DDI ’08Space AFF Wave IIAnuj, Jackie, Matt3/96
A2: States CP- 2AC Frontline
1. Perm: [insert appropriate perm]
2. Perm solves: State and federal action together result in the best possible regulations-divisions of state and federal power should not be static
, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law, 1/
, “Harnessing the Benefits of DynamicFederalism in Environmental Law,” Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 06-37The states’ failure to restrict their regulatory authority to issues impacting only their own jurisdictions, and thefederal government’s failure to regulate only when the states’ ability to address an issue effectively is hobbled bycollective action problems, are inconsistent with the policy implications of the scholarly debate over environmentalfederalism, in which scholars have supported a particular allocation of at least primary regulatory authority betweenthe states and the federal government.
The purpose of this Article is not to reengage in the long-running debate over whether, and when, the federal or the state governments are the more appropriate environmental regulators.
Rather,the purpose is to question the fundamental assumption underlying the debate: that regulatory authority to addressenvironmental ills should be allocated to one or the other level of government with minimal overlap. This Articleargues first that
a static allocation of authority between the state and federal government is inconsistent withthe process of policymaking in our federal system, in which multiple levels of government interact in theregulatory process. Absent constitutional changes that would lock in a specific allocation of authority, broad,overlapping authority between levels of government may be essential to prompting regulatory activity at thepreferred level of government.
This Article further argues that
a static allocation of authority deprives citizensof the benefits of overlapping jurisdiction, such as a built-in check upon interest group capture, greateropportunities for regulatory innovation and refinement,
and relief for the courts from the often futile andconfusing task of jurisdictional line-drawing. Part I.A of this Article critiques the scholarly adherence to a generallyrigid separation between state and federal jurisdiction, which I argue is rooted in the dominance of economic modelsin the environmental federalism debates. In Part I.B, I contrast the scholarly preoccupation with the separation of federal and state power with environmental federalism in practice, which is marked by a large degree of jurisdictional overlap and interaction between the states and the federal government. Part II of this Article sets forth
an alternative vision of environmental federalism, drawing upon recent scholarship
conceives the statesand the federal government as alternative—not mutually exclusive— sources of regulatory authority. Such aconception views the interaction between the two levels of government as a means of improving the qualityand responsiveness of regulation.