Question and Answer: Drug Cartels in2010.

Questions posed by Xu Jingjing ( Cloris Xu) Reporter for Life Week in Beijing

I received an e-mail request from a Chinese journalist who posted 9 questions about events in Mexico
during 2010, and I replied to her with a quick (unedited) response. The following questions (in bold)
were asked by Xu Jinjing
(Life Week, -­‐5/F, Building B, No.9 Xiaguang li Street, Chaoyang District, Beijing, China, 100016
M. P. : ++86 139 1199 7738
Tel : ++86 01 8468 1067
E-mail : cloris1113@gmail.com
Website : www.lifeweek.com.cn
1) Question from XU Jingjing :In 2010, the cartel wars in Mexico have produced
unprecedented levels of violence throughout the country. Did it mean the fight has
ungraded to a new level? Why did this happen?

The violence in Mexico has steadily increased in a logarithmic pattern, especially in the years
following 2004. But it is important
to remember that this bloodshed
is concentrated in specific regions
and States within Mexico.
Officially, more than 30,000 drug
executions have been recognized
during the 4 years of Felipe
Calderon’s Presidential term.
Some experts (for instance Walter
McKay in Mexico City) estimate that there were more than 35,000 executions during the past 4
years.

Nationally, the number of homicide deaths that are

directly linked to drug violence has grown from 1080
murders in 2001 to more than 11, 000 so far (late
December) in 2010 (source: Transborder Institute, Reforma,
Stratfor) according to the University of San Diego’s

Trans Border Institute (2010 Mid-Year Report on Drug

Violence in Mexico. Angelica Duran-Martinez, Gayle Hazard, and

Viridiana Rios).

Reforma (Mexico City Daily newspaper) and the

private research and intelligence firm Stratfor.

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Question and Answer: Drug Cartels in2010. Questions posed by Xu Jingjing ( Cloris Xu) Reporter for Life Week in Beijing

These homicide totals represent national data, but the violence is concentrated in specific
regions and cities of Mexico. For instance, Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua (opposite El Paso, Texas)
had an average of 7 murders daily during 2010 (more than 2,500 murders by mid of December).
Other cities and States in the northern frontier and the border Mexico shares with the United
States are soaked in blood and experience a disproportionate number of drug executions
(Tijuana in Baja California, most parts of Chihuahua State, Nuevo Laredo and Tamaulipas State
are also disproportionately high). Another region with an extremely high murder level is the
State of Sinaloa and its capital city of Culiacán. Over the past 3 to 4 years, violence has
dramatically exploded in other States such as Michoacán, Guerrero (Acapulco), and Nuevo
Leon (Monterrey) as new turf wars emerge. Areas with extremely high murder rates are the
regions where the drug cartels have long been established, or where cartels are fighting to the
death to grab or retain the “plaza” (this is the term indicating control of a region).
Why did the violence increase?
Violence has increased because of the failed strategy to fight a “war on drugs” initiated by the
Felipe Calderon government. The strategy of Felipe Calderon has not been well planned nor
consistently executed (WikiLeaks document the official United States concern and unease with
the Mexican government strategy). It appears that President Felipe Calderon believed it was
only necessary to “cut off the head of the snake” — that is, to eliminate or capture “leaders of
drug trafficking organizations”— but each time that the military or police “captured” or “killed”
a capo there were several new and more brutal pretenders to the throne who emerged to unleash
a bloodbath. These new “bosses” seem to have been more ruthless as they waged a war violence
to establish their dominion and control. And to complicate matters, there has been very little
evidence that Felipe Calderon directed his attack at all drug trafficking organizations with equal
zeal or force. He targeted specific cartels (for instance, La Familia de Michoacan and perhaps the
Beltran-Leyva faction of the Sinaloa cartel)— probably using information supplied by rival
cartels. His strategy has not targeted very powerful cartel leaders in the State of Sinaloa or among
“Los Zetas”, and President Calderon’s attacks against the their enemies has only served to
strengthen them.
Violence increased because of a failed government policy that allowed the most powerful drug
leaders to consolidate and expand their base, and the Calderon strategy resulted in a power
vacuum that generated internal fighting and chaos (small time hoodlums and street thugs are
killing each other).
This violence has been expanding to a boiling point because the Mexican government has
consistently failed to address the macro issues that create social inequality. There is little
evidence that the Calderon government has seriously addressed issues such as corruption in
government, failures in the justice system (the gamut from police, courts and prisons), a failure
to hold the army and justice system accountable for widespread abuses of rights, youth
unemployment and education underfunding1, unemployment and high levels of worker
migration, economic inequities related to trade imbalances, a growing gap between the rich and
poor and a commitment to dealing with drugs as a war instead of as a health issue.

1
More than 7 million young people are neither in school nor working — “los ninis”— and they are the cannon fodder and willing recruits into
the cartels.

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Question and Answer: Drug Cartels in2010. Questions posed by Xu Jingjing ( Cloris Xu) Reporter for Life Week in Beijing

2) Question from XU Jingjing: It seems one reason for the severe violent is the division
and conflict among the drug cartels which fight for domain. In the past 2010, what
are the most important fights among the cartels? Is there any change of respective
domain of drug cartels and their relation? How will the change influence the
government’s drug war in the future?
The business arrangements
and cooperation between
major Drug Trafficking
Organizations is constantly
shifting and subject to re-
arrangements. This has
always been the reality within
Mexico, and it was no
different during 2010. The
groups that “formed” and
“dissolved” during 2010 were
different, but the overall cycle
of how cartels work together
and feud with each other
follows a recurrent pattern.
The two most powerful Drug
Organizations in Mexico
during 2010 were the Sinaloa
Drug Trafficking
Organization (including the
faction led by Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman Loera and a faction led by Ismael “El Mayo”
Zambada) and the paramilitary Drug Trafficking Organization known as Los Zetas”. The
Sinaloa Drug Trafficking Organization is especially powerful in the West and center of Mexico,
and its main rival Los Zetas are powerful in the East.
There are other organizations sometimes align with the Sinaloa Cartel or with Los Zetas in
shifting and non-permanent deals— and other smaller organizations frequently shift alliances
and negotiate a degree cooperation with the two major drug trafficking organizations.
Two of the smaller organizations remain powerful because they have historically controlled the
plaza and routes in key smuggling regions: the Arellano Felix family historically controlled the
routes through Tijuana (Baja California) and continues to be influential (even though
weakened) and it appears to have made an accommodation arrangements with the bigger
organizations. The Carrillo Fuentes Drug Trafficking Organization headed by Vicente Carrillo F
(also known as the Juarez Cartel) has retained its historical control of the drug plaza in Ciudad
Juarez and its essential drugs routes leading directly into the United States. It has managed to
hold onto enough of its base to make it a real power, but has become entrenched and situated
primarily in Ciudad Juarez. In a sense, it has retreated to its essential core and has used its army
wisely to protect its turf. Two other Drug Trafficking Organizations are relatively small in the
scheme of things, but they have been especially violent and have their finger in a

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Question and Answer: Drug Cartels in2010. Questions posed by Xu Jingjing ( Cloris Xu) Reporter for Life Week in Beijing

disproportionate number of violent acts.. The remnants of the Beltran-Leyva Organization (now
called the South Sinaloa Cartel) has experienced infighting and bloody repercussions after the
death of its leader Arturo Beltran Leyva last Christmas, and it seems to have formed shifting
alliances with several of the other groups during 2010 depending on whomever seemed to be
gaining the upper hand in controlling the Beltran Leyva empire. Also, La Familia de Michoacan
is an atypical drug trafficking organization with a religious overtone, but it is also ruthless and
bloody; but La Familia has been under specific and intense attack by Felipe Calderon in the
State of Michoacan (Felipe Calderon’s sister is planning to run for governor of the State, and
Michoacan is Calderón home territory).
Additionally, there are smaller organizations and even isolated bands of thugs and hoodlums
that work with and for the bigger organizations. Some were previously more important as
regional powers, but they have been gradually weakened over the years and have been
dominated by the more powerful organizations (the Gulf Cartel is the best example).
The Mexican government strategy has consistently targeted the smaller cartels and
organizations, and it appears that the Mexican government may have weakened them: this is
probably what happened to the Gulf Cartel, the Tijuana (Arellano Felix) cartel, the Beltran-
Leyva organization, and La Familia de Michoacan drug group. Unfortunately, the only outcome
of government success was the removal of established leaders within several groups and the
unleashing of higher levels of violence as “lieutenants” fought amongst themselves to fill the
captured boss’s shoes. The government attacks on smaller organizations also unleashed an army
of killers for hire— “sicarios”— who shift allegiance from pay check to pay check.
There does NOT seem to be any indication that Felipe Calderon’s government has learned from
failures during four years of ineptitude in battling the cartels. Personally, I do not expect that the
Mexican government will change during 2011, and I am very sad to report that I expect the
Calderon government will continue to make the same mistakes.
3) Question from XU Jingjing: What are the most important achievements of the
administration of Mexican President Felipe Calderon in the drug war in 2010? How
do the achievements change the landscape of the drug war?
The Felipe Calderon government can claim success in eliminating and executing Arturo Beltran
Leyva in late December 2009, and in the capture and execution of several Beltran-Leyva
lieutenants and sub commanders during 2010. But, each of these publicly celebrated successes
also created direct and unanticipated consequences that unfortunately contributed to an
increase in violence during 2010.
Several leaders of La Familia de Michoacan were arrested and executed, but those “successes”
also generated and fomented a situation of instability in Michoacan. In the latter months of 2010,
several cities experienced blockades and shootouts that resulted in the loss of innocent life.
Actions targeting of Los Zetas in Nuevo Leon led to outbreaks of violence in Mexico’s third
largest city (Monterrey). Blockades by truckers (spurred on and financed by Los Zetas) closed
2
Monterrey and disrupted major shipping routes into the United States.

2
Monterrey is a major industrial city with direct highway routes into the United States through Nuevo Laredo. And more than 8,000 tractor
trailers move through Laredo and Nuevo each day

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Question and Answer: Drug Cartels in2010. Questions posed by Xu Jingjing ( Cloris Xu) Reporter for Life Week in Beijing

4) Question from XU Jingjing: What did President Calderon do to adjust his

administration and security organization in order to confront the escalated drug
war? How do you evaluate these measures? Did he use the experience of Colombia for
reference?
Felipe Calderon has come to depend much more on the Mexican Navy (Marines) than on the
army to carry out any major initiative against cartel jefes. His favoritism has generated an
unanticipated consequence of chaos and disorganization in managing resources and developing
policies to fight a drug war. The Mexican army and Mexican Navy view each other as rivals
instead of partners, and the competition between the two branches of the military is a “zero-sum
game”. When one element is successful, it is interpreted as a failure and shortcoming of the other
group. The army and navy are NOT working cooperatively in the drug war, and view the other
as rivals in a competition to gain the favour of the President.
I do not know if Felipe Calderon has consciously tried to follow the example of Colombia, but
he has done similar things to those that were done in Colombia — even though they may not be
relevant to Mexico.
The Mexican government is approaching the problem of drugs as a WAR and it is continuing to
believe that a WAR must be fought with equipment and arms. The Merida Initiative at its core
does little more than supply equipment, technology and arms to the military. And unfortunately,
there are parts of Mexico where the military continues to work hand in hand with the cartel
bosses and organizations.
Furthermore, the military is divided and engaged in an internal battle for influence (navy vs.
army) and the army does not have enough trained personnel capable of using the sophisticated
equipment to advantage. Army and other sources of intelligence are sadly deficient, and all of the
technology in the world will not overcome the lack of a basic plan of intelligence gathering. Most
army recruits are poor men from remote villages who can barely read or write, and they desert
(leave) the army in frighteningly large numbers (there are at least 140,000 army members who
are AWOL (missing) and their whereabouts (location) is unknown. Many of these men have
deserted to join the cartels, or they have simply become low level criminals earning a living
engaging in street crime.
There is also a bigger issue separating Colombia from Mexico, and Felipe Calderón does not
seem to have addressed it. In Colombia, the success in controlling the drug violence is most
likely a direct function of the break-up of large cartels into so-called “cartelitos” (little cartels).
Colombia was successful in doing this, and as a result has managed to keep a “lid” on levels of
violence because there is no one cartel that is more powerful than the military or the government.
In Mexico, this is NOT the case. There are at least two cartels that are more powerful, more well
equipped, more flush in money, possessing better intelligence, and managed and staffed by more
competent people than the Mexican government or its military. Calderon’s strategy of attacking
the smaller cartels seems to have only strengthened the bigger organizations and converted them
into an even more dangerous foe.

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Question and Answer: Drug Cartels in2010. Questions posed by Xu Jingjing ( Cloris Xu) Reporter for Life Week in Beijing

5) Question from XU Jingjing: Calderon took steps to shift the focus from using the
Mexican military as the primary tool to fight with the cartels to using the newly
reformed Federal Police. Why did he do so?
The answer to this is very simple! The Justice System is corrupt, inefficient and has always been
directly involved in the drug trade. The control of “turf” (plazas) has been distributed by high
level officials in Mexico City for at least 50 years. Several decades ago (beginning in the 1970’s),
the control of the drug war was taken away from military forces because it had been corrupted
and it was directly involved. Government support to battle drugs was then assigned to various
Justice institutions and organizations within the Procuraduria (PRG)3. The only thing that this
managed to accomplish was to change the location drug planning/corruption within the
government. When it became evident that the Justice organization (PGR) had also been
corrupted and was directly involved, the control was given back to the army.
It is estimated that the drug trade in Mexico has a value of between $30 and $50 billion annually.
This money, along with the powerful corrupting force of “plata o plomo”4 has made it almost
impossible to eliminate corruption from any social control organization created within Mexico.
6) Question from XU Jingjing: Some analysts say the government’s resources are
stretched to the limit. What is your observation? How much resource did the
Government dispose in the fight with drug cartels?
I don’t have data available to answer this question directly. But it seems obvious to me that the
army is stretched to the maximum, and cannot fulfill all of the responsibilities that have been
assigned to it. Within the Mexican cabinet and SEGOB (Secretaria de Gobernación), there has
been an open admission that parts of Mexico are not controlled by the government (wide swaths
of Tamaulipas in particular).
7) Question from XU Jingjing: President Calderón now seems willing to at least open a
debate about a radical change in drug policy: the legalization of marijuana. Soon
after taking office, in December of 2006, he had refused to even consider the idea.
But in August this year, he presided over a series of round-table gathering of
intellectuals, academics, and drug specialists and said merely that he was “taking
note of the debate that has been started here, regarding the regulation of drugs … I
think, first of all, that it must take place in the context of a democratic pluralism.”
How do you think about this change? Is the legalization of marijuana one of a good
approach to save the country? How and why? What does it mean for drug cartels if
the marijuana is legalized?
Felipe Calderon is NOT willing to engage in a discussion about legalization of marijuana! A
major policy paper prepared by three former presidents of Latin American countries (including
former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo) recommended the legalization of marijuana and also
called for alternative strategies including the legalization of several other drugs. Felipe Calderon
has rejected that report and spoke directly out against it.
When the issue was raised again last year, Felipe Calderon indicated that he might possibly listen

3
The specific organizational names and structures have changed several times over the years.
4
Silver or lead. Bribe or death.

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Question and Answer: Drug Cartels in2010. Questions posed by Xu Jingjing ( Cloris Xu) Reporter for Life Week in Beijing

to the arguments but that he would not participate in any discussion about legalization of
marijuana.
And more importantly, marijuana is only one of the drugs coming through Mexico. Marijuana is
important to the Sinaloa cartels because it provides stability and a constant source of income
that allows the organization to maintain a stable workforce. Mexico is also the major transport
route for cocaine, heroin and synthetic drugs. Most of the violence in the past few years has
actually been generated by the battles over drugs other than marijuana. In particular, Mexico has
become the “assembly” point for synthetic drugs that arrive from the far east as precursor
chemicals, and after it is cooked into powerful street drugs in central Mexico it is shipped along
the routes opened up by NAFTA and leading directly into the United States.
8) Question from XU Jingjing: Some analysts say Calderon is at a crossroads. The
increasing level of violence is seen as unacceptable by the public and unless all the
cartel groups can be decapitated and brought under control — something that is
highly unlikely given the government’s limitations — the only way to reduce the
violence is to restore the balance of power among the cartels. What is your opinion?
Where is the end of the drug war and severe violent?
When Felipe Calderon began his war on the drug cartels (2005) he sent the Mexican army to
Michoacan even though that State was not the heart and soul of Mexican drug trafficking. Most
analysts agree that he selected Michoacan for political reasons — not for strategic reasons. He
needed to demonstrate that he was a “legitimate president” after a controversial vote where he
defeated Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, AND because Michoacan was politically important to
the opposition leftist PRD.
Calderon’s strategy has never represented a coherent and systematic attack on cartels, and has
consistently sent troops all over the country in a reactive rather than proactive manner. His
attempt to chase down cartel big leaders has been a failure and has simply resulted in the
creation of more “cartelitos” (cartel + ito means little cartel). Any success has come at the
expense of the most poorly organized and least efficient organizations involved in drugs in
Mexico, and he has had relatively few major accomplishments against major cartels.
In fact, organizations such as Los Zetas have been very active in suggesting that Felipe Calderon
has specifically protected the Sinaloa Cartel (El Chapo Guzman, El Mayo Zambada) and their
“narcomantas” (narco posters) specifically make the claim the government and the PGR are
protecting El Chapo. Many Mexican analyists have examined the arrest statistics and can
demonstrate that the Sinaloa cartel have much fewer members arrested (even though it is the
largest).
And the Mexican government has not done very much to implement a major strategy (trace
money and money laundering trails).
Felipe Calderon has been at the crossroads since the first day of his presidency, and there is
nothing new about the dilemma he is now facing. He will continue to be at the crossfire in the
remaining two years of his presidency.
The violence will continue for many more years and I cannot foresee any end of it before 2105
or even later.

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Question and Answer: Drug Cartels in2010. Questions posed by Xu Jingjing ( Cloris Xu) Reporter for Life Week in Beijing

9) Question from XU Jingjing: President Calderon and his National Action Party face
the presidential election in 2012. So 2011 promises to be an interesting year indeed.
In your analysis, how will the subtle politics influence the drug war in 2011?
I am not a political scientist (I am a sociologist and criminologist). Felipe Calderon will be an
irrelevant force in the presidential campaign for 2012. The factions and candidates have already
emerged (governor of Mexico State for PRI) and Marcelo Ebrard/Andres Manuel Lopez
Obrador for the PRD. The PAN candidate will be severely handicapped by Felipe Calderon’s
failure, but a possible candidate might be the new governor of Sinaloa Mario Lopez Valdez (aka
Malova).
The Mexican people are reluctant “supporters” of Felipe Calderon because there is no other
alternative until the election happens.
There will be nothing subtle about the campaign for President in 2012. It will be a very nasty and
brutal campaign with many accusations of “connection to cartels”.

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