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    Behavioural Investing: A Practitioner's Guide to Applying Behavioural Finance
    Behavioural Investing: A Practitioner's Guide to Applying Behavioural Finance
    Behavioural Investing: A Practitioner's Guide to Applying Behavioural Finance
    Ebook1,254 pages12 hours

    Behavioural Investing: A Practitioner's Guide to Applying Behavioural Finance

    By James Montier

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    About this ebook

    Behavioural investing seeks to bridge the gap between psychology and investing. All too many investors are unaware of the mental pitfalls that await them. Even once we are aware of our biases, we must recognise that knowledge does not equal behaviour. The solution lies is designing and adopting an investment process that is at least partially robust to behavioural decision-making errors.

    Behavioural Investing: A Practitioner’s Guide to Applying Behavioural Finance explores the biases we face, the way in which they show up in the investment process, and urges readers to adopt an empirically based sceptical approach to investing. This book is unique in combining insights from the field of applied psychology with a through understanding of the investment problem. The content is practitioner focused throughout and will be essential reading for any investment professional looking to improve their investing behaviour to maximise returns. Key features include: 

    • The only book to cover the applications of behavioural finance
    • An executive summary for every chapter with key points highlighted at the chapter start
    • Information on the key behavioural biases of professional investors, including The seven sins of fund management, Investment myth busting, and The Tao of investing
    • Practical examples showing how using a psychologically inspired model can improve on standard, common practice valuation tools
    • Written by an internationally renowned expert in the field of behavioural finance
    LanguageEnglish
    PublisherWiley
    Release dateOct 9, 2009
    ISBN9780470687796
    Behavioural Investing: A Practitioner's Guide to Applying Behavioural Finance

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      Behavioural Investing - James Montier

      SECTION I

      Common Mistakes and Basic Biases

      1

      Emotion, Neuroscience and Investing: Investors s Dopamine Addicts

      ¹

      Understanding what happens in our brain when we make decisions may help us to learn to overcome some of the mistakes we make. Emotions are key. Our ability to exercise self-control over such impulses is limited and decreases with use! Too often we succumb to our hard-wired tendencies to focus on the short term and herd.

      • Emotional decision-making is the default option for our brains. However, we all like to think that we only use logic to arrive at our decisions. In fact without emotion we would be largely incapable of making any decisions, but all too often we allow emotion to rule unchecked. Welcome to the human condition!

      • Neuroscientists have recently uncovered two particular traits of significance to investors. The first is that we are hard-wired for the short term. We tend to find the chance of short

      • The second is that we appear to be hard-wired to herd. The pain of social exclusion (i.e. betting against everyone else) is felt in exactly the same parts of the brain that feel real physical pain. So pursuing contrarian strategies is a little bit like having your arm broken on a regular basis!

      • Self-control over these impulses is very hard. Psychologists have found that self-control is a limited resource. The more we use it, the less we have left to deal with the next occasion when self-control is required.

      • The good news is that we continue to make brain cells pretty much throughout our lives. And our brains aren’t fixed forever, we can rearrange the neurons (a process called plasticity). We aren’t doomed, we can learn, but it isn’t easy!

      What goes on inside our heads when we make decisions? Understanding how our brains work is vital to understanding the decisions we take. Neuroeconomics is a very new field that combines psychology, economics and neuroscience. That may sound like the unholy trinity as far as many readers are concerned, but the insights that this field is generating are powerful indeed.

      Before I head off into the realms of neuroscience I should recap some themes we have explored before that provide the backdrop for much of the discussion that follows. One of the most exciting developments in cognitive psychology over recent years has been the development of dual process theories of thought. All right, stay with me now, I know that sounds dreadful, but it isn’t. It is really a way of saying that we tend to have two different ways of thinking embedded in our minds.

      SPOCK OR McCOY?

      For the Trekkies out there, these two systems can, perhaps, be characterized as Dr McCoy and Mr Spock. McCoy was irrepressibly human, forever allowing his emotions to rule the day. In contrast, Spock (half human, half Vulcan) was determined to suppress his emotions, letting logic drive his decisions.

      McCoy’s approach would seem to be founded in system X. System X is essentially the emotional part of the brain. It is automatic and effortless in the way that it processes information - that is to say, the X-system pre-screens information before we are consciously aware that it even made an impact on our minds. Hence, the X-system is effectively the default option. The X-system deals with information in an associative way, and its judgements tend to be based on similarity (of appearance) and closeness in time. Because of the way the X-system deals with information it can handle vast amounts of data simultaneously. To computer nerds it is a rapid parallel processing unit. In order for the X-system to believe that something is valid, it may simply need to wish that it were so.

      System C is the Vulcan part of the brain. To use it requires deliberate effort. It is logical and deductive in the way in which it handles information. Because it is logical, it can only follow one step at a time, and hence in computing terms it is a slow serial processing unit. In order to convince the C-system that something is true, logical argument and empirical evidence will be required, and Table 1.1 provides a summary of the main differences between the two systems.

      This dual system approach to the way the mind works has received support from very recent studies by neuroscientists who have begun to attach certain parts of the brain to certain functions. In order to do this, neuroscientists ask experiment participants to perform tasks while their brains are being monitored via electroencephalograms (EEG), positron emission topography (PET) or, most often of late, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The outcomes are then compared to base cases and the differences between the scans highlight the areas of the brain that are being utilized.

      Table 1.2 lays out some of the major neural correlates for the two systems of thinking that we have outlined in Table 1.1. There is one very important thing to note about these groupings: the X system components are much older in terms of human development. They evolved a long time before the C-system correlates.

      THE PRIMACY OF EMOTION

      This evolutionary age helps to explain why the X system is the default option for information processing. We needed emotions far before we needed logic. This is perhaps best explained by an example using fear, which is one of the better understood emotions.² Fear seems to be served by two neural pathways. One fast and dirty (LeDoux’s low road), the other more reflective and logical (the high road), and the links to the two systems of thinking outlined above are hopefully obvious.

      Table 1.1 Two systems of reasoning

      Source: Modified from Epstein (1991).

      003

      Table 1.2 Neural correlates of the two reasoning systems

      Source: DrKW Macro research.

      004

      Imagine standing in front of a glass vessel that contains a snake. The snake rears up, the danger is perceived, and the sensory thalamus processes the information. From here two signals emerge. On the low road the signal is sent to the amygdala, part of the X system,² and the brain’s centre for fear and risk. The amygdala reacts quickly, and forces you to jump back.

      However, the second signal (taking the high road) sends the information to the sensory cortex, which, in a more conscious fashion, assesses the possible threat. This is the system that points out that there is a layer of glass between you and the snake. However, from a survival viewpoint, a false positive is a far better response than a false negative!

      Emotions: Body or Brain?

      Most people tend to think that emotions are the conscious response to events or actions. That is, something happens and your brain works out the emotional response - be it sadness, anger, happiness, etc. Then your brain tells your body how to react - tear up, pump blood, increase the breathing rate, etc.

      William James, the grandfather of modern psychology, was among the first to posit that actually true causality may well flow from the body to the brain. In James’s view of the world, the brain assesses the situation so quickly that there simply isn’t time for us to become consciously aware of how we should feel. Instead the brain surveys the body, takes the results (i.e. skin sweating, increased heart beat, etc.) then infers the emotion that matches the physical signals the body has generated.

      If you want to try this yourself, try pulling the face that matches the emotion you wish to experience. For instance, try smiling (see, we aren’t always miserable and bearish despite our reputations). If you sit with a smile on your face, concentrating on that smile, then very soon you are likely to start to feel the positive emotions that one associates with smiling.³

      An entertaining example of the body’s impact upon decisions is provided by Epley and Gilovich (2001). They asked people to evaluate headphones. While conducting the evaluation, participants were asked to either nod or shake their heads. Those who were asked to nod their heads during the evaluation gave much more favourable ratings than those who were asked to shake their heads.

      In the words of Gilbert and Gill (2000), we are momentary realists. That is to say, we have a tendency to trust our initial emotional reaction and correct that initial view only subsequently, occasionally and effortfully. For instance, when we stub a toe on a rock or bang our head on a beam (an easy thing to do in my house), we curse the inanimate object despite the fact it could not possibly have done anything to avoid our own mistake.

      Emotions: Good, Bad or Both?

      However, emotions may be needed in order to allow us to actually make decisions. There are a group of people who, through tragic accidents or radical surgery, have had the emotional areas of their minds damaged. These individuals did not become the walking optimizers known as homo economicus. Rather, in many cases, these individuals are now actually incapable of making decisions. They make endless plans but never get round to implementing any of them.⁴

      Bechara et al. (1997) devised an experiment to show how the lack of emotion in such individuals can lead them to make suboptimal decisions. They played a gambling game with both controls (players without damage to the emotional centres of the brain) and patients (those with damage to the emotional parts of the brain). Each player was seated in front of four packs of cards (A, B, C and D). Players were given a loan of $2,000 and told that the object of the game was to avoid losing the loan, while trying to make as much extra money as possible. They were also told that turning cards from each of the packs would generate gains and occasional losses. The players were told of the impact of each card after each turn, but no running score was given.

      Turning cards from packs A and B paid $100, while those from C and D paid only $50. Unpredictably, the turning of some cards carried a penalty. Consistently playing packs A and B led to an overall loss, while playing C and D led to an overall gain.

      Table 1.3 Progress over the game

      Source: Bechara et al. (1997).

      005

      Performance was assessed at various stages of the game. Four different periods were identified. The first involved no loss in either pack (pre-punishment); the second phase was when players reported they had no idea about the game, and no feeling about the packs; the third was found only in the controls, who started to say they had a hunch about packs A and B being riskier; and finally, the last phase, when (conceptual) players could articulate that A and B were riskier.

      Table 1.3 shows the average number of rounds in each phase, and the percentage of players making it through each phase of the game. The patients were unable to form hunches, and far fewer survived the game.

      Now cast your eye over Figures 1.1 and 1.2. Figure 1.1 shows the number of cards drawn from packs A and B (bad) and C and D (good) in each phase by the controls. In the pre-hunch phase they are already favouring the good packs marginally. In the hunch phase, controls are clearly favouring the good packs.

      Now look at the performance of the patients in Figure 1.2. In the pre-hunch phase they continually chose the bad packs. As noted above, there was no hunch phase. And perhaps most bizarrely of all, even when they had articulated that packs A and B were a bad idea, they still picked more cards from those decks than from C and D! So despite knowing the correct conceptual answer, the lack of ability to feel emotion severely hampered the performance of these individuals.

      Figure 1.1 Average number of cards drawn from bad and good packs: The controls.

      Source: Bechara et al. (1997).

      006

      Figure 1.2 Average number of cards drawn from bad and good packs: The patients.

      Source: Bechara et al. (1997).

      007

      However, similar games can be used to show that emotions can also help us. Bechara et al. (2004) played an investment game. Each player was given $20. They had to make a decision each round of the game: invest $1 or not invest. If the decision was not to invest, the task advanced to the next round. If the decision was to invest, players would hand over $1 to the experimenter. The experimenter would then toss a coin in full view of the player. If the outcome was a head, the player lost the dollar, if the coin landed tail up then $2.50 was added to the player’s account. The task would then move to the next round. Overall 20 rounds were played.

      Bechara et al. played this game with three different groups: normals, a group of players with damage to the neural circuitry associated with fear⁵ (target patients who can no longer feel fear), and a group of players with other lesions to the brain unassociated with the neural fear circuitry (patient controls).

      The experimenters uncovered that the players with damage to the fear circuitry invested in 83.7% of rounds, the normals invested in 62.7% of rounds, and the patient controls in 60.7% of rounds. Was this result attributable to the brain’s handling of loss and fear? Figure 1.3 shows a breakdown of the results, based on the result in the previous round. It shows the proportions of groups that invested. It clearly demonstrates that normals and patient controls were more likely to shrink away from risk-taking, both when they had lost in the previous round and when they won!

      Players with damaged fear circuitry invested in 85.2% of rounds following losses on previous rounds, while normal players invested in only 46.9% of rounds following such losses.

      Bechara et al. also found evidence of just how difficult learning actually is. Instead of becoming more optimal as time moves on, normal players actually become less optimal! (See Figure 1.4.) For the record, a rational player would, of course, play in all rounds.

      Figure 1.3 Percentage of players investing divided into the outcomes from the previous round.

      Source: Bechara et al. (2004).

      008

      Emotion, therefore, can both help and hinder us. Without emotion we are unable to sense risk, but with emotion we can’t control the fear that risk generates! Welcome again to the human condition!

      Camerer et al. (2004) argue that the influence of emotions depends upon the intensity of the experience. They note

      At low level of intensity, affect appears to play a largely ‘advisory’ role. A number of theories posit that emotions carry information that people use as an input into the decisions they face... ...At intermediate level of intensity, people begin to become conscious of conflicts between cognitive and affective inputs. It is at such intermediate levels of intensity that one observes . . . efforts at self-control...

      Figure 1.4 Percentage of players investing by groups of rounds.

      Source: Bechara et al. (2004).

      009

      Figure 1.5 Probability of forceful behaviour by arousal state.

      Source: Loewenstein et al. (1997).

      010

      ...Finally, at even greater levels of intensity, affect can be so powerful as to virtually preclude decision-making. No one ‘decides’ to fall asleep at the wheel, but many people do. Under the influence of intense affective motivation, people often report themselves as being ‘out of control’ . . . As Rita Carter writes in Mapping the Mind, ‘where thought conflicts with emotion, the latter is designed by neural circuitry in our brains to win’.

      Camerer et al. (2004)

      It is also worth noting that we are very bad at projecting how we will feel under the influence of emotion - a characteristic that psychologists call ‘hot-cold empathy gaps’. That is to say, when we are relaxed and emotion free, we underestimate how we would act under the influence of emotion.

      For instance, Loewenstein et al. (1997) asked a group of male students to say how likely they were to act in a sexually aggressive manner in both a hot and a cold environment. The scenario they were given concerned coming home with a girl they had picked up at a bar, having been told by friends that she had a reputation for being ‘easy’. The story went on that the participants and the girl were beginning to get into physical genital contact on the sofa. The participants were then told they had started to try to remove the girl’s clothes, and she said she wasn’t interested in having sex.

      Participants were then asked to assign probabilities to whether they would (1) coax the girl to remove her clothes, or (2) have sex with her even after her protests. Figure 1.5 shows the self-reported probability of sexual aggressiveness (defined as the sum of the probabilities of 1+2). Under the ‘no arousal’ condition there was an average 56% probability of sexual aggression. After having been shown sexually arousing photos, the average probability of aggression rose to nearly 80%!

      SELF-CONTROL IS LIKE A MUSCLE

      Unfortunately a vast array of psychological research (Muraven and Baumeister, 2000; Baumeister, 2003) suggests that our ability to use self-control to force our cognitive pro-cess to override our emotional reaction is limited. Each effort at self-control reduces the amount available for subsequent self-control efforts.

      Figure 1.6 Self-control is a draining experience.

      Source: Muraven and Baumeister (2000).

      011

      A classic example of Baumeister’s work concerns the following experiment. Participants are asked to avoid eating food for three hours before the experiment began (timed to force them to skip lunch). When they arrived they were put into one of three groups.

      The first group were taken into a room in which cookies had recently been baked, so the aroma of freshly made chocolate chip delights wafted around. This room also contained a tray laid out with the freshly baked cookies and other chocolate delights, and a tray full of radishes. This group were told they should eat as many radishes as they could in the next five minutes, but they were also told they weren’t allowed to touch the cookies. A second group was taken to a similar room with the same two trays, but told they could eat the cookies. The third group was taken to an empty room.

      All the food was then removed and the individuals were given problems to solve. These problems took the form of tracing geometric shapes without retracing lines or lifting the pen from the paper. The problems were, sadly, unsolvable. However, the amount of time before participants gave up and the number of attempts made before they gave up were both recorded.

      The results were dramatic (see Figure 1.6). Those who had eaten the radishes (and had therefore expended large amounts of self-control in resisting the cookies) gave up in less than half the time that those who had eaten chocolate or eaten nothing had done. They also had far less attempts at solving the problems before giving up.

      Baumeister (2003) concludes the survey by highlighting the key findings of their research:

      1. Under emotional distress, people shift toward favoring high-risk, high-payoff options, even if these are objectively poor choices. This appears based on a failure to think things through, caused by emotional distress.

      2. When self-esteem is threatened, people become upset and lose their capacity to regulate themselves. In particular, people who hold a high opinion of themselves often get quite upset in response to a blow to pride, and the rush to prove something great about themselves overrides their normal rational way of dealing with life.

      3. Self-regulation is required for many forms of self-interest behavior. When self-regulation fails, people may become self-defeating in various ways, such as taking immediate pleasures instead of delayed rewards. Self-regulation appears to depend on limited resources that operate like strength or energy, and so people can only regulate themselves to a limited extent.

      4. Making choices and decisions depletes this same resource. Once the resource is depleted, such as after making a series of important decisions, the self becomes tired and depleted, and its subsequent decisions may well be costly or foolish.

      5. The need to belong is a central feature of human motivation, and when this need is thwarted such as by interpersonal rejection, the human being somehow ceases to function properly. Irrational and self-defeating acts become more common in the wake of rejection.

      When I read this list it struck me just how many of these factors could influence investors. Imagine a fund manager who has just had a noticeable period of underperformance. He is likely to feel under pressure to start to focus on high-risk, high-payoff options to make up the performance deficit. He is also likely to feel his self-esteem is under threat as outlined in 2 above. He is also likely to begin to become increasingly myopic, focusing more and more on the short term. All of this is likely to be particularly pronounced if the position run resulting in the underperformance is a contrarian one. Effectively, most of the elements that lead to the psychology of irrationality are likely to be present in large quantities.

      HARD-WIRED FOR THE SHORT TERM

      Having explored the role of emotions and our ability to moderate their influence, it is now time to turn to some examples of how powerful neuroscience can be in helping us to understand investor behaviour.

      The first example suggests that we may be hard-wired to focus on the short term. Economists are all brought up to treasure the concept of utility⁶ - the mental reward or pleasure experienced. Traditionally, economists view money as having no direct utility; rather it is held to have indirect utility, that is, it can be used to purchase other goods and services, which do provide direct utility.

      Neuroscientists have found that money actually does have ‘utility’, or at least the brain anticipates receiving money in the same way that other rewards are felt, such as enjoying food or pleasure-inducing drugs (Knutson and Peterson, 2004).

      The trouble is that the reward system for the brain has strong links to the X-system. The anticipation of reward leads to the release of dopamine. Dopamine makes people feel good about themselves, confident and stimulated.

      Cocaine works by blocking the dopamine receptors in the brain, so the brain cannot absorb the dopamine, and hence nullify its effects. Because the brain cannot absorb the dopamine, it triggers further releases of the drug. So when one takes coke, the dopamine release is increased, taking the user to a high. Neuroscientists have found that the larger the anticipated reward the more dopamine is released.

      McClure et al. (2004) have recently investigated the neural systems that underlie decisions about delayed gratification. Much research has suggested that people tend to behave impatiently today but plan to act patiently in the future. For instance, when offered a choice between £10 today and £11 tomorrow, many people choose the immediate option. However, if asked today to choose between £10 in a year, and £11 in a year and a day, many people who went for the ‘immediate’ option in the first case now go for the second option.

      In order to see what happens in the brain when faced with such choices, McClure et al. measured the brain activity of participants as they made a series of intertemporal choices between early and delayed monetary rewards (like the one above). Some of the choice pairs included an immediate option, others were choices between two delayed options. The results they uncovered are intriguing.

      When the choice pair involved an immediate gain, the ventral stratum (part of the basal ganglia), the medial orbitofrontal cortex, and the medial prefrontal cortex were all disproportionately used. All these elements are associated with the X-system. McClure et al. also point out that these areas are riddled by the midbrain dopamine system. They note, ‘These structures have consistently been implicated in impulsive behaviour, and drug addiction is commonly thought to involve disturbances of dopaminergic neurotransmission in these systems.’ Since money is a reward, the offer of money today causes a surge in dopamine that people find very hard to resist.

      When the choice involved two delayed rewards, the prefrontal and parietal cortex were engaged (correlates of the C-system). The more difficult the choice, the more these areas seemed to be used. Given the analysis of the limits to self-control that was outlined above, perhaps we should not hold out too much hope for our ability to correct the urges triggered by the X-system. All too often, it looks as if we are likely to end up being hard-wired for the short term.

      Keynes was sadly right when he wrote, Investment based on genuine long-term expectation is so difficult to-day as to be scarcely practicable.

      HARD-WIRED TO HERD

      In the past, we have mentioned that there is strong evidence from neuroscience to suggest that real pain and social pain are felt in exactly the same places in the brain. Eisenberger and Lieberman (2004) asked participants to play a computer game. Players think they are playing in a three-way game with two other players, throwing a ball back and forth.

      In fact, the two other players are computer controlled. After a period of three-way play, the two other ‘players’ began to exclude the participant by throwing the ball back and forth between themselves. This social exclusion generates brain activity in the anterior cingulate cortex and the insula, both of which are also activated by real physical pain.

      Contrarian strategies are the investment equivalent of seeking out social pain. In order to implement such a strategy you will buy the things that everyone else is selling, and sell the stocks that everyone else is buying. This is social pain. Eisenberger and Lieberman’s results suggest that following such a strategy is really like having your arm broken on a regular basis - not fun!

      To buy when others are despondently selling and sell when others are greedily buying requires the greatest fortitude and pays the greatest reward

      Sir John Templeton

      It is the long-term investor, he who most promotes the public interest, who will in practice come in for the most criticism... For it is in the essence of his behaviour that he should be eccentric, unconventional and rash in the eyes of average opinion

      John Maynard Keynes

      PLASTICITY AS SALVATION

      All of this may make for fairly depressing reading. With emotions we cannot control ourselves, and without them we cannot make decisions. We appear to be doomed to chase short-term rewards and run with the herd. When we try to resist these temptations we suffer subsequent declines in our ability to exercise self-control. Not a pretty picture.

      However, all is not lost. For many years it was thought that the number of brain cells was fixed and that they decayed over time. The good news is that this isn’t the case. We are capable of generating new brain cells over most of our lifetime.

      In addition, the brain isn’t fixed into a certain format. The easiest way of thinking about this is to imagine the brain as a cobweb. Some strands of that cobweb are thicker than others. The more the brain uses a certain pathway, the thicker the strand becomes. The thicker the strand, the more the brain will tend to use that path. So if we get into bad mental habits, they can become persistent.

      However, we are also capable of rearranging those pathways (neurons). This is how the brain learns. It is properly called plasticity. We aren’t doomed, we can learn, but it isn’t easy!

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      Part Man, Part Monkey

      Leaving the trees could have been our first mistake. Our minds are suited for solving problems related to survival, rather than being optimized for investment decisions. The result of our inheritance is that we are all capable of making mistakes. The list below provides a list of maxims to remember in order to avoid the most common investment pitfalls.

      • These biases apply to me, you and everyone else as well.

      • Be less certain in your views, especially if they are forecasts.

      • You know less than you think you do.

      • Try to focus on the facts, not the stories.

      • More information isn’t better information.

      • Listen to those who disagree with you.

      • Examine your mistakes, failures aren’t just bad luck.

      • You didn’t know it all along, you just think you did.

      • Judge things by how statistically likely they are, not how they appear.

      • Big, vivid, easy to recall events are less likely than you think they are.

      • Don’t confuse good firms with good investments or good earnings growth with good returns.

      • Use reverse-engineered models to avoid anchoring on the market prices.

      • Don’t take information at face value; think carefully about how it was presented to you.

      • Sell your losers and ride your winners.

      Figure 2.1 The self vs others’ susceptibility to biases.

      Source: Adapted from Pronin et al. (2002).

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      Perhaps the first step down this path is becoming aware of the fact that we are all likely to suffer from what psychologists call heuristics and biases. Heuristics are just rules of thumb that allow us to deal with informational deluge. In many cases they work well, but sometimes they lead us far stray from rational decision-making.

      Of course, we all like to think that we are immune to the influences of biases. But the reality is, of course, that we are all likely to suffer some of these mental errors on some occasions. For instance, Pronin et al. (2002) asked people to rate on a 9-point scale (with 5 being ‘somewhat’) how likely the average American was to suffer a particular bias, and how likely they were to suffer the same biases. A booklet describing the biases was provided. Figure 2.1 shows the results. In all cases, people rated themselves less likely to suffer a given bias than average. Across the biases, the average score for the average American was 6.75. For those taking part, the average score was 5.31. All the differences were statistically significant. Pronin et al. refer to this as the bias blind spot.

      THE BIASES WE FACE

      Psychologists have spent years documenting and cataloging the types of errors to which we are prone. The main results are surprisingly universal across cultures and countries.

      Hirschleifer (2001) suggests that most of these mistakes can be traced to four common causes: self-deception, heuristic simplification, emotion, and social interaction. Figure 2.2 tries to classify the major biases along these lines. It outlines the most common of the various biases that have been found, and also tries to highlight those with direct implications for investment.

      This may look like a mass of mistakes, and indeed it is; however, for the purposes of exposition, let’s focus on the 10 most important biases that we come across.

      BIAS #1: I KNOW BETTER, BECAUSE I KNOW MORE

      Let me start by asking you three questions. Firstly, are you an above-average driver? Secondly, are you above average at your job? Thirdly, are you above average as a lover?

      Figure 2.2 Taxonomy of biases.

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      So far in the countless times that I have conducted those questions I have only had one person answer that he is a below-average lover. For the record, he is one of my colleagues, and obviously desperately needs help! Now, why am I asking you these very strange questions? Well, they go to the heart of the two most common biases that we come across - overoptimism and overconfidence. Overoptimism and overconfidence tend to stem from the illusion of control and the illusion of knowledge.

      The Illusion of Knowledge: More Information Isn’t Better Information

      The illusion of knowledge is the tendency for people to believe that the accuracy of their forecasts increases with more information. So dangerous is this misconception that Daniel Boorstin opined: ‘The greatest obstacle to discovery is not ignorance - it is the illusion of knowledge.’ The simple truth is that more information is not necessarily better information; it is what you do with it, rather than how much you have, that matters.

      Nowhere is this better shown than in a classic study by Paul Slovic (1973). Eight experienced bookmakers were shown a list of 88 variables found on a typical past performance chart on a horse (e.g. the weight to be carried, the number of races won, the performance in different conditions, etc.). Each bookmaker was then asked to rank the pieces of information by importance.

      Having done this, the bookmakers were then given data for 40 past races and asked to rank the top five horses in each race. Each bookmaker was given the past data in increments of the 5, 10, 20, and 40 variables that the bookmaker had selected as being most important. Hence, each bookmaker predicted the outcome of each race four times - once for each of the information sets. For each prediction, the bookmakers were asked to give a degree of confidence ranking in their forecast.

      Figure 2.3 Accuracy vs confidence for bookmakers as a function of the information set.

      Source: Slovic (1973).

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      Figure 2.3 shows how both accuracy and confidence change as the information set grows over time. Accuracy is mainly a flat line regardless of the amount of information the bookmakers had at their disposal!

      However, look what happened to the bookmakers’ confidence. It soared as the information set increased. With five pieces of information, accuracy and confidence were quite closely related. However, by the time 40 pieces of information were being used, accuracy was still around 15%, but confidence has soared to more than 30%! So more information isn’t better information; it is what you do with it that truly matters.

      That fact doesn’t stop the vast majority of investors desperately trying to accumulate more information than their rivals. The evidence suggests that, just like bookmakers, professional investors are generally much too confident.

      Professionals Worse than Chance!

      Figure 2.4 is based on a study by Torngren and Montgomery (2004). Participants were asked to select the stock they thought would do best each month from a pair of stocks. All the stocks were well-known blue-chip names, and players were given the name, industry, and the prior 12 months’ performance for each stock. Laypeople (undergrads in psychology) and professional investors (portfolio managers, analysts, and brokers) both took part in the study. At each selection, players were asked to state how confident they were in the outcome predicted.

      The bad news is that both groups were worse than sheer luck. That is to say, you should have been able to beat both groups just by tossing a coin! The even worse news was that the professionals were really dreadful, underperforming laypeople by a large margin. For instance, when the professionals were 100% sure they were correct, they were actually right less than 15% of the time! This fits with the mass of evidence that psychologists have uncovered: while experts may know more than non-experts, they are also likely to be even more overconfident than non-experts.

      Figure 2.4 Accuracy and confidence on stock selection.

      Source: Torngren and Montgomery (2004).

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      Players were also asked to rank the inputs they used in reaching their decisions. Figure 2.5 shows the average scores for the inputs. Laypeople were essentially just guessing, but were also influenced by prior price performance. In contrast, the professionals thought they were using their knowledge to pick the winners.

      The Illusion of Control

      The illusion of control refers to people’s belief that they have influence over the outcome of uncontrollable events. For instance, people will pay four and a half times more for a lottery ticket that contains numbers they choose rather than a random draw of numbers. People are more likely to accept a bet on the toss of a coin before it has been tossed, rather than after it has been tossed and the outcome hidden, as if they could influence the spin of the coin in the air! Information once again plays a role. The more information you have, the more in control you will tend to feel.

      Figure 2.5 Average rating of input importance.

      Source: Torngren and Montgomery (2004).

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      BIAS #2: BIG ≠ IMPORTANT

      Every piece of information can be judged along two dimensions - strength and weight. Confusing these two dimensions can easily generate overreaction and underreaction. For instance, let’s assume that you have interviewed a potential employee and have taken up his or her references. You receive a letter of recommendation, which is full of glowing testimonials to your potential employee’s abilities in almost every walk of life. Sadly, the letter was written by the candidate’s mum.

      The strength of the information is represented by the high level of the glowing traits talked about; the weight of the information is very low because the author of the letter is a highly biased source.

      Tversky and Griffin (1992) have shown that, in general, a combination of high strength and low weight will generate overreaction, whereas low strength and high weight tends to create underreaction (see Table 2.1).

      Investors often seem to confuse these two elements of information. For instance, when a firm announces either the introduction or suspension of a dividend payment, investors tend to underreact. They treat the information incorrectly. In fact, changes in dividend policy are very high weight (management doesn’t alter dividend policy lightly). However, they also tend to be low strength because investors (incorrectly) don’t place much emphasis on dividends.

      In contrast, investors seem to almost continually overreact to firms with historically high earnings growth. Investors seem to take tremendous faith from a firm’s past history, rather than focusing on the likely prospects in the future (more on this later).

      Table 2.1 The dimensions of information

      Source: DrKW Macro research.

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      BIAS #3: SHOW ME WHAT I WANT TO SEE

      Consider the following situation: Four cards are laid out in front of you, and each card carries one alphanumeric symbol. The set comprises E, 4, K, 7. If I tell you that if a card has a vowel on one side, then it should have an even number on the other, which card(s) do you need to turn over to see if I am telling the truth?

      Give it some thought. Most people select E and 4. The correct answer is E and 7 as only these two cards are capable of proving whether or not I am lying. If you turn the E over and find an odd number, then I was lying, and if you turn the 7 over and find a vowel then you know I was lying. By turning the 4 over you can prove nothing. If it has a vowel then you have found information that agrees with my statement but doesn’t prove it. If you turn the 4 over and find a consonant, you have proved nothing. At the outset I stated that a vowel must have an even number. I didn’t say an even number must have a vowel!

      So why are we drawn to E and 4? We have a very bad habit of looking for information that agrees with us. This thirst for agreement rather than refutation is known as confirmatory bias. When Karl Popper wrote his philosophy of science, he stated that the only way of testing a view is to form the hypothesis and then spend the rest of the day looking for all the information that disagrees with it. But that isn’t the way most of us work. We tend to form our views and then spend the rest of the day looking for all the information that make us look right.

      Our natural tendency is to listen to people who agree with us. It feels good to hear our own opinions reflected back to us. We get those warm, fuzzy feelings of content. Sadly, this isn’t the best way of making optimal decisions. What we should do is sit down with the people who disagree with us most. Not to enable us to change our minds (because the odds are staked massively against such an outcome), but rather to make us aware of the opposite point of view. We should look for the logical error in the opposite point of view. If we can’t find such an error, then we shouldn’t be so sure about holding our own view as strongly as we probably do.

      A supplementary problem for trying to follow this path is that we often find ourselves suffering the hostile media bias. That is, not only do we look for information that agrees with us, but when we are presented with information that disagrees with us we tend to view the source as having a biased view!

      BIAS #4: HEADS WAS SKILL, TAILS WAS BAD LUCK

      We have a relatively fragile sense of self-esteem, and one of the key mechanisms for protecting this self-image is self-attribution bias. This is the tendency to attribute good outcomes to skill and bad outcomes to sheer bad luck. This is one of the key limits to learning that investors are likely to encounter. This mechanism prevents us from recognizing mistakes as mistakes, and hence often prevents us from learning from those past errors.

      To combat this problem we really need to use a matrix diagram similar to Table 2.2. Only by cross-referencing our decisions and the reasons for those decisions with the outcomes can we hope to understand where we are lucky and where we are skilful - that is, was I right for the right reason, or was I right for some spurious reason? In order to use this framework, we need a written record of the decisions we took and the reasoning behind those decisions, so remember to write things down.

      Table 2.2 Decision matrix

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      BIAS #5: I KNEW IT ALL ALONG

      One of the most dangerous biases we encounter when teaching behavioural psychology is hindsight bias. This refers to the fact that after something has happened we are all really sure we knew about it beforehand! The best example of hindsight bias among investors is the dot.com bubble of the late 1990s. Going around talking with investors and telling them it was a bubble used to result in physical threats of violence against us. Yet now, going around and seeing exactly the same set of investors, there has been an Orwellian rewriting of history. Now everyone sits there saying they knew it was a bubble - they were investing in it, but they knew it as a bubble!

      Of course, if everyone thinks they can predict the past, they are likely to be far too sure about their ability to predict the future. Hence, hindsight is one of the dynamic generators of overconfidence. I mention that hindsight is one of the most dangerous biases when teaching behavioural psychology, because there is a risk that after reading this you will walk away, saying, ‘Well, that was kind of interesting . . . but I knew it all along!’

      BIAS #6: THE IRRELEVANT HAS VALUE AS INPUT

      When faced with uncertainty we have a tendency to grab on to the irrelevant as a crutch. The incorporation of the irrelevant often happens without any conscious acknowledgment at all (a classic X-system trait).

      The classic example of anchoring comes from Tversky and Kahneman (1974). They asked people to answer general knowledge questions, such as what percentage of the United Nations is made up of African nations? A wheel of fortune with the numbers 1 to 100 was spun in front of the participants before they answered. Being psychologists, Tversky and Kahneman had rigged the wheel so that it gave either 10 or 65 as the result of a spin. The subjects were then asked if the answer was higher or lower than the number on the wheel, and also asked their actual answer. The median response from the group that saw the wheel spot at 10 was 25, and the median response from the group that saw 65 was 45! Effectively, people were grabbing at irrelevant anchors when forming their opinions. For what it is worth, the percentage today is just under 20%.

      Another well-known example concerns solving eight factorial (8!). It is presented in two different ways to the survey participants: as 1 × 2 × 3 × 4 × 5 × 6 × 7 × 8 or as 8 × 7 × 6 × 5 × 4 × 3 × 2 × 1. The median answer under the first scenario was 512; the median answer under the second scenario was 2250. So people appear to anchor on the early numbers in forming their expectations. By the way, the actual answer is 40,320.

      Anchoring has obvious implications for valuations, especially in a world in which we all sit in front of screens that flash prices at us all day long. It is far too easy to latch onto the current market price as an anchor. Analysts are often fearful of announcing target prices that are a long way from current market prices. I know that whenever I tell investors that the S&P 500 would need to fall to around 500 before I would be prepared to buy it, the reaction is usually a grin, as if I had taken leave of my senses (which, in fairness, many have argued I did a long time ago). However, simply dismissing 500 because it is a long way from the current 1181 is a version of anchoring.

      Northcraft and Neale (1987) show that real estate agents suffer anchoring when pricing houses. They took two groups of estate agents to the same house, and gave them exactly the same information except that the original listing price of property was different for each group. They were asked to provide a variety of prices. The results are shown in Figure 2.6. On average, the difference between the two groups was more than 12%, despite the fact they looked at the same house!

      Figure 2.6 Anchoring and housing valuations.

      Source: Northcraft and Neale (1987).

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      A further example of anchoring affecting valuation can be found in a paper by Ariely et al. (2003). In this study, participants were shown a variety of common(ish) objects. They were then asked whether they would buy the object for a dollar amount equal to the last two digits of their Social Security number. The participants were then asked the maximum price they would pay for each item. The idea of asking the first question was to set up the anchor (i.e. the last two digits of their Social Security number). If people anchor, then there should be some differences between those with a high/low Social Security number.

      Figure 2.7 shows the results of Ariely et al.’s experiment. The average ratio of high Social Security number participants’ maximum purchases prices to low Social Security number participants’ maximum purchase prices was an incredible 2.7×! The highest differential was just under 3.5×. So, despite the fact that the Social Security numbers had nothing to do with the objects, they created vast valuation gaps.

      Figure 2.7 Anchoring and valuation (LHS is in $).

      Source: Ariely et al. (2003).

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      The degree of anchoring is heavily influenced by the salience of the anchor; that is to say, the more seemingly relevant the anchor, the more people will tend to cling to it, which helps to explain why analysts are so frequently afraid to have target prices that differ vastly from market prices. However, as already shown, even totally irrelevant anchors can have a massive effect on valuation.

      From an aggregate market perspective, what are the likely anchors? Prices are flashed at us all day long - TV ads, newspaper inserts, ticker tape numbers scrolling across the bottom of the TV news channel, stock analysts’ e-newsletters, real estate listings, and more. Investors seem to latch onto these price mirages and mistakenly equate them with values. Of course, we can guard against such mistakes by using reverse-engineered models of valuation. Take market prices and check what they imply for growth, then assess whether there is any hope of that growth actually being delivered.

      BIAS #7: I CAN MAKE A JUDGEMENT BASED ON WHAT IT LOOKS LIKE

      Consider the following: Linda is 31, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy at her university, and as a student was deeply concerned with issues surrounding equality and discrimination. Is it more likely that Linda works in a bank, or is it more likely that Linda works in a bank and is active in the feminist movement?

      Somewhat bizarrely, many people go for the latter option. But this can’t possibly be true. The second option is a subset of the first option, and a subset can never be larger than one of the contributing sets!

      So what is happening? Well, people judge events by how they appear, rather than by how likely they are. This is called representativeness. In the example of Linda, people picking the option that Linda works in a bank and is active in the feminist movement are underweighting the base rate that there are simply more people who work in banks than people who work in banks and are active in the feminist movement!

      Representativeness has many applications in investment. For example, do investors think that good companies make good investments? If so, this is a potential case of representativeness. A further example of representativeness is outlined in Figure 2.8. It shows portfolios based around long-term earnings growth forecasts for consensus analysts.⁷ The first bar shows the per-annum growth rate in the 5 years prior to expectation formation. It also traces out the earnings growth per annum in 1, 3 and 5 years following the forecasts.

      The results show that analysts suffer representativeness twice over. Firstly, companies that have seen high growth in the previous 5 years are forecast to continue to see very high earnings growth in the next 5 years. Analysts are effectively looking at the company’s past performance and saying ‘this company has been great, and hence it will continue to be great’, or ‘this company is a dog and it will always be a dog’. This is exactly the same logic as the Linda problem!

      Secondly, analysts fail to understand that earnings growth is a highly mean-reverting process over a 5-year time period. The base rate for mean reversion is very high. The low-growth portfolio generates nearly as much long-term earnings growth as the high-growth portfolio. Effectively, analysts judge companies by how they appear, rather than how likely they are to sustain their competitive edge with a growing earnings base.

      Figure 2.8 Earnings growth isn’t persistent.

      Source: DrKW, Montier (2002), and Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2003).

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      BIAS #8: THAT’S NOT THE WAY I REMEMBER IT

      Our minds are neither supercomputers nor even good filing cabinets. They bear more resemblance to post-it notes that have been thrown into the bin, and covered in coffee, which we then try to unfold and read! However, we all tend to think of our memories as perfect, like picture postcards or photos. The psychological truth is that memory is a mental process. One input into that process is the truth, but it is certainly not the only, let alone the major, input. In general, people are more likely to recall vivid, well-publicized or recent information.

      The recency effect is also reinforced by the fact that people tend to rely on their own experiences in preference to statistics or the experiences of others. In a wonderfully titled paper ‘The tree of experience in the forest of information’, Simonsohn et al. (2004) show through a series of experiments that direct experience is frequently much more heavily weighted than general experience, even if the information is equally relevant and objective.

      Simonsohn et al. hypothesize that one reason for the overweighting of direct experience "is the impact of emotion.... [D]irectly experienced information triggers emotional reactions which vicarious information doesn’t".

      They continue, If people use their direct experience to assess the likelihood of events, they are likely to overweight the importance of unlikely events that have occurred to them, and to underestimate the importance of those that have not. In fact, in one of their experiments, Simonsohn et al. find that personal experience is weighted twice as heavily as vicarious experience! All of this means that investors’ experience will be a major determinant of their perception of reality.

      The emotional impact of information also has its role to play. For instance, when asked which is a more likely cause of death in the United States, shark attacks or lightning strikes, a large number of people opt for shark attacks. Why? Because shark attacks are easy to recall, and they are easily available to the memory. When someone gets nibbled off the coast of Florida we all hear about it, and, to those of us of a certain age, Jaws was a truly terrifying film. In fact, the chances of being killed by a lightning strike are 30 times greater than the chance of being killed by a shark. More people die each year from pig attacks or coconuts falling on their head - or even getting their head stuck in an electrically operated car door window - than die of a shark attack!

      A less drastic example comes from Kahneman and Tversky (1973), who asked people the following question: In a typical sample of text in the English language, is it more likely that a word starts with the letter k or that k is its third letter? Of the 152 people in the sample, 105 generally thought that words with the letter k in the first position were more probable. In reality, there are approximately twice as many words with k as the third letter as there are words that begin with k. Yet because we index on the first letter, we can recall them more easily.

      The shark example has applications in finance. Investors are always looking for the big trigger event. However, in focusing on the ‘big trigger’, investors often miss the cumulative impact of small pieces of news. The press help to perpetuate the myth that every infinitesimally small wiggle in the markets can be accounted for by some ‘rational’ explanation. For instance, a recent newspaper contained the following explanation for a significant up-day in the stock market: ‘U.S. stocks on Wednesday put up their best one-day showing in almost four months as falling crude prices and some positive corporate news bolstered the bulls in the lead up to the end of the first quarter.’

      BIAS #9: IF YOU TELL ME IT IS SO, IT MUST BE TRUE

      WYSIWYG (pronounced wizzy-wig - what you see is what you get) was a computer term that described the on-screen appearance being identical to the printed version. All too often, financial data isn’t WYSIWYG. Obstrufication (or obfuscation: confusion resulting from failure to understand) is frequently the name of the game when it comes to financial information. Of course, the financial markets employ a veritable army of analysts to check through the numbers and expose what is really going on. Well, that is the theory, at least!

      However, the reality of analysis may be very different. I suspect that investors and analysts frequently suffer from narrow framing or frame dependence. That is to say, we simply don’t see through the way in which information is presented to us. Any decent pollster can extract exactly the desired answer simply by framing the question in differing ways.

      The following represents a classic example of narrow framing.

      Imagine that you are preparing for an outbreak of an unusual Asian disease that is expected to kill around 600 people. Two alternative programmes to combat the disease have been proposed. Scientific estimates of the outcomes from the two programmes are as follows:

      If programme A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If programme B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved and a two-thirds probability that none of the 600 people will be saved.

      Which programme would you favour?

      When Kahneman and Tversky asked this question they found that 72% of subjects favoured programme A. Now consider the same problem, but with the following estimated outcomes:

      If programme C is adopted, 400 will die. If programme D is adopted, there is one-third probability that nobody will die, and a two-thirds probability that 600 will die.

      Kahneman and Tversky found that only 22% of subjects favoured programme C.

      Of course, the astute among you will have quickly spotted that programme A is identical to programme C, and programme B is identical to programme D. However, the way in which the question was presented created this oddity of preference reversal.

      The importance of framing is probably due to cognitive limits. Our brains have only a limited ability to deal with information. In particular, we tend to suffer from something known an inattentional blindness.⁸ Inattentional blindness is a phenomenon in which people fail to notice stimuli appearing in front of their eyes when they are preoccupied with an attentionally demanding task.

      My favourite example involves people being asked to watch two groups of players (one dressed in white, the other dressed in black) pass a basketball between members of their own team. Watchers were asked to count the number of passes between players wearing white tops. They were also asked to note if anything unusual occurred during the watching of the video. As the film was played, a gorilla walked into view, faced the camera and beat his chest. Despite the obvious incongruity of this occurrence, 46% of watchers failed to notice anything out of the ordinary! (See Simons and Chabris, 1999.)

      Let me give you an example from Finance. In

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