also has taken timely and decisive action to implement those recommendations not requiring legisla-tion, and has advocated beore Congress or those requiring legislation.The nal report o the Commission was inormed by 17 days o public hearings involving 115witnesses; 52 Commission meetings; more than 850 interviews; numerous site visits, orums, andpanel discussions; and the detailed analysis o thousands o documents supplied at the Commission’srequest by the military services, government agencies, eperts, and other stakeholders. It containssi major conclusions and 95 recommendations, supported by 163 ndings.In conducting its work, the Commission has gathered inormation, analyed evidence, identiedsignicant problems acing the reserve components, and sought to oer the best possible recom-mendations to solve the problems identied. The problems we identiy in this report are systemic,have evolved over many years, and are not the product o any one ocial or administration. Manyo the Commission’s recommendations to solve those problems can be implemented immediately;however, a number o them may take years to implement eectively. Their ull implementation willrequire additional work by Congress and the eecutive branch.At the core o these changes is the eplicit recognition o the evolution o the reserve componentsrom a purely strategic orce, with lengthy mobiliation times designed to meet Cold War threatsrom large nation-states, to an operational orce. This operational reserve must be readily availableor emergencies at home and abroad, and more ully integrated with the active component. Simul-taneously, this orce must retain required strategic elements and capabilities.The Commission concludes that there is no reasonable alternative to the nation’s continued increasedreliance on reserve components as part o its operational orce or missions at home and abroad.However, the Commission also concludes that this change rom their Cold War posture necessitatesundamental reorms to reserve components’ homeland roles and missions, personnel managementsystems, equipping and training policies, policies aecting amilies and employers, and the orga-niations and structures used to manage the reserves. These reorms are essential to ensure thatthis operational reserve is easible in the short term while sustainable over the long term. In act,the uture o the all-volunteer orce depends or its success on policymakers’ undertaking neededreorms to ensure that the reserve components are ready, capable, and available or both operationaland strategic purposes.In reviewing the past several decades o intense use o the reserve components, most notably asan integral part o operations in Iraq, Aghanistan, and the homeland, the Commission has oundindisputable and overwhelming evidence o the need or policymakers and the military to breakwith outdated policies and processes and implement undamental, thorough reorms in these areas.The members o this Commission share this view unanimously. We note that these recommenda-tions will require the nation to reorder the priorities o the Department o Deense, thereby neces-sitating a major restructuring o laws and DOD’s budget. There are some costs associated with theserecommendations, but the problems are serious, the need to address them is urgent, and the benetso the reorms we identiy more than eceed the epense o implementing them.These issues are etremely comple, and people o good character and conscience will disagreewith some o the solutions we propose. That is to be epected. No signicant reorms have beenundertaken in the laws aecting the reserve components or more than hal a century. The lastmajor Deense reorm eort—the Goldwater-Nichols Department o Deense Reorganiation Acto 1986—made undamental adjustments to the roles o the Secretary o Deense, the Chairman o the Joint Chies o Sta, and combatant commanders but did not aect the structures or policies o the reserve components. We hope and anticipate that this report will generate lively debate amongthe institutions and key policymakers responsible or protecting U.S. national security.With the submission o this our last report, the Commission turns our ndings, conclusions, andrecommendations over to the legislative and eecutive branches, where we eel condent they willbe careully considered, improved upon, and implemented. We believe that this action will have thesame proound and positive eects as did the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.The Commission wants to epress our continuing deep appreciation or the signicant support andcooperation rom the Congress and the Department o Deense as well as the sustained, superb work