period on the first of each month. sential to conserve overhead personnel and
Recruits who arrived before the middle of to keep new construction at an absolute
the month were given intensified training minimum.^" It was decided instead to
in an effort to have them complete the make more intensive use of the existing
course with those who had started on the centers and to reduce the length of the
first. Those arriving after the middle of the training period from thirteen to eight
month were held over and trained in basic weeks. Moreover, the QMRTC's were in-
military subjects while awaiting the start structed to eliminate any team training
of the next period. Camp Lee solved the that was being carried on and to concen-
problem by starting new classes at two- trate completely upon the training of in-
week intervals. The two centers also dif- dividuals. All courses were ordered cut to
fered in regard to organization for tech- the barest essentials.
nical training. Fort Warren continued the Under the eight-week training program,
policy of assigning recruits with similar the War Department specified that the
classifications to the same company or centers should devote full time during the
companies. Camp Lee, however, dropped first four weeks to basic military training,
that procedure in October 1941 and began and reserve the final four weeks for tech-
assigning recruits to training companies nical instruction. The purpose of this was
without regard to their occupational spe-
cialties. Thus the training company re-
mained the administrative unit for "* Ltr, TAG to TQMG. et al. 2 Sep 4
, 1 , sub: T/O
housing, feeding, and basic military train- for RTCs. AG 320.2 (8-20-41) PC-C.
''
Mathews, Development of (IM RTCs, pp. 27-28.
ing, but the members were assigned to ^" For a more detailed account of the planning proj-
technical training classes as individuals.'^'^ ect, see Mathews, Development of Q_M RTCs pp. 31-33.
,
THE TRAINING OF ENLISTED REPLACEMENTS 225
to make certain that the trainees would ics and other allied specialists for the re-
complete their basic military training as mainder of tlje year.*^
quickly as possible and be available, if The situation created by having training
necessary, for assignment to units. Thus periods of different lengths for supply and
they would possess the fundamental motor trainees caused serious administra-
knowledge to fill in at least as basics in any tive difficulties, particularly at Camp Lee.
unit in which they were needed. This
Under the existing system of classification
meant that technical training was rele- and assignment, men were being assigned to
gated to second priority for the time being. companies as they came, with no attention
Camp Lee was able to comply with the given to the types of specialists or period they
provision immediately, but a shortage of were to train.
Such a system provided maxi-
technical training facilities compelled Fort
mum utilization of barracks capacity, the
foremost criterion at the moment. But with
Warren to continue the split-day training men remaining in the same company until
system until May 1942.^' completion of training, groups would be
The eight-week training program was shipped from companies at various stages,
leaving vacancies. Capacity requirements
strictly an emergency measure, and in
could be fulfilled only by filling in a new
February 1942 the War Department di- stage of training or by squeezing companies
rected the centers at Camp Lee and Fort together. Both were bad from the standpoint
Warren to undertake a gradual return to of morale, efficiency, the supervision of train-
a thirteen- week schedule.^- The new pro- ing, and the maintenance of
records.*^
gram for trainingQuartermaster enlisted The shorter period for motor training
replacements varied considerably, how- did not remain in effect long, for in No-
ever, from the original thirteen-week pro- vember 1942 a return to the universal
gram. It provided for four weeks of basic thirteen-week training period was di-
military training followed by eight weeks rected. ^'^ In the meantime, Camp Lee had
of technical training and one week of basic solved many of its administrative problems
military procedure. Training under the by organizing trainees into separate mili-
new schedule began for some of the men tary and technical training companies.
as early as March 1942. By the middle of Under this system, all incoming recruits
July the new program was in full oper- were assigned to military training com-
ation at both installations for training all panies and remained with them through-
Quartermaster replacements except motor out the period of basic military training.
specialists, who by special authority re-
mained on the eight-week schedule be- ^'
(1) Freedman, General Aspects of the Training
cause personnel requirements in this field Program, Camp Lee, p. 25. (2) Freedman, General
Aspects of the Training Program, Ft. Warren, p. 9.
were greater than the QMRTC's could ^- Ltr, TAG to TQMG, et al., 28 Feb 42, sub: In-
supply even by housing many of the crease in Period of Tng at RTCs, AG 320.2 (2-3-42)
trainees in tents. Although third and EC-C-M.
fourth echelon maintenance functions had
'' litr, Gen Munnikhuysen, OQMG, to CGs,
Camp Lee and Ft. Warren QMRTCs, 16 Jul 42, sub:
already been transferred to the Ordnance Tng ofQM EM, 353.01.
Department, the shortage of Ordnance ^^ Freedman, General Aspects of the Training Pro-
gram, Camp Lee, p. 29.
training facilities made it necessary for the ^^ Ltr, Mil Tng Div, OQMG, to CGs Camp Lee
QMRTC's continue to train large
to and Ft. Warren QMRTCs, 14 Nov 42, sub: Tng Di-
quotas of apprentice and general mechan- rective No. 10.
226 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
The trainees then were transferred to tech- centers underwent a marked increase.
nical training —
companies either to a Some of the additional functions origi-
motor unit or a supply unit in accordance nated with the introduction of new subject
with their specialties. These companies matter into the courses, while others grew
conducted all of the training during the out of the attempt to improve training
technical training phase. At Fort Warren, methods and procedures. It was necessary,
on the other hand, trainees were assigned for example, to establish courses for train-
to a particular company and remained ing new instructors and improving the
with it through both their basic military caliber of the teaching of older ones. An-
and their technical training. This plan was other important development was the
followed until the spring of 1943 when creation at each of the centers of a tech-
Fort Warren adopted the Camp Lee sys- nical training service. Its principal func-
tem of separate military and technical tionswere to develop training methods,
training companies. ^"^ and procedures and to co-ordi-
materials,
The huge expansion at the Camp Lee nate them, with those developed at the
QMRTC had made it necessary to add Quartermaster School; to determine the
three regiments and greatly increase the number and types of instructors required;
size of training companies in April 1942. and to select, train, and guide the in-
This created a problem in training super- structors.**
vision that was solved by organizing the More emphasis was placed upon the
center's eight regiments into three bri- function of training illiterates and others
gades. Two of the brigades were comprised who required special attention. Such
of three white regiments each, while the trainees at the beginning of the program in
third was comprised of the two Negro regi- 1941 had constituted only a small per-
ments. Three of the center's most experi- centage of the total personnel to be
enced officers were selected as brigade trained, and they had remained with their
commanders, and among their functions basic companies while receiving special in-
was that of conducting tests to determine struction at the elementary schools. Later
the progress in training. The brigade sys- on, as their number and percentage grew
tem was adopted about a year later at they were separated from the regular
Fort Warren. ^^ trainees and organized into special train-
The impact of the war brought numer- ing units which fed, housed, and clothed
ous other developments at the QMRTC's the men, and provided the elementary
in 1942. The training doctrine was revised training necessary to remedy their defi-
frequently to meet the transition from
emergency to actual war and to provide (1) Freedman, General Aspects of the Training
*''
ciencies. This program reached a peak only to continue training Ordnance per-
during the summer of 1942, but the bur- sonnel, but also to make their facilities
den finally was lightened in August of that available for an extensive program for
year when the War Department lowered training enlisted men in the AAF and the
the maximum percentage of trainees of Adjutant General's Department. Although
this type who were to be instructed. A year the majority of the men trained for the
later the QMRTC's were relieved com- Ordnance Department in 1943 were auto
pletely of the responsibility for this train- mechanics, for whom the QMRTC's pro-
ing when the function was transferred to vided only basic military training, the cen-
the reception* centers/® ters conducted the full thirteen-week
The expansion of functions at the centers program for other Ordnance personnel,
extended beyond those which benefited including cooks, mess stewards, clerks, car-
enlisted trainees participating in the gen- penters, chauffeurs, packers and craters,
eral program. Both Camp Lee and Fort electricians, machinists, and welders. By
Warren inaugurated refresher courses for the end of April 1943, however, the facil-
oflScers and ROTC graduates. At Fort ities of the Ordnance Department had be-
Warren a branch of the OCS was opened come adequate for its own needs and
and an officers' replacement pool was this training was discontinued at the
established. Courses for cadres and for QMRTC's. The training for the AAF,
trainees who were awaiting assignment to though, continued throughout 1943 and
the OCS were among the other additions more than 15,000 speciaUsts were trained
made to the program of the two centers for that command by the Camp Lee and
during the year. By the end of 1942 the Fort Warren centers. These included car-
combined capacity of the two QMRTC's penters, supply clerks, cooks, mess ser-
had been increased to more than 40,000.^° geants, motor operators, and plumbers.
Throughout most of 1942 the QMRTC's For the Adjutant General's Department
had been under extremely heavy pressure only basic military training was con-
to turn out replacements for the many new ducted, and this program continued
units hurriedlyformed to meet the critical throught the first half of 1944.''
situation resultingfrom the attack upon Two other major developments in 1943
Pearl Harbor. By the beginning of 1943, were outgrowths of the lowered require-
however, the pressure had begun to sub- ments for Quartermaster replacements.
side. The expansion rate of the Army had One was the discontinuance of the Fort
decreased to a marked degree and, with Warren QMRTC
after two and a half
mobilization nearing its final stages, re- years of existence during which the center
quirements for replacements were declin- graduated more than 122,000 specialists
ing toward the level at which they would trained in the diverse fields of motor and
have to be kept for strictly maintenance
purposes. All training was back on the
*'
(1) See above, Ch. V, Classification by Intellectual
Capacity. (2) Mathews, Development ofQJABTCs, p. 41.
thirteen-week schedule, and the centers For a detailed account of this special training, see
(3)
were able to operate under more nearly Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Repls, Fillers, and Cadres,
normal conditions. Pt. I, App. 5.
'^"
Mathews, Development ofQMRTCs. pp. 4 1-42, 57.
The reduction in Quartermaster re- '^'
Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Repls, Fillers, and
quirements permitted the QMRTC's not Cadres, Pt. 1, pp. 58-59.
228 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
supply operations.^" Although the inacti- shipped from the center. The field training
vation began on 1 July and no new program was carried out under simulated
trainees were received after that date, it tactical conditions. The course of instruc-
was the middle of October before the cen- tion for the first week included such sub-
ter actually was discontinued. The other jects as compass problems, village fighting,
development was the lengthening of the and camouflage. For the final two weeks
training period, effective in August, from the trainees were taken to the A. R Hill
thirteen weeks to seventeen weeks as pre- Military Reservation, about seventy miles
scribed by the ASF for the training of all from Camp Lee, for combined training in
enlisted men in that command because of basic military and technical activities in
the general reduction in requirements for the field."^^
trained personnel. The new program In many respects the fall of 1943 was
placed much greater emphasis upon basic one of the most successful periods in the
military training and extended the period history of Quartermaster replacement
of this phase to six weeks. This was fol- training operations. By then, all of the
lowed by the customary eight weeks of training was centered at one installation,
technical training, and then by an addi- more time was available for training the
tional threeweeks of team or field training. men, both the basic military and the tech-
The later period was designed to allow nical training organizations were function-
practical application under field condi- ing under well-tried methods, and the
tions of theoretical military and technical program had been rounded out by the ad-
instruction presented in the preceding dition of three weeks of field training.
fourteen weeks and to train each man as Moreover, operations were not yet com-
a member of a team so that when he joined plicated by the more varied types of train-
a unit in a theater he would have a better ing that were required later in the war.
concept of his place in the organization.^^
The adoption of this new program made Revisions in Replacement Requirements
it necessary for the remaining QMRTC
at
Camp Lee to make several changes in its The year 1944 brought a series of new
training organization. A new office, that problems that resulted in sweeping
of director of field training, was created changes affecting not only the organiza-
and a new type of training organization tional structure of the Camp Lee QMRTC,
the pool company —
was established to but also the scope and mission of its train-
process the trainees and to handle the ad- ing program, the type of personnel to be
ministrative details during the field train- trained, and even the designation of the
ing phase. Under this new schedule, center.
trainees were assigned first to a basic mili- One of these problems arose from the
tary company, then moved to a technical fact that the strength of the Army at the
training company, and finally transferred beginning of 1944 was near its authorized
to the pool company. '-Freedman, General Aspects of the Training Pro-
The pool companies, in which Negro gram, Ft. Warren, p. 7. 1
'
ment of a unit training program for petrol- within the ASF and of such technical
eum laboratory units, laundry units, training as was common to the technical
service companies, headquarters and services. Training terminology also was
headquarters companies for base depots, standardized. The seventeen-week pro-
and postal units. The postal units were gram as a whole became known officially
under the jurisdiction of The Adjutant as basic training. The first phase of this
General, but The Quartermaster General program, generally six weeks in length,
was given the responsibility for their train- was designated as basic military training.
ing. At the same time, the trainee capacity The second phase, generally eight weeks
of the center devoted to the basic training
of Adjutant General personnel was in-
Ltr, Brig Gen Wilbur R. McReynolds, OQMG,
to CO Camp Lee, 1 1 Jan 44, sub: O.rgn of Camp Lee
creased from 1,800 to 4,000.^*^ for Tng Program, 1944, 353.
The changes in functions were accom- '«
Ibid.
Freedman, General Aspects of the Training Pro-
'"
panied by revisions in the center's train- gram, Camp Lee, pp. 48-50.
ing structure. The three phases of train- " ASF Cir 104, Sec. IH, 15 Apr 44, sub: Plan for
ing — supply, motor, and field — which Tng Certain ASF EM.
230 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
in length, was redesignated as basic tech- specifying the number to be trained in
nical training. The weeks of the
final three each type of specialty. In the case of units,
program were designated in one of two ASF headquarters determined the par-
ways, in accordance with the type of train- ticular types needed and the availability of
ing conducted. When the trainees were personnel and equipment. These data
formed into teams or groups and trained were embodied in a preactivation order to
as loss replacements under field conditions The Quartermaster General, who set up
the period was termed basic team training, the quotas and issued the directives to the
but when they were assembled into a com- center. The personnel required for the
plete unit and trained as an official organ- units was ordered into the center by The
ization the period was designated as basic Adjutant General. Personnel for other
unit training. types of training, such as retraining, was
One of the most important aspects of the ordered into the center without quotas and
reorganization was the introduction of the the training proceeded in accordance with
preactivation training program, which priority requirements.''^
provided that all recruits were to be When the preactivation training began
trained first as individuals before being as- in mid-June, it increased to seven the dif-
signed to units for unit training. This ferent categories in which training was
marked the abandonment of the old sys- being conducted at the Camp Lee ASFTC.
tem whereby fillers for newly activated The other six were basic military, basic
units frequently were supplied directly technical, basic military retraining, basic
from reception centers. The new plan in- technical retraining, basic team training,
sured that enlisted men would receive a and training of activated units. The com-
minimum of fourteen weeks of training as plexity of this program was in sharp con-
individuals, including six weeks of basic trast with that which had existed during
military training and eight weeks of basic the earlier part of the war when the center
technical training, prior to their utilization had been confronted with the compara-
as overseas loss replacements or as fillers for tively simple problem of training only
newly activated units. At the conclusion of filler and loss replacements. Although in
their preactivation training phase, the en- the meantime it had been redesignated as
listed men selected as loss replacements re- an ASFTC, the Camp Lee center still was
ceived an additional three weeks of basic organized on a regimental basis with seven
—
team training, while those assigned to new regiments four white and two Negro
units as fillers received an additional six regiments and one unit training regiment.
weeks of basic unit training. Inasmuch as each regiment usually had an
The process for regulating the flow of assortment of trainees in all seven cate-
trainees at the ASFTC's was quite com- gories of training, there was much dupli-
plex under the varied training procedures. cation of effort and waste of overhead per-
Loss replacements were ordered into the sonnel at a time when a serious manpower
center by The Adjutant General in ac- shortage existed. Moreover, requirements
cordance with requirements established by shifted so rapidly that training loads were
G-3. The Quartermaster General drew up almost constantly fluctuating from one
the quotas, based upon these require- ' Freedman, General Aspects of the Training Pro-
ments, and issued a directive to the center gram, Camp Lee, p. 47.
THE TRAINING OF ENLISTED REPLACEMENTS 231
category to another. It became obvious problem. Lack of interest on the part of re-
during the summer of 1944 that a more trainees, exaggerated promises that were
made at other stations to mollify their ship-
flexible organization was necessary if ef-
ments to our Center, failure to be paid for a
fective training was
be given.
to
'^''
ing every phase of the center's operations. All of this added up to the fact that the
The regimental training system, which retrainee arrived at the ASFTC in low
had been employed since the inception of spirits and in an antagonistic mood. The
the center, was replaced by one consisting center, therefore, was confronted first with
of three groups. One group was organized the task of building morale and changing
to instruct white troops in both basic mili- the attitude of the men so that they would
tary and basic technical training, another be receptive to instruction. Special efforts
to perform the same function for Negroes, were made to bolster morale by giving
and a unit training group to prepare units each man an opportunity to state his
for extended field service. This reorganiza- grievances frankly and then attempting to
tion simplified operating procedures, in- resolve them quickly. A liberal policy was
sured more uniform standards of instruc- adopted in all dealings with these men.
tion,and resulted in a considerable saving Furloughs were granted whenever possible,
in overhead personnel. With administra- steps were taken to expedite their pay, and
tive duties controlled centrally, many any clothing needed was issued promptly.
officers and enlisted men who
previously The retrainees were grouped according to
had been engaged in administrative work grade and previous experience to counter-
within the seven regiments were made act any impression that they were being
available for training purposes or were re- treated as rookies.
leased for duty overseas.''' The necessity for retraining was ex-
By this time, with more and more men plained in detail to the men during their
being returned from overseas and increas- orientation. Noncommissioned officers
ing numbers from zone of interior installa- were assured that there would be no re-
tions being prepared for duty in the ductions in grade except for disciplinary
theaters, retraining had become the most reasons. To avoid demoralization resulting
pressing problem. Although retraining from unnecessary repetition of training,
provided the opportunity to evaluate pre- tests were given the retrainees soon after
vious training, it also presented serious their arrival to determine whether they
difficulties, particularly in giving instruc- needed further basic military training.
tion in basic military retraining. Those achieving a stipulated grade were
At best it is a thankless task for a retrainee transferred immediately to technical train-
to begin a training cycle after he has com- ing, while those falling below this grade
pleted one in the early stages of his army
career. It is difficult for a man who has been ''°
Capt K. H. Dodd. Basic Military Training, Hq
subjected to fire, who
has had active part in
ASFTC. Camp Lee, Va., July 1944-Septembcr 1945
combat in perhaps another arm of the serv- (Camp Lee hist rpt,Jun 46), pp. 1-2. (Hereafter cited
ice, to readjust himself to take a basic course as Dodd, Basic Mil Tng.)
which he regards as "fundamental rookie «' Ibid.,
pp. 2-3.
training." The problem is essentially a selling •=-
Ibid., App. A.
232 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
were shown their shortcomings and made duty in zone of interior installations.
to reahze that they actually needed the
It is evident that the lack of officers with
training. The personal touch was em- post quartermaster experience has a tendency
phasized, with company commanders of- to affect our courses and training because of
fering to help the men solve their individ- lack of realization of what job and what type
ual problems. The retrainees were segre- of training is needed for post, camp, and sta-
tion duty. This is just the reverse of the situ-
gated in accordance with the degree of
ation three years ago in that we knew very
their advancement in order to avoid bore- little at that time about theaters of operation
some repetition of elementary instruction. requirements and our training was faulty be-
The same careful screening was employed cause we were teaching post, camp, and sta-
tion duties in place of theater of operation
in technical training, with each retrainee
duties.*'^
required to take only the portion of the
course that his test showed he needed. In At the time of their establishment it had
this way many hours of training were been assumed that the replacement train-
saved, and retrainees were made available ing centers through their normal training
for assignment at the earliest possible processes would produce an adequate
date.*'^ number of potential leaders to serve as
Another special problem in 1944 con- noncommissioned officers in newly acti-
cerned the training of limited-assignment vated units. This proved to be a fallacy,
personnel for jobs in zone of interior in- and by 1944 a serious shortage of qualified
stallations so that they could relieve gen- noncommissioned officers had developed.
eral-service men for service overseas. In To overcome this shortage, insofar as the
the face of the growing manpower short- QMC was concerned, steps were taken in
age, the Army objective was to prepare all the spring of that year to establish a Lead-
able-bodied men for duty in the theaters ership Training Course at Camp Lee.
and to fill as many jobs as possible in this Candidates were selected from outstanding
country with limited-assignment person- trainees who had completed their basic
nel, Wacs, and civilians. The training of military and technical training and had
limited-assignment personnel was a special exhibited sufficient qualities of leadership
problem for several reasons. One of these to be considered potential noncommis-
was that, because of their physical limita- sioned officers.
tions, the men had to be placed in segre- The program called for nine weeks of
gated units for their basic military train- training. The first three weeks were de-
ing. They were transferred to technical voted to instruction in teaching methods
training individually, whenever the unit and duties of noncommissioned officers.
commander determined that a man had During the final six weeks the students
completed the amount of training com- were appointed acting corporals and as-
mensurate with his physical condition. signed to training companies in order to
Another reason for the difficulty was that give them practical experience. The name
all courses had been designed from the be- of the course was changed to Noncommis-
ginning of the war to meet the one objec-
tive of preparing men for service in the
'^^
Ibid.. A pp. A.
sioned Officer School in Troop Leadership In compliance with this directive, the
in the fall of 1944 when the regimental ASF instructed the chiefs of the technical
training system of the center was replaced services in December 1944 to revise the
by a group organization. Actually, there basic technical and basic team training
were two of these schools at first, one for phases of their replacement training pro-
whites and the other for Negroes, but be- grams. It was the middle of April 1945,
fore the end of 1944 the number of Ne- however, before the new programs became
groes had declined to such an extent that effective. From then until V-J Day Quar-
the two schools were combined and came termaster training at the Camp Lee and
to be known simply as the Troop Leader- Fort Warren ASFTC's was directed pri-
ship School. '^^ marily toward the production of highly
skilled replacements for the Quartermas-
and equipment, and physical drill. Pistol training programs upon which the various
was included, as was installations based their detailed training
familiarization firing
rifle marksmanship, but the schedule schedules, to determine in advance the
called for only a few hours of preparatory exact extent of the role the Quartermaster
training and range firing.'' These pro- soldier would play in a global war. It was
grams were notable for their lack of tacti- about the middle of 1943 before any reli-
cal infantry training subjects that would able experience data were available for es-
prepare Quartermaster personnel for serv- tablishing training requirements. More-
ice under combat conditions, such as over, training facilities and equipment
Army orientation, bayonet training, famil- were extremely scarce during the early
iarization and field firing of the carbine, days of the war and this further handi-
cover and movement, extended order drill, capped the expansion of the program.
hasty field fortifications, infiltration and Still another factor was that the Corps,
combat course training, demolition train- because its training for years had been de-
ing, mines and booby traps, defense voted to producing post quartermasters,
against air and mechanized attack, and was severely lacking in personnel capable
tactical scouting and patrolling. of conducting field training. This was evi-
These subjects and other features had denced by the caliber of the early cadres
been added by the spring of 1944,"' but sent to the QMRTC's.
the elaborate basic military training pro- . they were for the most part unqualified
. .
gram, which by then was standard for all for the jobsthey were expected to perform.
ASF enlisted personnel, had been devel- Few had any type of basic military experi-
oped gradually since 1940. The develop- ence, almost none had fired the various
weapons, and most were considered the un-
ment was particularly slow at first for a Regular
desirables and castoffs of various
number of reasons. For one thing, there Army units."
had been repeated delays in preparing
Quartermaster mobilization training pro- The
early deficiencies of the training
grams during the emergency period be- program were overcome as rapidly as pos-
cause the Quartermaster School, with its sible after the country entered the war. To
limited number of personnel and heavy facilitate instruction and give the trainees
teaching load, was reluctant to undertake the most appropriate environment for
the task, while the OQMG lacked the ex- practical military instruction, training was
perienced training personnel to assume removed insofar as possible from the class-
the responsibility. Consequently, the pro- room and drill field to wooded training
grams were not formulated as rapidly as areas, which were equipped eventually
they might otherwise have been. During with demonstration areas, infiltration
the critical period following Pearl Harbor, courses, regimental theaters, practice fir-
the first objective was to train the largest ing ranges of various types, and virtually
number of men possible in the shortest •'
MTP 10-2. 25 Jul 41. sub: QM MTPs for QM
time possible, and there was little oppor- Enlisted Repls at QMRTCs.
tunity to make drastic changes in basic '-
MTP
21-4, 10 Mar 45, sub: for EnlistedMTP
Pers of the ASF.
doctrine. Another reason was that it was '^
Lt William H. Fickcs, Basic Military Training
difficult for the War Department, whose (Camp Lee ASFTC hist rpt. Mar 45), p. 1 3. (Here-
function it was to prepare the mobilization after cited as Fickes, Basic Mil Tng.)
236 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
every other kind of facility for basic mili- Some portions of the test were conducted
tary training. Training films and film strips by squads, others by platoons. Individual
had been introduced in a small way at the deficiencies were reported to the company
QMRTC's during the first commanders, who ordered the men to
training cycle,
and their use was gradually expanded un- remedy their weaknesses by additional
til practically every subject was supple- training, usually conducted after normal
mented by this type of visual aid.^* Nu- training hours. A progress chart was insti-
merous other kinds of training aids also tuted at Camp Lee in April 1943. Each
were employed in an effort to reduce the- squad leader maintained a chart showing
oretical instruction to a minimum. By the the presence or absence of each trainee at
fall of 1943 all instruction in basic military each instructional period. Time lost by ab-
training was being made as realistic as sence was required to be made up in extra
possible. The battle inoculation course was instructional periods. Eventually, individ-
being utilized to condition the men men- ual cards recording the satisfactory or un-
tally for combat operations by subjecting satisfactory completion of each course
them to close overhead fire, battle sounds, were developed."
and other conditions they were likely to A more reliable method of testing indi-
encounter in the field. viduals was established at Camp Lee early
The progress of the trainees in absorb- in 1945. It involved the use of a pictorial
ing instruction during the basic military test consisting of 100 questions pertaining
training phase was ascertained by means to all prescribed basic military subjects.
of periodic tests. These tests, originated in Each question was of the best-answer type,
the summer of 1941, had to be reformu- with four possible answers depicted in pic-
lated and improved almost constantly to ture form. The papers were graded and
keep pace with revisions in training pro- evaluated by the Basic Military Testing
grams. During the greater part of the war, Section of the center by means of an elec-
basic military testing included a battalion trical accounting machine. The results
test at the end of the first two weeks, a regi- were analyzed and an applicatory test was
mental test at the end of the fourth week, compiled, based on subjects in which er-
and a brigade test at the conclusion of the rors were committed by one third or more
basic military training period. of the group.
The brigade test was the most compre- Trainees whose papers on the pictorial
hensive and the most important of these test had been unsatisfactory were segre-
tests because it determined whether or not gated into small groups for the applicatory
the men had successfully completed this test, during which individual performances
phase of training. More than fifty different were carefully checked. Those whose pro-
mimeographed tests covering the basic ficiency had been rated as satisfactory in
military training field were developed by the pictorial test were divided into groups
the brigade headquarters, and when the of twenty to twenty-five to participate in
trainees appeared on the field they were an applicatory critique conducted by the
unaware of which particular test they
would face. Each test encompassed eight ' ^ For a complete list of films used in basic military
company officers and cadre, during which explain by word or' picture the technical
stresswas placed on those subjects in operation of a complex machine.
which the pictorial test had revealed the Even when the first training equipment
company to be weakest. Results in the ap- arrived much of it was obsolete or unsuit-
plicatory phase of testing were consoli- able. For instance, the first sterilizers made
dated with those in the pictorial phase, available to the sterilization and bath
and personnel found deficient in part were school atCamp Lee were mule-drawn,
required to make up those subjects in con- wood-burning or coal-burning vehicles of
current basic training in a technical com- 1908 vintage, in sharp contrast to the
pany. The success of the method of testing modern, motorized, highly intricate, gaso-
developed at Camp Lee was indicated by line machines.'^ Similarly, the trucks uti-
the fact that it was adopted in whole or in lized at first in the training of mechanics
part by other training centers over the and drivers were either civilian or World
country.''' War I types, quite unlike those produced
for World War II.
case ot men sent directly to units upon fin- baked bread in mobile bakeries, and laun-
ishing their basic miHtary training. dry operators washed clothes for the camp.
These early problems were pretty well During the later years of the war the
resolved by the beginning of 1943. Com- technical trainingprogram was expanded
petent instructors had been selected and by the addition of such new courses as
trained, technical shops and other training testing of petroleum products, office-ma-
facilitieshad been constructed, and the chine repair, band training, slaughtering
original gap between urgent requirements and the cutting of meats, and preparation
on the battle fronts and production on the of dehydrated foods. Moreover, frequent
home front had lessened to the extent that adjustments were necessary because of the
sizable quantities of equipment were be- constant improvement of equipment and
ing provided for the training centers. The- the development of new and better train-
oretical instruction in the classroom had ing aids. Most of the training films were
been reduced to a minimum, and each only in the embryonic stage by the end of
man was being given the opportunity to 1942, and many other types of training
learn his job by doing it. For example, ap- aids were still to be developed.
prentices learned to become mechanics by Generally speaking, all technical train-
working on modern military trucks, bakers ing at the QMRTC's was divided into two
THE TRAINING OF ENLISTED REPLACEMENTS 239
categories: motor training and supply best by doing, and to that end they re-
training. During the emergency period ceived most of their training by actually
and the early months of the war when the meeting diagnosis and maintenance re-
Corps was responsible for the transporta- quirements on vehicles in need of repair.
tion function, motor training represented The unit shop method was employed,
more than half of the Quartermaster with the shops divided into chassis and en-
training load.'^ This situation did not gine bays, each equipped with appropri-
change immediately with the transfer of ate tools and equipment.*' Uniformity of
motor transport activities to the Ordnance instruction in the various shops was as-
Department on 1 August 1942. Facilities sured through the use of lesson plans for
of that service were not yet adequate for instructors and job sheets for students. A
training personnel in third and fourth minimum amount of theoretical instruc-
echelon maintenance, so the QMRTC's tion was supplemented by an extensive
were directed to instruct the necessary program of practical conferences and dem-
maintenance specialists. This policy con- onstrations where numerous training aids
tinued into 1943, though Camp Lee and were utilized, including training films,
Fort Warren were required to give only film strips, charts, and cutaway models of
basic military instruction to the majority automotive working parts.
of Ordnance trainees after December Students were instructed in nomencla-
1942.^"Motor training declined sharply at ture, mechanical operations, and the use
the QMRTC's in 1943, as there was no of hand tools, and then taught how to re-
longer a demand for the Corps to supply pair and adjust various types of Army ve-
motor mechanics except for second eche- hicles. In addition, they were instructed in
lon maintenance of its own vehicles. methods of recovering disabled vehicles
Schools for motor training were organ- under field conditions. They were taught
ized into two general groups: motor opera- first the disassembly and reassembly of
tion or driver training, and motor mainte- engine units, together with the hand-tool
nance. The latter group offered instruction course consisting of soldering, filing, chip-
in many different automotive fields to ping, drilling, thread cutting, screw ex-
train men as apprentice and general nie- tracting, and flaring. The vehicle-recovery
chanics, machinists, welders, blacksmiths, portion of the course consisted of training
engine specialists, electricity and carbure- in field rigging and expedients, wreckers
tion specialists, draftsmen, and shop fore- and wrecker service, and actual recovery
men. operations.
Motor training, insofar as organization One feature of this training was the
and program of instruction were con- "county fair" method of instruction
cerned, developed a more or less definite
pattern by 1943. The plan employed at ''
(1) Freedman, General Aspects of the Training
Camp Lee in giving instruction to me- Program. Camp Lee, p. 13. (2) Freedman, General
Aspects of the Training Program, Ft. Warren, p. 17.
chanics and apprentices illustrates the """
Freedman, General Aspects of the Training
)
{ 1
general procedure followed in training all Program, Ft. Warren, p. 17. (2) Freedman, General
of the various specialists in the motor Aspects of the Training Program, Camp Lee, p. 3. 1
'''
Separate engine and chassis shops were used at
maintenance field. The program was Fort Warren. See Fickes and Dodd, Basic Tech Tng,
based on the theory that trainees learned Camp Lee, p. 42, n. 70.
240 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
whereby small groups of trainees were able QMRTC. Throughout the course the re-
to witness various demonstrations at the lationship between the students and in-
same time, rotating until each group had structors was similar to that between ap-
witnessed all demonstrations. The final prentices and foremen. Individual rather
stages of training consisted of repairs, re- than group instruction was the rule.
placements, and adjustments to engine Students were graded on their aptitude
units with special attention to engine re- and interest displayed in the workshop
building, carburetion and ignition, lubri- and their general ability to perform the
cation, and vehicle inspection.^- tasks covered in the job sheets.
The production shops, where the sixth In the motor operations school, poten-
and seventh weeks of "the course were tial vehicle operators who passed prelimi-
spent, provided the trainees with ample nary mental and physical examinations
opportunity for practical application of were subjected to a psychophysical test.
their training in the servicing of the hun-
dreds of vehicles in use at the Camp Lee *- Ibid., pp. 41-50,68.
THE TRAINING OF ENLISTED REPLACEMENTS 241
This was designed to determine visual the trainees fired actual machine guns
acuity, steadiness, color perception, range mounted on trucks at free balloons, towed
of vision, and co-ordination of the trainees, and radio-controlled
sleeve-aerial targets,
and to eliminate those unfit to become airplane targets along the seacoast.**
Army drivers. The drivers' course during Supply training covered a wider and
the first weeks was virtually the same as more diversified field than motor training
that given apprentice mechanics. The ob- and presented a greater problem in group-
jective was to teach the nomenclature and ing specialists for common courses. The
functions of units and parts of motor ve- groupings made at Gamp Lee and Fort
hicles as a background for training in ve- Warren varied from time to time but, gen-
hicle operation as well as in preventive erally speaking, plumbers, steamfitters,
maintenance, including inspections, tight- and sheet metal workers were given a
ening, lubrication, and the use of tools and common course, as were chief clerks,
equipment furnished with Army vehicles. typists, clerk-typists, shipping clerks, mes-
Brief classroom instruction was given in sengers, and first sergeants. Instruction in
such subjects as hand signals, map read- depot supply, commissary operations, pro-
ing, forms and records, and lubricants. curement, and warehousing usually was
Actual driving instruction was conducted combined because depot supply and com-
on a progressive pattern, beginning with missary operations were similar in that
elementary training, followed by convoy they dealt with items procured, while
operations, night and blackout driving, warehousing was a concomitant of each.
driving over difficult terrain, motor inspec- Salvage, service, and railhead operations
tions, and decontamination of vehicles, also provided a common ground for train-
and concluding with instruction regarding ing. Similarly, a carpentry course was
trailer units, loads, and loading. At the given construction specialists and general
conclusion of the course trainees were mechanics as well as carpenters. In each
given final written and road tests. ^^ instance of combined training an attempt
An additional week was added to the was made to accentuate the specialty
drivers' eight-week course in the summer training necessary for the individual. ^^
of 1944 in order to train personnel in the Such groupings usually made it possible
mechanism, maintenance, and the firing to consolidate the numerous specialists in
of the .50-caliber machine gun from vari- the supply-training field into fewer than
ous mounts. Trainees spent the first day twenty technical schools at each of the
and a half learning the nomenclature and QMRTG's. The most common of these
mechanism of the gun and then were as- were administrative and supply, depot
signed to a scaled-down range where they supply, bakery, canvas repair, carpentry,
practiced firing a compressed-air-operated clothing and textile, cooks' and mess ser-
duplicate of the gun at model planes geants', electrical, fumigation and bath,
towed across a backdrop. The scale was
such that the leads taken with the training
gun were the same as would be taken with "Ibid., pp. 50-57,62-69.
an actual machine gun under normal bat-
>"'
(1) Ibid., pp. 58-59. (2) MTP 21-3, Sec. VI,
1
TRAINEES REPAIRING CLOTHING in the textile repair shop, Camp Lee, Va.
ing under convoy and bivouac conditions. curriculum as the need arose. In January
Early in 1942 the school was allocated 1944 a dehydrated food section was cre-
areas at the rifle range, where tents were ated and students were trained to prepare
pitched, field ranges were set up, and complete meals with dehydrated products.
meals were served to troops. Later in the In February of the same year a butchery
year student cooks were assigned to the section was established to train butchers in
daily motor training convoys and to troops the proper Army method of slaughtering
ordered to bivouac overnight in areas out- animals and cutting meats. The students
side the camp. A pastry class was formed were placed in various meat packing
in the summer of 1942 to instruct student plants and slaughter houses in the nearby
cooks in baking pastry under field as well cities of Petersburg and Richmond to gain
as garrison conditions. In September 1943, practical experience.^*'
when troops sent to the A. P. Hill Military In the depot supply school, originally
Reservation were organized into com- known as the warehousing school, general
panies, student cooks were assigned to all-round training in Army depot pro-
each company and completed their in- cedure was conducted for selected students
struction under conditions closely parallel- to prepare them for duty as warehouse-
ing those in theaters of operations.
Special subjects, too, were added to the Ibid. pp. 111-19.
244 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
men and stock record clerks. They were ServiceCommand, where students loaded
given courses in property accounting, sub- and unloaded perishable subsistence,
sistence accounting, storage and issue, shipped refrigerator cars to various ports
requisitions, field operations, procurement, and military installations, and kept the
and map reading. Instruction was pri- necessary records.
marily by the lecture and practical exer- A depot supply training laboratory was
cise method. At the same time, the students constructed late in 1944. It contained a
were given a working knowledge of Army number of offices designed to represent
Regulations pertinent to depot functions. various types of companies, battalions,
As in other schools, increasing emphasis regiments, divisions, stations, and depots.
was placed on practical and field training. Use of this laboratory enabled instructors
A dummy boxcar was erected for use at to detect more easily the weaknesses in
the camp in illustrating the proper method student performance and gave students a
of loading and unloading various types of better understanding of the flow of paper
equipment and supplies. The trainees through the various channels of supply.
were taken on a tour of the ASF depot and About the same time the entire field train-
the holding and reconsignment point ad- ing area was established as a camouflage
jacent to it at Richmond, where a com- school, one of the features of which was a
plete inspection was held, followed by a camouflage course that students in all of
critique. In October 1943 the school was the technical schools were required to at-
commissioned to operate a provisional tend one day a week.
depot for training purposes at the A. R During 1945 facilities of the field train-
Hill Military Reservation. The trainees ing area were increased greatly, and the
lived there for two weeks and experienced depot supply training program was made
for the first time conditions similar to those more varied and functional. For example,
they would find in a theater of operations. the students were taught the correct
During that time they were required to method of preparing motor vehicles for
move the depot several times to new loca- rail shipment, and a glider was utilized to
tions, at least twice under blackout condi- demonstrate air cargo transport. Under
tions. the guidance of instructors, the students
In December 1943 a field training area built paulin warehouses and open-storage
was established within the limits of Camp sheds similar to those used in the various
Lee, where, during the eighth week of theaters. Supplies in paulin cases were
training, principles taught earlier in such stacked in a manner illustrating proper
subjects as camouflage and concealment, provision for ventilation to prevent dete-
traffic control, stacking of supplies in the rioration of supplies in the humid weather
open, and safety precautions were applied encountered in Pacific areas. A model
in preparation for what was to follow at beachhead was constructed to demon-
the reservation. In February 1944 ar- strate supply operations on enemy beaches.
rangements were made to have trainees The students were taught such things as
spend a week of their training at the cold- how to use rafts to float in supplies, and
storage warehouse at the Richmond Quar- how to construct temporary bridges. Every
termaster Market Center and at the rail- effort was made to acquaint trainees with
head and distributing point of the Third the field expedients and improvisations
THE TRAINING OF ENLISTED REPLACEMENTS 245
DUMMY BOXCAR used to demonstrate how to load and unload various types of equipment
and supplies.
learned from personnel returned from period was devoted primarily to classroom
overseas supply operations. ^^ instruction in such subjects as laundry
In the laundry school, as another illus- units, marking and receipt of clothing,
tration, studentswere instructed in the op- sorting and delivery, types of water, gen-
erations of mobile, portable, and perma- erators, boilers, and plumbing.**
nent types of Army laundries, as well as Progress of students in absorbing tech-
in the methods of handling all types of nical training at theQMRTC's was tested,
fabrics, the different water temperatures in general, by weekly and spot quizzes in
required under varying conditions, and the various schools and a final test at the
other knowledge necessary for the success- end of the technical training period cover-
ful washing of clothes. The course was de- ing all significant phases of the require-
signed to produce four different types of ments for the specialty involved. Originally
specialists: skilledlaundry foremen, laun- these final tests were largely theoretical,
dry-machine operators, potential laundry for, while emphasis was placed on meet-
mechanics, and firemen. More than half of
the total training time was spent in giving " (1) Ibid., pp. 95-99. (2) Capt K. H. Dodd, Basic
experience the oper- Technical Training, Hq ASFTC, Camp Lee, Va.,
the students actual in
July 1944-September 1945 (Camp Lee hist rpt, Jun
ation of all types of laundry machines and 46), pp. 16-17.
boilers. The remaining portion of the ***
Fickes and Dodd, Basic Tech Tng, pp. 125-27.
246 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
ing certainrequirements, no uniform Those trainees who complete their tech-
yardstickhad been established to ascertain nical training in an eight week period are
merely apprentices. Eight weeks is not suffi-
just when these requirements had been
cient time to train a man technically. The
met. In some subjects, such as typewriting best that can be said for such a trainee is that
and weapons firing, the progress of stu- he is equipped to enter a unit and be further
dents was obvious, but this was not so in trained until he becames proficient in his
many other subjects, such as salvage col- new assignment. If trainees had the advan-
tage of a 12 week training period in their
lection and laundry maintenance. By June
particular skill they would be adequately
1944, however, standardized testing pro- trained and well qualified to move into a unit
grams had been adopted for all specialties and perform the work for which they had
at both the theoretical and performance been prepared.^'
levels. Performance tests varied in dura-
The regimental form of training organ-
tion from a two-hour test for a motor
ization, which was employed by all of the
mechanic and a twelve-hour test for a replacement training centers throughout
clerk, to a twenty-four-hour test for a
the greater part of the war, was deemed
laborer or labor foreman. Trainees were
inefficient because it was necessary for the
graded as "skilled" or "potential," and regimental headquarters to perform ad-
such grades were submitted to the Classifi- ministrative and supply functions that
cation and Assignment Section to be used
could have been handled by the center
as a basis for placement in outgoing assign-
headquarters in one consolidated organ-
ments.^^
ization. The duplication resulting from this
system was a waste of manpower. Camp
Evaluation of the Replacement Lee effected a considerable saving in over-
Training Program head personnel when it abandoned the
regimental structure in the fall of 1944 and
In an analysis of the replacement train- established three groups to conduct train-
ing program as it affected the QMC ing.
during World War theII, OQMG
found Much valuable training time was lost at
that the system, for the most part, was the replacement training centers during
"well fitted to the needs for training spe- the war because no solution was found to
cialists" because it permitted "an advan- the problem of how to keep the output of
tageous concentration of the best available specialists of the various types in balance
training facilities and teaching personnel," with requirements for them. The centers
and promoted standardization of instruc- trained men in accordance with require-
tion. At the same time, the OQMG ment and replacement rate tables, which
pointed out that there were some short- number and types of special-
specified the
comings that tended to lower the efficiency
ofQMC operations.^"
One of these was the failure to provide ^Ml) Ibid., pp. 30-31. (2) Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng
sufficient time for the technical training of of Repls, Fillers, and Cadres, Pt. 1 p. 31.
,
ists needed per thousand men for each tional specialties conformed to existing
arm and service. These rates varied con- requirements.
siderably as the war progressed. In the be- Division of control over the QMRTC's
ginning they were based on the require- themselves was still another weakness.
ments for speciaUsts for the many types of While The Quartermaster General had
new units of all kinds that were being full responsibility for conducting the train-
activated, and upon normal attrition, that ing, commanders of corps areas (later
is, from such causes as death, trans- service commands) frequently exercised
losses
fers, and discharges. Later on, after mobi- administrative control over the QMRTC's.
lization was completed and casualty data The OQMG
expressed the conviction at
became available from the theaters where the conclusion of the war that the replace-
the units had been sent, battle casualties ment training centers had functioned
plus normal attrition became the basis for more efficiently when they were main-
computing requirements. Thus demands tained as installations of the individual
for some types of specialists increased while technical services and both administrative
others declined. During the first six and training activities were kept entirely
months of 1944, for example, require- under their jurisdiction. It was pointed out
ments for specialists in such activities as that consolidation of the two functions
depot operations, laundry, and clothing eliminated duplications and thus not only
and equipage were much greater than relieved a substantial number of personnel
they had been in the first six months of for other jobs but also simplified and im-
1942, while demands for bakers, cooks, proved co-ordinating procedures.
clerks, and motor operators declined Obviously there were weaknesses, too,
-'-
sharply. in the overseas replacement system, for,
Both Camp Lee and Fort Warren con- despite the fact that more than 400,000
sistently trained too many men in some Quartermaster enlisted replacements were
categories and too few in others,with the trained in nearly 100 different military
result that many had to be retrained in specialties at Camp Lee and Fort Warren
other specialties. Much of this difficulty during the war, commanders in the var-
might have been overcome if the reception ious overseas theaters reported that they
centers had exercised greater care in mak- experienced considerable diflficulty in get-
ing their shipments of trainees to replace- ting the types of specialists they needed.
ment training centers conform moreclc'sely They complained from time to time that
in numbers and qualifications to the de- the quantities of men they received fell
to actual requirements, particularly be- culty was that replacements often grew
cause the requirements were changing stale as a result of the long time that inter-
almost constantly. As a result, fully trained vened between the completion of their
men were not always available for over- training in the zone of interior and their
seas shipments in all of the categories listed assignment to duty in a theater.
in the requisitions and others had to be Col. Lloyd R. Wolfe, director of the
substituted. OQMG
Military Training Division, who
The requisition system itself was at least investigated the situation on a trip to the
partially to blame. In the first place. The European Theater of Operations, came to
Quartermaster General was not author- the conclusion that the failure of theaters
ized to communicate directly with theater to receive the type of trained replacements
commanders on matters of personnel and they requisitioned was due to one of two
therefore was unable to follow through on things:
requisitions. The names and MOS num- Either personnel responsible for the prep-
bers of the replacements who were to be- aration of theater requisitions are not indicat-
come available for overseas assignment ing thereon the MOS numbers required. . . .
manders finally filled their requisitions training "on the job." Obviously such a
through MOS numbers. It was often three situation could never satisfy all
parties; it
could only be resolved by constant experi-
to four months from the time the theater
commanders submitted their requisitions mentation.
before the soldiers arrived in the theaters,
>'^
Remarks, Col Hastings and Col Wolfe,OQMG,
at Conf, 17-29 Dec 45.
and a lot of things could happen in the in- " Address, Col Wolfe, OQMG, at Conf, 17-29
terim. One of the most common things Dec 45.
CHAPTER VIII
progressed to higher commissioned grades States into the war and forced a vast en-
as they acquired additional training else- largement of the OCS program and facil-
where or experience in the field. The ad- ities. The October class was approximately
vanced training generally was conducted the same size as the first one, but the third
at the Quartermaster School or at the class, which began in January 1942, en-
various depots. rolled 500 candidates. Within a few
Enrollment at the OCS was restricted months the Quartermaster OCS quota
originally to warrant officers and enlisted had jumped to 1,200 per class, and it be-
men under thirty-seven years of age who came necessary to establish a branch OCS
had been in active service at least six at Fort Francis E. Warren, Wyo., to han-
months, but early in 1942 the age limit dle the overflow from Camp Lee. New
was raised to forty-five and the length of Quartermaster OCS classes were started
service required for eligibility was reduced at the rate of one about every three weeks
to three months. The training covered a throughout 1942.
period of three months until July 1943, This mass production of new officers
when the course was lengthened to seven- made it necessary to revise instructional
teen weeks. methods and to procure many additional
As in the case of other Quartermaster instructors, a large share of whom were se-
schools, the instructional program and lected from among the graduates of the
teaching methods changed radically at early OCS classes. Manuals and other
the OCS during the war. The 150 students training publications were hurriedly pre-
in the first class, which was conducted at pared, and training aids, such as films,
the Schuylkill Arsenal in Philadelphia in miniature models, charts, graphs, and
the summer of 1941, spent twenty-four dramatizations, began to be developed to
hours a week for thirteen weeks in the supplement lectures. Training equipment
classroom attempting to absorb instruction was so scarce throughout the first year of
in technical fields from lectures. Their the war that instructors frequently had
basic military training consisted of three only pictures, drawings, or replicas to show
hours of calisthenics each week and four the candidates in demonstrating the oper-
hours of drill and inspection on Saturday ating principles of the weapons and the
mornings. Members of the faculty and numerous types of machines they would
staff, largely Reserve officers with limited use later in the field. It was 1943 before
experience, had to devote much of their equipment was available in sufficient
time to preparing instructional material quantities so that the candidates could ob-
because War Department publications serve, and sometimes participate in, the
were inadequate. The only weapons avail- actual operation of the machines and ap-
able were rifles borrowed from the Uni- paratus.
versity of Pennsylvania ROTC.' The course of instruction itself was also
With the transfer of the Quartermaster revised substantially following Pearl Har-
School from Philadelphia to Camp Lee, bor. Actual involvement in the war meant,
Va., the second officer candidate class be- of course, that a large proportion of the
gan there in October 1941. It had been
under way two months when the attack Rpt, Mil Tng Blv, Tng of Off Candidates, Pt. I,
-
on a very small scale. For a brief period in of modern global warfare. The survey led
December of that year no classes were in to a decision to allot more time to such
session, and the one class that began that subjects as weapons familiarization and
month enrolled only 103 candidates. It firing, physical training, inspection and
quickly became apparent, however, that maintenance of motor vehicles, command
requirements for commissioned personnel of Negro troops, vehicle loading, bivouacs
in the QMC had been underestimated, for in theaters of operations, map exercises,
almost immediately another serious short- stock record accounting, preparation of
age of Quartermaster officers developed shipping documents, supply procedures for
and it became necessary to increase sharply units ordered overseas, the command
the size of OCS classes. In the first six voice, troop movements by motor trans-
months of 1944 eight new classes were port, Quartermaster administration,
started with a combined enrollment of ap- methods of instruction, and classification
proximately 2,550.^ of clothing.*^
This reversed trend and sudden revival Revisions made in the OCS subject
in officer candidate training stimulated in- matter after the middle of 1944 were of a
terest in the program and resulted in a relatively minor nature, but a reorganiza-
number of changes. One of the most im- tion of the School Department in October
portant of these was the inauguration of a of that year brought changes in educa-
tactical field training program that re- tional methods and procedures that re-
quired the candidates to live under field sulted in a general improvement of the
conditions for two of the seventeen weeks program. OCS instructors, who formerly
of their training period. During this phase had divided their time among various
they were called upon to solve practical kinds of courses at the Quartermaster
problems in technical and basic military School, were assigned exclusively to the
training and in this and other ways prove newly created Officer Candidate Division
their ability and leadership. The field and so were able to devote their full atten-
training was conducted originally at the tion to this one type of training. Moreover,
Swift Creek Recreation Area and the Jor- the director of the officer candidate course
dan's Lake Training Area, both in the was also made director of the Officer Can-
general vicinity of Camp Lee, and later at didate Division, and this gave him the
the A. R Hill Military Reservation. responsibility for the OCS program as well
Another important change was the ap- as the immediate supervision over the in-
pointment in January 1944 of a director structional staff. Thus he was able to
of officer candidate training, who occupied realign the various fields of subject matter
a staff position under the assistant com- in such a way as to eliminate duplications
mandant. Quartermaster School Depart- and provide a more logical sequence and
ment. One of the first acts of this director continuity to the training.^
was to conduct a survey. to determine the Reports from the theaters had indicated
strong and the weak points of the OCS " Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Off Candidates, Pt. II,
program. This proved helpful in correct- p. 22.
ing mistakes and in strengthening the pro- « Ibid., Pt. I.
pp. 26, 33-34, and App. 21, showing
gram to insure that the new officers ac- program of instruction.
Supplementary Hist Rpt, Mil Tng Div, OQMG,
'
quired the combination of military and for ASF, QMC Officer Candidate School, 30Jun-31
technical skills necessitated by the logistics Dec 44, pp. 1,4-5,9-11.
SCHOOLS FOR OFFICERS AND ENLISTED SPECIALISTS 255
that the most common weakness among cer who served as leader and field instruc-
Quartermaster was their lack of tor. The platoon leader was the keystone
officers
leadership ability. Emphasis therefore was of the officer-training system because he
centered upon interpreting all OCS train- instructed the men in all military phases of
ing in terms of the leadership duties and Quartermaster operations, and it was
responsibilities of junior officers with upon his leadership that much of the suc-
troops in the field. All staff-level training cess of the program rested. Moreover, he
was eliminated except certain phases con- had the responsibility for making a careful
sidered essential as background for later study of each man
and in his platoon
advanced instruction.^ eliminating all who
failed to display the
Educational procedures employed be- necessary qualifications. The platoon lead-
tween the fall of 1944 and V-J Day were er usually was a recent graduate of the
characterized by the increased use of ap- OCS who had been chosen for the job be-
plicatory exercises, demonstrations, and cause he had demonstrated superior abil-
group performances, including such new ity in leadership. ^°
features as dramatic skits to illustrate mili- The cadet system followed at the school
tary leadership, animated cartoons with provided a practical test of the candidates'
recorded narrative, written "situations" or ability to command troops. Each man was
problems requiring individual solutions, given the opportunity to command troop
and forum-type presentations in which units ranging in size from a squad to a bat-
both faculty members and students parti- talion, and to serve in the capacity of both
cipated. A "corner book shelf was pro- a noncommissioned and a commissioned
vided in the classrooms to encourage officer. The platoon leader had the respon-
voluntary collateral reading on the tech- sibility for assigning cadet officers and
nical and tactical progress of the war. maintained a roster to make certain that
Early in 1945 the portion of the training cadet duties were evenly distributed
period devoted to field training at the A. R among the candidates. Each cadet was
Hill Military Reservation was increased to graded on the originality and initiative he
three weeks, in line with the policy of pre- showed in the performance of his duties
senting all types of instruction in practical and responsibilities.
form. Beginning in the spring of that year, Another important feature of OCS
when the early defeat of Germany had be- training was the Quartermaster Demon-
come a certainty, all map-reading exer- stration Battalion. This battalion, which
cises and training problems in field oper- was employed in the technical training
ations and logistical planning were based and field operations of all divisions of the
on anticipated activities in the Pacific.^ Quartermaster School, was authorized in
Candidates in the early OCS classes April 1942, but it was the fall of the year
were organized into a single training com- before adequate equipment was available
pany for housekeeping purposes, but later
when their numbers increased, it be-
**
Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Off Candidates, Pt. II,
on,
p. 13.
came necessary to form them into regi- " Ibid., pp. 1-11.
to make itswork effective. It comprised the student's ability was still in doubt he
thoroughly trained men and officers and was ordered to appear before the Officer
its function was to demonstrate the correct Candidate Faculty Board, which ruled
method of carrying on the various Quar- upon the disposition of all weak students.'"
termaster activities and the proper use of Competent instructors were scarce from
equipment. the start, and the shortage became acute
The officer candidates not only watched when the OCS enrollment began to in-
but participated to some extent in these crease sharply soon after Pearl Harbor. It
demonstrations. For example, when a field was necessary at first to select outstanding
bakery unit was being demonstrated, they students from OCS classes and commis-
helped to mix the dough, operate the ma- sion them a week or so in advance in order
chinery, and eat the bread. A similar pro- that they might be ready to teach in the
cedure was followed in demonstrations of next scheduled class. A systematic pro-
other units. The candidates were encour- gram for selecting and training instructors
aged to examine the units, ask questions, was set up early in 1942 with the estab-
and discuss the problems connected with lishment of the Instructor Training and
their use in the theaters. The value of this Guidance Section under the assistant com-
practical training aid was rated so highly mandant of the Quartermaster School.
and the program of demonstrations in- OCS classes remained the greatest single
creased to such an extent that by the early source of potential instructors. By 1945,
part of 1945 the Demonstration Battalion however, more than 60 percent of the in-
had absorbed the Military Training Divi- structors were officers returned from over-
sion of the Quartermaster School.' seas. Because of the constant turnover of
Special training platoons were estab- instructors, the work of the section was
lished late in 1942 for candidates who important throughout the war.'
appeared to possess the necessary qualifi- At the beginning of the OCS program,
cations but whose records of progress were each instructor specialized in certain sub-
not up to the level of the rest of the class. jects and taught them both in the OCS
Those whose difficulty was traced to the and in other divisions of the Quartermas-
fact that they had lost or had never ter School. Early in 1942, however, in
learned the technique of efficient study order to put the school on a stricter mili-
were assigned to the Academic Orienta- tary basis, members of the faculty as well
tion Platoon where efforts were made to as the OCS candidates were organized
help them correct their own deficiencies '
weeks to overcome his weakness. If success- Instructor Training and Guidance Section, see Pt. I,
ful he joined the next OCS class. When l^p. 48-52.
SCHOOLS FOR OFFICERS AND ENLISTED SPECIALISTS 257
along regimental lines. Instructors taught of World War II. In 1925 the school was
only in the regiment to which they were removed from the jurisdiction of the Phila-
assigned. Because this plan was uneco- delphia Depot and established as an inde-
nomical and inefficient, it was soon aban- pendent institution of the Corps. By 1936 '''
doned and the faculty was again it had become the function of the school
reorganized. This time a department sys- not only to train selected officers, warrant
tem was devised whereby instructors were and enlisted men, but "to stand-
officers,
grouped into departments in accordance ardize methods of quartermaster instruc-
with the subjects they taught. This ar- tion" and "to prepare and revise training
rangement continued until October 1944 and Army extension courses." ^^
literature
when, as pointed out earlier, the Officer During World War II the program of
Candidate Division was created in the the Quartermaster School expanded enor-
Quartermaster School Department and mously. In addition to training officer can-
the instructors who were assigned to it de- didates, the institution conducted numer-
voted their full attention to teaching in the ous courses of instruction in administrative,
ocs. technical,.and military aspects of Quarter-
master activities for enlisted men and
The Qimrtermaster School women. Reserve and National Guard
officers, ROTC students, and commis-
While various temporary schools were sioned personnel. The school also had the
conducted earlier by the QMC, the Quar- responsibility for preparing and revising
termaster School had its beginning as a manuals, handbooks, and similar instruc-
permanent educational institution in Jan- tional material. Moreover, it was given a
uary 1920. At that time the General Ad- new function in October 1943, when it was
ministrative School was established at the called upon to assist to a limited extent in
Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot for the the training of Quartermaster units.''
purpose of training selected enlisted men When the emergency was declared in
of the Corps in clerical, administrative, 1939 the activities of the school were still
and executive duties. The original class comparatively limited in scope. The pro-
graduated only seventeen men, but the en- gram of instruction comprised only a two-
rollment in subsequent classes grew month refresher course for National Guard
steadily, and in 1921 the school moved to and Reserve officers, which would fit them
larger quarters in the Schuylkill Arseaal primarily for garrison rather than active
in Philadelphia. The following year offi-
cers and warrant officers were enrolled for
" 1) Annual Report of I he Qiiartermaster General, 1920
the first time, and extension courses were (
Schuylkill Arsenal had been adequate for for the administration of the school's en-
peacetime instruction, they became quite larged training program, but by the spring
cramped and unsuitable when the pro- of 1942 a regimental-type organization
gram began to expand to meet emergency under a commanding officer of troops was
requirements. Quarters were insufficient authorized. Under the system of school
at the installation to accommodate all of regiments both the students and the faculty
the students and even meals had to be ob- were organized along regimental lines.
tained outside from civilian sources. More- The instructors taught only in the regi-
over, most of the instructors were lacking ments to which they were assigned. They
in field experience, and equipment was also acted as company officers and gave
inadequate for the new courses. ^^ instruction in both basic military and tech-
The steady growth of enrollment in nical subjects. In August 1942 all academic
these courses and the opening of the large instructors were withdrawn from the regi-
ROTC graduate and officer candidate ments and placed in the Academic Train-
classes in the summer of 1941 forced the ing Division, which was created to provide
Quartermaster School to seek larger quar- for more specialization in technical sub-
ters, where technical field training could jects. The regiments retained sole respon-
be given, and it was moved to Camp Lee sibility for basic military training.
in the fall of that year. Between then and About a year later, in July 1943, the
the late summer of 1942 four main groups Academic Training Division was renamed
of temporary buildings were completed, the School Department, and assumed re-
along with extensive outdoor tactical field
'"
Rpt, Mil Tng Div, OQMG, for ASF, Schooling
training and technical training demon-
of Commissioned Offs, QM School Sec, pp. 1-7.
stration areas. '« Ibid., p. 1.
Activities of the schoolexpanded sharply -" E. Ramsey Richardson, History of the Quartermaster
infantry divisions, and the course was plishments in World War II. (Hereafter cited as Rpt,
extended to six weeks. Mil Tng Div, Accomplishments in WW II.)
260 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
title of the course was changed to the course, although the total number was
Civilian SOS Depot Selection Course, and comparatively small. The course was one
the 315 graduates were commissioned in of the most important conducted at the
the supply services instead of in the ASC school and nearly 3,500 officers from vari-
as originally intended. ous technical services were graduated.-^
The ASF Depot Course, which provided Between July 1943 and June 1944 the
technical instruction in all operational Quartermaster School also offered three
phases of Army warehousing to officers of twenty-day Special Depot Courses. Two of
allthe technical services, was inaugurated these were to acquaint Navy officers with
in March 1943 and classes were in session Army warehousing methods and proce-
almost constantly throughout the remain- dures. The third was for Quartermaster
der of the war. The course was divided officers and was similar to the ASF Depot
into three periods. The first four-week Course with the exception that field trips
period was conducted at the Quartermas- were omitted.
ter School and the instruction was of a Another outstanding program con-
general nature, including such subjects as ducted at the school was the Advanced
the organization of the Army for supply, Supply Officers' Course, which was estab-
the physical handling and transporting of lished in January 1943. It was designed to
supplies, modern warehousing methods, train field-grade and potential field-grade
materials handling, property accounting, officers for field duty as division quarter-
packaging and crating, open storage, and masters, corps quartermasters, task force
protection against enemy action. The sec- quartermasters, or staging area quarter-
ond period covered the special phases pe- masters, and as other staff assistants. Early
culiar to a particular service, while the in the course advanced tactical military
third consisted of practical work in a joint- subjects and exercises were introduced,
ly operated depot. The second and third and actual field training in relation to the
phases were conducted concurrently, first operation of Quartermaster units was in-
at the Columbus ASF Depot and later at stituted at the A. R Hill Military Reserva-
the Utah ASF Depot.-- The classes at the tion. Primary emphasis, however, was
Quartermaster School included some mili- upon advanced technical supply problems,
tary instruction, but the emphasis was which were attacked from a staff rather
upon technical instruction and practical than an operating angle. Classes in this
demonstration of depot practices and course were in session ten weeks and more
procedures. than 2,000 officers were given the train-
Constant eff'orts were made to increase ing-
"'
the effectiveness of the ASF Depot Course, Two special unit-training courses for
to use faculty members with actual experi- officers, each of four weeks' duration, were
ence in overseas depot operations, and to conducted at the school between April
give practical and up-to-date instruction 1943 and February 1944. The first was
concerning the problems of supply in over-
--'
seas theaters. Field trips to depot installa- See below. Officer Training al Depots.
-'
known as the Officers' Course (Special), supplant the training formerly given
and seven classes were conducted during Quartermaster personnel by the American
the period from April to November 1943 Institute of Baking. This course dealt with
for Quartermaster officerswho had been all phases of Army baking and was de-
selected for assignment to particular units signed to produce key personnel for post
soon to be activated. This course was and field bakeries. The Military Fuel and
divided into three phases. Phase one was Lubricants Course was developed in
designed to train officers in basic Quarter- March 1945 when it became apparent
master services in theaters of operations; that continued demands for qualified
phase two included unit operation and commissioned personnel in that field
command training; and phase three was would create a critical shortage of officers
devoted to specialization in a particular trained in fuel and lubricants operations.
unit. The student officers were required to The program was established in two
solve practical problems that might arise phases in conjunction with the Navy. The
upon their assignment to newly activated first phase was a two-week academic
units. A somewhat similar unit-training course at the Quartermaster School, while
program, known as Officers' Unit Train- the second was a three-week applicatory
ing Course B, was conducted from Novem- training course at the Naval Operations
ber 1943 to February 1944 for pool officers Training School at Bayonne, N. J.
awaiting overseas assignment. The pro- Two courses designed to prepare Quar-
gram was made by organizing
realistic termaster officers for the unusual supply
provisional battalions in which the student and unit activities in the Pacific area were
officers performed duties in company-type instituted at the Quartermaster School
units. The faculty acted as battalion head- during the closing months of the war. The
quarters, and the students, acting as com- Quartermaster Technical Operations
pany officers, had the opportunity to learn Course was conducted during April and
how battalions were administered in rela- May 1945. Techniques developed in sup-
tion to subordinate companies. ply operations in Europe were presented
In an effort to meet emergency demands in this course, which stressed the operation
needed Quartermaster officer
for critically and maintenance of Quartermaster non-
and enlisted specialists between 1943 and divisional units, with special attention to
V-E Day, the Quartermaster School pre- the peculiar supply conditions that the
sented three other specialized courses. The officers might expect to encounter in the
Graves Registration Course was estab- Pacific. Between July and September 1945
lished in response to requests from theater a series of four-week classes in the Special
commanders late in 1942 for officers capa- Clothing and Equipment Course was pre-
ble of handling casualties then occurring sented to officers and enlisted men repre-
in combat zones, and three two-week senting the ASF, the AGF, the AAF, and
classes for officers were conducted during the Canadian Army. This instruction per-
the first half of 1943. The course stressed tained to the use and conservation of Army
work and improvisation in
practical field clothing and equipment designed for em-
graves registration operations. The Ad- ployment in wet-cold climates, such as
vanced Baking Course for officers and en- that of the Japanese home islands. The
listed men was established in July 1943 to course was divided into two parts. The first
262 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
two-week period was conducted at Fort because the school was largely occupied
Devens, Mass., where the students became with the training of officer candidates. Be-
acquainted with the principles of clima- fore the end of 1942 the progress of the war
tology and their relationship to Army had created demands for more and better-
clothing and equipment and studied the qualified noncommissioned officers than
new items of Quartermaster wet-cold could be supplied from the graduates of
clothing and equipment. The second two- the courses in the QMRTC's. Conse-
week period was offered at the Quarter- quently a twelve-week advanced course in
master School, where intensive training administration and supply for enlisted
was given the students in lesson planning, men was inaugurated at the school in
public speaking, the use of climatic maps, December of that year.
the proper use of clothing, techniques of This new program was known at first as
teaching, fitting of wet-cold items, the Enlisted Specialist Course. It was de-
psychology of combat, and conservation of signed to train enlisted men in administra-
clothing and equipment. tion and supply for grades up to technical
Beginning in the spring of 1945 the sergeant. Although originally designated
Quartermaster School also operated a as basic in character, the program of in-
four-week Nurses' Basic Military Training struction was so complete that in April
Course for the Third Service Command. 1943 it was redesignated the Quartermas-
The purpose was to orient newly commis- ter Noncommissioned Officers' Adminis-
sioned nurses and instruct them in the tration and Supply Course (Advanced).-^
principles and methods of medical field '
to qualify them both technically and tac- ASFTC's as well as to service commands
tically for their Quartermaster duties. In and the arms and services.
the spring of that year the course, which During the spring of 1944 the course
originallyhad been restricted to qi:otas was adapted to the needs of enlisted WAC
from the QMRTC's at Camp Lee and personnel and was renamed the Quarter-
Fort Warren, was opened to men from the master Noncommissioned Officers' and
AGE, the AAF, and the nine service WAC Administration and Supply Course
commands. (Advanced). The course was revised once
At that time, an inquiry from Fort
too, more in the spring of 1945, this time to
Warren focused attention on the question meet the needs of personnel to be rede-
of whether Negro enlisted men could be ployed to the Pacific after the defeat of
enrolled in the course. The question was Germany. The new course became effec-
not settled immediately, but beginning in tive in June 1945 and was renamed the
March 1944 Negro students were admit- Advanced Administration and Supply
ted. Eventually, quotas were allotted to Course (Enlisted). It was an eight-week
264 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
program designed to train warehouse fore- Corps, Quartermaster company adminis-
men, administrative noncommissioned tration, fiscal procedures, procurement
officers, commissary stewards, subsistence procedures, property accounting, military
noncommissioned officers, and Quarter- leadership, storage and issue of supplies,
master supply technicians. By V-J Day ap- defense against chemical warfare, and sal-
proximately 7,000 enlisted personnel had vage operations. Subjects given during the
completed the various courses of this ad- second-year advanced program included
ministrative program at the Quartermas- commercial transportation, subsistence,
ter School.-" military leadership, military history and
policy, military law, training manage-
Reserve Officers' Training Corps ment, field operations, and principles of
warfare. In addition, the students were re-
The emergency Quartermaster Reserve quired to undergo a practical outdoor pro-
Corps program was in- gram of rigorous
Officers' Training physical conditioning,
augurated in mid-June 1941 with the es- military drill, and other basic military
tablishment of a unit at the Harvard subjects.-^ Each ROTC unit was organ-
Graduate School of Business Administra- ized into a battalion or regiment, accord-
tion. This was the only Quartermaster ing to the number of students participat-
ROTC unit organized before Pearl Har- ing, and instructions in the field and
bor and the only one conducted at a grad- classroom were carried out on that basis.
uate school. During the first eight months
-'"
This figure is given as an approximation. Sources
of 1942, however, additional Quartermas-
See Richardson, Hist oj'QM
difier as to the exact total.
ter ROTC units were opened at eight App. IV-D, p. 4. Compare Rpt, Mil Tng Div,
School,
other colleges and universities.-'* Accomplishments in WW
II, p. 8.
Students enrolled in the Quartermaster The schools where Quartermaster ROTC units
'-"^
tions was the Quartermaster Motor Trans- Emergency Period. (2) Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Off
port School, a special service school at the Candidates, Pt. I, p. 22.
" Ltr, Gen Munnikhuysen, OQMG, to TAG, 30
Holabird Quartermaster Depot near Oct 40, sub: Courses of Instruction at the QM MT
Baltimore. School, and Ind, TAG to TQMG, 7 Nov 40, 352.01.
266 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
maintenance through the Fort Wayne By the end of the fiscal year 1942, seven
Quartermaster Supply Depot, Detroit, in civiUan trade schools had been placed
which a series of four-week courses was under contract by the QMC and were
conducted in conjunction with the plants being operated under the administrative
of certain automotive manufacturers. Of- and instructional control of The Quarter-
ficers who were enrolled became familiar, master General. Six of these, in various
by means of lectures and inspection trips, sections of the country, were presenting
with the vehicles produced at these plants eight-week to twelve-week courses for en-
and learned the basic principles of main- listed men in general automotive mechan-
tenance.^^ ics. The six schools were transferred
The Quartermaster General gained eventually to the Ordnance Department."
complete control over another type of The seventh trade school, the American
motor transport school before the transfer Institute of Baking in Chicago, was en-
of the program to the Ordnance Depart- gaged in teaching advanced post and field
ment. In the spring of 1942, four corps baking to officers and enlisted men. This
area motor transport schools that had been contract remained in effect until the mid-
conducting basic and advanced automo- dle of 1943.
tive mechanics courses for enlisted person- Two additional civilian trade schools
nel during the fiscal years 1941 and 1942 were placed under contract in the fiscal
were finally placed under his administra- year 1943, and they continued to train
tive as well as instructional supervision. Quartermaster enlisted men until early
These schools were located at Fort Devens, 1944. One of these was the Mid-West
Mass.; Miller Field, Staten Island, N. Y.; Motive Trades Institute, Danville, III.,
Fort Sheridan, III.; and Fort Crook, Nebr. which conducted a twelve-week course in
This transfer of control was a further step
(1) The plants were those of the Ford Motor Co.,
'^
toward the standardization and correla-
Chrysler Motor Corp., and the Truck and Chevrolet
tion of the motor transport training pro- Divisions of General Motors Corp. (2) Rpt, Mil Tng
gram.''"' Div, Tng of Commissioned OfTs, Pt. I, MTSchools
Sec, p. 2.
' (1) Ltr, Hq SOS to TQMG, 15 Mar 42, sub:
Civilian Trade and Factory Schools Transfer of CA MT Schools. (2) Memo, TQMG for
Dir of Tng Div, SOS, 30 Mar 42, same sub.
Even though many new technical Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Accomplishments in
••^
WWII,
p. 12.
schools and courses were added, military (1) These six schools were: the David Ranken,
''
of urgently needed officer and enlisted Tire and Rubber Co., Akron; Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Co., Akron; Indian Motorcycle Co., Spring-
mechanical specialists. These schools con- field, Mass.; Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Milwaukee;
ducted courses ranging in length from Electric Auto-Lite Co., Toledo; Winton Engine Plant,
one to six weeks in repair and rebuilding Geperal Motors Corp., Cleveland; and National Sup-
ply Co., Philadelphia.
of shoe-stitching machinery, business- (1) The schools turned over to the Ordnance De-
'•'
machine operation, the manufacture and partment were the Firestone, Goodyear, Harley-
repair of metal petroleum containers, and Davidson, and Indian Companies. (2) For more de-
tailed accounts of factory-sponsored schools see Rpt,
dry-cleaning operations.^" Mil Ti)g Div, Schooling of Enlisted Pers. MT Schools
Sec, pp. 7-19, and Young, Inspection of Aiilitary Train-
ing, pp. 23-26, 53-54.
Schools in Civilian Educational ^" The sponsors of these schools were the Landis
mands of the Army. The course was Army. They consisted of nine bakers' and
designed to prepare selected Quartermas- cooks' schools, one in each corps area,
ter and other ASF officers for higher which were offering four-month courses
echelons of Army supply work by ac- for selected enlisted men of the Regular
quainting them with the terminology, Army in the theory and practice of cook-
fundamental problems, and point of view ing, baking, mess management, and the
of businessmen and industrial organiza- elements of nutrition.
tions with whom the Army had to deal in In order to provide intensive training
obtaining supplies and equipment; to give over a shorter period of time, the courses
them an opportunity to study industrial were reduced from four to two months
methods adaptable to supply operation; early in the summer of 1940, but the nine
and to enlarge the administrative capac- schools were still unable to produce a suffi-
ities of the officers so that they might be cient number of graduates to fill the in-
more handling Army supply
effective in creasing demands for cooks, bakers, and
problems/' Nearly 400 officers had been mess sergeants. Consequently in the fall of
given this training when the course was that year, the corps areas were authorized
discontinued in October 1943/' to expand facilities by establishing sub-
The urgent need for technically quali- schools to operate directly under the
fied personnel to test and analyze petro- supervision of the nine parent bakers' and
leum products acquired by the Army from cooks' schools. At the peak of the program
foreign sources led to the establishment of in the summer of 1943 there were ninety-
the last of these specialized Quartermaster five of these subschools in operation, and
training programs in September 1943. At during that one year alone nearly 12,000
that time The Quartermaster General and officers and more than 46,000 enlisted men
the Eighth Service Command established were trained under the program. ^^ All of
a course at the University of Tulsa, Tulsa, these schools were under the technical and
Okla., to train officers and enlisted men as instructional supervision of The Quarter-
petroleum laboratory technicians and pe- master General, while the administrative
troleum test-engine operators for service in control was the responsibility of the corps
Quartermaster petroleum products lab- area in which they were located, except for
The training certain designated subschools that were
oratories in overseas areas.
began four-week course, which was placed under the administrative supervi-
as a
lengthened to six weeks in the spring of sion of their post commanders.
1944. By the fall of that year the require- With the number of subschools steadily
ments for these technicians had been ful- ^' Dean Donald K. Da\'id, Harvard Uni-
Incl, Ltr,
filled, and the were discontinued
classes versityGraduate School of Business Adm. to Gen Cor-
after a total of 67 officers and 260 enlisted bin, Actg TQMG, 4 Feb 43, sub: Advanced Tech
Tng Course for Army Sup Offs.
men had been given the training.^' ^- Rpt, Mil Tng Div, sub: Accomplishments in
WW II, p. 11 A.
' '
11.(2) More detailed accounts of
) Ibid., p.
Schools for Bakers and Cooks ( 1
that existed at the beginning of the emer- ing of Commissioned Offs, Pt. I, Harvard School of
Business Administration and University of Tulsa Sees.
gency were entirely inadequate to meet '^
Rpt, Mil Tng Div, sub: Accomplishments in WW
the requirements of the rapidly expanding II, p. 10.
270 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
bination with regular ration components. who, in turn, designated food supervisors
The mission of the other was to train offi- at each installation to carry out the details
cers and enlisted men as instructors in the of thenew conservation measures. The op-
preparation and serving of dehydrated eration of the Food Service Program
foods. Three other courses were added to resulted in a better co-ordinated training
the regular curriculum in 1942 for the pur- program in the schools for bakers and
pose of training company grade and field cooks, a more efficient utilization of mess
grade officers in such matters as changes personnel, the preparation of more palat-
in the handling of rations and the latest able meals, and a marked improvement in
methods of conserving food. the conservation of food.
Numerous other steps were taken to im- The Quartermaster Subsistence Re-
prove the training program. Early in 1941 search Laboratory at the Chicago Quar-
The Quartermaster General made ar- termaster Depot participated in the
rangements with the National Livestock program for training bakers and cooks be-
and Meat Board to send crews of its ex- tween 1940 and 1943 by conducting spe-
perts to all of the schools for bakers and cial courses for officers and enlisted men
cooks to give lectures and practical demon- in various phases of subsistence. At inter-
strations in the approved methods of cut- vals during the emergency and the early
ting and cooking meats. Recognizing the months of the war it offered four-month
importance of a standard and more palat- courses to noncommissioned officers in
able brew of coffee, The Quartermaster subsistence inspection and allied subjects.
General inaugurated in 1942 a special These courses were replaced in March
two-week course in coffee roasting and 1942 by two-week courses for both officers
brewing for officers and enlisted personnel.and enlisted men in cold-weather cooking
One of the most notable steps to im- designed to provide "a suitable diet for
prove the training of cooks and bakers troops stationed in Alaska and other cold
and the food program as a whole was regions," which were continued until April
taken in July 1943 when the Commanding 1943." The laboratory also opened a two-
General, ASF, issued a directive establish- month course in October 1941 to train
ing the Food Service Program in a move officers for service as assistant comman-
to co-ordinate all food activities within his dants of the schools for bakers and cooks,
command and to foster conservation in the but classes were terminated in March
handling of food throughout the Army. 1942. This course included theoretical
The program provided for more rigid instruction at the laboratory, followed by
supervision and inspection of messes, im- practical training at the Fort Sheridan
proved methods for the preparation, dis- School of Bakers and Cooks.
tribution, and consumption of food, and The outstanding feature of the schools
more efficient technical training for mess for bakers and cooks was the centralized
supervisors, cooks, and bakers. While the control exercised by The Quartermaster
program was placed under the general di- General over training that enabled him to
rection of The Quartermaster General, it provide a uniform program of instruction.
was immediately supervised by the direc-
^' Walter Porges, The Subsistence Research Laboratory
tors of food service, appointed by the com-
(CQMD Historical Studies, No. 1, May 1943), pp.
manding generals of the service commands, 30-31.
272 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
At the same time, the general operation of Quartermaster General late in October
the schools was hampered by the fact that 1944 to re-establish and operate the Quar-
the service commands retained adminis- termaster Subsistence School at the Chi-
trative control over the schools. The prin- cago Depot. The school had been closed in
cipal weakness of this division of responsi- 1936 and subsequently converted into the
bility was that The Quartermaster Gen- Subsistence Research and Development
eral had no authority to inspect the train- Laboratory. The director of the labora-
ing for which he had promulgated the tory —
Col. Roland A. Isker was named —
doctrine/'^ commandant of the school when it re-
opened on 4 December 1944.
Subsistence School The immediate objective was to give ad-
vanced instruction to officers in an effi^rt
Since procurement and storage of sub- them for overseas subsistence as-
to qualify
sistence had been centralized in the depot signments. The original authorization, re-
and market center systems during the war war ended, provided for a
vised after the
and most of the key posts were occupied by thirteen-week course and a schedule of
civilian experts, a training problem arose four classes, each with a quota of twenty
in the fall of 1944 when the prospect of an student officers. Only two of these classes
early end to the war induced many of the had been graduated by V-J Day, and the
^^
civilians to accept jobs in private industry. third was in progress.
Their resignations threatened to create a
serious situation because of the lack of Officer Training at Depots
qualified officers to take their places.
The Quartermaster General pointed While Quartermaster depots were con-
out that new post Quartermaster officers cerned primarily with supply operations,
had acquired little knowledge or experi- they contributed materially to the pro-
ence in the procurement of subsistence gram of advanced training for officers. All
supplies, and emphasized the need for of the depots during the war conducted
prompt action in providing facilities for courses of instruction for officers perma-
training permanent officer personnel for nently assigned to them as well as for offi-
assignment to key positions in the procure- cers who were in the depot replacement
ment and storage of subsistence as well as pools awaiting assignment. ^^
in the Food Service Program.
^''
For more detailed accounts of the training and
The volume of subsistence procure-
dollar inspection of schools for bakers and cooks see (1) Rpt,
ment amounts to over $1,500,000,000 per Mil Tng Div, Schooling of Commissioned Offs, Pt. I,
year. An error of as little as one percent Bakers' and Cooks' Schools Sec; (2) Rpt, Mil Tng
through the lack of skillful buying would cost Div, Schooling of Enlisted Pers, Pt. I, Schools for
the government $15,000,000. The tonnage Bakers and Cooks, Sec; (3) Young, Inspection of Mili-
tarv Training, pp. 17-19,54-56, 132-33.
volume of subsistence exceeds 20,000 tons per
day. The loss of even as little as one percent
'''
Memo, Gen Gregory for CG
ASF, 28 Sep 44,
through inefficient storage control would re-
sub: Establishment of QM Subsistence School, 352.01.
^"^
A more detailed account of the Subsistence
sult in the loss of 400,000 pounds of food per
School appears in Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Schooling of
day, or more than sufficient food to feed five Commissioned Offs, Pt. II, QM
Subsistence Course
divisions. ^^ Sec.
^' The pool system is discussed above in Chapter
Headquarters, ASF, authorized The VI.
SCHOOLS FOR OFFICERS AND ENLISTED SPECIALISTS 273
' Young,
Inspection of Military Training, p. 143.
depot-training inspections were more fre- which was presented at the Quartermaster
quent and thorough, and the depots gen- School. ^^ This advanced training was con-
erally, despite their continuing difficulties ducted at the Columbus Depot from April
in providing training facilities,were exert- 1943 until May 1944 when the program
ing greater efforts to conduct the kind of was transferred to the Utah Depot. The
instruction thatwould enable their officers initial plan called for presentation of the
to meet FOR By the fall of
standards. second and third phases in successive two-
1944, overseas demands for Quartermas- week periods. However, a more practical
ter officers had depleted the supply of system was adopted whereby the training
available commissioned personnel at the was combined in a four-week course with
depots to the point that formal training at the theoretical instruction of the second
these installations ended in October. ^"^ phase and the on-the-job training of the
The most valuable feature of the train- third phase given concurrently in half-day
ing at depots for assigned and pool officers periods. In this way the student officers
was that the student officer could actually learned the duties of the various types of
participate in the operations he was study- depot personnel in the morning and then
ing. Yet while the depots offered this ex- watched these duties being performed in
cellent opportunity for practical applica- the afternoon.''"
tion of technical instruction, by the same The Packaging, Processing, and Pack-
token they were generally lacking in facili- ing Course was also conducted at the
ties and experienced personnel for con- Columbus Depot, with classes beginning
ducting basic military training, and conse- November 1944 and continuing until
in
quently that type of training often was 15 June 1945. The course was established
neglected to a serious degree. Another out- to relieve the shortage of officers experi-
standing weakness was that the training enced in packing and crating, and the
task was subordinate to the depots' pri- Columbus Depot was selected to give the
mary mission of supplying troops, and the training because it possessed the best-
programs frequently had to be conducted equipped facilities, including a large box
at odd times and under unusual circum- shop. The objective was to give officer and
stances. Moreover, most of the officers as- enlisted personnel on-the-job training in
signed to the depots experienced so much the packaging and crating of Quartermas-
difficulty in learning their own jobs and in ter supplies for both overseas and domestic
keeping up with the increasing work loads shipments. The course originally ran four
that they had little time to devote to the weeks but subsequently was condensed into
training of other officers. three weeks. The later classes placed par-
In addition to the training given as- ticular stress upon the training of officers
signed and pool officers at all of the depots, For more detailed discussions of the training of
'^*'
special depot courses were conducted at assigned and pool officers at depots see ( ) Young,
1
sessed specific technical skillsneeded by ingand Packing Course Sec, pp. 1-6.
"-'
Ibid., Pt. I, Advanced School for Storage Offs
the QMC. Others were Reserve and Na- Sec, pp. 1-13 and Pt. II, same sub, same Sec, pp.
tional Guard officers, nearly all of whom 1-6.
SCHOOLS FOR OFFICERS AND ENLISTED SPECIALISTS 277
enlisted men and officers was conducted shifting requirements and the needs aris-
at the Quartermaster School, which ex- ing from the development of new Quarter-
panded its program enormously after the master functions. Aside from the fact that
institution was moved from the Schuylkill the increased complexity of operations
Arsenal to Camp Lee in the fall of 1941. multiplied the types of specialists required,
Numerous other military installations and that Quartermaster officers for the
were established for the specialized train- first time had to be trained as combat
ing of Quartermaster personnel. These in- leaders as well as technicians, certain
eluded motor transport schools in various trends emerged in the course of the train-
parts of the country, approximately a hun- ing program. One of these was the shift in
dred bakers' and cooks' schools, and the emphasis from training officers for garri-
Quartermaster Subsistence School in Chi- son duty to preparing them for assignment
—
cago all in addition, of course, to the with the field forces, though this trend did
OCS, the QMRTC's, and the Quarter- not occur in any pronounced degree until
master unit training centers. Moreover, after the United States entered the war.
nine Quartermaster ROTC units were or- The tendency throughout the emergency
ganized in colleges and universities, and period had been to teach peacetime sub-
programs of advanced instruction for offi- jects and to conduct instruction in an
cers were set up on a full-time training academic and theoretical manner. The
schedule in all of the pools and usually on trend after Pearl Harbor was suddenly to-
a part-time basis at the various depots. ward more practical subjects and more
Despite the huge expansion in the pro- realistic training for actual war.
gram of instruction at Army Another definite trend was toward the
installations.
military facilities alone were unable to standardization of programs within the
meet all of the requirements for training various fields of instruction, a standardiza-
Quartermaster specialists, and it became tion that was designed to promote uni-
necessary for the Corps to request assist- formity in technical instruction as well as
ance from factories, commercial trade in military training. The mass production
schools, and civilian educational institu- of new officers and the necessity for hur-
tions in training officers and enlisted men ried instruction to meet the emergency
for certain jobs requiring highly developed situation required the OQMG
to set up an
technical or administrative skills. extensive program for developing better
Courses of instruction as well as teach- and standardized instructional techniques
ing methods underwent marked changes and training aids, and for training the
during the war. The training program had many qualified instructors needed to carry
to be changed almost constantly to meet out the program.
CHAPTER IX
also be used to augment existing units conditions as other units of the Army, and
when additional platoons or companies were organized along military lines for ad-
would be too large. Composite units varied ministration, discipline, and their own
as to the number, size, and types of detach- defense. This, however, was a modern de-
ments included, in accordance with the velopment. It was not until 1912 that the
strength of the force or installation to be Corps began to function as a strictly mili-
assisted and the specific services required. tary organization. A rider to the Army
Appropriations Act of that year consol-
Origin and Development of
idated the Quartermaster, Subsistence,
Quartermaster Units
and Pay Departments, thus creating the
The work of most Quartermaster units Quartermaster Corps with its own officers
was of a technical nature, but these units and troops."^ In all wars fought up to that
were all nevertheless military organiza- L'-S". Statutes at Large, Vol. 37, p. 591 (Act ap-
tions. They were subject to the same field proved 24 Aug 12).
280 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
^
time, from the American Revolution 'de-lousing' or have his shoes repaired."
through the war with Spain, the actual In the two decades following the 1918
field operations of the Quartermaster's Armistice, relatively little was done to
Department, though supervised by offi- overcome the weaknesses that the experi-
cers, had been carried on primarily by ence in France had brought to light in
civilian employees, or by detachments of units of the QMC
and other service organ-
combat troops when civilians were not izations. Although the National Defense
available. Act of 1920 had paved the way for mod-
Although Congress in 1912 had author- ernization of the country's military organ-
ized the establishment of Quartermaster ization, sufficient funds were not appro-
units, the Corps as organized in 1916, just priated because of public apathy and a
before the United States entered World lethargy settled upon the Army with the
War I, provided for only four types —
truck, result that progress in many fields, includ-
bakery, pack, and wagon companies/ ing that of troop-unit modernization, was
almost at a standstill. One development
Not very much was accomplished along
this line of reform until the United States that did take place soon after the 1920 act
entered the first World War, but the change restored the Army transportation function
came rapidly after that. General John J. Per- to the QMC, however, was the establish-
shing, commanding the American Expedi- ment of motor-transport operating, main-
tionary Forces in France, sent home requisi-
tenance, and supply units.
tions in rapid succession calling for specialized
supply troops which he found in use in the A revision of all the Quartermaster
French and British armies. These units were T/O's finally occurred in 1935 as a result
organized, trained as far as possible, and of efforts by General. Douglas Mac Arthur,
shipped overseas. By the end of 1917 there then Chief of Staff", to accomplish "an
were twenty-eight different types of Quarter-
master troop units in existence, placing quar- orderly program for progressive modern-
termaster functions for the first time on a ization of the Army" after "circumstances
thoroughly military basis. of the first postwar decade had compelled
the Army to lag behind in adapting its or-
Generally speaking, the Quartermaster
ganization, equipment and tactical doc-
units in World War I were similar in name
trine to modern requirements." '
It was
and performed about the same functions
under this revision of tables in the mid-
as those in World War II. However, they
thirties thatQuartermaster units generally
had been hastily organized and there was
were organized on a regimental basis. For
little time for training or for ironing out
example, the Quartermaster regiment of
imperfections before they became opera-
the infantry division replaced the Quarter-
tional. Their performance, on the whole,
was creditable and contributed to the suc-
cess of the American arms in the great bat- ^ Manual for the Quartermaster Corps, United States
tles of 1918, but there was much room for Army, 1916 (2 vols., Washington, 1917), I, Art. I, p.
II.
improvement pioneer organiza-
in these
'
Thomas M. Pitkin, "Evolution of the Quarter-
tions at the time of the Armistice. For master Corps, 1775-1950," QAIR. XXIX (May-June
example, the units were either fixed or of 1950), p. 109.
and it was often necessary
limited mobility
" "Camp Lee, Va.," Q_MR,
Lt Victor L. Gary,
XXI (September-October 1941) p. 24.
for the American soldier on the front line Ltr, CofS to
'
TQMG
et al., 9 Jul 34, sub: Revi-
to "walk back 20 to 25 miles to get his sion of Tng Methods, AG 353 (7-9-34).
THE ACTIVATION AND TRAINING OF UNITS 281
master train, or supply train as it had been fantry division had provided for a Quar-
known in World War I. termaster regiment to perform the normal
Early in 1939, at the direction of the Quartermaster functions required by the
General Staff, The Quartermaster Gen- division. Under the shift to the triangular
eral requested the Quartermaster Board to form of organization, the division had
make a thorough study of all Quartermas- fewer men than before, and therefore the
ter T/O's and recommend any revisions in organic Quartermaster regiment was re-
the tables for motor transport and supply placed by a battalion. Later on, in the fall
units considered necessary to make them of 1942, when automotive maintenance
conform to provisions of the Protective was transferred from Quartermaster to
Mobilization Plan. He urged that special Ordnance jurisdiction, the work load of
attention be devoted to the problems of the Quartermaster organic unit in the
providing greater mobility and of stand- division was reduced still further, and the
ardizing the various units —
company, bat- battalion was replaced by a company.^
talion, and regiment —
so that they could Nondivisional types of units also experi-
be employed in either combat or rear enced this process. The Quartermaster
areas.** regiment virtually disappeared in the
Reorganization was under way when 1939-40 reorganization. Quite a few bat-
the outbreak of the war in Europe, the talions were retained at that time, but the
President's proclamation of a limited na- search for greater flexibility through re-
tional emergency, and the introduction of duction in the size of units continued. By
the blitzkrieg type of warfare by the Ger- the fall of 1943 further revisions of tables
mans in the campaigns of 1939 and 1940 had eliminated the fixed-size battalion as
provided a real impetus for eliminating all well as the regiment from the Quarter-
deficiencies and building the Army to such master organization, and the company be-
strength that it would be capable of meet- came the basic T/O unit as it did in most
ing the modern armies of Europe in actual of the other supply services.^"
combat. Briefly, in addition to motorizing The company itself, normally the small-
and mechanizing the Army, the modern- est operating unit, acquired much more
ization process involved converting the flexibility in the 1939-40 reorganization.
outmoded square divisions of World War
I into smaller, more compact triangular '^(l) Ltr, Maj Gen Henry Gibbins, TQMG, to
divisions, and reorganizing supply troops President QM Bd, 26 Jan 39, sub: Revision of T/O
so that they would be able to function
of Certain QM Units. (2) Ltr, Gibbins to same, 26
Apr 39, same sub, 320.3.
more efficiently under this streamlining. Ml) T/O 10-271, Nov 40, sub: QM Regiment
1
In line with the sharp trend toward mo- (Inf Div, Square). (2) T/O 10-17, 15 Sep 42, sub:
the first place, there was a decided trend See Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and
Bell I. Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops,
toward reduction in the size of units. For UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
example, the T/O for the old square in- (Washington, 1947), p. 327.
282 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
' units,
ir
panics m the numbers or types needed for especially quartermaster and ordnance, were
a particular purpose. For example, Quar- primarily affected. A
group headquarters
termaster truck companies could be which proved especially effective in the train-
ing of Negro troops could be left undisturbed
grouped in accordance with specific re-
quirements for a special transportation
job, or different types of units, such as " (l) OQMG Rpt, Organization and Functions of
truck, refrigeration, gasoline supply, sal- Quartermaster Units, 30 Nov 45, Sec. on QM Group
'
.^ *.
'
l^f^ -"
, , Hq and Hq Detachments and QM Battalion Hq and
vage repair, service, and laundry com- ^^ Detachments. (2) Ltr, Hq AGF to All CGs, 16
panics, could be assembled to carry out a Oct 43, sub:QM Sv in the Fid.
THE ACTIVATION AND TRAINING OF UNITS 283
as successive increments of units came under mobilization. Most notable among these
its supervision and passed on to a port of em- were: (1) the depot company, supply,
barkation. In the theater the group system
which was designed to provide administra-
made it possible to attach Negro or white
tive and technical personnel for a Quarter-
units to a group headquarters as needed or
desired. Negro units especially gained in master supply depot in a theater of oper-
strength, usefulness, and experience by the ations; (2) the gasoline supply company,
operation of this plan.^^ whose function was to break down bulk
As a means of increasing mobility, pro- deliveries of gasoline and lubricants re-
visions w^eremade in the 1939-40 revision ceived at railheads, truckheads, and refill-
of the T/O's for various types of mobile ing points and distribute them to troops in
—
Quartermaster units mobile shoe repair the field; (3) the port headquarters, to be
shops, mobile laundries, mobile commis- organized for the purpose of directing
sary units, mobile sterilization and bath housekeeping and local transportation
outfits, and mobile maintenance units. functions at ports established in overseas
Most of these organizations, how^ever, ex- theaters of operations;'^and (4) the Quar-
isted only on paper for many months, termaster port battalion, comprised of four
primarily because no funds were available companies, whose function was to provide
for the necessary mobile equipment. ^^ It the common labor required to load and
was 1941 before the money had been ap- discharge vessels in theaters of operations.
propriated and the equipment began roll- Many of the depot supply and gasoline
ing off assembly lines. supply companies were activated and
It was anticipated that such units would
trained during the war and proved invalu-
keep pace with the fast-moving motorized able in carrying out Quartermaster func-
combat troops and be able to operate near tions in the theaters. On the other hand,
the front lines. Actually, these so-called the comparatively few Quartermaster port
mobile units were only semimobile, and battalion and port headquarters units that
they failed to live up to expectations when had been activated by the summer of 1942
put to the test in the North African cam- were redesignated and transferred to the
paign. Their equipment was too bulky and Transportation Corps, which was created
too heavy, and was installed in cumber- at that time to handle rail and water trans-
some vans moved by tractors. All of the portation. Similarly, hundreds of motor-
equipment, therefore, was completely re- repair and maintenance units of various
designed to be more compact, weigh less, types that had been activated and trained
and have greater maneuverability. It was as Quartermaster organizations were
late in the war before the new mobile placed under the jurisdiction of the Ord-
equipment was in production, and com- '- Palmer et al.. The Procurement and Training of
paratively little of it ever reached the Ground Combat Troops, p. 321.
13 Memo, ACofS G-3 for CofS, 4 Jun 40, sub: Ac-
front.''
Most of the 1939-40 revisions in the tivation of Certain QM Units, 320.2.
See Risch, The Quartermaster Corps: Organization,
'^
T/O's were directed toward modernizing Supply, and Services, /, Chap. IV.
'^ It was contemplated that most of the duties at
and refining Quartermaster units already
ports of embarkation and debarkation in the United
in existence, but a number of distinctly
States during mobilization would be performed by
new types were created on paper to be civilian personnel supervised by officers as they were
could provide bread for 1,200 troops. The men and officers to serve in Quarter-
listed
third type, team BH, was set up to bakemaster units, he had extremely limited
bread for 5,000 individuals. The flexibility jurisdiction over the actual training of the
provided by this system made it possible to units themselves, and yet he had to "take
select the combination of teams which the rap" for those which performed un-
could meet the requirements of an armed satisfactorily in the field. He contended
force of almost any given size that could that since he had to shoulder the blame for
not be served economically by a regular any deficiencies of the units he should
bakery company. have the entire responsibility for training
Despite the seeming simplicity of the them.'^
way in which the service organization sys- As a matter of fact, it was eight months
tem was set up, it became apparent early after Pearl Harbor before he was granted
in 1945 that the principles underlying the any authority to activate and train Quar-
organization and use of cellular tables termaster troop units. Even after that, the
were not generally understood, and that AGF and the service commands continued
full advantage was not being taken of the to exercise more control over the training
possibilities for establishing composite of the ground units than he did, while the
units. It was necessary, therefore, at that AAF trained all of the Quartermaster
late date to launch a program for educat- aviation units. The result was that much
ing staff^ agencies in the use and back- of the time there was little uniformity in
ground of the tables.'* the training given Quartermaster organ-
Comparatively few composite units were izations to carry on their functions in the
organized and trained in the zone of in- field.
terior during the war. Inasmuch as they Before March 1942, the training of all
were designed to meet the variable and ground troop units was a function of Gen-
often rapidly changing conditions encoun- eral Headquarters, U. S. Army (GHQ),
tered in theaters of operations composite which delegated the mission to its subor-
units did not lend themselves readily to a dinate armies. In addition, until June 1941
program of training in the United States. when the Army Air Forces was organized,
By the time a theater commander submit- GHQ
was responsible for training all avia-
ted his requisition and the unit could be tion units though it delegated this mission
put together and trained it was likely that to the GHQ
Air Force. Each corps area
the particular need for it would no longer was responsible for organizing and train-
exist. Consequently, composite units gen- ing the Quartermaster units assigned to it
erally were organized and trained in the to carry out its supply and administrative
theaters as needs arose. duties. The sole responsibility of The
Quartermaster General in regard to units
77?^ Corps' Limited Responsibility was to furnish the training doctrine, and
for Unit Training this was followed only when the com-
One of the standing grievances of Maj. "* Lt Col Robert C. McKechnie, "Practical Use of
Gen. Edmund B. Gregory, The Quarter- Cellular Tables," dMR, XXIV (March-April 1945),
p. 63.
master General in World War II, was that '' Statement, Gen Gregory, QM Conf, Camp Lee,
while he was responsible for training en- 2-4 Oct 44.
288 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
mander in charge of training a unit was the situation in regard to Quartermaster
inclined to do so. Although many new units was little changed from what it had
Quartermaster units were activated fol- been before March 1941 in that the activa-
lowing the passage of the Selective Service tion and training of the units remained
Act in 1940, no change was made in the under the control, generally speaking, of
supervision of their training. Furthermore, the field armies and corps areas, and the
regardless of whether the units were availability of housing was still the pri-
activated and trained under GHQ
or mary factor in determining which agency
corps area control, they generally were would conduct the training.
stationed at posts, camps, or stations more Even though The Quartermaster Gen-
in accordance with the availability of eral by then had acquired the authority to
housing space than with training facilities conduct all training at the QMRTC's and
and qualified instructors. The new units the various Quartermaster depots,'^ just as
received their cadres from Regular Army he did at the Quartermaster School, the
units and their fillers from Regular Army, fact was that comparatively few units were
Reserve, National Guard, and selectee ever assigned to any of these installations
sources.-" for training during the emergency period
Demands for new Quartermaster units or the first year of the war, and therefore
at zone of interior and overseas defense in- the training supervision of The Quarter-
stallations were even more urgent by the master General during that period was
spring of 1941, and the General Staff confined almost entirely to instruction of
turned to the newly established replace- enlisted men and officers as individuals.
ment training centers as the best available Meanwhile, several high-level adminis-
agencies to supply the critically needed or- trative changes provided the basis for es-
ganizations. Consequently the first train- tablishing the pattern that was to be fol-
ing cycle at the QMRTC's at Camp Lee lowed in determining just which command
and Fort Warren was devoted to a form of would be responsible for the training of
preactivation unit training in which the particular types of Quartermaster units.
men were trained specifically as fillers for First, the establishment of the AAF, with
about a hundred Quartermaster units and the Air Force Combat Command replac-
were then assembled into those units at the ing the GHQ
Air Force, in June 1941 re-
QMRTC's before activation of the units sulted in the transfer from to the GHQ
at other installations. The demand for ad- AAF of the responsibility for activating
ditional service units was so great during and Quartermaster aviation
training
this cycle, which extended from March to units.-'" The development was
effect of this
the latter part of June 1941, that many that, since The Quartermaster General
Quartermaster unitscontinued to be had had no jurisdiction over these units up
trained at scattered posts, camps, and sta- to that time and the AAF thereafter had
tions under GHQ or corps area control. autonomous control, he never acquired
Upon completion of the first training -"
(1) AR 170-10, 10 Oct 39, sub: CAs and Depts.
cycle the two QMRTC's assumed their in- (2) Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Training of Units, Pt. I, pp.
tended role of training individual replace- 2-3. (3) Young, Inspection of Aiilitaryi Training, pp. 1-2.
-' AR 170-10, Change 1,31 Mar 41, sub: CAs and
ments for utilization wherever needed Depts.
instead of as fillers for specific units. Thus -- AR 95-5, par. 3a, 21 Jun 41, sub: AAF.
THE ACTIVATION AND TRAINING OF UNITS 289
any degree of authority over the training redesignating the corps areas as service
or inspection of aviation units. commands, issued a general training di-
Secondly, with the abohtion of GHQin rective in which he attempted to define the
the general reorganization of the War De- unit training responsibilities of his subordi-
partment on 9 March 1942, the responsi- nate services and agencies. He vested in
organizing and training Quarter-
bility for the service commands the general respon-
master units assigned or attached to the sibility for training all SOS units "except
subordinate field armies passed to the for those units exempted by the Com-
newly created AGF. At the same time, the manding General, Services of Supply."
corps areas, which had a hand in the The authority for training the units that
training of nondivisional Quartermaster he exempted from service command con-
units, became subordinate to the SOS, as trol was delegated to the "Chiefs of the ap-
did the QMC
and the other supply propriate Supply or Administrative Serv-
~^
services. ice concerned."
Itwas not made clear immediately just This meant that The Quartermaster
what responsibility the SOS and its subor- General at last had been granted definite
dinate agencies and chiefs of services, such authority to organize and train Quarter-
as The Quartermaster General, were to master units, even though his authority
have in the training of nondivisional units. was to be restricted to those units specifi-
In fact, it was May 1942 before the War cally assigned to him by the Commandmg
Department attempted to end the confu- General, SOS. Before that his only respon-
sion that existed among the new major sibility had been to prepare the doctrine
commands as to the extent of their respon- for their training, and this was purely
such units. At that time the
sibility for academic since his programs served only
General Staff laid down the principle that as standardized suggestions for the training
"in general, the using command will train and he had no means of determining the
a unit" and directed that the Command- nature of the doctrine actually employed
ing General, SOS, would be "responsible or the results obtained.
for the training of units organized to op- The Quartermaster General's oppor-
erate installations and activities controlled tunity to exercise his newly acquired con-
by him and those units organized in the trol over unit training was quite limited
United States solely for Services of Supply during the last half of 1942 and the early
installations and activities in overseas gar- part of 1943 because the SOS was able to
''^
risons, bases, and theaters." place only a comparatively small number
This ruling was helpful so far as it went, of units under his jurisdiction.-'' The prin-
but it still left unsettled the question of cipal reason was that while the War De-
whether the SOS or the AGF was to train partment made a further attempt to clari-
the types of service organizations, such as fy jurisdiction as between the AGF and
Quartermaster truck, graves registration, the SOS by listing periodically certain
salvage, and other units, which could be
organized in the United States for opera- -•'
Memo, ACofS G-3 for CG SOS et al., 30 May
tion in either the combat or the communi- 42, sub: Responsibility for Tng.
Bakery Units 42 7 35
Depot Companies (Supply) 25 1 19 3 2
Hq & Hq Companies, QM
Base Depot 11 1 8 2
Sales Companies 4 1 3
" Actually these six were given their final unit training by the AGF.
Source: Rpt, Mil Tng Div for TQMG, 11 Sep 45, sub: Outstanding Accomplishments in World War II, p. 22.
acquired the authority to activate and Tng Sv Units. (2) Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Units,
train them.-*^ Pt. I, pp. 66-67.
THE ACTIVATION AND TRAINING OF UNITS 291
terested in their training. In addition, prior be moved to Camp Ellis upon completion
to completion of training, units have been of that new installation. Instead, one half
employed on activities other than that for
of the Quartermaster training staff at Van-
which activated and for which they should
receive training prior to overseas assign- couver Barracks was transferred to Carnp
ment. . . . Ellis in mid-April, while operations at
The establishment of a Unit Training Cen- Vancouver Barracks continued officially
ter wherein unit training for all types of units
until the middle of September. At that
can be conducted is most desirable. Such a
time the center was transferred without
training center would be better prepared and
able to conduct training than any other com- personnel or equipment to Fort Warren,
mand. Furthermore, the Chief of Service can though the eighteen Quartermaster units
select and transfer men from one unit to that had been activated at Vancouver
another on determined qualifications, and by Barracks in July continued their training
the use of a small casual detachment rear-
there until the end of October. ^° The Fort
range specialists in the various units and fur-
nish cadres. Officers and non-commissioned Warren QMRTC
had been discontinued
officerscan be better trained with an instruc- and its personnel and facilities were uti-
tor guidance program, and the use of train- lized to operate the Wyoming installation
ing aids of all types including training films
as a Quartermaster unit training center
and charts can be employed.-'
through V-J Day.
Headquarters, SOS, soon to be redesig- Although their locations shifted. The
nated the ASF, approved the proposal two Quartermaster General had two unit
months later, when facilities finally be- training centers under his jurisdiction
came available for this purpose. The first throughout most of 1943 and the early
Quartermaster unit training center was es- part of 1944 —
the peak period for activa-
tablished at Vancouver Barracks, Wash., tions and —
thus was able to exercise a con-
on 10 January 1943.-* Although it was siderable degree of control over the train-
stipulated that the facilities of this instal- ing of Quartermaster units that were as-
lation were to be utilized by the QMC signed to the ASF. However, the limited
only temporarily pending the completion housing capacities of the two centers made
of the new ASF unit training center at itimpossible to train all of the new organi-
Camp Ellis, Lewiston, III., and only fifty- zations as fast as they were being formed.
three Quartermaster units were trained at Many Quartermaster units therefore con-
the center before it closed in the fall of tinued to be trained at scattered service
1943,-^ the program was significant It
the Quartermaster unit training program. tablishment of QM UTC, Vancouver Barracks, Wash.
-» Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Units, Pt. I, Van-
One of the first moves was to cancel the couver Barracks Sec, p. 22.
provision that the Quartermaster center '" Ibid.,
pp. 15, 20.
292 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
command posts even though the facilities primarily to train service companies and
of both Camp Lee and the Quartermaster relieve the Camp Ellis Quartermaster
School were pressed into service to train training group of its heavy training pro-
certain units in an effort to meet the criti- gram for Negro enlisted men. Eventually,
cal need Quartermaster organizations.
for with the inactivation of the group at Camp
The basic function of the Camp Lee Ellis in mid-October 1944, Fort Devens
QMRTC from its inception in 1941 had took over the function formerly assigned to
been to supply cadres for Quartermaster the Illinois center and continued in opera-
units to be activated elsewhere, but from tion until the spring of 1945.^^
time to time a few miscellaneous units had Records in the Military Training Divi-
been activated and trained there. General sion, OQMG,
at the end of the war show
Gregory had expressed the conviction that between July 1942, when the Com-
from the early days of the war that the manding General, SOS, delegated unit
highly developed shops, specialized equip- training authority to him, and V-J Day,
ment, and qualified personnel at the The Quartermaster General activated and
QMRTC were particularly well suited for trained nearly 850 Quartermaster units.
the training of Quartermaster units and (See Table 18.) Comparable statistics are
that the center should be utilized in part not available on the number of Quarter-
for that purpose. It was December 1943, master units trained by all of the various
however, before he obtained authority to other agencies that at one time or another
establish unit training as a regularly as- had jurisdiction over them, but on 30 June
signed function at Camp Lee. The pro- 1945 there were 3,781 Quartermaster divi-
gram, which continued throughout the re- sionaland nondivisional units. ^^
mainder of the war, began with the
Type QMC Units
activation of thirty-four laundry platoons
but was expanded later to include many Total 3,781
—
the war was set up at the Fort Devens
Ellis Sec, p. 26; and Pt. II, Ft. Devens Sec, p. 1.
'^
See Statistics, April 1952 draft. Troop Units Sec,
ASF Unit Training Center, Ayer, Mass., MS in OCMH.
THE ACTIVATION AND TRAINING OF UNITS 293
Quartermaster units which took the field available regardless of whether satisfactory
inWorld War II. training facilities were at hand. As for
—
equipment weapons, ammunition, and
Principal Training Problems motor vehicles were among the more im-
portant items in which scarcities persisted.
Quartermaster units activated before For example, the 76th Quartermaster Bat-
1943 not only were trained under widely talion (Mobile) had so few trucks for train-
varying conditions and interpretations of ing purposes during the winter of 1942-43
doctrine but were handicapped by many that the individual student driver "re-
other difficulties, some of which persisted ceived only about one hour per week be-
throughout the war. One of the most hind the wheel." ^"^
serious of these during the earliest stages Another serious obstacle to Quarter-
of mobilization in 1939 and most of 1940 master unit training, particularly in 1942,
was the inadequacy of funds for defense was the critical shortage of personnel. Orig-
purposes: inal plans called for the replacement
Ammunition was not available for train- training centers to furnish the fillers for
ing nor wasmoney available to lease or pur- new units, but the output of the QMRTC's
chase maneuver areas. Even the problem of fell so far short of meeting the require-
purchasing enough gasoline to move a unit ments for the many new units being acti-
to a training area assumed gigantic propor-
vated that the majority of the fillers had to
tions. Much equipment was obsolete
of the
and so badly worn that it would not provide be sent to the units directly from the recep-
adequate training for the troops. Too, equip- tion centers. Allotments of personnel to the
ment was not constructed as we know it to- QMC
were so small in proportion to needs
day. Trucks were, for the most part, two- that newly activated units frequently had
wheel-drive converted commercial models
to mark time for weeks and often months
without provision for changing gear ratio in
transmission. Such aids as infiltration courses, waiting for their fillers to arrive. More
combat villages, radio-controlled aircraft tar- often than not when the fillers came they
gets and amphibious vehicles were unknown were completely lacking in both basic mil-
to the American army unit.^^ itary and technical training. In many in-
Extreme shortages of facilities and stances units "were activated with first
equipment continued long after Congress sergeants having less than six months mili-
in the summer of 1940 began to appropri- tary service, cooks who had never cooked
ate almost limitless funds for military in an Army kitchen nor had any training
needs. Time had then become the limiting in the subject, mechanics who could not
factor because men were being inducted even drive an Army vehicle." ^' Moreover,
into the Army and formed into units new units rarely received all of their fillers
faster than labor could build the necessary at one time. Instead, fillers usually drib-
housing and training facilities for them or bled in at irregular intervals, making it
industry could turn out the required equip- necessary either to delay the training of
ment. Shortages of both housing and the earlier arrivals while the new fillers
equipment actually increased until late in
1942 and continued to hamper training to
3^Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Units, Pt. I, pp. 5-6.
'"Organizational History, 76th QM Battalion
some extent throughout much of 1943. (Mobile), 10 Dec 42-1 May 44, Hist Br, OQMG.
Units had to be trained where housing was " Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Units, Pt. I, p. 8.
294 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
caught up, or to carry on the training at tional equipment, increase its strength,
different levels. and obtain a fair amount of training, but
The early history of the 108th Bakery in the interim it was alerted several more
Company illustrates how shortages of per- times, moved to six different locations,and
sonnel and equipment along with other experienced many other difficulties.^^
difficulties handicapped unit training dur- The shortage of qualified cadres and the
ing the hectic days of 1942, when all lack of any practical system for supplying
branches of the Army were making frantic them to units activated at scattered posts,
efforts to put together and train the organ- camps, and installations created addi-
izations they had to have in a hurry. This tional training problems. Inasmuch as the
particular company was activated on 24 QMRTC's were able to furnish only a
March 1942 with one officer and nine en- small portion of the large number of cadres
listed men supplied as cadre by another needed, the usual procedure was to trans-
bakery unit. The following two months ferthem from units already in training. In
were spent in trying to acquire the neces- some instances the parent organization
sary equipment and supplies. It was June had been activated only a short time itself,
before the first fillers began to arrive, and had not yet acquired all of its own person-
these brought the enlisted strength of the nel, and had no qualified men to spare.
unit up to only twenty-seven men. Since Moreover, older units generally were re-
these men were far too few in number for luctant to give up their better men and
separate training, they were detailed for often sent along their misfits rather than
the next five weeks to a truck company for their competent personnel. The net result
instruction in such subjects as might be ap- was that unit commanders frequently re-
plicable to a bakery company. ceived little assistance from their cadres
In July the bakery company was alerted and sometimes were even burdened with
to go to a staging area to prepare for over- the task of providing basic training for
seas movement. When the unit arrived at both the cadres and the fillers. ^^
the staging area in August it had never Another serious handicap in the activa-
baked a loaf of bread, nor even set up an tion and training of units before 1943 was
oven in its five months of existence. It still the shortage of officers and their general
lacked half of its baking equipment and lack of experience. The job of leading and
needed seventy-two men to attain full training Quartermaster units during the
strength. Most of the fillers had come from emergency period and the early months of
Infantry and Field Artillery replacement the war fell largely to Reserve officers be-
centers, while those from the Fort Warren cause the number of Regular Army offi-
QMRTC were chiefly laundry and sew- cers was quite small and the supply had to
ing-machine operators, carpenters, plumb- be spread exceedingly thin throughout the
ers, blacksmiths, undertakers, truck expanding Army. While most of the Re-
drivers, and cooks, with only a sprinkling
'"
Organizational History, 108th Bakery Co, Hist
of bakers. Fortunately, orders for move-
Br, OQMG.
ment overseas were canceled, and between '"
Maj Lloyd R. Wolfe, QMC, to Col Mc-
(1) Ltr,
September 1942 and April 1943, when it Reynolds, 3Feb 41, no sub. (2) Memo, TQMG for
finally left the United States for North CO SOS, 24 Aug 42, sub: Unit Cadre Tng Centers,
QM School, Camp Lee, Va., 352. (3) Rpt, Mil Tng
Africa, the unit was able to acquire addi- Div, Tng of LInits, Pt. I, p. 8.
THE ACTIVATION AND TRAINING OF UNITS 295
serve officers possessed useful technical Graves Registration Company, which was
comparatively few of them had had
skills, activated in April 1943, had lost 63 per-
any field experience or were familiar with cent of its original personnel by the follow-
methods of Quartermaster operations in ing September.^*
the modernized Army. Officers who cameSuch losses not only disrupted training
from civilian sources usually were com-
but tended to lower morale because the
pletely lacking in military experience. personnel lost had to be replaced, and if
Thus it was a formidable task to find a suf- the replacements happened to be raw re-
ficient number of officers capable of com- cruits from reception centers, as they often
manding and training all of the new field were, basic training generally had to be
units that were being activated. Many of- started all over again. It was not unusual
ficers had so little knowledge of what they for units to undergo the morale-shattering
were supposed to do in the units to which process of having to repeat basic training
they were assigned that they had to under- several times. Moreover, when units
go training themselves while attempting to finally were alerted for movement over-
instruct the men under them. "An officer seas, higher authority frequently had to
frequently would find himself teaching a strip lower-priority units in various stages
subject in the afternoon that he had just of training in order to bring the alerted or-
^-'
learned himself that same morning." ganizations up to full strength. This be-
The greatly increased output of the came a vicious circle since, in turn, other
OCS finally produced a surplus of officers units had to be robbed in order to attain
in 1943. This, together with the fact that authorized strength for the stripped units
steps had been taken to develop leadership and to qualify them for shipment overseas.
and other qualities that would enable new Personnel turnover continued to be one
officers to command troops in the field, re- of the more serious handicaps faced by
sulted in a marked improvement in the units in the later stages of the war despite
situation. The relief proved to be only tem- measures taken to overcome it. Beginning
porary, however, for another critical in the fall of 1942 and continuing through
shortage of officers suddenly developed 1943, for example, it was the general prac-
early in 1944, causing a condition some- tice to authorize overstrength in units at
what similar to that which had existed in the time of activation in an effort to offset
1942. losses from normal attrition. While this
another obstacle, and one of the worked out in some instances, most units
Still
most persistent and troublesome of all, was experienced difficulty in achieving even
the almost constant loss of trainee person- normal strength at the time of activation
nel suffered by the units at all stages of the because of the general shortage of person-
training process. This personnel turnover nel, and the policy was discontinued early
was the result of withdrawals for cadres, in 1944. Some Quartermaster units as late
transfers to the AAF or ground combat as November 1944 had more than 100 per-
units, assignments to the OCS, as well as
elimination of physically limited person-
nel, hospitalizations, and deaths. A turn-
^<'
Organizational History, 76th QM
Battalion (Mo-
bile), Dec 42-1 May 44.
1
over of 50 percent or more was not at all ^' Insp Rpt, Capt Victor A. Sharett, QMC, for
notice." '*^
Though designed primarily for dated unit training programs in December
the training of units, the new program, Hke 1941 to serve as standards in providing ad-
its predecessor, served also as the basis for vanced technical training for Quartermas-
training replacements and was the pattern had completed their
ter organizations that
used by Quartermaster units beginning in basic unit instruction under the provisions
the winter of 1940-41 as well as by the of the 1940 program. The need for these
QMRTC's when they opened in the units was so critical, however, that com-
spring of 1941. paratively few of them were able to under-
The 1940 program concentrated the go any of this additional training before
former sixteen weeks of training into thir- their hurried departure overseas or to
teen weeks, established eight hours per defense stations in the zone of interior. ^^
day as the minimum time to be spent in It became more and more apparent in
training, and was more specific in that it the months following the United States'
included twenty-five separate programs entry into the war that the Army's emer-
with detailed instructions for training the gency training plans and programs were
various types of Quartermaster units. It outmoded, and that Quartermaster and
also set aside much more time for basic other supply units would have to undergo
military training, and specified that training similar to that given combat
periods allotted to post and garrison duties troops if they were to function successfully
"be utilized for actual training in the in a modern global war. Therefore, acting
duties required of Quartermaster Corps upon instructions from the Director of
personnel when serving at a post or Training, SOS, The Quartermaster Gen-
station."
'''
eral issued a separate unit training pro-
Inasmuch as The Quartermaster Gen- gram that embodied this new concept.
eral had no control over the actual train-
The unit must be able to act alone in de-
ing of Quartermaster units — then the fense against attacks by hostile airplanes, air-
responsibility of GHQ and the corps borne and paratroop attack, mechanized
areas — he had no direct means of deter- units or ground troops, including intrenching
and construction of obstacles. It must be
mining how widely his training doctrine
capable of maneuvering under fire and es-
was being employed or what results were cape every observation by the use of camou-
being obtained. Nevertheless, the 1940 flage and existing cover. The unit must be
program was adopted to a large extent at able to apply the principles of demolition to
and con- all quartermaster installations. It must be
the various training installations
competent to provide for its security on the
tinued to serve as a general guide for
march and in camp by use of patrols,
Quartermaster unit training until the fall advance, flank and rear guard, and out-
^^
of 1942.^' posts.
In the meantime, the attack upon Pearl
Harbor had created a sudden demand for
many Quartermaster units with sufficient ^^ MTP 10-1, 1 Oct 40, Sec. I, par. 2.
""^
Ibid., Sec. I, par. 3.
training to permit them to be assigned to -''
For a detailed discussion of the 1940 program,
defensive missions at home or abroad. In see Young, Mobil Tng Plans and Programs, pp. 39-
an meet this emergency situation,
effort to 45.
*""
Ibid., pp. 64-67.
The Quartermaster General issued a series "MTP 10-1, Sec. I, par. 3d, 21 Sep 42, sub:
of sixteen-week Quartermaster consoli- MTP's for QM Units.
298 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
The 1942 program not only placed Units were activated and trained at
more emphasis upon combat subjects but such a rapid pace during 1942 that many
outlined in detail the training schedules of them had to wait weeks or months after
for the various types of units as well as the completing the initial thirteen-week pro-
enlisted specialists in each, the appropriate gram before being assigned to overseas
references to be used, and the hours to be duty. During the interim the men were in-
devoted each subject. The program al-
to clined to go stale and lose morale from
lotted thirteen weeks to unit training lack of activity. To prevent this, The Quar-
the same time allotted under the 1940 pro- termaster General, at the direction of SOS,
—
gram but the period was divided gener- prepared and released in tentative form in
ally into four distinct phases. The first four January 1943 and in final form in April
weeks were to be set aside for basic mili- 1943 a supplementary Quartermaster
tary training, the second four weeks for in- training program to provide advanced in-
dividual specialist instruction, the third struction during a second thirteen-week
four weeks for unit training as a whole, period. The primary aim of this advanced
and the final week for review and inspec- training was "the promotion of teamwork
tion. At the same time the procedure was in the application of the technique essen-
designed to be as flexible as possible to per- tial to each unit's service mission during
mit some deviation when local conditions combat." ^^
made it necessary. The training time was This type of advanced training was not
increased from forty-four to forty-eight entirely new, but rather a refinement and
hours a week, a move that reflected the expansion of the tactical training of Quar-
critical need in 1942 for the rapid activa- termaster units that had been undertaken
tion and training of new units. In an effort after Pearl Harbor under the Quartermas-
to improve the caliber of instruction, the ter consolidated unit training programs.
program specified that the training was to The program was invaluable in that it
be carried out under the direction of ex- provided for the men in units awaiting
perienced officers and qualified cadres. orders a period of useful occupation dur-
Since The Quartermaster General's ini- ing which they received their final condi-
tial authority to train Quartermaster tioning for overseas service. This 1943 pro-
SOS units had been delegated to him only gram remained in effect until January
two months before the 1942 program be- 1945, but the exigencies of the military
came most of the early organiza- situation limited its application. In many,
effective,
tions over which he gained control were if not most, instances the units were
trained under its provisions. Upon the di- shipped overseas before they had an op-
rection of the SOS, the program was portunity to complete the advanced train-
modified to the extent of providing more ing."
realistic basic military training. However, The year 1943 marked an important
the program as originally adopted served
'"
For more details about the 1942 program, see
as the pattern for the thirteen weeks
first
Young, Mobil Tng Plans and Programs, pp. 71-80.
of mobilization instruction given all SOS " MTP 10-3, Sec. I, par. 2, 14 Apr 43, sub: Unit
and AGF Quartermaster units activated Training Programs for QM Units of the ASF.
(1) Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Units, Pt. I, p. 73.
-'
between the time it was distributed and
(2) Young, Mobil Tng Plans and Programs, pp. 83-
the fall of 1943.^° 90.
THE ACTIVATION AND TRAINING OF UNITS 299
turning point in the training of Quarter- the various theater commanders and pre-
master units. In the first place that was the pared instructions for the three major
year Quartermaster unit training centers commands concerning the numbers and
came into being and The Quartermaster types of units each would have to furnish
General acquired a much greater degree by a certain date. These commands, in
of control over the training of Quarter- turn, instructed their subordinate agencies
master units in the ASF. Secondly, the im- to select the specific units to be called and
mediate requirements for additional troops to issue the necessary activation and train-
overseas subsided sufficiently during ing instructions. The units thus selected
—
1943 as a result of the improved strategic were then alerted and told how much time
position of the Allied forces —
so that the they would have before movement to
various branches of the Army could finally designated staging areas where final ar-
devote more time and attention to the task rangements for shipping them abroad
not only of adjusting the training program were to be made. The port commander
to the needs dictated by battle experience, designated the time they were to arrive at
but also of providing more thorough in- the staging areas.
struction. This plan was based on the assumption
Such action had become imperative by that when a unit arrived at a staging area
that time since reports were coming in it would be completely organized,
from the theaters that units as well as re- manned, equipped, and trained, and that
placements were arriving overseas with it would merely have to undergo a routine
serious training deficiencies and had to check before proceeding to a port of em-
undergo additional instruction before they barkation. It was intended that the staging
could perform their functions in the ad- areas would have to perform only such
vanced areas. The War Department had cursory functions as determining that
been aware of this situation to some extent records were in order, ascertaining
at least, but theater requirements had whether the men in the units were physi-
been so urgent in 1942 that many units cally qualified for overseas duty and had
were shipped overseas hastily even though been immunized and vaccinated, and
it was realized that they did not have "the making certain that the units possessed all
desired degree of training."
^^
of their necessary equipment and supplies.
Moreover, so many problems arose in Things did not always work out as
the hurried processing of units in the fever- planned numerous reasons. In the first
for
ish days of 1942 that preparations for mov- place, personnel was in such short supply
ing units overseas became a difficult and and the competition for men was so keen
complicated procedure. An understand- among the various branches of the Army
ing of the problems encountered helps to that alerted units often were far below
make clear why units, particularly those strength when they arrived at the staging
shipped out in the early stages of the war, areas, despite the fact that they had been
usually required additional training after given top priority. This meant that in
they reached the theaters. On the surface order to obtain the full complement re-
the procedure for processing units ap-
Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United
^''
peared to be quite simple. The War De- States Army, July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1943 to the Secre-
partment computed the requirements of tary of War (Washington, 1943), p. 34..
300 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
quired for movement overseas they had to This scarcity of equipment handicapped
take men from units further down the the training of units to such an extent that
priority scale. The men acquired in this it was often extremely difficult forthem to
eleventh-hour scramble were in various qualify for movement overseas. Not only
stages of training and often had to undergo did shortages exist in the technical equip-
hurried instruction at the staging areas in ment required for their instruction and use
an attempt to bring them up to minimum in carrying out supply functions, but
requirements. Sometimes these men had weapons and ammunition were often non-
been members of entirely different types existent for training unit personnel in self
of organizations. Thus, as a result of the defense as prescribed by the revised train-
hasty build-up in the staging areas, units ing programs. Even when the units had
frequently arrived overseas with a hodge- the necessary guns there frequently was no
podge of personnel of varied training and ammunition available for firing practice
experience. because combat organizations had priority
Moreover, the lower-priority organiza- on the limited supply. It was not unusual
tions from which the men were transferred in 1942 for units to have to borrow
usually were left in a badly depleted and weapons at the staging areas to meet the
demoralized state. Not only was their minimum training requirements. Often
training disrupted, but they too, in turn, the original weapons issued for training
would have to take men from still other purposes were obsolete models and re-
units when the time came for them to placements became available too late for
move overseas. Once started this proce- firing practice. Similarly, technical equip-
dure of robbing Peter to pay Paul became ment frequently was out of date or entirely
a never-ending process. unavailable during the training period,
A similar situation existed in regard to and when the allotments of the required
equipment. Production ran so far behind types finally arrived the units had little
requirements during 1942 that there sim- time in which to become familiar with
ply was not enough to meet the needs of them before they embarked.
all of the organizations in the advanced Among other related problems were
stages of training, let alone those of the those growing out of frequent changes in
many new units being activated each priorities, for which theater commanders
month. Until late in 1943 units rarely if were often responsible, that resulted in
ever had all of their equipment even by constant revision of movement schedules.
the time they reached the staging areas, In some instances alerted units which had
and many of them arrived with less than been told originally that they would have
half of their allotments. Procurement was two or three months in which to prepare
such a problem that the moment a unit for movement to staging areas, suddenly
gained priority status steps were taken to received orders a few days later to move
obtain the equipment in which it was de- within a week or so. As a result, they
ficient from any sources available. As in usually arrived long before they were
the case of personnel, this frequently meant actually ready. On the other hand, units
robbing units lower down on the priority were sometimes detained in staging areas
list. Thus another vicious circle was set in for several months because the heavy
motion. movement overseas had exhausted the
THE ACTIVATION AND TRAINING OF UNITS 301
available shipping capacity. Such units which came to be known as "POM," and
lostmuch valuable time and were inclined were designed to standardize procedures
to go stale because the staging areas were and eliminate many of the conditions that
overcrowded and lacked the proper facil- had been a source of difficulties. In gen-
ities for training during this interim. eral, unit commanders were given the pri-
When previous measures proved inef- mary responsibility for making certain
fectual in correcting the conditions that that units were adequate in all respects,
caused these difficulties, the War Depart- and they were to receive earlier warning of
ment early in 1943 took more drastic steps impending movement to staging areas so
to insure that the units designated for over- that they could have more time to com-
seas movement were properly organized, plete preparations.
trained, and equipped. On 5 January it Under POM, the unit, unless otherwise
issued a directive which outlined in brief authorized by the War Department, was
its revised policies and procedures for pre- to move to the staging area only after it
paring units for service in the theaters. had completed its prescribed training and
Among the new provisions was the stipula- had reached its full authorized strength of
tion that before any unit embarked it must officers and enlisted men qualified for
submit a full report of its status for the ap- overseas service. Actual movement to the
proval of the Chief of Staff. The Inspector staging area or port of embarkation was to
General was to inspect all units destined —
be made as before only upon the call of
for overseas duty in order to determine the the port commander, who was to assume
adequacy and complete control over the units upon their
efficiency of personnel, the
state of technical training, and the com- arrival. Units were to be equipped as com-
pleteness and condition of equipment. pletely as possible before they moved to
Action to correct the deficiencies disclosed the staging areas. Similarly, medical re-
was to be initiated on the spot. To meet quirements, including vaccinations and
emergency demands for additional units immunizations, were to be met prior to the
for overseas movement, each major com- departure from the home station.
mand was to set up and maintain a pool of The procedures and policies set forth in
units completely organized, manned, and the original POM, and the revisions that
equipped. A new system was adopted for were made in later issues of the publica-
establishing the order of priority, and the tion, resulted in eliminating most of the
three major commands were to be fur- conditions that had caused the major diffi-
nished each month with the monthly over- culties encountered earlier in preparing
seas requirements for the succeeding six- units for movement overseas. These meas-
month period, broken down by quantities ures, however, were not wholly corrective
and types of units. -^ in instances where units continued to be
This directive was followed on 1 Febru- trained under widely varying conditions
ary 1943 by the release of detailed instruc-
^Ml) Ltr, AGO to CG SOS et al., 5 Jan 43, sub:
tions for the guidance of all echelons
Orgn, Tng, and Equip of Units for Overseas Sv, AG
involved in bringing units to a state of 320.2 (1-2-43) OB-S-C-M.(2) For a more detailed
camouflage, mines, booby traps, first aid, Eighth SvC Conf of Tng OITs, Camp Claiborne, La.
antitank protection, discipline, and phys- " (1) MTP 10-101, 25 Sep 43, sub: QM MTPs
icaland mental conditioning for battle.
for QM Units. (2) For a detailed discussion of this
program, see Young, Mobil Tng Plans and Pro-
This new program was prepared and dis- grams, pp. 108-09, 111-19.
THE ACTIVATION AND TRAINING OF UNITS 303
required, especially the ability to enforce if the specialists remained with the units
the first three weeks were to be devoted to varied in accordance with the available
instruction in the technical operations of training staff", and initiative of
facilities,
the unit at a fixed installation, and the the different centers. For the most part, the
final three weeks to field training under specialist instruction given the fillers
actual bivouac conditions away from all trained in these centers was conducted at
military installations. their technical schools in the same manner
Of particular significance was the provi- as that given the individual replacements
sion in the 1945 program whereby Quar- trained under the QMRTC program.
termaster units receiving other than orig- The unit training phase of instruction
inal basic unit training were to be evalu- for the organizations at these centers con-
ated, given credit for previous training and stituted a definite advance over the indi-
experience, and then required to complete vidual specialist training and stressed
only those portions of the new program teamwork and functional training of com-
that were necessary to correct deficiencies bined personnel under tactical conditions.
and prepare them for operations in the The usual basis for this training was the
Pacific. The purpose was to avoid unnec- field exercise, in which the units were re-
essary repetition of training and to con- quired to set up their equipment and dem-
serve time during the critical redeploy- onstrate the skill they had acquired in its
ment period. This provision made it possi- use as well as the extent to which they had
ble to adapt the instruction outlined in the absorbed basic military training.
1945 program to the particular training These exercises were conducted in con-
needs of redeployed Quartermaster units junction with other troop units of the Army
after the official inauguration by the War whenever possible, and the Quartermaster
Department on 1 1 May 1945 of the rede- organizations were given the opportunity
ployment training program that specified to gain practical experience. For example,
a forty-four-hour training week for these bakery units baked bread for the men,
organizations.''" laundry units washed their clothes, and
Because of the sudden surrender of Ja- shoe repair companies participated in the
pan in mid-August 1945, the period in current shoe repair work of the center or
which the 1945 program served as the gen- nearby installations. These practical op-
eral guide for basic training of Quarter- erations produced a feeling of teamwork in
master organizations was of comparatively the new organizations and taught them
short duration. —
Most of these units those the principles of discipline and leadership.
newly activated and undergoing the full The officers, noncommissioned officers,
six-week phase, as well as those requiring and enlisted personnel of the units also had
only partial training under the redeploy- the opportunity to learn each other's atti-
—
ment program received their training tudes and capabilities and thus were bet-
either at Camp Lee or at Fort Warren ter fitted to work together by the time they
during this period. had completed training.
All of the Quartermaster unit training Summary
centers followed in general the standard-
ized pattern of instruction prescribed by Much of the early difficulty encountered
The Quartermaster General in the various in the training of Quartermaster units can
training programs developed in the 1943- *" For fuller details of the 1945 program, see
45 period. The implementation, of course. Young, Mobil Tng Plans and Programs, pp. 235-47.
306 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
be traced to the fact that, while the War tarded by the lack of funds. Money to
Department had prepared a Protective build training centers was not available
MobiHzation Plan for the Army as a before the fiscal year 1941, and in the
whole, the detailed subordinate plans for meantime, therefore, the General Staff"
the training of Quartermaster troops had could make no decision as to the number
not been developed far enough to be of and types of Quartermaster training cen-
practical value when the emergency was ters that could be established. When
declared. This meant that plans had to be money was provided in the summer of 1
improvised on the basis of a hurried study 1940, the General Staff" decided to con-
of anticipated problems and the organiza- struct such centers, but because of limited
tion needed to meet them. Constant revi- funds it was forced to restrict the Quarter-
sion of the hastily prepared program be- master training centers to two, both of
came necessary after battle experience in which were to be used exclusively for
the North African campaign demonstrated training individual enlisted replacements.
that the training given Quartermaster It abandoned earlier tentative plans for
units during the emergency period and the two Quartermaster unit training centers
early part of the war had been entirely in- and was compelled to reject a spirited plea
adequate. Thus it was 1943 before a satis- by The Quartermaster General for modi-
factory training program was developed. fication of this decision. Two years
"^^
It continued to be modified throughout the elapsed before the War Department could
war in the light of reports from observers make facilities available for the establish-
in the theaters. ment of the Quartermaster unit training
The inadequacy of Quartermaster centers that did so much in 1943 and
training plans at the beginning of the thereafter to improve the preparation of
emergency as well as the slow development units for service overseas.
of the program in the months that fol- The same tendency to discount the ne-
lowed was due in large measure to the gen- cessity for tactical training of Quartermas-
eral tendency to discount the need for tac- ter troops was evident in January 1941
tical training of Quartermaster troops. when the War Department ignored the
The theory persisted that such troops needs of the QMC in its plans for estab-
would be able to perform their functions lishing officer candidate schools. These
in comparative safety behind the lines as plans were based on the assumption that
they had in World War I and that their Quartermaster requirements for officers
training could therefore be restricted pri- were of secondary importance and could
marily to technical operations. There was be met at first by utilizing Reserve officers
a slow awakening to the realization that and later by transferring excess officers
the situation in World War II was differ- from other branches of the Army and com-
ent: supply lines were subject to attack at missioning civilians on the basis of their
any time, and the lack of preparedness on technical skills. The General Staff" revised
the part of Quartermaster units to defend its plans a few months later after The
these lines could bring disaster to the com- Quartermaster General pointed out that
bat troops they were supporting. the QMC already was experiencing a se-
Even if there had been a greater aware-
ness of the need for this type of training, See above, Ch. VII, Training of Enlisted Replace-
the program would still have been re- ments.
THE ACTIVATION AND TRAINING OF UNITS 307
others had placed the requisition and fol- quately trained specialists as fillers; regu-
lowed it up.''''
lating the flow of qualified cadres to newly
It was soon after, and largely the result activated units; forbidding the use of units
of, this incident that the decision was made on operational jobs while they were in
to delegate to the Director of Military Per- training; and maintaining close supervi-
sorinel, ASF, the responsibility for assign- sion over the training progress of units to
ing enlisted men as well as officers to all determine the particular instructional em-
units activated within that command, and phasis required to correct deficiencies.
to establish future activation schedules in The unit training centers were better
accordance with the availability of person- organized and equipped to train Quarter-
nel. Activation orders issued thereafter master units than were most of the scat-
specifically designated who was to requisi- tered posts, camps, and stations where the
tion fillers and who was to be responsible bulk of the earlier units had been trained.
for their delivery.*^' Moreover, these centers for the most part
In a further effort to eliminate some of were staffed by Quartermaster officers
the training difficulties, the Commanding who generally had a better understanding
General, ASF, at that time delegated au- of Quartermaster problems and methods
thority to The Quartermaster General to of solving them than did the officers in
train certain designated Quartermaster other branches who were in charge of
units. This action, followed by the estab- training Quartermaster units.
lishment of Quartermaster unit training Aside from the greater control that The
centers early in 1943, eventually gave The Quartermaster General was able to exer-
Quartermaster General quite extensive over the training of Quartermaster
cise
control over the activation and training of through the establishment of unit
units
Quartermaster units in the ASF. But that training centers, a number of other factors
training obstacles and improve the quality cers — a lieutenant colonel, a major, and a
of Quartermaster units. He accomplished captain. The duties of these teams con-
date, in contrast to the situation earlier would be well trained as individuals, there
when such aids were not yet abreast of the was a widespread belief in the OQMG
training mission and many units had been that units were not activated early enough
sent into the field without definite instruc- to develop a "team spirit." In other words,
tions as to howthey were to operate. The it was felt that the officers did not have suf-
training programs, too, had been adjusted ficient six weeks of unit train-
time in the
in accordance with battle experience and ing to learn the strong and weak points of
made more realistic in order that the units their men, and that the men, in turn, did
might be better prepared to meet the ac- not have adequate time to learn just what
tual conditions they would encounter in the was required of them by their officers and
field. For example, the training period was noncommissioned officers.^" Before reme-
lengthened from thirteen to seventeen dial action could be taken the end of the
weeks, and the scope of instruction was ex- war in Europe was approaching and at-
panded to include such subjects as booby tention was already centered upon the
traps, mine fields, hand-to-hand combat, X:ask of retraining units for redeployment
and operation under overhead fire, sub- against Japan.
jects which had not been included in ear-
lier programs. ''*
(1) ASF Cir 37, 4 Jun 43, sub: Designation of
The Quartermaster General had pro- Tng Activities Installations Under the Provi-
and
sions of AR 170-10. (2) For a detailed account of the
tested frequently to higher authority dur- functioning of the technical training teams, see
ing the early years of the war that the Young, Inspection of Military Training, pp. 62-70, 100-
25.
Quartermaster units being trained outside '^'
WD Cir 36, Sec. IV, par. 2c, 28 Jan 44, sub: Pers.
his jurisdiction were not receiving their ""
Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Units, Pt. I, p. 78.
PART THREE
SPECIAL SERVICES
CHAPTER X
nearly 500,000 horses and mules. ^ The OQMG OO 23, 31 Jan 41, no sub. (3) OQMG OO
procurement of so large a number of ani- 84, 2 Mar 42, sub: Reassignment of QM Functions.
1
was developing in the country as a result mount Service, n. d., on file in Rmt Br, OQMG.
(1) fbid. (2) WD GO 65, 17 May 19, sub: Army
•
being conducted by the Department of Colo.; and Pomona Quartermaster Depot, Pomona,
Agriculture be taken over by the Army Calif
ANIMALS FOR MILITARY USE 315
depots was to assure the existence of a mals from permanent remount depots or
reservoir of officers and enlisted men to other sources in the rear and issue them in
keep alive the techniques of handling ani- a state of excellent health, training, and
mals. In connection with the Army horse fitness for immediate combat use by the
breeding program, remount depots tested mounted arms." "^
stallions for their breeding ability before
sending them to stud farms, instructed per- Horses and Mules
sonnel in breeding methods, and bred a
limited number of selected stallions and Throughout the period from the end of
mares in order to have a few superior World War I until the beginning of World
animals/ War II the question of whether motoriza-
The procurement and issue of animals tion, mechanization, and aviation had
was different in many respects from that of made animals obsolete in modern warfare
other types of Quartermaster supplies. was a matter of much discussion and
They cannot be stored like hams, trucks, serious study. As
1940 radical views
late as
shoes and pants. They must be provided for on both continued to
sides of the question
every hour of the day because they are ani- be held by officers high in the Army, al-
mals of flesh, bone and blood. Moreover, though by then horses and mules had been
animals when first purchased are not suitable
replaced completely by motor transporta-
articles of issue. They must be sent to our Re-
mount Depots where they will have an op- tion in most military units. Steps had been
portunity to become sick, regain health, flesh taken in 1938 to motorize the last of the
and condition, and obtain a suitable degree infantry regiments that were still in part
of training so that the average soldier can animal-drawn, thus eliminating the need
handle, ride or drive them. The processing
for draft mules in such regiments." The
period at our depots in normal times con-
sumes not less than 1 20 days because we have Army in 1940, however, still had two
found by experience that to attempt to issue horse-cavalry divisions, two horse regi-
animals in a shorter period of time runs the ments, and two mixed horse and motor
risk of their becoming sick after being issued
transport regiments, with a total author-
to troops.'*
ized animal strength of 20,300—16,800
'-'
At the beginning of the emergency there horses and 3,500 mules.
were three permanent remount depots, Despite the trend toward elimination of
located at Front Royal, Va., Fort Robin-
son, Nebr., and Fort Reno, Okla. All of TM 10-395, pars. 9, 14, 18 Dec 41, sub: Rmt.
"
these had been in existence for years. A Operations," QA4R. XX (January-February 1941),
fourth was established in 1943 at Pomona, 25.
Calif., when W. K. Kellogg, fancier of " Ltr, TQMG to CE, 30 Sep 43, sub: Kellogg
Arabian Stud Farm.
Arabian horses, donated the Kellogg •" TM 10-395, Sec. VI, 18 Dec 41, sub: Rmt.
Arabian Nursery to the War Department.'' " Ltr, TAG to TQMG, 17 Feb 39, sub: Mules Ren-
A number of temporary remount depots dered Excess by Motorization Program, AG 454 (2-
16-39) (Misc)D.
were established overseas during the war, Edwin N. Hardy, "The Remount
'•(1) Lt Col
notably in the China-Burma-India, Med- Service and the Breeding Plan," Q_MR, XIX
Army
iterranean, and Southwest Pacific theaters (March-April 1940), 7. (2) Maj Gen John K. Herr,
"Truth About the Cavalry," Congressional Record, 79th
of operations. The
mission of these over- Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 92, Pt. 12, App. (25 June-2 Au-
seas remount depots was "to receive ani- gust 1946), pp. A4491-92.
316 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
animals, mobilization planning in 1939 and sea, at best difficult to obtain in ade-
contemplated a notable expansion in re- quate quantities, would become still
mount operations in the event of a national scarcer if trucks and ships had to carry the
emergency. Procurement of more than huge quantities of forage necessary to feed
200,000 horses and mules was envisioned. thousands of animals.
The execution of these plans was depend- The Remount Branch and many vet-
ent, of course, upon the development of an eran cavalrymen vigorously dissented from
actual demand for more horses and mules. the contention that horses no longer had a
After the war broke out in Europe in the role in modern warfare. "Battles cannot
fall of 1939 it became increasingly uncer- always be fought on roads," a prominent
tain whether this demand would really remount officer pointed out, "and in many
develop. The proponents of complete mo- campaigns there will arise situations in
torization gained many new adherents which mechanized units cannot move at
because of the decisive fashion in which all." He maintained that conditions
' *
German panzer and motorized divisions would inevitably occur under which fire
shattered organized resistance in Poland power could most quickly be brought to a
and France. To be sure the overwhelming desired point by horse cavalry. He urged
publicity given to these units undoubtedly that the cavalry "be considered mobile fire
caused the new adherents to overlook the power and the horse and mule a means to
extensive use the Germans made of horses. transportmen and fire power to a position
At any rate plans made in the summer of where fire power could be used on the
1940 for the immediate expansion of the ground." ^^ A veteran Cavalry officer de-
Army provided for a much larger degree clared that "erroneous pictures of horsed
of mechanization and motorization than cavalry have developed ... in recent
had been contemplated originally. years with too little consideration for its
Those who advocated elimination of the adaptability in actual warfare." Many still
horse cavalry were numerous and influen- conceived, he said, of cavalrymen riding
tial in the General Staff. They main- boot to boot and recklessly charging with
tained that airplanes performed reconnais- saber and pistol, though such tactics had
sance better than the cavalry had ever proved suicidal during the Civil War. He
done, and that tanks were far superior to pointed out that the cavalry could nego-
cavalry in firepower and in ability to tiate terrain that the mechanized forces
ward off hostile attacks and menace the could not get over, and do it much faster
enemy's rear and flanks. As carriers of sup- than the infantry. He cited the important
plies and haulers of field artillery horses roles that horses had played in recent
were patently inferior to automotive years in the fighting in China, the Italian
trucks, especially since, they contended, conquest of Abyssinia, the Spanish Civil
roads existed almost everywhere in the War, and the German conquest of
world. It was pointed out, moreover, that Poland.''
an unduly large part of the time and ac- Meanwhile, procurement activities of
tivities of the Army necessarily would be '
' Col Edwin N. Hardy, Horses and Mules in Alodern
concerned with obtaining forage and car- Warfare (Chicago, 1941), p. 5.
''
ing for horses if they were present in large Ib,d.,p. 7.
''
Brig Gen Henry J. Reilly, "Horsed Cavalry and
numbers. Another objection to horses was the Gas Engine's Children," Cavalry Journal, XLIX
the fact that transportation, both on land (January-February 1940), 2-9.
ANIMALS FOR MILITARY USE 317
the Remount Branch were expanded in horses were procured in the fiscal year
the year 1941, but buying fell far
fiscal 1943 and none from then on through V-J
short of the 200,000 level that had been Day.
envisioned as possible in the prewar mobi- As a matter of fact, throughout the war
lization plans. In fact, only about 24,000 period the problem of the Remount
horses and 4,000 mules were obtained for Branch, insofar as horses were concerned,
the Army during that period. was chiefly a matter of disposal rather
Issues of animals to the using arms, how- than of procurement. This situation began
ever, did not keep pace even with these to develop after Pearl Harbor when many
limited purchases. The Cavalry took but animal-using organizations were ordered
13,500 of the 22,000 riding horses pro- dehorsed because the units were needed
cured, the Field Artillery about 1,800, and overseas immediately and no shipping
the other branches of the Army about 250. space was available for movement of their
Draft horses and pack mules went almost animals. The large-scale dismounting of
wholly to the Field Artillery, which took these units began in the spring of 1942
600 horses and 2,400 mules. Army de- when seven federalized National Guard
mand for animals thus fell far below what horse-mechanized regiments and the 6th
had been regarded as probable by mobili- Cavalry Regiment were directed to turn in
zation planners, and at the end of the their animals. Similar orders were issued
fiscal year 1941 the remount depots still to various other units in the following
had 28,000 horses on hand."' months. The 1st Cavalry Division was de-
At the beginning of the following fiscal horsed during April and May 1943, and
year the Remount Branch estimated "that finally the 2d Cavalry Division and the
a limited number of riding horses would 56th Brigade of the Texas National Guard
be required for replacements and that a were dehorsed in March 1944.'**
small number of pack mules would be The rapid dismounting of the Army
needed to provide initial issue to new units naturally was reflected in the return of
and for replacements." '' Procurement of more animals to depots than were being
riding horses, which had been brought to issued by these installations. In the fiscal
a standstill in the summer of 1941, began year 1942 about 6,000 animals were issued
again in September but was stopped soon as compared with approximately 15,000
after when it was announced that various returned, and on 30 June 1942 the depots
units were to be dehorsed and their ani- still had more than 21,000 on hand despite
mals returned to the remount depots. the sharp drop in procurement. While
Only about 2,900 horses were purchased fewer horses were sent back to depots in
in the fiscal year 1942, a figure that ap- the following fiscal year, with the dehors-
proximated the total number of requisi- ing program nearing completion, the
tions during that period. number still exceeded the issues about —
6,900 were returned as against 5,200
Elimination of Horses " Rmt Div, Annual Statistical Rpt, FY 1941, p. 3.
''
Rmt Div, Annual Statistical Rpt, FY 1942, pp.
The procurement of horses in the fiscal 3-4.
year 1942, small though the number was, ^1) Rpt. Rmt Br [circa Sep 45], sub: QMC Ac-
complishments in World War II. (2) Ltr, Lt Col Gor-
represented the last substantial purchases don W. Cook, OQMG, to Gen Herr (ret.), 13 Jun 46,
made by the Remount Branch. Only four no sub.
318 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
issued. That the excess was not greater can for military use virtually ceased, the Army
be attributed mainly to the unexpected horse breeding program continued in op-
demand from the Coast Guard for riding eration throughout the war on a slightly
horses for its beach patrols, then actively reduced was experienced
scale. Difficulty
engaged in protecting U.S. shores against with civilian agents be-
in placing stallions
landings from hostile submarines. The Re- cause war conditions and the shortage of
mount Branch supplied more than 3,000 farm labor made it impossible in many in-
riding horses to the Coast Guard during stances to provide proper care. Breeding
the fiscal year 1943, sUghtly more than the were somewhat cur-
activities therefore
total number of horses of that type fur- tailed both at depotsand on stud farms.
nished to the Army in that period.'" Nevertheless, approximately 39,000 foals
During the ensuing year, however, the were produced during the war years.-"
danger from submarines virtually disap- Many protagonists of the military use of
peared as a result of the increasing effec- horses were not convinced that the com-
tiveness of countermeasures, and issues of plete dismounting of the Army was a wise
horses to the Coast Guard dropped sharply policy. They argued that operations in
to about 800, a figure which, though small, mountainous areas in World War II proved
was still half the number of horses requisi- their contention that horses were a useful
tioned by the Army. Issues to the Coast supplement to motors and that the cavalry
Guard finally all but ceased, and at the was a valuable adjunct to armor. They
end of the fiscal year 1944 many horses on pointed to the apparently effective utiliza-
beach patrol were declared surplus to tion of animals by the Soviet Army and to
existing needs. the wartime experience of the U.S. Army,
Statistics on file in the Remount Branch particularly after the landings in Sicily
for the fiscal years 1941 through 1945 re- and Italy where the tortuous terrain made
veal the extent to which horses were elimi- reconnaissance extremely difficult and
nated in World War II. Approximately heavy weapons sometimes lagged far be-
33,000 horses were returned to the depots hind the infantry. Only horse cavalry,
by using agencies during these years, as they maintained, could have overcome
compared with less than 31,000 issued to these obstacles. In Italy, it was asserted,
units and stations, exclusive of the 3,900 there had been "desperate need for some
loaned to the Coast Guard. Most of those type of unit that could penetrate cross
issued to the Army in the earlier years of country and get through the different
the war were sent back in the later years, mountains at a decidedly faster rate than
with the result that the depots always had the infantry." "^
a considerable excess. Although procure- "* Data obtained from records in Rmt Br, OQMG.
and December 1945. Throughout the war U.S. Statutes at Large, Vol. 62, pp. 197-98. (Act ap-
period only forty-nine horses were shipped proved 21 Apr 48.) Within a year the breeding pro-
from the zone of interior to the armed gram was liquidated.
-' Maj Gen
John K. Herr, "Truth About the Caval-
forces overseas. ry," Congressional Record, Vol. 92, Pt. 12, App., pp.
Although the requisitioning of horses A4491-92.
ANIMALS FOR MILITARY USE 319
cavalry units could have been used in Tu- alry Division more or less intact until early
nisia if they had been available.-" Un- in 1944, when the division finally was sent
doubtedly they could have been used to to North Africa, without its animals, only
good advantage in Sicily, Italy, China, to be inactivated and broken up upon ar-
and Burma. In fact, many commanders rival overseas."^ The only other cavalry
from time to time cited the need for cav- division, the 1st, was sent to the Southwest
alry. It is apparent therefore that develop- Pacific early in the war and fought dis-
ments in motorization, mechanization, mounted as infantry, under special Tables
and aviation actually did not make horses of Organization. As late as November
obsolete in certain types of operations, and 1944 the War Department was still dis-
that the decision of the War Department cussing the possibility of using horse-cav-
against shipping horse units to combat alry units in the final stages of the war
theaters was based largely upon other con- against Japan. -^
siderations, primarily the severe shortage
of shipping space." ^ Demandfor Pack Mules
Transportation of horses and their for-
age was costly in ship tonnage. In strenu- In contrast to the declining interest in
ous campaigns horses could not live en- horses, the demand for mules increased
tirely off the land, and grain was not only during the war. This shift in requirements
more bulky than gasoline but was needed is illustrated clearly by records on file in
regardless of the amount of combat activ- the Remount Branch, OQMG, showing
ity. Another factor was that the feeding the number of animals purchased in the
and upkeep of horses presented great dif- United States during the war. These rec-
ficulties to a motorized army, and tended ords reveal that purchases of horses out-
to complicate troop movement and sup- numbered those of mules by more than
ply. Moreover, with the dismounting of five to one in the fiscal year 1 94 1 and by ,
many units early in the war most of the ex- nearly two to one in the fiscal year 1942
perienced horsemen were scattered when procurement of both kinds of ani-
throughout the Army on other assign- mals dropped off sharply as the need for
ments, and, with only a limited program them failed to materialize. The situation
for trainingreplacements, comparati^^ely changed radically, beginning however,
few men capable of training and caring for with the fiscal year 1943, when only four
horses were available when battle experi- horses were purchased, and none were
ence made it evident that animals could be purchased thereafter. In the same year
used and were needed for mountain 10,200 mules were procured, and in the
fighting.
An element of uncertainty regarding the
-'-'
Memo, AGF for OPD WDGS, 10 Nov 44, sub:
Orgn of Horse Cav Units, with Incls, AGF 320.2.
wisdom of the policy relating to the use of - •
Memo Slip, AGF G-3 for G-2, 7 Sep 44, sub:
horses appears to have persisted in the Orgn and Equip of Cav Recon Units, AGF 321 /.Ol.
-^ Greenfield The Organization of Ground Com-
War Department General Staff through- et al. ,
pack mules were procured abroad than pack animals, eventually solved the prob-
were sent to the theaters from the United lem in the Italian campaign by utilizing
States. One of these, of course, was that it experienced Itali-an Army horsemen who
was extremely difficult to obtain shipping had the added advantage of being familiar
space for the animals and their forage. with the terrain. By the end of the Italian
Another was that requirments for animals campai5n the U.S. Army Remount Serv-
in the theaters, particularly in the early ice in Italy was supplying animals to fif-
stages of the war, were not anticipated suf- teen Italian pack troops and to the U.S.
ficiently in advance to enable shipments to 10th Mountain Division. The Italian pack
be made. In this connection there appears units on the average consisted of 260
to have existed even in the minds of many mules, 12 horses, 1 1 officers, and 320 en-
early planners in the War Department an listed men. Each of the U.S. Army divi-
implicit faith in the ability of mechanized sions to which these pack troops were at-
forces to move over any type of terrain, tached had a U.S. liaison officer who
and apparently this faith persisted until advised the Italians of the tasks to be ac-
the troops in the field actually began to en- complished.^
counter rugged mountains in which motor
vehicles simply could not operate. In any Dogsfor War Purposes
case, it is obvious that no adequate ad-
vance plans were made for the use of pack From ancient times canine docility,
mules overseas or for the training of per- watchfulness, speed, acuteness of smell and
sonnel to handle and care for the animals. hearing, love of man, and eagerness to
Most of the pack animals obtained over- please him have made dogs valuable for
seas by the Army were procured on requi- many kinds of military service. The uses to
sition through the theater remount serv- which they have been put have changed
ices, which purchased the animals locally in accordance with developments in war-
and processed and trained them before is- fare down through the ages.
suance to troops. In many instances, how- Before the introduction of gunpowder,
ever, particularly during the early part of dogs usually took an active part in combat.
the war. Army units had to commandeer The early Greek and Roman soldiers
animals on the spot when need for them made use of large dogs by equipping them
suddenly arose. Later in the war many with spiked collars and sending them for-
mules were captured from the enemy. In ward to attack the enemy. During the
some cases, pack mules owned by civilians Middle Ages war dogs were outfitted with
were hired to carry supplies to the troops armor and frequently used to defend cara-
up in the mountains.'^ vans. The North American Indians devel-
The War Department policy of replac- oped the use of dogs for pack and draft
ing the cavalry with mechanized units and " (1) Ibid.,pp. 230, 237, 245. (2) Ltr, Maj Rhett to
the concomitant curtailment of the pro- OQMG, 3 Jan45, sub: Observations of Pack Mules,
gram in the United States for training per- MTO. (3) I*iterv, OQMG historian with Maj John
M. Brooks, 8 May 51. (Major Brooks served with the
sonnel in the care and handling of animals 7th Infantry Regiment in Sicily.)
resulted in a serious shortage of experi- '-
(1) Ltr, Maj Rhett to OQMG, 3 Jan 45, sub: Ob-
Hist of QM PBS,
enced horsemen in those theaters where servations of Pack Mules, MTO. (2)H. Vickers, British
MTO, pp. 247-48. (3) Ltr, W. G.
urgent needs developed for pack animals. QMG in India, to Maj Gen Raymond A. Wheeler,
The Fifth Army, one of the largest users of CG USAF CBI. lOJun 43, no sub.
324 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
work as well as for sentry duty. By the in snowbound and desolate parts of New-
early part of the twentieth century most foundland, Greenland, and Iceland.**^
European countries were utilizing dogs in
their armies. Russia used ambulance dogs Origin of the War Dog Program
during the Russo-Japanese War. Dogs
were employed as sentries by the Bul- The Army still had no plans for training
garians in the Balkan upheaval of 1910, dogs when the United States entered
by the Italians in Tripoli, and by the World War II. That such a program was
Britishon the Abor Expedition in the eventually adopted was due partly to the
Himalayas. During the long-drawn-out enthusiastic support given the idea by the
Spanish- Moroccan War, the Riffs camou- major organizations of dog owners and
flaged the animals in garments to make partly to the vision of a few military men
them indistinguishable from their owners who foresaw various ways in which dogs
in the hazy visibility of the desert and might be serviceable. As soon as it became
trained them to run along the front lines apparent that the United States might be-
and draw the fire of the Spaniards, thus come actively involved in the war, fanciers
revealing gun positions. ^^ of dogs pointed out the possible value of
Dogs were used in sizable numbers in the animals to the armed forces, and
World War I, particularly by the Ger- leaders of several prominent dog organiza-
mans, French, and Belgians, and proved tions turned their attention to developing
of considerable value under advantageous training techniques that might be mili-
conditions for certain types of auxiliary tarily useful, particularly in sentry and
duties. The German Army is reported to casualty work.^^
have utilized approximately 30,000 of the The attack upon Pearl Harbor and the
animals for messenger and ambulance sudden entry of the United States into the
service. The French and Belgian Armies war greatly stimulated interest in the use
employed them on a smaller scale for mes- of dogs for sentry duty. With industrial
senger, ambulance, and draft work.^^ plants and Army installations being rapid-
Despite the long history of their military
use by other countries, dogs had never YJD TM 10-396, 1 Jul 43, sub: War Dogs, pp.
5-6.
been utilized by the U.S. Army in tactical '' Ibid., pp. 6-7.
operations before World War II. At the ''(1) WD FM 25-6, 4 Jan 41, sub: Dog Team
Transportation, 1. (2) Memo, Chief of Rmt Br for
time of Pearl Harbor the sled dog was the p.
QM, Ninth CA, 13 Feb 41, sub: Sled Dogs.
only type to be found in the Army. About "'
(1) Ltr, TAG
to Exec Committee, U.S. Antarctic
of these animals were assigned to mili-
fifty Sv, 15 Jan 4 1, sub: Transfer of Antarctic Sled Dogs.
tary stations in Alaska, where they were (2) Ltr, Lt Col Owen G. Collins, OQMG, to USW,
1 Jan 41, same sub. (3) Ltr, Maj Nathan Thumin,
employed when snow and ice precluded AGO, to ACofS G-4, Oct 4 sub: Dogs for the Air
1 1 ,
DOG TEAMS IN ALASKA ready to start out with their drivers, 1943.
ly expanded, the potential damage that tion to guide the patriotic purposes of dog
might be done by saboteurs, enemy ahens, owners along constructive lines. ^* It was
and fascist-minded groups was constantly designed to serve as a clearing house for
mounting, and precautionary measures co-ordinating the various attempts to de-
were required. The necessity for such velop interest in sentry dogs. Enlisting the
measures was further emphasized early in co-operation of the American Kennel
1942 when German submarines began to Club, the registration body for all pure-
operate in large numbers near the Atlantic bred dogs, Dogs for Defense mobilized the
and Gulf coasts, and the landing of expert most powerful professional and amateur
saboteurs loomed as a distinct possibility. influences in order to acquire dogs by do-
Dog fanciers were not slow to point out nation and, after training, to distribute
that the animals might be extremely valu- them where they were most needed.
able auxiliaries if they were attached to Shortly after the establishment of Dogs for
Coast Guard beach patrols then being or-
Outstanding among the leaders of this movement
''^
ganized to prevent such landings, and if were Mrs. Milton S. Erlanger, prominent dog breeder
they were used as guards at industrial and exhibitor; Arthur Kilbon, who for years had writ-
ten articles about dogs for the New York Sun and other
plants and Army installations.
publications under the pseudonyms Arthur Roland
Dogs for Defense, Inc., was established and Roland Kilbon; and Lcn Brumby, head of the
in January 1942 as a national organiza- Professional Dog Handlers' Association.
326 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Defense, theAmerican Theater Wing War wide variety of tactical uses by other arms
Servicemade a formal offer to donate dogs and services. On 16 July 1942 the Secre-
to the QMC
for defense purposes, an offer tary of War directed The Quartermaster
accepted by The Quartermaster General General to include in the program train-
with War Department approval early in ing for roving patrol, messenger, and sled
February. Inasmuch as the organization work, in addition to fixed sentry duty. The
of the Theater Wing group did not lend it- directive also ordered the AGF, the AAF,
self readily to the actual procurement and and the theaters of operations "to explore
training of dogs, officials of Dogs for De- the possibilities of using dogs advanta-
fense agreed to assume these responsibili- geously in the various activities under their
^-
ties.^^ control."
Within the OQMG, supervision of the In the fall the functions of the QMC
program was assigned initially to the Plant were further expanded to include the pro-
Protection Branch of the Inspection Divi- curement and training of dogs for the
sion on the theory that dogs would be used Navy and the Coast Guard. The latter re-
chiefly with guards at civilian war plants quired dogs in mounting numbers for its
and Quartermaster depots. Requirements beach patrols, and the Navy needed them
were estimated originally at only 200 ani- for sentry duty at its yards, air stations, ord-
mals.^" While Dogs for Defense quickly ac- nance plants, and ammunition depots. ^^
cepted the donation of 100 acceptable
dogs, the training program it instituted Procurement and Training
proved unsatisfactory since the organiza-
tion had to rely on the volunteer services To implement the greatly expanded
of qualified trainers at private kennels program The Quartermaster General
scattered in various parts of the country, ordered the establishment of war dog re-
and standardized instruction was there- ception and training centers. ^^ Their func-
fore impossible. Moreover, the demand for tion was to receive animals procured by
sentry dogs was beginning to outstrip the
original limited conception of the number ''
(1) Ltr, Rachel Crothers, Pres. of American The-
required. ater Wing War Service, to TQMG, 28 Jan 42, no sub.
Ltr, TQMG to USW, 29 Jan 42, sub: Sentry Dogs.
As a consequence, a new training pro- (2) Ltr, USW to TQMG, 10 Feb 42, sub: Procurement
(3)
gram was developed in the summer of of Dogs. (4) Ltr, Henry L Caesar, Pres. of DFD, to
1942. Procurement continued to be ac- TQMG, 2 Mar 42, no sub.
'" Ltr, Chief of Plant Protection Br, OQMG, to
complished by Dogs for Defense, but its Pres. of DFD, 3 Mar 42, sub: Procurement
1 of Dogs.
training function and the supervision of ^'
(1) Ltr, Chief of Plant Protection Br, to Pres.
the program generally were transferred in of DFD, 20 May 42, sub: Dog Program. (2) OQMG
OO 156, 25 Jun 42, sub: War Dog Program. (3)
June from the Plant Protection Branch to OQMG OO 25-5, 7 Sep 42, sub: Assignment of Dog
the Remount Branch, which had long ex- Program.
perience in dealing with animals and fur- '-
Ltr, SW toCG SOSf/fl/., 16 Jul 42, sub: Use of
Dogs in the LI.S. Army.
thermore had strategically located depots " Memo, Lt Col Frederick C. Foy, GSC, for
capable of handling the enlarged pro- TQMG, 30 Sep 42, sub: Procurement and Tng of
gram.^' Dogs. The Marine Corps procured its own dogs and
trained them at New River, N. C.
The scope of the program was soon ''
Ltr, TQMG to TAG, 28 Jul 42. sub: Tng of Dogs
broadened to include training of dogs for a for Use in U.S. Army.
ANIMALS FOR MILITARY USE 327
Dogs for Defense, give them a rigid phys- In 1942 and 1943, when practically all
ical examination, classify them according of the dogs were trained to perform the
to the type of work for which they seemed comparatively simple tasks involved in
best fitted, and provide the training neces- sentry duty, both sexes of more than thirty
sary to make them useful to the Army. In breeds were considered suitable for mili-
addition, the centers had the task of train- tary service. Experience revealed, how-
ing enlisted men to serve as dog handlers ever, that even for watch duty some breeds
in order that there might always be avail- were unsatisfactory.^^ By the fall of 1944
able personnel capable of caring for the the number of preferred breeds had been
animals and supervising their work. —
reduced to seven German shepherds,
The first of these centers was established Belgian sheep dogs, Doberman-Pinschers,
in August 1942 at the Front Royal, Va., farm collies, Siberian huskies, Malemutes,
Quartermaster Depot. Three others were and Eskimo dogs. Crosses of these breeds
opened late in 1942 —at Fort Robinson, also were acceptable.
^^
Nebr.; Camp Rimini, Mont.; and San Dogs for Defense served as the procure-
Carlos, Calif. — and a fourth was opened in ment agency for the Corps until March
April 1943 at Cat Island, Gulfport, Miss. 1945, when its officials asked to be relieved
The centers at Front Royal and Fort of this responsibility. At that time the
Robinson were located at permanent re- QMC set up its own organization for dog
mount installations, while the others were procurement. During its three years of op-
independent establishments. Camp Ri- eration Dogs for Defense obtained ap-
mini, situated in a region in the Rocky proximately 18,000 dogs through donation.
Mountains where the snow lay on the Between 1 March and 27 August 1945 the
ground for many months of the year, was Corps recruited 1,380. Purchases of sled
utilized exclusively for the training of sled and pack dogs had been made earlier by
and pack dogs. Cat Island was used for
tactical training because its semitropical ^^
(1) Rpt, Rmt Br [area Sep 45], sub: QMC Ac-
complishments in World War II. (2) Memo, TQMG
climate and dense vegetation made it a for Dir of Mil Tng, ASF, Jun 43, sub: Expansion of
1
suitable place to prepare dogs for use in War Dog Reception Center and Tng Centers.
'" OQMG Dailv Activity Journal, 2 Aug 44,
jungle warfare.^ pp.
2-3; 6 Dec 44, pp. 1-2.
All of these centers, except the one at " (1) Among these were Great Danes, whose large
Fort Robinson, were discontinued during size made them unsuitable for training, and hunting
the latter half of 1944. By the summer of breeds in general because they were too easily diverted
by animal scents. Ltr, Chief of Rmt Br to Marie A.
that year the Allied military situation had Stone, 2
Jun 43, sub: Specifications for Dogs. (2) For
improved to the extent that the need for a listing oT breeds that were acceptable in the early
dogs to assist in guarding U.S. coast lines stages of the program, see WD TM 10-396, Jul 43, 1
tually disappeared. As a result, the num- Horse Breeding, and Dogs, p. 3. For use as sled dogs,
ber of sentry dogs returned began to Malemutes, Eskimos, and huskies were preferred since
their large, long feet and thick pads enabled them to
exceed by far the number issued. Training haul heavy loads over ice and crusted snow. Partly
activities, which were then being devoted because these animals were scarce and partly because
need arose,
increasingly to the instruction of scout they had always been purchased as the
the Army continued to buy most sled dogs, as well as
dogs, were concentrated thereafter at the pack dogs, instead of procuring them through Dogs
Nebraska post.^'' for Defense.
328 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
RECEPTION CENTER FOR WAR DOGS, Front Royal, Va., August 1942. Dogs
are weighed in and given a medical examination.
the QMC. Thus a total of about 20,000 basic significance was the development of
dogs were procured during the war. Of a comprehensive plan whereby dogs and
these, only slightly more than- 10,000 handlers could be trained together as a
finished training for some form of war team for sentry or tactical work, since the
work, the others being disqualified for one effectiveness with which the animals per-
reason or another.^'' Undersize, disease, formed their duties depended not only
temperamental defects, inferior scenting upon the thoroughness of their own train-
powers, and extreme excitability under ing but upon that of their masters as well.
gunfire or other noise were the principal Attempts were made to standardize
causes for rejection. training methods insofar as possible. Con-
A highly specialized program ditions varied considerably, however, and
for train-
ing both dogs and their handlers was set adjustments had to be made in accordance
up by the Remount Branch through the with the number and quality of men and
co-operation of technical experts of the
Military Training Division, OQMG,
and ''
Rpt, Rmt Br \circa Sep 45], sub: Accomplish-
leading dog trainers in the country. Of ments in World War II.
ANIMALS FOR MILITARY USE 329
KENNELS AT FRONT ROYAL War Dog Reception and Training Center. Enlisted
men are training to become dog handlers.
dogs to be trained, the number and quality Coast Guard utilized approximately one
"^^
of instructors, the availabihty of facilities, third of these.
and the time that could be allotted. Sentry Trained sentry dogs were issued by the
dogs could be trained in about eight weeks, QMC
to hundreds of military installations
but other types usually required approxi- '" WD TM 10-396,
Jul 43, sub: War Dogs, p. 137.
1
mately thirteen weeks. ^" " Statistical Data Book I, Rmt Br, OQMG (n. p.).
Training of war dogs during the early The following table shows the numbers and types of
dogs trained by the QMC:
part of the program was limited almost ex-
clusively to sentry animals for which there
Type of Dog
was a big demand. Experiments in the use
of dogs for other military purposes were
being carried on, but it was 1944 before
other types were trained on any sizable
scale. Of the 10,425 dogs trained at the
war dog centers during World War II,
senger work; most of the men who had The enthusiasm with which this project
experience abroad in schooling war dogs began later turned to disappointment.
were engaged in other essential work. Only two units of mine detection dogs
Moreover, preliminary reports on the were ever activated and trained. Both
use of scout and messenger dogs in North were sent to North Africa, where the ani-
Africa by the British in 1942 and 1943 had mals failed to prove their proficiency in
indicated that their work was unsatisfac- locating mines when they were used on
tory. According to observers, the animals typical German mine fields. The M-dogs
were easily frightened and confused by had been tested in the United States and
artillery fire, and those doing scout work pronounced excellent detectors, but when
lost their and neglected
sense of direction tried out under battlefield conditions they
to smell out the enemy. While messenger fell far short of attaining the standard of
dogs ordinarily gave good service on short efficiency that had been established by the
patrols, they also were affected adversely Corps of Engineers. In two tests in Septem-
by heavy gunfire. It was suggested that, ber 1944 the dogs located only 51 and 46
though conditions in North Africa might percent, respectively, of the mines plant-
preclude their successful employment in ed. Inasmuch as the discovery of at least
^"^
that region, "in close country such as the 90 percent was considered essential to
islands of the south Pacific" they would
53 Ltr, Chief of Rmt Br to Front Royal War Dog
have a very definite use in guarding lines RTC et al, 13 Aug 43, sub: Notes on Mil Dogs.
^^ Ltr, TAG to Commander Allied Land Forces,
of communication and would be par-
ticularly useful in detecting infiltrating SWPA, 26 Apr 43, sub: Test of Tng Dogs, AG 454.3
^^
(2-23-43) C.
troops. =*=^
Ltr, TAG to TQMG el al.. 19 Nov 43, sub: Con-
As a precautionary measure, in the event stitution and Activation of 238th Engineer Mine De-
that the Army might require them, the tection Co (Dog). AG 322 (17 Nov 43) OB-I-
SPMOU-M.
QMC continued to train dogs in small >« Ltr, Maj Rhett to TQMG, 22 Dec 44, sub: Mine
numbers for tactical use, emphasis being Detection War Dogs.
332 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
make any method of mine detection prac- The observer reported that the animals
ticable, was decided not to employ the
it worked more effectively when the dogs
dogs. Both units were inactivated and and their handlers were thoroughly famil-
M-dog training was discontinued. iar with each other.
Meanwhile, reports coming in from the As a and similar reports
result of this
Southwest Pacific on the experiments with that came in later, the program for train-
scout and messenger dogs were on the ing dogs for tactical use was expanded in
whole highly favorable. The observer with 1944, and efforts were made to overcome
the dogs in New Guinea reported that in the shortcomings brought to light by com-
the period between July and December bat experience. Particular emphasis was
1943 the animals were used in the forward placed upon training scout dogs, teaching
and combat areas and had given "con- the animals to be silent at all times, and
'"
sistently excellent performance." This exposing them to simulated battle noises in
experience established the fact that dogs the early course of their instruction in
could be deployed effectively in tactical order that they might learn to exhibit no
units. The observer found that scout dogs fear or other reaction in the presence of
used in reconnaissance work warned pa- heavy gunfire.
trols of the presence of Japanese at varying Since the function of scout dogs was to
ranges up to 1,000 yards, depending upon give silent warning of the approach of an
conditions of open or closed terrain, wind enemy, they were trained for use princi-
direction, and dampness of ground. They pally with reconnaissance and combat
could be employed effectively in amphib- patrols and at outposts. Their chief tasks
ious operations to detect the enemy on were to warn of ambushes or attempts at
beaches and in undergrowth along the infiltration. Though the distance at which
shore, for the dogs had no fear of water or they were able to give warning depended
travel by small boats. He reported that upon a number of factors, such as the
messenger dogs demonstrated that they ability of the master to understand his dog,
could cover distances of from 600 to 1,000 wind direction and velocity, volume or
yards with great speed over any kind of concentration of human scent, humidity,
terrain, and that their chances of getting and denseness or openness of country, the
through were excellent as they presented dogs usually could detect the presence of
small targets. enemies long before the men became
On the other hand, the observer re- aware of them. When operating with re-
ported that combat experience revealed connaissance or combat groups, the dog
certain weaknesses in the training of dogs. and his master proceeded a short distance
The most apparent of these was that, while in advance of the patrol, following the gen-
the dogs had been trained against the fir- eral direction indicated by the patrol
ing of small arms, most of them had not leader, but moving so as to take advantage
been conditioned to withstand the noise of of wind and other conditions favoring the
heavy gunfire and as a consequence their dog's power of scent. Upon the dog's warn-
usefulness deteriorated rapidly when they ing of a hostile presence, the master im-
were suddenly exposed to heavy artillery
Ltr, Lt Robert Johnson to CinC GHQSWPA.
action. A tendency on the part of some of 6 Dec 43, sub: Rpt on Experience of Trailing Dogs in
the dogs to bark at night was also noticed. New Guinea.
ANIMALS FOR MILITARY USE 333
mediately signaled the patrol leader, who proved to be a serious handicap. Another
in turn issued instructions as to the course weakness of the early platoons was that
of action to be taken. At outposts the dog they had not been given advanced train-
and master remained at a fixed posi-
his ing with AGE units of the kind with which
tion a short distance from the unit to they were to be associated.
which they were attached, and the animal To correct these deficiencies the War
was taught to alert while stationary.''^ Department transferred the responsibility
for the activation, training, and prepara-
Development of War Dog Platoons tion for overseas movement of the dog
units to the AGE late in 1944.''^ This
Except for the two experimental Engi- meant that handlers were to be selected by
neer M-dog units, the initial issues of dogs the AGE from men who had been trained
and handlers trained duty overseas
for in infantry tactics and scouting and that
were as casual detachments. It was not would be given advanced instruc-
the units
until March 1944 that the War Depart- with infantry organizations. The
tion
ment authorized the establishment of Quartermaster General, however, retained
Quartermaster war dog platoons and is- responsibility for the procurement of dogs
sued special Tables of Organization and and their basic training and the issue of
Equipment (T/O&E's) for that purpose. dogs and handlers.
'"^
the dogs, but the fact that many of the "' Memo, SW for CG AGF et a/., 26 Sep 44, sub:
handlers were physically unfit for combat Responsibility for War Dog Orgns.
"- Ihid.
service and had had no experience in in- " T/O&E 7-167, 14 Dec 44, sub: Inf Scout Dog
fantry tactics, scouting, and patrolling Plat.
334 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
dog platoons and reorganized to conform were put in World War II. Scout dog
with the new T/O&E. During 1945 the platoons, which emerged in the latter part
AGF activated and trained six infantry of the war, were found to be "a capable
scout dog platoons. Five of these, however, and valuable adjunct when properly
did not complete their training until short- and used."
trained ''^
ly after V-J Day and consequently were The experimental nature and limited
not sent overseas. Thus all but one of the success of the war dog program is reflected
sixteen war dog platoons that saw service in statistics. Although approximately
in the war were activated and trained bv 20,000 dogs were procured, only about
the QMC. half of that number were trained and
issued by the QMC, and fewer than 1,900
Evaluation of the War Dog Program of these were shipped overseas. It was late
in 1944 before scout dogs were being sent
At first the war dog program was con- any sizable numbers, and
to the theaters in
ducted largely as an experiment to deter- by the end of the war only 436 had been
mine which, if any, types of militarily shipped abroad, as shown in the following
"'
trained dogs might be of value to the Army table:
in modern warfare. Numerous uses for the
Total Issued Shipped
animals had been envisioned by dog fan-
Type of Dog Trained ^I Overseas
ciers, but after extensive tests the QMC in
actually trained and issued dogs for only Total 10,425 8.531 1.894
tions and circumstances under which the mum benefit. There the enemy at first of-
dogs were unable to perform satisfactorily, fered only slight resistance, retreating into
and, consequently, it was of vital impor- the mountainous jungles of the interior
tance that the handlers be acutely aware and then sallying forth in small groups to
of the limitations of the animals as well as harass the Americans. In patrol operations
their abilities. It was equally important designed to uncover Japanese bivouac
that the dogs be thoroughly schooled in areas, supply dumps, and lines of commu-
their duties and that their handlers be well nications the 26th War Dog Platoon
trained in scouting, patrolling, and minor proved invaluable. During the period 17
tactics. September-10 November 1944, the dogs
Reports received from overseas during made more than one hundred patrols with
and immediately following the war give infantry troops, ranging from a patrol of
ample evidence that, while many satisfac- five men to a rifle company of two hun-
tory results were obtained from the use of dred or more. The commander of the
scout dogs in the war against Germany, 155th Infantry Regiment reported that the
these animals were employed much more dogs never failed to alert at less than
effectively in the islands of the Pacific. The seventy-five yards and not a single casualty
dense tropical vegetation and the semi- was suffered while a scout dog was being
darkness of the jungles even at midday af- employed.
forded the Japanese excellent opportunities Of equal importance is the ability of the dog
to infiltrate behind the American lines and to pick up enemy bivouacs, positions, patrols,
conduct reconnaissance. Such enemy op- troop reconnaissance, etc. long before our pa-
erations could not easily be detected by trol reaches them. This advance warning has
frequently enabled our troops to achieve sur-
ordinary patrols, but when dogs accom-
prise and inflict heavy casualties on the
panied these patrols they were able to de-
Japs.*^^*^
tect and give silent warning of the enemy
long before the men became aware of Not all reports on the use of scout dogs
them. The dogs could also be used to good were favorable, even in the Pacific. Most
advantage in mountainous areas, in river of the unsatisfactory results, however, ap-
bottoms, and in heavily wooded terrain. peared to be traceable to attempts to
The presence of the animals with pa- utilize the animals when conditions were
trols greatly lessened the danger of ambush not favorable. Reports showed that in
and tended to boost the morale of the sol- open country with no trail to follow the
diers. dogs were unsuccessful because they
strayed easily and made too much noise
Personnel who have used the dogs state that
they have saved many lives and are enthu-
moving through the underbrush. Nor
siastic over their value. It was noted that could they be employed properly in
where a dog was present on a patrol, there crowded areas since they alerted on de-
was a feeling of security and relief from the tecting all human beings outside the im-
nervous tension caused by fear of an ambush. mediate patrol. They sometimes even gave
This enabled the patrols to operate more ef-
ficiently and cover greater distances."'
" Ltr, Lt Col Peter Calza, Hq I Corps, to CO Sixth
Army, 10 Aug 45, sub: Rpt on Infantry Scout Dog
The fighting on Morotai in the Nether- Plat, AG 319.1 Rpt 45.
Ltr, Col Walter
"•^
Hanna, CO 155th Inf Regt to
lands Indies illustrates the manner in CG USAFFE, 2 NovJ.44, sub: Use of War Dogs with
which scout dogs were used with maxi- an Inf Regt.
336 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
WAR DOG ON BIAK ISLAND, off the coast of Netherlands New Guinea, used to track
down the enemy hidden in the jungle.
warning on pigs, chickens, carabaos in — Other reports from Italy stated that in
on any creature giving forth a scent. "^
fact, open country the scout dogs were so con-
In the war against Germany conditions spicuous that the enemy discovered them
generally were unfavorable to the wide- before they could alert. In the mountains,
spread use of dogs. Scout dogs in two in which so much of the fighting took
platoons operating with the Fifth Army in place, soft, deep snow and steep, slippery
Italy in the autumn of 1944 were reported trails prevented the dogs from working
to have been extremely gun-shy under satisfactorily. Similarly, the animals were
artillery fire.This distracted them from found to be of little use in heavy rains and
their scouting duties and made them vir- deep mud. But on a static front, when the
tually useless.'" Gun-shyness was a major weather was clear, with no snow or mud
weakness of most of the dogs assigned to on the ground, or when there was a firm
the early platoons because they were crust on the snow, scout dogs could be em-
trained to become accustomed only to the ployed advantageously. After the final of-
firing of small arms. Later on the training fensive against Germany began, the rapid
program was adjusted- to overcome this movement of troops and the intense gun-
failing, but it was never found particularly
advantageous to use the animals in heavy '
'Ltr, CO 26th War Dog Plat to CG USAFFE, 2
combat. More and more their activities Nov 44, sub: War Dogs with Inf Rcgt.
" Ltr, Maj Rhett, AFHQ. QM Sec, APO 5 2, to 1
were restricted to duty with reconnais- TQMG, 21 Dec 44, sub: Observation on QM War
sance patrols. Dog Plats, MTO.
ANIMALS FOR MILITARY USE 337
PATROL AT AITAPE, North East New Guinea, starting out through the jungle with
war dogs.
fire made the utilization of dogs for scout- leader crept cautiously forward alone, and
ing impractical, and they were used not more than 200 yards away discoverd a
large group of German soldiers in ambush.
instead as sentries."'
With this valuable information, the patrol re-
That scout dogs did perform valuable turned to the outpost where they called for
service in the European theater as well as mortar fire to wipe out the enemy position.
'-'
development in the Army, for until 1901 but the operation of these post laundries
the enlisted man had been left to take care was of a strictly limited nature, since they
of his laundry needs as best he could. were constructed only in the absence of
At that time efforts were made at the other facilities. They were not established
at posts where post exchange laundries or
post level to assist military personnel in ob-
taining prompt and regular laundry commercial facilities were functioning
serv-
ice at reasonable rates. Laundries, oper- satisfactorily. The operation of the Quar-
ated by civilian personnel, were organized termaster post laundries was completely
at some of the larger Army posts by post decentralized. They were administered by
exchange officers who utilized post ex- the post quartermasters, who rendered all
change funds for the purpose inasmuch returns and money accounts as prescribed
as the Army was not granted appropria- by regulations. These laundries were in-
tions for laundries or authorized to operate tended to be self-sustaining, their expenses
them. Post exchange councils prescribed of operation and maintenance being met
prices for laundry work and salaries for from the prices fixed for the work done.
laundry personnel. In most instances, the These prices varied widely, however, un-
facilities were commercial laundries oper-
(1) Ltr. Actg SVV to Hon. John B. Shannon.
'
ated as a post exchange feature under re- Chairman of Committee to Investigate Government
vokable licenses that were issued to firms Business, 15 Sep 32, and Inci, Rpt Showing Ori-
iji
to enable them to furnish laundry service gin and Development, Authority for Operation and
.\d\antages of Maintaining Laundries and Dry Clean-
to stations. In addition to administering ing Plants for L?se b>' the .Armv', prepared in OQMG
the post exchange laundries, the councils by Capt John R. Holt, 331.5. (Hereafter cited as
also controlled relations with commercial Holt Rpt.) (2) Regulations for the Army of the United
States (Washington, 1913), pp. 71, 73, 74.
laundries serving the various posts." '
L'.S. Statutes at Large, Vol. 35, pp. 742-45. (Act
In 1909 Congress gave the QMC au- approved 3 March 1909.)
LAUNDRY AND DRY CLEANING OPERATIONS 339
der the prevailing system of decentraliza- but the large quantity of laundry machin-
tion.The lack of uniformity also applied to ery purchased during the war enabled the
the quality of the work performed, since OQMG to establish laundries on a larger
the OQMG set no standards for launder- scale in the postwar period than in the
ing and exercised no over-all supervision of years preceding 1917.' While some mobile
operations.^ laundries were set up at various stations
With the declaration of war in 1917 and along the Mexican border, they were
the concentration of large numbers of men gradually taken out of active circulation
at cantonments, the laundry problem as- and their equipment was installed in avail-
sumed serious proportions. Not only did able buildings to provide fixed-type laun-
laundry service have to be furnished for dries.
officers and men at camps and for Army By the end of the 1920's the QMC had
hospitals, but facilities also had to be pro- installed forty Quartermaster laundries as
vided overseas because the Secretary of well as four dry cleaning plants at major
War delegated responsibility for organiz- installations in the United States and its
ing and operating laundry companies for possessions. Quartermaster operation of
overseas duty to The Quartermaster Gen- dry cleaning plants as adjuncts to laundries
eral under the National Defense Act of dated from World War I. The large quan-
1916. tities of woolen clothing and blankets that
Then, too, the fact that the money needed dry cleaning led to a plan for the
clothing allowance for enlisted men was construction and operation of government-
abolished made all clothing issued govern- owned dry cleaning plants, but this project
ment property and placed upon the gov- was abandoned with the signing of the Ar-
ernment the responsibility for cleaning, re- mistice. Not until 1920 were such plants
pairing, and pressing it. The OQMG erected and operated as part of the laun-
therefore took steps to construct govern- dry service.^
ment-owned laundries at the larger camps, Further expansion or even adequate
and on 9 August 1918 the Secretary of maintenance of these laundries and dry
War authorized the construction of nine- cleaning plants in the decades before
teen cantonment laundries at a cost of World War II was handicapped by the
$300,000 each.* meager funds granted by Congress for this
One of the most important aspects of purpose. The number of laundries tended
laundry activities during World War I was
the development of a mobile laundry unit
^
(1) WD GO 68, 19 Apr 1910. (2) Annual Report
of The Quartermaster General, 1919, p. 117.
for use overseas near the front. This unit ^ Rpt cited above, n. 3
(2).
functions of bathing and disinfestation. and Surplus Prop Br to Asst Exec of Sup Div, OQMG,
OQMG prepared a special report that was By 1930, branch offered a de-
too, the
submitted to a Congressional committee tailed statement of recommendations re-
investigating government competition with lating to laundry operations that was in-
private enterprise. In transmitting the re- corporated in the Handbook for Quarterrnas-
port to the committee's chairman, the
" See Annual Report of The Quartermaster General to
Secretary of War officially opposed the the Secretaryof War for the years 1922-1939.
abolition of the Quartermaster laundries '" For the viewpoint of the Laundry Owners Na-
ters.It explained the use and proper in the postwar reorganization of the
method of handUng various items of laun- OQMG
by placement of the Laundry
dry equipment, described and analyzed Branch in the Salvage Division of the Sup-
the use of various kinds of laundry sup- ply Service.^* By 1930 the dwindling im-
plies,and recommended washing formulas portance of salvage activities had resulted
for processing different items of clothing in the elimination of the Salvage Division,
and equipage. This statement marked the and responsibility for laundry operations
beginning of standardized laundering was transferred to the Clothing and
methods. Standardization was further pro- Equipage Branch of the Supply Division.
moted by the specifications developed by By the end of the thirties OQMG admin-
the Laundry Branch for laundering done istrators had once more returned to the
under commercial contract. First devel- idea of associating laundry, surplus prop-
oped as a service for the Civilian Conser- erty, and eventually salvage operations in
vation Corps, these specifications were also a single branch within the Supply Divi-
applicable to contracts executed in behalf sion.'"'
of the Regular Army. They not only estab- On the- eve of World War II, laundry
lished standards that private firms were to activities were being administered by a
achieve in executing contract laundry section in the Laundry and Surplus Prop-
work, but they helped as well to define erty Branch of the Supply Division. It
those of Quartermaster laundries. prepared the regulations affecting Quar-
termaster laundries and dry cleaning
Administrative Organization plants, exercised over-all supervision of
them, gave technical advice on specifica-
Developments Within the OQMG tions for supplies, machinery, and equip-
ment, and approved their purchase. It
By 1939 the varied and comprehensive prepared the budget estimates for these
experiences of the OQMG in maintaining facilities and collaborated with the Con-
and operating a laundry service for the struction Division in preparing floor plans
Army during the previous twenty years for buildings and the arrangement of laun-
had provided an adequate basis for meet- dry machinery.
ing the laundry requirements of World These activities were being handled by
War II. These were formidable only be- four persons in 1940, a situation that was
cause they were so huge. To handle the soon changed by the impact of the rapid
task it was necessary for the OQMG to ex- growth of the Army and the accompany-
pand the administrative organization re- ing expansion of laundry facilities of newly
sponsible for laundry operations. established installations. Increased activ-
In the years following World War I, this ities resulted in the redesignation of the
responsibility had been vested in the Sup- Laundry Section as a branch in June
ply Service, or Supply Division as it was
•^OQMG Office Memo 119, 30 Aug 21, sub:
later renamed, and administered in the Orgnof OQMG.
decade of the twenties by the Laundry (1) The Laundry and Surplus Property Branch
'"'
—
cluded expendable items soaps, deter- OQMG OO 84, 31 Mar 42, sub: Reassignment of
QMC Functions.
gents, and special materials, such as ink,
(1) OQMG OO 184, 31 Jul 42, sub: Reassign-
''
ment purposes and for use in buildings al- new facilities both in the zone of interior
ready in existence. Responsibility for set- and in the theaters was transferred from
ting up laundry facilities and for procuring the Corps of Engineers to the QMC. This
laundry machinery for initial installations transfer was vigorously defended by The
and for use in new buildings was vested in Quartermaster General when the Corps of
the Corps of Engineers, to whom these Engineers later sought a modification of
functions had been transferred from the the directive.-
Construction Division, OQMG, late in Within the OQMG
these responsibil-
1941 along with all other construction ities were distributed among the divisions
activities of the QMC. Responsibility for according to the functional organization of
initial procurement was separated from the office. Thus the preparation of specifi-
construction operations and returned to cations for laundry equipment was as-
the OQMG in June 1943.-" Actually, the signed to the Military Planning Division,
Corps of Engineers had never purchased purchase and inspection to the Procure-
items of laundry equipment even before ment Division, storage and issue to the
this transfer; they had been procured by Storage and Distribution Division, and the
the Washington Quartermaster Depot administration of the stockpile of equip-
upon direction of the Office of the Chief of ment to the Laundry Branch of the Serv-
Engineers. With the centralization of pro- ice Installations Division.-'^
curement in the OQMG, an efficient pur- The changes made procurement re-
in
chasing organization was established at sponsibility modified relationshipsbetween
thejeffersonville Quartermaster Depot.-' the QMC and the Medical Department.
The Chief of Engineers retained respon- Hospital laundries were built only when
sibility for the determination of require- other facilities for handling hospital bulk
ments and the authorization of funds for work, in particular Quartermaster laun-
laundry equipment used in new facilities, dries which processed the work free, were
either constructed or acquired. not available. Such laundries operated
The Corps of Engineers remained re- under rules and regulations promulgated
sponsible for constructing new laundry by the Medical Department and were not
The Laundry Branch, OQMG,
facilities. under the jurisdiction of The Quartermas-
maintained a close relationship with that ter General. Their construction, however,
Corps, continuing to authorize the con- did fall within the province of the Con-
struction of laundries as it had in the past,
determining whether existing commercial -« ASF Memo S5-103-43, 8 Jun 43, sub: Assign-
facilities could take care of local needs or ments by PAB.
whether another Quartermaster laundry, -' Memo, Gen Gregory for CG ASF, 15 Dec 43,
sub: Responsibility for Procurement of Kitchen,
not unreasonably far from the site in ques- Bakery, Laundry, and Similar Equip.
tion, could handle a camp's requirements. --
(1) Memo, Maj Gen Thomas M. Robins,
DCofEngrs, for Control Div, ASF, 10 Nov 43, sub:
At the same time that procurement re-
Modifications of Memo S5- 103-43. Chief of
sponsibility was returned to the OQMG,
(2)
Laundry Br to Dir of Sv Instls Div, OQMG, 29 Nov
responsibility for the specifications and 43, same sub. (3) Memo, TQMG for CG ASF, 15
design of laundry equipment and for the Dec 43, sub: Responsibility for Procurement of
Kitchen, Bakery, Laundry, and Similar Equip.
control and administration of the stockpile -
OQMG OO 25-46, lOAug 43, sub: Assignment
of laundry and dry cleaning equipment for of Functions Transferred from CE.
344 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
struction Division, OQMG, during the including those at
sibility for all laundries,
emergency period and later passed to the general hospitals, was vested in The Quar-
Corps of Engineers. The constructing termaster General.-^ He was expected,
agency provided the funds for initial pro- however, to adhere to the detailed stand-
curement of equipment. All additional ards for all hospital laundry service fur-
equipment was procured through the nished by The Surgeon General, and to
Laundry Branch, funds being provided by maintain close liaison with him in refer-
The Surgeon General's Office. This was in ence to such activities.
accordance with regulations that made the As the war in Europe drew to a close,
QMC responsibile for the procurement of the changes in assignment of functions
supplies used by two or more branches of made were defined with greater
in 1943
the Army. After the transfer of procure- precision. At that time, The Quartermas-
ment responsibility for laundry and dry ter General was assigned responsibility for
cleaning equipment in the summer of the specifications and the purchase,
for,
1943, the Laundry Branch initiated all and issue of, all fixed
inspection, storage,
procurement for hospital laundries as well and mobile laundry and dry cleaning
as for Quartermaster laundries. Subse- equipment operated by the Army. He was
quently, the Medical Department was di- also responsible for determining require-
rected to transfer to the QMC all funds ments and providing funds for mobile
held for the purchase of laundry and dry laundry and dry cleaning equipment and
cleaning equipment and supplies. There- for all replacements. On the other hand,
after such supplies and equipment were the Chief of Engineers administered these
furnished to laundries operated in con- last two functions as they applied to equip-
junction with hospitals without reim- ment for newly acquired or newly con-
bursement.-^ structed fixed facilities. Similarly, the
The operation of laundries, too, posed Commanding General, AAF, the Chief of
problems of mutual interest and required Ordnance, and the Chief of the Chemical
the co-operation of the OQMG and The Warfare Service were responsible for de-
Surgeon General's Office. The latter con- termining requirements and providing
trolled all matters relating to the protec- funds for the fixed equipment used in
tion of health while the Laundry Branch, plants performing specialized operations
OQMG, offered technical advice in its for these branches. In determining re-
field. Until the summer of 1944, hospital quirements for equipment at new facilities
laundries and Quartermaster laundries and additional equipment at existing facil-
were under the staff supervision of The the Chief of Engineers and The
ities,
Surgeon General's Office and the OQMG, Quartermaster General consulted with the
respectively. At that time, in view of the Commanding General, AAF, with regard
"critical labor situation all over the coun- to those facilities at installations under his
try and the dwindling availability of com- command and with The Surgeon General
mercial laundry service," Headquarters,
ASF, became greatly interested in insuring
maximum utilization and efficiency of op- -' WD Cir 7, Sec. II, 5 Jan 45, sub: Responsibility
forProcurement of Equip and Supplies.
eration of Army-owned laundry and dry -'
WD
Cir 352, Sec. IV, 30 Aug 44, sub: Program
cleaning facilities. As a result, staff respon- to Effect Improvement in Opn of Laundry Facilities.
LAUNDRY AND DRY CLEANING OPERATIONS 345
in reference to those operated in conjunc- tor. He was expected to visit the QMC
tion with hospitals.-*^ laundries in his area every six months and
make such additional special inspections
Relations With the Field might be directed by the Laundry
as
Branch. He worked in close co-operation
Quartermaster laundries and dry clean- with the service command, sending word
ing plants were established at posts or of an impending inspection well in ad-
camps in the zone of interior, and respon- vance of his visit; in no case was he to
sibility for their proper operation was interfere with the normal operations of a
vested in the commanding general of the service command but he was to function
corps area within whose jurisdiction they as a technical adviser to help the com-
were located. Technical supervision of manding officer achieve maximum re-
'-
these facilities was a function of The Quar- sults.
termaster General. He prescribed the The technical inspector also conducted
methods, standards, regulations, and al- investigations to determine the necessity
lowances for the operation of the installa- for constructing new laundries or for
tions,determined production standards, acquiring commercial facilities for oper-
suggested methods for improvement of ation by the QMC, and he made arrange-
operations, and made technical inspec- ments for commercial service under
tions. contract. The importance of these investi-
The rapid expansion of Quartermaster gations was pointed out by the chief of the
laundries beginning with the emergency Laundry Branch:
period and the increasing need for closer From past experience it has been found
supervision of them raised problems in re- that with practically no exceptions, Service
lationships between the field and the Commands will concur with recommenda-
OQMG. For example, commanding offi- tions from camps and stations for the
posts,
construction of new laundries or acquisition
cers of the corps areas had early been
of commercial facilities. Usually such con-
advised to station experienced laundry currence is made with little or no effort made
officers at each Quartermaster installation. to determine the necessity for such construc-
Inspection, however, revealed that posts tion or acquisition, or the availability of serv-
ice from commercial plants or nearby Quar-
were operating either with officers un-
termaster Corps installations. Such experi-
trained in Quartermaster methods and ence has indicated that recommendations by
procedures or with trained officers who the Service Commands were not based upon
were assigned additional duties that inter- facts and that independent investigation by
fered with those relating to laundry oper- qualified O.Q.M.G. Technical Laundry In-
1942, therefore, five inspection areas were OQMG, 8 Jul 43, sub: First Anniversary Conf of
established, each under a laundry inspec- CGs SvCs.
346 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
specters were usually required to prevent what he considered an infringe-
tion to
unnecessary duplication or acquisition of ment of his authority "a typical illustra- —
laundry and dry cleaning facilities."^
tion of the growing tendency on the part
Such facts caused the OQMGin the of Staff" Divisions and Technical Services,
summer of 1943 to oppose a proposal by ASF for a centralized control of service
Headquarters, ASF, to decentralize con- command post activities as well as those at
tinuing inspections to the field. '" On the service command headquarters." Ham-
other hand, the rapid growth of the Army pered by drastic reductions in overhead
and the increase of administrative prob- personnel and yet responsible for oper-
lems had necessitated a greater delegation ations, he felt that commanders ought to
of responsibility to the field. Thus to expe- have full latitude to assign personnel to
dite laundry operations all matters per- obtain their maximum effective use. Al-
taining to the hiring of laundry employees, though the Deputy Chief of Staff" for Serv-
including the determination of wage rates, ice Commands, ASF, was in sympathy,
had been decentralized to the service com- The Quartermaster General was quick to
mands in the fall of 1942. point out that Quartermaster laundry op-
It was not to be expected that the exer- erations were a $24,000,000 a year busi-
cise of staff supervision and actual opera- ness which could not be entrusted to
tion of the laundries could be accomplished inexperienced, untrained personnel.
without some disagreement over authority. Where trained laundry technicians were
The Laundry Branch had established a not employed, plants operated unsatisfac-
system of inspection, on the basis of which torily and losses were incurred. The Chief
it prepared and sent recommendations to of Staff" himself had stressed the necessity
the service commands, suggesting, for ex- for improving laundry service, and in the
ample, that unsatisfactory laundry officers interest of clarifying responsibilities The
be replaced, incompetent workers be re- Quartermaster General suggested the pro-
moved, machinery be repaired, and supply mulgation of a new directive that he had
policies be brought into accord with regu- already submitted to Headquarters, ASF.^-
lations. However, it was not always easy to
get action on these suggestions, and inspec-
-^ Chief of Laundry Br to Dir of Sv Instls Div,
tors upon returning later to an installation
OQMG, 25 Aug 43, sub: Decentralization of Con-
too often found nothing had been done.^^ tinuing Inspections.
In a number of instances in 1944 inspec- ^" Memo, TQMG for DCofS for SvCs, ASF, 30
Aug 43, sub: Decentralization of Continuing Inspec-
tors found that laundry officers were being
tions.
assigned additional duties unrelated to " See, for example
(1) Ltr, Dir of Sv Instls Div,
laundry operations, though this had been OQMG, to CG
Ninth SvC, 21 Jun 43, no sub. (2)
Ltr, Col Brunswold, OQMG, to CG Fifth SvC, 29
prohibited by instructions to the field as
Jun 43, sub: Unsatisfactory Opn of QMC Laundry
early as 1941. As a consequence, the at Camp Campbell, Ky.
OQMG called attention anew to this di- '-
(1) Ltr, Lt Col Joseph E. McMullen, OQMG,
to CG Seventh SvC, 31 Jul 44, sub: Assignment of
rective and re-emphasized the importance
Additional Duties to Laundry Off. (2) Ltr, CofS
from an operating standpoint of having an Seventh SvC, to CG ASF, 7 Aug 44, same sub. (3)
experienced, well-trained officer in charge Memo. DCofS for SvCs for Brig Gen Clinton F. Rob-
inson, ASF, Aug 44, no sub. (4) Memo, TQMG
of a laundry. The Commanding General,
1 1
directive.
^^
In the light of difficulties that had been
This directive was published in August encountered, the August directive again
1944. It was aimed at the promotion of stated that The Quartermaster General
"prompt service, elimination and preven-
tion of backlogs, adherence to established " (1) Memo, TQMG for CG ASF, 26 Jul 44, sub:
standards of quality in performance of Opn of Laundries and Dry Cleaning Plants, inclos-
work, and maximum utilization of facil- ing draft of WD Cir and changes to
ARs. (2) An
^^ The
amended version was submitted in Memo, TQMG
ities to provide adequate service." for CG ASF, 2 Aug 44, same sub. (3) Memo, TQMG
directive reiterated that The Quartermas- for CG ASF, 8 Aug 44, sub: Responsibilities for
Supervision of Laundry Opns.
ter General would continue to function as
WD Cir 352, Sec. IV, 30 Aug 44, sub: Program
'^
the staff' agency of the Commanding Gen- to Effect Improvement in Opn of Laundry Facilities.
eral, ASF, and to have technical control (1) WD Cir 388, 27 Sep 44, sub: Transfer of Re-
*5
would determine the need for the estab- Expansion of Fixed Laundries
Hshment or expansion of Army-operated
facilities as well as the need for discon- Construction
tinuance of any of them. Moreover, he
would decide on changes in their operat- In 1940 there were only thirty-three
ing capacities, such as increasing the num- Quartermaster fixed laundries, twenty-
ber of shifts in order to meet demands or nine of which were in the United States
eliminate backlogs, and rule on all matters and four in its overseas possessions. Five of
relating to commercial service, though the those within the country included dry
servicecommands would still negotiate cleaning plants. When the Army first be-
and award contracts in accordance with gan to expand in the emergency period.
regulations. Finally, his responsibilities in The Quartermaster General adopted a
personnel matters were clarified through policy of constructing Quartermaster
the authorization granted him to direct laundries at most of the large camps, but
the transfer and assignment of laundry the availability of commercial service for
superintendents to all installations, and of smaller camps was to be investigated. At
laundry officers at all except AAF stations that time laundry machinery could be
when this would improve operations. He readily obtained, and the construction
couldrecommend transfer and reassign- policy proved a sound one in view of later
ment of laundry officers at AAF installa- developments, such as loss of skilled labor,
tions, but action was dependent upon the low and the tremendous increase
priorities,
decision taken by the Commanding Gen- in thevolume of civilian laundry work in
AAF.
eral, defense plant areas which hampered com-
To carry out the objectives of the pro- mercial laundries in providing service for
'"
gram of improved laundry service, the the Army.
commanding general of each service com- Opposing government competition and
mand was directed to establish at his protesting that they could handle all laun-
headquarters a director of laundry service. dering for camps in their vicinities, com-
The Quartermaster General assisted the mercial laundries in some instances were
service command in selecting a qualified successful in curtailing the construction
and competent officer for this position. program. On the other hand, the expense
The under the supervision of the
directors, involved and the large amounts of critical
service command quartermasters, were materials used in building Quartermaster
empowered to carry out the provisions of laundries made it impossible for the QMC
the August directive for the commanding to provide sufficient facilities for the Army.
generals of the service commands and The It therefore became the rule to build Army
secure adequate service. The need for con- mandeering laundries or building its
they could not decry government "compe- OQMG, 8 Jul 43, sub: First
Anniversary Conf of
CGs SvCs.
tition" and then abandon Army work •'"Army l^aundries,'" Business Week, ]une 7, 1941,
without suffering the consequences. The pp. 30-32.
troops had to be provided with laundry
^" Harold C. Buckelew, "The Army's Laundry —
and You," Laundry Age, March 1, 1943, p. 19.
service, and if private firms did not furnish —
" "What'U It Be Reveille or Taps? " Starchroom,
it the government would, either by com- October 15, 1942, pp. 4, 6.
350 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Six months later it was necessary to acquire ments inasmuch as prewar developments
another commercial laundry since Defense had long before clarified procedures. On
Laundries and Dry Cleaners, Inc., in- the other hand, until early in 1943 the
formed officials at Fort Devens that it Army was not permitted to draw up a gov-
would discontinue service on 24 July/- ernment contract providing for the
A more successful agreement was nego- processing of the personal clothes of the
tiated between the AAF Technical Train- soldier.
ing Command at Miami Beach, Fla., and Peacetime arrangements had permitted
the local laundrymen. So effective was the "companies and similar units including
"Miami Plan" that it served as a model hospitals" at posts, camps, or stations to
for similar arrangements elsewhere. Con- contract with private firms for the laundry
fronted with the usual variation in prices, work of enlisted men, the company com-
irregular service, and similar difficulties, manders usually collecting the charges
the commanding officer called the laun- each month. In the case of nonpayment by
drymen together and made it clear that men for their laundry work, the
enlisted
Army needs would have to be met. For pay of the defaulters could be stopped to
their part Army officials took steps to satisfy their indebtedness.^^ Such arrange-
standardize procedure on pickups and de- ments did not have the status of govern-
liveries, for which Army trucks were used. ment contracts, but the obligations
Deductions were permitted from payrolls incurred could be met easily since the
to satisfy indebtedness to the commercial number of men at any given post was
pool. On the other hand, the pool clearing small. They proved highly unsatisfactory,
house, called Service Laundries, Inc., or- however, when the Army increased in size
ganized the production of its members, and the constant movement of troops im-
adopted a piece rate with graduated peded the collection of payments due pri-
charges for enlisted men and officers, and vate firms. The problem assumed serious
collected the money due the laundries, de- proportions, particularly when in the fall
ducting 5 percent to pay its operating ex- of 1942 as a result of a War Department
penses and to provide both a reserve fund directive, credit privileges were curtailed
for retiring its organization and a sinking and all services obtained through post ex-
fund against deferred payments by the changes, including laundry work and dry
Army.^^ So well managed was this pool cleaning by private firms, were put on a
^"^
and so promptly were accounts adjusted cash basis.
that losses to Miami laundries by default- The effect was to place upon commer-
ing soldiers were negligible. cial laundries the burden of making their
The difficulty experienced by laundry- own collection of charges due them, there-
men in collecting laundry charges from in- ^-
(1) Ltr, Col Hamilton, OQMG,
to CofEngrs, 3
dividual soldiers posed one of the major Jul 43, sub: Constr of QMC
Laundry, Ft. Devens,
problems for the Army in obtaining com- Mass. (2) Ltr, Hamilton to GAS Div, OQMG, 7 Aug
43, sub: Communication from Sen. David L Walsh.
mercial service. Bulk work —
that is, the
^' James T.
Larrimore, "The Ramparts We Wash,"
laundering or cleaning of such govern- Starchroom, October 15, 1942, pp. 9ff.
ment-owned items as mattress covers, " AR 210-50, 31 Dec 34, sub: Posts, Camps, and
by increasing the amount of paper work There was no way in which the laundry-
and the personnel needed to operate col- man could recover his losses unless he dis-
lection and delivery stations and resulting posed of such clothing to the public. This
in the end in higher prices for the soldier. procedure was undesirable, and instruc-
The director of the Service Installations tions were therefore issued to the field
Division, OQMG, argued that many firms making appropriations available for the
would lose interest in Army business be- recovery of such clothing. Proprietors of
cause of the added accounting burden. He laundries and dry cleaning establishments
felt that a contract would be legally fea- were to be paid a reasonable service
sible under the authority that the Army charge for the laundering or dry cleaning
had to deduct charges from the payroll, of all unclaimed government clothing that
and he urged its use. This would mean they returned. This clothing was there-
that the government would assume finan- upon restored to stock for Army use.^^
cial responsibility for bills unpaid because
of death, desertion, or for other reasons. Purchase and Lease of Laundries
The proposed change would also simplify
and promote more satisfactory relations While it made use of available com-
between the Army and the commercial mercial laundry and dry cleaning service,
laundries. ^"^ Furthermore, he pointed out the OQMG
also found it necessary in the
that inasmuch as credit was allowed sol- fiscal year 1943 to inaugurate a policy of
diers patronizing Quartermaster laundries, purchasing or leasing commercial laun-
the War Department directive discrim- dries and operating them as Army facili-
inated against private firms. This policy was based primarily on
ties.^"
Early in 1943, therefore, the War De- the need to conserve critical materials, but
partment permitted post quartermasters or the OQMG
was also motivated in some in-
supply officers to execute government con- stances by its inability to obtain satisfac-
tracts for commercial laundry and dry tory service from the laundry owners.
cleaning services for enlisted men, the Whether or not to acquire a plant in a
charges for which were to be paid from given area was determined by a Laundry
funds authorized to regional Quartermas- Branch representative who surveyed the
ter depots for the purpose. The govern- and ascertained whether the
facilities
system, the Laundry Branch was instru- Commercial Laundry and Dry Cleaning Sv.
mental in obtaining a regulation that per-
^'^
WDCir 467, Sec. IV, 12 Dec 44, sub: Clothing.
Chief of Laundry Br to Dir of Sv Instls Div,
^''
though consent of the owner was not req- good will or rolling stock, which he was
uisite. The Corps of Engineers then sent free to dispose of as best he could. If quali-
appraisers and technicians who arranged fied, the laundry owner or his managers
for purchase or lease of the property, de- were commissioned as captains or first
pending upon the situation encountered. lieutenants and placed in charge of the
If so much new machinery had to be in- plant. Most of the laundry employees were
stalled or other improvements made that retained as civil service personnel at the
a lease ultimately would be more expen- same wage rates they had previously re-
sive than outright purchase, the plant was ceived.'^"
purchased. New machinery installed in a The number of commercial laundries
leased plant remained government prop- leased or purchased began to rise steadily
erty, but the Army agreed to make it avail- after June 1942. By March of the following
able to the owner at "reasonable prices" y^ar there were ten, and by June the num-
if he so desired. ber had increased to fifteen.-'' The Army
The appraisers discussed the terms of
lease or purchase, which were based upon '"'
Buckelew, "The Army's Laundry — and You,"
an annual percentage of the Army's ap- Laundry Age, March 1, 1943, p. 20.
' (1) liyid., p. 21. (2) Chief of Laundry Br to Dir
praisal of real estate and equipment. No of Sv Instls Div, OQMG, 23 Jun 43, sub: New QMC
compensation was given the owner for Laundries and Dry Cleaning Plants.
LAUNDRY AND DRY CLEANING OPERATIONS 353
Table 19 — QMC Fixed Laundry and Dry Cleaning Plant Activities: Fiscal
Years 1940-1945
354 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
seventy-seven dry cleaning plants, of perimental units until 1940. By the follow-
which twenty-seven were in the zone of in- ing year, mobile laundry equipment, uti-
terior and fifty were overseas. They han- lizing a van-type trailer drawn by a trac-
dled approximately 18,000,000 pieces of tor, had been devloped and standardized
dry cleaning in the fiscal year 1945.^^ through the co-operative efforts of the
Laundry Branch and the Motor Transport
Use of Mobile Laundries Division, OQMG. Although this equip-
ment was a great improvement over that
The service provided overseas by fixed used in 1918, its deficiencies were promptly
laundries was supplemented by that fur- revealed in its operation in North Africa.
nished by mobile laundries operated by Subsequently, under the guidance of the
Quartermaster laundry units, which fol- Research and Development Branch, a
lowed the troops into the theaters of opera- more satisfactory design was developed.''^
tions. The use of mobile laundry equip- Unfortunately, development and pro-
ment dated from World War I, but little curement came too late and none of this
effort had been expended to bring it up-to-
date before World War II. Handicapped '^
Ibid.
newly designed and improved mobile to provide service for enlisted men, but
equipment was put into operation during they also handled the work of other groups
the war. Although approximately 2,000 of and organizations. If the capacity of a
the old van-type semimobile laundries facility became overtaxed for any reason
were procured and most of them operated for example, because of scarcity of labor
overseas,"' there never was a sufficient priorities for service were established. En-
number to take care of all laundry needs listed men's clothing had top priority, fol-
in the theaters. Moreover, their limited lowed by the laundering of government-
mobility confined their use largely to rear owned property such as that used in hos-
areas. As a result, the American soldier in
many instances applied his ingenuity to '«(!) General Gregory indicated that 1,200 of
these mobile laundries were in operation in the the-
the problem of maintaining cleanliness
aters. See Laundry Age, October 1, 1943, p. 61. (2)
and developed and operated makeshift Address, Col Koerbel, Chief of Laundry Br, at QM
laundries that supplemented the efforts of Conf, 2-4 Oct 44.
^' For the operation of these mobile laundries by
the mobile units in all theaters.^'
Quartermaster laundry units overseas, see (1) Al-
vin P. Stauffer, The Quartermaster Corps: Opera-
Operation of Quartermaster Laundries tions in the War Against Japan, Ch. X; (2) Irving
Cheslaw and William Chaikin, The Quartermaster
Quartermaster fixed laundries in the Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany, Ch.
zone of interior were established primarily VIII, both volumes in preparation for this series.
356 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
pitals and in the Army Transport Service an effort was made to enact legislation that
and accumulated at repair shops in the would allow free laundry service to en-
course of reclamation operations. The listed men, but the proposed act was
laundry of officers and other authorized deemed undesirable by the inas- OQMG
patrons, such as civilian employees, had much as it would have discriminated
the lowest priority. At hospital laundries, against soldiers who did not happen to be
which eventually came under the control stationed at camps possessing Quartermas-
of The Quartermaster General, hospital ter laundries. ''
Various alternative sugges-
work and the laundering of government- tions proved unacceptable and for the du-
owned property had top priority. Next in ration of the war a flat rate of $1.50 a
order they handled the clothing of enlisted
- (1) AR 210-10, par. 14, 20 Dec 40, sub: Ad-
personnel, senior cadet nurses, authorized ministration — Posts, Camps, and Stations. (2) AR
civilian attendants and employees, and 30-2135, 12 Jan 45. sub: QMC
Laundries and Dry
officers.''* Cleaning Plants.
" Memo, Lt Col Edward B. McKinley, OQMG,
Laundry service to enlisted personnel for CofS G-4, Jun 41, sub: HR 4638— Free Laun-
1 1
month was set by The Quartermaster Gen- Shortage of labor was a major difficulty
eral. The single bundle rate was fifty that the QMC shared with many indus-
cents.''" On the other hand, organizational tries whose low wage level resulted in a loss
work, such as the white clothing of cooks of workers to better-paying war industries.
and and sheets, pillowcases,
bakers, However, civilians employed in Quarter-
blankets, and other bedding, was laun- master fixed laundries had the advantage
dered or dry cleaned free of charge. While of working under civil service regulations,
laundry and dry cleaning services were which granted sick leave and other bene-
provided without reimbursement to any fits that generally were superior to those
arm or service of the Army, other depart- provided by commercial laundries. While
ments of the federal government were re- the QMC attempted to keep wage rates at
quired to pay for them. the same level as those prevailing in near-
The resulting work load offered no by commercial facilities, overtime gave the
special problems for the QMC
beyond the worker an opportunity to augment his in-
familiar difficulties of establishing ade- come.
quate facilities despite low priorities and As a consequence, laundry owners lost
shortages, of increasing operating effi- many of their skilled operators to Army in-
ciency through improved techniques and stallations, much to their vexation. In their
institution of multiple-shift operations, efforts to find workers for laundries, post
and of overcoming labor scarcities. While quartermasters frequently had to be cau-
the burden of laundering and dry clean- tioned about the repercussions that might
ing for enlisted men decreased as troops result from the practice of indiscriminately
moved overseas, the renovating of used attracting experienced employees from
clothing and equipage turned in by troops commercial firms. Laundry owners were
upon their departure overseas as well as further irritated because Quartermaster
that shipped back from the theaters laundries did not share the task of training
steadily increased in amount and impor- new workers in the face of the growing
tance. Such clothing and equipage had to labor scarcity. To remedy this situation,
be renovated rapidly not only to speed its Laundry Branch worked out arrange-
the
return to stock and subsequent reissue but ments with the Civil Service Commission
also to prevent undue deterioration, which whereby an examination for "Laundry
resulted when these items remained soiled Trainee" was announced. This permitted
for prolonged periods of time. The main Quartermaster laundries to hire personnel
problem was to synchronize laundry and and train them on the job, paying them 20
reclamation operations. The economical percent less than regular employees during
use of laundry facilities for this purpose the training period. After that they could
could be accomplished easily when the re- be recommended for promotion.'''
sponsibility for both laundry and reclama- This action eased somewhat the pres-
tion operations was vested in the same offi- sure upon commercial firms but did not
cer. By 1944 relations between repair «" SB 10-1944, Feb 45, sub: Charges for Sv Ren-
shops and laundries and dry cleaning dered EMs by QMC Laundries.
plants had been adjusted and integrated (1) Col Koerbel, Laundry Br, to Pers Div,
'^'
PRISONERS OF WAR AT WORK, Fort Dix Quartermaster Post Laundry, August 1944.
settle the problem of labor shortage. To the subject of using such labor to The
meet its needs, the OQMG sought, with- Quartermaster General as early as the fall
out success, adoption of a policy permit- little immediate action fol-
of 1942, but
ting the use of personnel in the Women's lowed although some internment camps
Army Corps. It also urged the use of en- were constructed at posts possessing Quar-
listed men in laundries located in areas of termaster laundries. While the '^^
OQMG
particularly acute labor scarcity, but early was eager to use the labor of prisoners of
in the war there was little authority for war to relieve a situation in post laundries
permitting such use of enlisted men. Fur- that was becoming progressively more
thermore, higher authority did not favor acute, the Eastern and Western Defense
the practice even when enlisted men were
classified for limited service. Not until ""'-
(1) Col Hamilton, Sv Instls Div, to Pers Div,
early in 1943 was a directive issued specifi- OQMG, 6 Nov 42, sub: Use of Troop Labor in
Commands rejected the idea.'" When The issued special instructions to ensure the
'
Adjutant General informed the service proper washing and finishing of garments
commands in the summer of 1943 that as well as the proper use of equipment and
German prisoners of war might be used in supplies. Washing formulas had been de-
post laundries where an adequate labor veloped many years before the war, but
supply was not available, the Laundry they were revised in 1941 and again in
Branch took steps to offer technical advice 1943 to permit "a good quality of washing
on, and urged the desirability of, using with a maximum safety factor" in order
such labor. In time a body of experience that they might be used by inexperienced
in the employment of prisoners of war at personnel. "^^ It is true that quality produc-
laundries became available. Although an tion in all aspects of laundering could not
excellent work record was established at a be emphasized before the fall of 1944
number of camps, as a rule production by when most of the troops had been trans-
prisoners of war was not comparable to ported overseas and the pressure for pro-
that of civilians. A survey of August 1944 duction was eased. Until that time the ef-
indicated that their average efficiency was forts of the Laundry Branch were devoted
only 50 percent that of civilian person- to the elimination of unwarranted delays
nel.'"' in laundry service resulting from exces-
In their operation of Quartermaster sively heavy work schedules, inadequate
laundries, supervisors and laundry officers planning, or insufficient personnel.
were guided by the technical information In addition to scrutinizing every phase
furnished by the Laundry Branch. Early of the laundry process to expedite the serv-
in the war the bulk of this information was ice offered, the Laundry Branch also made
found in a number of pamphlets, manuals, use of tests to arrive at more suitable for-
circulars, and By the end of mulas or methods of operation. Launder-
regulations.
1944 much had been brought ing tests were conducted under controlled
of the data
together in —
two publications a manual conditions by the Quartermaster Board at
and a bulletin — that established standard Camp Lee to determine, for example, the
operating procedures.''*^ These publications causes for the felting of woolen socks and
took cognizance of changed conditions their excessive shrinkage in washing. The
that required modifications of laundry laundering process itself was investigated
practices as a result, for example, of the
variations in the typesand textures of the " 2d Ind, Col Hastings, OQMG, to PMG, 9 Mar
clothing processed. They also offered de- 43, onLtr, Hastings to PMG, 26 Feb 43, sub: Utili-
tailed information to laundry supervisors zation of POWs.
who had the task of training new em- "''
(1) Ltr, TAG toCGs SvCs, 9 Jun 43, sub: Labor
of POWs. (2) ASF Cir 290, 3 Sep 44, sub:POW —
ployees and of superintending the growth Efficiency in QMC Laundries.
of their laundries in accordance with «« Chief of Laundry Br, OQMG. to Eighth
(1) Ltr,
standard laundry procedures. SvC, 18 May43, sub: Publications for QMC Laun-
dries. (2) TM 10-355, 1 Dec 44, sub: QM Fixed
Although during a greater part of the Laundry Procedure. (3) TB 36, 1Dec 44, sub:
emergency and the war years quality Standard QM Fixed Laundry Opn.
" (1) Ltr, Col McMullen, OQMG, to CO CFQMD,
work was of less importance than the
7 Dec 43, no sub. (2) Operating details are more
quantity of essential production accom- fully elaborated in Filler, Laundry and Related Activities
plished, the Laundry Branch nevertheless of The Quartermaster General.
360 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
to determine at which stage the greatest in the bleaching process. On the basis of
shrinkage was produced. Other tests were data thus accumulated the OQMG for-
concerned with the effect of laundering mulated its recommendations. Tests con-
upon color and redyeing of clothing and ducted by both commercial and military
equipage.''^ agencies provided the Laundry Branch
Private industry, particularly the Amer- with a vast amount of data that enabled it
ican Institute of Laundering, also con- to meet specific situations for which it
ducted tests for the QMC. A number of might otherwise have been unprepared.
commercial firms co-operated in testing
"" Rpt, Dir of QM Bd
formulas designed to conserve chlorine to TQMG, Report of the
Quartermaster Board, Camp Lee, Virginia, 1 February
and hypochlorites, which were important 1942-30 June 1944, pp. 61-62, 66-67.
CHAPTER XII
in the care of the dead rests on the legisla- As a consequence, the work of establish-
tion enacted by Congress during the Civil ing such cemeteries and removing to them
War, which marked the origin of the na- the remains of those who were killed in
tional cemeteries. battle or died of disease in the Civil War
was begun immediately under the jurisdic-
ordered the Quartermaster General to were set up for the service of troop concen-
provide forms for preserving burial records tration areas or hospitals. Later, as a re-
at Army hospitals and materials for regis- sult of losses in battle, more national ceme-
tenance of interment records was thus could report to the Secretary of War in
inaugurated and the first step taken to-
ward preserving the identity of the graves '
One of the oldest of the post cemeteries, dating
of the dead. It was the responsibility of the back to 1816, is the Fort Crawford Cemetery
at Prairie du Chien, Wis.
commanding officer of the military corps - U.S. Statutes at Large, XII, 596 (Act of 1 7 July
or department to enforce the proper execu- 1862); XIV, 353 (Act of 13 April 1866); XIV, 399
and forms within
tion of burial regulations (Act of 22 February 1867).
WD GO 75, 1 1 September 1861.
his command.^ '
U.S. Statutes at Large, XII, 596 (Act of 1 7 July
The procedures thus initiated were 1862).
362 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
1864 that "the improvement of the na- held by the enemy and reinterring them in
tional cemeteries has been a source of great the consecrated ground of a national
gratification to all who visit them, and en- cemetery.When troops were sent overseas
tirely dissipated the prevailing opinion of during later wars, it was a simple matter
those living remote from Washington, that to extend the principle to include areas
soldiers were irreverently or carelessly outside the continental limits of the United
buried." ^ States. First utilized during the Spanish-
With the end of the war, eighteen addi- American War, this principle had a much
tional national cemeteries were estab- broader application in World War I.
lished in 1866, all but one of which were The way was paved for the appearance
for the concentration of battle dead and of a theater graves registration service dur-
most of which were in former Confederate ing World War I by the fact that by then
territory. At the end of hostilities the the QMC
had been militarized. Special-
Quartermaster's Department also insti- ized troop units had been created to per-
tuted a complete survey of the graves of all form functions carried out earlier by
the soldier dead. This resulted in the as- civilian employees or detachments from
sumption by the government of the respon- the line. The theater graves registration
sibility for the care of some three hundred service consisted of specialized operating
soldier plots. units for the care of the dead to function in
The role of the Quartermaster General close support of combat forces, and a head-
in caring for and providing final disposi- quarters staff" that was charged with the
tion of American war dead was definitely preservation of mortuary records and the
established by efforts the Department maintenance of temporary burials and
made to collect and reinter the remains of semipermanent military cemeteries. With-
deceased Union soldiers. This task was in the territorial limits of his command, the
"virtually completed" by 1870 when the theater commander was responsible for the
remains of 299,696 Union soldiers had conduct of all graves registration opera-
been buried in seventy-three national tions. On the other hand, the formulation
cemeteries. Of these war dead 58 percent of all general policies and uniform tech-
were identified.'' In 1876 the War Depart- nical standards rested with The Quarter-
ment confirmed the delegation of all re- master General who, when hostilities
sponsibility for supervising national
cemeteries to the Quartermaster General ^ Annual Reports of The Quartermaster-General from
1861 to 1866 (Washington, 1880), p. 48.
and ordered the transfer to him of all rec- •^
Annual Report of The Quartermaster General Made to
ords previously kept in the office of the the Secretary of War for the Tear 1870 (Washington,
Secretary of War.' 1870), p. 68.
ended and theaters were inactivated, as- outside the continental limits of the United
sumed full control over field operations States."' The expansion
of wartime respon-
and bore direct responsibility to the Secre- culminated in the assignment of
sibilities
tary of War for final disposition of the re- responsibility to The Quartermaster Gen-
mains of the dead. eral for returning the remains of all Amer-
During the twenty years following ican dead, including those of the Army,
World War I, the responsibilities of The Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard,
Quartermaster General contracted to the and civilian employees of the War Depart-
hard core of permanent cemeterial func- ment and other agencies of the govern-
tions that had to be administered in times ment, after the cessation of hostilities.
of peace. He had direct control over
Arlington National Cemetery and Mexico Administrative Organization
City National Cemetery, and in addition
he was responsible for the establishment In 1939 the peacetime cemeterial func-
and general supervision of all national tions of The
Quartermaster General were
cemeteries, soldier plots, Confederate being administered by the Memorial
burial plots, monuments, and military Branch in the Administrative Division,
parks under the jurisdiction of the War OQMG,'' but as Quartermaster activities
Department, and the maintenance of all increased the branch was raised to the
records pertaining to them.* He purchased status of a division at the end of 1940.^-
grave sites and procured and distributed Within a little more than a year, as a re-
government headstones and grave mark- sult of the functional reorganization of the
ers. He directed the training and assign- OQMG March 1942, the Memorial
in
ment of supervisory personnel for national Division was again reduced to a branch
cemeteries. He provided for the recovery and was assigned to the Service Installa-
and disposition of the remains of deceased tions Division, which acted as a catch-all
military and civilian personnel when such for miscellaneous functions of the OQMG.
expenses were payable from War Depart- The director of this division was responsi-
ment appropriations and maintained all ble for administering such unrelated activ-
interment records. He was responsible for ities as those pertaining to the procurement
handling all graves registration activities and training of horses, mules, and dogs
in the United States.^
These peacetime functions were greatly **
For modifications of this jurisdiction, see Execu-
tive orders of 10 June and July 1933, and 26 Febru-
1 1
expanded by the sharp increase in the size ary and 25 April 1934.
of the Army in 1940 and, after Pearl Har- « AR
30-5, 8 Dec 42, sub: QMC — General Provi-
volume of work, and functions performed," 43, sub: Additional Pers. (2) Sv Instls Div to Civ Pers,
and he recommended that its six sections OQMG, 22 Jun 43, same sub. (3) Sv Instls Div to Civ
be consolidated into four and its twenty- Pers, OQMG, Jul 43, same sub.
1
closed.'^ Although the director of the Or- tions, the administration of which
ganization Planning and Control Division constituted a civil function of the QMC
urged reconsideration of the rejected sug- akin to the control of rivers and harbors
gestions as offering "excellent opportunities exercised by the Corps of Engineers. Na-
of improvement," no further action was
'" tional cemeteries had been created by
taken on the basis of the survey, and the legislation that authorized the Secretary of
personnel problems of the Memorial War to establish and maintain them, and
Branch remained unsolved. this authority he had delegated to his
Relegation of the Memorial Division to Assistant Secretary of War and in turn to
the status of a branch not only hampered The Quartermaster General. On the eve
its was in- of World War II, general supervision of all
chief in pleading his case, but
compatible with his responsibilities as national cemeteries was a function of The
technical adviser to The Quartermaster Quartermaster General, but direct control
General, particularly after the latter had and supervision was exercised in the field
been designated Chief, American Graves by the commanders of the corps areas in
Registration Service. Interposed between which the national cemeteries were lo-
the chief of the Memorial Branch and The cated, except those specifically exempted.
Quartermaster General was the director of The Quartermaster General was author-
the Service Installations Division. In the ized to communicate directly with the
fall of 1942, still another intermediary was corps area commanders on all matters re-
established when direction and super- lating to the administration of national
vision of the Service Installations Division cemeteries.'*
and other operating divisions When the War Department was reor-
of the
OQMG were assigned to the Deputy ganized in March 1942 and the Services of
Quartermaster Genera) for Supply Man- Supply was established, it was assumed
agement and Operations. ^^ that the civil functions of the were QMC
to be exempt from any change in control
teries.A subsequent delegation of duties termaster General and his chief adviser on
assigned to the Under Secretary of War graves registration matters. It was the
put a different interpretation on the mat- spring of 1944, however, before the Memo-
ter, and thereafter all communications rial Branch gained divisional status, and
from The Quartermaster General to the not until after hostilities ended in Europe
Under Secretary of War relative to ceme- was the desired organization for its over-
teries had to be channeled through the seas activities achieved.
Commanding General, SOS.^^ As a part The branch's reorganizational efforts
of the general reorganization, corps areas were merged in the summer of 1943 with
were later redesignated service commands, a program of preliminary planning for the
but this brought no change in QMC rela- return of the war dead, which was a part
tionships with the field.-" of the over-all demobilization planning
Until March 1942, graves registration being undertaken in the War Department.
activities in the theaters — that is, the iden- Assigned to The Quartermaster General
tification and burial of the dead, the regis- by the chief of the demobilization plan-
tration of graves, the administration of ning unit, initially located in the ASF but
military cemeteries in active theaters of later transferred to the General Staff, this
operations, and the original execution of study of a program for the return of the
mortuary records pertaining thereto war dead was delegated to the chief of the
were a command function and as such were Memorial Branch.-- At approximately the
under the supervision of the Chief of Staffs. same time. Col. Robert P. Harbold was
In reference to such matters, there was appointed to that position. He was brought
direct communication between The Quar- into the organization by The Quartermas-
termaster General and the Chief of Staff. ter General because of his experience and
Until 1940 this channel of communication the knowledge he had gained in graves
led to G-4, the Supply Division, but at registration activities during World War I.
that time the supervisory function was re- Colonel Harbold energetically sought to
assigned to G-1, the Personnel Division, effect the kind of organization he deemed
on the premise that "Graves Registration necessary for carrying out the mission of
was essentially a service dealing with per- the Memorial Branch.
sonnel (although deceased.)" -^ In March The directive requesting submission of
1942 this direct line of communication was the study had suggested that it be pre-
disrupted by the interposition of the newly sented in three parts: Part I, Determina-
created SOS and all communications tion of the Policy Relative to Burials
thereafter had to flow through its com- Overseas and the Return of the Dead;
manding general. Part II, The Plan of Operation, Both in
,'« WD Cir 59, Mar 42, sub: WD Reorgn.
(1) 2 (2)
Struggle for Divisional Status WD Cir 181, Sec. V, 10 Jun 42, sub: Assignment of
Duties. SOS GO 21, 10 Jul 42, no sub.
(3)
-» WD GO 35, 22 Jul 42, sub: Redesignation of
(1)
While channels of communication with CAs. (2) AR 170-10, 10 Aug 42, sub: SvCs and Depts.
higher echelons of authority remained -' For a more detailed account see Edward Steere,
number of authorities between The Quar- TQMG, 22 Jun 43, sub: Demob Ping.
CARE OF THE DEAD 367
the United States and Overseas, Including mulating graves registration policies.
the Organization Required and the Per-
To have this Division under an interme-
sonnel by Types; and Part III, The Pos- diate office and not under the direct super-
sible Necessity for the Expansion of the vision of The Quartermaster General necessi-
National Cemeteries and the Acquisition tates all questions of policy and important
Coun- questions pertaining to this Division being
of Sites for Cemeteries in Foreign
taken up first with the intermediate office
tries.
and educating it as to the necessity of such
The OQMG submitted its plan for the procedure; the intermediate office then tak-
return of the war dead on 14 August 1943, ing case up with the next higher echelon and
but since any comprehensive program was finally the matter may or may not reach The
Quartermaster General at the discretion of
dependent, according to the Memorial
intermediaries who do not have full knowl-
Branch, upon the branch's expansion into edge of the working functions of the Divi-
a division and the organization of an sion.-^
American Graves Registration Service,
most of the study, which was incorporated Using the opportunity aff'orded by the
in Section A of Part II, was devoted to a preparation of this study, the chief of the
detailed plan for the reorganization of the Memorial Branch sought to convince
Memorial Branch.-^ Briefly this phase of higher authority that intelligent consider-
the study proposed a simplification of the ation of the problems pertaining to the dis-
chain of authority in the OQMG and an position of the war dead had to be pred-
expansion of the Memorial Branch. icated on the immediate restoration of the
The need for simplification was made Memorial Branch to its former divisional
more urgent by the anticipated designa- status and the establishment of an auton-
tion of The Quartermaster General as omous Graves Registration Service Branch
Chief, American Graves Registration within the reconstructed division. The pro-
Service."^ It was argued that no effective posed division was to be developed largely
or useful purpose was served by the dual by expanding sections into branches and
supervision exercised over an organization subsections into sections.
engaged nonmilitary activities by the
in The Special Planning Division, con-
director of the Service Installations Divi- cerned with demobilization plans to be
sionand the Deputy Quartermaster Gen- activated at the end of hostilities, approved
eral forSupply Planning and Operations, the broad policy recommended in the
both of whom performed essentially mili- study but confined its comments on organ-
tary functions. Instead, it was proposed ization and personnel to that proposed for
that the chief of the Memorial Branch the theater. It offered no comment on the
should be regarded as the deputy to The suggested internal reorganization of the
Quartermaster General in his extraordi-
nary capacity as Chief, American Graves This study, submitted to the Special Planning
-
'
lays in installing thephotographic ma- Sec, Memorial Br, Sv Instls Div, 26 Oct 43.
-" Chief of Memorial Br to TQMG, 30 Mar 44, sub:
chine and obtaining smooth, continuous
Pers.
functioning. By that time the chief of the '"
Chief of Memorial Br to TQMG, 5 Apr 44, sub:
Memorial Branch was again directing the Survey of Pers in Memorial Br.
CARE OF THE DEAD 369
the one advocated by Colonel Harbold " Ltr, E. O'Toole, OP&C Div, to Gen Barnes, Dir
since August 1943 had been brought into of OP&C Div, 3 Apr 44, no sub. 1
during the period 6 April 1 9 1 7 to 1 1 No- " XVII, 202 (Act of June 1872), and
(1) Ibid., 1
vember 1918, although such burial had to 605 (Act of 3 March 1873). (2) Revised Statutes of the
UmtedStates, 2d ed. (Washington,
1878), par. 4878.
be without cost to the United States. ^^ For various amendments see U.S. Statutes at Large,
'**
While Congress liberalized the right of Vol. 29, pp. 625-26 (Act of 3 March 1897); Vol. 38, p.
burial by extending the privilege through 800 (Act of 28 January 1915); Vol. 41, p. 552 (Act of
15 April Vol. 49, p. 339 (Act of 13 June 1935);
the'amendments it enacted, it in no way Vol. 57, p.1920);
37 (Act of July 1943).
1 1
charged from the service affected the pol- available, the OQMG
recommended the
icy theWar Department pursued in the es- adoption of the following policy:
tabhshment of national cemeteries. Orig- To extend the present cemeteries, if prac-
inally, during the Civil War and for ticable, when burial space therein is ex-
some seventy years thereafter, it was War hausted and additional space is desired.
Department policy to establish cemeteries If the above is impracticable, to establish
only where and when the needs of the War new cemeteries in convenient localities to the
cemeteries in which burial space has been ex-
Department required them. Most of the hausted.'"
national cemeteries had been established
during the period 1862-70. Once the con- Actually, the subject lay dormant for a
centration of Civil War dead had been few more years. By the mid-1930's, the ap-
completed, the number of national ceme- proaching exhaustion of burial space in
teries increased gradually because of the some national cemeteries, the pressure ex-
abandonment of many frontier posts and erted by veterans' organizations to have
the necessity of concentrating the remains national cemeteries established throughout
buried in these post cemeteries in central the country, and the interest of Congress
cemeteries for designated areas. This had in the subject compelled a re-examination
been accomplished by 1892. National of War Department policy. ^^ This review
cemeteries had thus been established on was initiated as the result of a proposed bill
battlefields or for concentration of the re- to establish five additional cemeteries, and
mains of those killed in battle. Later when was continued later by a proposal to estab-
space in the original cemeteries was ex- lish about twenty new cemeteries, one in
hausted, some of these areas had been en- each state in which there was no national
larged to care for those who died in the cemetery. There was obviously a desire on
service. The national cemetery system, the part of Congress to adopt a policy that
however, had been essentially a facility of would extend the cemetery system to pro-
the War Department to care for its dead, vide for veterans. For the first time, it was
and the burial of veterans was incidental assumed that the government was obli-
to War Department needs. The law gave gated to provide burial space for honor-
only the privilege or right of burial in a na- ably discharged veterans. It followed that
tional cemetery to the veterans; it did not itwas the duty of the War Department to
obligate the government to provide burial anticipate the burial needs of discharged
space.
^"
veterans and in due course recommend to
Adherence to this policy had posed no
problem before World War I for there had '" Ltr, Maj Gen Henry Gibbins, TQMG, to ASW,
Feb 37, sub: Policy Re: Establishment of National
been comparatively few veterans who were 8
Cemeteries.
entitled to burial in the national ceme- ^' Memo, Maj Wade H. Haislip, OASW, for
teries. As a result of that war, however, it TQMG, 11 Jan 29, no sub.
was estimated that over four million vet- ^-(1) Memo, TQMG for ASW, 13 Feb 29, sub:
Study of Available Burial Space in National Ceme-
erans would become eligible for burial in teries. (2) Memo, TQMG for ASW, 18 Mar 29, same
national cemeteries. The Assistant Secre- sub.
^' Lt Col Basil D. Edwards, OASW, for
Memo,
tary of War requested a review of War De- (1)
TQMG, 30 Dec 36, no sub. (2) Hearings Before Subcom-
partment policy in 1929.^' Since at that mittee of Committee on Alilitary Affairs, U.S. Senate, 74th
time sufficient burial space seemed to be Cong.,' 2d Sess., on S. 4268, 20 May 36.
372 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Cons^ress the establishment of cemeteries of the OQMG undertook no new construc-
for that purpose only. But this required tion during the war
years. It did complete
autocratic decisions bv the War Depart- in the fiscal year 1942 construction of the
ment, since some locations would have to new Golden Gate National Cemetery near
be denied while others were accepted. San Francisco. Calif, the establishment of
Consequently the department would be which had been authorized by Congress in
subject to much criticism as well as to con- 1939. Shortly after Pearl Harbor, on 29
stant pressure and agitation. December 1941. Congress had authorized
On the basis of an analysis prepared by the Secretary of War to establish a na-
the OQMG. the War Department came to tional cemeterv in the vicinity of Portland.
the conclusion that the choice of localities Ore., but the Memorial Branch submitted
for national cemeteries should be left to the no estimate of appropriations for this pur-
discretion of Congress: that the War De- pose and initiated no such project.^' This
partmient would remain neutral but that was in line with a Presidential directive
itshould supplv full and complete infor- that funds for lands and cemeterial pur-
mation \s'hich would enable Congress to poses should be limited to urgent defense
decide whether a cemetery was warranted needs. In planning for the care of the dead,
by the facts and to act accordingly.'^ the Memorial Branch indicated that no
In general, bv 1939 it had become the steps would be taken to establish addi-
policy of the War Department to establish tional cemeteries until after the cessation
new cemeteries onlv on the basis of special of hostilities.*^
acts of Cong^ress authorizing them. During Long before the end of the war. how-
the thirties several new cemeteries were ever, a bill had been introduced in Con-
thus established. It was true that under ex- gress that proposed to provide one national
isting laws the Secretary of War had au- cemetery in every state and such other na-
thority to establish national cemeteries, to tional cemeteries in the states, territories,
accept donations of land from any state for and possessions as might be needed for the
this purpose.'- and purchase land when
to burial of war veterans. ^^ Referred to the
required. Experience, however, had shown Military Affairs Committee of the House
that this authority was of "little practical of Representatives, the proposed bill was
use"" since funds were required to establish then sent to the War Department with a
a new national cemeterv and to maintain request for a report covering the estimated
it. Procedures under the laws required number of soldiers of all wars who would
that the Bureau of the Budget, as well as
the appropriations committee of Consjess. ^^ (1) Ltr. TQMG to ASW. 8 Feb 3 7. sub: Policy
had to be convinced of the need for the Re: Establishment of National Cemeteries. (2) Memo.
be eligible for burial in each state, the customan.- duties performed by the Memo-
space required, an estimate of costs, and rial Branch (later Division; in the verifica-
recommendations for implementing the tion of service and authorization for burial.
plan. The Memorial Branch prepared a An
individual who died while on active
voluminous, comprehensive report that service could be interred by the superin-
recommended the establishment of seven- tendent of a national cemeten.- without au-
tv-two national cemeteries —
sixty-nine in thorization by The Quartermaster Gen-
the United States and one each in Alaska, eral. but if any doubt existed as to an in-
Puerto Rico, and Hawaii. Nine of the ex- dividuals eligibility status his ser\-ice had
isting national cemeteries were to be in- to be verified and his burial authorized by
eluded in this expansion program, but the The Quartermaster General. Such verifi-
other seventv were either to be inactivated cation and authorization were also neces-
immediately upon passage of the bill or sary in the case of an indi\idual who died
after the new cemeteries had been estab- after discharge or retirement from the
lished.^" armed forces. Burials in the national ceme-
No action was taken in the 78th Con- teries had increased by slightly more than
gress. and the bill was proposed again in 1.000 in the fiscal year 1945 as compared
1942.""'
the following Congress. In the meantime, with the fiscal year
the Memorial Branch was engaged in con-
siderable planning and correspondence on Headstones and Markers
the proposed expansion program. The ef-
forts expended on this planning were fruit- One of the imponant and continuing
less since Congress failed to enact the pro- functions of the Memorial Branch in peace
posed bill expanding
into law. Interest in and war has been the furnishing of
in
the national cemeterial system was to be headstones for the unmarked graves of all
renewed during the postwar years. former service men whose last service ter-
minated honorably, regardless of whether
Maintenance and Operation thev were buried in a national, post, or
private cemetery. If the relatives or other
Since no new construction was under- applicant desired the government to mark
taken during the war years, the work of the the grave, the same type of stone was fur-
National Cemetery Section later Branch
(
i nished regardless of rank,
was confined largely to the care and main- The origin of this Quartermaster re-
tenance of existing national cemeteries, sponsibility stemsfrom measures initiated
Funds for this purpose were granted each during the Civil War. The first step was
year by Congress in the War Depanment taken in the fall of 1861 when Secretary of
Civil zAppropriations Act based on the
annual estimates for the operation of na- i'
The orieinal study in six volumes was later thor-
tional cemeteries submitted by the Secre- oughly revised and condensed into two volumes. See
ri*' ^ /-. ' National Cemeteries: A Studv Prepared in the
tary of War to Congress.
q^^j^ ^^^ k^^^u^x of the Committee on Military-
There could be little or no curtailment Affairs. Reference HR 5 6. 15 Feb 45.
1
vertisements were to be made for sixty days showed that the stone lacked sufficient
successively in at least twenty newspapers, width and height. In March 1903 the size
with contracts to be awarded to the lowest was increased to 39 inches in length, 12
responsible bidder.^' The OQMG called inches in width,and 4 inches in thickness,
for bids, and sample headstones of various the sunken shield in which the inscription
sizes and designs were received, but nine was cut to be 3/16 of an inch deep with
months later no decision had been made. the letters of the inscription to be raised
At that time Congress further amended to that height in the shield.
the law to provide for sixty days' adver- World War I brought another discussion
tisement in ten newspapers of general cir- of design and a proposal to adopt a new
culation. At the same time, it appropriated type of headstone for the graves of all vet-
$1,000,000 for furnishing the headstones.''^ erans. Public sentiment, however, so
After much study two distinct designs strongly favored the Civil War type of
were adopted by the Secretary of War. The headstone that the War Department
headstone for the known dead was to be a finally decided to continue furnishing it
slab of white marble or durable stone, 4 for veterans of the Civil War and the Span-
inches thick, 10 inches wide, and 12 inches ish-American War. A second and new type
high above the ground. It was to be neatly of headstone was to be used for veterans
polished and have a slightly curved top. of World War I and all other wars. After
The number of the grave, rank, name of 2,200 headstones of the new type had been
the soldier, and name of the state from erected in national cemeteries, it was de-
which he came were to be cut on the front cided that they were not satisfactory and
face of the stone. For the unknown dead, a different design was adopted in April,
the headstone was to be a block of marble 1922. This headstone was of a slab design,
or durable stone 6 inches square and 2V2 slightly rounded at the top, of American
feet long, the top and 4 inches of the sides white marble, 42 inches long, 13 inches
of the upper part to be neatly dressed and wide, and 4 inches thick. It was embedded
the number of the grave to be cut on the so that 24 inches were above ground. On
top. The block was to be set firmly in the the front face were inscribed the name of
ground with the top level with the grave. ''*
the soldier, his rank, regiment, division,
By the end of 1873 contracts had been date of death, and the state from which he
awarded to five contractors in various came. Above this inscription in a small
parts of the country. rosette the emblem of religious faith was
This Civil War type of headstone was cut — a Latin cross for those of Christian
furnished not only for all the unmarked and a Star of David for those of the
faith
graves of Union veterans of that war but Hebrew faith. For headstones in national
also for those of the veterans of the Revo- and post cemeteries, the grave number
War of 1812, the Mexican War, was cut on the rear face of the stone.
lution, the
and the Indian campaigns. Later it was This type of headstone had also been in-
also furnished for the graves of Spanish- " XVII, 345 (Act of 8 June 1872).
Ibtd.,
American War veterans. "* Ibid.,XVII, 545 (Act of 3 March 1873).
^' "Headstones," Q_MR, XVII (January-February
The original design of the headstone for
1938), p. 34. All later descriptions of headstones and
the known dead subsequently was modi- markers are taken from this article prepared in the
fied on the basis of experience which Memorial Branch, OQMG.
376 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
tended for use in marking the graves of veteran, the state from which he entered
veterans of World War I who were buried the service, his rank, organization, and
in overseas cemeteries. However, visitors date of death. This type was approved by
had been so impressed by the simple, white the Secretary of War on 14 August 1936.
wooden cross and the Star of David used Four years later, in response to public de-
in these cemeteries that they urged reten- mand. Congress authorized the Secretary
tion of these designs. As a consequence, on of War to furnish a marker of such design
1 7 December 1 924 the Secretary of War and material as he approved for use on
approved the adoption of these two types graves in cemeteries where stone markers
of headstones for overseas cemeteries. The were not acceptable.*'" On 1 1 July 1940 the
inscription on each consisted of the name Assistant Secretary of War approved the
of the soldier, his rank, regiment, division, use of a bronze marker that was identical
date of death, and the state from which he with the stone marker, except that because
came, together with a record of any deco- of the material utilized it had a %-inch
rations that might have been awarded to rise in lieu of the 4-inch thickness used in
him. stone.
When
Confederate graves were first During World War H one other devel-
marked under the provisions of the law of opment occurred as a result of a new type
1906, the type of headstone adopted was of burial, known as group burial. Any
of the same size and material as the head- burial of more than three deceased consti-
stones for Union veterans of the Civil War tuted a group burial. Such burials were
except that the top was pointed instead of used in those cases —
for example airplane
—
rounded and the shield on the front face crashes where individual identification
was omitted. Later, after Congress passed was impossible upon recovery of remains
the act of 1929, the Secretary of War ap- although the individual names were
proved the adoption of a design which was known. This type of burial developed early
a white marble slab, 39 inches long, 12 in the training period and was used to an
inches wide, and 4 inches thick, and even greater extent later, particularly in
pointed at the top. On the front face was the return of the dead program following
inscribed the name of the soldier, his rank, the end of the war.
ifhigher than a private, his company, and Initially, to mark a group burial, the
his regiment. Above this inscription the Memorial Branch had used a stone of up-
cross of honor of the Confederate States right slab design similar to the World War
Army was cut in a small circle. I type except that the size was increased
These three types of upright marble to accommodate the list of names of those
—
headstones Civil War, World War I, and buried in the one grave. Since the number
—
Confederate designs continued to be fur- of dead interred in a common grave fre-
nished by the Memorial Branch. In addi- quently was very large, such stones were
tion, as a trend developed in private ceme- ungainly in size and out of harmony with
teries toward restricting the use of upright other markers in the national cemeteries.
markers and monuments in so-called park The Memorial Branch therefore sought
plan cemeteries, the OQMG developed a authorization to use a flat stone, set flush
flat marker of marble or granite, 24 inches with the ground, to mark the graves of
by 12 inches by 4 inches. Lengthwise on "" U.S. Statutes at Large Vol. 54, p. 142 (Act of 18
the stone were inscribed the name of the Apr 40).
CARE OF THE DEAD 377
group burials. This new type of stone was although the duties of letting contracts,
approved by the Assistant (formerly placing orders, and furnishing proper ship-
Under) Secretary of the Army on 9 May ping instructions were transferred to the
1950.^^ Boston Depot as the Quartermaster agency
nearest to the quarries where the stones
Procedure were to be cut. From 1929 on, however, all
functions relating to supply were central-
The procedure for obtaining a govern- ized in the Memorial Branch, OQMG, in
ment headstone to mark the grave of a order to insure prompt supply and delivery
veteran had long been established. The of stones.
headstone was automatically supplied in During World War II these functions of
the case of a veteran buried in a post or na- the Memorial Branch continued as they
tional cemetery upon receipt of the inter- had in the years of peace. War did bring a
ment report of the superintendent of the shortage of critical materials, as a result of
cemetery concerned. On the other hand, which the branch suspended the furnishing
an application was required for veterans of bronze markers for the duration of the
buried in private cemeteries. It could be war. Military air crashes and deaths at
filed by relatives, friends, veterans' organi- camps in the zone of interior naturally in-
zations, or anyone who could furnish suf- creased the work of the Memorial Branch
ficient information to prove that the un- during the war years, but the peak of its
marked grave was that of a deceased activity in procuring and furnishing head-
ex-service man. stones and markers was not reached until
Such applications were received from all 1949, when as a result of the return of the
parts of the world, and before a stone could dead program about 135,000 stones were
be erected the Memorial Branch had to required, the largest number ever procured
perform a considerable amount of detail by the branch in a single fiscal year.
work. Receipt of an application involved
first of all the verification of service from Disposition of Remains
official records or authorized sources and
Policy Development
frequently entailed painstaking archival
research. The branch then placed the order Formulating the policies that regulated
for the stone with a contractor, furnished the care and disposition of the remains of
routing and shipping instructions, and officers and soldiers who died either in
made sure that the stone was properly in- peace or in war constituted an important
scribed, finished, and delivered to the function of the Memorial Branch. Early
correct destination for erection at the grave Army Regulations established no policies,
of the veteran. other than ceremonial, on the disposition
When this responsibility was first as- of remains, but apparently it became the
sumed and for many years thereafter, the custom to bury deceased officers and en-
quartermaster of the Washington Depot listed men at the military post at which
handled the supply of headstones. By 1900 they had been stationed, or at the place of
the need for closely supervising the veri- their death, if this was deemed proper and
fication of service and the placing of the right by the commanding officer. The
correct inscription on the headstone caused «' DF, ACofS G-4, to TQMG, 18 May 50, sub:
a centralization of this work in the OQMG, Group Burial Markers in National Cemeteries.
378 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Articles of War did direct that an inventory tation. Burial expenses as such were limited
be made of the mihtary personnel throughout these years to $75.00 for the
effects of
who died in the service of the United States burial of an officer, $15.00 for that of a
in order that these might be transmitted to noncommissioned officer, and $10.00 for
'^-
their families or administrators. the burial of a private soldier.'*^
It was not War, however,
until the Civil Army Regulations were amended dur-
that policies were formulated more pre- ing the Spanish-American War so that the
cisely in general orders and later in Army remains of soldiers and officers who were
Regulations. By that time the Quarter- killed in action, or who died while on duty
master's Department had become respon- in the field or at military posts, could, if
sible for the care of the dead, and Army their relatives so desired, be transported to
expenditures for the burial of officers and their homes for burial by the Quartermas-
soldiers were paid from the appropriation ter's Department. Funds for this purpose
for incidental expenses of the Quarter- were specially appropriated by Congress.
master's Department in the annual appro- Burial expenses —
$75.00 for an officer and
priation acts.*'^ $35.00 for an enlisted man were specifi- —
During the war years, 1861-65, officers cally limited to the cost of the coffin and
and soldiers were buried where they fell in the reasonable and necessary expense of
battle or near military hospitals, and their preparation of the remains for burial.
remains were later reinterred in national They were not to include such items as
cemeteries under the program completed "guarding remains, expense of services of
by 1 870. After the war, officers and soldiers clergyman or minister, music by band or
who died while on duty in the field or at choir, flowers, cost of hire of pall to be used
military posts continued to be buried, as in with horse, tombstone, crape or gloves for
pre-Civil War days, at the nearest regular pallbearers, and expense of grave site
fort orbarracks cemetery, although they where the remains are sent home at the
^'^
could be buried at the nearest national request of relatives."
cemetery. Interment in post or national After the Spanish-American War the
cemeteries occurred if the remains were not former policy of interring the remains of
claimed by relatives or friends.^* officers and enlisted men in the nearest
In the decades of peace between the post or national cemetery was reinstated.
Civil War and the Spanish-American War,
the regulations remained unchanged ex- '*-
Military Laws and Rules and Regulations for the
Armies of the United States (Washington, 1813), Arti-
cept for a slight modification in regard to
cles 94, 95.
handling expenses. Until 1891 the expense '^'
Revised United States Army Regulations (Washing-
of causing "the body to be decently coffined ton, 1863), p. 159.
Department. At that time, however, the Hq of the Army GO 29, 10 March 1891. (3) Regula-
tions for the Army of the United States, 1895 (Washing-
cost of transporting the remains to a post ton, 1901), pars; 85, 162.
or national cemetery was separated from «•*
(1) Hqofthe Army GO 141, 12 September 1898.
other burial expenses and made payable (2) Hq Army GO 151, 22 September 1898. (3)
of the
Hqofthe Army GO 48, 15 March 1899. (4) Hqofthe
from the appropriation for Army transpor- Army Cir 9, 6 April 1900.
CARE OF THE DEAD 379
However, the regulations were amended cost of burial and transportation, was to be
to the effect that if officers and enlisted made by the quartermaster directly to the
men were killed in action, or died in mili- Quartermaster General. Expenses were
tary camps or payable from the same funds as before. *^^
in the field or hospital while
in Alaska, or at places outside the conti- Payment of burial expenses did not re-
nental limits of the United States, or while main limited to personnel of the Regular
at sea, their remains could be transported Army. In 1902 Congress authorized the
to their homes for interment if so desired Secretary of War to transport to their
by relatives or friends.*^' homes the remains of civilian employees of
In 1909 this limited application of the the Army who died while on duty in U.S.
policy of shipping home the remains of possessions in Cuba, or in China.'" This
military personnel was expanded to in- authorization was later broadened to in-
clude for the first time officers and enlisted clude those civilian employees who died on
men who died in line of duty within the Army transports or in foreign countries, as
continental limits of the United States as well as in U.S. possessions while on duty in
well as its possessions, and in peace as well the field. From World War I on, burial
as in war. This became a basic element of benefits were extended not only to Regu-
the policy governing disposition of remains lar Army personnel but to officers and en-
that continued to be applicable during listed men of the Army of the United
World War II. As before, deceased officers States, that is, to those of the temporary
and enlisted men were buried in the near- military organization of the United States
est military post or national cemetery, but, established during an emergency or war
if requested by relatives, their remains
'^
period.
might be transported home for interment. Following World War I the problem of
When death occurred in the United States national defense was thoroughly explored,
or Alaska, and early shipment was prac- and the care of the dead was among the
ticable, the War Department notified the many aspects re-examined. This study re-
I nearest relative by telegraph and requested sulted in the publication in 1924 of the so-
a reply by telegraph that would indicate called AR 30 series.'- Basic policies on the
whether shipment of remains home was
desired, the destination of the shipment,
" WD GO 120, 5 July 1904.
(1) WD GO 184, 9 September 1909. (2) Regula-
««
and the name of the person to whom the tions for the Army of the United States, 1910 (Washing-
ton, 1911), par/l06.
remains were to be consigned. The con- ''^
Regulations for the Army of the United States, 1910,
signee was notified by telegraph of the par. 106.
shipment.''* ""
Hq of Army GO
74, July 1902, p. 12. This is
1 1
Burial expenses continued to be limited a reprint of the appropriation act for civil expenses of
the government for the fiscal year 1903. Succeeding
to $75.00 for an officer but were increased appropriation acts provided for the burial expenses of
to $50.00 for an enlisted man. Where prac- civilian employees.
"'
For authority see (1) U.S. Statutes at Large, Vol.
ticable, a contract was to be made with an
45, pp. 251-52 (Act of 9 Mar 28); Vol. 49, p. 1508
undertaker or other competent person for (Act of 15 Jun 36); Vol. 52, pp. 398-99 (Act of 23 Jun
services during a fiscal year in the prepara- 38); Vol. 54, pp. 743-44 (Act of 8 Jul 40). (2) WD
Bulletin 30, 30 Oct 40.
tion of remains for shipment. Furthermore, '-
(1) AR 30-1830, 1 Feb 24, sub: Preparation for
a report of the disposition of the remains, Burial and Shpmt. (2) AR 30-1820, 1 Feb 24, sub:
together with an itemized statement of the Disp of Remains.
380 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
had been well established
care of the dead long since crystallized, but details of ad-
by that time, but later revisions of the ministration and procedure changed dur-
regulations introduced many refinements ing the war years. Whether interment
in procedures covering the identification, occurred in national or post cemeteries,
preparation for shipment, and inspection the Memorial Branch, OQMG, prescribed
of remains, as well as the observation of the policies of operation. Although post
state sanitary laws and health regulations cemeteries antedated national cemeteries,
in the shipment of remains. supervision of their maintenance and oper-
Different funds were designated for the ation had been placed under The Quar-
payment of burial expenses from time to termaster General along with that of
time. Until 1928 burial expenses were pay- national cemeteries when the latter were
able from funds specifically authorized in established during the Civil War. Post
the annual appropriation acts. In that cemeteries had been established when
year Congress enacted legislation author- posts were located in isolated areas in
izing appropriation of necessary funds order to take care of the burials of officers
from time to time for the disposition of re- and enlisted men, their families, and civil-
mains of military personnel and civilian ian employees connected with the Army
employees of the Army, but the law pro- on duty at the post. In later years, al-
vided for the payment only of the expenses though such deceased continued to be
of interment or of preparation and trans- buried at the post cemeteries, modern
portation of the remains to their homes or facilities permitted shipment of remains
to national cemeteries. It was not until from practically every post to any place
1938 that the law was amended to make desired by relatives, and as a consequence
provision for both transportation and in- burials at post cemeteries decreased. Post
terment of remains. ^'^ cemeteries, nevertheless, continued to be
By the fiscal year 1931 burial expenses operated during World War II, and their
had become payable from a fund desig- facilities were extended to provide burial
nated "Cemeterial Expenses" in the an- space for officers and enlisted men of the
nual appropriation acts and remained so armed forces of other countries who died
until World War II. At that time it was in the United States while serving as in-
felt that interment of those who died while structors or students with the armed forces
on active duty was a military expense not of the United States, or while engaged in
appropriately payable from "Cemeterial promoting national defense. ^^
Expenses". During the war therefore, these Commanding officers of the posts had
expenses, as a military charge, were paid jurisdiction over the post cemeteries. When
from the appropriation "Supplies and
U.S. Statutes at Large, Vol. 45, pp. 25 1-52 (Act of
Army" and
'
) '
Post Cemeteries
tions, HR, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., on WD
Civil Func-
tions Appropriation Bill for 1943 (Washington, 1942),
pp. 15-16.
By the time World War II, policy
of
''AR 210-500, Change 1, 31 Dec 42, sub: Post
governing the disposition of remains had Cemeteries.
CARE OF THE DEAD 381
corps areas were redesignated service com- ices. In an effort to improve the situation,
mands in the summer
of 1942, post ceme- the OQMG established a uniform contract
teries within their jurisdiction came under year 1930.^*
for burial services for the fiscal
the control of the commanding generals of This action initiated a system that was
the service commands. The responsibility used thereafter, although the form of the
of the OQMG for administering funds for contract was revised from time to time by
the post cemeteries was decentralized to the Memorial Branch.
the field and allotted to the commanders Contract procedures in obtaining burial
of the service commands within whose services were governed and limited by the
areas the post cemeteries were located.'*^ same legislation that applied to procure-
As an economy measure, the function of ment procedures generally. ^^ Hence, when
maintenance of post cemeteries was also an effort was made shortly after Pearl
transferred late in 1942 to the Corps of Harbor to streamline the purchasing sys-
Engineers, since had long been responsi- tem generally by suspending practically
it
ble for the maintenance of other facilities all legal restrictions on Army buying under
at post installations. As a result, QMC re- the First War Powers Act, the Memorial
sponsibilities in reference to post cemeteries Branch took advantage of the opportunity
were delimited. The Memorial Branch to amend the contract provision relating
continued to furnish headstones and to to acceptance of the lowest bid in order to
keep a central record of interment at post obtain better burial services. The uniform
cemeteries. It also prescribed the policies burial contract was modified to read that
on interment With the concur-
practices. "awards will be made only to bidders com-
rence of the Chief of Engineers, the QMC plying with the specifications."
**"
approved plans for new post cemeteries This move toward negotiation of con-
and the enlargement of existing ceme- tracts did not crystallize until the summer
and it formulated policy and direc-
teries, of 1943, when complaints on burial serv-
tives governing their operation.' ices increased to such an extent that The
Quartermaster General took action to
Burial Contracts and Claims improve the services. Instructions to the
fieldemphasized that the contracting offi-
The impact of World War II led to a cer was not required to accept the lowest
modification of the procedures governing bid but that the primary objective was
burial contracts and the payment of burial quality and satisfactory service.^' The
claims. In making arrangements for the services of the most reliable, most compe-
burial of deceased military personnel, it tent, and best-established funeral directors
was customary until 1930 for the post in the areas surrounding the posts, camps.
quartermaster to advertise for supplies and " Daily Activity Rpt, OQMG, 4 Aug 42.
burial services. He accepted the lowest bid " AR 210-500, 3 Aug 43, sub: Post Cemeteries.
authority, price limitationson burial ex- 29 Apr 43. (2) OQMG Cir Ltr 86, 31 May 43, sub:
penses were eliminated.** Uniform Contracts for Burial Svs.
""'
See revised AR 30-1830, Aug 43, sub: Burial
1 1
proval of claims for burial expenses when penses, par. 3 (6) (a). (2) WD
Cir 350, Sec. VI, 28
Aug 44, sub: Remains. (3) Address, Col Harbold, Dir
such expenses were not arranged for by the of Memorial Div, sub: Preparation of Burial Contracts
military authorities. So many difficulties and Remains, QMs' Conf, 2-4 Oct 44, Camp Lee, Va.
CARE OF THE DEAD 383
eral of each service command had been the services of better funeral directors, it
informed that in delegating authority to a sought to ease the price restrictions im-
member of his staff to approve contracts posed by the Office of Price Administra-
for burial services, he, "other criteria being tion by obtaining an interpretation to the
equal, should select, if available, a Quar- effect that adjustments in maximum prices
termaster Officer who has had experience under the General Maximum Price Regu-
in this field, this is in viev^ of the special- lation might be authorized in those in-
ized nature of the services to be obtained stances where a possible shortage of supply
under these contracts and the fact that of funeral goods and services existed. Con-
they will not be forwarded to this office for tracting officers were urged to call to the
**'
review or approval." attention of bidders the fact that quality
In actuality, because of the changes of services rather than the lowest bid
made in post organization, burial services would govern in making awards of con-
contracts were handled by purchasing and tracts.*^
contracting officers who were not neces- The revisions made in the contract form
sarily Quartermaster officers. Their lack and specifications were effective, but they
of training and unfamiliarity with the had to be supplemented by efforts to elim-
procedures and problems involved led to inate the lax and perfunctory inspection
unsatisfactory results. The situation be- of remains and the consequent inadequate
came acute in July 1943. The sharply in- preparation which resulted from the fail-
creased number of complaints reaching the ure of purchasing and contracting officers
Memorial Branch on the preparation and to perform their duties in the required
condition of remains being shipped to next manner at posts, camps, and stations. The
of kin caused the OQMG to take steps to Quartermaster General proposed the
avert any unfavorable publicity. preparation of a check list of items to be
The Memorial Branch attributed the in- covered by the inspecting officers that
crease in complaints to a failure to observe would be used as a guide for the contract-
specifications and to the inability of some ing and medical officers concerned. He
local contractors, particularly those in also suggested the assignment of an addi-
small towns, to handle in a proper manner tional Quartermaster officer as a member
accidental deaths, many of which were oc- of the staff of each service command who
curring in the Army Air Forces. Further- would be thoroughly qualified to handle
more, there was a laxity in inspection on all requirements pertaining to the prepara-
and medical
the part of contracting officers tion and disposition of remains.^"
personnel at posts, camps, and stations. Study of the problems resulting from
These shortcomings were called to the at- decentralization of contracts to the service
tention of the service commands.***
To improve the situation, the OQMG -<
OQMG Cir Ltr 86, 31 May 43, sub: Uniform
Contract for Burial Svs.
also wrote more detailed and precise speci-
"" Ltr, TAG to CGs of SvCs ^/ al., 6 Oct 43, sub:
fications into contracts in order to in-
its Preparation of Remains of Deceased Mil Pers for
sure the results desired. To obtain the Shpmt, SPX 293 (27 Sep 43) OB-S-SPDO-M.
«' Unnumbered Ltr (OQMG) 26 May 44, sub:
priorities needed for steel used in caskets,
Uniform Contract for Burial Svs.
it co-ordinated its program with the War «» Memo, Gen Gregory for CG ASF, 26 Sep 44, sub:
Technical direction of theater graves regis- The Graves Registration Service in World War II, Ch. I.
CARE OF THE DEAD 385
1924, were: AR
30-1805, sub: QMC — GrReg; AR
I from all preceding wars in which the 30-1810, sub: Burials on Fid of Battle; and AR 30-
country had been engaged. 1815, sub: Rpts of Burials.
386 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
their activation and assignment to field 1830 — issued in 1924.^^ The manual was
commands. published on 23 September 1941, two
The type years after the project had originally been
of graves registration unit best
adapted to field conditions was under undertaken and barely three months
fairly continuous study during the twenty- before the attack on Pearl Harbor.. As
year interval of peace, and by the fall of a reference guide it left much to be
1940 there had been developed on paper desired. '°°
for each army corps a graves registration
companyof four platoons.^*^ The Memorial Graves Registration Service
Division was advised that "for planning of World War II
purposes, four companies have been in-
cluded in the War Department Augmen- As a consequence of the lack of ade-
tation Mobilization Plan, 1942," but their quately trained personnel, operations of
activation, of course, "depended on cir- theater graves registration services were
^^
cumstances." characterized by improvisations during
No graves registration units were trained most of World War II. Further, the short-
during the emergency period and there- age of graves registration units made for
fore none participated in maneuvers in inadequate and ineffective service in the
1940-41 or benefited from field experi- field. For example, in one theater where
ence. The Graves Registration Service re- the prescribed assignment of graves regis-
mained a paper organization, and no units tration companies would have resulted in
were activated before the entrance of the a ratio of one graves registration man to
United States into the war. Then, between 650 troops, the actual number assigned as
28 March and 2 December 1942, thirteen compared with the theater strength
companies were activated, but under the showed a ratio of one to 1,200.^°^ Nowhere
accelerated training program of wartime were enough companies provided. Ade-
there was no unit training and as a result quately trained graves registration units
there were no adequately trained cadres should have been phased in, in the proper
for purposes of augmentation. Not until ratio, along with combat units during mo-
early in 1943, over a year after the out- bilization if the mission of the Graves
break of war, were facilities available for a
comprehensive course of unit training.^"^ «« T/O 10-297, Nov 40. The company described
1
The formulation of an approved tactical in this T/O was never activated; the T/O itself was
revised on 2 January 1942.1
doctrine and training method was basic to, " War Plans Br to Memorial Div, OQMG, 31 Jul
and had to precede any program for, the 4 sub: GrReg Sv.
1 ,
charged with the collection, receipt, and the problems of graves registration and the
disposition of all personal effects found on care and disposal of the effects of deceased
the dead. soldiers. He appended a directive that he
recommended be issued by the War De-
Wartime Formulation of Graves partment.'""" After being processedthrough
Registration Policy channels, this directive was published to
the field as a circular on 18 February, over
Immediately following the attack on two months after the declaration of war.'""
Pearl Harbor, General Gregory initiated By this means the commanding general
action to suspend the shipment home of re- of each theater of operations and defense
mains from overseas possessions and other command was directed to organize a
stations outside the continental United graves registration service that would func-
States in accordance with Army Regula- tion as a part of the office of the quarter-
tions/°- This step was supplemented by master of the theater or defense command.
further action discontinuing the shipment Necessary instructions conforming to AR
of caskets to overseas stations and base 30-1805 and TM
10-630 were to be issued
commands in order to save cargo space. by the Commanding General, for GHQ
Local facilities were to be employed for those theaters and defense commands un-
temporary burials when the supply of der his jurisdiction, while all duties of the
^"^ graves registration service within the con-
caskets on hand was exhausted.
As a result of these directives such com- tinental United States were to be per-
mands as the Caribbean Defense Com- formed by the Memorial Division,
mand, the Iceland Base Command, and OQMG. Required reports were to be
others were confronted with the necessity made on forms prescribed by The Quar-
of establishing their own graves registra- termaster General. In addition, a number
tion services. At the same time, with hostil- of provisions not covered by the specified
ities already under way and no graves Army Regulation and technical manual
registration companies provided for any of were included. These forbade photograph-
the forces outside the continental limits of ing of temporary graves, outlined proce-
the United States, The Quartermaster dures to be followed when death occurred
General could only assume that the the- at sea, and indicated that information on
ater commander, acting on his own re- burial matters would be disclosed to rela-
sponsibility, would take necessary action tives only by The Adjutant General and
regarding casualties in his command. This, >"-'
(1) Ltr, TQMG to TAG, 9 Dec 41, sub: Shpmt
of course, was what General Douglas Mac- of Remains. (2) Ltr, TAG to CG, Caribbean Defense
Arthur was compelled to do in the Philip- Command etal., 13 Dec 41, same sub, AG 293.8 (12-
9-41) MB-A-M.
pines.'"* The Quartermaster General felt "" (1) Ltr, TQMG to TAG, 24 Dec 41, sub: Shpmt
that the entire question should be covered of Mortuary Supplies. (2) Ltr, TAG to CG, Caribbean
Defense Command et a/., 31 Dec 43, same sub, AG
in a general War Department directive.
293.8 (12-24-41) MB-A-M.
After attempting informally to secure '"^
For elaboration of the improvisation that oc-
the views of General Headquarters, U.S. curred, see Steere, The Graves Registration Service in
World War II, Ch. III.
Army, upon the proposed directive. The '">
Memo, TQMG for CofS, 20 Jan 42, sub: GrReg.
Quartermaster General in January 1942 1(111
WD Cir, restricted and unnumbered, 18 Feb 42,
called the attention of the Chief of Staff to sub: GrReg.
CARE OF THE DEAD 389
The Quartermaster General. This last pro- master General and The Adjutant Gen-
vision caused much confusion. Both The eral for furnishing information to relatives
Quartermaster General and the Chief of and friends concerning grave location, dis-
Staff, GHQ, would have preferred to cen- posal of remains and effects, and other
tralize the handling of such information in related matters. This represented a dupli-
the OQMG, but they had been overruled cation of Quartermaster functions, led to
by the Chief of Staff. The field was further the release of erroneous information, and
informed that detailed instructions on the was productive of confusion and embar-
disposal of effects would be issued later, for rassment to relatives and the War Depart-
The Quartermaster General planned to ment since reburials were frequently
establish an effects bureau at the Kansas made, and The Adjutant General might
City Quartermaster Depot, a bureau advise of one burial place and The Quar-
which was subsequently placed in opera- termaster General of another. Colonel
tion.^"" Harbold therefore recommended that The
Without trained personnel, graves Quartermaster General be held responsi-
registration services so established resorted ble for the dissemination of all such infor-
to hasty improvisation to meet their needs. mation since there was a clear line of
This could have been obviated had ade- demarcation between the duties of the
quate plans been made in the prewar years Casualty Branch, AGO, and those of the
to provide properly trained cadres for new Memorial Branch, OQMG.
units and to establish during the emer- A second major area of confusion re-
gency a rate of expansion for graves regis- sulted from the lack of uniformity in the
tration companies that would have main- methods of handling the dead in the differ-
tained some sort of balance with the ent theaters of operations. "It is only
growth of the armed forces. Makeshift through concerted action and uniform
methods were used, for in the absence of procedures that efficient results may be
trained graves registration units for com- expected at the cessation of hostilities when
bat forces technical standards and proce- the military dead are returned," Colonel
dures for the collection and burial of the Harbold pointed out. He therefore recom-
dead could not be prescribed by The mended that The Quartermaster General
Quartermaster General during the Philip- be designated Chief, American Graves
pine campaign of 1942 or the initial phases Registration Service, to direct the estab-
of the North African campaign. Efforts lishment of, and formulate policies for, the
later had to be directed toward eliminat-
ing the confusion that resulted and devel- '»'
(1) Memo,TQMG for CofS, 9 Feb 42. sub: Disp
oping uniform procedures of graves regis- of Effects of Deceased Mil Pers. (2) Ltr, TQMG to
CO SOS, 23 Mar 42, sub: Instructions for Opn of Ef-
tration. fects Bureau.
The first move in this direction was "'"
Ltr, Brig Gen Francis H. Pope, OQMG, to CG
ASF, 15 Jul 43, sub: Dissemination of Info Re: GrReg
made in the summer of 1943 when Colonel Matters. The letter and an enclosed draft of a pro-
Harbold, the newly designated chief of the posed circular were prepared by Colonel Harbold,
Memorial Branch, analyzed the areas of although signed by the director of the General Ad-
ministrative Services Division in accordance with in-
confusion resulting from the circular of 18
structions requiring his signature on all communica-
February 1942.'°* The first of these was tions from the OQMG indorsing inclosed drafts for
the joint responsibility of The Quarter- publication by the War Department.
390 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
graves registration services in the theaters,tries are observed that such transportation
and, further, that he be authorized to cor- is available therefor and not required for
respond directly with the chiefs of the the movement of troops or supplies." ^'^
graves registration services to insure the Colonel Hamilton's proposed policy
use of uniform methods. To this end he modification would, no doubt, have been
drafted a revised circular that was sub- effected expeditiously since the Casualty
mitted to higher authority for approval on Branch, AGO, had indicated it was in no
15July 1943. way concerned, and the director of the
In the meantime, Col. Charles S. Ham- Military Personnel Division, ASF, there-
ilton, director of the Service Installations fore forwarded the recommendation
Division, OQMG, called attention to the through channels for approval. But at this
fact that the Commanding General, point and just three days before the Secre-
Northwest Service Command, was auto- tary of War approved the change, the
matically returning bodies of deceased Deputy Quartermaster General for Supply
military personnel without consulting the Planning and Operations, Brig. Gen.
OQMG. He felt that this would lead to James L. Frink, in a letter transmitted to
embarrassment and that the OQMG The Adjutant General through the Under
would have no record of the disposition of Secretary of War and approved by him,
remains from that area when plans were sent a recommendation proposing adher-
prepared for the return of the military ence to the original policy."' The cross-
dead. He was of the opinion that no re- purpose exhibited in this instance was
mains should be returned from outside the illustrative of the confusion promoted by
continental limits of the United States the multiplicity of intermediaries between
unless it was so directed by the OQMG the chief of the Memorial Branch and The
and on special request of the next of kin. Quartermaster General and the failure to
He recommended the adoption of a uni- observe newly established channels of
form policy to this effect and the dispatch communication with higher authorities.""
of a radiogram to the Northwest Service Confronted with approvals of two con-
Command instructing conformance to The Adjutant General
flicting directives.
such a policy."'^ asked instructions of the Assistant Chief of
The course of action pursued by the Staff', G-1."^ The difficulty was resolved
Secretary of War and reaffirming the then incorporated in the directive that
favorable action taken by the Secretary of superseded the circular of 18 February
War on the proposal submitted by Colonel 1942."' Under this War Department Cir-
Hamilton. This disposal of the case was cular 206, notification of death was sent
approved by the Secretary of War on 14 to the next of kin by The Adjutant Gen-
August 1943, and the revised policy was eral, who also advised the family that in-
published to the field on 21 August.''^ The formation on the place of burial would be
directive continued the policy on shipment furnished by The Quartermaster General
of remains unchanged but added that when military security permitted such in-
"prior to shipment, a request for instruc- formation to be revealed. The Quarter-
tions will be submitted to The Quarter- master General was responsible for
master General, and shipment will not be notifying relatives and friends of the grave
made until receipt of instructions from location, disposal of remains and effects,
The Quartermaster General." and other related matters after these had
The grant of this authority paved the been cleared with the Director of Intel-
way for acceptance of Colonel Harbold's ligence, ASF.
proposal to designate The Quartermaster Later these procedures were modified to
General as Chief, American Graves Regis- the extent that letters of condolence or
tration Service. The Adjutant General in sympathy might be written by the respon-
forwarding the proposal to the Under siblechaplain or the immediate command-
Secretary of War indicated his agreement ing officer. They could disclose no burial
and apparently acquiesced in the view information, however, and the letters had
that joint responsibility in the dissemina- to be routed through the agency responsi-
tion of burial information had created ble for the rendition of casualty reports to
confusion."^ The Adjutant General to insure that the
In order to formulate workable proce- official casualty report had been made
dures, the Control Division, ASF, surveyed prior to release of the letters and that they
the way in which the joint control system contained no classified information.""*
had operated in the past. It found that War Department Circular 206 also
procedures had broken down, and that as designated The Quartermaster General as
a result no official information regarding Chief, American Graves Registration, and
place of burial was being transmitted to made him responsible for formulating
War Department.'"'
the next of kin by the policies for the operation of the graves
However, unofficial information as to registration services outside the continen-
grave location reached the next of kin tal United States. On all such matters he
through letters from friends of the de-
"^ AGO Memo, W55-39-43, 21 Aug 43, sub:
ceased, the company commander, or the Shpmt of Remains.
chaplain. "' (1) Informal Action Sheet, Chief of Casualty Br,
On the basis of consultation between the AGO, to TAG, 7 Aug 43, sub: Revision of
1 Cir, WD
18 Feb 42. (2) Memo, TAG for USW, 17 Aug 43, no
chief of the Casualty Branch, AGO, the sub.
chief of the Memorial Branch, OQMG, '"^ Memo,
Lt Robert K. Kraus, Control Div, ASF,
and representatives of G-1 and the Joint for Lt W. Cresap, 27 Aug 43, sub: Furnishing
Col M.
of Grave Info to Families of Deceased.
Security Control, remedial action for this " WD Cir 206, Sep 43, sub: GrReg.
1 1
Planning for the Final Disposition France, Belgium, and England. Further-
of Remains more, it was felt that since all but one of
the military cemeteries of World War I
During the last two years of the war, the had been in areas overrun and occupied
Memorial Branch, while administering its by enemy troops during World War II,
responsibilities in reference to the oper- this fact would make its influence felt in
ations of the Graves Registration Service, determining the decision that relatives
was at the same time devoting consider- would make. The Memorial Branch con-
able time and study to planning for the cluded that requests for return of the dead
disposition of the remains of the war dead would exceed 85 percent as compared with
at the end of hostilities. Such planning had 60 percent following World War I.
been initiated in the summer of 1943 in The Memorial Branch therefore recom-
response to a directive from the demo- mended the adoption of a general policy of
bilization planners and had resulted in the either returning the dead or concentrating
submission of a policy study.'"" From then them in national cemeteries to be estab-
on the subject was under constant review. lished in Allied countries, the decision to
be made by the nearest of kin. It proposed
Policy Study 34 to determine their wishes in a poll by let-
ter, to be conducted by The Quartermas-
Although Policy Study 34, submitted to ter General after the end of hostilities. It
the demobilization planners in August stipulated further that if requests for re-
1943, was, for the most part, used as a ve- turn of the dead buried in any Allied
hicle for presenting the case in behalf of a country reached or exceeded 70 percent of
proposed Memorial Division, it also offered the total known American burials in that
a plan of organization for the postwar country, all the dead would be returned.
American Graves Registration Service and Those for whom no authorized requests
proposed in general terms the objectives to had been made would be buried in a na-
be sought in a program for the return of tional cemetery in the United States desig-
the dead.
The policy to be pursued was based on "' For operation of graves registration services in
an analysis of the factors involved and the the Mediterranean, European, and Pacific theaters
experience drawn from World War I. It see Steere, The Graves Registration Service in World War
//, Chs. V, VI, VII.
was noted that the preponderance of let-
(1) Policy Study 34, 14 Aug 43. (2) Ltr, Gen
'-"
ters to the OQMGhad requested the re- Tompkins, ASF, to TQMG, 22 Jun 43, sub: Demob
turn of remains to the United States. Ping.
CARE OF THE DEAD 393
nated by The Quartermaster General.' '' realized that they would eventually as-
This program was to be administered sume the responsibilities for cemeterial
through a postwar American Graves operations originally assigned to theater
Registration Service, the personnel needs commanders, the American Graves Regis-
of which could only be based on the re- tration Service was projected as a self-con-
quirements after World War I and a con- tained organization, with full control over
sideration of such factors as the probable supply and transportation incidental to
expansion of active theaters, the number field operations, as well as administrative
of dead in and the estimated losses for and disciplinary jurisdiction over its
these theaters, the lack of communication personnel.
facilities inthe theaters, the distances in- Insofar as a possible expansion of the
volved, and the time authorized for com- cemeterial system was concerned, the
pletion of the work. Memorial Branch considered it unneces-
A preliminary study of the situation and sary to plan for the acquisition of sites for
the deployment of troops indicated a num- cemeteries in foreign countries since the
ber of geographical area commands size, number, and location of cemeteries
Europe, Africa, Asia, and North
Pacific, could not be determined until after the
America —
into which the American cessation of hostilities. Nor was there any
Graves Registration Service would be need to plan for the expansion of national
divided for administrative purposes. The cemeteries in the United States since, on
tentative organization divided these gen- the basis of World War I experience, the
eral areas into ten active zones and two great majority of the dead would be in-
probable zones, and these twelve were fur- terred in private cemeteries. It was felt that
ther divided into forty-five sectors, in- the rate of expansion in some of the na-
dicated only in a general manner to show tional cemeteries was more than adequate
the possible and probable scope of activ- to provide grave sites far beyond the 10
ities of the American Graves Registration percent of remains interred in national
Service. It was estimated that two ports cemeteries in the World War I program for
would be required each sector, or a total
in the return of the dead.'"^
of ninety, to handle the importation of sup- This policy study was reviewed by the
plies from the United States and the ship- Director, Special Planning Division, by
ment of casketed remains to the home- and of Person-
the Directors of Operations
land.'-"' nel, ASF, and by the Chief of Transporta-
The Quartermaster General in his tion. The study, together with copies of
capacity as Chief, American Graves Regis- their remarks,was returned to The Quar-
tration Service, was to be the administra- termaster General with the advice that the
tive and technical director of this overseas broad policy recommended in the study
organization, while the American Graves was approved, but that "changing circum-
Registration Service Branch, to be estab- stances may make it necessary that a re-
lished as an autonomous unit in the pro- examination of the present plan take place
posed Memorial Division, would act as his with the conclusion of major hostilities in
special staff for overseas operations. The
-' Policy Study 34, Pt. I, pp. 1-2.
zone commanders would report directly to -- Ibid., Pt. II, Sec. B, pp. 1-7, 12-13.
The Quartermaster General. Since it was -' Ibid.,Vx. Ill, p. 1.
394 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
'-^
the European-African Theater." The Quartermaster General for returning
Criticism of the plan centered largely the remains of all American dead, includ-
on the fact that the American Graves ing those in the Army, Navy, Marine
Registration Service was proposed as a Corps, Coast Guard, and civilian em-
separate, integrated organization apart ployees of the War Department and other
from the existing theater commands. This, governmental agencies, and the planning
incidentally, was a criticism that was to be for the establishment of American Graves
repeated, with variations, again and again Registration Service area commands in
throughout the two-year planning period. quiescent theaters or in rearward areas far
The Memorial Branch had projected an removed from the battle front of active
organization of zones and sectors that theaters. By November work was begun
would come into operation at the end of on formulating final plans for the disposi-
the war when the military organizational tion of the war dead. These were approved
scheme would be passing out of existence, in September 1945 and represented a syn-
but higher echelons of authority preferred thesis of the planning submitted in the
to fit it into the existing military frame- policy study of August 1943 and the sep-
work. The Director of Operations, ASF, arate planning programs of 1944.
considered that less attention should be Exploring the problem of postwar dis-
paid to an elaborate graves registration position of remains of the war dead. Colo-
headquarters throughout the world and nel Harbold raised the question of
more "to the establishment of sections to consolidating all repatriation planning
fit into headquarters structures of Theaters and operations in one agency in order to
of Operation." He was supported in this effect economies in personnel, to facilitate
position by the Director of Personnel, ASF, the distribution of supplies, evacuation of
who thought "personnel should be allotted areas, and shipment of bodies to the
by the War Department to the Theater United States, and to expedite completion
Headquarters for distribution to the sec- of the task. He proposed vesting this re-
tors as organized within the existing chain sponsibility in The Quartermaster General
of command." ^-•' and to this end suggested a conference of
the interested governmental depart-
Responsibility for Disposition ments.^"" His program was approved by
of All Dead The Quartermaster General and presented
to the Commanding General, ASF, in the
While the plan embodied in Policy summer of 1944. Forwarded through
Study 34 remained under general but con-
tinuous study, certain aspects of the prob- '-' Ltr, TAG to TQMG, 28 Nov 43, sub: Demob
Ping (Disposal of Dead).
lem resulted in separate planning pro- '-'
Transmittal sheet. Gen Lutes, Dir of Opns,
( 1 )
grams, such as the one advanced for the ASF, to Dir of Control Div, ASF, 14 Aug 43, sub:
expansion of the national cemeterial sys- TQMG Demob Ping. (2) 1st Ind, Deputy Dir of Pers,
ASF, toDir of Special Ping Div, 13 Oct 43, on Trans-
tem to provide burial space for all veter- mittal Sheet, Control Div to Dir of Pers, 24 Sep 43,
ans. ^""^ Other phases, developed in separate sub: Demob Ping.
planning programs during 1944, included '-•^
See above, National Cemeteries, pp. 369-73.
'-' Memo, Col Harbold, Dir of Memorial Div, for
the planning undertaken in connection
TQMG, 20Jun 44, sub: Return of Dead Upon Ces-
with the assignment of responsibility to sation of Hostilities.
CARE OF THE DEAD 395
channels to the General Staff, the proposal Navy Department, were furthering inter-
met with favor, and The Quartermaster service co-operation within the scope of
General was directed to call a conference existing policy, changing conditions in the
^-^
for 25 August. Pacific made it possible to reconsider early
Responses were prompt and favorable. directives governing the disposition of re-
Apart from the Army, only the State De- mains that had been issued by the Navy.
partment had a policy and procedure — These directives had made no provision
—
antedating that of the Army for return- for the consolidation of remains from many
ing its dead from foreign lands. It was small cemeteries in isolated areas in the
represented at the conference and ex- Pacific because of the shortage of shipping
pressed approval of the aims, but ultimate- and the necessity of maintaining supply
course in
ly elected to follow its traditional lines. When in the fall of 1944 the naval
caring for its dead. Among the other bases in the Samoan Defense Group were
agencies and departments, only the Navy about to be abandoned, the commandant
could point to any large number of re- Group proposed removing
of that Defense
mains in foreign lands, but from the be- remains from various points and reinter-
ginning of the war it had co-operated ring them at the Tutuila Military Ceme-
closely with the Army in making burials tery. Similar inquiries were made by the
and maintaining records. It had no desire commanding general of the South Pacific
to duplicate the Graves Registration Base Command. '^^ The Commander in
Service.''^ As a consequence, all of the Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, recommended
agencies approved the program for vesting that no action be taken along the proposed
responsibility in The Quartermaster Gen- lines until after the war, a position con-
eral as Chief, American Graves Registra-
tion Service, to effect the return of their
dead and to create cemeteries in areas '-'-
TQMG
(1) Memo, for CG ASF, 26 Jun 44, sub:
where the dead were not to be returned. Return of Dead Upon Cessation of Hostilities. (2)
It was not expected that one conference Memo, Dir of Special Ping Div. WDSS, for CG ASF,
2 Jul 44, same sub, and st Ind, Hq ASF to TQMG,
1 1
could settle all details, but subsequent ex- 29 Jul 44. (3) Letters of invitation were sent out on 10
ploration of procedures and problems of August to the Deputy Director of Plans and Opera-
co-operation, particularly with the Navy tions for Demobilization, ASF, the Bureau of Medi-
cine and Surgery of the Navy Department, the Coast
Department, led to a satisfactory clarifica- Guard, Marine Corps, Air Transport Command,
tion not only of such procedures as provid- Chief of Chaplains, Transportation Corps, Red Cross,
ing escorts, polling next of kin, and trans- U.S. Maritime Commission, U.S. Employees Com-
pensation Commission, and the Foreign Service Ad-
ferring jurisdiction over cemeteries estab- ministration of the State Department.
lished by the Navy or Marine Corps, but '-'
Ltr, Rear Adm Luther Sheldon, Jr., Actg Chief
also of established graves registration of BuSandA to TQMG, 5 Aug 44, sub: Eventual
1
instructions contained in TM
10-630 as amplified by
of the cemetery. The American Graves a letter from The Quartermaster General to all the
Registration Service was also made re- August 1943, sub: Temporary Cemeteries
theaters, 13
sponsible for the care and concentration of and Interments Outside Continental Limits of U.S.
"Ml) JCS Policy Memo 12, 17 Feb 45. (2) Ltr,
remains at any Army or Navy bases that TAG to CGs of All Theaters et a/., 19 Feb 45, sub:
were to be relinquished in the future. This Disinterment and Reinterment of Bodies Outside
Continental Limits of U.S. (3) Deputy COMINCH-
policy was communicated to the field in
Deputy CNO
to Chief of Naval Pers, 20 Feb 45, same
February 1945."^ sub.
CARE OF THE DEAD 397
visory headquarters included zone and forth in Col T. R. Howard, Introductory Study of
sector headquarters to be set up imme- Phased Development of Activation of Graves
Regis-
tration Area Commands and Subordinate Units, see
diately, with an area headquarters to be Stecre, The Graves Registration Service in World War II,
established in the third phase. It was Ch. IX.
thought that greater economy could be Memo, TQMG for CG ASF,
' '> 1 Nov 44, sub:
1
cial type Quartermaster graves registration Nov 44, on memo cited n. 36. 1
398 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Commanding General, Mediterranean to be charged against the theater troop
Theater of Operations, for his comment or ceiling. Copies of the revised plan were
concurrence. sent to the theaters on 30 January 1945.'^"
The General Staff approved the sug- The inquiry from the Mediterranean
gested changes, and G-3 added the recom- theater,'^' which had speeded the formu-
mendation that the plan as modified "be lation of a program for the organization of
submitted to the Commanding Generals the Graves Registration Service in the
of all Theaters for their information and theaters, had resulted in a plan that left
not for comment or concurrence inasmuch the theater commander still saddled with
as the Quartermaster General is now the burdensome responsibility of caring for
charged with the formulation of policies temporary cemeteries in areas that had
for the operation of graves registration lost their military significance. He was
services outside the continental limits of given a free hand in activating the ele-
the United States." ^^^ The plan was there- ments of an area command in accordance
upon returned to The Quartermaster with tables of distribution shown in the
General to be rewritten, incorporating the plan, but he remained responsible for the
recommended changes. '^^ organization and had to continue charg-
While the recasting of the plan involved ing the required personnel against his
no change in organizational structure, it theater troop ceiling. The relief that he
required a restatement of relationships be- sought was denied. While the plan fell
tween the theater commander and the short of its original objectives, it neverthe-
Graves Registration area commander and less contributed toward the postwar organ-
those that would later apply between the ization that was established.
Chief, American Graves Registration
Service, and the area commander. In the Current Plan for the Return
revised plan, responsibility for military of the Dead
cemeteries in the rearward areas was
vested in the Graves Registration Service At the time the plan for the organiza-
area command of the theater until such tion of graves registration services in the
responsibility passed to the zone of in- theaterswas being considered by higher
terior.During this period the area com- echelons of authority, ASF headquarters
mand was to be under the administration became concerned about the status of final
and operational control of the quartermas- planning for the disposition of the war
ter of the theater command. When a thea-
ter was discontinued or its geographical DF, Deputy ACofS G-3 to G-1 and OPD, 7 Dec
''*'
such areas. Initial activation of units of the 13 Jan 45, sub: Orgn for QM GrReg Sv. (2) Ltr, TAG
Graves Registration area commands was to CGs of All Theaters et a/., 30 Jan 45, same sub, AG
322 (24 Jan 45) OB-I-SPOPP-M.
to be accomplished by the utilization of '^' Rad, CG Allied Force Hq, Caserta. Italy, to
aries — the American Area, the European Before the withdrawal of the regularly
and Mediterranean Area, and the South- constituted graves registration companies,
west Pacific and Asiatic Area.'" These cemeterial, exhumation, and reception
area commands had no counterpart in the teams and zone and sector headquarters
organizational scheme of August 1943, would be organized and phased in accord-
and except for the fact that the table of ing to the organizational plan for the
distribution for the headquarters of the Graves Registration Service (Zone of In-
Mediterranean theater area command terior) of 30 January 1945.'*^ A program
was borrowed intact and applied to the for the return of the dead was not expected
headquarters establishments of two of the to begin for six months after the end of the
area commands, they bore no relationship war, and during this interim these super-
to, and must not be confused with, the visory headquarters and operating units
area commands of the Quartermaster would carry on the work of exhumation,
Graves Registration Service (Zone of In- concentration, and other activities of the
terior). Graves Registration Service. When the
The zone-sector organizational arrange-
"-(1) Memo, Dir of Plans and Opns, ASF. for
ment of Policy Study 34 was carried over
TQMG, 30 Nov 44, sub: Current Plan for Return of
into the Current Plan with provision made American Dead and Establishment of Overseas and
for fourteen zones in lieu of the twelve pro- U.S. Cemeteries. (2) Memo, Col Harbold, OQMG,
for Dir of Plans and Opns, ASF, Jun 45, same sub.
1
U.S. ARMY TRANSPORT HONDA KNOT passing under the Golden Gate Bridge,
Coast Guard, as well as in the Army, and the records, especially those of southern prisons, were
incomplete. The number of persons subject to the re-
among civilians employed in the Maritime turn of the dead program who were killed or died
Commission, Red Cross, and all govern- overseas in World War II estimated by the Mem-
is
ment agencies in the theaters, except the orial Division at 358,967. This estimate included
279,180 in the Army of the United States, 49,329 in
State Department which cared for its own the Navy, 21,726 in the Marine Corps, 1,038 in the
dead. The number of persons who were Coast Guard, and 7,694 civilians, of whom 6,000 were
killed or died overseas in World War I was employed by the Maritime Commission.
'''^
total number of fatalities overseas in World
The
approximately 81,500,'''^ or less than one War was 81,462, according to data on file in the
I
fourth as many as in World War II, but the Decedent Branch, Memorial Division, OQMG.
404 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
on a much smaller scale, and fewer than taken
into consideration. For example, air-
half as many troops were involved. plane crashes took an exceedingly heavy
A total of 280,835 remains were recov- toll. Many of these planes were completely
ered in the theaters during and following destroyed by fire or explosion, thus making
World War II.' Although this represents identification of the dead virtually impos-
'"'
only 78 percent of the fatalities, as con- sible. Tanks, too, were used much more ex-
trasted with the impressive record of ap- tensively in World War II and their fre-
proximately 96 percent in World War I, quent destruction by fire posed a similar
most of the reasons why such a large num- problem of identification.
ber —78,132 —
were never recovered are As a result of instructions from next of
fairly obvious. Naval and amphibious op- kin, remains of 109,866 were buried over-
erations were on a vast scale and many seas in permanent U.S. military ceme-
more men were lost at sea than in World teries. The other 170,752, or approxi-
War Moreover, the fighting occurred in
I. mately 61 percent, were returned to the
all parts of the world, including dense jun- United States. Of these, 132,753 were
gles, many little-known islands of the Pa- buried in private cemeteries and 37,248 in
cific, and numerous other more or less iso- national cemeteries, while 751 were re-
lated areas of the globe, a factor which shipped to Canada, Mexico, and other
seriously complicated and handicapped countries.
recovery. Similarly, air travel was exceed- The return program was financed by
ingly heavy over sea lanes, impenetrable Congress in a series of appropriations, the
jungles, and inaccessible mountain areas, first of which was enacted in May 1946,
such as the Hump in the China-Burma-In- and the last in 1948. Total appropriations
dia Theater. When planes crashed in such amounted to $190,869,000. For the 279,-
regions, recovery of the dead was often im- 867 remains, including interments both
possible, despite greatly improved search overseas and in the United States, for
and recovery techniques developed during which final disposition had been completed
the war. as of 30 June 1951 the Memorial Division
Of the 280,835 remains recovered, 270,- estimated the average cost of recovery and
479 were identified. The 10,356 who were burial of a soldier to be $564.50. No com-
not identified constituted 3.7 percent of parable figures are available for previous
the recoveries. This compares favorably wars.
with the 1,648 unknowns, or 2.2 percent,
in World War I, if the greater difficulties of
Mem-
'^' Data, as of 30 June 1951, obtained from
establishing identity in World War II are orial Div., OQMG, October 1951.
Bibliographical Note
Shortly after its establishment on 11 Forces, are in the files in storage at the
July 1942, the Historical Section in the Federal Records Center at Alexandria,
Office of The Quartermaster General pro- Va., that are administered by the Depart-
jected a historical program calling for a mental Records Branch, Adjutant Gen-
series of monographs covering specific eral's Office. The materials include circu-
Quartermaster functions. These mono- lars, office orders, and intraoffice memo-
graphs were intended for later uSe in pre- randa; correspondence with field installa-
paring the comprehensive history of the tions, with other government agencies, and
Quartermaster Corps in World War II. with industry; inspection reports; direc-
The pertinent monographs, together with tives from, reports to, and correspondence
studies prepared by historical units at the with agencies exercising controls over
various QMC
field installations, have pro- Quartermaster operations; transcripts of
vided the framework of research upon conferences and interviews; organization
which much of this volume is based. These charts, manuals, and related data; and nu-
have been supplemented by a considerable merous other materials. The type of docu-
amount of additional research since the ment used is indicated in footnote cita-
monographic coverage of Quartermaster tions. Where such indication is not made,
activities discussed in Volume II was not the document is part of the intraoffice cor-
nearly so complete as it was for the supply respondence of the OQMG.
operations analyzed in Volume I. These records are classified according to
As in Volume where the authors used the War Department Decimal File System,
I,
Statistical Review, World War II: A Summary U.S. Congress, Senate. 77th Congress, First
of ASF Activities Session. Hearings Before a Special Commit-
Statistical Yearbook of the Quartermaster Corps tee Investigating the National Defense Pro-
U.S. Congress, Senate. 74th Congress, Sec- and Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of
ond Session. Hearings Before Subcommittee the United States Army, July 1, 1941 to June
of Committee on Military Affairs on S. 4268, 30, 1943, to the Secretary of War (Washing-
20 May 1936 ton, 1943)
List of Abbreviations
AAF
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 409
DCofS
410
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 411
SB
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
Salerno to Cassino
Cassino to the Alps
The European Theater of Operations
Cross-Channel Attack
Breakout and Pursuit
The Lorraine Campaign
The Siegfried Line Campaign
The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge
A. P. Hill Military Reservation, 228, 243, 244, 254, Army Ground Forces (AGF)
255, 260 concurrence of, in salvage directives, 8
Adjutant General, The, 230, 248, 388, 389, 391 dog units, 333, 334
Adjutant General, Office of The, 147 OQMG formulation of conservation doctrine for, 1
Administration and Supply School, 218 and Physical Profile Plan, 162
Administrative Division, OQMG,
142, 213, 363 priority position of, 203
Air Corps Ferrying Command, 324 QM inspection of units in, 217
American Graves Registration Service quotas for specialists, 149
criticism of proposed 1943 plan for, 394 responsibility for redistribution of trainee allot-
current plan for, 399-402 ments, 147
problem of integrating elements of proposed, into training of QM units by, 213, 216, 217, 287, 289,
theater establishments, 396-99 290
proposed plan of 1943 for, 392-93 and war dog program, 326, 331
responsibility of, for concentration of remains at Army horse breeding plan, 314,318
Army and Navy bases, 396 Army Industrial College, 103
American Institute of Baking, 261, 267 Army Nurse Corps, 370
American Institute of Laundering, 360 Army Service Forces (ASF). See also Services of Sup-
American Kennel Club, 325 ply
American Theater Wing War Service, 326 assumption of staff responsibility for salvage by, 9,
Animals. See also Dogs; Horses; Mules. 13
arguments for and against use of, 316, 318-19 personnel functions of, 47 1
Cemeteries, national —
Continued Classification, clothing —
Continued
burial rights in, 369-70 and standards of serviceability, 56-59
corps area supervision of, 365 training program for, 59-60
development of QM responsibilities 361-63 for, Classification, enlisted men. See also General-service
effect of WD reorganization on QM responsibility men; Limited-service personnel; Physical Profile
for, 365-66 Plan.
establishment of, 361, 362 continuing process of, 146
interment of Civil War dead in, 362 effect of manpower shortage on objectives of, 156
modification of policy on establishment of, 371-72 by intellectual capacity, 163-67
origin of, 361 by occupational skill, 146, 148-56
original policy on establishment of, 37 1 by physical capacity, 156-63
renewed interest in expansion of, 372-73 at reception centers, 146, 149, 150, 153, 154
wartime suspension of construction of, 372 at replacement training centers, 154
Cemeteries, post Classification, officers
burialat, 361,377, 378, 379 by age, 198
field jurisdiction over, 380, 381 by occupational specialties, 197
QM supervision of, 380 original categories of, 197
Chemical Warfare Service by physical capacity, 198
need for laborers in, 147 WD plan of, 197
and Physical Profile Plan, 163 Clayton formula, 109
relative size of, 1 39 Clothing
Chicago QM Depot ClassA, 41,42, 43, 46
contract termination at, 92, 102, 103 concessions in use of renovated, 42
disposal of GFE at, 108, 109, 110 definition of Class B, 41
and problem of GFM 106-07
in special rations, definition of Class X, 54, 57
QM Subsistence School 272 at, disposition procedure for, in prewar years, 52-53
training of bakers and cooks at, 27 formulation of instructions for classification of, 58,
Chief, American Graves Registration Service 59
designation of TQMG as, 363, 367, 391 high mortality rate of substandard, 4
proposal for, 389, 391 inclusion of Class B, in station stock, 54
responsibilities of, 391-92, 395 introduction of new procedure to govern disposition
Chief of Chemical Warfare Service, 344 of, 52-54
utilization of Class B clothing in, 68, 69 and Physical Profile Plan, 163
World War I food, 7 proportion of civilian-type jobs in, 147
Conservation program proportion of Negro officers in, 203
conflicting views on, 11-12 relative size of, 39 1
and effective field supervision, 6-9 responsibility for laundry facilities and machinery,
and indoctrination of troops, 23, 24, 26 343
initiation of an ASF, 25 transfer of construction to, 140, 181,343
promotion of QM, 11 Courses. See also Officer Candidate School; Quarter-
responsibilities of command agencies in, 11, 24 master School; Quartermaster Replacement
Consolidated termination program, 98 Training Centers.
Construction Division, 343, 344 OQMG, Advanced Administration and Supply Course (En-
Contract Settlement, Office of, 96 listed), 263
Contract Settlement Act, 76, 89, 92, 95, 97, 103, 109 Advanced Baking Course, 261
Contract termination. See also Pretermination plan- Advanced School for Storage Officers, 276
ning; Termination inventory, disposal of. Advanced Supply Officers' Course, 260
company-wide settlements in, 98-99 Army Specialist Corps Depot Operations Course,
comparison of World War I and World War II, 88 259
consolidated program of, 98 ASF Depot Course, 259, 260, 275
co-ordination of War and Navy Department activi- Civilian SOS Depot Selection Course, 260
ties in, 98-99 Depot Administration Course, 259
delegation of authority for, 89 Enlisted Men's Course (Special), 258, 262
development of policy for, 89 Graves Registration Course, 261
factors causing,88 Military Fuel and Lubricants Course, 261
importance of, 88 Nurses' Basic Military Training Course, 262
procedure for, 92-96 off^ered in co-operation with universities, 268-69
QM organization for handling, 89, 92 Officers' Basic Supply Course, 259
separation of,and purchasing activities, 92 Officers' Course (Refresher), 259
training for work of, 103-04 Officers' Course (Special), 258, 259, 261
Contract Termination Branch, OQMG Officers' Course (Tactical), 259
criticism by, of pretermination planning in sub- Officers' Unit Training Course B, 261
sistence field, 102 Packaging, Processing, and Packing Course, 275
establishment of, 89 Quartermaster Noncommissioned Officers' Ad-
expansion of, 92 ministration and Supply Course (Advanced), 262
INDEX 419
Department of Agriculture, 110, 314 procurement and training of dogs by, 326, 327
Department of Commerce, 112, 113 purpose of, 325
Depot Property Disposal Board, 1 1 transfer of training function of, 326
420 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Dry cleaning plants Fort Warren QMRTC
number of, in 1920's, 339 administrative supervision of, 215, 216
number of, in 1939, 340 adoption of brigade system at, 226
number of, in 1940, 348 capacity of, 219
QM, in World War I, 339 and Assignment Section at,
Classification 154
reimbursement of commercial, for unclaimed Army company assignment of trainees at, 226
clothing, 351 criticism of classificationprocedure by, 149
responsibility of EM for obtaining service from, 43 discontinuance of 156, 156n, 227
wartime expansion of QM, 353-54 expansion of, 219
inactivation of, 215
Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D., 319 organization of staff departments at, 220
Enlisted men redesignation of, as an ASFTC, 215, 229
145-68
classification of, shortage of trainees with mechanical skills at, 15 1
opposition of, to QM
construction program, 348 commercial opposition to Army, 340
reimbursement of, for unclaimed Army clothing, developments in OQMG organization responsible
351 for, during World War II, 341-42
use 349
of, distribution of responsibilities for, 342-45
Laundries, fixed OQMG-field relationships in reference to, 345-48
Army Regulations for, 340 peacetime arrangements for collection of charges
authorization of QM, 338 for, 350
cantonment, 339 problem of collecting charges for, 350, 351
construction program for, in 1940, 348 provision of, by laundry pools, 349-50
defense of QM, 340 responsibility of EM for, 43, 338
expansion of, 348-49, 354 Laundry and Surplus Property Branch, OQMG, 341
historical development of QM, 338-4 Lend-lease
labor problems at, 357, 358 for French forces, 30 1
number of before World War H, 338, 339, 348 Russian share of, 1 30
number of, in World War II, 353 shipments to United Kingdom, 130
opposition to construction of QM, 348 value of QM
supplies shipped under, 130
opposition to operation of, 340 Limited-service personnel
fxjst exchange council control of, 338 abolition of category, 158
priorities of service in, 355-56 accumulation of, in QMC, 159-60
prisoners of war 358, 359
in QM, induction of, 157
rates for EM 356-57
in, andOCS, 188
and use of commercial laundries at posts, 338 physical classification as, 156
Laundries, hospital policy on use overseas, 1 57
construction of, 343, 344 provisions of WD Circular 161 on, 158
priorities of service in, 356 provisions of WD Circular 293 on, 158
procurement of supplies and equipment for, 344 replacement of general-service men in ZI by, 158,
regulation of, 343 160
staff responsibility for, 344 revision of policy governing, 158-59
Laundries, mobile training of, at Camp Lee ASFTC, 232
deficiencies of equipment for, 354
development of unit for, in World War L 339 MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, 280, 388
in post-World War I period, 339 McNarney, Lt. Gen. Joseph T., 205
substitutes for, 355 McReynolds, Brig. Gen. Wilbur R., 143, 159, 172
Laundry Branch, OQMG Maintenance activities
development of specifications by, 341 accomplishment of, under commercial contract, 43
efforts to eliminate delays in laundry service, 35.9 efforts to centralize control of, 38
impact of functional reorganization on, 342, 343 lack of co-ordinated plan for, 38
location of, 341, 342 necessity for, 43
promotion of quality production by, 359 Maintenance Division, ASF
relations with the field, 345-48 conferences of, 6
relationships with Corps of Engineers, 343 establishment of, 38
respnansibilities of, 342, 344 evaluation of combined shops by, 52
statement of methods of laundry operation by, inspection reports of, on processing unserviceable
340-41 material, 58
table of laundry allowances by, 340 integration of maintenance activities by, 51
utilization of testing method by, 359-60 and problem of control reports, 62
Laundry operations proposal by, to train personnel in production-line
development of standardized, 340, 341 method, 63
efforts to improve quality of, 347, 348 respnansibilities of, 38
inspection of, 345-46 Marine Corps, 167, 174,370, 394
regulations governing, 359 Market Center Procurement Program, 110, 111
in relation to reclamation activities, 357 Market Center System, 66, 67
testing of, 359, 360 Marshall, Gen. George C, 285, 286, 396
Laundry service Master production schedules, 86, 1 23
authorization of contract system for, 351 Materials Division, WPB, 10
INDEX 423
struggle of, for divisional status, 366-69 number of, shipped overseas, 322
temporary divisional status of, 363 overseas purchase of, 322, 323
Menu planning, 66 purchase of, in United States, 319, 322, 322n
Mess operations requirements for, 313, 319
need for skilled personnel in, 67 use of pack, overseas, 322, 323
proposals for improving, 67 Munnikhuysen, Brig. Gen. Henry D. F., 142, 143, 144
training for, 67
Mid-West Motive Trades Institute, 155, 267 National Cemetery Regulations, 369, 370
Military occupational specialties (MOS's) 146, 147 National Defense Act of 1920, 139, 280
Military Personnel Division, SOS, 195 National Guard, 26, 40, 183, 213, 317, 370
Military Personnel and Training Division, OQMG National Livestock and Meat Board, 27
difficulties in establishing control over training, National Youth Administration
213-14 collaboration of, in use of salvage, 30
establishment of, 142 liquidation of, 45
functionsof, 142, 193, 2 13, 214 QMC use of equipment of, 45
424 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Naval Operations Training School, Bayonne, N. J., Officer Candidate School (OCS) — Continued
261 length of courses, 250, 251
Navy Department, 167, 370 mission of, 191, 249, 2?6
co-ordination of contract termination activities of number of graduates of, 276
WD and, 98-99 number of officers obtained from, 186
and Joint Termination Regulation, 93 qualifications for, 184, 186, 187, 188, 250
procurement and training of dogs for, 326 quotas, 184, 186, 187, 190, 250
andSWPA, 112 raising of standards in, 188
Navy Nurse Corps, 370 revision of training program
at, 250, 251, 254
number of, in QMC, 173 role of director of officer candidate training at, 254
officers for, 204 size of classes at, 250, 251, 254
problems of leadership in, 170, 205 special training platoons at, 256
type of, in QMC, 173 supply of candidates to, by Camp Lee QMRTC,
Negroes, EM 155
comparison of, in QMC with other arms and serv- training techniques, 250, 255
ices, 168 transfer of, to Camp Lee, 219, 250
under Physical Profile Plan, 163
distribution of, use of platoon organization at, 255
large percentage of, in lower AGCT grades, 168 Officer candidates
OQMG protsst over allotment of, 171 assignment as instructors, 187
percentage of, in QMC, 168, 170, 171 Negro, 206
QM problems in training of, 169-73 percentages of failures among, 188
at QMRTC's, 220-21, 228 shortageof, early in 1944, 190
revised policy in distribution of, 171, 1 72 surplus of, in November 1943, 189, 191
shortage of leadership qualifications among, 1 69 training of, 212
shortage of occupational skills among, 169 Officer Procurement Service, 195
utilization of, in QMC, 172 Officers. See also Classification, officers; Replacement
Negroes, Negro.
officers. See Officers, pools.
Normoyle Motor Transport School, 265 commissioning of civilians as, 175, 176, 182, 192-97
comparison of problem of procuring, in World War
Office of Price Administration (OPA) I and World War II, 175
price control of funeral services, 383 competition with Navy in commissioning civilians
price control of salvage materials, 1 1, 35 196
as,
personnel utilization survey of Memorial Branch Plans for Period I (Redeployment, Readjustment, and
by, 364 Demobilization), 79
plan of, for organization of Memorial Division, Plant Protection Branch, 326 OQMG,
368-69 Policy Study 34, 367, 367n, 368, 392-94
proposals of, for procedural changes in Memorial Pomona, Calif, 315
Branch, 368 Pools. See Replacement pools.
survey by, of use of GFM, 105 Preactivation training plan
Organized Reserve, 370 adoption of, 230, 303, 310
use of, in training QM units in emergency period, OQMG opposition to delegating authority to field
294 for, 14, 15,32-33
Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) QMC responsibility for, 5-6, 7, 8, 12
allotments to QMC
from other branches of, 1 80 responsibility of civilian agencies for, 9-1
for woolen and worsted industry, 84, 88, 101, 102 Swift Creek Recreation Area, 254
inclusion in, of repaired materiel returned to stock, problem of GFE in, 107-10
62 problem of GFM
in, 94, 105, 107
and relation to V-E Day, 83 in subsistence contracts, 110-12
use of, in place of Special Army Supply Program, Texas National Guard, 56th Brigade, 3 7 1
Theater graves registration activities Continued — Training Branch, OQMG. See also Military Training
supervision of, by Chief of Staff, 366 Division, OQMG.
Theater graves registration service divisional status for, 214
development of, during World War I, 362 establishment of, 142, 213
responsibility of theater commander 362
for, SOS, 214, 215
in relation to
TQMG's formulation of policies for, 362-63 Training Division, SOS, 214, 215
Towmeter Co., 77 Transportation Corps
Training, basic military. See also Training, enlisted comparative Negro strength in, and QMC, 168
men. establishment of, 141
changes in, 234-36 proportion of civilian-type jobs in, 147
early programs of, 234 proportion of military-type jobs in, 146
factors handicapping development of programs for, proportion of Negro officers in, 203
235 relative size of, 1 39
standardization of, 229 transfer of QM port battalion and port headquar-
tests, 236-37 ters units to, 283
Training, enlisted men. See also Army Service Forces transfer of QMC officers and enlisted men to, 141
training centers; Camp Lee ASF Training Cen- Transportation Division, OQMG,
141
basic, 211, 212, 222, 223, 224 1943, 171, 172, 191,205
complexities of, in World War H, 208 use in requirement and replacement rate tables,
conflict within OQMG over responsibility for, 147
213-14 Troop Leadership School, 233
early lack of funds for facilities for, 306 Troop units, QMC
effect of motorization of Army upon, 208-09 distribution of trainees to, 147
increase in, 139
formulation of general policies for, 209, 214
plans for early activation of, 141
of Grade V, 165-67
lack of equipment for, 210
QM petroleum laboratories, 153
requisitioning trainees for, 147
lack of instructors for, 210
methods of, 209-10 Truck Regiment, 475th 157 QM,
OQMG organization for supervising, 213 Truman Committee, 69
Tutuila Military Cemetery, 395
problem of illiterates and non-English-speaking
personnel, 165-67
QM responsibility for, 209
Unit training. See also Preactivation training plan.
technical, 211,212, 222, 223, 224, 225
tendency to discount need for tactical, 306, 307
AAF responsibility for, of QM
aviation units, 288
amelioration of difficulties of, 296
in units, 212-13, 218
at Camp Lee QMRTC, 229, 288, 292
in World War L 217-18 AGF and SOS
conflicting responsibility of for,
Training, officers. See also Officer Candidate School; 289-90
Courses. corps area control of, 288
at depots, 272-76 early responsibility of GHQfor, 287, 288
lack of field, 182-83 effect of delegating responsibility for, to other
in motor vehicle maintenance, 267, 268 branches of Army, 307-08
as QM specialists, 175, 276 effects of personnel turnover on, 295
Training, technical. See also Training, enlisted men. effects of preactivation training plan on, 303
cooks and mess sergeants, 242-43 factors contributing to improvement of, 296, 309-10
depot supply, 243-45 limited responsibility of TQMG for, 287, 288, 292,
handicaps to initial program of, 237 307
improvements in, 238 program, for 1939-40, 296
laundry specialists, 245 program, in 1942,297-98
for motor transport activities, 239-41 program, changes in 1942, 298
new courses 238in, program, in April 1943, 298
program redeployment period, 234
of, for program, September 1943, 302
in supply, 241-45 program,July 1944,303-04
tests, 245-46 program, revised May 1945, 304-05
Trainingaids, 209-10, 226 program, seventeen-week, 302, 303
432 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
—
Unit training Continued University of Tulsa, 269
program, sixteen-week consolidated, 297 Unserviceable property, disposition of. See also Sal-
program, special twenty-six week, 302-03 vage activities.
provision for advanced, 298 Army Regulations governing, 1
efforts to increase mobility of, 281, 283 Volunteer Officer Candidate Plan, 187
emergence of company as basic T/O, 281-82 Volunteers
impact of World War II on reorganization of, 281 limited number of, for QMC, 145
inspection of training progress of, 309-10 preference of, for Navy, Marine Corps, and AAF,
intensification of field training in 1943 of, 302 167
modernized versions of World War I prototypes of,
War Production Board (WPB)— Continued Warden, Brig. Gen. John A., 149
and civilian scrap drive, 10, 27, 28 Warren, Senator Francis E., 219
and development of work-stoppage points, 88 Washington Depot, 343, 377
impact of controls of, on salvage program, 35 Wolfe, Col. Lloyd R., 143, 248
transfer of Bureau of Industrial Conservation to, 9 Women's Army Corps, 259, 370
War Department co-ordination u'ith salvage sec- Work Projects Administration, 45
tions of, 7, 10 Work-stoppage points, 87-88