This petition by Goodman ensued, alleging that the trial court abused its discretion ingranting WP's motion. In its reply in support of the petition, Goodman also requested that it beawarded the attorneys' fees and costs it incurred in ﬁling this petition and responding to themotion below.
III. Jurisdiction and Standard of ReviewA. Jurisdiction
We decided to exercise our original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 to review this case becauseno other adequate remedy is available. As we have previously held, "an appeal following a trialon the merits would not be an adequate remedy for a judgment lienor whose priority might bedestroyed by the sale of the encumbered property by a judgment creditor whose rights attachedsubsequent to the default judgment."
Weaver Constr. Co. v. Dist. Ct.,
190 Colo. 227, 230,545P.2d 1042, 1044 (1976). This case is time sensitive and requiring it to proceed through trialbefore ﬁling an appeal may endanger Goodman's ability to recover on its judgment lien.
B. Standard of Review
With the exception of C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3), the decision to grant relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b) isgenerally within the trial court's discretion and is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
First Nat'l Bank of Telluride v. Fleisher,
2 P.3d 706, 713 (Colo.2000). Abuse of discretion exists where a decisionis manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.
Colo. Nat'l Bank v. Friedman,
846 P.2d 159, 167(Colo.1993). However, we review de novo a trial court's decision to grant relief from a judgmentpursuant to C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3) on the basis that it is void, e.g., for lack of personal jurisdiction overthe defendant due to improper service of process.
First Nat'l Bank,
2 P.3d at 713-14;
see also In re Marriage of Stroud,
631 P.2d 168, 170 n. 5 (Colo.1981) ("[W]here the motion alleges that thejudgment attacked is void, C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3), the trial court has no discretion. The judgmenteither is void or it isn't and relief must be afforded accordingly.").
"For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment bydefault has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b)." C.R.C.P.55(c). Here, a judgment by default had been entered. Pursuant to C.R.C.P.
[ 222 P.3d 315 ]
60(b), a court may relieve a party from a ﬁnal judgment for the following reasons:
(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;(2) Fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconductof an adverse party;(3) The judgment is void;(4) The judgment has been satisﬁed, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is basedhas been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should haveprospective application; or(5) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
C.R.C.P. 60(b).The issues before us are (1) whether Goodman's service of process was invalid anddeprived the trial court of jurisdiction to enter a default judgment; and (2) if service was valid,whether WP's failure to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint constituted mistake,inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. These questions implicate subsections (1) and (3)