Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SSC 171
Prof. Ippel
Table of Contents
Introduction 3
Legal discussion 7
Social consequences 11
Conclusion 15
References 16
Islamic Shari’a courts in the Netherlands 3
Introduction
‘In the West, the idea of Shari’a calls up all the darkest images of Islam... It has reached the
extent that many Muslim intellectuals do not dare even to refer to the concept for fear of
frightening people or arousing suspicion of all their work by the mere mention of the word.’
This quote rings true to everyone who has seen the coarsening of the Islam debate and the rise
of the PVV in the Netherlands. The very word Shari’a and especially the mention of its
introduction in the Netherlands inspire us with fear; a fear that may prevent it from being
rationally analysed. In this paper, we set out to do just that. We will try to provide an insight
in Shari’a family law, its application and the possibility of establishing so-called Shari’a
family courts.
To do that, we will first look at the nature of Shari’a family law. What is its character and
what are its practices? We will then give a brief case study of two Western countries that have
already implemented Shari’a in some form, to examine the effects. With that done, we set out
to look at the legal ramifications of Shari’a family law and the place it can occupy in the
Dutch legal system. And finally, we will analyse the social consequences and desirability of
We hope that through this paper, we may contribute to a more thorough insight into Shari’a
and religious law in general and a better assessment of its viability in the Netherlands.
Islamic Shari’a courts in the Netherlands 4
Before we are able to discuss the merits of Shari’a family law in any way, we must
first establish what it is. In this first chapter, we will give a brief historic overview of Shari’a
and its main characteristics, after which we will focus on the different aspects of family law
Shari’a, meaning ‘the path to follow’ (Walsh & Hemmens, 2008, p. 339), is best
described as Islamic divine law. It is a legal system based on the holy book of Islam, the
Qur’an, and thereby directly on the will of Allah. This makes it, according to Walsh &
Hemmens (2008), ‘unchangeable and binding to all people’ (p.340). ‘The Qur’an functions as
a constitution, laying out general principles that must be interpreted and applied to a variety of
specific cases’ (p. 339). In the subsequent centuries, Islamic legal scholars have developed a
detailed legal code based on this constitution, which they have come to call ‘the path’
(Shari’a). It must be noted that different legal schools have emerged within Shari’a, and that it
may be impossible to speak of the Shari’a as a uniform system (Hallaq, 2005). However, for
the purposes of this paper they are still alike enough to be treated roughly the same.
With regard to Shari’a family law, we can define a number of practices and characteristics
always has the right to pronounce a divorce when he so wishes. His wife, to obtain a
divorce, must be able to demonstrate some kind of defect in the marriage, often of a
sexual or procedural nature (Hughes, 1886). Her discontent with the marriage is
• A woman may not marry those of other faiths; a man may marry other ‘women of the
We see that in general, Shari’a often has different provisions for men and women, with
women arguably often drawing the short side of the straw. This stems from the society in
which Islam originated; the tribal law system that it replaced barely gave women any rights
and treated them mainly as commodities. The Qu’ran and Sunna, the word of the prophet,
gave them a legal personality and substantive enforceable rights that were quite a revolution
It is, therefore, too simple to suggest that Islam is designed to oppress women – one
could argue that early Islam was in fact a movement to liberate women. However, modern-
day Shari’a is still based on that very same system, and a relative improvement from a
situation in which women have no rights at all just does not cut it anymore in a Western
society that has undergone several feminist revolutions. One could say that the focus of Islam
has shifted from its early days as a progressive system to a conservative system; whereas it
started as a system of revolution, it is now a system that (in general) clings to its initial values
and is reluctant to evolve. As a poignant example, many Egyptian men use the word
Shari’a law does not exist in many Western countries. In Canada however, in 2003 the
Islamic Institute of Civil Justice “would start offering arbitration in family disputes in
accordance with both Islamic legal principles and Ontario’s Arbitration Act” (Korteweg,
2006). This was to accommodate the 400,000 Muslims living in Ontario. This IICJ became
controversial, for even though Shari’a-based arbitration was already possible (Korteweg,
2006), many felt that such a court would undermine Canadian law. After two years, the
province’s premier at that time, McQuinty, did not allow for the courts to establish.
Furthermore, he banished other faith-based tribunals because of this discussion, leading even
to an amendment in the Arbitration Act: Since February 2006, family arbitration is only
allowed if based on Ontario or Canadian law, thus leaving out all religious arbitration
(Korteweg, 2006).
The one country where Shari’a law does exist in some form is England. There,
different Shari’a courts are active. There are ‘unofficial’ courts, such as the Islamic Shari’a
Council, which help mediating and advising Muslims (Atasheen, Namazie & Waters, 2010,
p.10), but are not binding in their judgments. And there is the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal
(Bakker et al., 2010, p. 31). This is a tribunal which falls under the Arbitration Act of 1996. In
short, this means that the judgments of these tribunals are binding by law, providing that the
parties involved have consented to the power of the tribunal beforehand. Therefore, the major
difference between such a court and other councils is that in the ‘MAT’ the court’s judgment
is binding by English law, as it were a civil court case (Atasheen, Namazie & Waters, 2010,
p.9 ). In other councils or courts however, the judgment is not binding by English law, which
The thing that both these countries have in common is that they both have a law called
the Arbitration Act. In these laws is defined how arbitration tribunals can be set up, and what
the requirements for such tribunals and their judgments are. This illustrates that should
Shari’a courts be installed in the Netherlands, a law such as these Arbitration Acts should be
Legal discussion
Due to its arguably discriminatory character, Shari’a law has an inherent tension with
one of the main foundations of our legal system: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Two articles from that declaration are mainly relevant to this study. The first one is art. 16(1):
“Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or
religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal
This article is clear and unambiguous, and the level of clash with Shari’a is high. Firstly, it
does not allow for discrimination in marriage on the basis of religion. The fact that Muslim
women may only marry Muslim men, and men may only marry women of the book,
represents the direct opposite of that idea. Then there is the fact that the article entitles men
and women to ‘equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.’ This rules
out the practices of Talaq, polygamy without polyandry, and basically all other forms of
gender inequality within family law that are legitimized by Shari’a. All in all, this article
makes the outlook of Shari’a in any country that subscribes to the Universal Declaration very
grim.
However, there may be some hope in the other relevant article, article 18:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in
Islamic Shari’a courts in the Netherlands 8
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
This article recognises the freedom of religion, which would generally be the main argument
in favour of having Shari’a. If the freedom to practice a religion is regarded as a human right,
then the Shari’a as a provision to safeguard that freedom must not be obstructed. However,
this article’s somewhat vague wording makes its interpretation difficult. It obviously chooses
a very individual perspective, recognising religion as an individual choice and not reasoning
from a group perspective. It does not necessarily provide a right to apply your religious
perspective to others, especially not if that infringes upon their human right not to be
discriminated against.
But that individual perspective can also be used to justify Shari’a, if we choose the
individual perspective of the woman. If it is also the woman’s religious belief that she has
different rights from a man, and if she consents to being discriminated against, is that still
This boils down to a very fundamental question of legal philosophy: if I have a right,
can I choose to contract out of that right? Or is my right, being a human right, so inalienable
Berger (2010) distils two basic views on this question in relation to Dutch Shari’a. On
the one hand, he argues, there is the perspective of personal autonomy and freedom. An adult
can make his own choices regarding his or her lifestyle and is free to consent to almost
anything; the only boundary is that of criminal law. The other view holds that a government
has the responsibility to protect the weaker members of society, and that being both women
and Muslims, ‘Muslim women (…) are in a doubly vulnerable position’ (p.60). Due to their
inferior legal position they cannot always obtain justice within Shari’a, even if they do want
it. There is also the question of whether or not the choice to go to a religious court is actually
Islamic Shari’a courts in the Netherlands 9
a real choice that can be made in perfect autonomy; if these courts exist, social pressure on the
woman to go to them may be so high that the choice not to do it is effectively no longer an
option. In particular, a study by Farrah Ahmed concluded that in systems where an option for
religious law exists “(i) many people do not enjoy a meaningful right to exit from the personal
laws because of community pressure to conform to the personal laws and (ii) the limited legal
power of individuals to choose the law that applies to them is enough neither to remove other
objections to the system nor to support the claim that the system enhances personal
autonomy” (2010, p.239). Opponents would counter that people take into account the
opinions of their peers all the time and that the woman is still the one that finally makes the
choice.
We must also keep in mind that this dichotomy does not apply solely to Islam – it is a
dilemma that many religions deal with to some extent. Discrimination of women is a recurrent
characteristic in many religions: for an example we need to look no further than the recent
case of the Dutch reformed SGP party, which was tried for discrimination because it did not
allow women eligibility within the party (Zoethout, 2010). It is therefore interesting to
examine the way the Dutch system deals with other religions at the moment.
The Dutch system does not allow for arbitration in the way that the Canadian and
British systems do or did. However, it recognises so-called courts of dispute settlement for all
kinds of religious minorities, such as Catholics (‘diocesan courts’), Jews (‘Beth Din’) and
Protestants (‘church councils’) (Berger, 2010). This kind of dispute settlement does not exist
in an institutionalised form for Muslims. However, Bakker et al. found that 13 of the 15
imams they interviewed for their research into Shari’a in the Netherlands had engaged in
some form of ad-hoc dispute settlement at least once before (2010, p. 75)
The specific difference between arbitration and dispute settlement courts is that
dispute settlement is never legally binding. The choice to go to such a court is a voluntary
Islamic Shari’a courts in the Netherlands 10
choice for both parties, as is the choice to obey the verdict. Parties always retain the right to
go to a national court, and that national court retains its primacy over all matters of family
law. This primacy is also reflected in the fact that courts only recognise a marriage according
to Dutch law, and so a religious marriage does not in itself have any legal value (Berger,
2010).
institutionalised form of Shari’a family law in itself. If the state respects the freedom of
religion, then it may not deny one religion the provisions that other religions do receive – and
seeing as those other religions already have dispute settlement courts, so should the Muslims.
However, when it comes to the specific rules of Shari’a, it is also clear that they create tension
with the Dutch legal system. And seeing as the Dutch Supreme Court has just ruled that the
SGP had to allow and actively promote the eligibility of women (Zoethout 2010), we could
interpret this verdict as saying that religious discrimination is unlawful even with consent.
Therefore, these courts may turn out to be very much restrained in the extent to which they
can practice actual Shari’a, simply because the Dutch legal system retains its supremacy over
them and it would outlaw many common practices within the Shari’a. With such small legal
leeway, one can almost say that an establishment of Shari’a courts would be a symbolic
measure, as the practice of actual Shari’a is severely limited by Dutch and international law.
In 2006, there were approximately 837.000 Muslims in Holland, which is more or less
5 % of the entire population of the Netherlands. Thus, one could say they have, or should
have a large influence in contemporary society. To cater for the Dutch government, Bakker et
al conducted a research on what kind of arbitration or courts exist for these Muslims in
contemporary Dutch society. For this, they interviewed several Muslims and experts in this
field. Concluding, they stated that they did not found any evidence for Shari’a courts to exist
Islamic Shari’a courts in the Netherlands 11
in the Netherlands, and found out that most of the time when Muslims have a dispute, they
ask advice from many different persons such as: family, friends, imams or other members
from a Mosque. Sometimes an imam is asked to arbitrate on a dispute, although often only
advice is given. In other words, there exists some sort of mediation and arbitration, but no real
courts are established (Bakker et al., 2010, p. 71, 77, 107, 109).
A very interesting feat of this research was that “almost every one of the respondents
said that the Shari’a in the Netherlands is not exactly the same as the one in for example
Pakistan”. They rather try to live to the Shari’a law as best as possible, as long as it does not
undermine the law of the country they live in (Bakker et al., 2010, p. 109).
This is an important notion, because this would negate the main arguments against
such courts: If these courts are established in accordance with Dutch law, then no women
could be discriminated or minorities oppressed for our human rights clause in the constitution.
This can be done for example by using an expert in Dutch law in the courts, as they do in
Social consequences
Next to the question whether Shari’a family law courts would be possible in the
Netherlands in regard to the law, and whether Muslims would want this to happen, there is
another question of equal importance. Namely, what are the social arguments in favor and
The want
Even though there are no official Shari’a courts existing in the Netherlands right now,
would Dutch Muslims actually want such courts to be established? This is a difficult question
to answer, for we did not have enough time to conduct enough in-depth interviews to have a
Islamic Shari’a courts in the Netherlands 12
clear view of this, which is why we have to resort to examining other researches and
of the Shari’a in the Netherlands, with more or less the same arguments as portrayed in the
‘Benefits’ section. However, the majority did not found it necessary to do such a thing,
because as one stated “The mutual differences and disagreements between and within Muslim
societies [are] far too great to apply a uniform ‘Shari’a approach” (Bakker et al., 2010, p. 44).
Furthermore, there does not seem to be a desire or want for such Shari’a courts in the
Netherlands. Until now, “the issue of implementing Shari’a is hardly raised by Dutch
Muslims” (Berger, 2006, p. 181), something which is also emphasized by Bakker et al.
Benefits
All of the benefits such Shari’a courts would have come down to tackling the
problems existing in Muslim societies within Western countries. During the debate in Canada,
Korteweg stated that Muslim women will use Islamic arbitration in any case, with or without
these courts. Therefore, it is better to have them, because this arbitration would then be
acknowledged by the government, and the state can watch over these tribunals (Bakker et al.,
Furthermore, in some cases Muslims would greatly benefit because of these courts. An
example is that if an Islamic marriage is conducted in another country and the man and
woman move to the Netherlands, this marriage is not official by Dutch law. This would mean
that if one of them would decease, the other one would not inherit anything, for they were not
Another example Bakker et al see fit is the one from Yilmaz, who illustrates the so-
called ‘Limping marriages’. He states that in England there are Muslim men who divorce their
wives under English law, but refuse to divorce them under Islamic law. This could be a grave
Islamic Shari’a courts in the Netherlands 13
problem for the women involved. Hence, he says that official courts as those in England are
for the better, because the government can keep these Islamic courts in line, and then their
judgments are in accordance with English law (Bakker et al., 2010, p. 32-33).
Harms
According to some, these courts would only be bad for the Muslims involved and
society in general. To answer to the courts in England and Canada, anti Shari’a law
movements have manifested. A good example is the ‘One Law for All’ institution, which
promotes the ‘No Shari’a Campaign’. According to their website (One Law for All) they want
to end the use of Shari’a and other religious laws in England, because it is discriminatory, it is
unfair, unjust and does not promote minority rights, nor does it promote social cohesion.
These claims are not well founded, but they cannot easily be refuted either.
There are indeed parts of Shari’a law and even Shari’a family law which are seen as
condescending or discriminating towards women. An example is the fact that men can marry
women from other religions but women can only marry Muslim men.
However, it is not clear what the effects of the MAT are in England on the Muslims
involved and the English society. Whether they are promoting the discrimination of women or
the social disintegration of Muslims in general (for they would have different laws) is not
known. Therefore, the claims brought forward by those against Shari’a family courts cannot
be proved on the basis of existing empirical research. It is of course possible to take a look at
the Shari’a as a whole, but in such courts the law used would only be certain or amended parts
Should Shari’a family courts be established, they will definitely be met with distrust
and it would be a controversial subject in contemporary Dutch society. The chief cause of this
is the rise of anti Muslim parties. Good examples of politicians are Pim Fortuyn and, more
Islamic Shari’a courts in the Netherlands 14
recently, Geert Wilders. His party, the ‘Party of Freedom’ is firmly against the Islam, because
he believes that it is a “violent totalitarian ideology” (Wilders, 2010, p. 13). The great rise of
this party in the latest elections illustrates that a significant part of the citizens of the
Besides the rise of the Party of Freedom one cannot find great anti-Islamic institutions
or parties in the Netherlands. Even extreme right wing parties, which are often affiliated with
such opinions, are not represented in Dutch politics anymore. Furthermore, in the Netherlands
Conclusion
It is apparent that no real Islamic arbitration courts exist in contemporary Dutch society. And
until now, the Dutch Muslims have not raised the question to establish these courts, indicating
that there is no need for them. However, should Muslims try to establish these courts in the
future, following in the footsteps of other religions, it will certainly be a long and hard road.
The position of women in Shari’a is precarious and generally inferior to that of men. The
discriminatory character of Shari’a towards women creates tension with human rights law,
and raises the question of whether or not rights can be given up if one chooses to. A question
which the Dutch legal system, unlike the British system before it, appears to answer with ‘no’
justifies the practice of Shari’a law; however, it is questionable whether or not social pressure
erodes this notion of autonomy. Furthermore, social resistance may be very high.
The road will undoubtedly be filled with obstacles and it remains to be seen whether or not
References
of Law, Policy and the Family, 24(2), 222-244. Retrieved from Oxford Journals
Database.
Atasheen, Y., Namazie, M. & Waters, A. (2010). Shari’a law in Britain. A threat to one law
for all & equal rights. London: One Law for All.
Bakker, L., Gehring, A., Mourik, K., Claessen, M. Harmsen, C. & Harmsen, E. (2010).
Berger, M. (2006). Shari’a Law in Canada – Also possible in the Netherlands? In Grinten, P.
& Heukels, T. (Eds.), Crossing Borders, Essays in European and Private International
Law, Nationality Law and Islamic Law in Honour of Frans van der Velden (173-183).
Hallaq, W. B. (2005). The origins and evolution of Islamic law. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Hughes, T. P. (1886). Divorce (Talaq): Excerpt from “Dictionary of Islam”. Retrieved from
http://muslim-canada.org/divorce.pdf
Korteweg, A. (2006). The Shari’a debate in Ontario. ISIM Review, 18, 50-51.
Luyendijk, J. (2001). Een tipje van de sluier: Islam voor beginners. Amsterdam: Podium b.v.
Uitgeverij.
Ramadan, T. (2005). Western Muslims & The future of Islam. London: Oxford University
Press.
Islamic Shari’a courts in the Netherlands 17
Rehman, J. (2007). The Shari’a, Islamic family laws and international human rights law:
Law, Policy and the Family, 21(1), 108-127. Retrieved from Oxford Journals
Database.
Unkown. (n.d.) One Law for All. Campaign against Shari’a Law in Britain. Declaration.
Walsh, A. & Hemmens, C. (2008).Law, justice and society: A sociolegal introduction. New
Wilders, G. (2010). Party of Freedom party program: De agenda van hoop en optimisme. Een
http://www.pvv.nl/images/stories/Webversie_VerkiezingsProgrammaPVV.pdf
Zoethout, C. (2010). Is het laatste woord aan de staat of toch misschien aan de SGP?.