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Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic

Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic

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62
D.F0LLESDAL
objects,thatisthat
'(gP',
iftrueofanobject,istrueofitregardlessoftwayinwhichitisreferredto,thenoneshouldbetternotquantifyincausalcontexts;oneshouldavoidcontrary-to-factconditionals,scientilaw-statements,confirmationstatements,andmanytypesofprebabilitstatementsanddispositionterms-ifOnewantstomakesense.
V
EMANTICALCONSIDERATIONSONMODALLOGIC
SAUL
A.
KRIPKE
HIS
papergivesanexpositionofsomefeaturesofasemanticaltheory
f
modallogics.'ForacertainquantifiedextensionofS5,thistheorywasentedin'ACompletenessTheoreminModalLogic?andithasbeenmmarizedin'SemanticalAnalysisofModalLogic'."Thepresentperwillconcentrateononeaspectofthetheory-theintroductionofantifiers-anditwillrestrictitselfinthemaintoonemethodofachieving
's
end.Theemphasisofthepaperwillbepurelysemantical,andhencewillomittheuseofsemantictableaux,whichisessentialtoafullpre-tationofthetheory,"Proofs,also,
will
largelybesuppressed.Weconsiderfourmodalsystems.Formulae
A,B,
C,...arebuilttofatomicformulae
P,
Q,
R,...,
usingtheconnectives
1\,"',
dD.Thesystem
M
hasthefollowingaxiomschemesandrules:
AD.
Truth-functionaltautologiesAI.DA
=>
A
A2.D(A
=>
B)
=>
DA
=>
DBRl.
A,A
=>
BIB
R2.
AIDA
weaddthefollowingaxiomscheme,wegetS4:
From
ActaPhilosophicaFennica,
16(1963),83-94.Reprintedbypermissionofthehorandthepublishers,SocietasPhilosophicaFennica,Helsinki.Thetheorygivenherehaspointsofcontactwithmanyauthors:ForlistsofseeS.Kripke,'SemanticalAnalysisofModalLogic',
ZeitschriftfurMathe-heLogikundGrundlagenderMathematik,
9(1963),67-96,and
J.
Hintikka,alityandQuantification'
Theoria,
27(1961)119-28.TheauthorsclosesttothenttheoryappeartobeHintikkaandKanger.Thepresenttreatmentofquanti-ion,however,isuniqueasfarasIknow,althoughitderivessomeinspirationfromaintancewiththeverydifferentmethodsofPriorandHintikka.
2
JournalofSymbolicLogic,
24(1959),1-15.
S
Ibid.,pp.323-4(Abstract).
4
Forthesesee'ACompletenessTheoreminModalLogic',
JournalofSymbolicogle,
24(1959),1-15and'SemanticalAnalysisofModalLogic',
ZeitschriftfurathematischeLogikundGrundlagenderMathematik,
9,67-96.
 
64
S.A.KRIPKESEMANTICALCONSIDERATIONSONMODALLOGIC65
.Thiscompleteness.theoremequatesthesyntacticalnotionof
provability
mamodalsyste:TIwithasemanticalnotionof
validity.
Therestof~hISpape:concerns,withtheexceptionofsomeconcludingre:narks,theintroductionofquantifiers.Todothis,wemustassociatewitheachworldadomainofindividuals,theindividualsthatexistinthatworld.Formally,wedefinea
quantificationalmodelstructure
(q.m.s.)asamodelstructure(G,K,
R),
togetherwithafunction
lj!
whichassignstoeach~
8~(
.aset
'!pCI;I),.
cal~edthe
domain
ofH.Intuitively
lj!(H)
isthesetofallindividualsexisting
III
H.
Notice,ofcourse,thatlj!(H)neednotbethesamesetfordifferentargumentsH,justas,intuitively,inworldsotherthantherealone,someactuallyexistingindividualsmaybeabsentwhilenewindividuals,likePegasus,mayappear.'
.'Y~
mayth:nadd,tothesymbolsofmodallogic,aninfinitelistofindividualvanables
x,
y,
z,...,
and,foreachnonnegativeinteger
n
alist~fn-adicpredicateletters
P»,
Qn,..'.'
wherethesuperscriptswillsometimes~eunderstoodfromthecontext.Wecountpropositionalvari-ables(atomicformula~)as'O-adic'predicateletters.Wethenbuildupwell-formedformulae
III
theusualmanner,andcannowprepareour-selvestodefineaquantificational
model.
~odefin.eaquantificationalmodel,wemustextendtheoriginalnotion,whichassignedatruth-valuetoeachatomicformulaineachworld.Analogously:wemusts~pposethatineachworldagivenn-adicpredicateletterdeterminesacertainsetoforderedn-tuples,its
extension
inthatworld.Consider,forexample,thecaseofamonadicpredicateletter
P(x).
Wewouldliketosaythat,intheworldH,thepredicate
P(x)
istrueofsomeindividualsinlj!(H)andfalseofothers;formally,wewouldsaythatrelativetocertainassignmentsofelementsoflj!(H)to
x,rp(P(x),
H)
=
T
drelativetoothers
rp(P(x),
H)
=
F.Thesetofallindividualsofwhich
P
istrueiscalledthe
extension
ofPinH.Butthereisaproblem:should
(P(x),
H)begivenatruth-valuewhen
x
isassignedavalueinthedomainofsome
other
worldH'andnotinthedomainofH?Intuitively,suppose
(x)
means
'x
isbald'-arewetoassignatruth-valuetothesubstitutioninstance'SherlockHolmesisbald'?Holmesdoesnotexist,butinotherstatesofaffairs,hewouldhaveexisted.Shouldweassignadefinitetruth-valuetothestatementthatheisbald,ornot?Frege"andStrawson?Wegetthe
Brouwersche
systemifweaddto
M:
A:::>
D<)AS5,ifweadd:
<)A:::>
D<)AModalsystemswhosetheoremsareclosedundertherulesRlandR2andincludealltheoremsof
M,
arecalled'normal'.Althoughwehavdevelopedatheorywhichappliestosuchnon-normalsystemsasLewis'S2andS3,wewillrestrictourselvesheretonormalsystems.Togetasemanticsformodallogic,weintroducethenotionofa(norma
modelstructure.
Amodelstructure(m.s.)isanorderedtriple(G,K,whereKisaset,
R
isareflexiverelationonK,andG
8
K.Intuitively,lookatmattersthus:Kisthesetofall'possibleworlds';Gisthe'rworld'.
If
HIandH2aretwoworlds,
HIR
H2meansintuitivelythatH2'possiblerelativeto'HI;
i.e.,
thateveryproposition
true
inH2is
possible
iHI'Clearly,then,therelation
R
shouldindeedbereflexive;everyworlHis
possible
relativetoitself,sinceeveryproposition
true
inHis,
fortiori,
possibleinH.Reflexivityisthusanintuitivelynaturalrequirment.Wemayimposeadditionalrequirements,correspondingtovario'reductionaxioms'ofmodallogic:If
R
istransitive,wecall(G,K,anS4-m.s.;if
R
issymmetric,(G,K,
R)
isa
Brouwersche
m.s.;andifisanequivalencerelation,wecall(G,K,
R)
anS5-m.s.AmodelstructuwithoutrestrictionisalsocalledanM-modelstructure.Tocompletethepicture,weneedthenotionof
model.
Givenamostructure(G,K,
R),
a
model
assignstoeachatomicformula(propositiovariable)
P
atruth-valueTorFineachworldH
8
K.Formally,a
mo
rp
onam.s.(G,K,
R)
isabinaryfunction
rp(P,
H),where
P
varies
0
atomicformulaeandHvariesoverelementsofK,whoserangeisthe{T,F}.Givenamodel,wecandefinetheassignmentsoftruth-valuesnon-atomicformulaebyinduction.Assume
rp(A,
H)and
rp(B,
H)haalreadybeendefinedforallH
8
K.Thenif
rp(A,
H)
=
rp(B,
H)
=
define
rp(A/\B,
H)
=
T;otherwise,
rp(A/\B,
H)
=
F.
rp(
,-A,
H)isdefintobeFiff
rp(A,
H)
=
T;otherwise,
rp(-A,
H)
=
T.Finally,wedefi
rp(DA,
H)
=
Tiff
rp(A,
H')
=
TforeveryH'
e
KsuchthatH
R
H';othewise,
rp(DA,
H)
=
F.Intuitively,thissaysthat
A
isnecessaryinHiffistrueinallworldsH'possiblerelativeto
H.
Completenesstheorem.
l-Ain
M
(84,S5,the
Brouwersche
system)
6
GFrese'UberSinnundBedeutung'
Z'/h'''/
fi
Phil.hi
d
hi
..'.<:.'
et
s~
rtjiur
IOSOP
teun
p
I,OSO-
IfandonlyIf
rp(A,
G)
=
Tforeverymodel
rp
onan
M-(S4-,
S5-,
Brou
phische
Kritik,
100(1892),25-50.EnglishtranslationsinGeachandBlack
Transla-
wersche)
modelstructure(G,K,
R).5
lion~fron:thePhilosophicalWriti~gs~fG~ttlobl!rege,
(Oxford:Blackw~l1,1952),and
In
FeiglandSellars(eds.),
Readings
In
PhilosophicalAnalysis
(NewYork:AppletonCenturyCrofts,1949).
7
P.F.Strawson,'Onreferring',
Mind,
n.s.,59(1950),320--44.
5
Foraproof,see'SemanticalAnalysis...,'
Zeitschrift.•.
,9.
 
overelementsofK.If
n
=
0,
rp(pn,
H)
=
TorF;if
n
:2::
1,
rp(pn,
H)
isasubsetofU",Wenowdefine,inductively,foreveryformula
A
andH
13
K,atruth-value
rp(A,
H),
relativetoagivenassignmentofelementsofUtothefreevariablesof
A.
Thecaseofapropositionalvariableisobvious.Foranatomicformula
pn(Xl'...,xn),
where
P"
isann-adicpredicateletterand
n:;::::
1,
givenanassignmentofelements
aI,..,
an
ofUto
Xl>.,
Xn,
wedefine
rp(pn(xl,...,xn),
H)
=
Tifthen-tuple
(a!,...,
a,,)
isamemberof
rp(pn,
H);
otherwise,
rp(pn(Xl'...,xn),
H)
=
F,relativetothegivenassignment.Giventheseassignmentsforatomicformulae,wecanbuilduptheassignmentsforcomplexformulaebyinduction.Theinductionstepsforthepropositionalconnectives/\,,...."D,havealreadybeengiven.Assumewehaveaformula
A(x,yl,...,Yn),
where
x
andthe
YI
aretheonlyfreevariablespresent,andthatatruth-value
rp(A(x,yl,...,Yn),
H)
hasbeendefinedforeachassignmenttothefreevariablesof
A(x,
Yl,...,
Yn).
Thenwedefine
rp«x)A(x,Y1>,
In),
H)
=
Trelativetoanassignmentofb
l,,
b.;
to
Yl,,
Yn
(wherethe
b,
areelementsofU),if
rp«(A(x,
Yl,,
Yn),
H)
=
Tforeveryassignmentof
a,
bi,...,b-:
to
X'Yl,..',Yn,
respectively,where
a
13
7p(H);
otherwise,
rp«x)A(x,
Yl,...,
Yn),
H)
=
Frelativetothegivenassign-ment.Noticethattherestriction
a
13
7p(H)
meansthat,inH,wequantifyonlyovertheobjectsactuallyexistinginH.Toillustratethesemantics,wegivecounterexamplestotwofamiliarroposalsforlawsofmodalquantificationtheory-the'Barcanformula'
x)DA(x)
::::>
D(x)A(x)
anditsconverse
D(x)A(x)::::>(x)DA(x).
Forchweconsideramodelstructure(G,K,
R),
whereK
=
{G,H},G
=1=
H,d
R
issimplytheCartesianproduct
K2.
Clearly
R
isreflexive,transitive,andsymmetric,soourconsiderationsapplyeventoS5.FortheBarcanformula,weextend(G,K,
R)
toaquantificationalmodelstructurebydefining
7p(G)
=
{a},
'IJ!(H)
=
{a,
b},
where
a
and
b
aredistinct.Wethendefine,foramonadicpredicateletter
P,
amodel
rp
inwhich
rp(P,
G)
=
{a},rp(P,
H)
=
{a}.
Thenclearly
DP(x)
istrueinG
8
BertrandRnssell,'Ondenoting',
Mind,
n.s.,
14(1905),479-93.
when
x
isassigned
a;
andsince
a
istheonlyobjectinthedomainofG,
9
'ModalityandQuantification'.sois
(x)DP(x).
But,
(x)P(x)
isclearlyfalsein
H
(for
rp(P(x),
H)
=
F
10
A.N.
Prior,
TimeandModality
(Oxford:ClarendonPress,
1957,
VIII
+
148
pp.)when
x
isassign.ed
b),
andhence
D(x)P(x)
isfalseinG.Sowehavea
11
It
isnaturaltoassumethatan
atomic
predicateshouldbe
false
inaworld
H
ofallthoseindividualsnotexistinginthatworld;thatis,thattheextensionofapredicounterexampletotheBarcanformula.Noticethatthiscounterexamplecatelettermustconsistofactuallyexistingindividuals.Wecandothisbyrequiringisquiteindependentofwhether
P(x)
isassignedatruth-valueinGornotsemanticallythat
rp(pn,
H)
beasubsetof
[7p(H)]n;
thesemanticaltreatr:1entbelowwhen
x
isassigned6,soalsoitappliestothesystemsofHintikkaandPrior.wouldotherwisesufficewithoutchange.Wewouldhavetoaddtothe
axiom
systembelowallclosuresofformulaeoftheform
pn(Xlo..,
xn)/\(y)A(y).
::::>
A(xt)
Suchcounterexamplescanbedisallowed,andtheBarcanformulare-
(1
<
i
<
n).
Wehavechosennottodothisbecausetheruleofsubstitutionwouldnoinstatedonlyifwerequireamodelstructuretosatisfytheconditionthatlongerhold'theoremswouldholdforatomicformulaewhichwouldnotholdwhenthe.
(H'),(H)
hHRH'(HH'
K)
atomicformulaearereplacedbyarbitraryformulae.(Thisanswersaquestionof.tp
S;
'IJ!
wenever,
e..
PutnamandKalmar.)FortheconverseoftheBarcanformula,set
'IJ!(G)
=
{a,
b},'IJ!(H)
=
{a},
66S.A.KRIPKE
wouldnotassignthestatementatruth-value;Russellwould."Forthepurposesofmodallogicweholdthatdifferentanswerstothi~~uesti?nrepresentalternative
conventions.
Allaretenable.TheonlyexistmgdIS-cussionsofthisproblemIhaveseen-thoseofHintikka
9
andPrior-P-.adopttheFrege-Strawsonview.Thisviewnecessarilymustleadtosome.modificationoftheusualmodallogic.Thereasonisthatthesemanticsformodalpropositionallogic,whichwehavealreadygiven,assumedthateveryformulamusttakeatruth-valueineachworld;andnow,foraformula
A(x)
containingafreevariable
x,
theFrege-Strawsonviewre-quiresthatitnotbegivenatruth-valueinaworldHwhenthevariable
x
isassignedanindividualnotinthedomainofthatworld.Wethuscannolongerexpectthattheoriginallawsofmodalpropositionallogicholdforstatementscontainingfreevariables,andarefacedwithanoption:eitherevisemodalpropositionallogicorrestricttheruleofsubstitution.Priordoestheformer,Hintikkathelatter.TherearefurtheralternativestheFrege-Strawsonchoiceinvolves:Shouldwetake
DA
(in
H)
tomeanthat
A
is
true
inallpossibleworlds(relativeto
H),
orjust
notfalse
inanysuchworld?Thesecondalternativemerelydemandsthat
A
beeithertrueorlackatruth-valueineachworld.Prior,inhissystemQ,ineffectadmitsbothtypesofnecessity,oneas
'L'
andtheotheras
'NMN'.
Asimilarquestionarisesforconjunction:if
A
isfalseand
B
hasnotruth-value,shouldwetake
A/\B
tobefalseortruth-valueless?Inafullstatementofthesemanticaltheory,wewouldexploreallthesevariantsoftheFrege-Strawsonview.Herewewilltaketheotheroption,andassumethatastatementcontainingfreevariableshasatruth-valueineachworldforeveryassignmenttoitsfreevariables,"Formallywestatethematterasfollows:LetU
=
U
'IJ!(H).
U"is
,HBK
thenthCartesianproductofUwithitself.Wedefineaquantificational
model
onaq.m.s.(G,K,
R)
asabinaryfunction
e
(P'',H),wherethefirstvariablerangesovern-adicpredicateletters,forarbitrary
n,
andHranges
SEMANTICALCONSIDERATIONSONMODALLOGIC67

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