the robber barons of the late nineteenth century from ever emerging again. When freemarkets were transposed onto developing world economies, however, the merging of theory and implementation produced a series of cataclysmic outcomes that would gripcertain countries in a dire cycle of inequality, conflict, and poverty. A strong regulatoryframework was conspicuously absent, while a disparity between the speed of deregulation and privatization ± ³creative destruction´ ± on the one hand, and the erectionof regulatory institutions, on the other, created a window of opportunity for self-interested elites to plunder the state resources and emerge as the twentieth-centuryoligarchs.
iedman and EOI
Friedman¶s position on the role of government in market economies naturally precedes the idea of free trade and EOI as embraced by the Washington Consensus.Friedman places his argument for ³politically unfettered market coordination,´ as JamesC. Scott succinctly describes it, in the context of his benevolent critique of authoritarianism and all forms of freedom-repressing polities whose desired ends fail to justify their undesirable means. If societies of competing and disparate actors cannotreach a productive level of conformity without having to suppress or omit the voices of the few, his argument goes, then no form of political control is as acceptable as theultimate vehicle of proportional representation: the free market. In a free market, one¶scapital (i.e.: money, land, skills and knowledge, networks, motivation, etc.), as opposedto one¶s voice in an inherently flawed political system that imposes misrepresentativerestrictions on individual aspirations, becomes the ultimate determinant of one¶s power insociety. The Rousseauian threat of a corrupt, nepotistic, and exclusionary polity is