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    Regulating Minority Parties in Central and Southeastern Europe, Benjamin Reilly and Per Nordlund, Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies: Regulation, Engineering and Democratic Development. Tokyo: UNU Press, 2008, 95-125.

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    Regulating Minority Parties in Central and Southeastern Europe, Benjamin Reilly and Per Nordlund, Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies: Regulation, Engineering and Democratic Development. Tokyo: UNU Press, 2008, 95-125.

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    172 views18 pages

    Florian Bieber, Regulating Minority Parties in Central and Southeastern Europe

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    Florian Bieber
    Regulating Minority Parties in Central and Southeastern Europe, Benjamin Reilly and Per Nordlund, Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies: Regulation, Engineering and Democratic Development. Tokyo: UNU Press, 2008, 95-125.

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    Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies: Regulation, Engineering and Democratic Development Edited by Benjamin Reilly and Per Nordlund a University Press TOKYO NEW YORE: PAR © Centre for Democratic Institutions (CDI), International Institute for Democ- facy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), and United Nations Universi (UNU), ‘The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not nec- essarily reflect the views of the Centre for Demoeratic Institutions (CDI), Inter- national Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), o United Nations University (UNU). United Nations University Press United Nations University, $3-70, Jingumae S.chome, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 150-8925, Japan ‘Tels $81-3-3499-2811 Fax: 481-3-3406-7345 E-mail sales@hqunuedu general enquiries: press@hq.unu.edu hupifiwwwcunu.edu United Nations University Office at the United Nations, New York 2 United Nations Plaza, Room DC2-2062, New York, NY 10017, USA ‘el: +1-212-963-6387 Fax: +1-212-371-9454 ‘mail: unuona@ony-unu.edu United Nations University Press is the publishing division of the United Nations University. Cover design by Mea Rheo Cover photograph by Jocelyn Carlin/Panos Pictures Printed in Hong Kong ISBN 978.92-808-1157-5 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Pottical partes in confci-prone societies: regulation, engineering and democrate development died by Benjamit Rell and Per Nordlund. pm Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-9280611375 (pbk) I, Political partiesDeveloping countries, I. Reilly, Ben. Ut. Nordlund, Per. Fat reees "2008 maa 20n7e4—dea? 200802390 Contents Figures and tables . Contributors... Acknowledgements Part I: Introduction .. 1 Introduction Benjamin Reilly 2 Party regulation and constitutionalization: A comparative overview ... Ingrid van Biezen 3 Comparative strategies of political party regulation ‘Maithijs Bogaards Part Il: Regional experiences 4 Political engineering and party regulation in Southeast Asia ‘Allen Hicken 5 Regulating minority parties in Central and South-Eastern Europe .. Florian Bieber 6 Cs) 95 94 46 ”. *. ALLEN HICKEN, 2 Josh A. Tucker and Ted Brader. “The Emergence of Mass Partisanship in 11996", American Journal of Political Science, 45()): Geddes and Front “The Effect of Dctatorsips on Party Systems in Lat Lupa and Stokes, “Democracy Interrupted Roussins, “Electoral Coordination in New Democracies": Tait, “The Development of Stable Party Suppor: Lindberg, Democracy and Elections n Africa; Mainwaring and “Historical Sequences and the Stabzation of Interparty Competition na Kristin Birnie, Eticity and Electoral Poizs (New York: Cambridge Univer. ‘ity Press, 2007), Mainwaring and Zoco,“Histrical Sequences and the Stabilization of Inerparty Com petition’: owen M. Colomer, Poca! Insitutions: Democracy and Social Choice (New “America” York: Oxiord University Prost, 2001); Paul Hutcheroft and Joel Roeamera, “Strong Demands snd Weak Insitutions: The Origins and Evolution ofthe Democratic Deficit 2. s. 4 some function ofthe distance between the voter's Weal point and what she perceives as 3 ptys psion, proportional rules should proce stronger voter-party links, cause (a) PR tends to produce paris that have distinet policy postions and (b) the sistance between votes and the nearest party i closet under PR compared with major See Alien Hicken, “Parl Fabrication: Constitutional Reform and the Rise of Thal Rak “Thai”, Journal of East Asian Stier, (3, 2006 381-408. “The law puting the sytem int elect did aot come into effect uni the 199% election. “These reforms ako reduced political fragmentation (Reilly, Democracy and Diversity). See alo Stephen Sherlock, "Consolidation and Change: The Indonesian Parliament Afler the 2004 Elections", Cenire for Democratic Institutions, Canberra, 2004, avai ble at Finally, the need to accommodate minorities shaped policies towards E “Gninority parties. This accommodation might be based on the recognition F that minority inclusion is necessary for state stability, as was the case in f Macedonia {rom 1990 when Albanian parties began participating in gov- émment.'? Minority accommodation has also been a tool to pursue F Kinstae policies. Thus, Hungary's far-reaching cultural autonomy and widely viewed as a policy 10 after the violent overthrow. of the Ceausescu regime in late 1989, the predominantly Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms in Bulgari hhad its roots in the dissident Turkish National Liberation Movement dat: ing back to 1986, and the Greek party Omonia emerged in Albania as a hhuman rights organization in early 1990, before the communist regime collapsed.* As a result of the early emergence of minority partes, elec toral systems and institutional design in the immediate post-communis period were confronted with existing minority parties, which constrained 2 the extent to which the political system could be shaped by the new. institutions. Minority-majorty relations had different degrees of importance acrois post-communist Europe. In more homogeneous countries where inte ethnic tensions had been low, institutional design was shaped by other! cleavages and controversies. inter-ethnic relations, however, were hi ‘on the agenda in a number of post-communist countries that had wit nessed a rise in ethnic tensions in the last years of communism or imme diately after its fall. Examples of such tensions range from Russian, ‘minority opposition to Latvian and Estonian independence, to the violent clashes between Romanian miners and Hungarian protesters in Tét ‘Mures in March 1990, to the rising violence in Croatia in the summer of 1990. Because minorities were largely perceived either as a security: threat (by majorities and states) or as a human rights issue (by intern tional organizations), electoral systems and the political represeatation: df minorities were not the primary focus of attention to minority issues Confronted with the multiple challenges of transition, from economic to social and political, the establishment of a new institutional framework: = including revised electoral arrangements - took priority. All countries: of Central and South-Eastern Europe held elections within a few months of the fall of communism. Thus, by late 1990, all countries (with the ex: ‘ception of Albania) had held their first multi-party elections. ‘Minority-specific measures in the party and electoral systems of th ‘countries were shaped by three at times contradictory dynamics: (2) path dependency from the communist experience: (b) majority assertion ovet, the state; and (c) emerging efforts at the accommodation of minorities. ‘The legacy of minority policies under communism is apparent whet contrasting the post-Yugoslay space with other countries in Soult. Eastem Europe. All the countries of former Yugoslavia instituted forma ‘or informal mechanisms facilitating minority representation in parliti-g ‘ational pressure to seek accommodation and the implicit positive associ- ation between minority-fiendly policies and EU integration constituted a further reason for inclusive minority policies. In addition to minority-speciic considerations, electoral systems _ been shaped for a number of reasons that had litte to do with mino nonetheless had great potential impact on minority parties (Table ). In designing their electoral systems, most countries opted for pro- tional representation (PR), either with their first multi-party elections by later shifting from mixed or majoritarian systems to PR. Thus, by 007, only 3 out of 17 countries in Central and South-Eastern Europe {Nad a mixed clecorl system; ll other countries voted by PR. The 4B Table $2 Electoral systems in Central and Eastera Europe, 2007 “Threshold Electoral sysem __ Special minority representation Gercem) ‘Nania Miscbmenber 25 Proportion Bosnia-Herzegovina List PR_ House of Peoples (15) - reserved seats: 5 Bosniak, 5 30 Groat, Se Federation Lis PR Howse of Representatives (8) ~ reserved seas min. 30 Bosak, 4 Croat 4 Set, House of Peoples (38) = fesered seats 17 Croat, 17 Bosniak, 1 Se, 7 Other Republika Spska “List PR National Assembly (3) reserved sais: mis. 4 Croat 4 30 ‘Bost 4 Sot Counc of Peoples (28) ~ reserved Seat 8 Cron Bosak, 8 Serb 4 Other List PR na 49 List PR 8 reserved seats (out of 151): 1 Czech and Slovak, 1 5.0 Hungarian, 3 Sertian, {lain Bosniak, Albania, Montenegrin, Macedonian and Slovene, 1 Austan, Bulgarian, German, Polsh, Roms, Romanian, Rusa, Rustan Turkish, Uxranin, Vioh and Jewish minority Cech Republic Lis PR an so Estonia List FR ne So Biungary Mixedmenber na 50 proportion Kosovo LintR 20 reserved seat (ou of 12010 Serb 4 Roma/Ashkai : ‘Egyptian, 9 Bosniak, 2 Turkish and Goran Lawia List PR an so Uthania Parle ne 50 Macedonia Terre a 7 Montenegro Us PR 1 Teserved seats from Albanian electoral unit io = Pome > Hs FR Io tnestd (tl 46) : 30 Romania LPR 18 reseed sea reserved seat (ut f 99:1 cach Armenian, German, Turkish, Polak, alin Tora, Ucsian, * Mocedoen Ruhenan Grate serbia esp, Albin, Sina sn Chea ulgran Roma, Croat, Jewish " No theta (ta 250 so > o 2 reserved scat (ou of 0:1 Hungarian, 1 alan 40 Source: Authors coaplaon sor 106_FLORIAN BIEBER CENTRAL AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE _107 ‘organize themselves. Here, I shall examine restrictions on the minority parties in the form of (a) the exclusion of minorities from the political system through restrictive citizenship laws; (b) bans and other restrictive ‘measures directed against minorities; (c) gerrymandering; and (4) elee- *toral thresholds. “The most radical form of excluding minorities from politcal life is deny- ing minorities citizenship. Not only does this preciude the formation of minority partis, it also prevents minorities from voting for mainstream parties. This complete marginalization from political life has been a prominent feature for some minorities in Central and Eastern Europe. {Of course, the primary motivation of denying citizenship might not be “preventing political engagement, but nevertheless citizenship hurdles are Soften features of states reluctant to integrate (some) minorities. Restric- ‘tive citizenship laws are a feature of state dissolution: new states often > craft new citizenship laws to exclude some groups. The most prominent ‘examples across the region are the obstacles for Roma originally from “Slovakia in the Czech Republic to receiving Czech citizenship and for E21) Russiar-speakers in Latvia and Estonia," ‘When the Czech Republic split away from Slovakia in 1993, people -eriginally from Slovakia had to apply for citizenship, which affected ‘many if not most of the country’s Roma.'® The requirements included dministrative obstacles that appeared to target particularly Roma and, itl the revision of the law in 1996 and 1999 under pressure from the {Buropean Union and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in ‘Europe (OSCE), at first excluded many Roma from political life."” The ost significant and enduring form of political marginalization occurred ‘in Latvia and Estonia. After independence in 1991/1992, the republics established laws that restricted citizenship to persons who had lived, or [whose ancestors had lived, in the states prior to losing independence dur- “jig World War Il. As a consequence, most persons not belonging to ither of the titular nations (between one-third and over 40 per cent *25f the population in Estonia and Latvia, respectively) had to apply for izenship. The requirements, however, were so restrictive ~ including guage tests and annual quotas in Latvia ~ that few non-citizens were Efi cligible or able to obtain citizenship. $5 5)-Since the mid-1990s, consistent EU pressure, combined with an OSCE présence in the form of the High Commissioner on National Minorities prevalence of PR has had other explanations than minority inclusion, but has had a significant impact on minority representation. Conventional wisdom in much of the academic discussion on minority representation suggests that proportional systems tend to be superior to majoritarian systems, In fact, a great variety of electoral systems can ensure minority representation.'" The experience in Central and South-Eastern Europe suggests that PR, in combination with relatively high thresholds, might actually be a greater disadvantage to minorities than majoritarian sys-- = tems when minorities are geographically concentrated. In Albania, for example, the Greek minority party has been able to enter parliament. 34 only owing to the mixed electoral system; similarly, Albanian and Roma minority parties entered the Macedonian Sobranie through the single: member constituencies used until 1998.'? It appears that in the case of (#23 Macedonia the majoritarian electoral system in use from 1992 to 1998 in particular helped Roma representation owing to a high geographical Concentration of Roma in the Skopje neighbourhood of Suto. Orza (606 per cent in 2002).'? This effect is difficult to replicate elsewhere, 2 however, because Roma mostly lack such geographical concentration and electoral units to match it 2 By contrast, most of the largest minorities in the region are geographi- cally concentrated and have performed relatively well irrespective of the electoral system. In Serbia, for example, Hungarian, Albanian and

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