Hans-Georg Gadamer's "Correction" of Heidegger

Author(s): Walter Lammi

Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1991), pp. 487-507
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
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 Hans-GeorgGadamer's
"Correction"of Heidegger

WalterLammi

Among the remarkablerange of thinkersto have come under the

influenceof MartinHeidegger,the figureperhapsmost deservingto be
regardedas Heidegger'sproperand faithful "heir" has been Hans-Georg
Gadamer. Gadamer himselfhas alwaysbeen quick to acknowledgethe
intellectualdebt to his predecessor.Althoughthe two men were only
elevenyearsapart in age, theirrelationshipto all appearanceswas very
muchone ofmasterand pupil;neverdoes Gadamerseemto takeumbrage
at being describedas a "Heideggerian." I Indeed, he has characterized
himselfas a "studentofHeidegger"whohas "learnedthecraftofclassical
philology."2
However,Gadamer'sreference to theclassicsin thisconnectionraises
an interestingquestion.Gadamerhas also beenknownto say,quiteflatly,
"I am a Platonist."3How could thisbe possible?How could Gadamer
considerhimselfa "Heideggerian"and a "Platonist"at the same time?
At theleast,theexpression"HeideggerianPlatonist"is an oxymoronthat
mustreferto a strangesortof paradoxicalfigure.
We may add to thisthe puzzlingdifference simplyin the surfaceof
the two thinkers'work,in theirwritingstyles.AlthoughGadamer has
describedhisprojectin Truthand Method,hismagnumopus,as following
thelaterHeidegger'slineofinquiry,4 his straightforward discursiveprose
standsin markedcontrastto the laterHeidegger's"oracular" or quasi-
poeticruminations. Clearlylanguageplays a centralrole to both think-
ers-it is the "house of the truthof Being" to Heidegger,and according
to a celebratedformulationbyGadamer,"Languageis [thatkindof]being

1 See forexampleLeo Strauss'sdescriptionof Truthand Method(henceforth TM) as

themostimportantworkby a "Heideggerian"(CG 5).
2Jiirgen Habermas,Philosophical-Political
Profiles,tr.FrederickG. Lawrence(Cam-
bridge,1983), 190.
3 "Gadamer on Strauss:An Interview,"Interpretation, 12 (1984), 10.
4 "*Onthe Problemof Self-Understanding," in PhilosophicalHermeneutics,
tr. David
E. Linge (Berkeley,1976), 50.

487

Copyright 1991 by JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS, INC.

488 WalterLammi

which can be understood."5Consequently,this "surface"difference is

unlikelyto be superficial.
The difference has led commentators to posit that Gadamer is in a
sense domesticating Heidegger.JiirgenHabermasin a well-knownlau-
datio to Gadamer describesthe effectas "urbanizingthe Heideggerian
province."6In Habermas's view,the extremeradicalityof Heidegger's
thoughtcreatesa gulfbetweenhimselfand his readers,an isolationthat
calls fora "bridge" to renderhis insightsaccessible.Gadamer's great
achievement, then,has been to effecta kindof tamingthatnonetheless
succeeds in followingHeidegger"far enough to promotehis thought
productively and on a soundbasis."7
But giventhe centrality of languageto both thinkers,could such a
changein styletake place withoutdecisivelyaffecting substance?Could
notone argue,on thesamegroundson whichHabermaspraisesGadamer,
thatGadamer has on the contraryrenderedHeideggerfamiliarand ac-
ceptableat thecostoftrivializing histhought?8 As indicatedbythepoetic
stylisticdevelopmentof Heidegger'sown work afterBeing and Time,
the "divinemadness"of the philosophertranslatesratherpoorlyinto a
scholarlymedium.9
itwillbe arguedhere,Gadamer's"translation"
In reality, ofHeidegger
also offersa fundamental correctiveto Heidegger'sthought.The correc-
tiveis connected,in turn,to Gadamer's"Platonism"and to his embrace
ofthe"craftofclassicalphilology."To graspthenatureofthiscorrective,
it is necessaryto sort out the rathercomplicatedrelationshipbetween
Gadamerand Heidegger(boththe "early"Heideggerand the"late"). Of
specialimportanceare fourissues:(1) thelinkbetweenGadamerand the
early Heideggeron the questionof "truth";(2) the different postures
assumedbyGadamerand Heideggertowardphenomenology ("method");
(3) thespecialsignificance forGadamerofthelate-Heidegger essay,"The
Origin of the Work of Art"; and, most critically,(4) the two thinkers'
differenttreatments oftime,particularly in relationto (a) theimportance
of continuity versusdiscontinuity and (b) orientationtowardthe future
versusorientation towardthepast.At theend ofthisexplorationwe will
discoverthat Gadamer is indeed in a sense a Platonist,havingturned
froma Heideggerianto whatis arguablya morePlatonicunderstanding

5 Sein,das verstanden
werdenkann,istSprache,oftenbutsomewhatobscurelyrendered
as "Being thatcan be understoodis language."The sentenceis italicizedin the original
althoughnotin thetranslation (TM,432;WM,450).We willreturnto thisstatement below.
6 Habermas,Profiles,190.
7Ibid., 190-91.
8 RobertBernasconi offersthiscritiqueofGadamerin "BridgingtheAbyss:Heidegger
and Gadamer,"Researchin Phenomenology, 16 (1986), 4.
9 See StanleyRosen, Hermeneuticsas Politics(New York, 1987), 94: "Philological
in the face
sobrietyis a veryadmirablequality,but it pales intohistoricalinsignificance
of philosophicalmadness."
Gadamer's "Correction"
ofHeidegger 489

of reason,and of the relationbetweenreasonand experience,or reason

and revelation.

I. The Questionof Truth

It could be said thatthetitleof Gadamer'smagnumopus Truthand

Methodis a misnomerbecause thebook containsno theoryof truthand
is not about method.10 The failureof Truthand Methodto provideany
explicitlydevelopedtheoryof truth11 has been citedas a primeexample
of how Gadamer reststhe entireedificeof his thoughton appeals to
Heideggeriangrounds.12 Indeed,Gadamerdoes not hesitateto acknowl-
edge his debt to Heideggerin regardto his approachto the meaningof
"truth."
This debtinvolvesboththeearlyHeidegger,whoseworkculminated
in Beingand Time,and the laterHeideggerfollowingthe experienceof
the "turn,"or Kehre.It is of some interestin examiningtheinfluenceof
Heideggeron Gadamerto sortouttheeffects ofthetwo.Gadamerhimself
professes primary withthelaterHeidegger.He has described
identification
Truthand Methodas an attemptto express"withinthe hermeneutical
consciousnessitself' Heidegger'sline of inquiryfollowingthe Kehre;13
and, in contextof both "truth"and what we may tentatively termthe
"way" of hermeneutics, he makes particularreferenceto Heidegger's
groundbreaking essay,"The Originof the Workof Art."'14
However,it also the case thatthe conceptof truthin Gadamer's
is
philosophicalhermeneutics is basedon Heidegger'sradicalizationof"her-
meneutics,"l5 withhis conceptof the hermeneutical circlein Beingand

10
Althoughthisargumentis trueenoughas faras it goes, ultimately it lacks force
becauseit missesthepointof Truthand Method.Brieflyput,thatpointis to describehow
we findtruth,whichis notat all throughany"theoryoftruth."As for"method,"we will
see that while Gadamer's hermeneutical approach to truthis relevantto judging the
limitationsof any formalmethodof gainingknowledge,includingthe "scientific,"it is
itselfsimplydescriptiveas opposedto "methodological."
" "Gadamerhimselfseldommentionstruthdirectlyand nowhereformulates a coher-
ent characterizationof it in his own terms."Francis J. Ambrosio,"Dawn and Dusk:
Gadamerand Heideggeron Truth,"Man and World,19 (1986), 39. A listofcriticswho
havefastenedon thislacunain Truthand Methodis providedbyBriceR. Wachterhauser,
"Must We Be WhatWe Say?Gadameron Truthin theHumanSciences,"inHermeneutics
and ModernPhilosophy, ed. BriceR. Wachterhauser (Albany,1986),220 and n. 7, 238.
12
Bernasconi,"BridgingtheAbyss,"3.
13
Gadamer,"On the Problemof Self-Understanding," 50.
14 See Gadamer'sdescription of the deep impressionthisworkmade on Heidegger's
studentsin "Heidegger'sLaterPhilosophy(1960)," inPhilosophical Hermeneutics, 216-17.
15 Earlier"hermeneutics" referred usuallyto interpretation
oftheBible;but notuntil
Heideggerwas it universalized to referto theverystructureofhumanbeing-in-the-world.
See JosefBleicher,Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method,Philosophy and
Critique(London, 1980), 11-26.
490 WalterLammi

circleper se is limitedto theearlyHeidegger,

Time.16The hermeneutical
althoughtheconceptreappearsin alteredformin Heidegger'slaterthink-
ing. In fact,aftertheKehre Heideggerabandoneduse of the veryterm
"hermeneutics," an abandonmentthatGadamer considersto have been
a mistake. 17
The hermeneutical circlehad a fundamental rolein theearlyHeideg-
ger'sthought.In Beingand TimethecircledescribesDasein's privileged
access to Beingby wayofan intrinsic forestructure ofunderstanding. To
Heidegger the issue is not whether the circleis "vicious" but where and
how we enterintoit. That entry,Dasein's understanding of thetruth,is
alwaysa temporalevent.
In similarfashionthe hermeneutical circle is the basis for human
understanding in Gadamer's work. To Gadamer, as to Heidegger,under-
standingis an ontologically based modeofhumanbeingand notat all an
" 'act' of subjectivity." It is stillto be conceivedof dynamically"8-itis
alwaysan "event"-but thiseventcannotaccuratelybe characterizedas
a subject'sbecomingconsciousof somethingas an object.19Gadamer is
entirelyin agreementwithHeidegger'sanalysisof the forestructure of
understanding, whichhe calls the "readingof what is there."20But to
Gadamerthecircleis primarily or paradigmatically to be understoodas
the movement betweeninterpreter and text,in whichthe forestructure
consistsof the expectationsor "prejudices"withwhichthe interpreter
necessarily beginshis reading.21Thus in Gadamer'shermeneutical circle,
as in Heidegger's,everything standsunderanticipations so thattherecan
be no objectof understanding thatis simply"there. "22
In otherwordsthereis no pureperceptionor perfectobjectivity that
allows us to separateobjectsof knowledgefromacts of interpretation.
The mindsofreal peoplecan neverbe likenedto a "blankslate,"and the
anticipations thatcolorourperceptions areshapedbypersonalexperience.
Gadameradds thatwhilethegoal oftextualinterpretation is unquestion-
ablyto understand an author"in his sense,"theexpression"in his sense"

16
Hans-GeorgGadamer,"Text and Interpretation," and Modern
in Hermeneutics
Philosophy,378-79.
17 Ibid.,380.
18 See TheodoreKisiel,"The HappeningofTradition:The Hermeneutics ofGadamer
and Heidegger,"in Hermeneutics and Praxis,ed. RobertHollinger(NotreDame, 1985),
is an undergoing."
9: ". . . understanding
19See, for example,Hans-GeorgGadamer, "The PhilosophicFoundationsof the
TwentiethCentury,"PhilosophicalHermeneutics, 125.
20 TM, 239.
21
Roy J. Howard, ThreeFaces ofHermeneutics: An Introductionto CurrentTheories
of Understanding (Berkeley,1982), 147.
22
At issue,Gadamerpointsout,is the"astoundingnaiveteofthesubjectiveconscious-
ness,"whichapproachesa textwitha senseofcertainty here!"
that"thatis whatis written
("PhilosophicalFoundations,"121).
 ofHeidegger
Gadamer's "Correction" 491

is notto be takenas referringonlyto theauthor'sintentions as subjective

acts of meaning.23
Consideration ofsuchinfluenceshas led to thecriticismthatGadamer,
his protestations to the contrarynotwithstanding, is fundamentally an
"early Heideggerian."24 To buttressthis conclusion,one need merely
referback to the questionof how the two thinkersexpressthemselves.
Gadamer'sdiscursivestylebears muchcloserrelationto thespeculative
Heideggerof Beingand Time thanto the quasi-poeticHeideggerof the
workswrittenaftertheKehre.Furthermore, Gadamer'sviewof philoso-
phyas a "natural"humaninclination25 seemsto accordnotwiththelater
Heidegger's"end of philosophy"but withDasein's intrinsicdesirefor
understanding the truthof Beingin Beingand Time.26
The force thiscriticismis thatifin thesecrucialrespectsGadamer
of
is in factan "earlyHeideggerian,"it is hardto see how he avoidsfalling
into the same linguisticand conceptuallimitationsof the traditional
"metaphysics of presence"thatled Heideggerto whatGadamerhimself
has calledthe"dead-endstreet"27 ofBeingand Time.The earlyHeidegger
believedthatphilosophicalproblemsremainconstantdue to the "con-
stancyof human nature,"28and in his earlierworkshe attemptedto
provideanswersto thoseproblemsby way of scholarlyanalysis.Since
Beingand Timereflected bothoftheseassumptions, therewas no reason
to finishthebook iftheywerewrong.Heideggerbelievedthattheerrors
ofBeingand Timewerenotat all personalbutreflected thefundamental
failureofpost-Platonic Westernmetaphysics. This failure,summedup in
thephrase"metaphysics ofpresence,"consistsofviewingtruthnotas the
temporaloccurrenceof unconcealednessbut as the constantpresenceof
eternalobjects.29
23 Ibid.,121-22.BetweenHeidegger'shermeneutic circleand Gadamer'sadditionor
"radicalization"(122) is thedecisiveimpetusof the "universalization"fromHeidegger's
"The Originof theWorkof Art." See below,Part III, 11ff.
24
Bernasconi,"BridgingtheAbyss," 12.
25 Hans-GeorgGadamer, "On the Natural Inclinationof Human Beings Toward

Philosophy,"in Reason in theAge of Science,tr. FrederickG. Lawrence(Cambridge,

1984), 139-150.
26
Bernasconi,"BridgingtheAbyss," 12.
27 Hans-GeorgGadamer,"Heidegger'sPaths,"tr.C. Kayserand G. Stack,Philosophi-

cal Exchange2 (1979), 87.

28 Quoted fromthebeginning by Otto Poggelerin
of Heidegger'sHabilitationsschrift
MartinHeidegger'sPathofThinking, tr.Daniel Magurshakand SigmundBarber(Atlantic
Highlands,1987), 13.
29 Heidegger'scritiqueof the "metaphysics of presence"is clearlyexplainedin his
seminalessay"Plato's DoctrineofTruth,"tr.byJoanStambaughin W. Barrettand H. D.
Aiken(eds.), Philosophy in theTwentieth Century (New York, 1962),251-270.Gadamer's
agreement withthelaterHeidegger'semphasison temporality does notimplyendorsement
ofHeidegger'sPlatonicscholarship, whichhas beensubjectedto devastating criticismby
a numberof scholars.(See, forexample,William A. Galston, "Heidegger'sPlato: A
Critiqueof Plato's Doctrineof Truth,"The PhilosophicalForum,13 [1982], 371-84.The
492 WalterLammi

The transformation,and ultimateelimination,ofthequestionoftruth

in Heidegger'slaterwritingshas influencedGadamer in a different
and
moresubtledirection.Thiswillbe takenup afterdiscussionofthequestion
ofmethodbecause it involvesa thematiccollapseofthetwo questionsin
Gadamer'streatment of thephilosophicaltradition-a treatment that,it
willbe argued,endsup bydepartingfromHeideggerin an important way.

and the Questionof Method

II. Phenomenology

That Truthand Method fails to address issues of methodologyis

stressedby Gadamerhimself.In no wayis thatbook intendedto provide
a methodin the sense of normativerules of procedureforthe human
sciencesor Geisteswissenschaftenparallelto themethodologies ofthenatu-
ral sciences,and in the foreword to the second edition Gadamer takes
care to correcta commonmisapprehension to thecontrary.30 His concern
is insteadsolelywithwhatwe actuallydo whenwe seek understanding,
whetherof texts,worksof art, or the world,whetherwe are aware of
whatwe are doingor not.3"The scope of hermeneutics as developedby
Gadameris intendedto be universal,32 and consequentlyhe insiststhat
hermeneutics underliesthenaturalas well as thehumansciences.33 Her-
meneutics"onlydescribeswhatalwayshappenswheneveran interpreta-
tion is convincingand successful."This means thatit is nothingother
than-philosophy.34 Hermeneuticsis "practicalphilosophy,"by which
Gadamermeans "a theoreticalattitudetowardthe practiceof interpre-
tation."35
Thus the "method"of Truthand Methoditselfis descriptiveor, as
Gadamerputsit,"phenomenological." Whilegranting thatthismayseem
paradoxical,inasmuchas his hermeneutics is avowedlybased on Heideg-
ger's "turn"away fromthe last vestigesof transcendental phenomenol-
ogy936 Gadamer nonetheless that
believes it is possibleto retaina meaning-
ful sense of "phenomenology"from both Husserl and the early

history ofscholarlycriticismis discussedinRobertJ.Dostal, "Heidegger'sPlato,"Journal

of theHistoryofPhilosophy, 23 [1985],71-98.)
30 TM, xvi-xvii.
31
Kisiel, "Heideggerand Gadamer,"5.
32
See, forexample,"Aestheticsand Hermeneutics,"in PhilosophicalHermeneutics,
103.
33TM, 432-33.
34Hans-GeorgGadamer,"Hermeneutics as PracticalPhilosophy,"Reason in theAge
of Science,111.
35Ibid., 112.
36Gadamerhas describedtheKehreas preciselyHeidegger'sattemptto "reshapehis
own projectso as to dissociateit completelyfromtheHusserlianmodel...." "Heidegger
and the Historyof Philosophy,"437.
Gadamer's "Correction"
ofHeidegger 493

"theoryof the real experiencethat thinking

Heidegger'shermeneutical
is."37
In thelate 1950sHeideggervisiteda seminarconductedby Gadamer,
in the course of whichhe asked the studentswhat the connectionwas
betweenHusserl'sanalysisof internaltime-consciousness38 and his own
studyof timein Being and Time. Rejectingeveryattemptedanswer,he
finallyexplained:Therewas none!39Gadamertellsthisanecdoteto illus-
tratethe decisivenesswithwhichthe laterHeideggerrejectedthe entire
approachofhis teacherHusserl'sphenomenology-adecisivenessthatis
hardlyhistorically justifiedas applied to the Heideggerof Being and
Time.4
Gadamer is not in accord withthis attitude.4- However,he is also
unwillingto grant"phenomenology" a univocalmeaning,in recognition
of Husserl'sfailureto establishit as a "strictscience."In philosophy,he
says,therecan be no such thingas an objective"methodologicaltech-
nique": "One's own philosophicalstandpointalways shines through
[one's] descriptionof the basic meaningof phenomenology."42 This is
consistentwithhis refusalto supplyany methodin Truthand Method;
but it leaves unclearwhat Gadamer means by characterizing his own
procedureas phenomenological, otherthan the vague or tautological
meaningof "descriptive."
bylookingat specificinsightsthatGadamer
Thisissuecan be clarified
in variouswritingssays he has appropriatedfromHusserland the phe-
nomenologicalmovement. For thepurposesofthepresentdiscussiontwo
of theseare of particularimportance:the phenomenological conceptof
"horizon"and thephenomenological analysisofthe"intentional object,"
particularlyin regardto the "thing-in-itself."
The conceptof "horizon"in phenomenology was notoriginallyHus-
serlianbutappropriated fromFriedrichNietzsche.The conceptof "hori-
zon" plays an importantrole in Nietzsche'sthought.It is a limiting
conceptinthathumanbeingscannotseebeyondtheirhistoricalorcultural
horizons.Yet thislimitationis a prerequisite forhealth,and ultimately
forlifeitself.Nietzscheformulates thisas a "generallaw": "Everyliving

37TM, xxiv.
ofHusserl'svoluminousstudies
38 Heideggerwas theeditorof thepublishedportions

of internaltime-consciousness.
39 Gadamer,"Heidegger'sPaths," 83.
40To simplify somewhat,Heidegger'sanalysisin Being and Time retainsHusserl's
notionofintentionalitybut reappliesit from"consciousness"to Dasein's entirebeing-in-
the-world (JitendraNath Mohanty,The ConceptofIntentionality [St. Louis, 1972],129).
41 He speaks of the "phenomenological craftsmanship"that was "all too quickly
forgotten by the scholarshipof the time." Hans-GeorgGadamer,"Heideggerand the
Languageof Metaphysics(1967)," PhilosophicalHermeneutics, 230.
42 Hans-GeorgGadamer,"The Phenomenological Movement(1963)," Philosophical
Hermeneutics, 143.
494 WalterLammi

thingcan becomehealthy,strongand fruitful onlywithina horizon. . ."

Everything dependson a person'sabilityto "forgetat the righttimeas
well as to rememberat the righttime."43Accordingto thisperspective,
the term"historicism"means insightinto the essentialrelativity of all
horizons.HistoricismforNietzscheis a greatbut life-destroying truth
becauseittakesawayourabilitytobelieveabsolutelyin anything. Nothing
is meaningful in itself,yetit is essentialthatwe believein something-
whichcan apparentlybe almostanything-forin freeingourselvesfrom
"the tyranny ofcapriciouslaws" by recognizingthattheyare capricious,
we end up destroying the sourceof culturalvitality."
The conceptof"horizon"is also fundamental to Husserl,notso much
in the sense of overall culturallimitationsas on the level of personal
experience,whereimplicithorizonsof beforeand afterrequirefocusing
on one thingat a necessarycost of forgetting or ignoringan infinityof
others.However,in Husserl'sinvestigation, whichultimately concerned
theinnerexperienceoftime-consciousness, thehorizonsofone experience
flowintothoseof anotherso thatin the continuumof experiencesthere
is a constantfluxofhorizons."Horizon,"then,to Husserlas opposedto
Nietzsche,is in no way a staticconcept.45
FromHusserl'sstudiesGadamerdevelopedtheconceptof "horizon"
for hermeneuticalpurposes of his own. In so doing he reexamined
Nietzsche'sconceptand arrivedat whatamountsto a fundamental cri-
tiqueoftheassumptionthatknowledgeis relativeto temporalor historical
conditions.On theone handGadamer,likeNietzsche,understands "hori-
zon" to denotethefinitelimitations of any particularperspectiveat any
particulartime.46However,he interprets Nietzscheas believingthat a
horizoncan be simply"closed,"whichin Gadamer'sjudgmentconstitutes
a "romanticreflection, a kindofRobinsonCrusoedream,"47 becausejust
as no individualexistswithoutothers,no culturalor historicalhorizon
existsin staticand totalisolationfromothers.48 Horizons,mostparticu-
larlythehorizonofthepastthatwe call "tradition,"are alwaysin motion
just as humanlifeis alwaysin motion.49 Thereis no historicalconscious-
nessin thesenseofNietzsche's"historicist insight"thatsetsthehorizons
intomotion;all historicalconsciousnessdoes is makethatmotionaware

43 FriedrichNietzsche,"On theAdvantageand DisadvantageofHistoryforLife,"tr.

PeterPreuss(Indianapolis,1980), 10.
44See FriedrichNietzsche,BeyondGoodand Evil, tr.WalterKaufmann(New York,
1966), 100-102(aphorism188).
45 Cf. TM,216.
46 TM, 269.

47 Ibid.,271.

48 Gadamer'sinterpretationofNietzscheis problematicon thispoint.Whetheror not

his critiqueis on target,however,Gadamer'spositiveargumentforthedynamicconcept
of "horizon"remainscogent.
49 Ibid.,217.
 ofHeidegger
Gadamer's "Correction" 495

ofitself.50 The awarenessthatour horizonsare fluid,ratherthanteaching

thatnothingis true,makesit possibleto findnewtruths-to "expandour
horizons,"as the sayinghas it.
Thus the self-awareness of historicalconsciousness,farfrombeinga
"deadlytruth"about the relativity of all values,is forGadamerthe key
forreachingbeyondor behinda givenhorizonto confront thepossibility
thatthereis truthto be learnedfromthepast."I am convincedofthefact
that,quitesimply,we can learnfromtheclassics,"Gadamerconcludes.5"
Nietzsche'shistoricism is truein thesensethattimeand place set limits:
"To existhistorically meansthatknowledgeofoneselfcan neverbe com-
plete."52But it failsto understandtemporaldistanceas a positiveaid to
discovering truth,53whichis thewayGadamerunderstands theinterpret-
er's hermeneutical situationonce it is broughtto self-consciousness.This
self-consciousness is whathe terms"consciousnessofthehistoryofinflu-
ence,"54and to Gadamerthe wholepointof historicalstudiesis to trace
conceptsback throughthehistoryoftheirinfluence to thepointofawak-
eningtheir"real, living,evocativemeaning."55 At thatpoint,the inter-
preterhas achievedthebefore-mentioned "fusionofhorizons."Gadamer
of
viewsthe"centralproblem" hermeneutics, whichhe callsthe"problem
of application,"as preciselythe task of thattracing-the task,in other
words,of "consciousnessof the historyof influence"to bringabout the
interpretive understanding56 of a text's claim to truth,which is what
constitutes a "fusionof horizons."57
It is clearthatthissortofhistoricalstudydepartsfundamentally from
Husserl'sapproachto phenomenology as pure ahistoricaldescriptionof
experience58 despiteitsdebtto hisconceptof"horizon."The purposehere
is to explicateGadamer'sself-termed "phenomenological" approachfrom
itsrootsin thephenomenological movement, notto conflateand thereby
confusethe two.
The second"methodologically" important conceptthatGadamerap-
propriatesfromphenomenology concerns "intentionalobject." This
the

50Ibid.,271.
51Ibid., 490.
52Ibid., 269.
53Cf. Howard, ThreeFaces ofHermeneutics, 148.
54 The GermantermsWirkungsgeschichte and wirkungsgeschichtliches are
Bewusstsein
misleadinglytranslatedthroughoutthe Englishtranslationof Truthand Methodand
elsewhereas "effective-history" consciousness."Here theywill
and "effective-historical
be renderedmoreaccuratelyas "historyoftheinfluence"and "consciousnessofthehistory
of influence"respectively. (I am indebtedto ProfessorGeorge L. Kline at BrynMawr
College forbothpointingout thisproblemand suggesting the solution.)
55" PhilosophicalFoundations,"127.
56 Understanding to Gadamer alwaysinvolvesinterpretation. See, forexample,TM,
274: "Interpretationis the explicitformof understanding."
57 TM, 274.
58
"PhilosophicalFoundations,"127.
496 WalterLammi

is theobjectof consciousnessas temporally constituted in consciousness.

Gadamer'sis also a highlyselectiveappropriation. Gadameragreeswith
Heidegger'srejectionof thenotionofa pureconsciousnesscharacterized
by intentionality,59 but nonethelesshe sees meritin the notionthatany
object, i.e., somethingthat is "out there,"only exists for us via our
perspectiveson it. This does not mean thatthe objectis simplyrelative
to our (historically conditioned)perspectives; Gadamerdoes notdenyits
realityas itself-as, thatis, the"thing-in-itself."But he followsHusserl's
approachto the"thing-in-itself," whichis to saythatphenomenologically
speaking,it is "nothingotherthanthecontinuity withwhichthe shades
of the various perspectivesof the perceptionof objects pass into one
another."60 To turnthispointaround,in everyperspectiveon the world
the existenceof a "world-in-itself' is implied.The presenceof many
world-views does not relativizethe worldthatis beingviewed.
This is whyGadamercan say in the Forewordto the secondedition
of Truthand Methodthat"the idea of a work-in-itself, divorcedfromits
constantlyrenewedrealityof being experienced,always has something
abstractaboutit." This meansthatwhileit is quitepossibleand mayeven
be necessaryfortheinterpreter to intendor seekto understandthework
as it is in itself-thatis, definitively-thatgoal is in realityunattainable.
Gadamer's principlethatunderstanding necessarilyinvolvesinterpreta-
tion61means that while on the one hand understanding can neverbe
arbitrary or merelysubjectivebehaviortowardthegiven"object,"on the
otherhand theclaimto a definitive understanding is necessarilya "dog-
maticsolution."62
In lightof the above discussion,it becomes clearerwhy Gadamer
shouldchoose to call his approach"phenomenological"despitehis Hei-
deggerianroots.This bears directlyon the issue,whichhas been raised
but not resolved,of Heidegger'sinfluenceon Gadamer,particularly of
therelativeinfluenceoftheearlyand late Heidegger.Thereare twoways
to look at thematter.One is to viewthisdebtto phenomenology, which
is largelyin accordwithBeingand Time,as further evidencethatdespite
Gadamer'sown beliefthathis workis primarily based on thepost-Kehre
Heidegger,he is reallyjust an earlyHeideggerianwho is consequently
entangledanew in theperennial"metaphysics of presence."The otheris
to take Gadamer at his word, in which case his phenomenology may
indicatenotso mucha dependenceon theearlyHeideggeras an indepen-
dence fromHeideggeraltogether.To resolvethisissue it is necessaryto
examinefirst, Gadamer'sclaimeddebtto thelaterHeidegger,and second,

9 Cf. Mohanty,The ConceptofIntentionality,

129-32.
60
TM, 406.
61
Ibid., 274.
62 Ibid., xix.
Gadamer's "Correction"
ofHeidegger 497

of the "metaphysicsof
his relationto the traditionand understanding
presence."

III. Legacies of the Later Heidegger:The Workof Art

In "The Originof the Workof Art," Heideggerdiscussesa number

ofthemesthatare centralto hislater,post-Kehre thinking. For Heidegger
theworkofartoriginates not,as "commonsense"and nineteenth-century
aestheticswould have it,fromthe artistor his "genius"but ratherfrom
the "essence" of art,whichis its truth.63 The workof art,thatis, the
"great"workofart,is notmerelya manifestation oftruth,butan "event"
in whichtruthcomesto be as something"standingin itself'that"opens
up its own world."64In the creationof the workof artthe happeningof
truthshows its historicity by virtuenot of entering,but of "making"
historyanew. The foundingof a politicalstateis anothersuch event.A
thinker'sessentialquestioningprovidesyetanother.65
In all of theseevents,forwhichthe workof art is paradigmatic, the
accomplishment is an historicaleventwhosemeaningconsequently stands
quite apart fromthe subjectiveintentionsof the artist,statesman,or
thinker.Heidegger'sessayeffectively extendsthehermeneutical analysis
of Dasein's truthand Being in Being and Time into the realmof art,66
and behindthe experienceof art appears"the whole universality of the
hermeneutic experience."67The distinctionbetweenthe meaningof the
workof art and its creator'ssubjectiveintentionsunderliesGadamer's
hermeneutical principlethatunderstanding a textis independentof"what
the authormeant."68
The idea thattheworkofartbringsitsownworldwithitleadsdirectly
to Gadamer'sfocuson therelationbetweentheworkand our encounter
withit; thisrelationto Gadamer,as to Heidegger,has priorityover its
relata.The relationis nothingotherthanthepreviously discussed"fusion
ofhorizons."69 Thus Gadamer'suse oftheconcept"horizon"is developed

63 Heidegger,"Origin," 57 ff.The issue of "genius" in the theoryof aestheticsis

discussedin Part I of TM.

6 Gadamer,"Heidegger'sLater Philosophy,"222.
65 Heidegger,"Origin,"62.
66
RichardE. Palmer,Hermeneutics (Evanston,1969), 159. The circlealso reappears
in aesthetics:we can knowwhatthe workof art is onlyfromthe essenceof art; yetwe
mustinferthe essenceof art fromworksof art. Heidegger,"Origin,"18.
67 Hans-GeorgGadamer,"MartinHeideggerand MarburgTheology(1964)," Philo-
sophicalHermeneutics, 201.
68Ibid.,210.
to Hans-GeorgGadamer,The Relevanceof theBeautiful
69 "Editor's Introduction"
and OtherEssays,ed. RobertBernasconi(Cambridge,1986),xiii.Cf. TM, 273: "Under-
standing... is alwaysthe fusionof thesehorizonswhichwe imagineto existby them-
selves."
498 WalterLammi

notonlyfromthephenomenology ofHusserland theearlyHeideggerbut

also and moredirectlyfromthe transformations of Heidegger'sKehre.
It is now generallyacknowledgedthattheKehredid not constitutea
"reversal"in Heidegger'sthought.70 Even the characterization of it as
representing a shiftin perspectivefromDasein's understanding of the
meaningofBeingto thetruthofBeing(and eventually to whatHeidegger
calls the"topologyofBeing")71appearsin thepresentcontextnotexactly
wrongbut overlysimplistic.The questionis, whatdoes such a "shiftin
perspective"mean?The laterHeidegger'sabandonmentofsuch termsas
"Dasein," "hermeneutics," and even"truth"itselfdoes notmeanthathe
simplyabandonedthe conceptsrepresented by thoseterms.It is rather
the case thathe reassessedand reworkedthemagain and again,so that
to conveythe "way" of his thoughthe was forcedto findnew meansof
linguisticexpression.
For example,the eliminationof "Dasein" in the effortof the later
Heideggerto think"Being"withoutbeingsbyno meanscallsfora concept
of "Being" as somehowdisembodied.It meansratherthatthemanifesta-
tionsof Being in different "epochs" take on variedsignificance, so that
thereis no single,univocalsense of "There-being"to warrantthe term
"Dasein." The "historyof Being" is no less essentiallytied to human
being.72 WhileGadamer'srefusalto followthe path of the laterHeideg-
ger's quasi-poeticexpressionremainsto be satisfactorily explained,it is
now possibleto understandhow he could claim to be expressingthe
thoughtoftheKehrein Truthand Methodwhileretaining keytermsofthe
earlyHeidegger.It has becomeclearwiththeconceptsof"hermeneutics,"
"horizon,"and the"meaning"oftheworkofartthattheissueis whether
and how his appropriation and development of termsfoundin the early
Heideggerreflectthe transformations of theKehre.
In lightoftheseconsiderations,it is usefulto returnto thediscussion
of Gadamer's notionof truthas it relatesto the later Heidegger.The
transformation of "truth"in "The Originof the Work of Art" may be
summedup as "puttingtruthto work."73In the work of art truthis
establishedin an absolutelyuniqueway,as the"bringingforthofa being

70
This is thethrustof Heidegger'sletterto Richardsonin the Forewordof Through
Phenomenology to Thought.See also David Krell, "Nietzsche in Heidegger'sKehre,"
198-99,and Calvin 0. Schrag,"The Transvaluationof Aestheticsand theWorkof Art,"
ThinkingAboutBeing,123.
71 The "topologyof Being" is among the late Heidegger'smost opaque and poetic

concepts.To explainit wouldbe beyondthescope ofthisessay,as wellas thecompetence

ofitsauthor.A simplisticsummary is thatHeideggerattemptspoeticallyto "locate" Being
by bringingits traces"home" in language.
72 David FarrellKrell,Intimations ofMortality:Time,Truth,and Finitudein Heideg-
ger's ThinkingofBeing(University Park, 1986), 103.
73 Cf. Heidegger,"Origin,"39.
Gadamer's "Correction"
ofHeidegger 499

such as neverwas beforeand will nevercome to be again."74The origin

oftheworkofartconcernsthattruth"fromwhichan opennessofbeings
can firstactuallyshow itself."75
From the uniquenessof art's manifestation of truth,Gadamer con-
cludesthatphilosophycannotsubsumeart.As muchas commentary and
interpretation theexperienceoftheworkofart,theycannot
can facilitate
exhaustitsclaimto truth.Art,Gadamersays,"resistspureconceptualiza-
tion."76This is notto denythatit can be understood.Thereis a "language
ofart,"77theunderstanding ofwhichrequiresa combinationofhistorical
or hermeneutical consciousnessand opennessto thework'sclaimto truth
as it "addressesus directlyas ifit showedus ourselves."78In Gadamer's
formulation the inexhaustibility or ultimateresistanceto translationof
meaningin theworkofartshowsan "excessofmeaning"thatis present
in each workof the "languageof art."79
What,then,"is" thistruththatis beingclaimed?Here, once again,
thequestion"whatit is" becomesinseparablefrom"how it is." Truthin
the originof theworkof art comesto be as an interplayor "dialectic"80
of truthand untruth,or a-Tetheiaand Tethe.In this contextHeidegger
introducesthe conceptof "earth,"whichwiththe term"world" consti-
tutesa preliminary formulationofthe"fourfold" ofhislaterdevelopment
of the concept"truth"(and abandonmentof theterm)in thepreviously
mentioned"topologyofBeing"(in whichtheterm"Being"is also eventu-
ally abandoned).
Gadamer views the conceptof "earth" as the "new and startling"
elementin the "Originof the Work of Art.""8The conceptof "world"
had been developedin Beingand Timeas thehorizonofDasein's forest-
ructureof knowledge,but "earth" added an essentiallypoetic note, a
"mythicaland gnostic"counterpartto "world."82The truthof art as
self-presentation of Being comes to presencethroughthe struggleof
"world" and "earth"in whicha "clearing"(Lichtung)or open space is
createdforthe eventof truth."Earth" representsself-concealment as
"world"does openness.It is thatoutofwhichtheself-presentation arises,
and intowhichit disappears.83 Everygenuineworkof art carrieswithit

74 Ibid.,62.
75 P6ggeler, Path,107.
76Gadamer,"The Relevanceof the Beautiful,"Relevance37.
" TM, 432.
11.
78Ibid.,
102.
PhilosophicalHermeneutics,
79Gadamer,"Aestheticsand Hermeneutics,"
80 C. D. Keyes,"Truthas Art:An Interpretation ofHeidegger'sSein undZeit (Sec.44)
and Der Ursprung Des Kunstwerkes,"in Sallis (ed.), Heideggerand thePath of Thinking,
70-71.
81 Gadamer,"Heidegger'sLater Philosophy," 217.
82 Ibid.
83
Ibid.,223.
500 WalterLammi

an "incompletehistory"ofsimultaneous concealmentand unconcealment

so thatitsveryfiniteness displaystheinfinitevariability or "unfathomable
depth" of truth.84 In the tensionof world and earthis the abidingor
reposeofthatself-presentation, alongsideofwhichthebeholdermustalso
tarry.85Thus it is only a step beyond Gadamer's own explanationto
interpretthe importof the struggleand interconnection of "earth" and
"world" as a matterof time.
As the "becomingand happeningof truth,"86 artis an eventnot only
in itsoriginbutin everyinstanceofgenuineinterpretation or understand-
ing. Thus an essentialelement of the truth of art is its representation,87
and in each ofitseventful occasionswe to whomit is represented experi-
ence the presenceof its truthas suddenand unfamiliar. In theseclosely
relatedaspectsof the workof art we come to the centerof Heidegger's
analysis.
The suddenarrivalof meaningin the workof artcombinedwiththe
necessityof tarryingalongsideits abidingself-presentation characterize
the criticalelementsof discontinuity and continuity withintemporality.
Since the workof art is historyin the "essentialsense that it grounds
history,"88at issueis thenatureofhistoricaldiscontinuity and continuity.
The elementofdiscontinuity is expressedin a conceptthatHeidegger
appropriatesfromhis studyof early or "primordial"Christianity, the
kairos.89The kairos is time reckoned not in linear fashion but according
to significantevents,in thefirstinstancethe comingof Christ.Thus the
kairosreflectshow historyis made and made anew in a way thatcannot
be calculatedin advancebut appearsas a suddenarrival,"as a thiefin
the night."90
Heidegger'sanalysisofthe workof artrepresents a decisivedevelop-
mentofthekairosnotsimplyas thesuddennessofnoveltyin thehistorical
momentbut as a presentdependentupon a futuretowardwhichthereis
a gatheringof the past in "fulfilled"time.91This is the "abiding" or
"tarrying"withinthetensionof worldand earthin the workof art.The
strangenessof truthhappens in the "intimacyof the battle"92of this
abidingof worldand earth.

84 P6ggeler,"'Historicity'in Heidegger'sLate Work,"63.

85 Gadamer,"Heidegger'sLater Philosophy,"222-23.
86 Heidegger, "Origin,"71. Emphasisin the original.
87 TM, 104. Gadamer goes on to characterizethis representation as "play": "We
startedfromthe positionthattheworkof artis play,i.e., thatits actual beingcannotbe
detachedfromits representation and thatin the representation
the unityand identityof
a structureemerge"(109).
88
"Origin,"77.
89
See the discussionof Heidegger'srelationto primordialChristianity in Poggeler,
Path, 24-31.
90I Thess., 5.
91P6ggeler,"Historicity," 60.
92
Heidegger,"Origin,"77.
 ofHeidegger
Gadamer's "Correction" 501

To explicatetheconceptof"abiding,"Gadamerrefers to thehistorical
originsofartin religiousdance and festivals.In theperformance ofdance
and, more clearly,the re-creationof festival,the eventsare joined not
simply"in" time,but takeon a timeoftheirown. "Festivaltime"is not
just a span of hours or days,but a special kind of timewitha special
mood (Stimmung)-thatis,a specialwayofbeing.Fulfilledtimeis auton-
omous time,thatis, timethatstandsapart fromthe ongoingtemporal
movementof externalnature.93 In the specialway thatwe have to learn
how to tarrywiththeworkofartin orderto experienceit,Gadamerfinds
a kindoftemporality thatis "perhapstheonlyway thatis grantedto us
finitebeingsto relateto whatwe call eternity."94
In orderto understandHeidegger'srejectionof transhistorical and
atemporaltruth,thecriticalquestionbecomes:whatsortofdiscontinuity
and continuity does thisspecial sortof timeimply?"Real knowledge,"
Gadamerhas written, "has to recognizethekairos."95But forGadamer,
above all it is "preciselycontinuity thateveryunderstanding of timehas
to achieve,even when it is a questionof the temporality of a workof
art."96For Heidegger,as we see in the nextsection,thisis not so clear.

vs. Discontinuity
IV. Continuity

The substantively mostapparentand perhapsalso mostfundamental

differencebetweenHeideggerand Gadamer,whichbears on theircon-
trastingmodes of expression,is betweenGadamer's orientationtoward
towardthefuture.For
the historicalpast versusHeidegger'sorientation
Gadamer the primarytask may be describedas one of remembrance,
whichrequiresan "unceasingconversation"withthetradition.For Hei-
deggerconversationwiththe traditionis only instrumentaltowardthe
thinkingofBeing,so remembrance alwaysremainsa secondarytask.97In
a well-known passage Gadamerhimselfarticulatesthisdifference:
Heidegger, whofirstdescribedtheideaofunderstandingas theuniversal
determi-
natenessofThere-being [Dasein],meanstheveryprojective ofunder-
character
standing,i.e.,thefutural character [Dasein].I shallnotdeny,
of There-being
however, thatwithin theuniversal contextoftheelements ofunderstandingsI
haveemphasized theelement of whatis pastand handed
of theassimilation
down.Heidegger also,likemanyofmycritics, wouldprobably feelthelackof
an ultimate inthedrawing
radicality of[my]conclusions....Whenscience...
bringson the"cosmicnight"on the"forgetfulness ofbeing,"thenihilism that
Nietzsche prophesied,thenmayonelookat thelastfading lightofthesunthat

93 Gadamer,"The Relevanceof theBeautiful,"42.

94 Ibid.,45.
95 Gadamer,"Hermeneuticsas a Theoreticaland PracticalTask," Reason in theAge
ofScience,121.
96 TM, 109.

97FrancisJ. Ambrosio,"Dawn and Dusk: Gadamerand Heideggeron Truth,"47.

502 WalterLammi

ofturning
sky,instead
hassetintheevening shimmer
aroundtolookforthefirst
ofitsreturn?98

In thisdescriptionGadamer seemsto be expressingno morethan a

preference,a differencemerelyofemphasisratherthanofsubstance.It is
fairto accuse Gadamerof beingdisingenuousifhis preference turnsout
to have substantiveimplications.To the extentthatGadamer's view of
the historyof philosophydiffers fromthatof Heidegger,thisdifference
of temporalfocuswill magnifythe importanceof-their disagreement.Is
Gadamerbeingless thanforthright about the depthof his disagreement
withHeidegger?
Such in factseemsto be the case. It is no mereconflictof tastethat
Gadamersees in historyor the tradition99 an essentialcontinuitywhere
Heideggerfindsan irreducibleelementof discontinuity. This distinction
is assumedin Habermas'slaudatioto Gadamer,withits contrastof Hei-
degger'sradicalbreakand Gadamer'sattemptto build a bridge.??
This argumentgoes to the heartof Gadamer's intellectualrelation
to Heidegger.One way to conceptualizeHeidegger'sview of historical
discontinuityis in termsof his formulation of "epochs" of Being:
Thehistory ofBeingmeansdestinyofBeinginwhosesendings boththesending
and theIt which sendsforthholdback withtheir To hold
self-manifestation.
in
backis, Greek,epoche. Hence we speakoftheepochs of the of
destiny Being
The of
[Seinsgeschick].... sequence epochs[cannot] be as
calculated neces-
sary.... The epochsoverlapeachotherin theirsequenceso thattheoriginal
sending is moreandmoreobscured
ofBeingas presence in different
ways.101

The sequencecannotbe calculatedas necessarybecauseitis notsimply

continuous.What is "sent" in the historyof Being thatin an essential
sense"holdsback," yetnonetheless sendsitself,can be described(insofar
as thematter-the"mystery"-permits descriptionat all) as an "excess"
ofBeing.In thiscase "anyattemptto understand thathistoryas continu-
ous expels the excess of Being," therebydenyingHeidegger's"central
insight."102
Thus epochal eventsare those in which the overlappingepochs of
Beinghave been "sent" to foundtheepochsof history, whichculminate
in the"greatestdanger"ofthemodemage oftechnology. That Gadamer
agreesat leastto some extentwiththisviewis indicatedby his mention
ofthe"cosmicnight"ofthe"forgetfulness ofBeing";withHeidegger,he

98 TM, xxv,translationslightlyrevised.
99The close relationship
of "history"and "the tradition"is expressedin Gadamer's
workby the conceptof "consciousnessof the historyof influence,"to whichwe return
below (TM, 416).
100Cf. Bernasconi,"Bridgingthe Abyss,"5.
101Heidegger,"Time and Being,"9.
102 Bernasconi,"Bridgingthe Abyss,"5.
 ofHeidegger
Gadamer's "Correction" 503

thinksthatmodernity is defined"quiteunequivocally"bytheemergence
ofmodernscience.103 That is Heidegger'sgrandview,in whichthekairos
is the epochal sendingof Beingas thedelimitation of temporaltruth.In
order to understandwhat will turnout to be a subtlebut ultimately
importantcorrectionof this view by Gadamer,it is helpfulto turnto
anothersense or "level" of the kairos,also suggestedby the Biblical
reference:"[T]hensuddendestruction comethuponthem,as travailupon
a woman withchild,"104 or as the ever-unexpected arrivalof our own
death.
Heideggergrantspriority to thefuturein thetemporalconstitution of
Dasein in Being and Time. This priorityis consistentwiththe epochal
giftsof Being: "the originalwayscomes to meetus fromthe future."105
This consistency providesanotherreminderof theelementof continuity
in Heidegger'sthoughtaftertheKehre;as Heideggerhimselfhas stressed,
theorientation aftertheKehreis onlypossibleon thebasisoftheexistential
analyticofBeingand Time.106 The reasonforDasein's future-orientation
turnsout to be its ultimatepossibility-its"ownmostpotentiality-for-
Being"-which is nothingotherthandeath.107 Dasein's discoveryofhow
to liveauthenticallydependsuponan anxiousand resolutebeing-toward-
death,and consequently towardthefuture.108
On thisissueGadamertakesspecificexceptionto Heidegger'sanalysis.
He pointsout thatbeing-toward-death is unnecessaryforestablishingthe
essentialtemporality or finiteness of Dasein, since its basic constitution
ofbeing-in-the-world as "care" (Sorge)alreadyestablishesthatfiniteness.
Indeed,afterBeingand TimeHeideggerhimself"neveragainplaced the
problematic ofdeathat thecenterofhis thought."109 Thus whileHeideg-
ger retainedhis sense of the priorityof the futureafterthe Kehre,in
respectto its originalbasis in thetemporalanalyticofDasein it becomes
to Gadamerhighlyquestionable.
Probablybecause of Gadamer'sgeneralreluctanceto takeissue with
Heidegger,as wellas therelativeprominence ofhis moregentleaffirma-
tion of differencein the Forewordto the second editionof Truthand

Reason in theAge ofScience,6.

103 Gadamer,"Science and Philosophy,"

104IThess.: 5,3.
105Heidegger,"Dialogue on Language," 10.
106
Heidegger,"Letterto Richardson,"xvi-xx.
107
MartinHeidegger,Being and Time,tr. JohnMacquarrieand Edward Robinson
(New York, 1962), 307, emphasisin the original.
revealsto Dasein its
108 Cf.Beingand Time,311 (Sein und Zeit, 266): "[A]nticipation

lostnessin the they-self, and bringsit face to face withthe possibilityof being itself,
primarilyunsupportedby concernfulsolicitude,but of beingitself,rather,in an impas-
sionedfreedomtowardsdeath-a freedomwhichhas been releasedfromthe illusionsof
the 'they,'and whichis factical,certainof itself,and anxious." The entirepassage is
italicizedin the original,withthe phrase"freedomtowardsdeath" boldfacedforadded
emphasis.
'09Gadamer. "HeideLLer'sPaths." 85-86.
504 WalterLammi

Method,thispointofdisagreement has notgenerallybeenremarkedupon

despiteGadamer's characterization of its "urgency"to him.110 Yet its
importanceis difficult to overemphasizebecause it showsthatthereis a
serioussubstantive basis forwhatotherwiseappearsas a merepreference
againstHeidegger'sgrantingof priorityto the future.
Thereis anotherinteresting wayin whichGadamer'sdeparturefrom
Heidegger'sassigningpriority to thefuturecan be seento havesubstantive
foundation.Gadamersuggeststhatunderstanding, farfromconsistingof
the act of a subject,involvesa momentary "loss of self."'11In termsof
human knowledge,he consequentlyconcludesthat thereis a kind of
priorityof the past. "It is not reallywe ourselveswho understand:it is
alwaysa past thatallows us to say, 'I have understood'."'112
On the level of the workof art and consequently of history,forGa-
damer the kairosof fulfilledtimeis seen as consistingof an "absolute
present"in whichis gatheredthepastin readinessforthefuture. 113 Hence
theequivocationin describingGadameras grantinga "kindof"'priority
to thepast. Nevertheless thedifference of emphasisfromHeideggerand
itssubstantivebasisremainclear.The question,then,is howthisdifference
bearson the issue of historicalcontinuity and discontinuity.
Thereis a certainlack ofclarityin Heidegger'sviewofhistorythatis
broughtout withsome forceby Gadamer.The elementof discontinuity
in Being's epochs or "fate" (Geschick)is crucial for the possibilityof
Heidegger'sown fateful"step back" out of metaphysics intothe "other
thinking" whichalone can awaitthe"savingpower."This is a matternot
at all ofHeidegger'sowneffort, butofwhatBeinghas allottedto man.Its
appearanceis theunforeseeable kairos.Yet on theotherhand,Heidegger
ascribesto history"a kindofinnerconsequentiality" in thatit represents
a processof the increasingforgetting of Being.Gadamer'sconclusionis
summedup in tworhetoricalquestions:"Does nothistoryalwayspresent
a continuity? Comingto be in passingaway?"'114
Clearlythisconclusionis not simplycontraryto Heidegger.It repre-
sentsa choiceofone tendencywithinHeideggeroveranother,conflicting
tendency.Yet it amountsto a decisivecorrectionofHeidegger'sthought.
In partits substantive basis has provento be a difference of emphasisin
the existentialanalyticof Dasein as well as in the phenomenological
descriptionof the act of understanding. Also, however,the correctiveis
dictatedas a matterof straightforward, carefulscholarshipand conse-
quentlyof whatcould be viewedas Gadamer'sintellectualhonesty.

1
IIbid., 86.
I "On the Problemof Self-Understanding," 51.
112 Ibid., 58.
113 Cf. "Aestheticsand Hermeneutics,"
104.
114 Gadamer,"Hegel and Heidegger,"Hegel's Dialectic:Five Hermeneutical
Studies,
tr.P. Christopher Smith(New Haven, 1971), 109.
 " ofHeidegger
Gadamer's "Correction 505

Gadamer's argumentfor continuity-within-discontinuity becomes

clearin his owncommonsensical description ofwhatitcan possiblymean
to speak of timein termsof "epochs." He startsby lookingforelements
ofgenuinediscontinuity in thecourseofevents.He findsfour.First,there
are certain historicalevents that so changethe face of the worldas to
deservebeingcalled "epochal"; thereleaseofatomicpoweris theexample
he gives. Second, he considersthe experienceof timewithinour lives.
While this happens gradually,therecomes a point when incremental
changesadd up to qualitativeones,suchas whenwe say ofsomeone,"she
is no longera child," or "he is an old man now." Third,the transition
fromone generationto anothermay signify an epochal time-span, as we
can see clearlyin the transitionof rulersin changingdynasties.And
fourth,thereare what he calls "absoluteepochs" in eventsfromwhich
historicaltimeis measured,suchas thekairosofthebirthofChrist.While
the latterusuallyrefersto religiousevents,Gadamer also includesthe
possibilityof absoluteepochsin termsof the historyof ideas.II5
In supportof Heideggerand as opposedto the Greekviewthatonly
the ahistoricalconstantsof human lifeare genuinelyreal,116Gadamer
findsthe realityof historyin the experienceof transition, whichto him
is whatconstitutes"fate" or "destiny"(Geschick).To thisextent,then,
he grantsprimacyto thediscontinuity ofthekairos.Yet itis quiteobvious
thatthisdiscontinuity, even-or especially-in thecase of "absoluteep-
ochs" is anythingbut absolute.To Gadamer, "discontinuity poses the
questionof in whatsenseit containscontinuity." 117
The answeris thatthereis an important kindoftruthin remembered
reality.This mayappear in so simple a matter as thedeathofan acquain-
tance,whichsuddenlycastshis lifein a new light,perhapsidealized,but
now and henceforth out of the streamof history,standingstill. This
suddenstillnessor discontinuity "seemsto helpthetruthto speak." Thus
to Gadamerthesensein whichcontinuity is containedwithindiscontinu-
ity is found in rememberedreality.In the remembering of historical
consciousness(the problemof "application"of the "historyof theinflu-
ence") the past-the tradition-is not turnedinto an objectbut under-
stood afreshas an eventof truth.
An important qualification mustbe added to thisemphasison remem-
bering.GadamercreditsHeideggerwiththe "greatinsight"thattheway
thatthepastbelongsto humanrealityis notprimarily in memory, butin
forgetting.That whichis transitory is forgotten. Memory is the mode of
preservation amidsteverything thatis constantly sinkingaway in forget-
fulness.Thereforehistoryis notsimplycontinuous;its continuity cannot

of Historyand the ExistentialMoment,"

115 Hans-GeorgGadamer,"The Continuity

tr.Thomas Wren,PhilosophyToday,16 (1972), 230-240.

116 Ibid., 235.

1'7 Ibid., 237.

506 WalterLammi

be takenforgrantedbutconstitutes a humantaskofrenewal.118 Gadamer

has appropriatedfromHeideggerthe structure-the "how it is" oftruth
thatwe haveseenas unconcealment (aletheia)arisingfromand in tension
with concealment(rethe).The difference betweenthem is that where
HeideggerseeksdirectinsightintothetruthofBeing(or Beingoftruth),
Gadamer looks for help in conversationwith the tradition.This very
muchresemblesSocrates's"flightintothelogoi"fromPlato's Phaedo.119
The basicforminwhichthepastis handeddownis language.Gadamer
sharesthe laterHeidegger'semphasison the importanceof language.A
detailedcomparisonoftherelationbetweenthetwoin thisregardwould
requirea full-length studyof its own. However,theirdifference maybe
succinctlysummedup in Gadamer'sstatement, quotedat the beginning
ofthisarticle,that"languageis [thatkindof]beingwhichcan be under-
stood."To Heidegger,theunderstanding ofBeingis the"EventofAppro-
priation"(Ereignis),whichinvolvesan instantaneous"flash" of insight
thatis ultimatelywordless.To Heidegger,then,it seemsthatspeech is
basedon silence.120 "Hermeneutics," saysGadamerto thecontrary, "may
be preciselydefinedas theartofbringing whatis said or written to speech
again. 121 He has describedthelaterHeidegger'squasi-poeticwritings as
"sometimes moreexpressive ofa linguisticneedthanofitsovercoming." 122
It wouldbe easyto exaggeratethisdifference. In Gadamer'sthinking
a
thereis also place fortheinstantaneous, as we haveseeninhisdescription
of the momentary"loss of self' in the act of understanding, and he
describesknowledgeas intuition, whichat leastin thecase ofperception
involves"directgivennessof what is known." 123 In no way does the
statement"languageis [thatkindof]beingwhichcan be understood"-
despitethe appearanceof its more commonEnglishrendition,"Being
whichcan be understoodis language"-implythatGadameris a nomi-
nalist.He explainsthatthisshouldnotbe takenas a metaphysical asser-
tion.It is onlyintendedto explainthe universalscope of hermeneutics:
In everywordof languageis impliedan infinity of meaningat the same
timethateach wordappearsat theexpenseofall others,thereby exempli-
fyingineluctablefinitude.Gadamer explainshis pointwitha sayingof
Goethe'sthat"everything is a symbol,"whichmeansthatanygiventhing
is relatedto and henceimplieseverything else thatthereis. The assertion
is notaboutthe"whatis" ofeach being,butratherabout"how itencoun-
tersman's understanding." 124
Nonetheless,withall caveatstakenintoaccountthereremainimpor-
118
Ibid., 239-40.
119
cf. TM, 414.
120
See StanleyRosen,Nihilism:A PhilosophicalEssay (New Haven, 1969),87ff.
121
Gadamer,"Hermeneuticsas a Theoreticaland PracticalTask," 119.
122
Gadamer,"The Heritageof Hegel," Reason in theAge ofScience,57.
123
Gadamer,"The Phenomenological Movement,"132.
124
Gadamer,"Aestheticsand Hermeneutics,"103.
Gadamer's "Correction"
ofHeidegger 507

tantdifferencesbetweenGadamerand Heidegger.It is instructive to note

of
the conceptualization art as containingan excess of meaning.In one
sense theserepresentthe same thought.The meaningof the workof art
is to Gadamer its truth,self-contained in its advent as kairos but of
inexhaustibledepth;the "excess" of Being as what Being "sends" is to
Heideggeralso thetruthofart,and the"sending"can also be understood
in termsof the kairos.
Yet behindthe difference of perspective,in Heidegger'scase from
Beingand in Gadamer'sfromtheworkofart,restsa fundamental differ-
ence betweenthe two. Heidegger'sapproach is "grandlyspeculative"
whereGadamer'sis merely"commonsensical"-or"phenomenological."
Heideggercan be understoodas basinghis entireway of thoughton an
ultimatelyexperiential
foundation125or,whichamountsto thesamething,
126 Gadamer,on the contrary,
not on "reason" but on "revelation." ab-
stainsfromfaithwitha kind of determinedsobrietythatneitherstarts
fromnothingnor ends in the infinite.In so doing,he can be seen as
revivingthe Greek understanding of reason,whichby virtueneitherof
dogmaticallydenyingnorofaffirming mattersaboutwhichitis necessarily
ignorant,"remainsat most just open to revelation."
127

in Cairo.
The AmericanUniversity

125
See, forexample,Grimm'sIntroductionto P6ggeler,"Being as Appropriation,"
146.
126 Michael Allen Gillespie,"MartinHeidegger,"Historyof PoliticalPhilosophy, ed.
Leo Straussand JosephCropsey(Chicago, 1972), 903.
127 FrederickLawrence,"Gadamer and Lonergan:A DialecticalComparison,"Inter-
nationalPhilosophicalQuarterly, 20 (1980), 31. Lawrence'spointseems to be that the
avoidanceofdogmatism intheGreekunderstanding ofreasonentailsa kindofagnosticism:
Reason permitsofrevelation"in principle,"so to speak,eventhoughas "beyondreason,"
revelationis ultimately"unreasonable."