?nt_anted to the faoult7 or ?rinceCOIl U.a1versity 1n c.

ZKl1c1aoy ror tho De&rH of Dootor at Phlloaoplq

ie<Jo;rrsDlole4 t01! ~ oy tlIe ~Qt,.." ....

, , ,

This i'tlpor introduce:; the OOLCOpt of a non-cooporat!:vo ~ (l.M

dovclops Mthod. for the mathematical a:l&lyGla of ::uch ~.. :he

te,iea and r-.y-ott 1"Unctiona de1"lned tor t.". oombinatlona of ?UN &tratoslea.

end =,e.~ff funetiono ot n:,:.mo. ~t1'l.er. it d.eilG~1S on t.'1.a 4'0rusi:JUlty Ol" impoco1b1l1t:{ of coalit1cms. OOClllUllicat1on. alId a14e-pr.:;monta.

Tho concept;a or an oq~ pomt. a aolut1o.u. a at;rong aa1ut1oa" a a~u1;ioa. &Uld valuaa &nI lJ:l~ by iOIAthaat1.oal dC'in.1ti4XW. And 1n later aoctlcmJ the 1ntorpretatian of thoso ooncepta 1zl non-cooperat! '1Q p:aH 1. cS1acuaae4.

\ "' "_ ~

pM ~ at lean one equ1l1br1ua po1J1t. OiZer ruul. 00Il0C'l1 iJhtI &eo-

Mtr1cal. atruoture ot the .et ot equ1l1brium point. ot • tu. with • 10-

1 ' .

~

:;. lut1AD. t1w ptalMa, of .... oluts1oM. and the a1a'banoe of •• ~

# . - -

.. , equ111brlUll po!n'tl !n • ~oa1 p._

.J Joe an ~t1~ of tile ~Ul,* tf4' appl1oat1aD .' Va .....

1 ot & '!aple tbreo .n potq .. 1 ta 1nolu&l4.

J o ~

I e

1,

I

W n

,

a..,

.-

Tabla ot Contents

!:oction

1. Introduction... • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 1

z. ro~ ::e£!JlitiQ01l and ':erminoloC:t • • • • • • • • •• 2

l'::!.atanco 01' Equilibrium .;.~1.nt8 •

• •

• • • •

••••

5

4. Sj~tr1ee of Game. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 7

~ol:.;tionc •

• • • •

• • • • ••

• • • • • • • • • • •

9

6. Geometr1oal p~ ot SolutiODD • • • • • • • • • • •• lS

7. Dominanoe and Contradiction !!ethoda • • • • • • • •• 15

o. A Throe-Mall "toker Gamo • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 17

D. uot1'ftLt1on and Interpretation. • • • • • • • • • •• 21

10. App11aationa. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 26

11. B1bl~Ph1....... • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 27

12. .lckDow'leclgelanta.. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 27

Introduction

Von ?ieumann and Uort:;8natorn have developed a very fruitful theory of t"wo-"ersou zero-sum games in their book Theor" of Games ~nd Economio 3er..Qvicr. ~,~i~ book also oontains 11 tr.ecr:l of n-:>erHon guoos or Q type whioh wo woulG call cco?eratlvo. Thi3 theorJ is baaed on an analys13 or the 1ntorrelationahinG of tho vnrious coalitions which can be i'or.'!lf)d by the players of the CQIlO.

Our thoory, in contradistinction. is based on the absenoe of coalitions in thnt it is as&UQOd ~;at each nBrtioipant aots indo~endeotly. without oollaboration or o~ication with any of the othero.

Tho notion ot an !S.ui11br1um !>Oint 1a the 'basio 1n::;rediont 1n our theorJ. This notion yioldD a ;;enoro.luation or tho ooncO'Jt of the solution of a twO-!lcraon sero-GWIl~. It turns out that tlle set of equilibrium points of a two-person :ero-cum ga::llS is 6imply the set of all pair. of OPPOlling "good strategies."

In the 1:1::1edlatel; followinG aections we ahall define oqu1l1b!"ium points and prove that a. finite non-cooperat1ve game always has at least one equ111br1ua po1llt. a shall alao 1ntrodUG. the Jlotiona or solvability a.a4 atrcmg aolfth111ty of • JIODooOoop8l'atift g_ and prove a th~ OIl the ge ... tr1cal atruoture at the Nt of equilibrium point. ~ • sol_bIe

gaM.

As an oxo:lplo ot the application ot our theo1j" 1Ie include a solution or a simplif1ed three person poker ~.

Tho motivation and 1ntorpretntioll or tho :athematlcal CODOept. en-

. played in the 'theor:r are reaCl1"'nld for d1scuaa1on in a speoial section or thi8 paper.

In this soctic:1 "t.'e dei'1.ne the 1:lesic concept a of this !l8f)cr and set

u:> atnndard -:;or::U~ology and D.otntion. I::lportaz::.t dol' ini tiona will bo

preceeded by Q auz-title inclcatj~g tho concept defined. The non-coc~

erath-e i:!ca ~ill be ilIlplic1t, ruthor than oxplicit, below.

F iai te GeJ;as:

For U8 an n-oorson ~ame will be a set ot n ,1aJ~~s, or ryosit1ons,

.

to each player, I , a na~:fr funotion, p,. , whioh ::aPtJ tho aet ot all

a-tuple. or rrure strategies into the real nu::tlher3. 'llhan we una tho term.

n-tunlo we shall always ::lean a sot 01' n ttema, 'With each item ",,8oo1ated

with a dU';!'ercnt player.

A mixed strategy of player

will be a oolleat1on of non-tI8:;at1ve

nUlQbera which have un1t BUm a.od are in one to one oorr •• pondeoo .. with h1a pure :strateL;ioB.

with

';-c. -I

L-~ tr>J - C(.

to repre .. nt such a mixed .trategy. where the

are the pure

.

strategi.. of player I • W. regard the

as pointa in a 81m-

plex whoae vertic.. are trA

1Tict'S

• This simplex ::lay be regarded

as a convex sub.et or .. real vector 8!'1lce, civing WI a natural proces. o£ linear cotlb1D.at1cn fer tho ::uxeci atrate!;1 •••

Wo shall use the lIutr1xea

tor player. and oil ~ J ~ to

and "t, • eta. wUl 1Jld1cate mixed atr~te{';10.J

$; , ti . wUl 11:d1-

~-

onto tho ,th payer's ol. th pure strategy. eta.

which ic 11noar 1n the .mi3.ed stratsGY or each p1a~l'Or L n-11 no nrJ.

Th13 extonsion we 5.'1a11 alBo denote by Pi • writinG filS., S1.,· _. Sn). ""ie aha'l I '.Yr~"':a -<2. or ;:t: to denotie an n-tu,lo of :ni;ccd 3tratacios

and U' .A.::= (S, I ••• Sn) then p; 0l)

Such an n-tlnle, ~ • "ill also '.:Jo l"'8,;arded 11S a ,oint ~D A. vector 8':'1.10e,

01" COl.lr2SC!, a convex po1:rt0~' the product or the 81::1n11oo. repreaontln;

t.1.ut mixed stratec:;iea.

For corrren1.ence we introduce the substitution notation

(Sl,c:,r. ...... ~:- • .1t:,s; .... )···Sfl)

(A; t;) to atand for -J._ -:::: (SI/5&,.· .. • 5.,) (CA.; t.) ; -t-J)

• The effect of suoeessive subot1tu-

/'

tiona

, etc.

(1)

•

'rhus an oquilibriu:u pOint ia an a-tuple .--<.t. such that each !llayer' a mixed stratcQ' maxWzoa his pal-otf 11' the atrate,€;lea of the others are

held fl.:1;ed. ThU8 oach l'a:;erl8 stratogy 1s optimal against those or the other.. We .hall OQo •• lonally abbnviate equillbri\a po1llt by oq. pt.

iio say ~18t 0. mL-:ed strateGY Si ~ a pure strato:y 1T"; ~ if

?i:: 1; C~ IT:ot and C;~ >0 · rr /~.:=(S'J51.,- - .• S .... }

and S; 0003 Tf; ol. "G18 &tieo cay thnt A uses IT';ot. •

---

:'l:'cm t.~e l!neari ty of f'; C S .......... 5n)

:U~~~ [P:f.4-; t:)] -=. rn:'" [p;0t jll:~ J

R~0Z-) -= P .. C--4,; Tr.oc.)

in S; ,

(2)

•

• Then we obtain

the £0110\'1'111[; tr1 .. t!.al o.occsnnr,.' and su!'.!'1cicnt condi"tion for .Ai.. to be

an equilib~~um ?Oint:

(3)

P:~)

•

--<t::: (S'J S"" .... :),,)

f;(4.) = ~Cot Ho(02)

and

, oonaoquentl:r for

( 3) to hold we p,.a{ (At:) < m~u..x. Pi~ 8-1

,

which 1s to •• 7 that ..4... does not WI. 7f: 0.( pure strnteO' for pla,..,r i • So 1M .. ite

UDloaa 1~ iD an optical

.. another necessary a..t\d .utficlent oondition tor an equUibriua point.

Sinoe a criterion (3) tor all eq. pt. can b. C'pressed a. tho equating of two continuous tunct10na OD. the apace or n-tuplea -4.. the

Cq_ pta. obvioaaly !OMl a cloud .waet of th~ apace. Actually, this V\u'Mbe..,..

aub .. t 1s £ormsd freD a ~ of p10088 or alb.gralc veri.ti .. , cut out by

other alcebraio vnrletiea.

Ex1stenco or Equilibrium ~'01l:rtB

I have previously publ1ahGdL.PrOC..:..l!.!.!.!.!!. 3(.) (1950) 48-49J a proof of t;~c :-eBul~ !;ola'N based on i:aJ( u.tur.i~ 6t:r:ers.1ized fixed point

theoretl. '.rho proof S;i van hera uses the Brouwer "tlleore;n.

'!he mthod 1a to !Set U? t\ oequence of ooutinuObS matpp lu;:H

whoee

fixed !,oi:!ta have all e<;_uilibr1um point 8& limit !,oint. A lilllit cappinC

'l'ill:.'O. 1, Ever:; f1nite same has an ec.;,ul.libriux:l point.

Proof' Uaini; our 3tandard notation. let --<2.. be 8Jl n-tuple of mixed

strategies. and

tho pa:r-orr to ~lnyer ; U' he uses hi.G

pure atrat.gy lliot and the othflrs u.s thoir rcspectivw miXed atrategies in -4_ • l"or each 1ntet;Gr A we dei'!.no tho following continuous funct10na oJ: ...4_ ,

q; (:l) m~ H ~f4.) ,

¢;,x{-J.?i = Pi~ {4.} -q;~) + YA • and ¢;t~}.)= YnaX[O)¢;o{(~~)..)J

•

~¢~(~;)..) > m~x¢t.f<t~)..) = y~>C

0(.

~t(-<L21 L: ~;t(4.JA) (l

1& cont1nuoua.

tefino S{~.>~)::::: LTf:O{ (.~ ~,")..) and

-4,./ (4.., ,,) ::- (s .', $(, .•. si) 0( • Ein.co all the operations

14 con-

ti:IuoUSJ and sinoe the apace ot n-tuplea. --4_ • 15 • coll, there cuat

bo n t1xoo point tor each A· • Honea thero w1ll be a aubao<juonc. 4" •

# COZlVQrt:1nG to -<t.* '* where 4,... iu j,·t:Bd under the ::ap?~ __J.__'A'8-,?(,...»).

naw~upp_~Q" -.-<t1t" woro net on 8Ciuilibl"ium point. ~ it .

R.=. (S, *, . · · s # ) Sotl) ca:ponant 5; * IlI.lGt be non-

opt1llal OCa1Dat the others, whioh moana Si* WI.a;o:.¥I purG atrato~ 1T~~ wh1ch la nCD-Opt!ral. ["coo {If») f~·4--J :h1.G l:X!ICUlD that

•

I [p;oI. (-<t,.._) - 'ii(:4r<lj - [p;",~itj - 'I: (.L-II:J] I <~. "",.I. ~) ( %.. p;o((~) - q;&<t~) + Y~cN <:'0

which 18

¢;O{ ~I"--' I¥.r·) < 0 ) WheM€e ¢i~ 0-tf4,~i}:o]TlbAInc. C. ~ (--4., /{!-4-) ) = . 0

• From this laat equation ... kuow that 14 SlOt ueed 1&1 Af4- ~

A,... = ?: ;riot C(~ (.4.~.J N_fA.))

t1xed po~.

•

wh1ch coaV'ad1ot:. ouzo ... uapt1on.

lIence _4_*' 18 1Dd .. ci an equ1l1br1ua point.

'.

An autoJ:lvlryhis~ or a~.trJ.r of n CSJ'.1O will bo a pon:tUtat1on of its pW8 atrat86108 which _t1s.f'1os OGrtail'l oonditionG, Ci"1Qn bolaw.

It' two atratoC1-a belont; to Q Gint;1o pln~ t."'4r.r :::w.~ CO into 1; .. 10 atnlt8l,;i08 ~.~ to A s~o pla;rer. Thua!1' ¢ 1:1 t.ho ?or.:utation of t..~ ~'""O otrnto.:;!oa 1~ !.nducCQ a ~'""t!on tp of the

playees.

Each .c-tuple at ?lU'e atratoc!oa 1a tharctaro per::lUtod into another no-tuplo oI :Jure strato&iOD. ',10 '2",/ call -x. the !.nducod ;?ar::::..tat!.on

oJ: theae n-tuplea. Let S denote an JPtuplo oJ: pure atrategiea and

p;{~) the ~r to p~ i wbsn the n-tuple S 141 ...

ployed. • .. e require that it'

• , cp

J -= •

which oa:zpletea the det!n1 t10ll of a a~r'J.

The penm.ttation ¢ baa Ii 'Wl1qv.e l1DRr .xtena1011 to the II1ad nrategUs. It

:he ext.Ialon ot ¢ to the =1xe4 atrate;1H cWtar~ ~tea aD _teM1on or )( to th8 n-tuplaa of loILi.ar1 .1&ra~. We aball alM

~ tb1a by 7<- •

We clet1.oe ... ;-tr1o ll-'Wpl. -<t. ot a gue by

.-4.. 'X = A tar all X ~s

it beinG Wldc'atood that A ..... penattatioZl derived trca a a'_v),

¢.

-8-

T".ciBO. 4. Any finite ~ hu a aytDItr10 equ1l1brll.lIl !'Oint.

?l"ooi': First we not. that

tuple.

Ii" A -= (<>'1 ••• S,,)

S;+t; :J.

$t'~1

UI\'e~ j'= i If J bo=e

= lS<+ (t-;l¢'= LSI ;-0 ) ¢ , he""" ~:r:+)X '" .-.l~ •

A+~ _ (SI+t4 •

gt ~ J ••

__.<lX=AI... ~ s;=ts;)¢

1a so

too because

'l'hia ahow6 that tho Get at .. ~ric n-tuplea 18 a convex aubaet of tho apace ot n-tuplea air:.ce it ia obv1oual;r elo_d.

How ob.one that for uah A the mapD1ng -<l.~'-£ /(-4.,).,..) u.d

111 the proot of e:iatenoe thecra waa 1ntr1nD1call1 defined. 'l'horerore~

r- . ;. "( .. ,.., ..

1: A'1.. ~ -4. / (A... , j\.) and j(" 18 '~ .~t~ morphilua at the r; ..

11'4 wUl haTo A;X:= A /( 4;X;) A) • ts ~, 1&.,._.. trkl ~jX = A, aDd tbeNtc.r. ..4.;:<- = ~/(-4.'IA.) =.--d.l. • CODMJq~ thia _pp1ng apt tt» ad of .~c n-tupl. 1Dto ita.It.

Since th1a set 18 • all theN lIIU8t be a .~trlc fixed po1nt -'. '" • And. as in the proof' or tho n1a'bmco tbGorc _ OO\1ld obtain a lJ.tllt

poiJ:Lt .A- k wh1ch lJGUl.4 bave to be ~trl0.

~olut1o=

1';6 c.efi!".8 here solutions. stronG solutions t and cub-sclutiotls. A

non-coopara:l:iivo g.r::JD dooa not alwa:J1J have a :lol; s tion, but wt.oo it does

the 301ution l:l unique. ztronC aolutio...'1:l ar-o solutions wi"::!! u'")Ccial

S', .m denote a. set o£ ~ Gtrate{;ict1 of playe:" ; om d. a aet or n-tuploa or r.d::od atrnte;!.eth

~olYabUltYl

A ~ 1.s solvable 1t its sfIt.4 . of equillbnua points .at1&-

(1)

'!h1a 1a ce.J.acl the ~b111V concl1t1on. The .elution of a 801 "ftlb1e gu:. 1. 1 ta .n. ~. or equU1brl\D point ••

strong solw.bUl'tp

A ~ 18 atrond:l .ol_hla 1t 115 bu a .Olution..ef!_ • lUah that tor aU ;5

s;

-10-

such tr~t tor Salle ;:t- the n-tuple (..:t; S;)

16 an ac;uillbr1u:n

point. L 5; iz the i th component oJ: SCi:lO oSuilibrium poin~.J TIc call S; the set at ocull1br1:um st:-trtc[,ies of r>lAyel" i •

-=.,r _J_ 1:3 a aub=et of the not of equilibrium po1nta of a [;BmLI and lat1s~1_ <tODd1tian (1); and if d 1D QIl-r';al rolnt!~ to t.lll4 ?rooperty then '!'18 call ~ a aub-aolutlon"

J · S

For any Gub-eolu'"...1on ~ we doi'ino the 'tll tactar aet. ; ~ u

~ ~at ot all S: IS ouch t!-.nt £. oonta1na ( ;:;t-; S:) for CCDI

;;t'.

5ate that a aub-ao1utlon. when ~ue. 1a a Dolut1o.Da 8Jld 1ta tutor uta are the aat. of equU1br1.uza atra:t8bloa.

'l'ffiXI. 2 J it. aub-401utlon, ~ • 18 the set of all c-tuples

(S.,/i&".·· Sft) mob h" each $i e ~i where S. 1a the

i th !'aat:or set ot ~ • o.c.ttr1oally. -eJ_ 18 tba prodwrt ot it.

i"aotor uta.

• 3:1 det1n1t10l'l

~;;~;)€-eL •

U111rl& tM oond1tlon (1) 121-1 t1=ea we obtain a\ICCCII.l~

0.; s,; S1.) €oJ>, · _. ) (*.; s,; $1.; s~; - . - ; S ft) E-.1 aDd the last 18 .~17 (s 1/ Sa.., ••• s,.,) f J. • wh1ch we neoded to abGIr.

!llEO" 31 The taator aota S' " S 1." " •• ~ '" ot a aubooaolut10A are cloaed and O~ as .~.t. ot the ra1xecl atrategy .~O ...

?root, It aut"tl0 •• to .how two th1n&.a (a) 1:

s; aDd

Sf e S·

• •

-11-

Si*:::: {S. +S()/2. € S';

.. limit point oJ: S; then S7*f Si

Let _;t €..£ . Then we he. ve

; (b) if

then

•

for any ~j , by usin~ the oriterion of

(I) J p~. 3

for an aq.

pt. Adding these inequalities, using the linearity of F:. (5.~ ••• S .. ) in

Si, and dividing by 2. we Get p" (t-; S:~ ~ 5(A;\i"*;t.i)

aLnce S; *:::: ($; + S,' ) /7... . ?rom t!'1is ;ve lalow that

~-t; Si7E} 13 an eg. pt. for any ..::t-E ~. If the set of

all such eg. pta. C:?t; C;;*) is added to d... the aU(;Ill8nted set

j)

cl~QX1:,r ~ati~iez couui"uion (1). ana ai.nce ~ was to be maximal it

follow8 that

•

To attack (b) note that the n-tuple (:t; s: :#=) ... ill be & limit point at the .et at n-tuplea o~' the 1'01'11. where '5: € S; , sinoe S; -:#- 111 a 11m! t point of

this set 1& a set at sq. pta. and hence any point 1n ita cloaure 18 all eq. pt., .inc. the •• t ot all sq. pt •• 1s cloaed La.a p,.l} J. theretor. (;:i-; S; #) ia an eq. pt. and hence S.-#- ~ S; trom

the aame argument aa tor

•

va1uea.

Let ~ be the set of equilibrium poillt. 01' a ,&Uta. lie d.f1.ne

Yi+- ;;',[P: f:4}] ) Vi-~ _;;':I[P:&li]

•

,,'~+ _ "','J. - V I

we 1I'1"its

,I. \.I+_~J.-

v/-::vi -v.

•

the u;eper value to player i ot the game,

-12-

Values .. ill obviOUGly have to oxiat 1.1' thero 1s but one equilibriuu

'Point.

One can define associate. 'mlueG ;:or a ;;>ub-eolut!.cn by reatriot1nc .J_ to ~he '~.- pta. 1n tho 8uo-Golution IUld tl::.en Wiin.:; the oame defining

equationa as aboYD.

aol'ftbloJ ~ lJolutio:18 GX!at only when tbero ia a "uddla po1ntD 111

Cecmotr!.cal Fo.rm of .solut!ona

In the two-pcraon lero-stml OAOG it han boon shown thnt tho 8()t of

st... .. tl'teg;r apace. 'fie sho.ll obta1:l the soma rosul'l; tor til l'layor' £I :lot of

•

for..,cry ,

1Ih1oh 18 ~1ti¢n (3) 011 pas- if • An equivalent condition is for

(2)

•

Lft ua D.CM QOCAiQuo tbe tom of the.n 5j at equll1bzolura atft ... .:10_, SJ. or phver j • lAt * be G7 eqt.11l.1.br1l.a po1J:da,t.t.II (;t; s_;) w1ll be all equWbzolua poUlt it and o.al.:T 1t SJ. E. Sj ~ 1"raa Tbao.:. ~ now apply oOD!1tlcma (2) to (.;f;~;) , obta1A1ng

,

SlJlH H 1& n-l1near a.td ;C !a co.tl4t&mb thoaeal'e a set of linNr 1nequallt1e. of the tara n~ ($;) '2:! 0 • F.aGh such 1nequal1ty 1a e 1ther aatia1'1ed for all SJ or tor tho.. ly1J:lg OIl and to one lid. ~ Ia. h~laDe pua1::l,; through the atJ'ateIg' .bplcr;. 'l'beretore. the

-12a-

Simple :::xamp lae

:!:cl3e ~ro ir:te:lded to illuutrc;t;v tl:o c()nce~t:3 cle.i'~.ned in the ?npcr

the 1e.:""'.:, ate.

Ex. 1 5 a.oC.. -3
-4 C\. ~ 4
-0 boe. 5
.. b r.> -4
v
:x • ., 1 a..ot 1
...
-10 0.. r.> 10
10 b c(.-1O
-1 b~ -1
Ex. 3 14.ot 1
-100.. ,,-10
-10 b 0(, -10
1 b p> 1
Ex. 4 i o.«, 1
o <1. r-> 1
1 \0 0( a
ob~ 0
EX. 5 1a... c{ 2
-1 q ~ -4
-4 k) C{. -1
2 b ~ 1
~.e lCl.Q(. 1
Oc1.r> 0
ObOf.. 0
o b f.> 0 ~1oak Golut10n,

::.5.

VI~ 1"7

Cr<; <l.-\- it b l ~ o{+ ~<; ~)

, V" -::. + '/,_

:~: :olut1on:

V, =:. \}1.. -:::. -I

UJl801vableJ equU1br1U11l_po~ (a}~), (kf3) ~ and ('Yi..-+ 'oh . ., C(/l. + (5/1.) .:!~ ~t.'"t.te:;1oB in the laat case have maxi-min and

.::U!li -!:lO.X pro~ert iss.

• with

an aamp1e or 1Databl11ty.

-JA-

ca::lploto :let LWh10h U. t1nitoJ 0: conditions wt...ll all be sat!.at1od si::lultan$Oualy on ao.."rlO convox polyhedral oubset of pla;ror j "S stratec;:t ci:tlplo..~. C I.nteraect1QIl or llal:.c-S?80ea.J

.cUi a oorollary "., oay concluuo that Skis the COOV6-"<. cloaure of: A i'1nits ;;t~ mixed 5trntGt;ioG L vor.. ice sJ.

D0J:l1oonCG find Ccmtrad1ct1on :1ethodD

I

';0 c.n;; tl--,<,:t 5j <lev'ootO@ <;; if

~or overy .;t.

" .

:his, ~~? to 10&:11::4; ~t S; ~i"1tiB plD.:tUr I a. hibhcr r>6j--

ott than $: DO 1'.i1&ttor lIhat the iitrll:ttl~io:J of the other plaj1)rs are.

I

To a •• 'ffhArther • atrateQ' f): dominates 5 i it aufl'icea to consi-

der on~ pure atrategioa far tho other ;?lAyera becaUGG of the n-li.netu- 1ty 01' p~ •

It 1aobvioua £ram the d.Gf1nitiona that .n2 esuilibrium oo1.J:xt 2!e. !nvolw .!. d~ted atratoQ ~, •

I

S. • ':han tor • amll couch p :::a o

-ti'= ti + p(S;/_ S;)

OAt can prave a tfltt properUea of tba At of Wldor.ua:t.d .tra~'1t It ia .~ ~ &.ad 18 .f'onaIId b)' tM u.n1on or ScaD ooUtlO'fdon at taou ot the ~ .imp_.

The intonat1OA obtawci by diaoovering doIIl1nano_ tor one ~ IM:¥ be r4 re~ to tho othen, !motU' as tba .15.m1natlon of olu ... ot lIdHd nratet;1 ••• a p".lble OOPlpODtnta ot an equillbrl131 po~ 1a CCIQO.-nec!. POl" the ;t IS 1IboM 0CIDp0bImta are all undam.1natod an all that need be COJl81dered abd th1a .1Wnatlne aamo or the stratez1M of ana pla,ar -.y =alca po.aiblo the ol1m1na'blon ~ .. new olaaa at atn:t:es1ee for another play.r.

-16-

.t.nathar ~rocoo.ure which tlaj. bo used ill loC(lt~ uquil1briUL1 ~intG

!.!! the c,.;;:.trtv1icticn-Wo ar..al:,"SilO. r:.cre one i:.S:;~ti ~Let n..~ o'i~llib4"1.Utl ;?Oint e~i.3t:i. lm"11:lo CCII:IpOl1011t at.'tG~iou lj'~t; ·.'1ithin certain re.::ions of ~ 3't~to£:" l<?nCOC a.-:.d :?l"OCccdI! to ctld~ce tu...-t,;lCr coc.di';;:!.Ol"..3 ;{hie:!. :ust 1Jo aat~!.od ~. t!'.g ~?othQC!.e !.s ·tr.l.O. :h:&:.art cf :-ouon!.ni; ~~ be can-ie<i t..~roubh aov6Z"&l ato.coa to eventually obtc.!.n a oontnu.uct1on illdiaat~ ~t there i3 no equil!.hr!.u:::l poi::t SAtW~~ t.ho in!. tial ~7Cthea1&.

'.

rcali=t!.c case ,. include tr.o ai:!lpli,;.'iac. _:iokor ~ ~iV'6n 0010lIl'. tho

( 1)

71:.e dec 1: is lar "6 II Tli th ac \lUll '." ::is.ll-_' hiGh and low cards. and

'.,.. ... ., -

a ~d Qor~lata at ana card.

(3) The ?lDyora ~lay in rotation and tho ;:;ar:w enes Q.fter 0.11 haw

t14a _ oall "behIIv:1Ol" ~ ... tbau III ';ho uorml torm of "~

~ Gel:JIt. and F.coDiDlaio ~T1or." In tho non:al i'om repreaeatat1cm tiro JlSixed atrateciea 'at & p~ ~ b. equivalent 1n ~ aonae tl-.at each makee the 1ndl vidual ohooe. _ell a_Uabla ~. oS: action 1n each particular .ltuat1OQ :requ1rinG action Oll hi- pal1rwith the ... 1"ntquenoy. 7hat i.e. thq ~ tbt __ bebaY10r pattem ot1 the pan at the 1n-

dlv1dual.

Bel:aY1Dl" ~. p.w the prcba.bU1t1e. ot taldn& •• ch of tho nr10ua poa.1b18 act1OW$ 1A each at the ~10ua poa.1blo a1tlati0!28 whiCh _, ar1.... llwa ~ dHcr1be bebarlor patterna.

In tDnI'e of behaTior panmaten the .trateg!. ... of the pIa,... -: be

with a hiQ! card at one' II laat opportun1 t:r to bert that thia w1ll not be

F1rst lloveG

r

0< - 01*1 .on- .!!&a

: ~ Opon on~

k Call I:': on low

-

I I

,... call 11 and II:r on ~

i Call z on ~
!! ~ open on hi~
E open on law
-
~ Call I and II OIl low
-
~ Opon on low
-
~ ...
.... 8
Call I OIl law
-
~ Call II on low
- 7/ Call I::1 on JE.!!

5' CUl!II and I on ~

move.

We looa1..O all poGo1blo equll1br1\12:l po1nta b: t1rat ah.ow1n& bot moat or the c;reek ~er. JI1UiTt 'Vall1ah. By dom~naM. mainly with a 11ttl. oontrad1ot1on-t)'pe a.ralye1a ~ 18 .U.'aated and with it &0 '{, 'S , aDd t1 'by 4ca1.aanoe. 1'hea oOJltftd1ct1ou eliminate f4-" ~, (. " A" k ~

•

Contn.d1ct1an ~1a .bow. that DOC. of the .. can be .I0I"O or one and

thua we obtain a ayatcl ot a1aUtar.aoUoG aJ.cCra1c equa"t1ona. 1be equat1O!l8 happ4t1'l to have but one ,olution with the -.r1ahlea 1ll tl:.II raz:p (0,') • We Get

,._) _ 1.\ - $31

1.1\- JO

€ ~ li- «-I ol-tt;

.., -= t.; ot ± \ ~:= ~-- ~ G(

• I ~ , ~+~

• These lfle Id 0(::. 30~.) tJ=. G }l;.1 ~ = • ~.<l" , ~"J /

' ..

.:;1000 tr.ere is onl:; OM equ111br1ut1 point the Gam8 1'.48 values J those are

" __ Oq<;, = - 1- 'tAo( ... 0-hlJ.

1- - • 'r"

•

I Q.#\d rr. eX = >/.,.. ~= t= I

]]I

l-=- VII- ) o~ n= 1rJ value to III' : · a ?>rt~= y~ 1.

]I G.-\ d III TCU"8U8 I

0<-= "73

'ftlue to I: -.IG'7:=: - I/~

I

nr

h\1h. ,()W ~::o 311,
bet ptl.s~ - - .. _ ....
P4.SS ~ss - ~ - .. - ... 1-= '%, ~1.1 s = Y., ,€ == 3/1J

value to lI.: -.l/~'::: - «;,4y-

The ooall.'bloA _mbers ha'"1O the power to ag,rao u.pon 6 r>&ttC'1l 0:

pl.q ~l'QI". the r.am 1. p~d. Th1. actftnta&. became. 81tn1t1caDb o~ l.n tl-.e case of coalition I]I[ whore]]I. :as.y- openaftor two paa ••• lIh8n I h:ld ,lanned to pus on both hl.W and ~ but wUl not open 1£

· .

Hotivatlou aDd Interpretation

In th1a section .. shall trJ' to oxpla1n the aicnUlcance ot tho concepta 1ntrad\JDeC! 1Jl th1a paper. l'hat 1.1, .. shall try to ehow how .quilibrium po1nta and .olutlona can be conneoted with obaorvabl •

. - _

p}wJ1CD1aa.

TM b .. S.o requirements tor a IlOn-oooperatlve pM 14 that thore Ihould be no pre-play cOlllmUJllcation among the pla:y.l'II f 1JAl.... 1 t baa

I¥) beerlJlg on the prrtttJ. Thua. bl' 1m:pllcatioA. there are no ccalit10M and no .1d ... pa~.. Decaua. there 1a no utra-pme ut11itr £' pa:r-otfJ tranater. the pa)-Qt'1"s 01" d1ttereJ:lt pla1erl are et1'ecta1ft17 1ncompal'abl.,

it ... tzoac.tora the pq-att t'uDDt1cma l1nearlra Pi ~ a ~ Pi + b: ,

equ1llbrium. pC'1nta an preHZ"98Cl W¥!er ,UGh tnnatanatiOll8.

We ,hall llaIf take up the • .. a-actlon· 1nterpr.tat1on of eliuUlbrlum po1DU. In th1. 1Dterpr.1d.0Il .o11ft1ou b&w DC) ",eat .1p1t1ouDe. It 1a ums--1&17 to UalDt that th8 perillo1panta hfte M1 kDawl",e or the total .tructure of the p.ma. ",. the .bUtt)' an4 1tto11mtlOJl to fP tbl-oudl 'aD)' caap1_ reason1nc proo..... Bd the partlo~pante U. ~POH4 to accumulate' -.p1r1oa11.ntormat1ODon the_."la~1 ... achaAtacM at the 'ftJ'1oua

~ puN atn."ci __ at 1Ibtt1r d1apoea1.

To b. lID" deta1led ..... aUM that then 11 • populatlO11 £1A tM .. 1I&.ot atat1aUoV ot ~lo1puta tor ••• poait1oa of the ca-. Let

ua alao &A18IJ that the ·a~ p~ ot tba 1n'Io1 .... II part101-

puta .elMted .t naS_ tna tb.a II popu1atioM that ~ 18. na-

bla awt"aC. tnqueaDl' with 1IbS.ab eaoh PUN telJ 18 ..,J.o,. by ~

"aftftP ...,... ot the appropriate population.

ss.nce then is to be no oollaborat1oD bit ..... Wi 'Y1c1uala p~ in

-2%-

d.U"terent poalt10D8 ot the ~. the probab1l1ty that a part10ular ntuple or pure .tn.teb1oa wUl be caplo~d in e. play1nc; or the &&me ahould be tha product at the probabUlt108 indioatins the ONiDOG of

tot the probability that -rrio( wUl be employC 111 a ranGcm

paying ot the pma be C. at • and let S;:: L. C i q rr i.::(

0(

...4.::.( S • ., S 1., - •• s "') • Then the ex~ pay-ort to an 1lld1-v-

1clual playiAg 111 the • th poa1t1on or the I}UIJII and emplo)'1nc the pure

•

.trateQ" 1f.0( 1.1

•

Now let U. oona1der t e£.reota the exper1eDO. r4 tha part10ipanta

will produce. To "CUM d1d.. that they aoou.Jlate4 ..,1r10&1

evid.noo on the pure .tratep. .. at their d1.poeal 1_ to ..... 1Ulat

thoae playlAc 1n poa! t10n

•

But it they know thea. they will eplOJ 0IIl.1 optSal pure atftwp.e •• 1 .... 1JbG .. pun .... tec'- 'Viol au.ab. tha1a

•

'~'17.ao. Si .xpre ... 1rhe1r b8n1~ $; atta __ poet- 1&1w ooC':'101enta oZl17 to ~ pure .... ~. 10 that

',~. .... ",' <', . t, .. '~ '~. •

Bu", th1a 1& .~. ooa41t1oa tor AI.... to be aD .u1br1_ poiDt. £ ... [q.J,r~

1'hua iIb4t .. 8UIIIpUoaa _ M4e 111 tb1a " ...... crU.0Il" lAWpret10A

leU to tbt ooaalua1oA tbd the JI1xed .'tft1;ecu. "~the avarap behaT10r 1n _oh ot the populaUo_ tarm an equ1l1brlua po1At.

!he populat1oDII need: D01J b. larte tt tM ulllllptlOlW rim :-:'r~;:c ! t:

,,_

-Z5-

:_:: hold. Thero an .ituations in 8Occoaica or international

poUtlca in lrhich. errootlwly ... c;roup of interests are involved in 0. non-cooperativo taM without belnc 8WIlr8 or it, the non-cnrel1088

. help1.rl&:to--tbe sltuatioJ1 truly nCll-oDoperative.

Actual.l7. of couraa, ,.. can onlyaxpoct soma Ban at appro:d:llate euqU1b1"luz::a. a1noo tho 1%lronat1Ol1. ita utU1r.ation, and the 8tabUIty or tbG a'V8nbO troqueno1ea wlll bo 1::Jparfeot.

We now akotab. allDthcr interpretation. onca in which aolutlona play .. -Jor role. and which 18 applIcable to .. p. p~ but once.

We procHc1 'til 1nveatlp.til1g the qu .. tiolU what would be a nraUcmal.-

(}ueatlon' By using the prlnclp1ea that .. rational prediction IIhould be unique. that the p~ .bGuld b. able to deduce and make u •• at It, and tha~ such lalowl.edg9 on the part at each pla~ ot what to expect the otbera 150 do ahould not lead h1a to act out at coctonld.tr with tlJ8 pre- 41ctl.. ODe 1. leeS to 'the ao=ept ot a Hlut1ala 4etlDN Mt'ozoe.

U SIJS1.., ••• S" .... the ... ot ~ n:.tes1ea ~ a aolwb1e ~. the -mloral" p~ ahota14 be. tln.....-.p

~

Mba't!or or l'I.~oaal atSI plq1Dc 1D poelt1oa i 1ICIU1d d .. w • Id.x.d

atta1MrQ Si SA 5; 1t. exper1mtll1J were carr1e4 out:."

IA th1I 1ntarprotat1oA ... rao4 to ~ the ~ JmaJr the run atru.c~ . at tn. ~ in on:1or to be able to deduce the pNdlot1Ob tor th.eza.Mlvea. It U quite .~ a zoat10zal1atlo &ad 1dM11aiDc 1.nterpNtat1oa.

In an WUlolvabl. ca- 1t .ClMtW. happeaa that &004 beur1atlo ne.cm. can be found tor Daft'awing down the .ot at oquU1brl.um pointa to <, tho •• 1n a 11Jl&le lub ... olut1on. which tbeD. p~ th. role of • aolut10n.

- l

III cooen.l a .ub-eolutioJl u.y be looked at .. a .et or mtually oompatible equU1.brium poiJlta. tonrW:lg a coherent whole. The sub- 1:he

solutions appeer to &i ... a natural subdivision o:i.at at equilibrium

. po1nta f4 •. ~.. .

Appl1cat1ona

The atu4y ot n-perSOll guea tor 'Whioh the accopted ethios ot tair play imply non-oooperatl'" playing 1&, or course. all obvious d1reotiO&l in which to apply thi8 thGo17. And poker 18 the moat obv1oU8 target •

.. - , .. -~ .... -- .- .. -" - .

The analyat. t4 a mere rea11st1c poker gaDI than our 'WIr"'-J .impl. JIIOdel should be quite an int.reat1D& aftair.

The oomplexity of tho mathozat1oalwork needed tor a oanplete 1nVMtigat10n 1ncr ...... rather' rapidly, hoaewr, with 1ncreaa1lq; ccmplex- 1V at the ca-J 80 that it HGI&I that ana1:,ra1a of a batIO :much aore oaepla thaD the GUIp'-- ,iwn hAre 1IOUld 0Ill7 be teaa1bl. u.ing appranat. oCllpU't:a1s1oaa1 ..tbocl ••

A 1etus obYtou. t:fptI ~ appl1cat1cm 18 to tho studJ of oooperatiw

~. Br.ooopeR1J1 pa we ~ ... 1tuatlO1l 1nvolv1n& a •• t r4

ph,... pur. Itrate;;1 N1<1 p~. u uaualJ but with t;ha uaumpt10D

tha1J the pta,... 08D aDd wUl aollaboa ... tba7 do 111 tbe ~ ",-nn amllfor'CClteJ"J1 tbeor,y. Thb - .... the pla,v. ~ OCW'm1oa'" ..s lora

u

ooal.iia1oaa wh1~ Y1l1 be .tJtoroed b7 an _In. I1l 1a UADIIO .. ...s.1J"

rutr1otiw. bcMnv. to .. IUIIMI &D7 truaterabU;V. or ne ClClllpt.l'ab11- 1"7 of the pq-ott. C 1Ih1oh Ihou14 b. 1n ut1l1't1 wtv to41tt .... ~. AIJ:'I cS .. 1N4 tnurerabWt, ClaD '- pa\ lAto 11M c- 11rM1t 1D.~ ot ... USI1nc 1t po •• 1bt. in the extr..c- ooll.aboftt1on.

The _1, .. baa 4.,.lope4 a -4)l1twSoal· app~ tott. ~ at 00- openUw .... band upoA ~ to XlGl-oGOpC'a'ti1w tOl1la ODe p"o.... 117 ~ • -.1el or tala PN plq ~1aUoA ao iaha1l ... n.p. ~ negotiation Mo'" .,... in .. ~ ncm-ooopcU1w ... L" Wb1ah 1d1l haft an 1J:It1D1V at p.l1"8 atn.teg1-J 4oacr1b1Dc the ~ .1tnaUon.

ru. l.arpr pM SA the treaW 1n t .... or tM ~ fit tbU pr.per

· , -

£ extended. to 1nt1n1t. ~ and it .... lusd are obtained they are taken ... the value. or the cooperatbe cam. T~ tho problem anal~1ng a cooperati'ft , .. beGQMI tho ,robl_ or obtaining 6 suitable. and convincing. non-cool"Oft.tlw model for the negotiation.

'!'he writer baa. by 8uoh. treatment. ob'ta1ned valuea tor all fillite

B1bllogra~

(1)

von NGumann. llor,,;enatern. "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior".

Pr1.no.ton Un1venlt7 Pre ••• 1944.

(2)

J. F. llaah. Jr •• "EquU1brlum l'o1nta in N-Per8011 a.-.tt• ?roc. N.

A. s. ~ (1950) 48-49.

Alna. ~. Gal., awl Aulm pvo ve.l.uablo criticiaa a.DIi G~CNlt.i.tmII tor 1mprov1ng the expoelt1on of the mater1al in thil paper. DaY1d Gale augs-ned the 1nve.tl;atlon at .yzaetr1c pmu. The aolut1on at the Poker .,.1 .. a jolJll; p:'ojan ~ 11)' LloJd a, Sbaplq &Df1 b .11;1101'. P!.DaU;,. the author wa. W8ta1.oec1 t1DaDo1al4 by tbe Atcmo JDercr 0-.5 •• • ioa 1D .... period 1949-60 cluriAg whiCh tid .. wort .... do:Ie.