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SOVIET AIRCRAF' si
CONSTRUCTION

. TRANSLATED F R O M RUSSIAN

Published for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration

and the National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C.
by the Israel Program for Scientific Translations
 -

TECH LIBRARY KAFB, "I

,.__ .
.

00b9L59

A.S. Yakovlev

FIFTY YEARS OF SOVIET

AIRCRAFT CONSTRUCTION
(50 I et sovetskogo samol etostroeniya)

Izdatel' stvo "Nauka"

Moskva 1968

Translated from Russian

Israel Program for Scientific Translations

Jerusalem 1970

1
TT 70-50076
NASA TT F-627
Published P u r s u a n t to a n Agreement with
T H E NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
and
THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Copyright 0 1970
Israel Program for Scientific Translations Ltd.
IPST Cat. No. 5768

T r a n s l a t e d by E. Vilim

Printed in Jerusalem by Keter Press

Binding: Wiener Bindery Ltd., Jerusalem

Available f r o m the
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Clearinghouse f o r F e d e r a l Scientific and Technical Information
Springfield, Va. 22151
 Table of Contents

.......................................
Author's Foreword V

1. A DIFFICULT START ................................. 1

2 . SOVIET PLANES. SOVIET ENGINES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3 . THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF AIRCRAFT CONSTRUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4 . WORLD WAR11 ..................................... 44

5 . AVIATION OUTSIDE THE SOVIET UNION .................... 67

6 . THE VICTORY OF SOVIET TECHNICAL GENIUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

7 . JETAIRCRAr'T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
8. SPORTSPLANES .................................... 120
9 . T H E CIVIL AIR FLEET ................................. 137
10 . THE SCHOOL O F SOVIET AIRCRAFT DESIGNERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Layout (I-Xi) o f Typical Aircraft ............................ 168

S u b j e c t Index ......................................... 179

NameIndex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

List of Abbreviations ..................................... 186

iii
 The creation of a powerful aircraft industty, of a modern air force and a
first-class civil aviation fleet, the development of aviation science and tech-
nology, rhese are same of the greatest historical achievements of the Communist
Party, the Soviet state, the working class, and the scientific and technical
intelligentsia, simply of all the Soviet people.
The victories in aviation, achieved by the Soviet Union, are of fundamental
importance. They are the resulr of practicing the Leninist policy of industrialization
which ensures that the USSR will be technically and economically independent of the
capitalist world. They demonstrated the preponderance of the socialist economic
system, its ability to liquidate the technical backwardness within the shortest possible
time. They convincingly showed the sweep of the scientific and cultural revolution
in the Soviet Union. They are a testimony to the incessant care by the Party and the
nation to strengthen the defense potential of the country.

iv
 AUTHOR'S FO RE WORD

This brief outline of the development of a i r c r a f t construction in the

Soviet Union during the fifty y e a r s of Soviet power does not c l a i m t o be
a comprehensive and profound analysis of the building up of the Soviet
air craft industry.
The author assumed a m o r e limited t a s k : t o d e s c r i b e the main s t a g e s
in the p r o g r e s s of a i r c r a f t construction by showing the technical growth of
scientific and design thinking of Soviet d e s i g n e r s f r o m the October Revolution
t o the present.
The heritage of Czarist Russia was nothing except poverty. The Soviet
people had t o build the a i r c r a f t industry anew s o that it would be worthy of
a g r e a t country and correspond t o military and economic needs. And such
an industry was created!
The first Soviet a i r m e n w e r e surrounded by the understanding and c a r e
of V. I. Lenin, with his help a i r c r a f t f a c t o r i e s w e r e "put on t h e i r feet, I ' and
the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI)*, the c e n t e r of aviation
science w a s organized, thus establishing Soviet a i r power.
The Central Committee of the P a r t y and the Soviet government devoted
systematic attention to the a i r c r a f t industry; they determined ways of
developing Soviet a i r c r a f t production.
The s u c c e s s e s of Soviet a i r c r a f t construction, which was most s e v e r e l y
tested in World War 11, a r e particularly pronounced when compared with
the aviation of the Soviet Union's enemies and h e r allies in the l a s t w a r .
The preponderance is on the side of the Soviet Union, h e r a r m e d f o r c e s and
h e r scientific and technical thinking.
Talented d e s i g n e r s and scientists, educated by the Party, founded Soviet
aviation fame. Their s u c c e s s e s a r e the visible r e s u l t of the self-sacrificing
work of a host of workers, administrative and technical employees of t h e
a i r c r a f t industry who always marched in the foremost r a n k s of the fighters
f o r the strengthening of the economic and defensive power of the Soviet Union.
Soviet a i r c r a f t construction passed through s e v e r a l m a j o r s t a g e s in i t s
development. The first stage was the reconstruction of prerevolutionary
plants and the preparation of a i r c r a f t production according t o captured
models. It corresponds to the period of r e s t o r a t i o n and reconstruction of
the Soviet Union. The second stage was t h e creation of Soviet a i r c r a f t
industry during the F i r s t and the beginning of the Second Five-Year Plan.
Then aviation developed on the b a s i s of original Soviet designs. The third
s t a g e was the mastering of new technology in the p r e w a r y e a r s with a view
t o the l e s s o n s of the Spanish civil w a r . The fourth stage was World War 11.
The fifth stage was the technical revolution in aviation, connected with the
advent of jet aircraft. Finally t h e p r e s e n t stage is the solution of p r o b l e m s

* [See List of Abbreviations.]

V
dictated by the m i l i t a r y and defense needs and t h e rapid growth of Soviet
civil aviation.
It is impossible in t h i s brief outline to d e s c r i b e o r mention all the d i v e r s e
work done in each stage of development of a i r c r a f t construction and the work
of a l l the design offices and individual designers who produced original types
and kinds of a i r c r a f t , some of which were only of experimental i n t e r e s t but
enriched o u r knowledge and o t h e r s which at some t i m e reached the production
s t a g e in s m a l l s e r i e s but were withdrawn in favor of better a i r c r a f t .
Here we deal only with the main t r e n d s at each stage of a i r c r a f t construc-
tion development which w e r e decisive for the creation of Soviet a i r power,
corresponding t o general political, m i l i t a r y and economic t a s k s solved by
the P a r t y and government.

vi
1 . A DIFFICULT START

The Soviet state received a poor inheritance i n aviation: some hundreds of old and worn-out airplanes,
mostly of foreign-make and obsolete plants and worshops producing aircraft and engines, partly based on
domestic labor. The aircraft industry had to be built from the beginning.
From the first days of Soviet power Lenin concentrated on the creation of a Red air fleet, and according
to his instructions, TsAGI was founded i n 1918 under the direction of Professor N. E.Joukowski.
In 1923 the Society of Friends of the Air Fleet (ODVF) was founded. This society not only accumulated
means for the restoration of plants and the construction of aircraft, i t also carried out much propaganda
among the masses. The building of the country's aviation became a national task.

Before the revolution a i r c r a f t production in Russia was confined t o about

fifteen plants and workshops in Moscow, Petrograd, Simferopol, Taganrog,
Rjybinsk, Odessa, and Riga. The l a r g e s t of them were: the bicycle plant
Duks in Moscow, the Shchetinin and Lebedev plants and the Russo-Baltic
Railroad C a r Plant in Petrograd, and Anatra in Odessa. All the a i r c r a f t
plants in C z a r i s t Russia employed a combined total of about ten thousand
w o r k e r s of different t r a d e s .
At that time most of the planes built in Russia were of foreign-make,
principally French Farmans, Morans, Voisins, Nieuports. Russian
manufacturers were reluctant to accept o r d e r s f o r Russian-designed planes.
Although Russia had planes of its own design, such a s the Lebed, P a r a s o l
and Sikorskii, the tendency was t o accept foreign types made according to
drawings by Western f i r m s or partly assembled f r o m p a r t s purchased abroad.
F o r instance, a s e a r l y a s 1913 the Russo-Baltic Railroad C a r Plant built,
under the direction of I. I. Sikorskii, the Il'ya Muromets* the f i r s t multi-
engined heavy a i r c r a f t in the world.
During World W a r I the front received some tens of t h e s e planes. The
d e s i g n e r s constantly improved it, increasing i t s load capacity and range.
Il'ya Muromets, E-type with four engines, had a speed of 135 kph and a
ceiling of 4000m. Its payload was 2.5 tons including a seven-man crew and
800 kg of bombs. Its defensive armament against enemy fighters, seven
machine guns, was powerful at that time.
True, the designing of planes in Russia and in the West was primitive;
aviation science was just being founded. The first branches of t h i s science
made themselves felt in the Moscow Technical College where an aviation
c i r c l e worked under the direction of P r o f e s s o r Joukowski. Members of t h i s
c i r c l e were students of the college and a r e now famous Soviet aviation
e x p e r t s : Tupolev, Arkhangel'skii, Vetchinkin, Stechkin.
When war broke out in 1914, the Russian a r m y of the front had just over
two hundred fifty serviceable planes. The calculations of the C z a r i s t
government t o cover t h e i r needs of a i r c r a f t and engines by purchases abroad

* This aircraft was built with the participation of N.N.Polikarpov who later became famous as a designer.

1
 proved wrong. During the w a r g r e a t difficulties in supply w e r e encountered.
addition the Allies t r i e d t o delude Russia with obsolete planes which w e r e
a l r e a d y unsuitable f o r t h e i r own a r m i e s . All t h i s made it n e c e s s a r y t o
c r e a t e a domestic a i r c r a f t industry.
It is c h a r a c t e r i s t i c that before World W a r I Russia produced, in total,
approximately f o r t y airplanes of different types p e r month w h e r e a s at the
end of the w a r in 1917 the Duks plant in Moscow alone produced seventy-five
t o one hundred planes p e r month.
Duks produced exclusively landplanes. The Shchetinin plant in Petrograd,
in addition to landplanes h’ieuport, F a r m a n , and Voisin, a l s o produced
flying boats designed just before the war by the famous Russian designer
D. P. Grigorovich. Grigorovich’s M-5 and M-9 flying boats w e r e a g r e a t
technical achievement f o r t h e i r time, and they s e r v e d the Russian navy
effectively in the Baltic and Black s e a s . Between 1914 and 1 9 1 7 about two
hundred hydroplanes were built. There w e r e no such planes in o t h e r
countries.
The work of the a i r c r a f t industry was impeded at that t i m e by a profusion
of different types and the frequent changes in design of a i r c r a f t by individual
plants. During the w a r the plants introduced s e r i a l production of m o r e than
twenty different designs. In 1 9 1 7 the main a i r c r a f t , produced in the l a r g e s t
quantities in Russian plants, w e r e reconnaissance and bombing planes
Farman-27, Farman-30, Voisin, and different t y p e s of the Nieuport fighter
planes.
A p a r t i c u l a r difficulty f o r the Russian a i r c r a f t industry was the production
of engines. A lack of good s t e e l s resulted in a weak metallurgical base,
and t h e r e w e r e other difficulties in the production of magnetos, s p a r k plugs,
and various instruments and devices. During the war only t e n to fifteen
percent of the required a i r c r a f t engines w e r e supplied by Russian plants.
After the F e b r u a r y revolution in Russia, f r o m mid-1917, d e l i v e r i e s t o
the a i r c r a f t industry f r o m abroad ceased almost completely. In October the
fleet of a i r c r a f t had slightly exceeded one thousand machines, most of which
w e r e already in need of r e p a i r . There w e r e considerable l o s s e s of planes
a t the front, and at that t i m e a i r c r a f t had a short s e r v i c e life.
With the victory of the October revolution, under conditions o f t h e incipient
foreign intervention and civil w a r , the most important t a s k became the
defense and strengthening of the revolutionary achievements. Literally
within the f i r s t f e w days of Soviet power the People’s C o m m i s s a r i a t of
Defense created t h e Aviation Board with nine m e m b e r s (three m i l i t a r y
a v i a t o r s and six f r o m a i r c r a f t plants, t r a d e unions and w o r k e r s ’ organiza-
tions). The board was charged by the Soviet government t o r e o r g a n i z e
aviation m a t t e r s and t o collect f r o m all f r o n t s airplanes, engines and s p a r e
p a r t s . It was n e c e s s a r y t o gather a s much as possible f o r the defense of
the Soviet r e g i m e .
Under the existing conditions it was difficult t o e n s u r e production in
a i r c r a f t factories. The r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the board t h e r e f o r e appealed t o Lenin.
This is what one m e m b e r of the board, K. V. Akashev, wrote in h i s m e m o i r s :
.
’I.. the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the board turned t o Vladimir Rich Lenin. W e
asked the s e c r e t a r i a t of the Council of People’s C o m m i s s a r s t o a r r a n g e f o r
a personal meeting with Lenin, and w e r e received that v e r y s a m e day.
After having briefly outlined o u r views of the importance and place of the
air fleet within the cultural s t r u c t u r e of the Soviet republic, we asked Lenin

2 ,
I

to c r e a t e a People's Commissariat of the Air Fleet. Lenin did not object

t o assigning an important role to the air fleet under peacetime conditions
of the country, and he agreed to its importance a s one of the great cultural
achievements of o u r century.
"This was particularly pleasing, because a short time before, when
asked to retain the a i r c r a f t factories, Larin at the P r e s i d i u m of the Supreme
Economic Council replied that the Soviet s t a t e did not need e n t e r p r i s e s
' s i m i l a r t o a scent and ointment f a c t o r ' .
"Concerning the main problem that interested us, namely the creation
of a People's Commissariat of the Air Fleet, Lenin did not r e j e c t it in
principle, but he explained to u s that in the present situation t h e Soviet
s t a t e had a m o r e urgent t a s k than the thorough reorganization of the air
fleet, namely that the October revolution must strengthen the foundation
of the country, i. e., the economy.
"'Next time we shall d i s c u s s the creation of the People's Commissariat
of the A i r Fleet' were Lenin's own words in conclusion.
"Our meeting with Lenin took place in January 1918. At that time the
situation was extremely serious. The Germans were threatening to conquer
Petrograd, the Government was preparing to move to Moscow, in the south
.
the counterrevolution took up a r m s . . *'I
The civil war and intervention made it imperative to develop chiefly the
military air force. In May 1918 the Main Administration of the Workers'
and Peasants' Red Air Fleet was created. In June the Council of People's
C o m m i s s a r s issued a d e c r e e nationalizing the a i r c r a f t factories. It was
the beginning of the recovery of the country's a i r c r a f t industry, with the
Duks plant in Moscow and the P e t e r s b u r g plant, subsequently named
"Krasnyi letchik" (Red F l y e r ) , being f i r s t .
That s a m e y e a r , 1918, under Lenin's direct participation, TsAGI w a s
founded, l a t e r developing into a l a r g e center of aeronautical science of
worldwide importance. It was the direct descendant of the aerodynamic
laboratory of the Moscow Technical College and the Computing and Testing
Office. This w a s one of the f i r s t proofs of the c a r e with which the young
Soviet s t a t e surrounded i t s aviation.
In December 1918 the board of TsAGI f i r s t met in Joukowski's apartment,
under his chairmanship. One must visualize the atmosphere of those days.
Many plants had closed down because of lack of raw m a t e r i a l s ; in Moscow
t h e r e was no light and fuel. Yet the seventy-year-old Joukowski initiated
and presided over a group for organizing a Soviet aviation center!
On Joukowski's initiative the Aviatekhnikum (in 1922 reorganized and called
the Academy of the Air F l e e t ) w a s founded in Moscow. The mechanical
department of the Moscow Technical College instituted aerodynamics as a
field of specialization (on i t s b a s i s the Moscow Aviation Institute (MAI) was
founded in 1930).
Even under the conditions of economic collapse the a i r c r a f t plants and
workshops gradually came back to life. T h e r e were no engines. Aircraft
m a t e r i a l s w e r e beyond their original worth. In 1919, when t h e Caucasus
was cut off f r o m central Russia, a g r a v e c r i s i s erupted because of lack of
a i r c r a f t fuel. The situation of the country in general w a s extremely g r a v e .
How bad the shortage of a r m s was is illustrated by the cable that Lenin

* Samolet, 1924, No. 2, p. 3.

3
 sent t o the Revolutionary Military Council on 9 June 1919, recommending
that two o r t h r e e men should s h a r e one rifle. * The supply situation became
c r i t i c a l . Still under such conditions during the f i r s t y e a r s of Soviet power,
in plants that had been p r e s e r v e d and partly rebuilt, a i r c r a f t w e r e not only
r e p a i r e d but even built and sent to the war fronts.
After the counterrevolution had been defeated and the foreign interven-
tionists chased out, the country was able t o begin peaceful construction.
The chief t a s k was the rebuilding of the economy and defense of t h e state.
It was n e c e s s a r y t o e n s u r e against any s u r p r i s e on the part of the enemies
surrounding the country.
One of the important defense m e a s u r e s w a s the creation of the country's
own aviation. As e a r l y a s January 1 9 2 1 the Council of Labor and Defense
decided to f o r m a commission f o r developing a maximum p r o g r a m of a i r c r a f t
construction. As the rebuilding of the economy progressed, the creation
of aviation became l i t e r a l l y a national concern. T h e r e w e r e mottos:
"Working men, build an a i r fleet!" "Proletarian, into the airplane! I '
"Donate an engine! 'I "Without victory in the a i r t h e r e is no victory on the
ground!" " F r o m model to glider, f r o m glider t o airplane! ' I .
Three problems faced the Soviet Union: t o find the means f o r building an
a i r fleet and f o r equipping new a i r c r a f t plants; to build planes and teach the
m a s t e r s of the country, the w o r k e r s and peasants t o fly them; to open up
the worst bottleneck in a i r c r a f t construction-engine production.
In March 1923 ODVF was founded. Its a i m was t o inspire a national
movement for the building of an a i r fleet, to organize the collection of means
f o r building a i r c r a f t and engines, to spread knowledge of aviation among the
population. The Society promoted organizations of m a s s a i r c r a f t modeling
and of glider flying. It made propaganda f o r aviation, published the journal
''Samolet, 'I organized propaganda flights throughout Moscow and the country,
though s t i l l with J u n k e r s planes bought abroad. The Society's newspapers
and periodicals solicited donations f o r the building of the a i r fleet.
In 1923 the society Dobrolet was founded; it developed l a t e r into the
Ministry of Civil Aviation.
The Soviet nation had to build its aviation while creating i t s science and
industry and educating its own aeronautical s c i e n t i s t s and engineers and
w o r k e r s and f l y e r s . The nation knew that nobody e l s e would help with t h e s e
t a s k s , and it relied only on i t s own strength.
At f i r s t it was n e c e s s a r y to provide airplanes f r o m abroad. To f o r m
r e g u l a r a i r f o r c e units, a s m a l l number of Fokker-D'7 fighter planes were
bought in 1922-23 f r o m Holland (where the German f i r m Fokker moved a f t e r
the defeat of Imperial Germany), and English Martinside fighters, Italian
Ansaldo reconnaissance planes, and German Ju-13 passenger planes.
The country did not even disdain using captured a i r c r a f t left behind by
the interventionists. According t o captured English models the Duks and
Aviarabotnik plants in Moscow began producing the De Havilland-4,
De Havilland-9, De Havilland-SA and the Krasnyi letchik plant in Petrograd
produced the Avro-504. ** Moreover, licenses w e r e obtained for the

* Lenin, V.I. Polnoe sobranie sochinenii (Complete Collected Works), Vol. 35, p. 332.
* * An Avro plane was shot down in 1919 near Petrozavodsk. The pilot was a White Guard by the n a m e
of Ankudinov. The famous aircraft designer Sergei Vladimirovich IIyushin was then a mechanic on
an aircraft repair train. nyushin was ordered to dismantle the plane after it had been shot down and
to bring i t to Moscow where drawings were made from i t at the Duks plant.

4
I

production of foreign-makes. The Aviarabotnik plant made the Fokker-D11;

Junkers in Moscow, which had a concession, produced the Ju-21 in Fil and
assembled the Ju-13 passenger plane.
Copying foreign models was a n e c e s s a r y evil and a t e m p o r a r y m e a s u r e .
In the twenties Soviet a i r c r a f t design offices were already organized: under
Tupolev in TsAGI and under Polikarpov and Grigorovich in the Duks plant.
The f i r s t born of Soviet a i r c r a f t production were the light s p o r t s monoplane
ANT-1 and the t h r e e - s e a t e r passenger monoplane AK-1, also called the
"Latvian Gunner, I ' which flew on the f i r s t Russian a i r route Moscow-Nizhnii
Novogorod in 1924, and then took part in the flight f r o m Moscow t o Peking.
N. N. Polikarpov built the s i n g l e - s e a t e r 1-1 fighter monoplane in 1923, and
in 1 9 2 4 flight t e s t s began of the 1-2 s i n g l z - s e a t e r fighter designed by
D. P. Grigorovich. In 1925 Tupolev built the a l l - m e t a l t w o - s e a t e r ANT-3
(R-3) reconnaissance plane, and immediately afterward the twin-engined
heavy bomber ANT-4 (TB-1).
Research work also branched into new fields. The aerodynamic laboratory
of the Moscow Technical College became too small, and on 9 May 1924 a
new aerodynamic laboratory was founded, now called the Chaplygin laboratory.
Also l a b o r a t o r i e s for r e s e a r c h on a i r c r a f t m a t e r i a l s and engines, a towing
basin, and an experimental plant were built.
All t h e s e m e a s u r e s by the Soviet s t a t e for building i t s own aviation
required an enormous effort and l a r g e s u m s of money. It received much
help f r o m the ODVF. The problem of building an a i r fleet and the work of
the ODVF w e r e discussed by the 13th Congress of the Bolshevik party. On
1 June 1924, ODVF, in a ceremony at the Moscow c e n t r a l a i r p o r t , presented
the 17th P a r t y Congress with the "Lenin" squadron,
F r o m money donated by the population one hundred combat a i r c r a f t were
built and delivered t o the a i r force. At that t i m e monky was a l s o collected
f o r the squadron "Ultimatum" in reply to the sudden ultimatum delivered
by Lord Curzon to the Soviet government, for the squadron "Our Reply to
Chamberlain, ' I and others.
The ODVF organized a number of long flights. In 1923 Velling in a Ju-13
plane f l e w 11,000km of the route Moscow-Tiflis-Tashkent-Moscow. In 1924
six R-1 planes piloted by Mezheraup, Garanin, Arvatov, Goppe, Yakobson
and Zalevskii, flew to Kabul in Afghanistan. These planes of Soviet
manufacture t r a v e r s e d the Hindukush mountain range and attained an altitude
of 5000m. In 1925 Kopylov in a Ju-13 plane flew the route Moscow-Kazan-
Ufa-Perm-Vyatka- Ustyug-Vologda-Moscow, a total of 10,000 km. That
s a m e y e a r the flight f r o m Moscow t o Peking, f o r that t i m e a grandiose
undertaking, took place. There were six planes, of which t h r e e were Soviet
manufactured (types R-1 and R-2). one was an AK-1 passenger plane and
two Ju-13s. Because of the variety of planes and the difficulty of the route,
t h i s flight was a s e r i o u s challenge to pilots and machines. The expedition
reached Peking after t h i r t y - t h r e e days. The participants of t h e flight,
Gromov, Volkovoinov, Ekatov, Naidenov, Tomashevskii and Polyakov,
received the title "Distinguished Flyer.
Beginning in 1925 the organization of flights was taken o v e r by the
Commission for Long-Range Soviet Flights, which was headed by S. S.
Kamenev, the commander- in- chief.
In the s u m m e r of 1 9 2 6 two international flights took place with R-1 planes:
the first piloted by Ya. Moiseev on the route Moscow-Teheran-Moscow, m o r e

5
 than 6000 k m and the second piloted by P. Mezheraup, on t h e r o u t e Moscow-
Ankara, approximately 2000 km. F r o m then on all the flights w e r e made
on planes which w e r e not only made but a l s o designed in Russia.
A i r c r a f t construction developed both in quantity and in quality. F r o m
planes tvhose main m a t e r i a l s w e r e pinewood, plywood and canvas, the
Soviet industry managed as early as in the mid-twenties t o change o v e r
Tupolev's a l l - m e t a l d u r a l planes. A. N. Tupolev at that t i m e wrote about
t h e f i r s t Soviet metal plane, the ANT-2.
"The 26 May 1924 should be marked in t h e h i s t o r y of Soviet a i r c r a f t
construction. On that day, over the c e n t r a l a i r p o r t , the f i r s t Soviet metal
plane, designed and built by t h e C e n t r a l Aerohydrodynamic Institute of t h e
Scientific and Technical Section of t h e Supreme Economic Council, c a r r i e d
out i t s t e s t flight.. .
..
I ( . T h e plane was built by a commission f o r t h e construction of metal
planes consisting of the m e m b e r s : Chairman A. N. Tupolev, t h e author of
the design and g e n e r a l l y in charge of t h e work of the commission; Deputy
Chairman I. I. Sidorin, who worked out methods of t h e r m a l treatment and
processing of t h e m a t e r i a l and c a r r i e d out s t r e n g t h t e s t s ; s c i e n t i s t s I. I.
Pogoskii and G. A. Ozerov.
"Elaboration of methods of analysis, assortment of p a r t s , shapes and
design d e t a i l s of the planes, testing and d i r e c t supervision of production
w e r e in t h e hands of TsAGI engineers A. I. Putilov, V. M. Petlyakov, I. I.
Pogoskii, B. M. Kondorskii, K. S. Nekrasov, N. I. P e t r o v , E. I. Pogoskii,
A. I. Zimin and o t h e r s .
"The t e s t flight w a s performed on 26 May by TsAGI engineer N. I. Petrov,
with sand for ballast. The flight was not experimental, t h e r e f o r e it w a s
not t i m e d ; its aim was t o find out the main flight c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e
plane.
"The plane took off t h r e e t i m e s altogether and accomplished five o r six
c i r c l e s at an altitude of up t o 500m. Both by i t s behavior in t h e air and
by i t s speed t h e machine proved i t s worth, and in the opinion of the many
onlookers it is a valuable contribution t o Soviet a i r c r a f t construction. ' I *
The ANT-2 is the f i r s t - b o r n among the Russian all-metal planes. In
s p r i n g 1926 t h e f i r s t official t e s t s were concluded of t h e f i r s t combat plane
designed by A.N. Tupolev. This was t h e ANT-3, o r R-3, an a l l - m e t a l
two-seater reconnaissance biplane, provided in serial production with a
400 hp, M-5 engine.
In 1926 M. Gromov as t h e pilot and E. Rodzevich as t h e flight engineer,
in a R-3 plane called P r o l e t a r i i c a r r i e d out a flight which at that time was
a n outstanding feat. They s t a r t e d f r o m Moscow on 31 August and returned
on 2 September, having flown the r o u t e Moscow-Konigsberg-Berlin-Paris-
Rome-Vienna-Warsaw-Moscow, i. e., 7000km in 34 hours flying t i m e . On
that flight t h e plane had a cruising speed of 200 kph. Gromov's flight caused
a sensation in Europe.
In August 1927, a l s o in a R - 3 plane, named Our Reply, Shestakov a s
the pilot, with flight engineer Fufaev, flew t h e r o u t e Moscow-Tokyo-Moscow,
about 22,00Okm, in 153 hours flying t i m e . This was an outstanding achieve-
ment and c h a r a c t e r i z e d not only the high level of t h e b u i l d e r s of a i r c r a f t and
engines, but a l s o the culture of production which ensured a high degree of

Samolet No. 8, p. 12, 1924.

6
reliability in the operation of all p a r t s of the a i r c r a f t and engines and the
skill of the country's pilots.
Gromov with a group of correspondents o f Moscow newspapers c a r r i e d
out a flight in 1 9 2 9 in a three-engined ANT-9, seating ten persons, visiting
the capitals of European countries, landing in Berlin, P a r i s , Rome, London
and Warsaw. The length of t h i s flight was 9000km, average speed was
180kph. The e n t i r e Soviet and world p r e s s gave t h e highest p r a i s e for plane
and pilot. After that the plane was put into s e r i a l production. F o r s e v e r a l
y e a r s it was used on the routes of the Civil A i r Fleet.
A triumph of Soviet aviation was the flight of pilots Shestakov and
Bolotov, navigator Sterligov, and engineer Fufaev in a m e t a l airplane
ANT-4, called Soviet Land, f r o m Moscow to New York in the fall of 1 9 2 9 .
Although t h i s flight took m o r e than a month because out of a total length of
the route of 21,500 km, 8000 km were over the ocean and much t i m e was
spent on replacing the wheel-type landing g e a r by floats, t h i s was the first
flight of Soviet flyers in a Soviet plane with a Soviet engine t o America.
Thus it was an outstanding achievement.
The flights of Soviet aviators in various planes of Soviet manufacture
w e r e a stringent t e s t , and they proved that Soviet technical thinking and
production know-how did not lag behind the West.
Now emerged the problem of selecting for m a s s production those planes
and engines of Soviet design which had withstood the tests. This was v e r y
important f o r defense. In 1 9 2 7 in i t s appeal "To a l l organizations of the
VKP(b), t o all w o r k e r s and peasants" the Central Committee of the P a r t y
said: "It is n e c e s s a r y t o improve socialist industry, r a i s e productivity of
labor, resolutely c a r r y out socialist rationalization of production, improve
agriculture, improve and strengthen t r a n s p o r t , it is n e c e s s a r y t o r a i s e
and develop the m i l i t a r y industry f o r the defense of the country. 'I*..
Among the keynotes to the "Defense Sunday," organized in 1927, the Central
Committee of the P a r t y included the appeals:
"Let u s build up the m i l i t a r y industry! We w i l l give e n t i r e units of planes
and tanks! We w i l l r a i s e t h e output of rifles and machine guns! The Soviet
land must become an impregnable f o r t r e s s ! I '
"Workers and peasants! Join the r a n k s of Osoaviakhim! Help defend
the Soviet Union in an organized manner! 'I**
Toward the end of the twenties conditions were favorable f o r the broad
development of the production of airplanes, engines, instruments, and of
new a i r c r a f t m a t e r i a l s . The problem of building a powerful a i r c r a f t
industry had to be solved in all i t s ramifications. It was solved in the y e a r s
of the First Five-Year Plan.

* KPSS o vooruzhennykh silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza (The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union).-
Moskva), Gospolitizdat, p. 295. 1958.
* * Ibid, p. 297.

7
 2. SOVIET PLANES, SOVIET ENGINES

In the years of the prewar five-year plans a powerful aircraft industry was created i n the Soviet Union
thanks to the unstinting efforts of the Party, the government and all the people. The Red Air Fleet was
completely q u i p p e d with Soviet-made machines. Modern plants were built, research institutes and design
offices were organized, and scientists, designers and aviation specialists were trained. On the basis of modern
science and technology new types of fighter, attack and bomber aircraft were developed and put into serial
production in the early forties. The war found the aircraft indusuy engaged in developing mass production
of modern types.

Although at the beginning of the F i r s t Five-Year Plan the Soviet a i r c r a f t

industry had already completely abandoned the copying of captured planes
and production under license, and had changed over to the production of
Russian a i r c r a f t , engines and instruments, the chief t a s k in the Five-Year
Plan was improvement and preparation of m a s s production.
In June 1 9 2 9 in i t s resolution "On the s t a t e of defense of the USSR" the
Central Committee of the P a r t y noted: "It must be conceded that one of the
most important r e s u l t s of the past five y e a r s is the creation of a Red a i r
fleet. A n important t a s k in the coming y e a r s in building up the Red aviation
w i l l be a rapid improvement of i t s quality to the level of the most advanced
bourgeois countries, and e v e r y effort must be made to plant the seeds,
cultivate and develop our own, Soviet scientific and design c a d r e s , especially
in engine construction. "*
Under t h e s e circumstances it was found that the Five-Year Plan of
Economic Development provided favorable conditions for considerably
increasing the defense potential of the USSR. During the previous five y e a r s
f i r m organizational foundations of the a r m y were laid; now the most urgent
t a s k was the creation of a modern base of m i l i t a r y technology. The Central
Committee of the P a r t y found it c o r r e c t and timely "to develop on a broad
front the work of strengthening and improving the technical equipment of
the a r m y . 'I**
At the beginning of t h e First Five-Year Plan both design c e n t e r s of the
country were considerably strengthened: TsAGI, which was headed by
A.N. Tupolev, and the Design Bureau headed by N . N . Polikarpov. In
the e a r l y t h i r t i e s Tupolev's design office was removed f r o m TsAGI and
established a s an independent experimental and design organization. TsAGI
continued with scientific r e s e a r c h while Tupolev's design office worked out
new types of aircraft. Tupolev attracted and trained an e n t i r e group of
s c i e n t i s t s : A. A. Arkhangel'skii, V. M. Myasishchev, V. M. Petlyakov, A. I.
Putilov, P. 0. Sukhoi and others. L a t e r on they themselves developed and
designed new types of a i r c r a f t .

* KPSS o vooruzhennykh silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza (The CPSU on the Aimed Forces of the Soviet Union),
p. 320.
* * Ibid., p. 319.

8
 Tupolev' s design office specialized in building multiengined dural
bombers and passenger planes.
Polikarpov's office designed new fighter models. Approximately for
ten y e a r s Soviet fighter units w e r e equipped almost exclusively with his
machines.
In addition to the powerful offices headed by Tupolev and Polikarpov t h e r e
w e r e also s m a l l e r design offices. A t e a m headed by D. P. Grigorovich
worked on types of engines suitable for fighters. Some of them, e. g . ,
1-2 and I-2B, w e r e produced in s m a l l quantities during the l a t e twenties.
In the Ukraine K. A. Kalinin designed and supervised construction of the
K-5 p a s s e n g e r plane. A. S. Yakovlev's design office worked on low-powered
planes. Production of the following engines also was introduced: M-22,
radial, air-cooled, 480hp and M-17, water-cooled, 500 hp.
By 1930 the basic types of a i r c r a f t and aircraft engines had been tested
in operation and w e r e being produced in Soviet plants f r o m Soviet m a t e r i a l s
by the hands of Soviet w o r k e r s and technicians. The a r m y a i r force received
s m a l l n u m b e r s of 1-3 fighter planes and R-5 reconnaissance planes, designed
by Polikarpov, and TB-1 bombers, designed by Tupolev. Prototypes of new
and improved types of combat aircraft w e r e being prepared for s e r i a l
product ion.
One of the f i r s t Soviet fighters, the 1-3, a wooden biplane, was built a s
e a r l y a s 1927. With a M-17 engine it developed a speed of 280kph. Its
a r m a m e n t consisted of two machine guns. Altogether four hundred planes
of this type w e r e produced. The 1-5, produced in 1930, was a further
development of the biplane. It was a light, maneuverable fighter powered
by a M-22 engine, with a speed of 286kph. It was also a r m e d with two
machine guns. The 1-5 was produced in l a r g e r numbers, about eight hundred.
Polikarpov's outstanding design, the t w o - s e a t e r R-5 reconnaissance plane,
powered by a M-17 engine, was widely used by the a r m y a i r force. This
wooden biplane with fabric wing covering and plywood fuselage skin proved
exceptionally successful. For i t s t i m e it had an excellent maximum speed,
230 kph. The wings w e r e connected by N-shaped streamlined s t r u t s and
s t e e l bracing. The upper wing was fixed t o the wing center section, mounted
on the fuselage by two p a i r s of drop-shaped, c r o s s sectioned s t r u t s . The
aerodynamically refined shape reduced resistance, yielding excellent
mechanical and flying characteristics.
The R-5 was, an outstanding combination of adaptability t o fulfill tactical
t a s k s , reliability and technological design, good stability and dirigibility,
simplicity of piloting and operation. Flight t e s t s of the R - 5 began in 1928,
and in 1931 s e r i a l production of the plane began. Within six y e a r s about
seven thousand planes of different v e r s i o n s w e r e built. The Soviet a i r force
received a splendid reconnaissance plane which had no equal anywhere in
the world. In September 1930 a group o f R - 5 planes excelled in c a r r y i n g out
a flight on the route Moscow- Ankara-Tbilisi-Teheran- Termez-Kabul-
Tashkent-Orenburg-Moscow. The distance of 10,500 k m was covered in
61 h o u r s 30 minutes flying time, at an a v e r a g e speed of 171 kph.
At that t i m e the Iranian government issued an international tender f o r
reconnaissance aircraft f o r the Iranian a i r force. In competition flights the
R-5 won first place, outstripping the best British, French, and Dutch
a i r c r a f t . The R-5 was widely used in military and civil aviation for many
y e a r s , including those of World W a r 11. After having flown for a long t i m e

9
 and having been used for various purposes, the plane was eventually
superseded by another excellent a i r c r a f t designed by Polikarpov, the U-2
(Po-2). The basic version of the R-5 a s reconnaissance plane o r light
bomber c a r r i e d t h r e e machine guns and could take on 500kg of bombs.
Other military v e r s i o n s were the s e a reconnaissance plane fitted with floats,
the R-5Sh attack plane with seven machine guns and the modernized version
with covered cockpit, the R-Z. Civil aviation used widely the P - 5 and
P - 5 a mail and passenger versions. In 1934 R-5 planes participated in
saving the m e m b e r s of the Chelyuskin expedition. The pilots in t h e i r two-
s e a t e r s took off f r o m the i c e with five of six p a s s e n g e r s on board.
In 1925 Tupolev's plane TB-1 (ANT-4) underwent t e s t s ; t h i s was the first
Soviet-built heavy bomber and one of the l a r g e s t planes built in the twenties.
The overall design of t h i s plane was a veritable revelation t o world aviation.
The TB-1 was an a l l - m e t a l monoplane powered by two M-17 water-cooled,
wind-mounted engines. The main innovations w e r e the cantilever wing with
five s p a r s and corrugated d u r a l covering and i t s thick profile. Analysist
and design of the wing w e r e the work of V. M. Petlyakov who succeeded in
ensuring high strength and rigidity of that l a r g e wing whose span was 28.7 m.
The low wings made it possible t o employ a comparatively s m a l l landing
g e a r with wide t r a c k . By filling the thick wing with a l a r g e amount of fuel,
the designers endowed the a i r c r a f t with outstanding load capacity and range.
With a maximum take-off weight of about 7.8 tons, the TB-1 could c a r r y a
payload of 3.5 tons. The normal weight of bombs was lOOOkg and the range
was then 1350 km. The plane had a good speed, 200 kph. It c a r r i e d a
crew of four and i t s defensive armament consisted of four machine guns.
The TB-1 was the first plane to be fitted with boosters, which considerably
reduced the take-off distance and facilitated lift-off of the overloaded
a i r c r a f t . Between 1928 and 1932 the TB-1 was series-produced in land and
seaplane versions. It marked the beginning of a new e r a in the development
of heavy a i r c r a f t and is considered a s the f i r s t genuine bomber. Similarly,
all heavy, nonmaneuverable a i r c r a f t (bombers and t r a n s p o r t p l a n e s ) were
built a s monoplanes with cantilever wings.
A logical development f r o m the design of the TB-1 was the gigantic
bomber type TB-3 (ANT-B), first built in 1930 and series-produced f r o m
1932 t o 1937. This plane was a four-engined, cantilever-winged monoplane.
The four engines ( f i r s t M-17, then M-34) were mounted on console t r u s s e s
on the leading edge of the wings, two on each side of the fuselage. The
wings, fuselage and t a i l unit were made f r o m duralumin; the fixed landing
g e a r , engine t r u s s e s and other p a r t s f r o m s t e e l ; the outer covering of the
entire a i r c r a f t was, a s before, corrugated duralumin. Compared with the
TB-1, the wing span was almost half a s l a r g e , attaining the enormous
magnitude of 40.5 m, and the wing a r e a was doubled t o 230m'. During
development and production Tupolev improved t h e design of the a i r c r a f t and
increased the engine power. He thereby succeeded in r a i s i n g the take-off
weight of the TB-3 t o 1 9 - 2 1 t o n s and the speed t o 288 kph, each engine
providing 970hp. The TB-3 could c a r r y 5 tons of bombs. With a bomb load
of 2 tons the TB-3 had a range of almost 2500 km. It had a crew of eight,
i t s defensive a r m a m e n t was eight machine guns.
During the mid-thirties the USSR was the only country m a s s producing
such huge a i r c r a f t a s the TB-3. Tupolev himself supervised the preparations
f o r production, having been nominated chief engineer of the administration

10
of the aircraft industry of the People's C o m m i s s a r i a t of Heavy Industry.
The TB-1 and TB-3 had a decisive influence on the further development
of bomber aircraft, both in the Soviet Union and abroad, especially in the
United States. These bombers blazed the t r a i l f o r building heavy landplanes
and they predetermined for many y e a r s the most rational configuration.
In t h e ten y e a r s preceding the war the Soviet bomber force was supplied
with 2 1 6 TB-1 and 818 TB-3 planes. They w e r e also used in civil aviation
a s transport planes (G-1 and G - 2 ) for heavy and bulky loads, especially
their a r c t i c version. In an ANT-4 pilot A. V. Lyapidevskii r e s c u e d the f i r s t
group of the Chelyuskin crew in 1934. In 1937 I. D. Papanin's expedition
t o the North Pole took place in f o u r ANT-6 planes.
Mass production of a i r c r a f t required the production b a s e to be enlarged
and new, l a r g e aircraft plants t o be built; the Central Committee of the
P a r t y therefore adopted a resolution on the building of l a r g e a i r c r a f t ,
engine and instrument plants. By 1933 t h e s e plants, which had been s t a r t e d
at t h e beginning of the F i r s t Five-Year Plan, a l r e a d y supplied a i r c r a f t in
l a r g e n u m b e r s : the 1-5 fighter, the R-5 reconnaissance plane, and the
TB-3 bomber.
The a i r c r a f t industry grew out of the industrial base of the country,
assimilating i t s foremost achievements, mainly in the fields of f e r r o u s
and nonferrous metallurgy, radio and e l e c t r i c a l engineering, mechanical
engineering, instrument manufacture, and chemistry. The qualitative and
quantitative level of aviation at that t i m e was therefore a lucid reflection
of the growth of the entire national economy.
The country, however, could not r e s t satisfied with i t s achievements.
The resolution of the 16th P a r t y Congress noted with satisfaction the
heightened fighting efficiency of the Red Army. On the other hand the
congress pointed emphatically to "the necessity of concentrating the P a r t y ' s
attention on an even g r e a t e r mobilization of all the f o r c e s of the working
c l a s s and the m a s s of s m a l l and medium peasants upon strengthening the
defense potential of the USSR, the power and fighting efficiency of the Red
Army, Navy and A i r F o r c e . ':?
The further strengthening of the defense potential of the country r e q u i r e d
even g r e a t e r activity of the broadest m a s s e s of w o r k e r s . The resolution
of the Central Committee "Ten Y e a r s of Defense'' said that it i s essential
"to t u r n the attention of the working people to the problems of building civil
aviation, airship construction, mechanization and motorization of the
Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, 'I and to "strengthening the organization
of Osoaviakhim (cadres, growth, m a t e r i a l base, etc. ). ' I * *
The necessity of constantly improving aviation techniques r e q u i r e d a
broad development of scientific r e s e a r c h in aviation. TsAGI, where
r e s e a r c h on aerodynamics, aviation m a t e r i a l s , and a i r c r a f t engines was
c a r r i e d out, was a universal scientific organization in its field, and it
became n e c e s s a r y to split it up into independent specialized r e s e a r c h
institutes. In addition t o the Special Design Bureau under chief designer
Tupolev, two other departments also left TsAGI and became independent.
The department of aviation m a t e r i a l s became the All- Union Insitute of

* KPSS o vooruzhennykh silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza (The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union),
p. 322.
* * Ibid., p. 328.

11
 Aviation Materials (VIAM) and the a i r c r a f t engine department became the
Central Institute of Aircraft Engine Construction (TsIAM). Within an
exceedingly short t i m e t h e s e organizations attained a high scientific level.
The question of personnel was of decisive importance for the plants,
institutes and a l l other institutions of the a i r c r a f t industry. There was a
shortage of prerevolutionary s p e c i a l i s t s a s well a s of young graduates of
the Military Aviation Academy. Most graduates of the academy joined the
, flight units of the a i r force. In 1930 MA1 was founded. Within a short t i m e
it became one of the best institutions of higher learning in the country; it
trained aviation engineers f o r the most diversified fields.
When summing up the r e s u l t s of the F i r s t Five-Year Plan, the P a r t y
proudly noted the s u c c e s s achieved in the building of the a i r c r a f t industry.
The resolution of the joint s e s s i o n of the Central Committee and the Central
Control Commission of 10 J a n u a r y 1933 mentioned among the gigantic
engineering works the a i r c r a f t and a i r c r a f t engine plants in Moscow, Gorki,
Voronezh, Siberia. * The resolution of the 17th P a r t y Congress (January-
F e b r u a r y 1934) counted the building of a i r c r a f t and a i r c r a f t engine plants,
one of the new branches of production, a s one of the p a r t i c u l a r l y g r e a t
s u c c e s s e s of industry. *;: As a r e s u l t aviation was able to develop f u r t h e r
quantitatively and qualitatively.
During the Second Five-Year Plan (1933-37) the a i r c r a f t industry
acquired a l l the n e c e s s a r y scientific know-how, based on highly trained
personnel and powerful production which increased in s i z e e v e r y y e a r a s
new plants w e r e built. Aircraft plants were planned by a special project
institute which had been organized within the framework of the a i r c r a f t
industry.
Wherever it was possible, production of a i r c r a f t and engines was
organized in flow lines and on conveyor belts. P r e s s i n g and casting of
p a r t s were introduced on a l a r g e s c a l e . This led to a considerable i n c r e a s e
in the productivity of labor and output. Simultaneously, owing to the
achievements of the r e s e a r c h institutes and design offices, the flight and
tactical c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the a i r c r a f t were also greatly improved.
Until the m i d - t h i r t i e s the USSR developed both heavy, nonmaneuverable
monoplanes with fixed landing g e a r and corrugated skin (bombers TB-1,
TB-3, and passenger planes) and light maneuverable biplanes (fighters and
reconnaissance planes). In the middle t h i r t i e s a decisive and final change-
over f r o m biplanes to monoplanes took place. This was because of the
achievements of aerodynamics, mechanics and engine construction, a c c u r a t e
methods of s t r e s s analysis, and the introduction of new high-strength
m a t e r i a l s . For some t i m e maneuverable biplanes s t i l l existed in the fighter
f o r c e together with f a s t monoplanes, but by the end of the t h i r t i e s the only
biplanes built w e r e the U-2 training planes.
The changeover to monoplanes with cantilever wings was an important
stage in the technical p r o g r e s s of a i r c r a f t construction. The monoplane
is aerodynamically s u p e r i o r t o the biplane, but at flying speeds of 200 kph-
250 kph this advantage is s m a l l . F u r t h e r the sufficiently rigid and strong

* KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK (The CPSU in Resolutions and
Decisions of Congresses, Conferences, and PlenaIy Session), Part 11, p. 719. Moskva, Gospolitizdat.
1953.
'* Ibid., p. 745.

12
 airfoils in the f o r m of the biplane cell have a s m a l l span and are simple in
production. As flying speed increased, the aerodynamic advantages of the
monoplane became m o r e predominant, and new a i r c r a f t w e r e built i n c r e a s -
ingly a s monoplanes. At f i r s t monoplanes w e r e provided with bracing
or inclined s t r u t s , taking s o m e s t r e s s off the wings; but bracing and inclined
s t r u t s , placed in the a i r s t r e a m , caused considerable head r e s i s t a n c e . As
s t r e s s analysis was perfected and experience in design was gained, fast
monoplanes with cantilever wings were built, where the wings had no outer
supports.
A n important factor was the increased wing loading: 140 kg/m2-
1 7 0 k g / m 2 instead of 70kg/m2-100kg/m2 in monoplanes around 1930.
Although leading speed, take-off distance and landing distance have increased
greatly, a s e r i o u s deterioration in take-off and landing c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s was
averted by the introduction of brake wheels and high-lift devices (flaps and
s l a t s ).
Flying speed w a s increased by reduced relative wing thickness and t h e
application of biconvex profiles; streamlined fuselages and closed cockpits;
fillets t o r e d u c e the deleterious interference at the joint of wings and
fuselage; u s e of smooth, thick wing covering (plywood or m e t a l ) instead of
the thin corrugated covering on heavy planes and f a b r i c covering on light
planes. By countersunk riveting, the u s e of sheet butt joints, the polishing
of the covering, the aerodynamic friction d r a g was greatly reduced.
One of the most important achievements of aerodynamics w a s the solution
of the problem of r e t r a c t i n g the landing g e a r in flight. The r e s i s t a n c e
of a fixed landing g e a r r e p r e s e n t s twenty t o twenty-five percent of the
total r e s i s t a n c e of t h e a i r c r a f t . The d e s i g n e r s t h e r e f o r e endeavored
t o r e t r a c t t h e landing g e a r completely o r partly in flight, even at the
p r i c e of a c e r t a i n i n c r e a s e in the weight of the a i r c r a f t (by one t o
two percent and a m o r e complicated design. This problem was
practically solved in 1 9 3 5 - 3 6 . The f i r s t stage was a fixed cantilever
landing g e a r with s p a t s (reducing the d r a g of the landing g e a r by
about thirty percent), then the main s t r u t s w e r e r e t r a c t e d , and finally a l s o
the t a i l wheel which replaced the skid. A fully r e t r a c t a b l e landing gear
meant an i n c r e a s e of fifteen t o twenty percent in maximum flying speed
without increasing engine power.
Flying speed w a s also increased by the introduction of cowling f o r engines
and r a d i a t o r s . On air-cooled engines where the cylinder heads protrude
into t h e air s t r e a m they w e r e covered with narrow profiled streamlined
r i n g s (Townend rings), which reduced drag. Then special cowls w e r e
designed which reduced d r a g even m o r e .
On liquid-cooled engines the nose r a d i a t o r s , which w e r e situated
immovably in the a i r s t r e a m , w e r e replaced by sliding r a d i a t o r s whose
a r e a could be reduced with increasing flying speed when the cooling action
b e c a m e m o r e intensive. The next s t e p was ducted r a d i a t o r s , with the
ducts located in the wings, the fuselage, o r the engine nacelle.
All t h e s e m e a s u r e s reduced d r a g by one-third t o one-half. Flying speed
increased by twenty t o t h i r t y percent with engines of equal power.
The appearance of controllable-pitch p r o p e l l e r s also meant a qualitative
improvement in a i r c r a f t construction. The fixed-pitch propellers, used
until t h e t h i r t i e s , w e r e designed f o r s o m e definite flying conditions. Under
different flying conditions the efficiency of t h e propeller was reduced. At

13
 flying s p e e d s of 200kph-250kph the l o s s e s w e r e small, but with incceasing
speeds the difference between maximum and take-off speed increased, and
t h i s caused a considerable i n c r e a s e in l o s s of t h r u s t of the power plant.
The first solution was a two-pitch propeller whose blades could be
adjusted t o a s m a l l pitch for take-off and climbing and t o a l a r g e pitch f o r
maximum flying speed. Then appeared p r o p e l l e r s with continuously
adjustable pitch, controlled by a special lever, and finally automatic
p r o p e l l e r s whose blades are automatically adjusted such that the engine
r u n s a t the most advantageous speed all the time. Although controllable-
pitch p r o p e l l e r s a r e considerably heavier and m o r e complicated than
fixed-pitch p r o p e l l e r s , they w e r e used in high-speed a i r c r a f t because
maximum speed increased by seven to t e n percent, t h e ceiling by eighteen
t o twenty percent, take-off t h r u s t by forty t o forty-five percent, and r a n g e
and r a t e of climb also increased.
Technical p r o g r e s s of aviation was bound up with the i n c r e a s e in
maximum-power altitude and engine power. The power of piston engines
is g r e a t l y reduced at e x t r e m e altitudes, because t h e density of the air is
reduced. Engines w e r e t h e r e f o r e provided with single-stage o r two-stage
s u p e r c h a r g e r s , increasing the p r e s s u r e of atmospheric air before it entered
the cylinders. Thus it was possible t o maintain engine power up t o the
r a t e d altitude. Supercharged engines also r a i s e d the maximum flying speed.
F u r t h e r , the possibility of engaging the s u p e r c h a r g e r low above the ground
m a d e it possible t o boost the engine for a s h o r t t i m e in c a s e of need (difficult
take-off conditions, aerial combat at low altitude).
During the late t h i r t i e s engine power was rapidly increased, together
with a reduction in the specific weight of the engines. The power of series-
produced engines r o s e f r o m 700 hp o r 800 hp t o 2000 hp and the specific
weight dropped f r o m 0.9 kg/hp t o less than 0.5 kg/hp, i. e., almost by one-
half, At the s a m e t i m e considerable s u c c e s s w a s achieved in reducing the
specific dimensions of the engines. All this contributed t o increased speed,
ceiling and r a n g e of Soviet a i r c r a f t .
The motto of the Soviet government t o "fly highest, furthest and fastest"
m e t with an enthusiastic r e s p o n s e f r o m scientists, d e s i g n e r s and employees
of the a i r c r a f t industry.
New a i r c r a f t constantly appeared on the experimental airfields: 1-15,
1-16, SB, DB-3, ANT-25 and other outstanding machines with which the
Soviet a v i a t o r s ensured a number of the highest a e r i a l achievements f o r
t h e Soviet Union.
In 1933- 34 Polikarpov designed and constructed a maneuverable biplane
fighter, the 1-15, with maximum speed of 360kph, and a monoplane fighter
1-16 with r e t r a c t a b l e landing g e a r , having a maximum speed of 454kph.
Both planes w e r e powered by a air-cooled r a d i a l M-25 engine, 715 hp, with
a well-designed cowling and controllable-pitch propeller. The a i r c r a f t was
of mixed design, typically Polikarpov: wood, s t e e l pipes, canvas skin, and
in limited amounts duralumin. For the f i r s t t i m e t h e r e was a r m o r plating
behind the pilot. The a r m a m e n t consisted of two synchronized 7.62 m m
machine guns.
The 1-15 and 1-16 appeared almost simultaneously and w e r e a l s o
simultaneously in action. At that t i m e it was believed that because of
t h e i r insufficient horizontal maneuverability, monoplanes would have t o
o p e r a t e together.with biplanes. The f o r m e r would catch up with the enemy
and paralyze h i s actions while the l a t t e r would d e s t r o y him. This concept

14

-- .. .. ..
I

was maintained until it w a s put t o the p r a c t i c a l t e s t in Spain and on the

Khalkhin-Gol, where it was found how difficult it is t o organize the
cooperation of fighters of different types under the rapidly changing conditions
of a e r i a l combat. In 1940 new high-speed monoplanes with powerful engines
appeared: Yak-1, MiG-1, and LaGG-3; they w e r e much s u p e r i o r t o the
best biplanes in speed and vertical maneuverability, making t h e rejection
of biplanes final. Between 1934 and 1939, however, the 1-15 and 1-16, of
which 651 9 and 6555 machines (in different versions), respectively, had
been built, represented the strength of the Soviet air force. They both
underwent a long development and w e r e excellent fighter planes.
The 1-15 had outstanding maneuverability. The t i m e needed t o execute
a t u r n at l 0 0 0 m was eight seconds, which was a r e c o r d f o r fighters. The
plane required six minutes t o c l i m b t o 5000 m and the s e r v i c e ceiling was
m o r e than 9000 m. Regarding flight and technical specifications, especially
vertical speed and horizontal maneuvers, the 1-15 was better than
comparable types abroad. It was considered the best biplane fighter. In
November 1935 V. K. Kokkinaki broke the world r e c o r d when he attained an
alitude of 14,575m with a lightened 1-15.
In the construction of the 1-15 new m a t e r i a l s w e r e used, such as chrome-
molybdenum pipes and sheet electron. This ensured a comparatively low
weight of the a i r c r a f t while the strength remained sufficient.
The design of this plane offered g r e a t possibilities for f u r t h e r develop-
ment. In 1936 the 1-15 b i s with a maximum speed of 370kph made i t s
appearance. It was fitted with four synchronized machine guns, and unlike
the 1-15 i t s upper wing was straight. In 1938 the 1-15 2 was built; it had
incipient gull wings (and was l a t e r known as Chaika (gull)), and with i t s M-62
engine it attained 443 kph. Although it was a biplane, the a i r c r a f t excelled
because of its streamlined shape and r e t r a c t a b l e landing g e a r . It proved i t s
worth on the Khalkhin-Gol, where f o r the f i r s t t i m e in addition to the four
machine guns rocket m i s s i l e s w e r e also used. The 1-15 2 was the only
series-produced Soviet biplane with r e t r a c t a b l e landing g e a r , and it was the
best biplane fighter e v e r built.
The 1-16 developed similarly. Polikarpov did not like "transporting air, ' I
s o he designed an original plane with minimum dimensions and low flying
weight, 1422 kg. The 1-16 was characterized by a sturdy fuselage of c i r c u l a r
c r o s s section, "trimmed" in front, and s m a l l low wings. The plane had
a wingspan of 9 m and was in total 6 m long. The dimensions and shape of
the plane remained unchanged f o r y e a r s of development, only in the l a s t
s e r i e s was the cockpit fitted with a movable canopy. The 1-16 was t h e f i r s t
high- speed monoplane with r e t r a c t a b l e landing g e a r and a controllable-pitch
propeller accepted by the Soviet a i r f o r c e . With a M-25 engine its speed
was l7Okph g r e a t e r than the speed of the 1-5 and 90kph g r e a t e r than the
speed of its contemporary maneuverable biplane, the 1-15. Its speed a l s o
exceeded the speed of contemporary fighter planes in other countries. In
the subsequent y e a r s the power of the engines, fitted in the 1-16, w a s
gradually increased up t o 1000 hp and t h e maximum speed of t h e plane t o
525 kph. New series with m o r e powerful a r m a m e n t w e r e produced. The
attack plane v e r s i o n of the 1-16 could c a r r y up t o 200 kg of bombs, and its
armor-plating was reinforced. After four o r five y e a r s of development,
however, the take-off weight and wing loading increased by about t h i r t y
percent somewhat reducing t h e plane's maneuverability. A shortcoming of

15
 the 1-16 was i t s s m a l l r e s e r v e of s t a t i c stability, making t h e plane difficult
t o control and requiring highly skilled pilots. Nevertheless in the f i r s t y e a r
of World War I1 t h e Soviet a i r m e n flying 1-16 planes self-sacrificingly took
on Messerschmitts which had a s u p e r i o r speed.
Many famous a i r m e n began t h e i r c a r e e r s in 1-16's, in Spain, in Mongolia,
at the f r o n t s in World War 11. Among them are G. P. Kravchenko, twice
recipient of the Hero of the Soviet Union, B. F. Safonov, and A. V. Vorozheikhin.
The f i r s t series-produced Soviet frontline bomber was t h e SB, designed
and constructed i n 1934 by Tupolev. It had two M-100 engines of 860hp
each, was completely made of duralumin, with smooth covering, unlike the
earlier Tupolev planes which had corrugated skin. Maximum speed of the
SB was 420 kph, range 1000 km, bomb load 500 kg, and it c a r r i e d a c r e w
of t h r e e .
Only a y e a r after the SB t h e high-speed, long-range bomber DB-3,
designed by S. V. Ilyushin, made i t s appearance; it was powered by two
air-cooled M-85 engines.
The DB-3 was.an a l l - m e t a l plane, with a streamlined fuselage, a
monocoque of oval c r o s s section, at t h e r e a r smoothly blending into the
keel, in front into a semisphere. The two-spar cantilever wing had a
smooth d u r a l skin. Inside the wings t h e r e w e r e l a r g e fuel tanks, and t h e
weight of the fuel reached as much as twenty-seven percent of t h e flying
weight. The plane had a crew of t h r e e and i t s armament was t h r e e machine
guns. The DB-3 became t h e main Soviet long-range bomber, flying
successfully throughout World War 11, renamed the 11-4; however, t h e 11-4
c l e a r l y differed f r o m the DB-3. Instead of M-85 engines of 765 hp each
it w a s fitted with M-88B engines of 1100hp, and its speed increased f r o m
320 kph t o 445 kph. For t h e s a m e distance, 4000 km, the 11-4 could take
on lOOOkg of bombs, i. e., twice as much as the DB-3, its take-off weight
increased somewhat, reaching 1 0 tons, and wing loading was increased
f r o m 140kg/m2 to 150kg/m2. Early in World War 11, when t h e r e w e r e
difficulties in t h e supply of metal, the designers succeeded in replacing
s o m e of the metal assemblies of the 11-4 with wooden ones without harming
t h e flight performance. The 11-4 was better in every r e s p e c t , especially
in range, than i t s counterpart, t h e German HE-111 bomber which had a
range of 2300 km.
In total 6784 planes, type DB-3 and 11-4, w e r e built. Before the w a r
V. K. Kokkinaki established s e v e r a l outstanding height r e c o r d s in a DB-3,
exceeding with a load of 500kg and lOOOkg 1 2 km, and with a load of 2000kg
11km. He a l s o c a r r i e d out s e v e r a l long flights, t h e most famous of which
was h i s flight t o t h e United States, a distance of 8000 km. 11-4 bombers
w e r e the f i r s t t o r a i d Berlin in August 1941.
In 1932 Tupolev's design office began work on t h e ANT-25 ( o r RD) which
l a t e r , in the s u m m e r of 1937, gained world renown when Chkalov, Baidukov
and Belyakov flew nonstop f r o m Moscow t o the United States, covering a
distance of m o r e than 9000 k m in 63 hours flying time. The fame of the RD
a i r c r a f t was enhanced by Gromov, Yumashev and Danilin, who a month
l a t e r repeated t h i s feat but covered m o r e than 11,000km in 62 hours flying
t i m e . The s u c c e s s of t h e flight was mainly due to the high reliability of t h e
engine.
The RD is an a l l - m e t a l monoplane with a l a r g e wingspan, powered by one
AM-34 engine designed by Mikulin. T h e r e w e r e attempts t o u s e t h i s a i r c r a f t

16
I

a s a long-range bomber, but this was not successful because of the plane's
low speed at approximately 200 kph.
Between 1930 and 1938 Tupolev supervised the design and construction
of prototypes of a l l - m e t a l multiengined a i r c r a f t , the ANT-14, ANT-16,
ANT-20. An extreme example of t h i s t r e n d in Soviet a i r c r a f t construction
was the eight-engined gigantic ANT-20, called the Maxim Gorki, which
made its first t e s t flight in June 1934, piloted by M. M. Gromov. The load
capacity of the Maxim Gorki was eighty p a s s e n g e r s , maximum speed -
280 kph, range 2000 km.
During the t h i r t i e s Soviet aviation and i t s people, d e s i g n e r s and especially
pilots, gained much fame, having provided outstanding examples of courage
and hero i s m .
In 1934 the d i s a s t e r with the icebreaker Chelyuskin occurred. The ship
was lost in the Arctic ice, and m o r e than one hundred persons spent the
winter in the icy "Shmidt camp. I' The polar e x p l o r e r s were in deadly
danger. The whole country, the whole world watched the r e s c u e operation.
After t h e inhabitants of the ice floes had been flown t o the Continent, the
Soviet government for the f i r s t t i m e bestowed t h e highest award, the title
Hero of the Soviet Union, on seven aviators who had distinguished themselves
in the r e s c u e of the Chelyuskin expedition: Lyapidevskii, Levanevskii,
Molotov, Kamanin, Slepnev, Vodop'yanov, and Doronin.
This was an e r a of aviation triumphs. At no t i m e before had aviation
e v e r occupied such a place in the life of the Soviet Union. Soviet pilots
entered the world a r e n a of a e r i a l competition. The s u c c e s s e s of Soviet
aviation w e r e founded on the creative endeavors of d e s i g n e r s and on the
rapidly growing a i r c r a f t industry. ,
On 21 May 1937 Vodop'yanov landed f o r the f i r s t t i m e in history in the
vicinity of the North Pole. The popular Soviet pilot Vladimir Kokkinaki
established s e v e r a l height r e c o r d s in Ilyushin's planes. Three women,
pilots Grizodubova and Osipenko and navigator Raskova, established the
women's world r e c o r d of long-distance nonstop flights. As happens some-
t i m e s in such c a s e s , the enormous achievements in aviation caused not
only a natural feeling of pride but also gave r i s e to smugness. It was widely
beiieved that both s p o r t s aviation and combat aviation were f i r m l y entrenched
as the world's best.
This mood found i t s expression in the speech by the P e o p l e ' s Commissar
of Defense at the 18th P a r t y Congress in March 1939.
"Air F o r c e personnel, said the People's Commissar of Defense K. E.
Voroshilov, "increased since 1934 by 138 percent, i. e., almost two- and-
a-half t i m e s . The number of a i r c r a f t increased by 130 percent, i. e., it
m o r e than doubled.
"If we e x p r e s s the growing might of the a i r fleet in h o r s e powers of
a i r c r a f t engines in comparison with 1934, we obtain an i n c r e a s e by
7,900,000 hp, i. e., an i n c r e a s e of 213 percent over that of five y e a r s ago.
"With the quantitative growth of the a i r fleet its qualitative aspect also
changed.
"Here are s o m e data t o support t h i s (see table next page).
"What is v e r y important, during that t i m e the proportions of the different
types of a i r c r a f t within the a i r f o r c e also changed. Heavy bombers increased
from 10.6 percent to 20.6 percent, an i n c r e a s e of twice t h e f o r m e r s h a r e .

17
 Light bombers and attack and reconnaissance planes dropped f r o m 50.2
percent t o 2 6 percent, a reduction of one-half. Fighters increased from
12.3 percent t o 30 percent, a two-and-a-half-fold i n c r e a s e . Thus the
proportion of types of a i r c r a f t doubled in favor of bombers and fighters.

Increase
-
of ceiling of range

Fighters .................... by 56.5 70 21.5 To -

Bombers (short-range) ........... by 8870 83 qo 50 qo
Bombers (long-range). ........... by 70% 7770 61 yo
Reconnaissance and attak planes .... by 6770 23 qo 45 q o

"That means that Soviet aviationhas become m o r e powerful and its striking
power h a s increased correspondingly.. .
.
'I.. I may announce that frequently now one finds on o u r m i l i t a r y airfields
not only fighters but also bombers with speeds f a r exceeding 500kph and a
ceiling of 14-15 thousand m e t e r s . . . I 1 *
These data, however, did not reflect accurately the s t a t e of the Soviet
m i l i t a r y aviation. That the proportion of light bombers and attack and
reconnaissance planes had been cut to one-half was r e p r e s e n t e d a s an
achievement demonstrates t h i s inaccuracy. A heavy p r i c e had to be paid
during the war for having underrated t h i s kind of a i r c r a f t .
During the Spanish civil war the f i r s t s e r i o u s signals indicating the
danger of boastfulness and smugness were received, warning the workers
in the a i r c r a f t industry.
When General Franco, supported by interventionist a r m y units and a r m s
of Hitler and Mussolini, unleashed the civil w a r , the Soviet people, together
with p r o g r e s s i v e people f r o m many countries, came to the aid of Republican
Spain. Soviet volunteers with t h e i r armament, including aviation, left for
Spain in fall 1936 in o r d e r to fight in the r a n k s of the International Antifascist
Brigade.
In t h e i r book "986 Fighting Days" the Spanish authors M. Ascarate and
H. Sandoval wrote about t h i s period:
"In the days of the most t e r r i b l e danger Madrid received unexpected help. "
" F o r the f i r s t t i m e planes appeared in i t s sky which did not spread death;
they brought salvation for the children and women of Madrid; they were
chattos (snubnoses) and moscas (midges).
"Ascending to the roofs of t h e i r houses, standing on balconies and
leaning out of windows, Madrid's inhabitants waved with shawls to welcome
the friendly pilots, and they cried-this t i m e for joy!
"At the end of October the f i r s t planes a r r i v e d in Spain, and a few days
l a t e r they already flew over Madrid; thanks to them the Spanish and Soviet
a i r m e n of the 'Celebrated' squadron w e r e able to repulse the criminal
r a i d s of the Italian and German a i r f o r c e s .
"That s a m e month the f i r s t fifty tanks a r r i v e d ; now the Republican
infantry had a r m o r , enabling attack on the enemy.
' XVIII s"ezd Vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (b), Stenograficheskii otchet (The 18th Congress of the
All-Union Communist Party (b), Shorthand Protocol).-Politizdat. p. 194-195. 1939.

18
 "The Soviet volunteers who came t o Spain rendered t h e people's a r m y
invaluable help because of t h e i r experience, with t h e i r advice and t h e i r
g r e a t heroism. Among a host of h e r o e s t h e following w e r e p a r t i c u l a r l y
outstanding: Voronov, Batov, Malinovskii, Pavlov, Kuznetsov, Meretskov,
Rodimtsev, Serov, Smushkevich, Khol'zunov, Minaev who fell in the defense
of Madrid, Gorev, Ptukhin, Krivoshein, Smirnov, Nesterenko and many
others. 'I*
At f i r s t t h e Republican a i r m e n fought successfully in 1-15 and 1-16
fighters, called llsnubnoses" by the Spaniards, and SB b o m b e r s which
received t h e name "Katyusha. ' I The German and Italian air f o r c e s , r e p r e -
sented during t h e f i r s t s t a g e of the war by obsolete Fiat and Heinkel f i g h t e r s
and Ju-86 bombers, suffered much damage.
In 1936 t h e 1-15s and 1-16s encountered Messerschmitts for the f i r s t
t i m e . These w e r e t h e first Me-1O9B f i g h t e r s powered by 610hp J u n k e r s
Jumo-210 engines. Their speed did not exceed 470kph.
The Soviet f i g h t e r s w e r e a s f a s t a s t h e Messerschmitts and t h e i r
a r m a m e n t was about equal, 7.62 mm machine guns. The Soviet planes w e r e
m o r e maneuverable, and t h e Messerschmitts suffered s e r i o u s l o s s e s .
This situation strengthened t h e feeling of satisfaction, and the moderniza-
tion of the Soviet fighter f o r c e was not considered urgent. The Hitlerites,
on t h e other hand, based on t h e f i r s t aerial battles in Spain, began improving
t h e i r aviation with feverish haste. They radically improved t h e i r Me-109,
powering it with a Daimler-Benz-601 engine of llOOhp, which increased the
speed of t h e plane to 570 kph. and arming it with a 20 m m cannon, increasing
t h e firing power of t h e fighter. This version of the Messerschmidt, t h e
Me-1O9E, went into serial production.
Some of the f i r s t Me-109Es w e r e sent in August 1938 t o Spain, where they
took p a r t in a e r i a l fights of the final phase of the Spanish tragedy under the
command of t h e best German fighter pilot Melders. The Me-109E had a
decided advantage over the 1-16, both in speed (100 kph f a s t e r ) and c a l i b e r
and range of i t s f i r e a r m s .
The G e r m a n s made b e t t e r use of t h e experience gained in t h e Spanish
war than the Soviet Union. New fighters, Yaks, MiGs, LaGGs, able t o
hold t h e i r own against t h e Messerschmidts, appeared as late as 1940 as
prototypes.
A comparison of the SB bomber in speed and bomb load with t h e Ju-88
w a s a l s o unfavorable to the USSR. The H i t l e r i t e s had s u p e r i o r bombers.
The Soviet dive-bomber Pe-2, like the new fighters, had only i t s prototype
ready in 1940. A plane cooperating with ground forces, similar t o the
German Ju-87 dive-bomber, practically did not exist in the Soviet air fleet.
At that time A. B. Yumashev and other pilots broke s e v e r a l world r e c o r d s
f o r loads, flying Soviet-made heavy bombers. These r e c o r d s of having t h e
l a r g e s t load capacity were c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f o r the heavy Soviet a i r c r a f t and
w e r e c r e a t i n g a g r e a t sensation. The t a s k of t h e bomber is not only t o lift
t h e bombs but a l s o t o deliver them quickly t o the t a r g e t ; yet t h e heavy
Soviet bombers w e r e v e r y slow and t h e i r range was a l s o insufficient.
F u r t h e r , everybody at that t i m e was overwhelmed by t h e maneuverability
of t h e fighters, believing that t h i s was t h e decisive quality. Yet it was not
taken into account that a fighter plane must f i r s t overtake t h e a d v e r s a r y
and then d e s t r o y him. What is required is not s o much maneuverability as

Ascarate, M. and Kh. Sandoval. 986 dnei bor'by (986 Fighting Days). pp. 76, 77-79. -Moskva.
Izdatel'stvo Progress. 1964. [Russian translation. ]

19
 speed and f i r i n g power, but t h e Soviet planes in serial production f r o m
1937-38 had neither.
At the beginning of 1939 anxiety a r o s e in the Soviet Union because of the
backwardness of t h e air force.
The capacity of the a i r c r a f t plants, built in t h e two f i r s t f i v e - y e a r plans,
was sufficient f o r the mass production of planes, engines and i n s t r u m e n t s .
The potential of t h e Soviet a i r c r a f t industry was sufficient regarding t h e
number of combat a i r c r a f t produced. The problem w a s that t h e s e a i r c r a f t
w e r e obsolete and w e r e i n f e r i o r t o the standards required by modern warfare.
When we compare t h e main types of Soviet planes in serial production
at the beginning of World War 11, i. e., in 1939, with t h e corresponding
German types, the Soviet Union appears t o be the worst. "The combat and
t a c t i c a l qualities of t h e German planes were much b e t t e r than of t h e Soviet
planes which had been produced during the Second Five-Year Plan ... Our
1-16 fighter had a maximum speed of 462 kph, and t h u s it was no match f o r
t h e German bombers . .. 'I*

The l e s s o n s of Spain caused t h e government g r e a t anxiety. Only

extraordinary m e a s u r e s could save the situation.
At the beginning of 1939 t h e C e n t r a l Committee of t h e P a r t y and t h e
government called a broadly attended conference of leading p e r s o n a l i t i e s
connected with aviation: designers, inventors, managers, s c i e n t i s t s ,
engineers and air f o r c e pilots. The conference was attended by d e s i g n e r s
V. Ya. Klimov, A. A. Mikulin, A. D. Shvetsov, S. V. Ilyushin, N. N. Polikarpov,
A. A. Arkhangel'skii, the commander of TsAGI M. N. Shul'zhenko, t h e author
of the present book, and many o t h e r s . Those p r e s e n t w e r e faced with the
problem of how t o overcome quickly t h e backwardness in aviation.
As a r e s u l t of the conference all those p r e s e n t w e r e enjoined t o consider
t h e situation and t o make concrete recommendations concerning t h e problems
discussed.
In s p r i n g of that same year, 1939, the second conference of a i r c r a f t
designers took place in the Kremlin. The exact work of each design office
was discussed and corresponding decisions were adopted. Conditions f o r
the rapid designing and construction of various t y p e s of a i r c r a f t w e r e
ensured for the d e s i g n e r s .
The following took p a r t in designing fighters: Mikoyan, Gurevich,
Lavochkin, Sukhoi, Pashinin, Florov, Borovkov, Shevchenko, Kozlov,
Polikarpov, Grushin, Yakovlev and Yatsenko.
In 1939 t h e Defense Committee of t h e Council of People's C o m m i s s a r s
of the USSR adopted two extremely important resolutions. One concerned
the building and reconstruction in 1939-41 of e n t e r p r i s e s producing aircraft
power plants and p r o p e l l e r s . The second resolution dealt with t h e develop-
ment of a i r c r a f t engine plants. P l a n s were made f o r building new plants
and f o r t h e reconstruction of existing plants which should produce engines
for combat a i r c r a f t . It was n e c e s s a r y at the beginning of 1941 t o double
the number of a i r c r a f t engine plants over that of 1939. To help engine
construction, s o m e e n t e r p r i s e s w e r e t r a n s f e r r e d f r o m o t h e r branches t o
t h e a i r c r a f t industry, and production of a i r c r a f t engines w a s organized in
s o m e automobile plants. **

* Istoriya Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-45 (History of the Great Patriotic War
of the Soviet Union 1941-19451, Vol. 1, p. 453.-Moskva, Voenizdat. 1960.
* * Ibid, pp. 412-414.

20
Prewar combat aircraft

Year of Engineskype, number, Take-off Armament and bomb load Maximum Altogether
Type of aircraft Range, km
production take-off power) weight, kg 'Iew speed, kph produced

"Fokku D-ll" 1922 M-6, 300hp 1250 2 machine guns 1.62" 1 225 515 300
R-1 (DN-SA) 1923 M-5, 400 hp 2211 3 machine guns 1.62 mm: 2 200 150 2800
200 kg bombs
R- 3 1925 M-5, 400 hp 2085 3 machine guns 7.62"; 2 201 750 100
200 kg bombs
T8-1 1925 M-17, 2 x 500 hp 1115 4 machine guns 1.62 mm; 4 198 1350 216
1000 kg bombs

1-3 1921 M-11, 500 hp 1863 2 machine guns 1.62" 1 280 5 85 39 9

R-5 1928 M-11, 500hp 2955 3 machine guns 1.62mm; 2 230 600 IO00
250 kg bombs
TB-3 1930 M-34RN, 4 x 910 hp 21000 8 machine guns 7.62"; 8 288 2410 818
2000 kg bombs
I- 5 1930 M-22, 480 hp 1355 2 machine guns 1.62" 1 286 530 803

1-15 1933 M-25, 115 hp 1313 2 machine guns 1.62mm 1 362 500 614

1-16 1933 M-25, 115 hp 1422 2 machine guns 1.62" 454 8 20

M-62, 1000 hp 1912 2 machine guns 20" 1 1 5 25 690 6555

2 machine guns 7.62"

M-34, 860 hp 11500 - 3 246 12411 2

S8 1934 M-100A, 2 X 860 hp 5732 4 machine guns 7.62mm; I 3 424 1 980 6656
500 kg bombs

1-15 bis
1-15 Z "Chaika"
1936
1938
M-25V,
M-62,
115 hp
1000 hp
1650
1859
2 machine guns 7.62"
4 machine guns 1.62mm 1 2408
3437
 Thapks t o the urgent m e a s u r e s taken by the Central Committee and the
government, the production base of the a i r c r a f t industry was considerably
strengthened and the number of design offices and institutions increased
greatly. New people joined the t e a m s of designers, working t o c r e a t e new,
modern combat a i r c r a f t , mainly fighters. A fundamental turning point was
reached in a i r c r a f t engineering.
Consequently, within a short time, in one-and-a-half to two y e a r s ,
completely new and modern prototypes of fighters, bombers, and attack
planes were produced and tested. The ground was p r e p a r e d f o r t h e i r m a s s
product ion.
F r o m among a l l the fighters o r d e r e d by the government work p r o g r e s s e d
best on the LaGG, MiG, and Yak types. These a i r c r a f t were tested almost
simultaneously at intervals of two o r t h r e e months. In May and June 1940,
without waiting f o r the end of the t e s t s and on the b a s i s of p r e l i m i n a r y
r e s u l t s , all t h e s e types of a i r c r a f t were put into s e r i a l production. Equally
extensive was the work to put I l - 2 attack planes, 11-4 bombers and P e - 2
dive-bombers into s e r i a l production.
The appearance of a i r c r a f t types Il, Pe, MiG, LaGG and Yak did not only
m a r k a fundamental rejuvenation of Soviet combat aviation by supplying it
with modern fighters, bombers and attack planes, but it was a l s o extremely
important to the government that young and creative d e s i g n e r s emerged.

22
I

Fighter Fokker D-11, 1922.

23
 Reconnaissance plane R-1 (DN-gA), 1923.

24

.- ... .._ .. ..
 A

Reconnaissance plane R-3, 1925.

25
 Bomber TB-1, 1925.

5768 26

. .. .. .... . ..I
Fighter 1-3, 1927.

27
Reconnaissance plane R-5, 1928.

28

-- - -_ --. - ._. .. 11.1 .- ... .I. .I. ... .... 111 1

I

___- - .~.

Fighter 1-5, 1930.

29
 A

Heavy bomber TB-3, 1930.

30
I o f z 3 4 s m

Fighter 1-15, 1933.

31
Fighter 1-16, 1933.

32
 . :. . I

Record-breaking aircraft RD, 1933.

33
From-line bomber SB, 1934.

34
Fighter 1-15 bis, 1936.

35
Fighter 1-15 2 , 1938.

36
3. THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF AIRCRAFT
CONSTRUCTION

In its development Soviet aircraft construction based itself on the outstanding successes of Soviet science
and technology. Problems of speed, range and ceiling were successfully overcome. Soviet aircraft was
provided with first-class equipment, insuuments and armament. Organization and planning of experimental
and design work, including research in aviation, were improved. The ties between science and production
became stronger: creative search became embodied in new models of combat aircraft.
The high quality of Soviet aviation science and technology enabled Russian pilots to establish several
outstanding world records.

Before the war, when Soviet aviation was about to be reequipped,

important organizational m e a s u r e s w e r e implemented, f o r developing
aviation science and rearranging the work of the design offices. In the 48
People's Commissariat of the Aircraft Industry the main administrations
of experimental a i r c r a f t construction, of engine and instrument production,
received additional specialists, principally f r o m among the most prominent
a i r force engineers. The management of TsAGI was also reinforced.
In the t h i r t i e s the Soviet scientists solved a number of important and
fundamental problems of modern aviation to e n s u r e rapid qualitative
improvement of Soviet a i r c r a f t construction. Among the most important
questions were undoubtedly the problems of spin and flutter.
Spin confronted aviation at an e a r l y stage of i t s development. The
unexpectedness of spin and the difficulty of pulling the a i r c r a f t out of it w e r e
for a long t i m e a grave danger. As e a r l y a s 1 9 1 6 K. Artseulov, a pilot,
deliberately made his a i r c r a f t go into a spin, laying the foundation of i t s
practical study. In the twenties the problem of spin became most topical
when c r a s h e s and d i s a s t e r s were found to have been caused by it. The
s c i e n t i s t s were required to solve quickly the question of 'how t o design
a i r c r a f t which would be safe f r o m spin. The point was that a s aviation
developed, wing loading and flight altitudes increased, and thus spontaneous
spin was observed with increasing frequency, which had troublesome
consequences. F o r instance the f i r s t series-produced Soviet fighter, the
1-1, made in 1923, under certain flight conditions had a tendency t o pitch
suddenly sideways and go into a protracted spin.
A number of leading Soviet s c i e n t i s t s investigated theoretically the
question of spin, making it possible t o analyze in detail the f o r c e s and
moments acting on the a i r c r a f t under c e r t a i n flight conditions and t o work
out the best ways of handling the a i r c r a f t t o pull it out of the spin. The
solution of the problem of spin is credited to two Soviet s c i e n t i s t s who
specialized in aerodynamics, V. S. Pyshnov and A. N. Zhuravchenko.
V. S. Pyshnov, then a s s i s t a n t at the Air F o r c e Academy, in August 1 9 2 7
published in the journal "Tekhnika vozdushnogo flota" an a r t i c l e titled
"Samovrashchenie i shtopor samoletov" (Autorotation and Spin of Aircraft).

37
 In the history of aviation t h i s was t h e f i r s t scientific theory of spin. In 1929
Pyshnov published t h i s paper "Shtopor samoleta" (Aircraft Spin) which in
detail explained the t h e o r y of spin and suggested a design of a i r c r a f t which
would be e a s y t o pull out of spin. He examined many problems of flight
dynamics which would facilitate p r a c t i c a l application. Various r e c o m m e n -
dations concerning t h e loading of a i r c r a f t , ensuring c o r r e c t trimming,
pulling out of and going into spin, reducing the tendency t o spin, c u r e d
aviation of t h i s ill.
pyshnov's work w a s presented by the scientific and technical commission
of the air f o r c e a t the World Congress of Scientists in Tokyo in November
1929, and it was officially cited a s the f i r s t fundamental t r e a t m e n t of the
theory of spin, solving most of i t s m y s t e r i e s .
In 1934 and 1935 Zhuravchenko published two papers, "Metody resheniya
zadach shtopora i ustoichivosti, upravlyaemosti p r i potere skorosti"
(Methods of Solving P r o b l e m s of Spin and Stability, Controllability upon
Loss of Speed) and "Prognoz shtopora a deistvitel'nyi polet" (Prediction
of Spin and Efficient Flight).
On the b a s i s of t h i s fundamental r e s e a r c h by Soviet s c i e n t i s t s changes in
design w e r e proposed and initiated. One of t h e m was a change in the
disposition and increase in s u r f a c e of the horizontal and v e r t i c a l t a i l
s u r f a c e s . Designers began investigating flow about the wing and tail unit
at l a r g e angles of attack. Before planes w e r e put into serial production,
they all underwent investigation of spin, and detailed instructions w e r e
worked out on how to handle t h e m in spin. To study conditions of auto-
rotation, TsAGI built a special wind tunnel with a vertical channel. The
investigation of spin served as a b a s i s f o r the study of any spatially unsteady
motion of a i r c r a f t .
During t h e e a r l y t h i r t i e s , when flying speed began t o exceed 350kph,
Soviet aviation w a s confronted with another previously unknown phenomenon,
flutter. This was the name given t o self-excited vibrations of wings and
tail units with fast, spontaneously increasing amplitude. The a i r c r a f t often
vibrated s o violently that t h e i r s t r u c t u r e suffered. The s c i e n t i s t s w e r e
faced with the t a s k of solving within a short t i m e engineering methods of
calculating the speed at which t h e s e vibrations may occur (critical speed),
and t o make practical recommendations f o r raising it.
The founder of the theory of flutter and of the e n t i r e school studying t h i s
problem was t h e distinguished scientist M. V. Keldysh.
As e a r l y as in the twenties V. P. Vetchinkin and S. A. Chaplygin studied
the vibrations of wings in an air s t r e a m , and in 1931 a special group was
set up in TsAGI t o study vibrations of a i r c r a f t in flight, including self-
excited vibrations. The investigations c a r r i e d out in TsAGI by M. V. Keldysh,
E. P. Grossman, A. I. Makarevskii and other prominent s c i e n t i s t s showed
that one of the c a u s e s of the n a t u r a l vibrations is the insufficient rigidity
of wings, tail units and fuselage. It was possible t o shift t h e instant at
which flutter o c c u r r e d beyond maximum flying speed by increasing the
rigidity of the s t r u c t u r e and by adopting various design m e a s u r e s which
w e r e a l s o recommended to designers.
Subsequently t h e s e recommendations w e r e consistently put into practice.
T h e r e w e r e recommendations f o r m e a s u r e s designed t o r a i s e the c r i t i c a l
speed of flutter. Among t h e m w e r e : t o i n c r e a s e the torsional rigidity of
the wing and t o i n c r e a s e the r a t i o of the frequency of torsional vibrations

38
t o the frequency of flexural vibrations; t o reduce the linear moment of m a s s
inertia of the wing; t o have the c e n t e r s of gravity of the wing sections a s
f a r t o the front a s possible, e. g., by placing the loads in t h e wing-leading
edge, and t o move the c e n t e r s of gravity of the ailerons t o the front; t o
make the wings n a r r o w e r ; t o i n c r e a s e the torsional rigidity of the a i l e r o n s
and t h e p a r t s of the t a i l unit; t o i n c r e a s e the frequency of a n t i s y m m e t r i c
vibrations of t h e t a i l s u r f a c e ; t o lighten the t a i l s u r f a c e s and move their
c e n t e r s of gravity forward.
Scientists a l s o developed methods of computing the c r i t i c a l speeds of
t o r s i o n a l and aileron flutter of the wing and torsional and flexural empennage
flutter in aircraft of different configurations. The accuracy of the methods
was checked on models in wind tunnels and in flight. S. N. Anokhin, a t e s t
pilot, in 1934-35 checked t h e accuracy of the theoretical computations on
a glider, and s e v e r a l other pilots did the s a m e on high-speed a i r c r a f t . The
glider or a i r c r a f t gained by dividing the speed at which, according t o the
computations, self-sustained vibrations should begin. Flight experiments
confirmed that the theoretical assumptions w e r e c o r r e c t .
On the b a s i s of flight experiments and theoretical investigations t e m p o r a r y
s t a n d a r d s of the strength of a i r c r a f t w e r e also worked out. Later on they
w e r e constantly revised on the b a s i s of work c a r r i e d out by V. P. Vetchinkin,
A. M. Cheremukhin, A. A. Goryainov, S. N. Shishkin, V. N. Belyaev, A. I.
Makarevskii, M. V. Keldysh, and many other scientists. The standards
a l s o reflected phenomena that had just been investigated: flight in a turbulent
atmosphere, flutter, compressibility, heating. New design f e a t u r e s w e r e
a l s o considered: s t r e s s e d skin, swept wings, and so forth.
Material-strength engineering developed a s streamlined shapes and
designs of a i r c r a f t changed by increasing speed, ceiling and unit load.
The f i r s t series-produced Soviet biplane fighter, the 1-2, had in 1925 a
speed of barely 230 kph and wing loading was 65 kg/m2. L e s s than ten y e a r s
l a t e r the monoplane fighter 1-16 had twice that speed, 454kph, and wing
loading of about 100kg/m2. Yet another t e n y e a r s l a t e r the Yak-3 fighter
attained a speed of 7 2 0 kph at about 200 kg/m2 wing loading. This tendency
was maintained, even into the jet e r a .
P r o g r e s s in a i r c r a f t construction is related t o the adoption of new
configurations and design f e a t u r e s would be unthinkable without the
pioneering efforts of material-strength specialists. Whereas in the e a r l y
s t a g e s of development of Soviet aviation calculations and s t r e s s analyses
w e r e c a r r i e d out according t o primitive standards (from today's point of
view) and w e r e checked only by elementary s t a t i c t e s t s , l a t e r investigations
of aeroelasticity w e r e added to s t a t i c s t r e s s analysis, with aerothermo-
elasticity, the theory of thin-walled s t r u c t u r e s and s h e l l s following.
Afterward fatigue tests on the ground and flight t e s t s with s t r a i n gauges
began.
Important f o r the practical utilization of the scientific investigations
and their technical application was the Designers' Handbook (Rukovodstvo
dlya konstruktorov (RDK)) which unified methods of design, construction
and testing of a i r c r a f t .
This handbook was needed because the design offices did not u s e the
same methods. Each office worked according t o its own r u l e s , and frankly,
not always successfully. The only law obligatory f o r all covered the
strength s t a n d a r d s f o r aircraft. Everybody abided by it. Other methodolo-
gical problems w e r e not dealt with, and even the testing of a i r c r a f t in wind

39
 tunnels was arranged by each designer in h i s own way. P r o c e d u r e s in
designing, constructing and testing a i r c r a f t w e r e not subject t o any
regulations. The work was not infrequently unsystematic, eventually
causing g r e a t and sometimes unjustified expenditure of m a t e r i a l and labor.
As long as t h e r e were only two o r t h r e e design offices in t h e country
and they w e r e as highly skilled as Tupolev's and Polikarpov's, they could
somehow manage without regulations, although unified direction was even
then advantageous. But when t h e r e w e r e many design offices, it was
I unthinkable that they should work without a unifying methodological "codex.
All t h i s was especially well understood when, as a r e s u l t of t h e unsyste-
matic and unorganized work in 1940 and 1941, s e v e r a l new a i r c r a f t crashed
on t e s t flights.
The f i r s t edition of t h e RDK handbook was prepared in 1940 and published
in 1941. The second edition, considerably r e v i s e d and enlarged by m o r e
than one hundred fifty printing sheets, was published a f t e r the Soviet Union
had entered t h e war. It incorporated t h e experience in design, construction
and combat of the new generation of Soviet a i r c r a f t which appeared shortly
before and during World W a r 11-the Yak, La, and MiG fighters, the 11-2
attack planes, and the 11-4, Pe-2 and Tu-2 bombers.
The f i r s t edition consisted only of five p a r t s and t h e second edition i n
t h r e e volumes had no less than eleven p a r t s :

1. Aerodynamics
2. Hyd roin echa nic s
3. Strength of materials
4. Flight tests of aircraft and equipment
5. Engines
6. Aircraft equipment
I. Aircraft armament
8. Landing gear and mechanisms
9. Standard systems
10. Materials
11. Semiproducts.

The f i r s t edition of t h e RDK handbook w a s prepared with the cooperation

of leading scientists, d e s i g n e r s and t e s t pilots. The scientific e d i t o r s of
p a r t s and c h a p t e r s were I. V. Ostoslavskii, aerodynamics; L. I. Sedov,
hydromechanics; S. N. Shishkin, strength of m a t e r i a l s ; A. I. Makarevskii,
chapter on s t r e n g t h standards; M. V. Keldysh, c h a p t e r s on dynamic and
vibration investigations, and computation of flutter; A. V. Chesalov, flight
t e s t s , landing g e a r and mechanisms; V. I. Polikovskii, engines; G. V. Akimov
and S. T. Kishkin, m a t e r i a l s ; N. I. Petrov, a i r c r a f t equipment; P. Ya.
Zalesskii, armament; and A. T. Tumanov, m a t e r i a l s . Authors of p a r t s of
t h e RDK handbook were M. A. Taits, N. S. Stroev, V. V. Kostochkin, G. P.
Svintsev, A. A. Dorodnitsyn, V. V. Struminskii, and many others.
The RDK handbook contains descriptions of wind tunnels and t e s t s in
them; requirements of wind-tunnel models of wings and aircraft and of
mock-ups; d a t a on t h e aerodynamics of wings; detailed recommendations
for the selection of unit load, profile, etc., f o r t h e design of the t a i l unit,
controls, and ailerons, and f o r the arrangement of the power plant; b a s i c
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and recommendations for t h e selection of p r o p e l l e r s and t h e
computation of t h e i r t h r u s t ; information on unified p r o p e l l e r s ; data on the

40
 determination of the stability and controllability of the a i r c r a f t f r o m model
experiments, on the longitudinal and l a t e r a l stability of a i r c r a f t , and on
the selection of horizontal and vertical t a i l s u r f a c e s .
The chapters of the RDK handbook dealing with hydromechanics were
extremely valuable to the designers of seaplanes. Here the experimental
basin of TsAGI and experiments in it were described. A l s o hydrostatic
computations were given, including the computation of unsinkability and
hydrodynamic analysis of seaplanes.
Especially detailed was the treatment of problems of strength of m a t e r i a l s .
In addition to the "Strength Standards" in the handbook, t h e r e a r e regulations
for the extent and sequence of s t a t i c and dynamic t e s t s , for the determination
of vibration c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , and f o r the computations of flutter. The
treatment in the book excels by being detailed and instructive,
A n e n t i r e part of the RDK handbook deals with flight t e s t s of a i r c r a f t and
t h e i r equipment. P r o g r a m s and documentation of the a i r c r a f t t e s t s a r e
given; t e s t s for stability, controllability, maneuverability and spin; t e s t s
of the power plant, of equipment, of f i r e a r m s and bomber armament, of
the mechanisms of the landing g e a r , controls, and landing s y s t e m s ; and
the instruments f o r flight t e s t s a r e described.
Several chapters of the RDK handbook deal with the engines and a c c e s -
s o r i e s and contain requirements and samples concerning design and methods
of testing such s y s t e m s a s gas, oil, liquid cooling, suction, exhaust,
r a d i a t o r s and cowlings, and control of the power plant. The most detailed
chapter is "Radiators and Cowlings", because the optimum design
of these p a r t s is important for reducing the r e s i s t a n c e of a i r c r a f t .
The part of the handbook entitled "Aircraft Equipment" deals with flight
and navigation instruments and electrical, radio, and high-flying equipment.
It gives information on the obligatory nomenclature of instruments and
equipment depending on the c l a s s of the a i r c r a f t , i t s tactical destination,
crew, and number of engines. Standard arrangements of instruments in
cockpits of fighters and attack planes a r e recommended.
The subsequent section, "Aircraft Armament", consists of chapters on
f i r e a r m s and bomber, mine, and torpedo armament, rocket m i s s i l e s , and
a r m o r i n g of a i r c r a f t .
Interesting is the chapter dealing with rocket m i s s i l e s ; it i s an abridged
version of "Kratkoe rukovodstvo PO primeneniyu raketnykh snaryadov s
samoletov" (Brief Manual on the Use of Rocket Missiles F i r e d f r o m
Aircraft). Soviet aviation was the f i r s t in the world to be equipped with
rockets and used successfully in the fighting on the Khalkhin-Gol. After
that the r o c k e t s "came down to earth", becoming the terrifying Guard
m o r t a r s , the "Katyushas. The chapter also contains g e n e r a l instructions
f o r the a r m o r i n g of a i r c r a f t , information on a r m o r plating and its charac-
t e r i s t i c s . Finally t h e r e a r e technical recommendations for the design of
a r m o r p a r t s and a r m o r e d s t r u c t u r e s of a i r c r a f t . P a r t i c u l a r l y it is proved
that a r m o r i n g of the main types of combat a i r c r a f t - f i g h t e r s , bombers,
attack planes and reconnaissance planes- is obligatory. Those sections
most vulnerable for the crew a r e protected by a r m o r .
The RDK handbook devotes much attention to the treatment of touch-down
installations. In particular the problem i s analyzed of standardization of
control cabins in different types of a i r c r a f t and of location of armament i n t h e
b o m b a r d i e r ' s compartment and in the cockpits of fighters and attack planes.

41
 Two sections of the RDK handbook contain descriptions of the physical
and mechanical properties of the main aviation materials.
This e n t i r e encyclopedia for aircraft designers, r i c h in content, was
compiled within a short time. It played an eminent p a r t in improving the
work of the design offices and was a vital link connecting science and
practice.
The People's C o m m i s s a r i a t of the Aircraft Industry gave high priority
to organizing design offices and r e s e a r c h institutes. The range of problems
of r e s e a r c h institutes was relieved of subjects that w e r e not urgent and
topical, and the scientists' work was oriented toward the solution of the
most important problems, both s h o r t - t e r m and long-term ones. Emphasis
was placed on the construction of new wind tunnels with high a i r velocities
and of gigantic laboratories for static and dynamic t e s t s where d e s i g n e r s
could check the strength of aircraft on highly scientific lines. Everything
was done to e n s u r e that aircraft d e s i g n e r s could utilize the latest scientific
investigations.
Design offices, r e s e a r c h institutes and industrial plants made a s u p r e m e
effort to e n s u r e that the new models of aircraft and engines were s e r i e s -
produced a s soon a s possible. The introduction of new aircraft and techniques
demonstrated the necessity to rebuild the radio industry, t o c r e a t e high-
quality metallurgy, t o reorganize tens o r even hundreds of e n t e r p r i s e s in
various branches of the economy working for the a i r c r a f t industry.
The prewar period is characterized by the parallel development of all-
metal heavy aircraft with dural skin and light maneuverable aircraft of
composite construction. A s the r a w - m a t e r i a l base expanded and the Soviet
aluminum industry developed, aluminum alloys w e r e increasingly used.
After having been tested on the experimental ANT-2 plane, the TB-1 (ANT-4)
bomber was built; h e r e the skin was made of corrugated duralumin-type
sheet and was s t r e s s e d in s h e a r and torsion. After the TB-1 all bombers
and their transport versions had metal skins, and beginning with the SB
the skin also covered the fuselage and was fully s t r e s s e d .
Dural p a r t s also found application in s o m e c a s e s in light combat a i r c r a f t
(fighters and reconnaissance planes). On the whole, however, these
a i r c r a f t had t r u s s f r a m e s made of steel pipes with fabric skin and wings
with wooden s p a r s and fabric skin, l a t e r replaced by plywood skin. Emphasis
was placed on cheap m a t e r i a l s in ample supply; this proved to be best under
conditions of m a s s production. Its justlfication became apparent during the
war when the enemy occupied Zaporozhe and Volkhov, where the aluminum
plants were located, thus stopping almost completely the production of
aluminum for some time. When it was possibIe, still during the war, to
r e s u m e production of aluminum in the Urals, duralumin was used m o r e
widely, including on fighters, e. g., the wooden s p a r s were replaced by
metal ones; this made it possible to reduce the weight of the s t r u c t u r e and
to i n c r e a s e the space available for fuel. The wing skin at first was
made of plywood. Only toward the end of the war was it replaced by metal
skin.
In the t h i r t i e s attempts were made to build passenger planes with f r a m e s
of stainless steel sections. This trend, however, was discontinued because
of the high cost of the m a t e r i a l and technological difficulties.
It is no exaggeration that even before the war Soviet aviation science
and industry had accumulated vast experience. On the basis of the latest

42
I

achievements of science and technology, prototypes of f i r s t - c l a s s modern

combat a i r c r a f t w e r e built; however the problem was m o r e complicated
than just to build new models of a i r c r a f t , engines, various instruments,
and to invent new materials. It was n e c e s s a r y t o organize m a s s production
of all t h e s e a i r c r a f t and everything else required, which was now on an
incomparably higher level than before.
The rapid mastering of the most advanced aviation techniques largely
depended on the courageous and self-sacrificing work of the t e s t pilots who
often risked their lives to test the performance of a i r c r a f t under the most
complicated and dangerous flight conditions. They w e r e the most important
and most highly skilled advisers of the designers.
As a r e s u l t of energetic and tenacious efforts, Soviet aviation was
qualitatively renewed within a short time. Thanks to the m e a s u r e s taken,
a l l the required types of combat a i r c r a f t were put into s e r i a l production.
However, at the beginning of the war t h e i r output was s t i l l small. It was
not possible to remedy the situation at the t i m e Hitlerite Germany attacked
the Soviet Union.

43
4 . , W O R L D WAR 11

World War I1 was a stringent test for the entire Soviet people and the Soviet army. The air force was i n
a particularly difficult position. Production of modern combat aircraft was not able to supply the required
numbers at the beginning of the war.
The aircraft industry overcame the difficulties caused by the sudden attack of Nazi Germany, evacuating
entire enterprises to eastern districts of the country and raising the daily rate of armament production. In
1943 the Soviet aviation gained the upper hand in the air, having outstripped the enemy both i n quantity and
quality of aircraft.
Toward the end of the war Soviet control of the air was complete: the remainder of the Luftwaffe turned to
to dust.

The s p r e a d of Nazi aggression in Europe led inexorably t o the unleashing

of war by Germany against the Soviet Union. The prewar atmosphere was
also c l e a r l y felt in the Soviet aviation industry.
At the beginning of 1941 the Central Committee and the government
deliberated on how to improve the work of the aviation industry and strengthen
the a i r f o r c e . It was n e c e s s a r y t o produce in the l a r g e s t possible numbers
new types of a i r c r a f t that had been developed by then.
On 2 5 F e b r u a r y 1941 the Central Committee of the P a r t y and the Council
of People's C o m m i s s a r s adopted an important resolution, Atonthe Reorgani-
zation of the Red Army Aviation. " This resolution confirmed the plan of
rearming the a i r f o r c e units, prepared by the People's Commissariat of
Defense. The aim was t o f o r m new units with half of them t o be equipped
with modern a i r c r a f t , a s much a s production permitted. The formation of
s e v e r a l a i r f o r c e units began. Zones of a i r defense with fighter a i r c r a f t ,
antiaircraft a r t i l l e r y and observation s e r v i c e were introduced. It was
envisaged that most f l y e r s would be taught t o handle the new a i r c r a f t during
1941.
The Central Committee and the government also dealt with p a r t i a l and
special problems. In winter 1940 the problem of the difficulties in operating
the new high-speed fighters and bombers was discussed, because the snow
had not been removed on airfields. Take-off on skis, technical difficulties
of r e t r a c t i n g the landing g e a r with skis, loss of speed because of the
increased a i r r e s i s t a n c e - a l l t h i s put the Soviet a i r c r a f t at a disadvantage
against foreign a i r c r a f t . Although the a i r force command protested because
it believed it impossible t o remove the snow f r o m the many field aerodromes,
the Central Committee and the Soviet government proposed that henceforth
a e r o d r o m e s be cleaned and rolled. Since then Soviet combat a i r c r a f t have
been running on wheels, summer and winter.
In e a r l y s u m m e r 1941 leading employees of the People's Commissariat
of the Aircraft Industry and of the a r m y a i r force w e r e invited to meet the
Central Committee and government t o d i s c u s s a l e t t e r received f r o m an
a i r m a n who complained of the complete absence of camouflage on a i r c r a f t

44
c
 and a e r o d r o m e s in the border regions. During the deliberations it was
discovered that one of the institutes of the People's Commissariat of Defense
had been preparing samples of camouflage f o r a long time. It had s e v e r a l
versions of camouflage paint for a i r c r a f t ready but had not suggested a final
version. An o r d e r was issued t o submit a proposal for a i r c r a f t camouflage
within t h r e e days. Within the stipulated t i m e one design office prepared
a i r c r a f t models of differing types with camouflage. After the problem had
been studied by the People's Commissariat of the Aircraft Industry, together
with representatives of the a r m y a i r force, the models w e r e approved, and
the a r m y a i r force was t o camouflage all a i r c r a f t within the shortest possible
time.
These and other f a c t s indicated that the country sensed the advent of war.
Nevertheless the attack by the Nazis against the Soviet Union came unexpec-
tedly. It put the Soviet armed forces, including the a i r force, into a difficult
position.
Although the Soviet-designed fighters, LaGG-3, MiG-3 and Yak-I, were
f a s t e r and m o r e maneuverable than t h e i r German counterparts and S. V.
Ilyushin's attack plane was unique, t h e i r s e r i e s production was only just
being s t a r t e d .
The s i n g l e - s e a t e r , all-wood LaGG-3 fighter had a speed of 570kph and
c a r r i e d one 20-mm cannon andone 12.7-mm machine gun. It made extensive
use of improved wood (delta wood, i. e., wood impregnated with phenolic
r e s i n , which is very strong) and was powered by a liquid-cooled 1050 hp
engine, type M-105P.
The MiG-1, and then i t s modification, the MiG-3, were specially designed
a s high-altitude fighters. The MiG-3 was a monoplane of composite
construction with plywood and metal covering, powered by an AM-35A,
1350hp engine, and its take-off weight was 3350kg. The armament of the
plane consisted of one 12.7-mm machine gun and two 7.62-mm machine guns.
Its maximum speed was 640 kph at an altitude of 7800 m.
The Yak-1 fighter was the first in the s e r i e s of Yak fighters.
All these planes had s e v e r a l f e a t u r e s in common: low weight, e a s y
piloting, extremely simple design, made of readily available m a t e r i a l s ,
suitability f o r m a s s production. It had all-wood, unslotted wings with two
s p a r s , plywood covering, and a t r u s s fuselage of welded s t e e l pipes covered
with canvas. The plane weighed 2.9tons and had a speed of 580kph. Its
armament consisted of one 20-mm cannon and two 7.62-mm machine guns,
The M-105P V-type engine was liquid cooled, of 1050 hp, designed by
V. Ya. Klimov; the cannon was situated between the banks of the V. The
gun b a r r e l w a s located inside the hollow r e d u c e r shaft, permitting firing
without a synchronizer and a l a r g e r caliber. Although the Yak-7 was
available almost at the s a m e time, the Yak-1 was developed independently
of it throughout the w a r . They were produced continually in different
versions .
The a r m o r e d attack plane Il-2, which was destined to become the most
widely used a i r c r a f t in World War 11, was designed in 1938 in Ilyushinls
office. At first the Il-2 w a s received coolly f r o m the military. They thought
its speed, range and a r m o r were insufficient. They wanted Ilyushin t o
change the a i r c r a f t f r o m a two-seater, with a machine gun f o r the defense
of the r e a r half sphere, into a single-seater without defensive armament.
During the w a r , however, the single-seater 11-2s suffered considerable
l o s s e s and it was n e c e s s a r y t o r e v e r t t o t h e two-seater version.

45
 The 11-2 was not the first attempt t o build an a i r c r a f t that would act a s
a tank d e s t r o y e r . Yet only Ilyushin succeeded in fully solving t h i s compli-
cated problem by designing an astonishingly lively plane whose favorable
f e a t u r e s enhanced one another, with powerful a r m o r and a r m a m e n t which
was constantly improved. The plane was intended t o fight tanks, and it w a s
itself a kind of "flying tank. '' The designer produced a single, compact,
welded a r m o r e d cell. It encompassed the e n t i r e nose and center of the
fuselage and provided reliable protection for the crew in both cabins, t h e
engine and radiator, fuel tanks, and other vital p a r t s of the a i r c r a f t . With
a take-off weight of l e s s than 6 tons, the a r m o r weighed m o r e than 700 kg.
The a r m o r e d s h e l l w a s also p a r t of the s t r e s s e d a i r f r a m e , which was why
such a comparatively low weight of the a i r c r a f t could be attained. The r e a r
section of the 11-2 was wooden, wings and empennage were of duralumin.
At the t i m e of the war the I l - 2 was powered by a liquid-cooled AM-38F,
1750 hp engine. The plane had a speed of 420 kph and a range of m o r e than
750 km. Its a r m a m e n t consisted of two 23-mm cannons, type VYa, two
wing-mounted machine guns, four rocket m i s s i l e s of 82- and 132-mm caliber,
and 400kg t o 600kg bombs c a r r i e d in the bomb bay o r under the wings.
Defensive armament was a 12.7-mm machine gun in the cabin of the gunner-
radio operator.
The 11-2 attack planes w e r e used in combat right f r o m the beginning of
the war and immediately acquired an excellent reputation. To the Germans
t h e i r appearance was a complete s u r p r i s e .
S e r i e s production of the Il-2 increased daily until output reached f o r t y
planes a day. At the s a m e t i m e the a i r c r a f t was being improved, In the
battle of Kursk the 11-2s were equipped with two 37-mm cannons and with
special antitank bombs.
The high-speed dive-bomber P e - 2 , designed by V. M. Petlyakov, was
also put into m a s s production. It was powered by two 1100 hp, liquid-
cooled M-105R engines, with water and oil r a d i a t o r s flush with the wings.
The new bomber was of all-metal construction, beautifully streamlined;
it excelled by its s m a l l dimensions and low r e s i s t a n c e . The weight of the
Pe-2 did not exceed 8.5 tons. With i t s speed of 540kph the a i r c r a f t was
almost equal t o the enemy fighter, the Me-109E, which operated in the f i r s t
period of the w a r on the Soviet-German front. Compared with i t s prede-
c e s s o r , the SB, the Pe-2 was 120kph f a s t e r . With a range of 1200km it
could c a r r y 600kg of bombs; the overload version c a r r i e d lOOOkg of bombs.
The equipment of the plane ensured accurate dive-bombing. Against enemy
fighters the plane was armed with five machine guns operated by the pilot,
the navigator and the gunner-radio o p e r a t o r , During the war the Pe-2 was
also built in the reconnaissance version with e x t r a c a m e r a mountings and
f u e l tanks. The Pe-2 was the main s h o r t - r a n g e bombing and reconnaissance
plane of the Soviet Union, and it was found to be efficient at the front.
Total a i r c r a f t output in 1 9 4 0 was sixty-four Yak-1 fighters, twenty MiG-3
fighters, two Pe-2 dive-bombers. In the f i r s t half of 1941, the following
planes were in production: 1946 MiG-3, Yak-1, and LaGG-3 fighters, 458
P e - 2 bombers and 249 11-2 attack planes; but most of the combat planes of
the a i r f o r c e were s t i l l outdated models.
On the f i r s t day of the war the Soviet a i r f o r c e suffered heavy l o s s e s .
The German a i r f o r c e attacked sixty-six aerodromes near the Soviet border.
By noon of 2 2 June 1941 the Soviet Union had lost twelve hundred planes:

46
 t h r e e hundred w e r e shot down in dogfights and nine hundred w e r e destroyed
on the ground.
The Soviet a e r o d r o m e s in the border d i s t r i c t s w e r e not r e a d y when w a r
broke out. According t o the existing plans, by 1941 t h e old a e r o d r o m e s
should have been adapted t o the new types of a i r c r a f t and new a e r o d r o m e s
built. The intention was t o reconstruct the a e r o d r o m e s successively so
that not all of t h e m would be out of action at the s a m e time. The "History
of the Great Patriotic W a r " (Istoriya Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny) s t a t e s ,
however, that "in spring 1941 the People's Commissariat of Internal
Affairs, which was charged with the construction work, did not consider
the situation and began construction simultaneously on most of the a e r o -
d r o m e s in the b o r d e r d i s t r i c t s . The r e s u l t was that at the outbreak of w a r
an extensive part of t h e s e a e r o d r o m e s was actually unsuitable f o r operation
under combat conditions; all the fighters w e r e concentrated on a few
a e r o d r o m e s , depriving t h e m of the possibility of maneuvering and making
camouflage and d i s p e r s a l difficult. Some a e r o d r o m e s , e. g., in the Western
Special Military .District, w e r e too close t o the b o r d e r making t h e m
exceedingly vulnerable in c a s e of sudden attack by enemy a i r c r a f t . The
lack of a network of a e r o d r o m e s on 22 June 1941, the cramped conditions
of a i r force units on the few peace-time aerodromes, of which many w e r e
well known t o t h e enemy, w e r e s o m e of the r e a s o n s f o r the heavy l o s s e s
that Soviet aviation suffered in t h e f i r s t days of the war. The civil defense
warning network in t h e western border zone was badly organized, and a i r
f o r c e units received belated information on the violation of the countryls
border by German planes.
"At the outbreak of the w a r the a i r f o r c e in the b o r d e r d i s t r i c t s was
engaged in widespread reorganization and retraining of personnel. " 8
In the fighting that followed, in spite of t h e i r heavy l o s s e s and flying
obsolete planes, t h e Soviet pilots managed t o inflict s e r i o u s damage on
the Germans. For example, in less than a month, between 22 June and
19 July, the German a r m y lost about thirteen hundred planes in aerial
combat.
In his postwar m e m o i r s Greffrat, a military historian and m e m b e r of the
German General Staff, wrote: "In the period f r o m 22 June t o 5 July 1941 the
German Luftwaffe lost 807 planes of all types, and f r o m 6 t o 19 July
477 planes. These l o s s e s prove that in spite of the s u r p r i s e achieved by
the Germans, the Russians found t i m e and strength f o r determined
counterattack. " **
T h i s successful counterattack completely s u r p r i s e d the G e r m a n s and
robbed them of the chance t o send part of t h e i r a i r f o r c e against the West,
as they had planned, because it forced t h e m t o reinforce t h e i r aviation
on the Soviet front at the expense of their strength in the West.
Regardless of l o s s e s , the G e r m a n s threw fighters and bombers, that w e r e
new in e v e r y r e s p e c t , into the fighting. They concentrated 4840 a i r c r a f t
on the Soviet-German front, of which 3940 w e r e German, 500 Finnish, and
500 Rumanian, and t h u s achieved a i r superiority.
The Soviet industry was unable t o r e p l a c e the l o s s e s the Soviet a i r f o r c e
had suffered in t h e f i r s t days of t h e war. In addition, in view of the rapid
..
Istoriya Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soyuza . (History of the Great Patriotic War of the
Soviet Union), Vol. 1. pp.476-411.
* * Mirovaya voina 1939-1945 (The World War 1939- 1945). p.472.- Moskva. IL. 1957.

47
 advance of the German army, one a i r c r a f t factory after the other in the
European part of the USSR, and thus within range of German bombers,
stopped work and was dismantled. As e a r l y a s 5 July 1941 the Council of
People's C o m m i s s a r s decided to evacuate p a r t of the equipment of plants
producing a i r c r a f t instruments f r o m the Central regions of the country to
Western Siberia t o duplicate t h e i r production. L a t e r came the decision to
evacuate the e n t i r e a i r c r a f t industry. The output of new types of combat
a i r c r a f t dropped sharply, and the old fighters and bombers, such a s the
1-15, 1-16, SB, and TB-3, were no match f o r the Messerschmitts and
Junkers .
It was c l e a r now that the trouble in which Soviet aviation found itself in
June 1 9 4 1 was a l s o because of the e r r o r s committed in the t h i r t i e s . This
is how we view them now, many y e a r s l a t e r .
Some of the Soviet tacticians were influenced by Douhet's doctrine
(although it was officially rejected in the USSR) of the omnipotence of a
strong bomber force. The effect was that the r o l e of heavy bombers was
overrated and the r o l e of attack planes and light bombers was underestimated.
The technical policy in a i r c r a f t construction mostly emphasized production
of heavy and superheavy planes. Heavy bombers were made in l a r g e s e r i e s .
Finally the gigantic planes were impressive at m i l i t a r y reviews; they
testified t o the increased potential of the Soviet a i r c r a f t industry and the
x h i e v e m e n t s of Soviet a i r c r a f t technology, but experience in the last war
demonstrated that they a r e not a decisive force.
The negative aspect of this gigantomania and even of r e c o r d s achieved
at that time was that they induced a feeling of smugness and the illusion that
aviation was able to s e a l off the border.
It was also a mistake that up t o the late t h i r t i e s , the Soviet Union had
only two l a r g e design offices, one f o r bombers and one f o r fighters, and
each of them had a monopoly in i t s field. In spite of the outstanding
qualities of the aviators who headed these offices, namely A. N. Tupolev
and N. N. Polikarpov, for a country a s l a r g e a s the USSR two design offices
certainly were not sufficient. Admittedly, at that t i m e t h e r e were some
other s m a l l groups of designers, but most of them had hardly any influence
on the development of Soviet aviation.
Finally, the most important a i r c r a f t plants were situated in the European
p a r t of the USSR. F u r t h e r , most of them were located between the western
border and the Volga. Only a minute number of a i r c r a f t plants beyond the
Volga proved t o be outside the range of enemy bombers. Although the front
was in urgent need of a i r c r a f t , t h e i r production had to be almost stopped
for a time, because it was essential to evacuate the plants t o Siberia.
Only the g r e a t m o r a l and physical strength of the Soviet people saved
the Soviet s t a t e in its desperate situation. F i r m solidarity with the P a r t y
and the huge industrial potential created by the people in the y e a r s of building
a new life made it possible to overcome all the difficulties and t o gain a
g r e a t victory.
During the initial period of the war the employees of the aviation industry
concentrated a l l t h e i r strength on liquidating the numerical superiority of
the German a i r force within the shortest possible time, to replace the l o s s e s
suffered in the first days of the war, and principally t o develop a s quickly
a s possible production of new fighters to achieve a i r supremacy. It was
not only n e c e s s a r y to organize quickly the evacuation of the plants, but also
to p r e p a r e simultaneously b a s e s in the East t o receive people and equipment
and to s t a r t production for the front.

48

.- .. .. .. ... .,
 Thousands of t r a i n s transported equipment of a i r c r a f t plants a c r o s s the
Volga, t o the Urals, to Siberia. Sometimes equipment and people were
loaded onto t r a i n s at the climax of enemy a i r r a i d s , but this did not stop
evacuation. F u r t h e r m o r e , while some plants were engaged in loading,
they continued producing a i r c r a f t . Each machine was dismantled at the
l a s t moment, and only after the p a r t s for the stipulated number of a i r c r a f t
had been produced. Then the assembly departments completed the
a i r c r a f t and turned them over to the military pilots directly at the plant
aerodromes. The staffs of the plants worked round the clock. Designers,
together with workers and administrative staff, helped with the loading,
taking c a r e that the expensive and breakable equipment of design offices
and l a b o r a t o r i e s a r r i v e d safely. Every foreman and worker, every designer
endeavored t o take a l l that was n e c e s s a r y so that production could b e
resumed immediately upon a r r i v a l at the new place.
The move beyond the Volga, to the Urals, to Siberia required new
cooperation, new lines of flow of goods transport, and t h i s complicated
the situation even more.
T r a n s p o r t s of industrial equipment alternated with military ambulance
t r a i n s and passenger t r a i n s carrying evacuees. Often precedence had t o
be given to ambulance t r a i n s o r to t r a i n s which evacuated people f r o m the
fighting zone t o the East. All this created enormous difficulties for the
r a i l r o a d s , not only involving the passage of an innumerable amount of t r a i n s
but also the organization of feeding and even the provision of most elementary
s e r v i c e s f o r the l a r g e number of people at the r a i l r o a d stations.
When f r o s t set in and snow began falling, the difficulties became even
g r e a t e r ; nevertheless, the t a s k was brilliantly fulfilled.
The people showed g r e a t h e r o i s m when, on arriving in winter at the
e a s t e r n d i s t r i c t s , at the new places, they resumed plane production within
a short time. In Moscow loading of t r a i n s was s t i l l in p r o g r e s s , and in the
East preparations were already being made to receive people and equipment.
Plans for locating departments were made, and mains installed for e l e c t r i c
power, compressed a i r , steam, water-everything was done so that the
a r r i v i n g machines could immediately s t a r t working.
By January or F e b r u a r y 1942 the evacuation on the whole was completed,
and the evacuated a i r c r a f t plants resumed s e r i e s production of engines and
planes within an exceedingly short t i m e .
In March 1 9 4 2 output of a i r c r a f t had already increased, and t h e i r supply
t o the front improved. As the Soviet pilots became familiar with the new
planes, they convinced themselves in a e r i a l combat of the preponderance
of Soviet aviation technology. Considerable numerical superiority, however,
remained on the side of the German Luftwaffe.
In defensive fighting the might of the Soviet a i r f o r c e grew. It helped
actively t o defeat the Germans outside Moscow, thereby also shattering
the myth of German invincibility. Even m o r e active was the r o l e of the
Soviet a i r f o r c e in the battle of Stalingrad.
In the e a r l y stages of the battle of Stalingrad in the middle of July 1942,
the Germans in support of t h e i r ground f o r c e s brought in l a r g e f o r c e s of
t h e i r aviation, particularly the 4th Air Fleet.
In t h i s section the German command concentrated m o r e than twelve
hundred planes. The German aviation was t h r e e o r four t i m e s s t r o n g e r
numerically than the Soviet aviation. Moreover, the Soviet 8th Air Fleet,

49
 which defended the city, was t h r e e - f o u r t h s equipped with obsolete planes,
and t h e r e w e r e v e r y few new planes.
In the fall of 1942 the government Committee of Defense decided t o
g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e the output of fighter planes. The Soviet command a l s o
c r e a t e d new units within the f r a m e w o r k of the 16th Air Fleet. These units
w e r e staffed by the best fighter pilots who were experienced f r o m fighting
the G e r m a n s n e a r Moscow and elsewhere. Soviet pilots won many victories,
demoralizing the German pilots, and young Soviet f l y e r s found that the
Soviet machines in t h e hands of skilled s o l d i e r s w e r e decidedly b e t t e r than
the enemy's.
T e r r i f i c damage w a s inflicted on the German ground f o r c e s by the 11-2
attack planes, which w e r e produced in constantly increasing numbers. At
night the German f o r c e s w e r e h a r r a s s e d by low-powered U-2 ( P o - 2 ) planes.
In the a e r i a l battle o v e r Stalingrad the Soviet a i r f o r c e and a n t i - a i r c r a f t
a r t i l l e r y destroyed o r damaged 929 enemy planes. The German l o s s e s w e r e
s o g r e a t that they had t o t r a n s f e r t o the battle zone a i r f o r c e units f r o m
faraway, including t h e 8th Air Corps, which was directly subordinated t o the
German High Command, and even a i r f o r c e units f r o m Sicily. The G e r m a n s
w e r e a l s o obliged t o t r a n s f e r t o Stalingrad some air f o r c e units f r o m
Leningrad and the c e n t r a l front. Yet even that did not help them. The sky
o v e r Stalingrad became a huge meat grinder of German aviation.
On 2 F e b r u a r y 1943 the encircled group of Field Marshal Paulus' f o r c e s
capitulated. The G e r m a n s had suffered a d i s a s t r o u s defeat f r o m which
they never fully r e c o v e r e d . The German a i r force, too, did not r e c o v e r
.
f r o m the blow. Greffrat wrote: 'I.. the German Air F o r c e suffered g r e a t
l o s s e s in the operations n e a r Stalingrad, Between 1 9 November and 31
December 1942 the G e r m a n s lost about t h r e e thousand planes. T h i s number
includes, in addition t o planes that w e r e shot down, a l s o planes captured
on airfields by the Russians. Also lost was a n enormous amount of
ammunition and m a t e r i a l . ' I *
General D o r r admitted: "Not only the ground f o r c e s , the a i r force, too,
lost a n e n t i r e a r m y a t Stalingrad. ' I * *
The t u r n in the fate of Soviet aviation that o c c u r r e d during the battle of
Stalingrad was not accidental. The output of planes produced by the Soviet
a i r c r a f t industry increased daily. Production of fighters increased steadily
during 1942, and in spring 1943 the Soviet a i r m e n won a g r e a t victory on
the Kuban, and thus established t h e i r a i r supremacy.
The considerable i n c r e a s e in the output of fighters made it possible t o
find novel solutions t o many tactical problems of aviation. F o r example,
the 11-4, the main long-range bomber of the Soviet air f o r c e , which had a
maximum speed of 450 kph, could not, throughout the w a r , r i s k flying
combat m i s s i o n s by day without a fighter e s c o r t . Since such e s c o r t s could
not be provided at the beginning of t h e war, the 11-4s w e r e mostly used at
night. As soon as m o r e fighters were supplied t o t h e front, the question
of flying daylight missions a r o s e . It was also n e c e s s a r y to provide fighter
cover f o r attack planes. It became absolutely n e c e s s a r y t o equip the Yak-9
fighter with heavy 37-mm cannons and t o i n c r e a s e the range of the fighters
in general. The i n c r e a s e in the range of fighters, especially the La-5

* Mirovaya voina 1939-45 (The World War 1939-45). p. 481.

* * Dorr, G. Pokhod na Stalingrad (The March on Stalingrad), p. 118.-Moskva, Voenizdat. 1957.

50
and Yak-9, w a s essential because the Supreme Command planned a l a r g e -
s c a l e offensive in s u m m e r 1943 and the rapid advance of the ground f o r c e s
had to receive air cover.
By s u m m e r 1943 the Soviet a i r f o r c e had powerful planes and equipment
at its disposal. The number of fighters was sufficient but w e r e dispersed
over an enormously long frontline. Under such conditions it was n e c e s s a r y
t o f o r m l a r g e offensive fighter units capable of carrying out the attack
operations the High Command had in mind. When t h i s problem was discussed
by the State Committee for Defense, it w a s noted that the Soviet fighter
planes were dispersed t o different fronts and could not be used, concentrated
into a powerful force, f o r independent tasks, e. g., gaining air superiority
at a certain s e c t o r of t h e front. As long a s the fighters cooperated with t h e
ground f o r c e s , they did not have an independent role. The a e r i a l battle
over the Kuban showed, however, what fighters can do when they a r e
bunched like a fist and purposefully used.
It was proposed t o f o r m s e v e r a l specialized fighter units directly
subordinated t o the Supreme Command and t o use them for massed air
s t r i k e s against enemy aviation.
Such organizational m e a s u r e s soon proved justified in view of the heroic
work of the huge a r m y of w o r k e r s and engineers. The Soviet a i r c r a f t
industry grew in the Volga region and in Siberia, and s e v e r a l plants w e r e
r e s t o r e d in the f o r m e r frontline a r e a . Teams of local and evacuated
specialists worked well together in a i r c r a f t plants. T h e r e w a s a broad
movement, covering the entire Soviet Union, of socialist emulation of
workers, administrative and technical employees of the a i r c r a f t industry.
The g r e a t e s t s u c c e s s e s w e r e achieved by plants headed by outstanding
managers, such a s S. I. Agadzhanov, M. S. Zhezlov, V . N . Lisitsyn, A. T.
Tret'yakov, A. A. Belyanskii, I. S. Levin, M. S. Komarov, and chief engineers
A. N. Ter-Markaryan, A. A. Kuindzhi and others.
By the middle of 1943 the Soviet air force had already twice as many
planes as the German Luftwaffe. "Average monthly output of a i r c r a f t r o s e
f r o m 2100 in 1942 to 2900 in 1943. In 1943 t h e a i r c r a f t industry supplied
altogether about 35,000 planes, i. e., 37.4 percent m o r e than in 1942.
"Engine plants in 1 9 4 3 produced 49,000 a i r c r a f t engines, almost 11,000
m o r e than in 1942. ' I *
The a i r c r a f t industry did not only increase the output of machines. The
y e a r 1943 also saw the struggle for better flight and tactical properties of
the a i r c r a f t in production. The Soviet a i r force received the La-5, Yak-9
and Yak-3.
During the war it w a s found that the LaGG-3, weighing m o r e than 3 tons,
had an insufficiently powerful engine. The designer t h e r e f o r e powered it
m o r e with an air-cooled radial engine, f i r s t a 1700 hp, Ash-82, then a
1850hp, Ash-82FN. The planes with t h e s e engines w e r e the La-5 and
La-5FN. F u r t h e r improvement of the a i r c r a f t could not be achieved by
increasing engine power but by reducing the weight of the s t r u c t u r e and
improving the shape, reducing l o s s e s on cooling and sealing the power plant
(which is particularly important in air-cooled engines). As a r e s u l t
maximum speed was r a i s e d t o 650 kph, and r a t e of climb and maneuverability
w e r e improved. Lavochkin's fighters had powerful armament: the La-5 had
* Istoriya Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soyuza (History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet
Union), Vol. 3, p. 167.

51
 two and the La-7 had t h r e e synchronized 20-mm cannons firing through the
plane of rotation of the three-bladed propeller. The sturdy r a d i a l engine
made the a i r c r a f t l e s s vunerable and provided a c e r t a i n m e a s u r e of
protection f o r the pilot against f i r e f r o m the front. Lavochkin's fighters
also excelled by e a s y control and good maneuverability, especially in steep
banking, and t h e i r flight and tactical c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s were better than those
of the German FW-190 and Me-109 fighters.
The Yak-9 appeared at the front at the t i m e of the Stalingrad battle. At
f i r s t it had a VK-l05PF, 1240hp engine, l a t e r a VK-l07A, 1650hp engine,
and the speeds attained by the a i r c r a f t w e r e 605 kph and 700 kph, respectively.
The Yak-9T fighter carrying 37-mmand 45-mm cannons w a s successful
not only against enemy a i r c r a f t but also against ground t a r g e t s . When the
Soviet a r m y began i t s attack, it was n e c e s s a r y t o i n c r e a s e the range of
fighter planes. The answer was the Yak-9D and Yak-9DD with r a n g e s of
1400km and 2200km, respectively, and the reconnaissance plane Yak-9R.
The Yak-9B was, in this s e r i e s , the only high-speed fighter-bomber with
400 kg of bombs c a r r i e d in the fuselage.
In 1943 the lightest and most maneuverable fighter of World War 11, the
Yak-3, was developed f r o m the Yak-1. It weighed 2650 kg. Its aerodynamic
shape was a radical improvement, and all its p a r t s were subjected to close
scrutiny. Since metal production in the Soviet Union had r i s e n , it was
possible t o r e p l a c e the heavy wooden wing s p a r s by aluminum ones. The
oil radiator, originally below the fuselage, was mounted onto the wing, the
water r a d i a t o r was made completely flush with the fuselage, the shape of
the cockpit was improved, and the t a i l wheel was made r e t r a c t a b l e . The
wing a r e a was reduced f r o m 17.15 m2 t o 14.85 m2. With a VK-105PF engine
the Yak-3 had a speed of 660kph, and with the new VK-107A engine t h i s
was r a i s e d t o 720 kph. Because of its perfect streamlining, lower wing
loading and power loading than that of the l a t e r modifications of the Me-109
and the heavy FW-190, the Yak-3 had higher speed, better r a t e of climb,
and better v e r t i c a l and horizontal maneuverability. The summing up by
the Scientific R e s e a r c h Institute of the Air F o r c e s t a t e s that the Yak-3 with
the VK-107A engine "in regard t o its flight specification and at heights f r o m
ground level t o i t s s e r v i c e ceiling is b e t t e r than any known Soviet o r foreign
fighter.
The bombers were also improved. Ilyushin developed the 11-2 into a new
all-metal, two-seater attack plane, the 11-10, with a m o r e powerful AM-42
engine, 2000 hp, and stronger a r m o r . Its speed was 551 kph and i t s
armament was the s a m e a s that of the 11-2. Ilyushin's attack planes were
a terrifying weapon of Soviet aviation. They s t r u c k t e r r o r in the enemy's
h e a r t and were called the "black death" by the Germans.
In the fall of 1943 m a s s production s t a r t e d of Tupolev's Tu-2 bomber,
a f t e r it had passed its government t e s t s and had been produced in a s h o r t
production run. This tactical bomber with two air-cooled Ash-82FN engines
of 1850 hp had a maximum speed of 547 kph at an altitude of 5400 m. At the
n o r m a l take-off weight of 10,380 kg the bomb load was 1000 kg, and the
overload version of t h i s plane could c a r r y up t o 3000 kg of bombs. The
instruments of the Tu-2 permitted level bombing and dive-bombing, both
with precision. In addition, the a i r c r a f t was equipped with two 20-mm
cannons and t h r e e defensive 12.7-mm machine guns. The Tu-2 had a crew
of four. Its normal range was 2100 km. The tactical and flying c h a r a c t e r -
i s t i c s of the Tu-2 were better than those of the German Ju-88 bomber.

52
 As e a r l y a s 1942 the Soviet aviation outstripped the Germans. In 1942
Germany produced 14,700 planes while the USSR produced 25,400. In 1943
Germany produced 25,000, the Soviet Union 35,000. Within t h e s e two y e a r s
the Soviet a r m y thus received 20,000 planes m o r e than the German army.
Hence the Soviet a i r f o r c e surpassed the German Luftwaffe quantitatively,
regarding the number of planes. This, too, was brilliantly confirmed in
the battle of Kursk.
In the battle of the Kursk bulge the Soviet a i r f o r c e fully utilized its a i r
superiority. The German ground f o r c e s suffered huge l o s s e s . Frightened
by the courage of the Soviet pilots and aware of the qualities of Soviet
fighters, the Germans avoided dogfights, even when they had momentarily
numerical superiority in planes. O r d e r s by the enemy command have been
p r e s e r v e d which categorically forbid engaging Soviet fighters, especially
the modernized ones.
In an a r t i c l e entitled "The Aviation of the Offensive" (Aviatsiya nastu-
pleniya) General S. I. Rudenko, the commander of the 16th Air Fleet, which
excelled in the battle of the Kursk bulge, wrote a s follows about the r e s u l t s
of t h e s e h i s t o r i c a i r battles:
"Here a r e some figures characterizing the work of the a i r f o r c e in one
day of the Orel-Kursk operation in summer 1943. Within one hour, between
1200 and 1300 hours, a massed s t r i k e of 411 planes was c a r r i e d out, between
1530 and 1630 hours 444 planes went into action, and the final s t r i k e between
1900 and 2000 hours saw 460 planes in action.. .
"Conclusions.
" F i r s t l y , the increased numerical strength of the Air F o r c e enabled u s
at that stage of the war t o c a r r y out many massed a i r attacks against
German a r m s and troop concentrations. Thanks t o that the Soviet aviation
not only supported the ground f o r c e s but played a decisive p a r t in ensuring
victory .
"Second conclusion. The high skill of the fighter pilots' flying planes, such
a s the Yaks and LaGGS, and the pilots' having learned brilliantly to change
altitude in combat, enabled u s to beat the enemy in the a i r . Whereas after
Stalingrad we could say that the initiative passed into our hands, after the
battle of Ore1 and Kursk we s a y that our aviation is f i r m l y on the way to
complete supremacy. "4
A s a result of the battle at Kursk the German a r m y found itself on the
brink of d i s a s t e r .
After the liquidation of Paulus' a r m y some German commanders and
especially Hitler himself, s t i l l cherished hopes of r e v e r s i n g the situation
by exacting revenge in the Kursk bulge, but after the crushing defeat t h e r e
no hopes remained f o r the Germans of winning the war. The destruction of
the German f o r c e s at Kursk foreshadowed Germany's defeat. The initiative,
both on the ground and in the a i r , had passed fully and incontrovertibly to
the Soviet army.
The Nazis r e t r e a t e d , endeavoring t o conserve t h e i r strength, to withdraw
in o r d e r t o new lines, a s the fascist newspapers wrote, "to straighten out
the front'' and "to organize an elastic defense. ' I The t a s k of the Soviet f o r c e s
was then t o encircle, destroy and not permit them t o withdraw "in o r d e r . I '
To break the enemy and then t o finish him off in his own den, such was the
t a s k given by t h e Soviet command. This also called f o r changed t a c t i c s in
* Krasnaya Zvezda, 19 August 1944.

53
 the air. The Soviet air force now endeavored t o prevent the organized
withdrawal of the desperately struggling enemy, t o destroy him at crossings.
F o r e v e r gone was the t i m e when G e r m a n fighters and bombers could
appear in the sky in small groups o r even singly. Now they could not d a r e
do such a thing. Afraid of the Soviet fighters, the German bombers now
appeared only under the menacing protection of M e s s e r s c h m i t t s and Focke-
Wulfs.
Sometimes the German f o r c e s r e t r e a t e d s o fast that the Soviet units
servicing a e r o d r o m e s in the rear did not have t i m e t o p r e p a r e new a e r o -
d r o m e s f o r the attacking forces. This belated organization of a e r o d r o m e s
f o r f i g h t e r s caused various difficulties when the Soviet a r m y was about t o
c r o s s r i v e r s , and it was particularly felt in the c r o s s i n g of the Dnieper.
The German a i r f o r c e t r i e d with all m e a n s at i t s disposal t o prevent t h e
Soviet f o r c e s f r o m crossing the Dnieper in t h e i r westward advance. The
Russians t r i e d t o c r o s s the Dnieper straight away as soon a s they reached
it and not to give the Germans t i m e t o fortify the right bank. Thus the
Russians upon crossing came under furious attacks by German attack planes,
fighters and bombers. The Soviet fighters w e r e limited by t h e i r range and
by a lack of forward airfields which had not been prepared, and t h e r e f o r e
they could not provide the required support f o r the t r o o p s c r o s s i n g the
r i v e r . Hence the Soviet government r a i s e d the question of increasing the
range of Yak and L a fighters within the shortest possible time.
This was achieved. *
After the Soviet f o r c e s had cleared the G e r m a n s f r o m the banks of the
Dnieper, the air f o r c e was charged chiefly with pursuing and destroying
the r e t r e a t i n g enemy. The Soviet air f o r c e cooperated with the ground
f o r c e s in the fighting f o r Kiev and in the operations of encircling t h e Korsun-
Shevchenko grouping. It destroyed enemy a i r c r a f t in the a i r and on the
ground. Within only t h r e e months of 1945, f r o m J a n u a r y t o March, about
four thousand German combat planes w e r e destroyed.
The w a r moved into the e n e m y ' s t e r r i t o r y . The end was near. The
G e r m a n s fought desperately and t r i e d t o slow down the advance of the
Soviet f o r c e s toward Berlin, but they had little s u c c e s s .
In Silesia the Soviet a i r m a n actively supported the ground f o r c e s . Here
they met modernized Focke-Wulfs and beat t h e m j u s t as m e r c i l e s s l y a s they
had recently destroyed the Messerschmitts-109 over Soviet t e r r i t o r y .
In East P r u s s i a the Soviet air f o r c e dealt the Germans crushing blows.
On 1 7 April 1945 the bombers of the 18th Air Fleet under Chief Air Marshal
A. E. Golovanov in the a r e a west of Konigsberg flew 516 s o r t i e s within
forty-five minutes and dropped a total of 3743 bombs.
At the approaches to Stettin the G e r m a n s t r i e d with full f o r c e t o stop the
Soviet advance such that t h e i r r e t r e a t i n g f o r c e s could c r o s s the Oder, but
the Soviet planes at that time hovered constantlyabove the German c r o s s i n g s .
In the Berlin a r e a Hitler collected a l l h i s remaining f o r c e s in the hope
of avoiding unconditional s u r r e n d e r . All t h e s e hopes w e r e dashed.

' At the beginning of 1944 a group of Soviet pilots in Yak-SDD fighters flew nonstop froiii the USSR to Italy
over German-occupied Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. This flight took place in daylight, in full view
of the enemy who was powerless against the Soviet high-speed fighrers. This flight to the port of flari on
Italian territory liberated by the Allies was organized according to instructions by the Soviet government
to render assistance to the Yugoslav army of national liberation.

54
Combat aircraft in World War I1

Type of Year of Engines (type, number, Take-off Crew Maximum

Armament and bomb load Range, km Altogether produced
aircraft production powed weight, kg speed, kph

11-4 1938 M-88B, 2 X 1100 hp 10,055 1 12.7-mm machine gun; 3 44s 3800 1528 DB-3
2 7.62-mm machine guns; 5256 iL-4
1000 kg of bombs
Pe-8 1939 AM-35A, 4x1350 hp 32,000 2 20-mm cannons; 8-12 440 4700 79
ASh-82FN, 4X1850hp 2 12.7 mm machine guns; 450 6000
2000 kg of bombs
11-2 1939 AM-38F, 1750 hp 5873 2 23-mm cannons; 2 420 765 36,163 n-2
2 7.62-mm machine guns; 4966 11-10
400 kg of bombs;
1 12.7-mm machine gun
Pe-2 1940 M-lOSR, 2X llOOhp 8520 3 12.7-mm machine guns; 3 540 1200 11,427
2 7.62-mm machine guns;
600 kg of bombs
Yak-1 1940 M-lOSP, 1050 hp 2895 1 20-mm cannon; 1 580 850 8721
2 7.6%” machine guns
MiG3 1940 AM-35A, 1350hp 3350 1 12.7-mm machine gun; 1 640 1250 100 MiG-1
2 7.62-mm machine guns 3322 MiG-3
Yak-9 1942 VK-105PF, 1240 hp 3060 1 37-mm cannon; 1 6 05 1000 6399 Yak-7
2 12.7-mm machine guns 16,769 Yak-9
La-5 1942 ASh-82FN, 1850 hp 3230 2 20-mm cannons 1 648 765 6528 LaGG-3
10,000 La-5
5753 La-7
Yak-3 1943 VK-lOBPF, 1240 hp 2650 1 2 0 - m m cannon; 1 660 900 4848
2 12.7-mm machine guns
VK-107A, 1650 hp 2984 2 20-mm cannons 720 1060
TU-2 1943 ASh-82FN, 2X 1850 hp 10380 2 20-mm cannons; 4 547 2100 2527
3 12.7-mm machine guns:
1000 kg of bombs
 In the a i r battle f o r Berlin the Germans put into action everything that
remained of t h e i r beaten a i r fleets, of the f o r m e r l y s o proud and invincible
Luftwaffe. The motley German a i r fleet was based on approximately forty
airfields around Berlin. In the a e r i a l fighting it was not a r a r i t y for one
thousand planes on both s i d e s to participate. On the f i r s t day of the Berlin
operation the Soviet a i r m e n flew 17,500 s o r t i e s , although the weather was
not favorable. The superiority of the Soviet aviation was complete, the
r e m a i n d e r of the Luftwaffe was crushed.
Near Berlin t h e Soviet airmen met German jet a i r c r a f t f o r the f i r s t time.
However, a s a dispatch from the battlefield t o P r a v d a of 2 May 1945 said,
"these unique jet-powered fighters did not help the Germans at all. " The
Soviet a i r m e n quickly found the weak spots of the enemy a i r c r a f t and shot
them down.
In the battle of Berlin the Luftwaffe was destroyed. Several thousand
planes, which the Soviet airmen did not manage to destroy in the a i r o r on
the ground, were captured.

56
 , ,. . .

. . .

. ....;z,
.,,..

o P 4 6 rom

Long-range bomber 11-4, 1938.

57
 Long-range bomber Pe-8, 1939.

5168 58
, ..
.. .
. .
.,,
"..,
. ^ I

,
.
,i

. .-.

59
 o z 4 s 8 tom

Frontline dive-bomber Pe-2, 1940.

60
 ,

e I I 3 4 rm

Fighter Yak-1, 1940.

61
Fighter MiG-3, 1940.

62
 . .
. .

Fighter Yak-9, 1942.

63
Fighter La-5, 1942.

64
I o I 2 3 4 sm

Fighter Yak-3, 1943.

65
Frontline dive-bomber Tu-2, 1943.

66

.-
5. AVIATION OUTSIDE THE SOVIET UNION

The successes achieved by Soviet aviation at the fronts of World War I1 are particularly striking if we
compare the technical level of the enemy air force with the Soviet air force.
Nazi Germany had first-class combat planes a t the outbreak of World War 11. During the war the
German Luftwaffe lost its superiority to the Soviet air force, both in quantity and quality.
At the Soviet-German front the German airmen suffered a decisive defeat.
The Anglo-American air forces had a powerful fleet of heavy bombers and they carried out massed
air raids against the enemy rear, but the production potential of Germany and the output of armaments,
especially aircraft, remained on a high level throughout the war.

T h e Soviet a i r m e n , flying combat a i r c r a f t of high quality, absolutely

defeated the German a i r force. The quality of the Soviet technical standard,
however, can only be a s s e s s e d c o r r e c t l y i f the air f o r c e s of the Soviet
Union's enemies and a l l i e s a r e a l s o briefly described.
In the w a r against the Soviet Union the Nazis assigned t h e i r aviation a
s p e c i a l task, and at that t i m e the Luftwaffe had complete air superiority
in the West. In principle the G e r m a n s planned t o u s e t h e i r aviation the
s a m e way they had used it in the West: f i r s t gain a i r superiority and then
move the f o r c e s wherever the ground f o r c e s r e q u i r e support.
The G e r m a n s looked with disdain upon the approaching battles with the
Soviet a i r m e n . They did not consider the Soviet aviation a match; they
though it "Asiatic," unstable t o stand up t o the "invincible" Luftwaffe.
The German command fixed t h e day of the invasion of the Soviet Union
f o r 2 2 June 1941 and charged the Luftwaffe with the following tasks:
1. T o attack suddenly Soviet a e r o d r o m e s t o paralyze Soviet aviation.
2. To achieve complete air superiority.
3 . After having fulfilled the f i r s t two t a s k s , t o u s e the aviation f o r
support of t h e ground f o r c e s directly on the battlefield.
4. To i n t e r f e r e with Soviet t r a n s p o r t , hamper troop movements in the
battle zone and a s f a r a s possible in t h e r e a r .
5 . To bomb l a r g e industrial centers: Moscow, Gorki, Rybinsk, .
Yaroslavl, Kharkov, Tula.
It must be admitted that the G e r m a n s managed t o fulfill t h e i r plans f o r
a e r i a l w a r f a r e extensively in 1941 and e a r l y 1942.
The G e r m a n s put into action against the Soviet Union almost a l l t h e i r
aerial strength, including units t r a n s f e r r e d f r o m the Western front, It
w a s assumed that after t h e first successful s t r i k e s p a r t of the bomber
and fighter units would b e returned t o the West t o fight against Britain.
At t h e beginning of the w a r the G e r m a n s did not have only numerical
superiority. They had the added advantage that t h e i r pilots who parti-
cipitated in the attack on the Soviet Union had had already much combat
experience against French, Polish and B r i t i s h planes. In addition they

67
 a l s o had considerable experience in cooperating with t h e i r own ground
f o r c e s , gained i n t h e fighting against West European c o u n t r i e s .
The G e r m a n airmen, who at first m e t in combat only obsolete Soviet
a i r c r a f t , w e r e surrounded with an a u r a of invincibility by Goebbels'
propaganda. However, a l r e a d y i n 1942 m o r e and m o r e modern Soviet-
built a i r c r a f t appeared, and the Germans' fame began quickly t o diminish,
until it b e c a m e completely unfounded. Even i n the first phase of t h e w a r
t h e G e r m a n s l o s t a large number of airmen. They had t o f i l l t h e man-
power gaps by h u r r i e d l y t r a i n e d young a i r m e n who had no combat
experience.
Throughout t h e w a r t h e G e r m a n s did not introduce any fundamentally
new t y p e s of aircraft. They improved t h e i r planes' flight and combat
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s by i n c r e a s i n g the power of existing engines, b y improving
t h e aerodynamic shape of a i r c r a f t , b y using s t r o n g e r weapons and r e i n -
f o r c i n g a r m o r , but t h i s inevitably led t o increased weight of t h e a i r c r a f t .
Together with a c e r t a i n gain i n speed and firing power, it impaired the
take-off and landing c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and the maneuverability of t h e planes.
T h e improvements on German planes during the war were marked by a
s e n s e of emergency and h u r r i e d n e s s , because t h e G e r m a n s w e r e forced
t o c a r r y them out only when they recognized the actual power of Soviet
aviation. When they s t a r t e d t h e i r war against t h e Soviet Union, they
w e r e convinced of t h e backwardness of Soviet technology. In h i s postwar
work " A e r i a l W a r f a r e ' ' t h e German h i s t o r i a n Greffrat stated:
"The r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e Luftwaffe High Command had t o a s k them-
s e l v e s one s e r i o u s question: how c o r r e c t was t h e i r a s s e s s m e n t of t h e
Russian aviation, regarding quality and chiefly regarding numbers? A
great s u r p r i s e f o r t h e G e r m a n s was, f o r instance, the appearance of the
Russian 11-2 attack p l a n e s . . . .
"The G e r m a n s considered the combat ability of t h e Russian air f o r c e
t o be limited on t h e whole. Of c o u r s e t h i s did not exclude the possibility
t h a t i n t h e c o u r s e of t i m e t h e Russians might overcome t h e i r weakness,
but everybody was convinced that the fighting capacity of the Russian avia-
tion would grow at an "Asiatic" pace, i. e., badly organized."*
T h e Nazis assumed that t h e i r a i r c r a f t p a r k was sufficient, i n quality
and quantity, to permit them t o wage the campaign against t h e Soviet Union
as envisaged in "Plan Barbarossa," i. e., f o r five or s i x weeks.
G r e f f r a t again wrote:
"Expecting the war in R u s s i a t o b e t h e s a m e kind of blitzkrieg as in the
West, H i t l e r intended t o r e t u r n some bomber and fighter units t o the West,
after having achieved his first s u c c e s s e s in the East. He planned t o keep
in t h e East only air f o r c e units f o r d i r e c t support of ground t r o o p s , s o m e
t r a n s p o r t s and a c e r t a i n number of fighter squadrons. In r e a l i t y everything
worked out quite differently."*::'
In the initial phase of t h e w a r t h e German aircraft industry produced
t h r e e b a s i c t y p e s of combat a i r c r a f t : Me- 109, Ju-87, and Ju-88, and t h e
t r a n s p o r t plane Ju-52. T h e r e were other aircraft produced in small
numbers: t h e twin-engined heavy fighter Me- 110, which was not s u c c e s s -
ful; t h e obsolete He- 111 and Do-217 bombers; and t h e FW- 189 recon-
naissance planes, called by the Russian s o l d i e r s r a m a ( f r a m e ) . When the
ramas appeared, the b o m b e r s could be expected t o follow soon.
* Mirovaya voina 1939-45 (The World War 1939-45), p.474.
** Ibid., p.469.

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 Because of t h e i r numerical superiority, t h e s e planes w e r e able at first
t o inflict considerable damage. Since the Russians w e r e s h o r t of fighters,
they could drop t h e i r bombs with impunity both day and night. At t h i s time
t h e G e r m a n s thought that t h e main t a s k of t h e i r a i r c r a f t industry w a s t o
produce the largest p,ossible number of planes. Not until late in s u m m e r
1942, after having to contend with t h e steadily improving quality and
numerical strength of Soviet aviation, did they change t h e i r approach and
begin feverishly t o p r e p a r e the modernization of t h e i r a i r c r a f t , b o m b e r s
and fighters. But it was too late. Neither t h e i r d e s i g n e r s n o r t h e i r air-
craft industry w a s a match f o r the Soviet Union any longer.
At t h e time Germany attacked t h e Soviet Union, t h e backbone of its
air f o r c e w e r e t h e Me- 109 fighters, which had been on combat duty s i n c e
1937.
In the first two y e a r s of the w a r i n Europe t h e first version of t h i s air-
craft, t h e Me- 109E, w a s used. T h i s aircraft w a s not being modernized.
T h e r e w a s no particular need t o do so, because f o r a long t i m e its flight
and tactical c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s w e r e as good as those of t h e B r i t i s h planes.
The necessity of modernizing the Me- 109E a r o s e only i n 1941 when t h e
G e r m a n s encountered new Soviet aircraft and improved B r i t i s h planes.
T h e r e s u l t w a s t h e appearance of t h e Me-1O9F i n s p r i n g 1942. The
difference between it and t h e original version w a s chiefly an improved
aerodynamic shape, a m o r e powerful engine and m o r e powerful a r m a m e n t .
The new a i r c r a f t was used i n large numbers i n the battle n e a r Kharkov i n
June. Even it, however, w a s not equal t o the best Soviet planes. Another
m o r e advanced a i r c r a f t w a s t h e r e f o r e built, the Me- 109G. It appeared
first at t h e end of August o v e r Stalingrad.
Each modification of t h e M e s s e r s c h m i t t - t h e 109F, 109G, 109G2, 109G4,
and o t h e r s - brought about s o m e improvement i n t h e tactical c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
of the aircraft. However, e v e r y improvement meant an i n c r e a s e in weight.
In t h e end t h e originally light and excellent Me- 109 weighed almost 3.5 t o n s
and lost its maneuverability. In spite of the increased engine power and
improved armament, the G e r m a n s did not succeed in endowing t h e i r M e s s e r -
s c h m i t t s with any qualities that would make them s u p e r i o r t o t h e Soviet
Yaks or Las.
In different modifications t h e Me- 109 w a s i n s e r v i c e throughout t h e
e n t i r e w a r . Still the G e r m a n s believed that they needed another fighter
to support t h e M e s s e r s c h m i t t s and, after having s t a r t e d t h e w a r against
the Soviet Union, they produced Kurt T a n k ' s fighter, t h e Focke- Wulf- 190,
powered by a 1650 hp, air-cooled radial engine BMW-801, unlike t h e
M e s s e r s c h m i t t with a Daimler-Benz engine.
The first r e p o r t on the appearance of t h e new enemy fighter, t h e
Focke- Wulf- 190, was published in t h e p a p e r Krasnaya Zvezda on 7 May 1943.
It w a s an event that the Soviet a i r m e n did not expect. T h e plane looked
quite different f r o m t h e M e s s e r s c h m i t t .
T h e Focke- Wulf- 190 w a s 20 kpn or 30 kph faster than t h e Me- 109, but
it w a s much heavier and less maneuverable. T h e G e r m a n fighter pilots
derived practically no advantage from it.
At first the Focke-Wulf-190 c a r r i e d four machine guns. In the c o u r s e
of t h e w a r t h e G e r m a n s added another two weapon emplacements and pro-
vided front and belly a r m o r . T h e s e "improvements" r a i s e d t h e weight of

69
 t h e plane t o 4 tons, f u r t h e r impairing t h e maneuverability and take-off and
landing c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the Focke-Wulf- 190.
Among t h e German bombers t h e He-111 must be mentioned f i r s t .
It had a Daimler-Benz-601 engine and was supplied t o the Luftwaffe i n
1936. S e v e r a l improvements succeeded in r a i s i n g the speed of t h e plane
f r o m 310 kph t o 400 kph. Although the plane had s t r o n g defensive fire-
a r m s , it w a s as a r u l e shot down by Soviet pilots because of its low speed,
u n l e s s i t was provided with powerful fighter cover.
A b e t t e r bomber was the twin-engined Ju-88; but when t h e Soviet air-
c r a f t industry began supplying the front with sufficient numbers of new
f i g h t e r s , the Ju-88 could not r i s k raiding e i t h e r without fighter c o v e r .
Finally, t h e r e was t h e J u - 87, a single-engined two-seater dive-bomber,
a f a i r l y slow plane. It w a s useful only where it did not meet opposition by
fighters, e.g., i n Poland, F r a n c e , and a l s o at t h e beginning of t h e war
against the USSR when t h e r e w e r e few fighters available. T h e G e r m a n s
at first endeavored t o u s e the dive-bomber Ju-87 as an attack plane, but
i t did not have any a r m o r and was incomparably inferior t o t h e Russian
"flying tanks" 11- 2 . By the end of t h e w a r t h e s e planes had almost dis-
appeared f r o m the Soviet-German front.
Dornier produced t h e Do-217 bomber. The G e r m a n s had g r e a t hopes
f o r it. But it seemed strange: since t h e r e was a modern bomber
available, the Ju-88, what could be gained by splitting o n e ' s f o r c e s and
producing an almost identical plane, the Do-217? The only difference
between the two planes was that one was made by J u n k e r s and the other
by Dornier and that t h e Ju-88 had a single tail unit, the Do-217 a twin
tail unit. Otherwise, even externally, the planes were identical.
T h e Do-217 bomber was somewhat faster than t h e Ju-88, but on t h e
whole it w a s not b e t t e r . During the war the Do-217 was seen r a r e l y at
t h e Soviet f r o n t . It was not used much and the main type of bomber right
t o the end of the w a r was the Ju-88.
In t h e w a r against Poland and F r a n c e t h e Junkers and M e s s e r s c h m i t t s
gained absolute s u p e r i o r i t y and w e r e t h e r e f o r e put into mass production
i n all German plants. L a t e r , after F r a n c e had been defeated and other
European countries had a l s o been conquered, t h e G e r m a n s organized
production of t h e s e a i r c r a f t in occupied countries.
At t h e beginning of the w a r the G e r m a n s mounted s i r e n s on t h e J u - 8 7 s .
Their t a s k was simply to frighten people. At the moment when they began
diving, the pilots switched on these s i r e n s which began t o wail, almost
imperccptibly at first, but then piercingly, increasingly louder as t h e
a i r c r a f t approached the ground. The G e r m a n s used t h e s e planes in North
Africa against B r i t i s h f o r c e s , terrifying the colonial s o l d i e r s .
In t h e second half of the w a r against the Soviet Union, the G e r m a n s
not only removed t h e s i r e n s but a l s o t h e Junkers and Heinkels did not
even r i s k appearing above the Soviet positions unless they could hide in
t h e clouds. They endeavored t o remain undetected a s long as possible.
When they encountered Soviet fighters, they w e r e usually shot down.
Not everything that seems good before t h e war proves its worth when
t h e shooting begins. Such was the case with t h e German fighter He- 100.
This plane was beautifully streamlined and f a s t e r than t h e Me- 109
(650 kph v s . 570 - 580 kph) . Concerning speed and maneuverability,

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it had no equal at t h e outbreak of World War 11. But what w a s t h e p r i c e
Heinkel paid f o r t h e advantage in speed?
T h i s plane powered by a water-cooled engine w a s deprived of normal
r a d i a t o r s . The cooling liquid passed through a complicated s y s t e m of
h e a t exchangers situated i n the double wing covering. Heinkel thus
improved the aerodynamic shape of t h e plane, but its operation became
too complicated. If a single bullet pierced the wing, the plane was dis-
abled, whereas other planes returned safely t o t h e i r b a s e s with t e n s of
bullet h o l e s i n them. In addition it was found that t h e He- 100 could not
f l y i n winter. T h e cooling system in t h e wings, operating on steam,
f r o z e . S e v e r a l such planes, which found t h e i r way t o t h e Soviet front,
caused t h e G e r m a n s a lot of trouble.
Thus a plane, well conceived and with good flight c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,
having g r e a t advantages against o t h e r fighters, turned out i n wartime
t o b e absolutely u s e l e s s . I t s slower competitor, t h e Me- 109, was f i r m l y
entrenched in t h e Luftwaffe and operated f r o m t h e f i r s t t o t h e last day
of t h e w a r .
The Me- 109, built in 1936, was not immediately appreciated. It was
not well received by t h e Luftwaffe command; but in spite of t h e opposition
by E r h a r d Milch, t h e s t a t e s e c r e t a r y i n t h e Ministry of Aviation, M e s s e r -
schmitt managed t o obtain an o r d e r f o r twenty Me- 109s. This batch of
f i g h t e r s w a s sent t o Spain. Under actual combat conditions t h e r e , t h e
plane proved its good combat c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . Afterwards it was pro-
duced in l a r g e r numbers.
Another example is t h e propaganda the G e r m a n s made with t h e ap-
pearance of a diesel-powered J u n k e r s bomber. T h e advantage of d i e s e l
engines is t h e i r economy; they need less fuel. Moreover, t h i s fuel is
cheap oil instead of expensive gasoline. It is no secret that Germany
before t h e w a r w a s s h o r t of aviation fuel. Since the G e r m a n s had no
oil of t h e i r own, they were forced t o produce synthetic gasoline, and
t h e possibility of using o i l instead of gas w a s vital f o r them. T h i s seeming
advantage did not stand the test, e i t h e r in experiments with prototypes
o r i n operation. Consequently d i e s e l engines w e r e dropped by t h e
German a i r c r a f t industry.
It is well known t h a t the G e r m a n s always overrated t h e i r strength
and underrated the enemy. F o r instance, in 1943 they pinned all t h e i r
hopes for a successful offensive at Kursk on t h e i r new weapons, air-
c r a f t Focke- Wulf- 190, T i g e r and Panther tanks, and self-propelled
guns, t h e Ferdinands. With t h e i r u s u a l self-confidence they assumed
t h a t t h e new weapons would be b e t t e r than t h e Soviet weapons and
would s e c u r e victory in t h e air and on t h e ground. T h e fighting in
s u m m e r 1943 proved that t h e Germans' confidence in t h e i r new weapons
w a s unjustified.
Even at t h e first c l a s h e s t h e Focke-Wulfe- 190 w a s no match f o r t h e
new Soviet fighters. Soviet designers produced during the w a r such
antitank guns and new t a n k s f o r which the vaunted German Tigers,
P a n t h e r s and Ferdinands held no t e r r o r . On the o t h e r hand it must
b e admitted t h a t t h e G e r m a n s succeeded i n producing a few planes with
j e t propulsion, especially t h e Me- 2 6 2 . A few of t h e m even appeared at
t h e front i n t h e last y e a r of the w a r .

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 Goebbels' propaganda machine made much of t h e possibility of influ-
encing events with t h e i r miraculous weapons. A legend was c r e a t e d about
t h e wondrous s e c r e t weapon that would s h o r t l y f o r c e B r i t a i n t o h e r knees
and e n s u r e German victory. T h i s r e f e r r e d t o pilotless aircraft.
T h e jet-propelled flying bombs V- 1 and t h e ballistic r o c k e t s V- 2,
used t o bomb London and other English towns, caused B r i t a i n much
damage. England l o s t forty-two thousand p e r s o n s as a r e s u l t of attacks
by V- 1 and V- 2. The Germans, however, did not succeed with t h e i r
b a r b a r i c methods in breaking B r i t i s h m o r a l e or changing h e r strategic
position.
T h e flying bombs and r o c k e t s had practically no effect on t h e c o u r s e
of t h e w a r i n t h e West and c e r t a i n l y not on t h e final outcome.
A i r r a i d s on London and other cities, however, especially e a r l y i n
the war, w e r e a calamity f o r the English. They had no f i g h t e r s which
could meet t h e German Heinkels and Junkers, escorted by Messerschmitts,
at t h e distant approaches. The basic fighter of the B r i t i s h Royal A i r
F o r c e at that time was t h e Hurricane with a speed of only 5 2 0 kph, Le.,
50 kph less than t h e Messerschmitt.
T h e only s e r i o u s obstacle t h e German b o m b e r s encountered over
B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r y w e r e a n t i - a i r c r a f t guns and a dense network of b a r r a g e
balloons. These m e a s u r e s soon proved insufficient f o r defense; t h e
German b o m b e r s almost always broke through and caused t h e B r i t i s h
c i t i e s much damage. T h e worst hit w e r e London and t h e large industrial
c e n t e r of Coventry.
The German r a i d s forced the English t o speed up fighter production,
because f i g h t e r s w e r e the most r e l i a b l e defense against air attack. How-
e v e r , m a s s production of fighters at that t i m e w a s hampered by constant
bombing. Thus t h e B r i t i s h s t a r t e d building underground f a c t o r i e s .
As a r e s u l t of far-reaching reorganization of production t h e B r i t i s h
introduced f a i r l y quickly the production of l a r g e numbers of single- s e a t e r
Spitfire f i g h t e r s which had a speed of 585 kph. The Spitfire was one of
t h e b e s t f i g h t e r s of World War 11. The B r i t i s h a l s o s t a r t e d mass produc-
tion of four-engined Lancaster bombers, enabling them to change f r o m
defense t o attack against Germany i n t h e air. The Spitfire f i g h t e r s and
Lancaster b o m b e r s formed the backbone of B r i t i s h air power i n World
War 11.
B r i t i s h b o m b e r s at the beginning of the war, 1939- 41, were heavy
four-engined planes with a maximum speed of about 400 kph. With t h e s e
planes the B r i t i s h c a r r i e d out f a i r l y ineffective r a i d s on Northwest
Germany, the Ruhr, Hamburg, and even on B e r l i n . They dropped com-
paratively s m a l l bombs, and the damage they inflicted on the German
capital was negligible. Nevertheless, i n e v e r y such r a i d the whole of
B e r l i n went underground into s h e l t e r s and the e n t i r e life of t h e city was
paralyzed.
G r e a t i n t e r e s t was aroused when a new bomber, the Mosquito, appeared
on the Western f r o n t . It was a wooden twin-engined plane, as fast as the
b e s t f i g h t e r s at that time, about 600 kph, and it had a long r a n g e . In s i z e
it was m o r e l i k e a fighter than a bomber, and it was t h e r e f o r e inconspicuous
i n flight. Manned by t h e b e s t and specially t r a i n e d airmen, the Mosquitoes
inflicted enormous damage on t h e Germans: they penetrated deep into t h e
German rear and almost unchallenged caused c h a o s .

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 Suffice it t o s a y t h a t in one thousand s o r t i e s of Mosquitoes only eleven
planes were l o s t . The attack plane version had a cannon i n front and could
tangle with enemy fighters, enabling t h e B r i t i s h t o c a r r y out a day-raid on
B e r l i n i n January 1943.
With t h e i r Mosquitoes the B r i t i s h accomplished a number of s u r p r i s e
r a i d s which made the G e r m a n s uneasy. T h e most convincing demonstration
of t h e i r high flying and tactical c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s was the destruction of a
d a m i n Holland.
In December 1941 t h e United States entered t h e w a r against Germany,
and f r o m then on most of the b o m b e r s involved in r a i d s on Germany w e r e
the Flying F o r t r e s s e s (B- 17) and L i b e r a t o r s , four-engined planes with
approximately the s a m e bomb load as the B r i t i s h planes. T h e American
planes w e r e faster than t h e B r i t i s h planes; they w e r e well a r m e d f o r
defense with machine guns and were less vulnerable. Still t h e Americans
had t o provide fighter cover i n e v e r y l a r g e - s c a l e r a i d of Flying F o r t r e s s e s .
The Flying F o r t r e s s e s raiding Germany w e r e usually based on B r i t i s h
a i r f i e l d s . The planes flew t o the t a r g e t i n waves at specified i n t e r v a l s and
f r o m different directions. This c r e a t e d difficulties f o r t h e G e r m a n air
defense. Such t a c t i c s made it impossible f o r t h e G e r m a n s t o concentrate
t h e i r a n t i - a i r c r a f t defense, and they had t o d i s p e r s e even m o r e t h e i r fighter
f o r c e s which w e r e a l r e a d y weakened because of t h e E a s t e r n front.
The United States before t h e w a r had a s t r o n g t r a n s p o r t aviation, but
t h e i r combat aviation was much l e s s developed than the Luftwaffe. A s
soon as the war s t a r t e d , t h e Americans built new combat planes and pro-
duced them i n l a r g e numbers.
At t h e beginning of World W a r I1 the strength of the American aviation
w e r e bombers: the B- 17 called the Flying F o r t r e s s , with a speed of 481 kph,
a range of 2736 km, a bomb load of 2742 kg, and t h e Liberator with a speed
of 483 kph, a range of 4023 km, a bomb load of 1360 kg; and t h e single-
s e a t e r P - 4 0 fighter with a maximum speed of 520 kph. L a t e r in t h e w a r
the Americans g r e a t l y improved t h e i r aircraft and produced large numbers
of B - 2 9 bombers, called S u p e r f o r t r e s s e s , with a speed of 600 kph, a range
of 5300 km and a bomb load of 4080 kg, and a l s o P - 5 1 fighters, Mustangs,
with a speed of approximately 600 kph, and the P-38, Aircobra, with a
speed of 580 kph.
At the same t i m e the Americans produced heavy fighters, P - 4 7 (Thunder-
bolt) and P - 3 8 (Lightning), both with a speed of 640 kph. Their ceiling and
range w e r e g r e t a e r than those of t h e f o r m e r planes, and w e r e mostly used
f o r e s c o r t i n g bombers.
Finally t h e Americans designed and produced in l a r g e quantities a plane
which was most popular with all the allies at that t i m e , t h e m i l i t a r y t r a n s -
p o r t plane Douglas C-47, the m i l i t a r y version of t h e D C - 3 passenger plane.
I t s speed was 346 kph, its range 2400 km, and it could t r a n s p o r t twenty-five
persons.
T h e American aviation had its peculiarities. Unlike the Russians,
B r i t i s h and Germans, t h e Americans g r e a t l y emphasized t h e production
of bombers; f i g h t e r s took second place. T h i s decision is understandable,
because t h e Americane did not have t o fear enemy attacks by b o m b e r s .
The enemy could not r e a c h them a c r o s s t h e ocean.
Most of the American planes w e r e Flying F o r t r e s s e s which operated
against Germany and Japan. At first, f r o m a i r f i e l d s in B r i t a i n and later

73
 f r o m southern Italy, these planes were able t o bomb Berlin and other towns
in CentralGermany. In the F a r E a s t the Americans with t h e i r Flying
F o r t r e s s e s could r e a c h Japan f r o m t h e i r bases.
The Flying F o r t r e s s was a heavy long-range bomber. It had to have
sufficient fuel in o r d e r t o r e a c h a distant target and r e t u r n t o base. It had
g r e a t lifting power and was v e r y heavy, weighing about 27 tons, and it
needed huge power. It had four 1200 hp engines.
Each such plane could c a r r y s e v e r a l tons of bombs and t r a n s p o r t them
o v e r a distance of 3000-4000 km. When the target was n e a r e r (1000-
2000 k m ) , the plane took on less fuel and m o r e bombs, 5 o r 6 tons. The
g r e a t e r the distance to the target, the m o r e fuel and the l e s s bomb load.
On the other hand, not a l l military objects on German t e r r i t o r y w e r e
within the range of the b o m b e r s flying f r o m b a s e s at the A m e r i c a n s ' dis-
posal; the range of the b o m b e r s was not g r e a t enough. The A m e r i c a n s
therefore organized together with the Soviet a i r force command the so-
called shuttle operations of the American b o m b e r s . Flying F o r t r e s s e s
took off f r o m a i r b a s e s i n North Africa o r Western Europe, reached any
point on enemy t e r r i t o r y , dropped their bombs, and finally landed on
Soviet airfields t o refuel f o r the r e t u r n t r i p .
On Soviet t e r r i t o r y , n e a r Poltava, t h e r e was an airfield which had
been specially r e s e r v e d t o receive Flying F o r t r e s s e s . They w e r e s e r -
viced, fueled, loaded with bombs, and then they took off again f o r the r e t u r n
journey. After a second raid they r e t u r n e d t o their own airfields.
A four-engined bomber is a complicated weapon. Equipped with modern
instruments, this plane can fly blind f o r many h o u r s and maintain radio
communication over thousands of kilometers. It is equipped with r a d a r ,
enabling i t , when flying blind o r a t night with z e r o visibility, t o r e a c h i t s
target accurately and t o bomb through the cloud cover. The Russian heavy
four-engined bomber of World War 11, the P e - 8 , had about the s a m e tac-
tical and flying c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .
The main task of the American fighters Thunderbolt, Mustang, and
Aircobra was to e s c o r t b o m b e r s . They t h e r e f o r e needed a long range
and a l a r g e fuel r e s e r v e , therefore lowering their combat qualities
and making them heavier than the M e s s e r s c h m i t t , Spitfire and Russian
fighters.
The A m e r i c a n s had a well-developed naval aviation. During the war
they built many a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s . These a r e special v e s s e l s of which
the upper deck is a runway. Under the protection of warships and fighters,
a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s s e c r e t l y approach the target to be bombed. Tens of
a i r c r a f t , light single- engined b o m b e r s and torpedo bombers, a r e lifted
by a i r c r a f t elevators f r o m the holds onto the flight deck and take off.
After having fulfilled t h e i r mission, they r e t u r n t o the c a r r i e r .
In view of the l a r g e distances i n the Pacific theater of operations it
was not always of advantage to the Americans to c a r r y out r a i d s with
four-engined b o m b e r s . After all, even the Flying F o r t r e s s e s could only
fly s o f a r and no m o r e . Before the A m e r i c a n s captured s e v e r a l Pacific
islands and built on them airfields for Flying F o r t r e s s e s , a i r c r a f t
c a r r i e r s played an important role i n the w a r against Japan.
The American a i r f o r c e caused the G e r m a n s heavy damage. It
destroyed considerable p a r t s of Berlin, Dresden, Frankfurt-on-Main
and other cities. It is characteristic that i n r a i d s on industrial c e n t e r s

74
the American air f o r c e avoided destroying important German e n t e r p r i s e s ;
American monopolies expected t o take possession of them.
The s u c c e s s f u l offensives of the Soviet f o r c e s i n s u m m e r 1944 caused
t h e Allies t o speed up opening t h e much-delayed second front i n t h e West.
The Allied air f o r c e s played a n active p a r t i n t h i s operation. On
6 June 1944 Anglo- American a i r b o r n e t r o o p s invaded occupied F r a n c e .
Many planes towing g l i d e r s with t r o o p s and weapons, protected by
Spitfires, Aircobras and Mustangs, c r o s s e d t h e English Channel. Above
t h e coast t h e g l i d e r s w e r e detached and landed o n F r e n c h t e r r i t o r y .
P a r a c h u t i s t s , arms and ammunition w e r e a l s o dropped f r o m four-
engined t r a n s p o r t planes. H i t l e r ' s Atlantic Wall was breached.

75
 similar planes

Non-Russian combat planes in World War I1

Yearof Maximum
Type of aircraft Engines (type, number, Range, Altogether
produc- Take-off Armament and bomb load Crew speed,
take -off power) weight, kg km produced
tion kPh

1 1935 lumo 211, 2 x 1400 hp ' 14,000 1 3 7.92 m m machine guns; : 4 I 400 1 2,300 ~ 5,600
1000 kg of bombs

Junkers Ju -8 7D 1935 Jumo 211, 1400 hp 6,600 4 7.92 mm machine guns; 2 310 1,920 5,000
500 kg of bombs

Junkers Ju-88A 1936 Jumo 211, 2 x 1400 hp 14,075 4 7.92 mm machine guns; 4 465 2,500 15,000
1000 kg of bombs

Messelschmitt 1936 DB-601, 1150 hp 2,605 1 20 mm cannon; 1 57 0 660 33,000

!
Me-1O9E 2 7.92 mm machine guns

Focke- Wulf FW-19OA 1939 BMW 801, 1700 hp 3,862 2 20 mm cannons; 1 604 983 20,000
2 7.92 mm machine guns
B r i t a i n a n d USA
Boeing 5 1 7 G 1935 Cyclone 9, 4 x 1200 hp 26,762 1 2 12.7 mm machine guns; 9 481 2,736 12,726
Fortress 111 2742 kg of bombs

Hawker Hurricane II 1935 Merlin 20, 1280 hp 3,266 1 2 7.69 mm machine guns 1 520 869 16,750

Supermadne Spitfire V 1936 Merlin 45, 1185 hp 3,004 8 7.69 mm machine guns* 1 585 772 22,000
 Mosquito IV 454 kg of bombs

Consolidated 6-24 1940 Twin Wasp, 4x 1200 h p 28,123 1 0 12.7 mm machine guns; 10 483 4,023 19,000
Liberator 1360 kg of bombs

Boeing E-29 1942 Cyclone 1 8 , 4 ~ 2 2 0 0hp 54,430 1 20 mm cannon; 10 598 5,300 4,547
4 Superfortress 10 12.7mm machine guns;
4080 kg of bombs
 o I 2 3 4 5 6m

Bomber Heinkel He-111, 1935.

78
Dive-bomber Junkers Ju-87, 1935.

79
 Fighter Messerschmitt Me-109, 1936.

80

.- - - .--. ,-. .I. .

.I .. I . I.. .I I.. I I 111 I 1111 1111 I
 o 2 4 6 8 s m

Dive-bomber Junkers Ju-88, 1936.

81
Fighter Focke-Wulf FW-190, 1939.

82

I. I
Long-range bomber Boeing 6-17 Fortress, 1935.

83
Fighter Hawker Hurricane, 1935.

84
 Fighter Supermarine Spitfire, 1936.

85

I
I ~
o r z ~ t s s m

Fighter Curtiss P-40B Tomahawk, 1938.

86
Fighter B e l l P-39 Aircobra, 1939.

87
Escort fighter Lockheed P-38 Lightning, 1939.

88
 o q 6 9 12 ism
- .- - . -

Long-range bomber Avro 683 Lancasrer, 1939.

89
 Fighter North American P-51 Mustang, 1940.

5768 90
 4 ? ? 6

Bomber De Havilland DH-98 Mosquito, 1940.

91
Long-range bomber Consolidated E-24 Liberator, 1940.

92
I o 4 8 n IS to m

Long-range bomber Boeing 8-29 Superfortress, 1942.

93
6. T H E VICTORY OF SOVIET TECHNICAL GENIUS

The war gave its verdict on different aviation doctrines and objectively assessed the level and trend
of aviation in the largest countries of the world.
Experience gained in the war confirmed the correctness of the Soviet military doctrine of harmonious
cooperation among all types of forces. Both the fascist theory of "blitzkrieg" and the Allies' total bombing
of Gennany proved unsuirable.
The policy of Soviet aircraft designers was fully vindicated. They strove for maximum simplicity and
economy in design, especially in wartime.
Improvements on planes and engines were carried out without interfering with their mass production and
without prejudice ro the supply of combat aircraft to the front.
In the fierce air battles of World War I1 Germany lost two-thirds of its aircraft at the Eastern front.

T h e victory of the Soviet people in World War I1 was the h i s t o r i c a l r e s u l t

of the development of the country's a r m e d f o r c e s , including the a i r force.
Only i f we have t h i s result in mind, can we understand how the Soviet a r m y
achieved a i r supremacy and dealt the Luftwaffe a crushing defeat and can
we comprehend the c o r r e c t n e s s of the new approach chosen by Soviet avia-
tion after the w a r . Wartime experience will f o r a long t i m e t o come be a
subject f o r r e s e a r c h , both by military historians and s t r a t e g i s t s and by
scientists, designers, and all o t h e r s involved in the creation of the a r m e d
might of the Soviet s t a t e .
If we analyze the r e s u l t s of the w a r , w e may first of all speak of the
collapse of the German idea of "blitzkrieg" and the failure of "Douhet's
doctrine."
Raids on London and other B r i t i s h c i t i e s by pilotless flying bombs did
not enable the Nazis t o attain t h e i r goal, to f o r c e the British into submission.
During the w a r the English organized t h e i r a i r - r a i d defense in an
exemplary manner. Spitfire fighters and anti- a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y caused
Goering's a e r i a l p i r a t e s heavy l o s s e s . Each raid cost the G e r m a n s m o r e
and m o r e l o s s e s , l o s s e s in bombers and a i r m e n , considered i r r e p l a c e a b l e .
In the end they had t o forgo a i r r a i d s and admit t h e i r defeat in the a i r w a r
against Britain.
The Allies a l s o did not attain any decisive s u c c e s s e s by only bombing.
As late a s July [ s i c ] 1944, when they w e r e afraid of the rapid advance of
Soviet f o r c e s in the E a s t , the AIfiericans and British landed on the north
coast of F r a n c e and opened the so-called second front. Until then the
Allies had limited t h e i r combat actions in Europe mainly to a i r r a i d s .
However, in spite of the f i e r c e bombing, the G e r m a n s f i r m l y stood t h e i r
ground.
The w a r proved how inefficient was the Anglo-American effort t o subdue
Nazi Germany only by a fleet of heavy b o m b e r s . The O b s e r v e r wrote in
1 9 6 1 that according to data on the effect of bomber f o r c e s published in

94
"Attack of Strategic Aviation against Germany 1939- 45" by C h a r l e s Webster
and Nobel Frankland, l o s s e s of t h e German war industry as a r e s u l t of
B r i t i s h bombing constituted only 3.2 percent in e a r l y 1943, 6.9 percent i n
late 1943 and 2.4 percent i n e a r l y 1944. In 1944 t h e Allied s t r a t e g i c b o m b e r
f o r c e dropped about one million tons of bombs on German t e r r i t o r y but did
not succeed in s e r i o u s l y impairing Germany's m i l i t a r y and economic
potential.
An example of t h e futility of t h i s policy are the r e s u l t s of air r a i d s with
incendiary bombs on Liibeck and Rostock i n 1942. Although Liibeck w a s
"successfully burnt," we now know t h a t a week l a t e r production t h e r e
reached 90 percent of its normal level.
One of the main objects of m a s s e d Anglo-American air r a i d s w a s t h e
destruction of a i r c r a f t plants, especially those making f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t .
Output of t h e s e planes, however, increased incessantly. Output of f i g h t e r s
Me-109 was: 449 i n 1939, 1693 i n 1940, 2764 i n 1941, 2665 i n 1942, 6247
i n 1943, and 13,786 in 1944.
The fight f o r Stalingrad is a l s o convincing evidence that t h e air f o r c e
alone cannot decide a battle. On s o m e days the G e r m a n s flew two thousand
s o r t i e s but were unable t o break t h e Soviet defense.
No m a t t e r how g r e a t the r o l e of heavy b o m b e r s is i n modern w a r f a r e ,
Nazi Germany could be defeated only by t h e simultaneous e f f o r t s and
cooperation of all types of weapons. T h i s is the e s s e n c e of t h e Soviet
m i l i t a r y doctrine.
The advantage of t h e Soviet aviation during the war l a y i n t h e c l o s e
cooperation with all kinds of weapons of t h e Soviet a r m e d f o r c e s . T h e
backbone of the Soviet a r m y air f o r c e was tactical combat a i r c r a f t .
Therefore t h e r e was practically no r o o m f o r heavy b o m b e r s s i m i l a r t o
the American F o r t r e s s e s or the B r i t i s h Lancasters, or f o r e s c o r t fighters,
such as the Thunderbolts and Lightnings.
An analysis of the development of combat performance of a i r c r a f t in
World War I1 shows that t h e requirements of the a r m i e s f o r combat air-
c r a f t w e r e limited t o f o u r o r five b a s i c types simultaneously produced.
T h i s proved to b e c o r r e c t both f o r the Soviet aviation and f o r t h e G e r m a n
Luftwaffe.
The main mass-produced German combat a i r c r a f t i n the w a r 1 9 4 1- 45
were:
Fighters with water-cooled engine Me-109
Fighters with air-cooled engine FW-190
Dive -bom ber Ju-88
Attack plane JU -8 7

T h e main types of aircraft in the Soviet air fleet during t h e w a r were:

Fighters with water-cooled engine Yak

Fighters with air-cooled engine La
Twin-engined dive-bomber and reconnaissance aircraft Pe-2
Attack plane 11-2
Long-range twin-engined bomber I1 -4

Main type I m e a n s mass-produced aircraft of which t e n s of thousands

w e r e made and which decided the aerial b a t t l e s in t h e E a s t , fateful t o t h e
Germans. F o r instance, up t o the end of the w a r t h e following w e r e

95
 produced: attack planes I1 - 39,000; f i g h t e r s Yak - 36,000, La - 22,000,
MiG - 3400; b o m b e r s Pe-2 - 11,000, 11-4 - 6500, Tu-2 - 800.
Regarding heavy long-range bombers, t h e i r r o l e i n w a r is g r e a t , as
shown by t h e enormous damage inflicted by t h e Allies on G e r m a n cities.
As mentioned before, however, t h e B r i t i s h and Americans, who used
t h e s e aircraft on a l a r g e s c a l e , w e r e unable t o achieve decisive military
succe s s .
It was p a r t l y t h i s r e a s o n which brought about t h e decision at t h e climax of t h e
w a r t o discontinue production of Pe-8 heavy bombers. In t o t a l only seventy-nine
such a i r c r a f t had been produced, and production w a s stopped in favor of
the light bomber Pe-2. T h e economy and t h e production facilities of t h e
Soviet Union at that t i m e did not permit simultaneous production of both
types of a i r c r a f t . After all, t h e war required many other aircraft types,
e . g., t r o o p t r a n s p o r t planes, liaison, t r a i n e r a i r c r a f t . T h e s e a i r c r a f t
w e r e of auxiliary c h a r a c t e r and did not d i r e c t l y affect the a e r i a l might
of t h e a r m y .
War experience confirmed that Soviet technical thinking about a i r c r a f t
was a c c u r a t e . T h e main Soviet a i r c r a f t - f i g h t e r s Yak and La, attack
planes 11, and b o m b e r s Pe - w e r e all through the w a r s u p e r i o r in combat
qualities t o t h e corresponding German types Me- 109, FW- 190, J u - 8 7 and
Ju- 88.
Reasons f o r t h i s s u p e r i o r i t y were that Soviet aviation had b e t t e r a e r o -
dynamics, b e t t e r weight c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , m o r e powerful f i r e a r m s (auto-
matic cannons of 20 m m , 37 m m and 45 m m c a l i b e r ) , RS aircraft r o c k e t s ,
and a completely new and original type of a r m o r e d aircraft, t h e 11-2 attack
plane.
In addition, the Soviet Union succeeded in improving the combat qualities
of aircraft without increasing t h e i r weight. The series-produced Yak- 3
fighter weighed 2650 kg, and with the same engine i t s speed, maneuverability
and a r m a m e n t w e r e much b e t t e r than those of t h e original version, the
Yak-1, weighing 2895 kg.
T h e Soviet planes built i n 1939- 40 had g r e a t potential f o r improvement,
w h e r e a s by t h e t i m e the w a r s t a r t e d the German planes, having been built
in 1935- 36, had been exhausted of any such possibility.
Because the modernization of Yak and La fighters and of I1 and Pe
attack planes and bombers was technologically well prepared, it was usually
accomplished without loss of output. Under wartime conditions, even when
a new type of a i r c r a f t is prepared, the peculiarities of series-production
technology have t o be considered to avoid l o s s of t i m e .
T h e G e r m a n Major-General von B u t l a r in h i s analysis of the war noted:
‘I.. . the Russians had the advantage that in the production of a r m s and
ammunition they took into account all the peculiarities of w a r f a r e in Russia
and ensured maximum simplicity of technology. A s a r e s u l t t h e Russian
plants produced enormous quantities of a r m a m e n t s which excelled by the
simplicity of t h e i r design. It was comparatively e a s y t o l e a r n t o handle
.
such a r m s . . ‘ I * T h i s admission of a f o r m e r enemy is convincing enough.
World War I1 fully confirmed the mature, independent and far-sighted
scientific and technical thinking in the USSR. These qualities a l s o underlay
the rapid advance of the Soviet air f o r c e in the postwar period, a t the dawn
of t h e j e t e r a .

Mirovaya voina 1939-45 (The World War 1939-19451, p. 217.

96
 In t h e i r postwar m e m o i r s and works dealing with t h e h i s t o r y of World
War I1 the f o r m e r German generals like t o d i s c u s s the c a u s e s of t h e i r
defeat in t h e w a r against t h e Soviet Union. Such m i l i t a r y f i g u r e s as the
famous commander and founder of the German a r m o r e d f o r c e s Colonel-
General Heinz Guderian, General Kurt von Tippelskirch and o t h e r s question
whether Germany could have defeated t h e Soviet Union i f i t had not been f o r
a "coincidence of unfavorable circumstances." What "unfavorable circum-
stances" w e r e these?
One of t h e c a u s e s Western memoir w r i t e r s want t o attribute t o Germany's
defeat is t h e aid that the United States extended t o the Soviet Union during
t h e w a r . T h i s circumstance, compounded with H i t l e r ' s mistakes and the
myth of the powerful Russian ally, "General Winter,'' are favorite arguments
of Western m i l i t a r y and political a u t h o r s , They would l i k e t o d e t r a c t f r o m
the r o l e of t h e Soviet army, Soviet industry, and the valor of the Soviet
s o l d i e r s as f a c t o r s in attaining victory o v e r Nazi Germany.
In r e a l i t y all t h e American aid t o t h e Soviet Union, all t h e d e l i v e r i e s
under t h e Lend-Lease Bill throughout the w a r did not amount t o m o r e than
4 o r 5 percent of the total output of aircraft, tanks, weapons and o t h e r
munitions in the United States between 1941 and 1945.
During the w a r y e a r s the United Stated produced altogether 297,000
planes, of which the Soviet Union received only about 14,000. The Americans
produced m o r e than 86,000 tanks but s e n t only 7000 t o the Soviet Union.
At the s a m e time the Soviet Union during the war produced annually
on an average m o r e than 30,000 tanks, self-propelled guns and a r m o r e d
c a r s , up t o 40,000 a i r c r a f t , and 120,000 guns. The Soviet Union fought
with i t s own strength.
Concerning aviation, no s e r i o u s , conscientious m i l i t a r y specialist could
a s c r i b e the Soviet victory i n t h e air t o the American a s s i s t a n c e .
In 1941 t h e Soviet a i r c r a f t industry produced 15,735 planes. In t h e
difficult y e a r 1942, with the evacuation of a i r c r a f t plants, m o r e than
25,000 planes w e r e produced, in 1943 - 35,000, and 1944 - 40,300 and i n
e a r l y 1945 - 20,900 planes. Can the 14,000 American planes that w e r e
sent compare i n any way with this great Soviet air fleet?
In the c o u r s e of t h i s g r e a t e s t of w a r s t h e Soviet aircraft industry
managed t o outstrip considerably the German aircraft industry although
Germany had at i t s disposal, i n addition t o i t s own r e s o u r c e s , the r e -
s o u r c e s of its allies and of the occupied c o u n t r i e s .
In 1944 German plants produced 27,600 fighters, attack planes and
day bombers, and during that s a m e t i m e Soviet plants supplied t h e front
with 33,200 such planes.
The s u c c e s s e s of the Soviet r e a r made it possible t o strengthen con-
s i d e r a b l y the air f o r c e . In 1944 a i r c r a f t production in the USSR was
3.8 t i m e s g r e a t e r than before the w a r .
Foreign m i l i t a r y historians and w r i t e r s i n many books and m e m o i r s
w r i t e i n detail and at length about t h e exploits of the aviation during
World W a r I1 on the Western front.
Neither the Soviet Union's f o r m e r enemies nor allies like writing
about the grandiose a e r i a l b a t t l e s in the E a s t where two-thirds of Germany's
planes w e r e destroyed. A s f o r the f o r m e r commanders of H i t l e r ' s
Luftwaffe, this much is clear: such reminiscences cannot be a g r e e a b l e .
When Americans and B r i t i s h keep quiet about t h e r o l e of t h e Soviet air

97
 I II I I I

f o r c e i n defeating t h e Luftwaffe, hardly mention Soviet a i r c r a f t , and if

they do, call t h e m primitive, knocked together with a n axe, this is simply
unscrupulous.
After all, Soviet combat aircraft w e r e much s i m p l e r i n design and
technology than American o r German machines, but such simplicity was
t h e i r advantage.
The Soviet aircraft w a s adapted t o t h e difficult conditions of t h e initial
phase of the w a r , the period of evacuation, a bad shortage of aluminum,
i n s t r u m e n t s , various m a t e r i a l s indispensable f o r mass production of air-
craft, engines, and equipment. It was easy t o introduce them into pro-
duction by unskilled w o r k e r s , mostly women and youngsters.
Nevertheless, the Russian aircraft stood up well under t h e b r u t a l con-
ditions of aerial combat on t h e Soviet-German front against t h e air fleet
of Nazi Germany.
Qualitative s u p e r i o r i t y and t h e constantly i n c r e a s i n g number of newly
produced planes ensured Soviet aviation air supremacy as e a r l y as t h e
beginning of 1943. Nazi Germany l o s t two-thirds of its planes on the
Soviet-German front of World W a r 11.

98
I

7. JET AIRCRAFT

When the war was over, much work was done in the USSR toward creating a large jet-powered air fleet with
which to equip the air force.
As early as the beginning of the fifties aircraft with original Soviet jet engines were put into serial
production.
Further development of jet aircraft was convincing proof of the high level of scientific and design expertise.
At the aerial parades in 1961 in Tushino and in 1961 in Domodedovo, models of supersonic combat aircraft
were shown, including the latest in aviation: a vertical take-off jet fighter (VTOL) and a supersonic multi-
purpose aircraft with changeable wing shape.

The postwar period of development of Soviet a i r c r a f t production was

marked by a scientific and technical revolution - t h e beginning e r a of jet
aircraft. The creation of a powerful jet a i r c r a f t fleet and complete change-
over t o military j e t s and the civil a i r fleet was a new test for Soviet aviators
and the a i r c r a f t industry. They passed this t e s t with honor.
In the t h i r t i e s it became c l e a r that o r d i n a r y planes with piston engines and
propellers had been developed almost completely, and that t h e r e was not
much room for further improvement. New vistas w e r e opened up which had
been predicted by K. E. Tsiolkovskii.
During the late thirties strenuous efforts w e r e made by r e s e a r c h institutes
and d e s i g n e r s in the USSR, Britain, Germany, Italy, and somewhat l a t e r in
the United States, t o produce reactive engines. In 1938-39 G e r m a n BMW
and J u n k e r s jet engines appeared, in Britain the engine designed by F r a n k
Whittle, and in Italy the Campini-Caproni. A l l these were inadequate
experimental jet engines but could be mounted in specially built a i r c r a f t .
T h e Italian d e s i g n e r s Campini and Caproni built the CC-1 and CC-2 jet
airplanes. T h e s e a i r c r a f t w e r e flown s e v e r a l t i m e s in 1940 and 1941, and
on 1 December 1941 a flight f r o m Milan t o Rome was c a r r i e d out. In the
Campini-Caproni a i r c r a f t a c o m p r e s s o r was driven by a conventional piston
engine. T h i s power s y s t e m was called motor-driven c o m p r e s s o r . It did
not e n s u r e high flying speeds and was l a t e r abandoned. The fuselage of the
Campini-Caproni plane f r o m the nose to the t a i l was a tube. A i r e n t e r e d
t h e round a i r intake in the nose, then passed into a two-stage c o m p r e s s o r
and was ejected through a j e t in the r e a r of the fuselage at i n c r e a s e d speed
and t e m p e r a t u r e .
Before the w a r W. M e s s e r s c h m i t t began designing his j e t fighter Me-262,
It made i t s first flight in 1942. In 1942 and 1943 it was tested and was then
put into s e r i a l production.
In addition t o the Me-262 Messerschmitt worked on a flying wing with a
liquid-propellant rocket engine, the Me-163. A s m a l l number of Me-163s
and Me-262s even reached the front. T h e s e new weapons, however, did not

99
 have any effect on t h e c o u r s e of t h e w a r i n t h e air. T h e same applies t o
Heinkel's j e t plane, t h e He-162.
When t h e G e r m a n s put t h e i r f i r s t jet planes into operation, many of t h e m
c r a s h e d . T h e s e d i s a s t e r s w e r e not caused s o much by t h e novelty of flying
jet aircraft but by that f e v e r i s h h a s t e with which t h e Nazis endeavored t o put
insufficiently t e s t e d and hastily designed planes into serial production, and
then immediately t o u s e t h e m at t h e front. Under such conditions c r a s h e s
could not be avoided, and t h i s caused pilots t o d i s t r u s t j e t planes.
In Britain Whittle's j e t engine underwent tests in A p r i l 1937. A f t e r t h e
initial defects had been corrected and the design of the engine improved, it
was mounted on a plane specially built by Gloster Aircraft.
With S a y e r s a t t h e controls, the jet-powered Gloster made i t s first
flight in May 1941. In October 1941 Whittle's engine, blueprints and a group
of engineers f r o m t h e firm P o w e r Jets were s e n t t o the United States t o give
technical a s s i s t a n c e t o the American f i r m General E l e c t r i c . Within a y e a r
a plane was built t h e r e , t h e Bell Aircomet powered by two General E l e c t r i c
Whittle-type engines; t h i s was the first American jet plane.
Making u s e of the experience accumulated in designing, building and
testing t h e i r f i r s t plane, Gloster Aircraft built t h e twin-engined fighter
Meteor. T h e Meteor was t h e only j e t plane used by t h e Allies i n World
War 11. I t s f i r s t flight was in March 1943. Meteors operated f r o m b a s e s
in South England against the German rockets. On 7 November 1945 a s p e c i a l
racing plane, the G l o s t e r Meteor IV, established a speed world r e c o r d
with 969.6 kph.
In 1945 De Havilland began work on t h e design of a jet-powered flying
wing, the DH-108. Two prototypes w e r e built. In A p r i l 1948 with one of
t h e m t h e t e s t pilot John D e r r y broke the world speed r e c o r d on a closed
100-km circuit; h i s speed was 973.81 kph. In September he attained a speed
of 1120 kph, i.e., almost t h e speed of sound, in diving f r o m a n altitude of
1 2 k m t o 9 km.
However, the B r i t i s h w e r e not successful with t h e i r DH-108. Soon both
planes c r a s h e d after having broken up in t h e a i r , burying t h e courageous
pilots under t h e i r wreckage.
The c r a s h e s of t h e DH-108s, whose flights until then had been excessively
publicized as a national triumph, and the l o s s of the test pilots had a de-
pressing effect. T h i s was enhanced by t h e unconvincing r e a s o n s given f o r
the c r a s h e s , published by the p r e s s and surrounded by many mysteries. It
was speculated that when a plane approaches a speed of 1000 kph, t h e air
becomes s o compact (this was at t h e t i m e called the sound b a r r i e r ) that upon
contact with it the wings and other p a r t s of the a i r c r a f t cannot a b s o r b the
impact, and thus are damaged. Such tales undermined t h e confidence of
pilots i n j e t planes. T h e real cause was that designers did not yet have
enough experience t o analyze stress of such fast a i r c r a f t c o r r e c t l y .
D i s t r u s t i n j e t c r a f t a l s o s p r e a d i n t h e Soviet Union, because t h e r e too
the first flights of jet-powered aircraft had a t r a g i c ending.
In t h e USSR in t h e initial period p r a c t i c a l work in the construction of
r e a c t i o n engines was done by many inventors and designers who mostly
concentrated on liquid-propellant rocket engines.
T h i s work was g r e a t l y influenced by the work of Tsiolkovskii's s u c c e s s o r ,
t h e s c i e n t i s t and designer F. A. Tsander, who built the f i r s t reaction engines
in 1930-33. Unfortunately t h e s e w e r e not put t o p r a c t i c a l use at that t i m e .

IO0
In t h e late t h i r t i e s two designers, A. M. Isaev and L. S. Dushkin, produced
liquid-propellant reaction engines mounted l a t e r in specially built a i r c r a f t .
T h e first flight powered by a reaction engine in the USSR was in
F e b r u a r y 1940 by pilot I. Fedorov on a n SK-9 rocket plane, the work of
Sergei Pavlovich Korolev, the famous builder of spacecraft.
In F e b r u a r y 1942 the test pilot Captain G r i g o r i i Bakhchivandkhi was
preparing a t an a e r o d r o m e f o r flight t e s t s of a plane designed by V. F. Bol-
khovitinov and powered by a liquid-fuel reaction engine designed by Isaev
and Dushkin. T h e plane was built under difficult wartime conditions, the
flight tests w e r e made in extremely cold weather, in isolation f r o m the
scientific base. Nevertheless, a s e a r l y as 15 May 1942 Bakhchivandzhi
made h i s first successful flight. Soon after, on a subsequent flight, the
pilot accelerated t o full thrust, the plane lost its stability, became uncontrol-
lable and crashed.
F u r t h e r development of reaction propulsion then changed f r o m liquid-
propellant reaction engines t o turbojet engines. A pioneer of turbojet engines
was A. M. Lyul'ka, a turbine designer who in 1937 began working on h i s first
turbojet engine.
It is fitting h e r e t o point out that toward the end of the w a r the speed of
fighter planes approached 700 kph. Developing a proven configuration,
S. A. Lavochkin designed the La-9, a fighter a r m e d with four cannons with
a speed of 690 kph. T h e Yak-3 with a VK-107 engine attained 720kph in
government t e s t s .
When a i r c r a f t attain what was then considered high speeds, the air
becomes compressible, the r e s i s t a n c e of the a i r c r a f t i n c r e a s e s s h a r p l y and
the efficiency of the propeller drops. It was t h e r e f o r e practically impossible
t o i n c r e a s e speed by improving streamlining, and t o i n c r e a s e the power of
piston engines would have caused the weight and s i z e of the power plant t o
i n c r e a s e disproportionately. T h i s circumstance was a s e r i o u s obstacle t o
f u r t h e r i n c r e a s e in a i r c r a f t speeds.
A m e a s u r e which could be quickly effected but was only a stopgap was t o
f i t fighters powered by piston engines with so-called boosters, Le., auxiliary
liquid-propellant reaction engines o r r a m j e t engines f o r s h o r t b u r s t s of
higher speed. T h e first models of t h i s kind w e r e t h e Yak-3 with a liquid-
propellant reaction engine and experimental MiGs and La-5s with r a m j e t
engine boosters.
A fundamental solution would be production of engines operated on a new
principle, turbojet engines, which have g r e a t advantages over piston engines,
because they can develop enormous thrust, yet t h e i r weight and s i z e a r e
comparatively modest. In addition, the engine t r a n s m i t s its energy d i r e c t l y
t o the a i r c r a f t , without t h e intermediary of the heavy and c u m b e r s o m e
propeller. After the w a r the Soviet d e s i g n e r s w e r e able t o concentrate on
problems of reaction propulsion.
T h e C e n t r a l Committee of the P a r t y and the government in December 1945
discussed s e v e r a l times the future development of Soviet aviation. T O keep
in t h e forefront of p r o g r e s s , especially in the field of reaction propulsion, it
was decided t o adopt urgent m e a s u r e s t o improve t h e construction of proto-
types of new types of a i r c r a f t , engines, and equipment, and to extend the
g r e a t e s t possible a s s i s t a n c e to r e s e a r c h .
At t h e end of December 1945 a n unsuccessful attempt was m a d e t o avoid
having t o c a r r y out t h e s e r a d i c a l m e a s u r e s by simply copying the G e r m a n

101
 Me-262. T h i s problem w a s discussed on a recommendation by the P e o p l e ' s
C o m m i s s a r i a t of the Aviation Industry. T h e recommendation was rejected.
T o put the Me-262 into serial production would be a mistake. First, t h i s
was not a successful plane; it was difficult t o control and unstable in flight.
Second, copying the M e s s e r s c h m i t t would d i r e c t attention and material
r e s o u r c e s t o t h i s plane, g r e a t l y damaging p r o g r e s s of Soviet j e t
aircraft.
Moreover, a t that time the work of Soviet d e s i g n e r s of j e t aircraft
was progressing successfully. Mikoyan's design office worked on the
twin-engined fighter MiG-9. Yakovlev's design office brought out the
single-engined fighter Yak-15 in October 1945; it w a s a l r e a d y on the airfield
f o r preliminary tests and f o r taxiing. T h e MiG-9 and Yak-15 promised t o
be lighter, easier t o fly, t o have better flying c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and be m o r e
reliable than the German planes. They could be put into serial production
m o r e easily.
In h i s postwar m e m o i r s the G e r m a n General Kurt von Tippelskirch wrote
about the Me-262: ' I . . .
T h e necessity of introducing changes in design in the
end had the r e s u l t that when the Allies invaded F r a n c e , t h e r e w e r e altogether
only t h i r t y such planes which had been a l r e a d y delivered t o the a i r f o r c e
units, but changes had yet t o be c a r r i e d out on them." He a l s o complained
that the pilots "did not l e a r n properly t o handle the new machine, especially
in take-off and landing."*
While rejecting the proposed copying of the M e - 2 6 2 , the government
decided t o speed up production of the Yak-15 and MiG-9, s o that they could
be shown at the Tushino air display in 1946.
T h e problem of developing j e t a i r c r a f t in the USSR was solved by the
decision t o u s e a n original approach.
Measures f o r g r e a t l y intensifying experimental and r e s e a r c h work in
construction w e r e outlined. One of the outstanding politicians and o r g a n i z e r s
of the defense industry, M. V. Krunichev, was in December 1945 made
minister of the aviation industry. T h e staffs of the design offices went t o
work with g r e a t vigor, realizing c l e a r l y how complicated and demanding was
the changeover f r o m piston-engines t o jet propulsion. T h e government
provided the n e c e s s a r y conditions.
T h e designers working on the Yaks set themselves the t a s k of producing
an a i r c r a f t in which only the engine would be new while the rest would a s
much as possible r e m a i n the s a m e a s in piston-engined a i r c r a f t . Upon
entering the cockpit, the pilot would take up h i s accustomed position, and in
taking off, landing, and in flight he would not feel any difference between t h e
j e t and a piston-engined plane.
T h i s concept was realized. T h e Yak-3 fighter, with which t h e pilots w e r e
familiar, was fitted with an RD-10 turbojet engine. Fundamental changes
had t o be made only i n the front of the plane, with the cockpit, wings,
empennage and landing g e a r remaining substantially unchanged. It was
calculated that the machine thus obtained would be v e r y light, v e r y e a s y t o
fly, and would have a speed of 800 kph, i.e., substantially m o r e than the
series -produced Yak- 3.
T h e MiG-9 fighter w a s the first series-produced j e t plane designed by
Mikoyan's design office. It was a single-seater, all-metal midwing monoplane.

e K u r t v o n T i p p e l s k i r c h . Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voiny(TheHistory0f the Second World War), p.484.-

Moskva. IL. 1956.

102
T h e plan view of the wing w a s trapezoidal. Two RD-20 j e t engines with a
t h r u s t of 800 kg each w e r e situated s i d e by side in the lower p a r t of the
fuselage. The tricycle landing g e a r with nose s t r u t provided a n excellent
view f r o m the cockpit and g r e a t l y facilitated a i r c r a f t control in take-off and
landing. T h e MiG-9 had powerful armament: one 37-mm cannon and two
23-mm cannons. Its take-off weight was 5000 kg, maximum speed 900 kph.
On 24 April 1946 pilot M. Ivanov made the f i r s t flight in a Yak-15, and
that same day pilot A. Grinchik made the f i r s t flight in a MiG-9. In August
both t h e s e first-born Soviet jet planes participated in the Tushino a i r display.
After the display t h e Ministry of the Aircraft Industry w a s o r d e r e d t o
produce and fly before the a n n i v e r s a r y of the revolution t e n or fifteen
Yak-15s and MiG-9s each. By 7 November 1946 all the planes w e r e ready;
however, the e n t i r e aerial part of the p a r a d e was canceled because of bad
weather.
Muscovites saw f i r s t Soviet jet planes flying o v e r Red Square on 1 May
1947. By that t i m e a l a r g e number of Yak-15 and MiG-9 planes had been
series-produced, and flights of j e t planes had become an ordinary event.
The pilots regained confidence in j e t a i r c r a f t .
In s p r i n g 1947 the t e s t pilot General P. Stefanovskii performed a e r o b a t i c s
f o r t h e first t i m e in a Yak-15, and the pilot I. Polunin showed aerobatics
publiclyinaYak-15 at theTushino display in 1947. Group aerobatics in jet
a i r c r a f t w e r e f i r s t displayed by five Yak-15s under the command of E. Savi-
tskii, twice recipient of the H e r o of the Soviet Union, at the air display in
1948.
Jet a i r c r a f t soon became an inseparable part of the daily life of the a i r
force. T h i s inseparability w a s not only because of the engineers and other
employees of t h e a i r c r a f t industry but a l s o of the t e s t pilots. In 1948 the
P r e s i d i u m of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR conferred the title of H e r o of
the Soviet Union on four t e s t pilots who had distinguished themselves most
in m a s t e r i n g the new technique of flying jet a i r c r a f t : P. Stefanovskii, M . Iva-
nov, I. Fedorov, and I. Ivashchenko.
The m e a s u r e s outlined by the government determined the r a t e a t which
development of engine construction proceeded in the Soviet Union, and f o r
this t h r e e s t a g e s w e r e envisaged.
The f i r s t stage w a s transitional. T o accumulate experience, captured
German engines Jumo-004 with a t h r u s t of 850kg and BMW-003 with a t h r u s t
of 800 kg w e r e t o be used.
The second stage was the introduction in Soviet plants of B r i t i s h engines
under license, the Derwent with a t h r u s t of 1600 kg and the Nin with a t h r u s t
of 2200 kg.
T h e t h i r d stage was the boosting of work on Soviet jet engines by the
design offices of V . Ya. Klimov, A. A. Mikulin, and A. M. Lyul'ka. A long-
range view of all the engines was taken, and they w e r e expected t o develop
t h r u s t s f r o m 3 t o 8 tons.
The development of j e t a i r c r a f t construction was a l s o outlined in g e n e r a l
and was put into effect in t h r e e s t a g e s during five o r s i x y e a r s .
T h e first stage comprised a i r c r a f t Yak-15 and MiG-9, at that t i m e a l r e a d y
built with captured engines Jumo-004 and BMW-003 (Soviet designation was
RD-10 and RD-20).
T h e second stage w e r e j e t planes with Derwent and Nin engines (Soviet
designation RD-500 and RD-45). T h e y w e r e single-engined fighters MiG-15

103
 (with RD-45 engines), La-15 and Yak-23 (with RD-500 engines) and t h e
twin-engined bomber 11-28 (with RD-45 engines), of which prototypes w e r e
built i n 1947-49 and then w e r e immediately put into serial production. T h e
three-engined bomber Tu-14 a l s o was series-produced at t h i s t i m e .
T h e MiG-15 designed by Mikoyan's design office was the jet fighter
produced i n the largest numbers. T h e plane had swept wings" and empen-
nage, a t r i c y c l e landing gear and a p r e s s u r i z e d cabin. T o p e r m i t abandoning
of t h e a i r c r a f t at high speed, a n ejection seat was incorporated. T h e jet
engine, f i r s t a n RD-45 with a t h r u s t of 2270kg, later a VK-1 with a t h r u s t
of 2700 kg, was located behind t h e pilot's cabin. Armament consisted of one
37-mm cannon and two 23-mm cannons. A l l t h r e e cannons and t h e ammuni-
tion f o r them w e r e located i n the fuselage on gun mounts which could be
lowered. When necessary, additional fuel tanks o r bombs could be suspended
under t h e wings. T h e MiG-15 had a take-off weight of about 4800kg and a
speed of up t o 1050 kph. T h e MiG-15s received t h e i r combat baptism in the
Korean w a r and proved s u p e r i o r t o t h e American F-86, t h e S a b r e s .
In 1948 t e s t s began of Ilyushin's t a c t i c a l j e t bomber 11-28, which had a
maximum speed of 900 kph and a range of 2400 km with a bomb load of 1ton.
I t s defensive a r m a m e n t consisted of four 23-mm cannons. T h e plane weighed
21.2tons. T h e 11-28 had tapered wings and a swept empennage. T h e two
engines w e r e mounted on b r a c k e t s on the wings and covered by streamlined
cowling, and the flexible-cell fuel tanks w e r e located i n the fuselage. T h e
plane excelled by i t s simple and technological concept and was e a s y t o pilot.
The 11-28 was a worthy s u c c e s s o r of t h e piston-engined bombers Pe-2 and
Tu-2. It became t h e main t a c t i c a l bomber of the Soviet a r m y air f o r c e .
T h e t h i r d stage w a s t h e construction of planes powered by the f i r s t Soviet-
made jet engines: f i g h t e r s MiG-19, fighter-interceptors Yak-25 and bombers
TU-16.
T h e t a c t i c a l fighter MiG-19, t h e f i r s t mass-produced Soviet supersonic
a i r c r a f t , had a maximum speed of 1450 kph. I t s swept wings w e r e at an
angle of 55", and i t s elevator unit was fully tilting. T h e r e a r p a r t of the
fuselage contained two RD-9B engines, mounted s i d e by side, with axial
c o m p r e s s o r s . With r e h e a t rating the engines had a t h r u s t of 3250kg. The
fuel tanks were in the fuselage, but wing drop tanks were a l s o provided. T o
s h o r t e n the landing run, brake parachutes w e r e used. The controls of the
a i r c r a f t incorporated many hydraulic b o o s t e r s and e l e c t r i c a l mechanisms.
The MiG-19 w a s a r m e d with t h r e e 30-mm cannons. Various additional
a r m a m e n t could be suspended under t h e wings, thus broadening t h e possibili-
ties of its t a c t i c a l u s e s .
In the e a r l y fifties the design offices of Mikoyan, Lavochkin, and Yakovlev
w e r e given t h e t a s k of designing t h e first Russian all-weather night i n t e r -
ceptor. T h e MiG-190, La-200, and Yak-25 w e r e built and tested. After
t e s t s f o r all a s p e c t s and a comparison of the flight and t a c t i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s -
tics, the Yak-25 w a s accepted f o r the a r m e d f o r c e s . It was used as a n all-
weather interceptor f o r defensive patrols.
The concept of t h e Yak-25 offered many possibilities of f u r t h e r develop-
ment and served as t h e b a s i s f o r the most variegated versions of t h e Yak-28,
series-produced supersonic combat a i r c r a f t .

' The first experimental plane in the Soviet Union with 35" swept wings was designed by S. A . Lavochkin.

104
 A. N. Tupolev's Tu-16 was powered by two AM-3 engines, each with a
t h r u s t of 8750 kg, mounted laterally where the wings w e r e joined t o the
fuselage. With a weight of 72 tons, the Tu-16 could c a r r y a bomb load of
3tons, having a range of 5760km. Its maximum speed was almost 1000 kph.
The six-man c r e w had powerful defensive a r m a m e n t , seven 23-mm cannons.
L a t e r the Tu-16 became a terrifying rocket c a r r i e r able to d e s t r o y ground
t a r g e t s without entering the enemy's a i r defense zone. Integrated into the
military a i r force and made highly reliable, the Tu-16 w a s developed into
the first Soviet jet passenger aircraft, the Tu-104, which is successfully
operated by Aeroflot.
T h e rapid deveiopment of the construction of jet a i r c r a f t in the Soviet
Union was due t o the outstanding s u c c e s s e s in producing j e t engines. It
should be pointed out that Soviet jet engines a t that t i m e did not have t h e i r
equal in other countries, both regarding design and thrust.
T h i s is briefly the history of the development of jet a i r c r a f t construction
in the Soviet Union.
How different is a l l t h i s f r o m the legends propagated in the West in o r d e r
to detract f r o m the s u c c e s s e s achieved by the Soviet Union and t o imply that
whatever the Soviet Union h a s was copied f r o m the West!
In this respect the admission by the American Richard Stockwell in his
book "Soviet A i r Power" is not without interest:
"The Russians began demonstrating t h e i r jet planes a s soon a s they had
been accepted a s equipment by the a r m e d f o r c e s in 1947. Western r e p r e -
sentatives saw t h e m on Aviation Day in Moscow, and also in E a s t Germany,
in Poland and elsewhere. But nobody in the West attached much i n t e r e s t to
the MiG-9 and Yak-15 planes.. .
T h e r a t e at which the Russians developed
t h e i r aviation in the late f o r t i e s was simply astonishing, but nobody in the
W e s t took any notice."*
Further: "The speed with which the Russians put the MiG-15 into s e r i a l
production was incredible, but what is even m o r e astonishing i s that nobody
in the West appreciated this fact. At the end of 1949 l a r g e numbers of
MiG-15 fighters could be found in E a s t Germany. They appeared s e v e r a l
t i m e s o v e r Moscow. The military representatives of Western countries
saw t h e m and wrote about t h e m in t h e i r reports, but none of them were
greatly i m p r e s s e d by these planes. 'I*':
T h e Western authorities believed that "one might f e a r the Russian a r m y
but not t h e i r backward a i r force."t
Not until the Korean w a r , when some MiG-15 fighters engaged the latest
North American Sabre j e t fighters, did the Americans realize the p r e e m i -
nence of Soviet technical thinking in aviation.
The well-founded doctrine of development of aviation in the postwar
period and the i n c r e a s e d power of the Soviet a i r c r a f t industry yielded results.
In the middle fifties the Soviet union had the following modern jet combat
a i r c r a f t in large-scale production: MiG-19, s h o r t - r a n g e fighter; Yak-25,
all-weather night fighter-interceptor; 11-28, tactical bomber; Tu-16, long-
range bomber.
T h e s e planes formed the backbone of the a i r f o r c e up t o the end of the
decade when they w e r e replaced by new or, better, f a s t e r planes with a

* metranslated from b s s i a n . 1
* * R i c h a r d S t o c k w e l l . Soviet Air Power. New York. 1956. ketranslated from Russian.]
t Ibid.

105
 higher ceiling, which w e r e shown at the a i r display a t Tushino on 9 July 1961.
T h i s display was a creative accounting by the aviators t o the P a r t y and the
Soviet people. It showed that in recent y e a r s the air fleet of the Soviet
Union had been thoroughly modernized. Speed, range and ceiling of t h e s e
planes w e r e f a r g r e a t e r . F o r the f i r s t t i m e supersonic combat j e t planes
for v a r i o u s purposes w e r e shown: fighters a r m e d with a i r - t o - a i r rockets,
heavy rocket c a r r i e r s with air-to-ground rockets, seaplanes o r flying boats,
special-purpose planes, a fighter with booster and others. All these were
superfast, super-long-range planes with a superhigh ceiling on which at one
t i m e o r another world r e c o r d s had been established. Complicated individual
and group aerobatics testified t o the skill of the pilots who handled these
machines perfectly.
The display in 1961 showed the r e s u l t s of the revolution which had t r a n s -
formed aviation technology:
- t h e military a i r f o r c e of the USSR had become jet-powered;
- Soviet aviation had become supersonic. T h e speed of s o m e fighters
taking part in the display was almost t h r e e t i m e s the speed of sound;
- Soviet aviation was a r m e d with rockets. T h e slow bombers w e r e
replaced by high-speed rocket c a r r i e r s .
The planes w e r e equipped with exceedingly good instruments, enabling
t h e m t o fly throughout the y e a r in any weather and t o r e a c h t h e i r target
accurately.
The display in 1961 did not only show the achievements of the a i r c r a f t
builders, but it also showed the gigantic effort by the P a r t y and a l l the Soviet
people.
It i s significant that f o r s e v e r a l days after the p a r a d e the foreign p r e s s ,
and not only specialized journals, were filled with accounts of the a i r display.
F o r obvious r e a s o n s the p r e s s of capitalist countries paid most attention t o
military aircraft. T h e scope and the high level of Soviet military aviation
w e r e completely unexpected by the West. They thought that the Soviet Union
had devoted a l l its efforts and r e s o u r c e s to the development of rockets and
had lost interest in aviation.
The London Daily Mail printed an article by its scientific r e p o r t e r
Stevenson Pew, who had been at the Tushino parade. He wrote that the USSR
showed new jet a i r c r a f t with supersonic speed ensuring the s a m e primacy in
aviation a s in s p a c e exploration. Pew continued in his a r t i c l e saying that,
deafened by the r o a r of a i r c r a f t , he felt like a little insect. At no display in
America, F r a n c e o r Britain had h e s e e n such skill a s in Tushino. T h e
display convinced the West that R u s s i a was f a r f r o m devoting a l l i t s efforts
exclusively t o rocketry. *
The New York T i m e s drew attention to the jet planes with b o o s t e r s and,
r e f e r r i n g t o the opinion of Western experts, wrote that the United States has
nothing that could compare in combat qualities with this Soviet aircraft.
R e f e r r i n g t o these s a m e experts, the Swedish Svenska Dagbladet reached the
s a m e conclusion a s the New York T i m e s . **
The Austrian paper Neues O s t e r r e i c h exclaimed: "This was a display of
military aviation the like of which the world had never s e e n before."

e Quoted in Pravda, 11 July 1961.

* * Ibid.

106

. .. .. ,
 And one m o r e opinion. The P a r i s paper, P a r i s P r e s s e Intransigeant
wrote; "This was a shocking revelation. Until now it seemed that the
R u s s i a n s had completely switched t o rocket construction, and the West
thought it still had a considerable edge in piloted aircraft. In Tushino the
Russians proved that they a r e able t o divide t h e i r strength equally between
exploring outer space and building a i r c r a f t such a s they displayed yesterday.
T h e i r technical achievements came unexpectedly."*
The quality of Soviet aviation technology of 1961, displayed in Tushino,
is clearly c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a number of g r e a t feats by Soviet f l y e r s a s t o
speed, altitude and range, achieved with new series-produced a i r c r a f t
f r o m among those which had s o i m p r e s s e d Western observers.
In July 1959 V. P. Smirnov flaw long-distance in an RV plane with a load
of 2 tons at a steady speed and at an altitude of 20,200m.
In October 1959 G. K, Mosolov flying an E-66 attained a maximum speed
of 2500 kph and an a v e r a g e speed of 2388 kph over a 15km-25-km speed
course.
In October 1959 B. M. Stepanov flying a 201-M plane lifted a load of
55.22tons t o an altitude of 13,000m.
In 1959 outstanding s u c c e s s e s w e r e achieved in long-range flights with
heavy a i r c r a f t when 17,000 km were covered without inflight refueling.
In April 1961 Mosolov in an E-66A plane attained an altitude of 34,714 m
in dynamic flight. Also in 1 9 6 1 Mosolov in an E-166 plane achieved a maxi-
mum speed of 3000 kph and 2681 kph on a 15 km -25-km speed course.
The excellent qualities of a i r c r a f t in the late fifties and e a r l y sixties
w e r e not only the result of the work of the special design offices of the
renowned g e n e r a l and chief designers. Much of the credit must go t o the
r e s e a r c h institutes - TsAGI, VIAM, and others - w h e r e important problems
of supersonic aerodynamics and strength of aviation m a t e r i a l s w e r e investi-
gated by the f o r e m o s t scientists, among t h e m in first place Academicians
V.V. Struminskii and S.T. Kishkin, and Corresponding Member A.I. Makarev-
skii; this enabled the designers t o build a i r c r a f t of such high quality.
The five y e a r s since 1961 a r e marked by f u r t h e r outstanding achievements
of Soviet a i r c r a f t construction. A t the 23rd P a r t y Congress the Minister of
Defense spokeof the new and modern planes supplied t o the a i r force. He
especially pointed out that new and highly efficient complexes of interceptor
planes had been created and supplied t o the forces; qualitative changes had
been made in long-range aviation; a considerable part of tactical, s e a ,
rocket-carrying, and especially of military transport planes had been
replaced by m o r e modern models.
The a i r display in Domodedovo on 9 July 1 9 6 7 was convincing evidence of
this rapid p r o g r e s s . It was a demonstration of the quality that Soviet
aviation had achieved on the 50th a n n i v e r s a r y of Soviet power.
The p r o g r a m of the display proved that aviation s c i e n c e and practice in
the USSR had achieved new s u c c e s s e s in the s i x y e a r s since 1961. P l a n e s
which in 1 9 6 1 had been shown only a s prototypes flew in e n t i r e squadrons,
piloted by rank-and-file military airmen.
T h e l a t e s t technical achievements were a l s o demonstrated. V. Mukhin
flew the f i r s t Soviet VTOL jet plane. T h i s a i r c r a f t , powered by two turbojet
engines with swiveling nozzles and with a s y s t e m of jet control, does not

* Quoted in Pravda. 12 July 1961.

107
 need any c o n c r e t e runway; it can take off and land on the tiniest patch. The
combination of high speed and this unique take-off and landing performance
o f f e r s a i r c r a f t completely new potentialities.
The problem of vertical take-off and landing has for a long t i m e challenged
the skill of a i r c r a f t engineers a l l o v e r the world. T h e r e a r e v a r i o u s prin-
ciples *which enable a i r c r a f t t o take off f r o m confined spaces, but s o f a r only
t h r e e o r four of these projects have been actually realized. T h e possibility of
building such a i r c r a f t was given by the advent of sufficiently powerful and
light turbojet engines. Vertical take-off requires that the t h r u s t of the
engine exceed the weight of the a i r c r a f t . In the Soviet plane the j e t s t r e a m
of the engine is deflected downward by special swiveling nozzles, thus
directing the thrust into a v e r t i c a l direction. When the a i r c r a f t h a s reached
a sufficient altitude, the pilot gradually t u r n s the nozzle into a horizontal
position, thus changing the direction of the exhaust g a s s t r e a m and a c c e l e r a -
ting the a i r c r a f t . In landing everything o c c u r s in r e v e r s e o r d e r .
Other novelties w e r e two supersonic planes which changed the shape of
t h e i r swept wings while in flight. F o r take-off, landing and long flights the
wings a r e opened up t o a s m a l l angle of sweep; for attaining a higher speed
the angle of sweep is increased.
Construction of a i r c r a f t with variable angles of sweep was made n e c e s s a r y
by two apparently irreconcilable requirements: v e r y high flying speed and
low landing speed. Wings with a large angle of sweep have the s m a l l e s t
resistance in high-speed flight but do not e n s u r e sufficient l i f t f o r take-off
and landing. Aircraft with such wings have a high landing speed, making
piloting difficult and requiring long runways.
A principle of combining low landing speed with high maximum speed by
changing the wing shape was proposed by an engineer named Makhonin
a l r e a d y before the war. T h e actual solution t o the problem, however, was
not put into effect until the mid-sixties when the first viable designs incor-
porating this principle appeared.
When designing Soviet planes with a variable angle of sweep, many
complicated technical problems had t o be solved. The main difficulty was
t o find an aerodynamic configuration which would e n s u r e stability and
controllability of the a i r c r a f t within the entire range of change of the wing
angle of sweep. It was n e c e s s a r y to combine two types of aircraft, a low-
speed a i r f r a m e and a high-speed fighter. The display in Domodedovo
proved that it was not beyond the Soviet designers t o solve this problem.
Both the VTOL a i r c r a f t and a i r c r a f t with a variable angle of sweep testify
t o the successfulness of design offices and r e s e a r c h institutes t o find the
solution of difficult problems confronting modern aviation.
Interesting was also the display of fighters with lifting engines located in
the fuselage, which shortened take-off and landing runs, and new fighter-
interceptors of a n original configuration.
The demonstration of the planes designed by 0. K. Antonov's design office
w a s effective. An-12 planes dropped parachutists; m o r e than one thousand
men with full combat equipment landed on the airfield. A lucid illustration
of the p r o g r e s s achieved in civil a i r transport was the fly-past of p a s s e n g e r
jet planes. The f i r s t was the v e t e r a n Tu-104, and then followed m o r e
modern liners, the Tu-134 and the 11-62, which landed with r e v e r s e thrust,
and the Yak-40, the first jet plane for local a i r transport.

108

... .- .- .. I. I- I. 1111 ..I I., .. I I

I ,
 A s always, s p o r t s pilots of the All-Union Voluntary Society of Cooperation
with the Soviet Army, A i r F o r c e and Navy (DOSAAF) and military pilots took
p a r t in the display and demonstrated aerobatics in t h e y a k - 1 8 P s p o r t s planes
and supersonic MiG-21 fighters.
The a i r display aroused much interest among foreign aviation specialists,
and the Soviet and foreign p r e s s were unanimous in praising Soviet s u c c e s s e s .
The representative of F r a n c e P r e s s e wrote: "All Western specialists a g r e e
unanimously that Russian technology has reached a high level. Most special-
ists believe that such high quality could be achieved only thanks t o a broad
network of r e s e a r c h institutes and laboratories and t h e existence of a first-
c l a s s industrial b a s e in a i r c r a f t construction."
Soon after the display many world r e c o r d s , achieved in the new planes,
w e r e announced. F o r instance, H e r o of the Soviet Union A. Fedotov attained
on 5 October 1967 a n altitude of 30,010m with a load of 2 tons. M.Komarov
attained an a v e r a g e speed of 2930 kph in a 500-km closed circuit. P. Ostapenko
attained an a v e r a g e speed of 2910- kph with a load of 2 tons on a 1000-km
closed circuit. A l l these r e c o r d s w e r e achieved in s e r i e s - p r o d u c e d single-
s e a t e r E-266 interceptors designed by A. I. Mikoyan.
The newspaper P r a v d a wrote on 10 J u l y 1967: "Yesterday's a i r display
was evidence that aviation h a s become an inseparable part of the Soviet a r m y
and navy, that it i s on the r e q u i r e d level both regarding equipment and the
training of the flying personnel, that it is ready hand in hand with the other
units of the a r m e d forces to fulfill the most difficult t a s k s for reliably
protecting the country against any a g g r e s s o r . "

109
 . .. .
. , . --.
,+.

Fighter Yak-15.

110
I

Fighter MiG-9.
Fighter MiG - 15.

112
Tactical bomber 11-28.

I13
 M k M

0 3 6 9 N 15m

Long-range bomber Tu-16.

I

. .- .:.

All-weather interceptor Yak-25.

1 I5
Fighter MiG - 19.

I16
117
I

Multipurpose jet aircraft with variable wing shape. Air display in Domodedovo, 1967.

119
8. SPORTS PLANES

In the first year;of Soviet power the Party encouraged in every conceivable way the development of sports
flying.
The foundation was laid for the mass production of light aircraft for training airmen.
T h e organization of sports flight in the country gained much publicity. Through aeroclubs the youth of
the country joined in building the aerial might of the country. The achievements in sports flying were the
contribution of the young generation.
Sports flying was the school for many heroes of World War I1 and renowned pilots holding world record.
Sports flying was also the initial start for many outstanding aircraft designers, the creators of the powerful
combat planes.

In Soviet a i r c r a f t construction a special place belong: to the creation and

development of s p o r t s flying. It played a role in developing Soviet d e s i g n e r s
and in training pilots f o r the a r m y and civil aviation.
Sports flying provided the entry into r e a l aviation f o r the d e s i g n e r s
S. V. Ilyushin and 0. K. Antonov, the famous rocket designer S. P. Korolev,
the renowned Soviet aerodynamics specialist V. S. Pyshnov and many others.
In the USSR low-powered aviation was born in 1924-25 when interest in
s p o r t s flying was aroused among military and aviation specialists.
P r o g r e s s of aviation - i n c r e a s e in speed, range, ceiling, lifting power -
was marked by constant i n c r e a s e in engine power. The first airplanes a t the
beginning of the twentieth century had engines of 2 5 hp-3Ohp. A s early a s
halfway through the second decade, however, when a i r c r a f t found wide-
s p r e a d u s e in World W a r I, the power of a i r c r a f t engines increased
rapidly. Whereas a t the beginning of the w a r engine power was 40 hp - 6 0 hp,
toward the end of the w a r it attained 250hp-40Ohp. Only ten y e a r s passed,
and in the f a l l of 1927 the British hydroplane Supermarine, which at the
international a i r c r a f t r a c e in Italy established a world speed r e c o r d of
453.85 kph, was a l r e a d y powered by a lOOOhp Rolls Royce engine.
Since the power of military a i r c r a f t was increased to attain maximum
speed, the highest possible ceiling and other tactical characteristics,
production and operating costs of the planes w e r e not of decisive importance.
However, a field of aviation such a s s p o r t s flying required economical, low-
powered planes. Sports flying, which s p r e a d in almost a l l European coun-
t r i e s after World War I, could not p r o g r e s s using existing military a i r c r a f t .
In the e a r l y twenties a r e t u r n t o a i r c r a f t with low-powered engines therefore
started. Attempts w e r e made t o i n c r e a s e flight performance mainly through
imp roved aerodynamic s .
To supply the network of aeroclubs and civil flying schools, inexpensive
planes w e r e needed, ones simple in design and cheap to operate. Small
planes appeared, with engines of 18 hp, 30 hp, 60 hp, up t o 100 hp, fulfilling
t h e s e requirements. Thanks t o t h e i r inexpensiveness, s m a l l dimensions,

120
dual control, maximum simplicity of maintenance, low weight while able t o
fly at 150 kph t o 200 kph, such planes found widespread u s e throughout the
world.
The u s e of low-powered a i r c r a f t was not confined t o clubs and flying
schools. They w e r e also used in military a i r f o r c e s a s communications
a i r c r a f t and f o r training pilots.
Since Soviet engine construction only made its first tentative steps in
the twenties, the d e s i g n e r s of low-powered a i r c r a f t had to begin with
obsolete Ansani engines of 35 hp, left over f r o m World War I, o r t o adapt
12 hp H a r l e y motorcycle engines. T h e first Soviet light plane was built by
a military pilot and a flying-school instruction, V. 0. Pisarenko; it was
built a t his expense and powered by an Ansani engine. Although the plane
had been built under v e r y difficult conditions, almost without any computa-
tions, it did not fly badly.
T h i s s a m e Ansani engine also powered A. N. Tupolev's first aircraft,
the ANT-1.
V. P. Nevdachin built his light plane "Burevestnik" with a Harley
motorcycle engine. It c a r r i e d out s e v e r a l flights o v e r the Moscow a e r o -
drome, piloted by A. I. Zhukov.
The Soviet d e s i g n e r s gained m o r e confidence when Osoaviakhim o r d e r e d
s e v e r a l engines f r o m abroad: Blackburn, Bristol-Cherub, and C i r r h u s of
18 hp, 30 hp, and 60 hp, respectively. However, the work done at that t i m e
was still unsystematic.
Low-powered a i r c r a f t w e r e built mostly in a m a t e u r c i r c l e s , by m e m b e r s
of Osoaviakhim groups a t plants and schools, without appropriate equipment
and instruments. Sometimes they had t o u s e d i s c a r d e d a i r c r a f t m a t e r i a l s
and p a r t s of old m-ilitary a i r c r a f t . The lack of m e a n s to work according t o
r a t h e r rudimentary blueprints made it n e c e s s a r y t o make changes even
while the a i r c r a f t w e r e being built.
Nevertheless, since 1925 the Soviet Union has obtained completely new
designs. Second t o the light planes built by P i s a r e n k o , Tupolev, and Nevda-
chin, the most successful light plane, f r o m the point of view of flight
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and design, was the single-seater RAF-1 with a Blackburn
engine, built by a student of the Military A i r F o r c e Academy, A. N. Rafael-
yants. It was a s good a s the famous British light plane D e Havilland DH-53.
It c a r r i e d out s e v e r a l successful flights.
In 1926 s e v e r a l clubs in different towns simultaneously built light s p o r t s
planes. The f i r s t among them made a light, two-seater biplane AIR-1 with
a C i r r h u s engine. T h i s plane, like the subsequent AIR planes, was built a t
the Military A i r F o r c e Academy according t o the design by A. S. Yakovlev
(then a n engine specialist of the flight detail of the academy). When it was
established that the plane had good flight c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , it was sent in
June 1927 on a roundtrip flight f r o m Moscow t o Sevastopol, which was
c a r r i e d out successfully by Yu. I. Piontkovskii. While en route he set two
world r e c o r d s f o r s p o r t s planes. After this flight low-powered aviation
aroused g e n e r a l interest and attention.
Also in 1927 V. P. Nevdachin completed the "Burevestnik" S-4, powered
by a Blackburn engine. T h e Burevestnik had outstanding flight c h a r a c t e r i s -
t i c s , and on one t e s t flight A. I. Zhukov broke the world altitude r e c o r d when
he reached 5000m.

121
 T h e s u c c e s s e s achieved by the AIR planes and by the Burevestnik gave
a f u r t h e r impetus t o the development of low -powered aviation. Osoaviakhim
provided the n e c e s s a r y funds. The design and operational c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
of a i r c r a f t improved. At the Berlin aviation exhibition the R u s s i a n light
planes "Burevestnik," designed by Nevdachin, and " T h r e e F r i e n d s " designed
by Sutugin, Gorelov and Semenov received commendation.
Between 1 9 2 7 and 1 9 2 9 s e v e r a l other light airplanes w e r e built in Moscow,
Leningrad, Kiev, Kharkov and other towns.
At that t i m e the t w o - s e a t e r monoplane AIR-3 was also designed. T h e
n e c e s s a r y money was collected by pioneers, and the plane was built at the
Aviarabotnik plant. It was called Pionerskaya pravda. On 6 September 1 9 2 9
this plane c a r r i e d out a nonstop flight f r o m Mineralnye vody t o Moscow.
The distance of 1750km was covered at an a v e r a g e speed of 1 7 0 kph. With
this flight students of the academy, the s p o r t s f l y e r s Filin and Koval'kov,
established two world r e c o r d s - length of nonstop flight and a v e r a g e speed
o v e r a distance of 1750 km.
T h e y e a r 1929 was memorable, because another t h r e e light airplanes
a l s o made t h e i r appearance.
V. B. Sharov, an engineer, built alight amphibious a i r c r a f t , Sh-2, powered
by a Walter engine. T h e Sh-2 f l e w f r o m Leningrad t o Moscow, taking off
f r o m the water and landing on an airfield, T h i s excellent model was after-
w a r d s built in l a r g e numbers and was extensively used in various branches
of the economy.
That s a m e s u m m e r a new single-seater light plane, the G-1, with a
Blackburn engine, designed by the famous glider pilot V. K. Gribovskii, was
tested. The plane had excellent characteristics.
T h e young Soviet d e s i g n e r s proved that they w e r e able t o build modern
s p o r t s planes, At f i r s t , however, the development of low-powered a i r c r a f t
was impeded by the lack of light Soviet-made engines. In view of that
Osoaviakhim o r d e r e d f r o m abroad a s m a l l number of 6 0 hp and 80 hp Walter
engines, with which s e v e r a l new designs w e r e worked out. Among t h e m
w e r e t h r e e planes, type AIR-4, with a 60-hp Walter engine. T h i s was a
greatly improved modification of the AIR-3.
In October 1929 Osoaviakhim organized a roundtrip flight on an AIR-4
over a distance of 3650 k m on the route Moscow-Kiev-Odessa-Sevastopol-
Moscow. T h e pilot was again Piontkovskii.
The r e s u l t s of the first long-distance flights clearly showed the achieve-
ments of Soviet s p o r t s flying. Nevertheless t h e r e was a proposal to import
s e v e r a l light planes of different types and t o copy them. T h i s proposal was
unjustified, because s e v e r a l Soviet light planes w e r e in design with flight
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a s good a s foreign planes.
The r a t e of technical p r o g r e s s in light s p o r t s planes was about the s a m e
in the Soviet Union a s in other countries. As in the West, the Russians,
too, had t o p a s s through stages of gradual increase of engine power f r o m
1 0 hp t o 6 0 hp. The fairly g r e a t initial enthusiasm f o r low power was soon
abandoned. Designers changed t h e i r views and c o r r e c t l y s t a r t e d building
planes with engines of 6 0 hp, 80 hp, and even 100 hp.
In the late twenties and e a r l y thirties the Soviet Union was a l r e a d y
committed to m a s s production of low-powered a i r c r a f t . T h e i r widespread
introduction was stimulated by the construction of the excellent Soviet a i r -
c r a f t M-11 engine of 100 hp, designed by A. D. Shvetsov. In 1 9 2 7 it was fitted

5768 122
into the two-seater, t r a i n e r biplane U-2, designed by N. N. Polikarpov. T h e
U-2 was tested by M. M. Gromov.
T h e plane built on the occasion of t h e tenth a n n i v e r s a r y of the October
revolution was a beautiful p r e s e n t f o r Soviet aviation, which it s e r v e d for
m o r e than thirty y e a r s . The plane was of simple design; the f r a m e was
made of pine laths, b r a c e d by wire and covered with canvas. The upper and
lower outer wing panels w e r e alike in shape and size, facilitating production.
Unusual a t that t i m e was the l a r g e empennage, resulting f r o m the s e r i o u s
study the designer had made on the problem of spin.
T h e flight c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the U - 2 w e r e extremely valuable in a training
plane. It allowed for even g r a v e piloting e r r o r s . By itself the plane did not
go into spin; and when spin was deliberately induced, the plane r e c o v e r e d
automatically when the stick was released. With the engine switched
off the plane had a r a t e of descent of 1-2 m / s e c , Le., much l e s s than the
speed of a parachutist. When the angle of attack was too g r e a t and the U-2
lost speed, the nose was automatically lowered and the plane gained speed
again. Altogether, the U-2 was an easily controlled and safe plane with
g r e a t lifting capacity, e a s y f o r take-off and landing, and with a low landing
speed. It maintained these qualities in all its v e r s i o n s and modifications.
Its equipment changed and its design was updated, but its shape and dimen-
sions remained on the whole unchanged. T h e r e w e r e no m a j o r changes in i t s
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s either. T h e weight was and remained about 1ton (except the
a r m e d version), maximum speed was about 150 kph, landing speed 70 kph,
take-off and landing r u n about 100 m.
The U - 2 was designed for the p r i m a r y t r a i n i n g of pilots. Soon, however, it
was also used a s aliaison aircraft, a s transport o r ambulance a i r c r a f t , in agri-
culture, f o r a e r i a l photography, f o r patrolling f o r e s t s , and s o forth. That
the plane could be used f o r s o many different t a s k s was due t o its g r e a t lifting
capacity and the all-purpose design. During the w a r the light night-bomber
U-2VS was particularly used. It was a r m e d with a machine gun and could
c a r r y 300 kg of bombs. Equipped with a muffler, the plane flew noiselessly
o v e r the enemy positions and efficiently destroyed men, fuel and ammunition
dumps, and vehicles. The U - 2 ensured continuous liaison with p a r t i s a n s o r
it was used f o r s h o r t - r a n g e reconnaissance. It s e r v e d a s night a r t i l l e r y
spotter (version U-SNAK), a s a propaganda plane with a powerful loudspeaker
(version U-2GN - "Voice f r o m Heaven"), a s a staff o r liaison a i r c r a f t (five-
s e a t e r U-ZShS).
After N. N. P o l i k a r p o v ' s death in 1944 the U - 2 was renamed Po-2 and was
produced a s such. After the w a r a modernized agricultural version, the
P o - ~ A , w a s produced and the t h r e e - s e a t e r limousine Po-2L. In all,
approximately 33,000 planes in different modifications w e r e produced. As
t o length of production run and universal applicability, the U - 2 had no equal
in world aviation.
In the e a r l y t h i r t i e s a s m a l l group of young public servants, who w e r e
aviation enthusiasts, worked in the Menzhinskii plant on the design of new
s p o r t s and light planes; the funds n e c e s s a r y f o r construction had been
r e l e a s e d by Osoaviakhim. In 1932 the t h r e e - s e a t e r limousine AIR-6 with
a s e r i e s - p r o d u c e d M-11 engine was built here. After testing the plane was
put into s e r i e s production and found widespread application in t h e economy.
At that t i m e Osoaviakhim organized a competition f o r the design of a light
plane. First p r i z e was awarded f o r a n electron (magnesium-based alloy)

123
 plane and second p r i z e f o r a stainless steel plane, Le., both m a t e r i a l s that
w e r e in v e r y s h o r t supply a t that time, What the country really needed was
a plane made of amply available and cheap material, Le., wood, s i m p l e t o
fly and reliable.
T h e development of light a i r c r a f t was in the beginning publicized effective-
ly by P r a v d a . In August 1934 together with Osoaviakhim the newspaper
organized the first g r e a t s p o r t s flights of a g r o u p o f AIR-6 planes o n t h e route
Moscow-Irkutsk-Moscow. T h e flight was successful and was d e s c r i b e d by
P r a v d a a s the beginning of m a s s participation in light aviation whose develop-
ment has a good chance in the USSR.
In the leading a r t i c l e on 25 August 1934 under the title "Sovetskii vozdu-
shnyi ford" (A Soviet Flying F o r d ) P r a v d a wrote:
" T h e r e is g e n e r a l interest in light a i r c r a f t . T h i s cannot be otherwise,
f o r the need of t h e m is obvious t o everybody. A light a i r c r a f t is needed for
regional and d i s t r i c t organizations t o provide quick and reliable connection
with any point in a region or district. Economic authorities need light planes
f o r operative management of subordinate enterpri-ses. T h e light plane is
viewed with envy by o u r young m e m b e r s of aeroclubs who need planes f o r
training, publicity and t o u r i s t flights. Light planes a r e needed but not
provided f o r local lines of our civil aviation.. . Low-powered a i r c r a f t make
it possible to a t t r a c t broad s t r a t a of the population t o aviation. T h e cultural
value of m a s s flights in light planes is immeasurable. It also has a g r e a t
role t o play in strengthening national defense. T o s a t u r a t e the country with
light planes, such i s the urgent task.. .
"The ball is now with the industry which must provide f o r s e r i a l produc-
.
tion of light planes. . . I t
Development of a l l kinds of s p o r t s flying in the country was boosted in the
t h i r t i e s by the network of aeroclubs which had been built up. H e r e future
pilots, parachutists, glider pilots and technicians of the a i r f o r c e w e r e
trained and selected.
To unite all the work connected with s p o r t s flying in Moscow at the Tushino
airport, the Kosarev Central Aeroclub was founded in March 1935. The
aeroclub initiated parachute and glider s p o r t s competitions, began flights on
low-powered a i r c r a f t and inspired aviation records. The C e n t r a l Aeroclub
was also the focal point f o r a l l designers. T h e aeroclub r e g i s t e r e d r e c o r d s
of such pilots a s V. P. Chkalov, M. M. Gromov, V. K. Kokkinaki and many
others.
In 1935 P r a v d a and Osoaviakhim organized an All-Union flight of training
and s p o r t s planes on the c i r c u l a r route Moscow- Gorkii- Kazan- Sarapul-
Perm-Sverdlovsk-Orenburg-Kuibyshev- Saratov-Stalingrad- Lugansk-
Stalino-Dnepropetrovsk-Kiev-Bezhitsa-Moscow. In addition t o the twenty
s e r i e s - p r o d u c e d U - 2 and AIR-6 planes, other training and s p o r t s planes
participated in the flight. They w e r e newly designed and r e p r e s e n t e d a e r o -
clubs, the s p o r t s aviation of the Red Army, the civil aviation fleet, the Gorki
propaganda squadron, and the association "Dinamo. '' First place in the flight
went t o Piontkovskii who had been flying an AIR-10.
The C e n t r a l Committee of the P a r t y gave much attention t o the problem of
training personnel f o r flying. On 12 July 1935 a demonstration of the
achievements of the m e m b e r s of the C e n t r a l Aeroclub was organized in
Tushino for P a r t y leaders. T h i s day marked the turning point in the fate of
Soviet s p o r t s flying. Soon a f t e r the display a t which a n AIR-10 was the victor

124

I I
I 1I
I

among a l l the participating s p o r t s planes, this a i r c r a f t under the designation

UT-2 ( t r a i n e r , two-seater) underwent government t e s t s and was accepted for
the a i r f o r c e a s a p r i m a r y t r a i n e r a i r c r a f t f o r flying schools and aeroclubs.
F o r ten y e a r s , beginning in 1936, the UT-2 monoplane with dual control was
the main p r i m a r y t r a i n e r a i r c r a f t . Many thousands of pilots, among t h e m
the heroic pilots of World War 11, received t h e i r first training on it.
In 1936 a single-seater s p o r t s training plane, the AIR-14, was produced.
It was later designated UT-1 ( t r a i n e r , single-seater). T h i s monoplane
powered by a n M-11 engine was intended f o r advanced flight training, for
training pilots in aeroclubs, and f o r military a i r f o r c e schools. T h e plane
passed its t e s t s successfully and was put into s e r i a l production.
Thanks t o the support by the C e n t r a l Committee of the P a r t y and the
Soviet government g r e a t s t r i d e s had been made in low-powered aviation in
the Soviet Union by 1937. An eloquent testimony of t h i s fact was the display
of new low-powered s p o r t s planes held a t the Tushino a e r o d r o m e on 6 May
1937. In the fly-past planes UT-1, UT-2, G-22, G-23 and o t h e r s took part.
G r e a t interest was aroused by the G-23 which was powered by a n automobile
engine of the Gorki Automobile Works. T h e designer and pilot V. K. Gribov-
s k i i himself flew the plane.
Soon a i r r a c e s w e r e organized on the route Moscow-Sevastopol- Moscow,
a distance of 2815 km. T h e r a c e s w e r e a stringent test of the s t a t e of Soviet
low-powered aviation. T h e best r e s u l t s achieved were: in s i n g l e - s e a t e r s by
the pilots Il'in and Dymov in UT-1 planes, in t w o - s e a € e r s by pilot Stefanov-
s k i i and navigator Nikitin in a UT-2, and by pilot Malakhov and mechanic
Volokitin in a G-20.
T h e r e s u l t s of the flight strengthened the reputation of low-powered a i r -
craft, and the l a r g e - s c a l e production of U-2, UT-1 and UT-2 planes gave
hundreds of thousands of young people the chance to join the military a i r
f o r c e via s p o r t s flying. T h e r e was a huge influx into flying and technical
aviation schools.
F u r t h e r development of training and s p o r t s flying in the country was
effected by basing training a i r c r a f t on combat aircraft. The UT-2 was in
1946 replaced by the t w o - s e a t e r training and s p o r t s plane Yak-18. T h i s
plane (first with an M-11 engine, then with an AI-14) had retractable landing
g e a r , an enclosed cockpit, controllable-pitch propeller and a f a i r amount of
instrumentation, including a two-way radio.
Finally, in 1960, jet-powered training planes, such a s the t w o - s e a t e r
Yak-30 and the single-seater Yak-32, with a RU-19 engine, designed by
S. K. Tumanskii, w e r e produced. With t h e s e planes the s p o r t s pilots
G. Korchuganova, R. Shikhina, V. Smirnov and V. Mukhin established world
r e c o r d s f o r the corresponding c l a s s of s p o r t s planes.
In August 1966 in Moscow a t the International Aerobatics Competition the
s p o r t s pilots G. Korchuganova and V. Martem'yanov in Yak-18PM planes won
the title of world champions, and the Yak-18PM was named the best
s p o r t s plane.
Low-powered aviation was f i r m l y established. It had become a public
s p o r t of national dimensions.

I25
 Type of
aircraft
Year of
production
Engines
(type, number, power or thrust)
Take-off
weight, kg
Fuel tank
capacity, kg
1 1 Crew Maximum
speed, kph
1 1 Ran,ne, Altogether
produced

M-2, l2Ohp 840 1 737

M-11, lOOhp 983 90 2 I 146 430 33000

M-11, lOOhp 937 87

2 1
139 ; 450 700
I
M-11, lOOhp 856 56 2 210 1 750 7243
I I

UT-1 1936 M-IIE, 150hp 5 90 68.5 1 1 257 I 670 1241

I

Yak-I1 1946 Ash-21, 570 hp 2418 270 2 ~ 456 1290 3859

I
1060 112 2 245 1095 6760
Yak-18 1946 M-11FR, l 6 0 h p ,
I
Yak-18A 1957 AI-l4R, 260hp 1316 ' 95 2 ' 254 710 Yak -18 of all
(

, modifications

Yak-30 1960 RU-19, 900kg 2250 2 660 965 ~ 6

(record 767) I
Yak - 18PM 1965 AI-l4RF, 300hp 1110 1 320 1 400
I
Trainer aircraft U-1 (Avro 540K), 1922.

127
 l-4 - -

e
Trainer aircraft Po-% 1927.

128
Amphibian trainer aircraft Sh-2, 1930.

129
Trainer aircraft UT-2, 1935.

130
I. .

0 7 2 3 4 5 1 1 1

Trainer and sports aircraft UT-1, 1936.

131
Trainer aircraft Yak-11, 1946.

132
I

Trainer and spons aircraft Yak-18, 1946.

133
 .- . .

n ‘c,

Trainer aircraft Yak-18A, 1957.

I34
 . .

Trainer jet aircraft Yak-30, 1960.

I35
Sports and aerobatics aircraft Yak-I8PM, 1965.

136
9. THE CIVIL AIR FLEET

During the fifty years of Soviet power a great civil air fleet was created. Today air transport plays an
important part in the economic life of the Soviet Union.
Recently t h e aircraft industry began large-scale production of jet passenger aircraft for different purposes,
including transcontinental liners connecting Moscow with foreign countries. Modern planes for internal short
and long air routes are also being produced.
Because of the length of airways and the volume of passenger ana freight transport the Soviet company
Aeroflot is definitely first among air lines.

Military and s p o r t s aviation w e r e the f i r s t to attain high speeds and

altitudes, but the civil a i r fleet has been equally successful.
Regarding a i r transport, prerevolutionary R u s s i a did not leave any
heritage at all. Not until Soviet power was established did a civil a i r fleet
come into being, based on the greatly developed production of a i r c r a f t and
engines. This civil a i r fleet has an important place among means o f t r a n s -
port and affects the economic life of the USSR considerably.
Soviet civil aviation is relatively young. The first occasional a i r route
f r o m Moscow t o Nizhni Novgorod, 420 km, was inaugurated in 1923. At that
t i m e the regular line Moscow-Konigsberg was opened, provided with four-
s e a t e r Fokker F - 3 planes.
Soviet civil aviation expanded extensively and o v e r c a m e many obstacles.
As late a s the middle thirties there were a few obsolete s m a l l Soviet-
made K-5 and ANT-9 p a s s e n g e r planes and P-5 m a i l planes flying domesti-
cally. T h e s e planes w e r e e x t r e m e l y inferior t o the world standard of
aviation technology. The industry, subordinated t o the People's C o m m i s s a r i a t
of Heavy Industry, produced practically no civilian a i r c r a f t . Aeroflot (the
f o r m e r Main Administration of Civil Aviation (GUGVF)) had only s m a l l plants
and r e s e a r c h institutes and t h e s e could not provide a radical solution t o the
problems of a i r transport.
In 1930 A. I. Putilov designed a passenger plane, the Stall-2; but by 1934
o r 19.35 it was a l r e a d y obsolete, though it was made of s t a i n l e s s steel, a t that
t i m e the s c a r c e s t m a t e r i a l in the Soviet Union. It was this alone that
prevented f u r t h e r production or development of the plane. Production of
engines f o r p a s s e n g e r planes was extremely backward.
In the mid-thirties the license f o r the production of the famous 2 4 - s e a t e r
p a s s e n g e r plane Douglas DC-3 was bought in the United States, and was then
put into s e r i a l production in a Soviet a i r c r a f t factory. T h i s had a certain
effect on the development of civil aviation in the USSR. The plane received
the designation L i - 2 a f t e r B. P. Lisunov, the chief engineer who organized
its s e r i a l production.
At that t i m e the aviation public and the p r e s s criticized Aeroflot because
civilian a i r transport was s o backward. A e r o d r o m e s w e r e a l s o in a difficult

137
 position. Even the Moscow airport, the c e n t r a l air t e r m i n a l of t h e Soviet
Union, was in an e x t r e m e l y bad state. Servicing of aircraft, workshops,
internal t r a n s p o r t of freight and luggage on the airport, the s i z e of the
a i r p o r t - all this was deplorably inferior t o other European a i r p o r t s .
It would s e e m surprising, but the perennial problem of p a s s e n g e r planes
was solved at the peak of the war. Toward the end of 1943, when Soviet
aviation had complete superiority, when the a i r c r a f t industry worked at
full capacity and supplied the front with all the combat a i r c r a f t required, it
was decided t o s t a r t production of t r a n s p o r t and p a s s e n g e r planes. This, of
course, had to be done without jeopardizing combat aviation. An a i r c r a f t
was r e q u i r e d which would be able to fly faster and f u r t h e r than t h e Li-2, a t
that t i m e the basic p a s s e n g e r plane.
In J a n u a r y 1944 the problem was discussed of a passenger e x p r e s s
s e r v i c e able to transport ten t o twelve p a s s e n g e r s nonstop over a distance
of 4000 k m or 5000 km. Also considered was the possibility of adapting
s o m e existing bomber f o r this purpose, e.g., the E r - 2 bomber designed by
V. G. Ermolaev, which w a s powered by diesel engines. However, doubts
w e r e raised whether it would be possible without radically changing the
fuselage t o place twelve p a s s e n g e r s in the plane and e n s u r e a minimum of
comfort r e q u i r e d for flights lasting 10 or 15 hours.
At that t i m e Ilyushin was working on a twin-engined transport and
p a s s e n g e r plane 11-12 whose prototype with diesel engines was being built.
In this context, it seemed inopportune to change the E r - 2 into a passenger
plane.
Soon the 11-12 was mass-produced but not with diesel engines. Instead
it was powered by two air-cooled Ash-82 engines. In 1947 the 11-12 planes,
powered by two piston engines, w e r e in abundance on the civil a i r w a y s of
the USSR. They w e r e l a t e r modified and designated 11-14, which was the
c l a s s i c a l monoplane with two air-cooled wing-mounted engines. F o r t h e i r
t i m e t h e s e planes w e r e excellent, economical and safe.
Immediately a f t e r the 11-12 and 11-14, Ilyushin's design office began work
on a l a r g e p a s s e n g e r plane, the 11-18, powered by four piston engines.
However, this first v e r s i o n of the 11-18 was not mass-produced. It was
thought that such l a r g e planes would not be needed.
It soon became apparent that Soviet civil aviation was beginning to lag serious-
ly behind the West, where jet-powered multiseat passenger planes appeared.
The first commercially operated p a s s e n g e r j e t a i r c r a f t in foreign airlines
was the British four-engined, sixty-seat Comet produced by De Havilland.
The Comet went into operation in the e a r l y fifties. After t h r e e c r a s h e s
within its first year, the plane had t o have its reliability fought f o r by the
company. After the shortcomings had been remedied, the Comet was again
put into production, and now f o r m o r e than fifteen y e a r s it has been flying
on many airways all o v e r the globe.
The problem of building a p a s s e n g e r jet plane was solved by adapting the
s e r i e s - p r o d u c e d military a i r c r a f t Tu-16 designed by Tupolev and powered
by two AM-3 engines of 8 t o n s thrust each designed by Mikulin; this
plane had been thoroughly tested in military practice. T h e adaptation
concerned the fuselage, o r r a t h e r a new fuselage was produced, originally
f o r fifty p a s s e n g e r s ensuring the n e c e s s a r y comfort.
R e g a r d l e s s of the difficulties of changing over f r o m bomber t o passenger
plane, the Tu-104 was successful, especially economically and in take-off

138
and landing characteristics. Its favorable qualities became even m o r e
apparent a f t e r the number of p a s s e n g e r s had been raised t o one hundred.
For s e v e r a l y e a r s , beginning in 1956, the Tu-104 w a s the basic a i r c r a f t
type on trunk lines of the civil aviation. Its cruising speed exceeds 800 kph,
i t s range is 3100km.
The Tu-104 was a g r e a t achievement of Soviet a i r c r a f t construction, both
f o r prestige and as a pioneering venture, blazing the t r a i l for widespread
use of jet passenger planes on the m a j o r airways of the country.
The problem of supplying civil aviation with modern p a s s e n g e r planes was
d i s u c s s e d by the C e n t r a l Committee of the P a r t y . T h e d e s i g n e r s Tupolev,
Ilyushin, Antonov, and the leading executives of the a i r c r a f t industry w e r e
instructed t o explore the possibilities of building p a s s e n g e r planes c o r r e -
sponding t o contemporary r e q u i r e m e n t s and the international standing of
the Soviet Union.
In 1954 Tupolev, Ilyushin, and Antonov received concrete a s s i g n m e n t s
t o build new passenger planes which could compete with Western models.
A s h o r t t i m e l a t e r 11-18, An-10, and An-24 planes appeared on t e s t a i r -
fields, as did the l a r g e s t a i r l i n e r in the world, the Tu-,114. A l l t h e s e planes
underwent comprehensive t e s t s , w e r e then put into s e r i a l production and
went into operation on the a i r w a y s of civil aviation. A c h a r a c t e r i s t i c
peculiarity of a l l the Soviet p a s s e n g e r planes, except the Tu-104, which had
turbojet engines, was that they w e r e turboprop planes which a r e m o r e
economical as to fuel consumption.
Tupolev's second j e t liner, the Tu-114, was designed for one hundred
seventy p a s s e n g e r s . I t s range was g r e a t e r than that of any other p a s s e n g e r
plane. T h e plane, powered by four turboprop engines, h a s a speed of about
900 kph. T h e Tu-114 takes 11 or 12 h o u r s flying t i m e f r o m Moscow t o
New York.
In recent y e a r s Antonov's planes have occupied a n important place in the
civil a i r fleet. F r o m among h i s planes the one hundred-seat t r a n s p o r t and
p a s s e n g e r plane An-10 should be mentioned. With its four turboprop engines
of 4000hp each, it has a cruising speed of 630 kph. Its maximum range is
4000 km. Immediately after this followed the An-24, a fifty-seat p a s s e n g e r
plane with two turboprop engines of 2500 hp each, and then came the An-22,
which was successfully shown at the P a r i s a i r salon in 1965. With its four
turboprop engines of 15,000hp each, it was the l a r g e s t a i r c r a f t in the world
at that time.
In the f o r t i e s Antonov designed a multipurpose light single-engine biplane,
the An-2, which found recognition and widespread u s e both in t h e USSR and
abroad. The An-2 with a n Ash-62M piston engine of lOOOhp h a s been used
f o r many y e a r s in the most diverse branches of the economy. It is a depend-
able and indispensable a i r c r a f t , both in agriculture and on local p a s s e n g e r
lines. T h e An-2. together with Polikarpov's excellent Po-2 is one of the
most long-lived Soviet a i r c r a f t . Such planes a r e ageless.
In the late fifties civil aviation operated t h r e e main p a s s e n g e r l i n e r s , the
Tu-104, An-10, 11-18, and the transcontinental Tu-114.
Of the first t h r e e planes the 11-18 was the most economical. It had the
longest range, the best take-off and landing c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and was least
susceptible t o weather conditions, because it was specially planned as a
p a s s e n g e r plane with all the features n e c e s s a r y f o r a p a s s e n g e r plane. It
became the main p a s s e n g e r plane under the Ministry of Civil Aviation.
T h e 11-18V had four turboprop AI-20 engines of 4000hp each. T h e 11-18
flies a t 8000 m with a cruising speed of 650 kph. I t s r a n g e is 5000 km. It

139
 h a s v e r y good take-off and landing characteristics. The take-off run,
depending on the load, is 750 m to 900 m, the landing run is only 550 m.
T o t h i s day the 11-18 is series-produced, both f o r domestic u s e and for
export. However, the I l l - s e a t 11-18 is a main-line plane, and the country
feels a shortage of planes for local lines, for which An-24 and Tu-124 planes
w e r e ordered. T h e s e planes a r e in s e r i a l production, and since the e a r l y
sixties they have been supplied t o Aeroflot.
T h e Tu-124 with two 5-ton D-20P engines is in overall shape and a e r o -
dynamic configuration s i m i l a r t o the Tu-104, only scaled down. It was
radically modified and provided with two D-30 jet engines of 6800 kg thrust
each, mounted outside the t a i l part of the fuselage. The number of s e a t s in
the p a s s e n g e r compartment was i n c r e a s e d to seventy-two. Thus a n e w pas-
s e n g e r plane appeared, the Tu-134, whichwas immediately s e r i e s - p r o d u c e d .
It is intended f o r passenger flights o v e r medium distances, i.e., 1500km
t o 2000km. Its cruising speed is 870 kph. Soon after the a e r i a l display in
Domodedovo, t h e s e a i r c r a f t s t a r t e d on regular passenger service.
Finally, in 1967, the 186-seat gigantic, new transcontinental 11-62
p a s s e n g e r planes went into service. They a r e powered by four NK-8 jet
engines of 10.5 tons t h r u s t each. T h i s plane was a worthy s u c c e s s o r t o the
turboprop v e t e r a n Tu- 114 which had been flying domestically and internation-
ally f o r Aeroflot.
The 11-62 was the object of g e n e r a l attention at the Aviation Salons in
P a r i s in 1965 and 1967, where it was exhibited together with other Soviet
a i r c r a f t . N o l e s s successful was another exhibit, a model of the supersonic
p a s s e n g e r liner Tu-144 shown in the Soviet space pavilion.
In 1 9 6 7 the Yak-40 underwent flight t e s t s . T h i s was a three-engined jet
for local flights, especially designed for operating f r o m unpaved s m a l l airfields.
In the USSR a s in other countries most p a s s e n g e r s on local lines fly in obsolete
slow piston-engined planes which should have been replaced long ago.
Many a i r c r a f t m a n u f a c t u r e r s inthe world a r e examining the problem of
designing a high-speed jet a i r c r a f t suitable for operating fromunpaved s m a l l
airfields. How urgent the need for such an a i r c r a f t has become is illustrated
by a curious fact. In the mid-sixties a special competition was held in the
United States for the best a i r c r a f t of local airlines. The conditions w e r e the
following: the a i r c r a f t must be suitable f o r runways not m o r e than 800m
long, c a r r y fourteen t o thirty p a s s e n g e r s , be economical, have a cruising
speed of 370 kph and a range of 1100km.
T h e competition was held because in the United States local lines operate
such obsolete planes a s the Douglas, Convair-240, Martin-202 and s o forth.
It was intended by 1970 t o replace these old, worn out, piston-engined planes
by the winning plane of the competition. However, things w e r e not that easy,
Out of the nine designs submitted in the competition, not one was approved.
Regarding the number of passengers, payload and range, the Yak-40
belongs t o the s a m e c l a s s a s the 11-12, 11-14, and Li-2, but its cruising
speed (550-600 kph) is twice a s great a s the cruising speed of its p r e d e c e s -
sors, and the p a s s e n g e r compartment of the Yak-40 provides a l l the
r e q u i r e m e n t s of modern comfort. T h e Yak-40 replaces the f o r m e r planes
on s h o r t a i r routes between 600 km and 1500 km long.
The power plant of the Yak-40 consists of t h r e e AI-25 jet engines located
in the r e a r section of the a i r c r a f t . Two engines a r e located on the sides,
the third one i s inside the fuselage, In the t a i l of the a i r c r a f t t h e r e is a
small auxiliary gas turbine runner f o r starting up the main engines.

140
 The AI-25 was designed by the office headed by the H e r o of Socialist
Labor A. G . Ivchenko. It is a light and economical turbofan engine.
Thus Aeroflot received in 1967 a whole family of new planes: the 24-seat
Yak-40 for short runs, the 72-seat Tu-134 f o r medium lines and the 182-
s e a t intercontinental 11-62. The take-off weights of t h e s e planes a r e 13,
44, and 150tons, respectively.
T h e l a r g e s t a i r c r a f t in the world, the giant An-22, is a l r e a d y well known
in the Soviet Union and abroad. The An-22 was twice exhibited at the P a r i s
A i r Salon and aroused the visitors' attention by its e x t r a o r d i n a r y size. The
c a r g o space of the plane is s o l a r g e that it can easily accommodate buses.
The An-22 is powered by four turboprop engines of 15,000hp each. It has
an enormous lifting capacity, a s attested t o by the r e c o r d s established on
26 October 1967. On that day the crew, headed by the distinguished t e s t -
pilot I. Davydov, attained an altitude of 7800m with m o r e than lOOtons
payload on board. In one flight fifteen world r e c o r d s w e r e established f o r
lifting t o such an altitude a load of 35, 40, 45, 50, 55, 60, 65, 70, 75, 80, 85,
90, 95, and 100 tons. Further, the previous r e c o r d s f o r lifting capacity
w e r e a l s o achieved by an An-22 plane, in October 1966.
Thanks t o the excellent technical equipment and the high skill of the flying
personnel, Aeroflot became the l a r g e s t airline in the world. T h e total
length of the airways of Soviet civil aviation is about 500,000km. A i r t r a n s -
port s e r v e s m o r e than 3000 towns and l a r g e settlements in the USSR. The
lines Moscow -Y uzhno- Sakhalinsk, Leningrad- Yuzhno- Sakhalinsk, P e t r o -
pavlovsk-Kamchatskii-Simferopol a r e the longest continental a i r routes in
the world. On s o m e days Soviet a i r l i n e r s t r a n s p o r t 150,000 to 200,000 pas-
sengers. In 1 9 6 7 m o r e than 55 million p a s s e n g e r s w e r e transported.
Aeroflot provides one-third of a l l the p a s s e n g e r transport in the world.
Soviet a i r c r a f t fly in fifty foreign countries. T h e foreign routes add up t o
approximately 100,000 km. Aeroflot's leading a i r liner, the Tu-114, flies
on p a s s e n g e r r u n s f r o m Moscow-Havana and Moscow-New Delhi. More
than thirty foreign countries placed o r d e r s f o r Soviet a i r c r a f t Tu-104, 11-18,
and 11-14.
T h e Soviet Five-Year P l a n of Economic Development f o r the y e a r s 1966-
1 9 7 0 envisaged a considerable development of civil aviation. The guidelines
approved by the 23rd Congress of the P a r t y state: "To i n c r e a s e by about
1 . 8 t i m e s the a i r transport of p a s s e n g e r s (by planes and helicopters). To
build thirty-five to forty main-line a i r p o r t s and two hundred a i r p o r t s f o r
local lines. T o provide main-line a i r p o r t s of national importance with
automatic o r semiautomatic approach control and with modern radio
equipment f o r traffic contro1."*
In the p r e s e n t Five-Year P l a n the design offices will continue work o n
new and improved aircraft. It is in the immediate future that Soviet p a s s e n -
g e r aircraft, like military aircraft, w i l l fly at supersonic speeds. Then a
flight f r o m the USSR t o America a c r o s s the ocean or t o India over high
mountains w i l l take no m o r e than 3 o r 4 hours.
The Soviet a i r c r a f t industry, basing itself on new achievements of science
and technology, reliably e n s u r e s increasing power t o the military a i r f o r c e
and continuous improvement of the civil a i r fleet.

* Materialy XXIII s"ezda KPSS (Documents of the 23rd Congress of t h e CPSU), p. 254. - Moskva, Politizdat.
1966.

141
 Maximum payload Range, km
Take-off Cruising
Type of Year of Engines
weight, Crew speed,
aircraft production (type, number, power or thrust) number of with maxi- maximum
kg passengers kg kph mum payload (with load)

AK-1 1924 Salmson, 170 hp 1670 3 225 1 130 450 -

K-5 1929 M-17, 500hp 4000 6 540 2 172 1020 -
1 -
ANT-9 1929
Titan, 3 X 230 hp
M-17, 2X 500hp
5044
6200
810 ~ 2 170
222 830 I
Passenger aircraft AK-1, 1924.

143
 I n

Passenger aircraft K-5, 1929.

144
 o z I 6 a iom

Passenger aircraft ANT-9, 1929.

145
Propaganda aircraft "Maxim Gorki," 1934.

146
I

Passenger aircraft Li-2, 1938.

I47
 . . . .- . .

o 4 n -& is mm
~~ _____

Passenger aircraft 11-12, 1946.

148
 .'.!
.. .. . . ..,. .
I.:
. .. .

I -
4 ......
m

v
Passenger aircraft 11-14, 1950.

149

I
 . .
. .

Passenger aircraft Tu-104, 1955.

150
Passenger aircraft 11-18, 1957.

151
Passenger aircraft An-10, 1957.

152
 o s IO IS zo 25 m

assenger aircraft Tu-114, 1957.

I53
Passenger aircraft An-24, 1959.

154
Passenger aircraft Tu-12.4, 1960.

I55
Passenger aircraft Tu-134, 1964.

156

____ ._. .... ... -- .. .. ... I- I.., _.

I ... 11
..
I
I

Passenger aircraft Il-62, 1963.

157
 . . F .

. .
. . . '1'
. .

L io
.- m

passenger aircraft Yak-40. 1967.

158
10. THE SCHOOL OF SOVIET AIRCRAFT DESIGNERS

The Soviet school of aircraft design combines simplicity and boldness of engineering and design thinking
with high scientific quality and inventiveness.
Soviet aircraft designers react quickly to everyday requirements, yet they also take a long-range view.
Their characteristic features a r e rational designing with a view to the environmental requirements and a
sober view of the economic and material potential of the country.
The successes attained by the Soviet Union in rocket engineering and space exploration are closely related
to the development of aviation.
Aircraft and rocket designers, mutually profiting from their scientific and technical experience, work
together in strengthening the economic power and defense capability of the Soviet Union.

When the fiftieth anniversary of Soviet power was celebrated, t h e a i r c r a f t

industry of the USSR had achieved worldwide recognition. I t s scientific and
technical f o r c e s and production potential had withstood with honor the most
difficult of all tests during World War I1 and new trials and tribulations in
the postwar period.
However, almost the g r e a t e s t achievement of the Soviet Union in aviation
is the training of scientists, designers, engineers and skilled w o r k e r s in
a i r c r a f t and engine construction - t h e creation of the Soviet school of
a i r c r a f t construction.
T h e enormous advance by the Soviet a i r c r a f t industry within t h r e e or f o u r
decades, its s u c c e s s e s , w e r e achieved both by the design offices and by the
r e s e a r c h institutes TsAGI, TsIAM, VIAM, LII and others, which blazed t h e
trail in aviation science. The scientists, who continued the work of
N. E. Joukowski and S. A. Chaplygin, advanced Soviet aviation science and
helped develop a i r c r a f t construction in the Soviet Union, a r e rightly accorded
authority and r e s p e c t by the country.
A c h a r a c t e r i s t i c feature of the Soviet school of a i r c r a f t construction is its
f i r m theoretical foundation, bold-design thinking infused with a s p i r i t of
constant innovation, the development of ideas with a long-range view in mind
of scientific and technical p r o g r e s s of aviation and fields connected with it,
utilization of the achievements in creating new m a t e r i a l s and new techniques
revolutionizing production p r o c e s s e s . Concerning construction of m i l i t a r y
a i r c r a f t , Soviet designers take into account s t r a t e g i c f a c t o r s based on modern
military doctrine and the economic potential of the country.
How m a t u r e the Soviet school of a i r c r a f t construction is was demonstrated
during the war.
During the mid-thirties, when t h e a r m s r a c e and the aggravation of the
international situation indicated that w a r w a s inevitable, competition between
t h e d e s i g n e r s in the l a r g e countries, especially Germany, t h e USSR, Britain,
the United States, Italy and F r a n c e increased greatly.

159
 It was obvious that the coming w a r would be a w a r of engines, and victory
would b e on the side of those whose technology was on a higher level, where
scientific and technical thinking was best.
At the beginning of World W a r I1 aviation was assigned the r o l e of one of
the decisive a r m s . A strenuous competition between countries o c c u r r e d in
scientific institutes, design offices, laboratories, and proving grounds. To
be p r e p a r e d for war, to overtake the enemy in technical development, this
became the main a i m of every Soviet designer, no m a t t e r in which field of
a r m a m e n t he worked.
Since every country kept i t s a r m s production s e c r e t , it was difficult if
not impossible t o predict everything. Nevertheless, when the German a r m y
attacked the Soviet Union and the main f o r c e s of the Luftwaffe began operating,
it became c l e a r that Soviet a v i a t o r s had been thinking correctly.
A s mentioned before, a t the t i m e of the outbreak of w a r the Soviet Union
tested and put into s e r i a l production the fighters MiG-3, LaGG-3, and Yak-1,
the attack plane 11-2 and the bomber 11-4, light bombers Pe-2, and heavy
bombers Pe-8.
During the war some types of a i r c r a f t w e r e dropped a s unsuitable; others,
on the contrary, were introduced into the a i r force. For instance, produc-
tion of MiG-3 fighters was discontinued in October 1941, then the P e - 8
bomber went out of production, and in 1943 the 11-4 bomber. In 1944 new
Tu-2 bombers began reaching the front.
The main a i r c r a f t with which Soviet pilots fought throughout the war,
f r o m the v e r y beginning until final victory, w e r e the Yakovlevs and Lavoch-
kins (fighters) and Ilyushins and Petlyakovs (attack planes and bombers).
In the a e r i a l fighting we w e r e able to gain detailed knowledge about the
e n e m y ' s planes. Soviet designers knew well the strong and the weak points
of German aviation. They understood in which direction the creative minds
of t h e i r designers would work, and they endeavored to prevent the possibility
of German s u r p r i s e s . "A designer has to look forward." T h i s was the main
motto of Soviet designers during the war.
This knowledge of the enemy's armaments and the ability t o predict t h e i r
f u r t h e r development enabled the Soviet designers t o e n s u r e qualitative
superiority t o aviation, tanks, a r t i l l e r y .
Soviet designers always kept in mind that a designer must a l s o b e a
tactician, that he must know perfectly all the peculiarities of his armament
and must even be able t o suggest the most effective application of new
weapons in combat. A well-known a i r c r a f t or tank or gun may be improved
in such a way that it r e q u i r e s completely different t a c t i c s . During the
c o u r s e of the w a r , new weapons often change some tactical principle that
had been followed for y e a r s .
During the w a r the designers observed attentively how t h e i r work was
a s s e s s e d a t the front. The d e s i g n e r ' s i n t e r e s t in a machine was not
exhausted a s soon a s the prototype is was ready. His duty was t o observe his
creation f r o m the moment it took shape until it entered the battlefied, to
c o r r e c t quickly any defects and t o perfect the machine. The d e s i g n e r s a l s o
watched how the enemy reacted in combat t o t h e i r weapons. It was important
t o them t o discover quickly the weak points in t h e i r designs and t o remedy
them. T h i s was achieved by close cooperation between d e s i g n e r s and the
frontline. The g r e a t e s t danger f o r a designer is isolation f r o m life, f r o m
the frontline, when he thinks that he has attained his ideal and d i s r e g a r d s
the fact that the enemy c e a s e l e s s l y improves his a r m a m e n t s and a l s o t r i e s
t o f o r e s e e what he may expect f r o m our side.

160
 When designing a new a i r c r a f t , e v e r y designer c o n s i d e r s not only its
combat qualities and tactics but also i t s technical and economic aspects.
Great discretion is r e q u i r e d in selecting m a t e r i a l for machines. This
problem has t o be handled v e r y carefully because in wartime s o m e m a t e r i a l s
become e x t r e m e l y s c a r c e . Some production o r raw m a t e r i a l b a s e may be
put out of action by enemy bombing o r may simply r e m a i n in enemy-occupied
t e r r i t o r y . T h i s is what happened in the beginning of World W a r 11.
What unexpected difficulties may occur with m a t e r i a l is shown by the
example of the LaGG-3 fighter. Delta wood was chosen a s the main s t r u c -
t u r a l m a t e r i a l for t h i s aircraft. Compressed under high p r e s s u r e and
impregnated with phenolic r e s i n s , this wood was much s t r o n g e r than pine
which was usually used. A s soon a s w a r broke out, delta wood became
e x t r e m e l y s c a r c e , because the r e s i n s required f o r its impregnation w e r e
imported f r o m abroad, and under wartime conditions deliveries w e r e
difficult t o obtain. Also the types of wood required f o r making delta wood
w e r e scarce.
In the end a solution t o the difficulties with delta wood was found. I t s use
in w a r t i m e would undoubtedly have been unprofitable. It was found in actual
practice that a i r c r a f t made of amply available Siberian pine was equal
t o a i r c r a f t made of delta wood, both in weight and in technological properties.
Experience in World War I1 taught that not a l l p r e w a r f o r e c a s t s a r e
proved c o r r e c t in actual combat conditions.
Shortly before the w a r a high-speed, twin-engined reconnaissance a i r -
craft with good aerodynamic qualities and streamlined shape, the Yak-4,
was designed. Maximum speed of this plane, made almost entirely of wood,
was nearly 150 kph f a s t e r than the speed of a high-speed bomber powered
by the s a m e engines. T h i s was a temptation t o change the Yak-4 reconnais-
sance plane into a s h o r t - r a n g e bomber. But when the plane was put into
s e r i a l production, it was a disappointment. It was n e c e s s a r y t o have a
defensive cannon on a standard swiveling mounting with an unwieldy a r m o r
plate f o r protection of the gunner, and this impaired the streamlined shape
and made the plane heavier. T h e experiment was not successful and in the
end it was abandoned. The Yak-4 planes took almost no part in the war; at
that t i m e Petlyakov's dural dive-bomber P e - 2 had a l r e a d y successfully
passed i t s t e s t s and was being mass-produced.
Something s i m i l a r happened with the MiG-3 fighter built at the beginning
of 1940. Its designers, A. I. Mikoyan and M. I. Gurevich, had embodied in
this machine a l l the achievements of aerodynamics available at that time.
The plane was powered by Mikulin's AM-35A engine. Thus the MiG-3 was
the fastest fighter; its maximum speed was 640 kph. It also had the highest
ceiling of a l l fighters. T h i s circumstance was considered v e r y important.
T h e tactical doctrine of the late thirties was based on the assumption that
a e r i a l combat would take place a t high altitudes. A l l countries endeavored
t o r a i s e the ceiling of combat aircraft. The MiG-3 was the most pronounced
expression of this doctrine. It had considerable advantages a s compared
with t h e M e s s e r s c h m i t t , not only in ceiling and speed but also in a r m a m e n t .
It had five weapon emplacements whereas the M e s s e r s c h m i t t had three.
Soon a f t e r the outbreak of war, however, it was found that the G e r m a n
pilots flying M e s s e r s c h m i t t s , which had a lower ceiling than the MiGs, did
not fight at altitudes where they w e r e a t a disadvantage. Contrarily, they
endeavored t o enforce dogfights at low altitudes where the heavier MiGs

161
 w e r e less maneuverable. In addition, the range of the MiGs at low altitudes
was also insufficient.
When a l l t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s became obvious, the d e s i g n e r s of the MiG
t r i e d t o reduce the weight of the plane by removing p a r t of the a r m a m e n t and
by s o m e other m e a s u r e s . T h i s was of no avail, and finally it was decided t o
discontinue product ion of MiG- 3 planes.
T h e s e examples show that a fundamental mistake in technical policy leads
eventually t o failure, not t o mention the waste of effort and m a t e r i a l means.
T h e r e a r e also examples of the opposite, when planes w e r e highly
successful in war, although before the w a r they had been the s o u r c e of
controversies and doubts. T h i s happened with the 11-2 attack plane.
Some military specialists at f i r s t did not fully appreciate the a r m o r e d
attack plane. They thought i t s a r m o r was insufficient and its speed too low,
that it would be a vulnerable target, and that therefore it would not find any
application. T h i s opinion was based on the assumption that a e r i a l w a r f a r e
would be conducted at g r e a t altitudes and that high ceiling and speed would be
most important for a i r c r a f t in the coming war. Even a f t e r the 11-2 had been
tested and the theoretical data had been confirmed, the a i r c r a f t was almost
rejected. It passed the government t e s t in J a n u a r y 1940, and a l m o s t up t o
the beginning of 1941 it stood motionless. Nearly a whole y e a r was lost.
Ilyushin, being convinced of the quality of the attack plane, appealed t o
the P a r t y C e n t r a l Committee on 7 November 1940. It was decided to put the
11-2 immediately into s e r i a l production. Thanks to e x t r a o r d i n a r y m e a s u r e s
the first two s e r i e s - p r o d u c e d planes w e r e ready a s e a r l y a s March 1941. In
the c o u r s e of the w a r the attitude toward the attack plane changed radically.
The 11-2 became one of the most popular planes. Neither the Allies nor the
Soviet Union's enemies had anything s i m i l a r t o the 11-2.
True, petty c r i t i c i s m of the plane continued even after w a r had broken out.
The designer was forced t o change this two-seater with defensive a r m a m e n t
f o r protection against fighters attacking f r o m the r e a r into a single-seater
without such defensive a r m a m e n t , and a l l this f o r one purpose: t o reduce the
weight of the plane, t o r a i s e its ceiling and speed. However, a t the peak of
the fighting because of the l a r g e l o s s e s of single-seater attack planes the
previous two-seater v e r s i o n was adopted again, with the establishment of a
weapon emplacement s o that the gunner-radio o p e r a t o r could f i r e a t enemy
fighters attacking f r o m the r e a r .
The c r i t i c s of the a i r c r a f t did not understand that one cannot fight tanks
f r o m high altitudes. Destruction of the tanks was m o r e successful the lower
the attack plane dived, and therefore it did not need high speed.
New technical means c r e a t e new tactics. The 11-2 plane needed tactics
corresponding t o attack planes.
T h i s is what life taught us.
It was not e a s y t o l e a r n t h e s e lessons. The creation of new a i r c r a f t and
improvement of existing ones often called for technical r i s k s , changes in
one's personal creative plans, and what was most difficult, discarding old
prejudices.
T o improve a combat plane in wartime, alterations had to be done in a
way s o a s not t o i m p a i r output. It is tempting t o make changes in design,
but if these be done unrestrainedly it might reduce the output of the weapon.
The designer must always take c a r e not t o introduce improvements that
might jeopardize fulfillment of the plan.

162

I, I I I .,.I I
I II
 The d e s i g n e r s w e r e therefore in close touch with s e r i a l production.
B e f o r e they introduced a n improvement of existing weapons they had t o have
a c l e a r idea of the difficulties in the technological p r o c e s s that t h e i r
improvement might cause. T h e designers had t o effect t h e i r improvements
s u c h that they could be introduced into s e r i a l production with minimum
l o s s e s in daily supply of planes t o the front.
It should be noted that in this respect Soviet designers had a g r e a t
responsibility and achieved notable s u c c e s s e s .
The Soviet fighters which w e r e s e r i a l produced in the E a s t had better
combat and flight c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s than the German Me-109. However, a t
the beginning of 1942 an improved fighter, the Me-109G, appeared at the
front. Like the previous M e s s e r s c h m i t t s , it was powered by a Daimler-
Benz engine, but a m o r e powerful one. T h e speed of the Me-109G was
somewhat higher than that of its p r e d e c e s s o r s .
The Government Defense Committee stipulated that ways must be found
t o i n c r e a s e the speed of Soviet fighters s o a s t o establish full s u p r e m a c y
o v e r the modernized M e s s e r s c h m i t t s , without reducing output of fighters
even by a single plane.
T h e solution to this problem was i n c r e a s e d engine power.
At that t i m e Klimov's design office had a l r e a d y designed the M-107 engine,
which had also passed the bench t e s t s and was much m o r e powerful than the
M-105P engine mounted in Yak fighters and Pe-2 bombers.
In May 1942 the Government Defense Committee discussed the problem of
raising the speed of fighter planes. T h e People's C o m m i s s a r i a t of Aircraft
Industry proposed putting into s e r i a l production the new M-107 engine instead
of the current M-105P.
The engine m a k e r s w e r e decidedly in favor of replacing the M-105P by
the M-107. Such a profound change in production, however, might have
considerably reduced the output of fighters. It was to be expected that the
M-107, being completely new, would also require lengthy adjustments t o
overcome initial flaws.
T h e change-over to the M-107 would have been disastrous for the output
of fighters and light bombers Pe-2, and another solution was therefore
adopted: Co s u p e r c h a r g e the M-105P at the expense of a somewhat lower
ceiling. T h i s had a l r e a d y been thoroughly flight-tested on Yaks and had
yielded excellent results.
The f e a r s of the engine specialists that boosting the M-105P could put too
much of a s t r a i n on the engine and greatly reduce its s e r v i c e life proved
groundless. In the bench test the supercharged M-105P engine lasted
203 hours whereas the s e r v i c e life of a series-produced engine was 100 hours.
The engine was put into production under the designation M-105PF.
Thus within a short t i m e the Soviet a i r force received fighters which had
been considerably improved, yet s e r i a l production had not suffered the
slightest drop in output. On the contrary, output greatly increased.
Saving time was an overriding consideration. Wherever t h e r e was a
choice between introducing a completely new design and improving an
existing one, p r e f e r e n c e was given t o t h e l a t t e r course.
During the w a r d e s i g n e r s and production engineers constantly improved
weapons. For instance, in mid-1942 Yak and L a fighters w e r e t o be provided
with RS rocket missiles and then with mountings for suspending a e r i a l bombs
under the wings.

163
 In 1942 a n outstanding creation of a r t i l l e r y d e s i g n e r s appeared: a l a r g e -
caliber 3 7 - m m a i r c r a f t cannon. Since it had t o be mounted on a i r c r a f t , it
was n e c e s s a r y t o build a heavy cannon fighter.
Within r e c o r d t i m e the Yak-9T was built. T h i s was the first Soviet
fighter with heavy cannons. It successfully passed first the government
t e s t s and then the military t e s t s and was put into large-scale production.
F u r t h e r work was done t o i n c r e a s e the firing power of the fighter. L a t e r
it was fitted with a 45-mm cannon. Toward the end of the w a r a n even
l a r g e r cannon was mounted.
The w a r was a difficult t e s t f o r Soviet designers, but its lessons w e r e
utilized t o perfect the Soviet a i r c r a f t design school.
In recent y e a r s Soviet scientists and d e s i g n e r s achieved grandiose
r e s u l t s in rocketry. Artificial e a r t h satellites, photographing the f a r side
of the moon, a soft landing on the moon, accurate "landing" of an entire
s e r i e s of huge ballistic m i s s i l e s in the Pacific, manned s p a c e flights - a l l
this had only been a d r e a m or even a utopia not long ago, and now it became
reality.
Rocket engineering completed agigantic step forward within a t i m e that by
the old s t a n d a r d s would s e e m incredibly short. Its achievements a r e
staggering.
At one t i m e the successful development of s p a c e flights encouraged the
opinion that aviation had outlived its usefulness.
"Will aviation survive in the future or w i l l it be completely superseded
by rockets ? I ' This question was asked all over the world by many specialists
who w e r e engaged in a i r c r a f t or rocket construction. Life a l r e a d y answered
the question.
In spite of the great attention given a l l over the world t o rocket engineer-
ing and in spite of its enormous successes, experience in the recent past
h a s shown that r e g a r d l e s s of these s u c c e s s e s in the p r e s e n t and in future,
t h e r e a r e always fields of application of flying machines where rockets
cannot s u p e r s e d e airplanes.
Today's a i r c r a f t w i l l be replaced by other types. Rockets will compete
with aviation and revolutionize it, but not d e s t r o y it.
Rockets have a broad field of application. First of all t h e r e is space,
interplanetary communication which by now is obviously a realistic proposi-
tion. Then t h e r e a r e r e s e a r c h flights both deep into s p a c e and around the
e a r t h f o r astronomical, geographical, biological and other r e s e a r c h
purposes.
Intercontinental ballistic missiles, Which accurately r e a c h t h e i r target,
a r e weapons of previously unheard-of power. Nevertheless, rockets cannot
always replace airplanes. Judging by frequent pronouncements, military
specialists in many countries believe that a s long a s t h e r e a r e ground forces,
they w i l l need such tactical aviation a s s h o r t - r a n g e fighters, s h o r t - r a n g e
bombers and reconnaissance planes of all types.
It is t r u e that s o m e people believe that the work of r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p l a n e s
may be done by automatic reconnaissance rockets. I s that not exaggerated?
After all, a e r i a l reconnaissance must be c a r r i e d out by man equipped with
modern optical and radio equipment. T h i s applies t o fixed t a r g e t s such a s
towns, ports, railroad junctions, and even m o r e s o t o mobile t a r g e t s ,
Some non-Soviet w r i t e r s have a mania for robots. Some a g g r e s s i v e
g e n e r a l s d r e a m of a push-button war in which they would not need any

164
s o l d i e r s who a r e s o m e t i m e s unreliable. T h e s e ideas a r e the ideological
s o u r c e of military doctrines which lower the role of man in military
strategy.
The Americans believe that the reliability of rockets is fifty percent,
that out of ten rockets only five r e a c h their target with certainty. *
Manned a i r c r a f t e n s u r e g r e a t e r accuracy, but this a c c u r a c y is not v e r y
important in the c a s e of nuclear weapons with t h e i r enormous damage
radius of tens of kilometers.
Some theoreticians believe that under conditions of nuclear warfare, l a r g e
l o s s e s in aviation a r e acceptable. F o r instance, the F r e n c h military
specialist Rougeron says: "Of what importance is the l o s s of s o m e hundreds
of Stratojet and Stratofortress planes if some dozens of t h e m w i l l succeed in
penetrating and dropping atom bombs equivalent t o 20 million tons TNT on
nuclear plants, stocks of nuclear a r m a m e n t s and launching s i t e s f o r inter-
continental m i s s i l e s with an a c c u r a c y of which only manned a i r c r a f t a r e
capable.''
T o Soviet military theory such a concept, built on the acquiescence to
large-scale l o s s e s of pilots, is unacceptable. Rockets must completely
s u p e r s e d e a i r c r a f t in a r e a s of military application where they can fulfill
t h e i r task m o r e reliably and m o r e economically. The most s o b e r specialists
a r e v e r y careful in defining t h e i r attitude toward the question of plane o r
rocket.
F o r instance, the British F i e l d Marshal Montgomery said that a s f a r a s
can be foreseen, piloted a i r c r a f t w i l l yet r e m a i n for a long t i m e t o come.
They w i l l be indispensable f o r reconnaissance and other tactical operations
because the human brain is the only mechanism capable of functioning under
unexpected c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
The American G e n e r a l Lindsay, head of the planning bureau of the U. S.
A r m y A i r Force, said in one of h i s speeches that even a f t e r enemy t e r r i t o r y
h a s been subjected to attacks by strategic ballistic missiles, t h e r e s t i l l
r e m a i n s a considerable part of the means for a e r i a l bombardment, b a s e s for
launching remote-controlled missiles, airfields dotted a l l o v e r the country.
Against these t a r g e t s piloted a i r c r a f t will be used, being m o r e maneuverable
and accurate.
Military and technical considerations lead increasingly t o approximately
the following conclusions: with the appearance of long-range ballistic
missiles the strategic bomber becomes l e s s important than it was previously.
Because m i s s i l e s a r e l e s s vulnerable than planes and t h e i r a c c u r a c y of
hitting a target is now great, missiles can c a r r y a nuclear charge of huge
destructive power to the stipulated target m o r e effectively than can a heavy
bomber.
T h e most effective weapon against bombers of a l l kinds a r e anti-aircraft,
ground-to-air m i s s i l e s . However, if this weapon is t o be used, the defended
t e r r i t o r y needs a certain density of these anti-aircraft m i s s i l e launchers,
because they have a comparatively s m a l l operational range.

* For instance, General Shriver, head of research and development in the U.S. Ministry of Aviation, said in
the House of Representatives, obviously on the basis of unsuccessful rocket launchings from Cape Kennedy,
.
that since rocket systems *'. .work within very small tolerances and have a mass of pipes, valves, etc.,
many small components may fail. And it is usually the little things that fail." [Retranslated from Russian].
For instance, the famous American Atlas rocket, a 26-meter missile, consists of 300,000 components. Each
of them may become the source of failure and foil the mission of the flight.

165
 Many specialists a g r e e that tactical a i r c r a f t used in s h o r t - r a n g e fighting,
aerial photographic, and radio reconnaissance, for cooperation with ground
f o r c e s and also for subduing enemy a i r c r a f t o v e r t e r r i t o r y insufficiently
supplied with anti-aircraft m i s s i l e launchers, will f o r a long t i m e yet
r e m a i n p a r t of the a i r f o r c e s of a l l countries.
Military planes capable of independently solving tactical t a s k s will be
a r m e d , in addition to f i r e a r m s , with m i s s i l e s f o r various purposes, air-to-
a i r , air-to-ground, air-to-ship and others.
So f a r we have discussed military applications of aviation. This cannot be
avoided as long as t h e r e a r e reactionary f o r c e s in the world planning w a r
and a g g r e s s i o n and resisting the endeavor of the nations t o achieve
disarmament.
Aviation h a s an equally g r e a t future in the peaceful life of mankind. It
has a leading role in a i r transport. A l l kinds of a i r c r a f t have still to be
vigorously developed, beginning with gigantic transcontinental jet l i n e r s
and ending with tiny piston-engined p a s s e n g e r planes, including ambulance
and agricultural aircraft, serving in the most d i v e r s e fields of the economy
and other fields of human activity. Here aviation is fated t o be the only
f o r m of a e r i a l transport for a long t i m e t o come. This transport has to
develop and improve constantly,
Many projects of a i r c r a f t of the future a r e now being widely publicized in
the world p r e s s . This indicates that d e s i g n e r s the world o v e r a r e busy
solving new problems of civil aviation.
Scientists and engineers a r e engaged in creating l a r g e t r a n s p o r t and
p a s s e n g e r planes for transcontinental flights, able t o develop a speed two
o r t h r e e t i m e s the speed of sound.
T h i s is a v e r y complicated problem. T o achieve this aim, v a r i o u s
problems must be solved in engine construction, fuel, m a t e r i a l s ; above all
the thermodynamic b a r r i e r must be overcome. The designers, therefore,
have not only t o e n s u r e n o r m a l condition.? for p a s s e n g e r s and c r e w s , but
also they must solve the problem of finding s t r u c t u r a l m a t e r i a l s whose
strength would not be affected by the high t e m p e r a t u r e t o which the surface
is subjected.
Increased flying speed of l a r g e transport planes will increasingly e r a s e
the difference between conventional a i r c r a f t and winged m i s s i l e s .
A s is well known, modern a i r c r a f t require l a r g e and specially equipped
airfields with expensive runways s e v e r a l k i l o m e t e r s long. In many countries
d e s i g n e r s a r e engaged in devising a i r c r a f t which can take off and land
vertically. T h i s problem will undoubtedly be solved one day, and that w i l l
again influence the further development of military and civil aviation. Then
t h e r e will not be any need for special airfields. Modern high-speed a i r c r a f t
will then be able to r e a c h the r e m o t e s t c o r n e r s of the earth.
The most topical problem, both for the future and the present, is the
development of radio instruments, ground and airborne, permitting t r a n s p o r t
planes to be literally independent of weather conditions s o that they can
safely take off and land under any weather conditions and in the worst
visibility. . .. . . . ..
Finally, t h e r e ' i s 'the creation of a variety of economical s m a l l planes
being used f o r local airlines under conditions off the airfield. Such planes -
simple, light, cheap, not requiring runways, reliable - w i l l in peacetime
take the place of the automobile in the nations' life.

166
 Rocket engineering, which itself developed on the basis of many y e a r s ’
experience and achievements of aviation science and technology, created by
people who w e r e educated by the Soviet school of a i r c r a f t construction, will
in its t u r n boost further p r o g r e s s of aviation and w i l l initiate methods of
producing higher speeds and g r e a t e r altitudes of flight.
The fiftieth a n n i v e r s a r y of the October revolution finds the Soviet a i r c r a f t
builders full of strength and creative plans whose realization will strengthen
even m o r e the economic and defense potential of the Soviet Union.

167
I. Fighter 1-16
e
m
\o

11. Bomber Tu-2

1 - controllable-pitch propeller,
2 - DE-601 engine,
3 - 7.92-mm machine guns,
4 - engine mounting,
5 - sight,
6 - protective armor,
I - fuel tank,
111. Fighter Me-109
8 - radio antenna,
9 - air cylinder,
LO - radio,
11 - retractable tail wheel,
12 - oxygen container,
13 - controllable slat,
14 - fuel tank.
15 - landing gear recess,
16 - trim tab control wheels,
17 - oil radiator,
18 - water radiator,
19 - reduction gear,
20 - 20-mm cannon.
II
12
1 - gunner's seat, 8 - air intake 15 - bomb,
2 - 7.92-mm machine gun, 9 - Jumo-211 engine, 16 - 7.92-mm machine gun
3 - gunner's hood, 10 - controllable-pitch propeller, 17 - fuel tank
4 - radio antenna, 11 - water radiator, 18 - drag brake,
-
5 sliding canopy, 12 - fuel-injection pump, 19 - bombs
6 - pilot's seat, 13 - air intake of the supercharger. 20 - photographic camera.
-
7 oil radiator, 14 - carrier,

IV. Dive-bomber Ju-87

1 - controllable-pitch propeller, a - sight, 15 - accumulator,
2 - glycol tank, 9 - bulletproof glass, -
1 6 tube for heating machine guns,
3 - Merlin engine, 1 0 - oxygen container, 17 - 7,69-mm machine guns,
4 - separator tank, 11- illuminating flares, la - pedals,
5 - flre bulldiead, 12 - radio, 19 - fuel filter,
6 - oil filter, 13 - radio antenna, 20 - oil t a n k
7 - fuel tank, 14 - air cylinders,

B 9 IO II 12 13

V, Fighter Spitfire
1 - oxygen containers, 8 - radio antenna, 15 - 23-mm cannon,
2 - sight, 9 - drag brake, -
16 37-mm cannon,
3 - bulletproof glass, 1 0 - rear fuel tank, 1 7 - air ducts,
-
4 boundary layer fence, 11 - RD-45F jet engine, 1 8 - landing light,
5 - front fuel tank, 12 - pilot's seat, 1 9 - camera gun,
6 - water tank, 13 - photographic camera, 20 - accumulator.
-
7 drive box, 14 - ammunition box,

\ \ - FI I I//

VI. Jet fighter MiG-15

1 - radiator shutters, 8 - radio antenna, 15 - fuel tank filler neck,
2 - AI-14R engine, 9 - radio compass antenna, 1 6 - f u e l gauge,
3 - oil rank, 10 - instrument panels, 1 7 - air filter,
4 - fire bulkhead, 11 - walkway, -
18 exhaust manifold,
5 - instructor's seat, 12 - landing gear warning device, 19 - air intake of generator ventilation,
6 - pupil's seat, 13 - landing light, 20 - air intake of cabin heating.
I - radio compass receiver, 1 4 - navigation light,

VII. Two-seater training aircraft Yak-18A

 1 - toilet, 8 - front compartment, - radio operator's place,
2 - rear compartment,
- snack bar, -
9 radio equipment,
15
1 G - toilet,
3 10 - navigator's place, 17 - electric starter,
4 - entrance door, -
5 - main Compartment,
11 captain's place, 18 - AI-20 engine,
-
12 radar,
19 - 011 radiator,
6 -toilet,
7 - cloak-room,
-
13 second pilot's place, -
20 fuel taplts,
-
1 4 flight engineer's place,

VIII. Turboprop passenger aircraft 11-18

I - rra;vigrrrc~r’r.
place, 25 - central cwmpsnment,
2 - ae~ondFiIor‘r place, 1r3 - stcwardessea‘ sration,
-
3 rad10 operawor‘s place, 17 - flight engmeer’s place,
-2- Toilet, 18 - cnptaifi’s place,
5 - trmt compartrnmr, 19 - radio antenna,
6 ... c103h-rOOII1, %i) -
wrarlicr radar.
7 - mark bar.
1 - pilot’s cabin,
2 - ventilation valves,
3 - ceiling,
4 - rack,
5 - cloak-room,
6 - toilet, I 12-entrance door,
X. Passenger jet plane Yak-40
7 -turbine starter, - luggage compartment,
8 - center engine AI-25,
13
14 - removable partltion,
-
9 entrance, 15 - pnssenger compartment,
10-lateral engine AI-25, 16 - folding seats,
11-fuel tanks, 17 - air conditioner vent,
18 - wenther radar.
i
6 7
\ \
1 - VIGLO5PF2 engine, 5 - sight, 9 - accumulator, 13 - water radiator shutter, , -
17 ammunition boxes,
2 - 20-mm cannons, G- armored backrest, 1 0 - radio antenna, 14 - water radiator, 1.8 - radiaror air intakes,
3 - supercharger bottle, I - bulletproof glass, 11 - air cylinder, 15 - pitot-static tube, -
19 water tanks,
4 - Joystick, 8 - radio, 12 - oxygen container, 16 - fuel tank, 20 - controllable-pitch propeller.

XI, Fighter Yak-3

Subject Index

Aircraft

AIR-1 121 E-66 107

AIR-3 Pionerskaya pravda 122 E-66A 107
AIR-4 122 E-166 101
AIR-6 124 E-266 109
AIR-1O(UT-2) 124, 126.130 ER-2 138
AIR-14(UT-1) 125,126.131
AK-1 Latvian Gunner 5,142,143 Farman 2
An-2 139 Farman-21 2
An-10 139,142,152 Farman-30 2
An-12 108 Flying Fortress (8-17) 13,74,16-17, 83.95
An-22 139,141
An-24 139, 140,142,154 G-1 122
Ansaldo 4 G-20 125
ANT-1 5,121 G-22 125
ANT-2 6.42 G-23 125
ANT-3 Proletarii 6 Gloster 100
ANT-3 (R-3) 5 , 6 , 2 1 , 2 5 GIoster Meteor 100
ANT-3 (R-3) Our Reply 6
ANT-4 Soviet Land I Heinkel-111 (He-111) 16, 68, 7 0 , 1 6 - 7 7 , 1 8
ANT-4(TB-l) 5 , 7 , 1 0 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 2 6 , 4 2
ANT-6 (TB-3) 1 0 , 1 1 , 1 2 , 2 1 , 3 0 , 4 8 1-1 5,31
ANT-9 7,137,142,145 1-2 5.9,39
ANT-14 11 1-2 bis 9
ANT-16 17 1-3 9 , 2 1 , 2 7
ANT-20 Maxim Gorki 17,142,146 1-5 9, 11, 15,21, 29
ANT-25 (RD) 14,16,21,33 1-15 14.15, 19,21,31,48
Avro 504K (U-1) 4,126, 121 1-15 bis 15,21,35
Avro 683 Lancaster 12,16-77,89,95 1-16 14.15, 16,19.20,21,32,39,48, 168
1-152 Chaika 15,21,36
11-2 22,40,45,46.50,52,55,59, 68,70,95.96,160,
Burevestnik S-4 121 162
11-4 16, 22.40.50, 55,51,95, 160
cc-1 99 11-10 52.55
CC-2 99 11-12 138,140, 142. 148
Chaika (1-152) 15,21,36 11-14 138, 140,141.142,149
Comet 138 11-18 138,139. 140,141,151,175
Convair-240 140 11-18D 142
11-18V 139
DB-3 14,16,55 11-28 104, 105, 113
De Havilland-4 4 11-62 108,140,141,142,157
De Havilland-9 4 Il'ya kluromets 1
De Havilland-SA (R-1) 4 , 2 1 , 2 4
Douglas (DC-3) 73,137,140 Junkers (Bomber) 48.70,71,72
 Junkers (Ju-13) 5 Sh-2 122,126,129
Junkers-86 (Ju-86) 1 9 Sikorskii 9
Junkers-81 (Ju-87) 19.68, IO, 76-77,79,95,96,171 SK-9 101
Junkers-88 (Ju-88) 19,52,68,70,81,95,96 Spitfire 12,74,76-77, 85, 94,172
Junkers-88A (Ju-88A) 76-17 Superfortress (8-29) 73.76-17,93,95

K-5 9,137,142,144 T8-1 (ANT-4) 5,7,9,10,11,21,26,42

TB-3 (ANT-6) 10,11,12,21,30,48
La-5 51,55,64,101 Thunderbolt (R-47) 13.74
La-5FN 51 Tomahawk (R-40V) 76-77,86
La-5 with ramjet engines 101 Tu-2 40,52,55,66,96,104,160,169
La-7 52,55 Tu-14 104
La-9 101 Tu-16 104,105,114,138
La-15 104 Tu-104 105,108,138,119,140,142,150
La-200 104 Tu-114 139,140,141,142,153,176
LaGG-3 15,45,46,51,55,160,161 Tu-124 140,142,155
Lancaster (Avro 683) 72,76-11,89,95 Tu-134 108,141,142,156
Lebed 1 Tu-144 140
Li-2 137,140,142,147
Liberator 73.76-11,92 U-1 (AVIO 504K) 4,126,127
Lightning (P-38) 73.76-77,88,95 U-2 (PO-2) 10,12,50,123,124,125,126,128
UT-1 (AIR-14) 125,126,131
M-5 1 UT-2 (AIR-10) 124,125,126,130
M-9 1 Voisin 1, 2
Me-109 170 VTOL j e t fighter 118
MiG-1 15,45,55
MiG with ramjet engines 101 Yak-1 15,45,46,52,55,61,96,160
MiG-3 45,46.55,62,160,161 Yak-3 39,52,55,65,96,101,102,118
MiG-9 102,103,104,111 Yak-3 with liquid-propellant engines 101
MiG-15 1O3.104,105,112,113 Yak-4 161
MiG-19 104,105.116 Yak-7 45.55
MiG-21 109,117 Yak-9 50,51,52,55,63
MiG-190 104 Yak-98 52
Mosquito (DN-98) 12,73,16-71,91 Yak-9D 52
Mustang (P-51) 73.74.16-77,90 Yak-9DD 52,54
Yak-9R 52
P-5 10,137 Yak-9T 52,164
Parasol 1 Yak-11 126,132
Pe-2 19,22,40,46,55.60,95,104,160,161, 163 Yak-15 102,103,105,110
Pe-8 55,58,74,96,160 Yak-18 125,126,133
Po-2 (U-2) 10,12,50,123,124,126,128 Yak-18A 126,134,174
Yak-18P 109
R - 1 (DN-SA) 4.21.24 Yak-18PM 126,136
R-2 5 Yak-23 104
R-3 (ANT-3) 5,6,21,25 Yak-25 104,105,115
R-5 10,11,21,28 Yak-28 104
R-5Sh 1 0 Yak-30 125,126,135
M F - 1 121 Yak-32 125
RD (ANT-25) 16,21,33 Yak-40 108,140,141,142,158,171
RV 107 Yak (Fighter) 19,22,40,45,53,54,69,102,160,163
R-Z 1 0

Designations

8-17 Flying Fortress 13,14,16-11,83,95 DC-3 (C-47) 13,131,140

8-24 Liberator 73.76-11,92 DH-53 121
8-29 Superfortress 73, 76-77, 93.95 DH-98 Mosquito 12, 13, 76-11. 91

180
DH-108 100 Me-109F 69
Do-217 68.70 Me-109G 69,163
Me-109G2 69
F-86 Sabre 104,105 Me-109G4 69
FW-189 68 Me-110 68
FW-190 52,69,71,76-77, 82.95, 96 Me-163 99
Me-262 71,99,102
He-162 100

Ju-52 68 P-38 Lightning 73,76-77,88,95

Ju-87 68,70,79,95,96,171 P-408 Tomahawk 76-71.86
Ju-87D 76-77 P-47 Thunderbolt 73,74,95
Ju-88A 76-77 P-51 Mustang 73,74,76-77,90

Aircraft Engines

AI-14 125 M-25 1 4 , 1 5 , 2 1

AI-14R 126,174 M-25V 21
AI-14RF 126 M-34 10.16.21
AI-20 139,175 M-34FRN 142
AI-2OK 142 M-34RN 21
AI-2OM 142 M-62 21,24,168
AI-24 142 M-85 1 6
AI-25 140,141,142,177 M-88B 16.55
AM-3 105,138 M-100 16
AM-34 (M-34) 1 0 , 1 6 , 2 1 M-100A 21
AM-35A 45.55.161 M-105P (VK-105) 45,55,163
AM-38F 46.55 M-105PF (VK-105PF) 52,55,163,178
AM-42 52 M-105R 46,55
Ash-21 126 M-107 (VK-107) 52,55,101,163
Ash-62IR 142
Ash-82 51,138 Nin (RD-45) 103, 104
Ash-82FN 51,52,55,142,169 NK-8 142
Ash-82T 142 NK-12MV 142,176

Bristol-Cherub 121 RD-3M 142

RD-9B 104
Campini-Caproni 99 RD-10 (Jumo-004) 102,103
RD-20 (BMW-003) 103
D-20P 142 RD-45 (Nin) 103,104
D-30 140,142 RD-45F 173
Rolls Royce 120
M-2 126 .RU-19 125,126
M-5 6.21
M-6 21 Titan 142
M-11 122,123,125,126
M-11E 126 VK-1 104
M-11FR 126 VK-105P (M-105P) 45,55,163
M-17 9,10,21.142 VK-105PF (M-105PF) 52,55.163,178
M-22 9.21 VK-107 (M-107) 52.55,lOl

181
Non-Soviet Engine Designations

BMW-003 (RD-20) 103 Ju-88 19,52,68.70,81,95,96

BMW-801 69.76 Jumo-004 (RD-10) 103
Jumo-210 19
DN-9A(R-1) 4,21,24 Jumo-211 76

He-111 16,68-70,76-77,78 Me-109 19,52,54,68,69, 71, 80.95,96,163,170

Me-1098 19
Ju-13 4,5 Me-109E 19,46,69,76-77
Ju-21 5
Ju-86 19 V-1710 77

I a2
 Name Index

Agadzhanov, S.l. 51 Florov, I. F. 20

Akashev, K.V. 2 Franco, F. 18
Akimov. G.V. 40 Frankland, N. 95
Anokhin, S.N. 39 Fufaev, D.V. 6
Antonov, 0. K. 108,120, 139
Arkhangel'skii. A. A. 1, 8, 20 Garanin, M.M. 5
Artseulov, K. K. 37 Golovanov, A. E. 54
Arvatov, Yu.1. 5 Goppe, V.V. 5
Ascarate, M. 1 8 , 1 9 Gorelov, S.N. 122
Gorev, V. E. 1 9
Baidukov, G.F. 16 Goryainov, A.A. 39
Bakhchivandzhi, G. Ya. 101 Greffrat 41, 50.68
Batov, P. I. 19 Gribovskii, V. K. 122.125
Belyaev, V.N. 39 Grigorovich, D. P. 2, 5, 9
Belyakov, A.V. 16 Grinchik, A.N. 103
Belyanskii, A.A. 51 Grizodubova, V. S. 17
Bolkhovitinov. V. F. 101 Gromov, M.M. 5, 6, I . 16, 11, 123, 124
Bolotov. F. E. I Grossman, E. P. 3 8
Borovkov, A.A. 20 Grushin, P. D. 20
Butlar, von E. 96 Guderian, H. 97
Gurevich, M. 1. 20,161
Campini, S. 99
Caproni, G. 99 Heinkel, E. 16, I1
Chamberlain, 0. 5 Hitler, A. 18, 53,54,68
Chaplygin, S. A. 5,38, 159
Cheremukhin, A.M. 39 n'in, A.N. 125
Chesalov, A. V. 40 nyushin, S. V. 12, 16, 17,20, 45, 46, 52, 104,120.
Chkalov, V. P. 16, 124 138.139, 162
Curzon, J. 5 Isaev, A.M. 101
lvanov, M.I. 103
Danilin. S.A. 16 Ivashchenko, 1. T. 103
Davydov. I.E. 141 lvchenko, A.G. 141
Derry. J. 100
Dorodnitsyn, A.A. 40 Joukowski, N. E. 1.3,159
Doronin. I.V. 17
D&r, G. 50 Kalinin, K.A. 9
Douhet. D. 48 Kamanin, N. P. 11
Dushkin, L.S. 101 Kamenev. S.S. 5
Dymov. V.P. 125 Keldysh, M. V. 38,39, 40
Khol'zunov. V.S. 19
Ekatov, A.N. 5 Khrunichev, M. V. 102
Ermolaev, V.G. 138 Kishkin, S. T. 40, 107
Klimov, V.Ya. 20,45.103,163
Fedorov. I. E. 101, 1 0 3 Kokkinaki, V. K. 15,16.17,124
Fedotov, A.V. 109 Komarov, M.S. 51
Filin, A. I. 122 Kondorskii, B.M. 6

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Kopylov, V.B. 5 Papanin, I.D. 11
Korchuganova, G. G. 125 Pashinin, M.M. 20
Korolev, S. P. 101.120 Paulus, F. 50, 53
Kosarev, A.V. 124 Pavlov, D.G. 19
Kosrochkin, V.V. 40 Petlyakov, V. M. 6, 8.10,46, 161
Koval'kov, A. 122 Petrov, N.J. 6.40
Kozlov, S.G. 20 Pew, S. 106
Kravchenko, G. P. 16 Piontkovskii, Yu. 1. 121,122,124
Krivoshein, S. M. 1 9 Fisarenko, V.O. 121
Kuindzhi, A.A. 51 Pogoskii, E. I. 6
Kuznetsov, N.G. 19 Pogoskii, I. I. 6
Polikarpov, N. N. 1, 5 , 8, 9, 14.15, 20,40, 48, 123
Larin, Yu. 3 Polikovski , V. I. 40
Lavochkin, S. A. 20,51,101,104 Polunin, I. P. 103
Lebanevskii, S. A. 17 Polyakov, I.K. 5
Lebedev, V.A. 1 F'tukhin, E. S. 1 9
Lenin. V.I. 1, 2.3, 5 Futilov, A.I. 6,8,137
Levin, I. S. 51 Fyshnov, V. S. 37,38, 120
Lindsay, R. 165
Lisitsp, V.N. 51 Rafaelyants, A. N. 121
Lisunov, B. P. 137 Raskova, M.M. 17
Lyapidevskii, A. V. 1 1 , 1 7 Rodimbev, A.1. 19
Lyul'ka, A.M. 101,103 Rodzevich, E.V. 6
Rougeron, K. 165
Makhonin 108 Fadenko, S. I. 53
Malakhov. I.S. 125
Makarevskii, A. 1. 38, 39, 40, 107 Safonov, B.F. 16
Malinovskii, R. Ya. 1 9 Sandoval, Kh. 1 8 , 1 9
Martem'yanov. V. A. 1 2 5 Savitskii, E. Ya. 103
Melders, V. 1 9 Sayers, P. 100
Menzhinskii, V. R. 123 Sedov, L. 1. 40
Meretskov, K.A. 19 Semenov, A.A. 122
Messershmitt, V. 99 Serov, A.K. 19
Mezheraup, P. Kh. 5 , 6 Shavrov, V.B. 122
Mikoyan, A. I. 20,103,104, 109,163 Shchetinin, S. S. 2
Mikulin, A.A. 16, 20,103,138,161 Shestakov, S.A. 6
Milch, E. 71 Shevchenko, V.V. 20
Minaev, A.V. 19 Shikhina, R.M. 125
Moiseev, Ya.N. 5 Shishkin, S. N. 39,40
Molokov, V.S. 17 Shmidt, 0. Yu. 17
Montgomery, 8. 1 6 5 Shriver, B. 165
Mosolov, G.K. 107 Shul'zhenko, M.N. 20
Mukhin, V. G. 107,125 Shvetsov, A. D. 20, 122
Mussolini, B. 18 Sidorin, 1. I. 6
Myasishchev, V. M. 8 Sikorskii, I. I. 1
Slepnev, M. T. 1 7
Naidenov, N. I. 5 Smimov, B.A. 19
Nekrasov, N.S. 6 Smimov, V.P. 107,125
Nesterenko. I.N. 19 Smushkevich, Ya. V. 1 9
Nevdachin, V.P. 121 Stechkin, E. S. 1
Nikitin, P. I. 125 Stefanovskii, P. M. 103, 125
Stepanov, B.M. 107
Osipenko, P. D. 1 7 Sterligov. B. V. 1 5
Ostapenko, P.M. 109 Stockwell, R. 1 0 5
Ostoslavskii, 1. V. 40 Stroev, N.S. 40
Ozerov, G.A. 6 Stmminskii, V.V. 40, 107

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Sukhoi. P. 0. 8.20 Volokitin, F.A. 125
Sutugin, L.I. 122 Voronov. N.N. 19
Svintsev, G. P. 40 Voroshilov. K.E. 17
Vorozheikin, A.V. 16
Taits, M. A. 40
Tank, K. 69 Webster, Ch. 95
Ter-Markaryan. A. N. 51 Whittle, F. 100
Tippelskirch, K. 97,102
Tomashevskii, A. I. 5 Yakobson, Ya.Ya. 5
Tret'yakov, A.T. 51 Yakovlev, A.S. 5, 9, 20, 102, 104, 121
Tsander, F.A. 100 Yatsenko. V. P. 20
Tsiolkovskii, K. E. 99, 100 Yumashev, A.B. 16.19
Tumanov, A.T. 40
Tumanskii, S.K. 125 Zalesskii, P. Ya. 40
Tupolev, A. N. 1,5,6, 8, 9, 10,16,17,40,48, 52, Zalevskii, A. 1. 5
105,120,121,138,139 Zhezlov, M.S. 51
Zhukov, A.I. 121
Vetchinkin, V. P. 1 , 3 8 , 3 9 Zhuravchenko, A. N. 37.38
Vodop'yanov, M.V. 17 Zimin, A.I. 6

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 LIST O F ABBREVIATIONS APPEARING IN TEXT

Abbreviation Transliteration Translation

DOSAAF Vsesoyuznoe Dobrovl'noe All-Union Voluntary Society

Obshchestvo Sodeistviya f o r Cooperation with t h e
Armii, Aviatsii, i Flotu Army, A i r F o r c e , and Navy

GUGVF Glavnoe Upravlenie Grazh- Main Administration of Civil

danskogo Vozdushnogo Aviation
Flota

LII Leningrads kii Industrial' nyi Leningrad I n d u s t r i a l Institute

Inst itut

ODVF Obshchestvo Druzei Voz- Society of F r i e n d s of t h e A i r

dushnogo Flota Fleet

TsAGI T s e n t r a l ' n y i Aerogidro- Central Aerodynamic Institute

dinamicheskii Institut

TsIANI Tsent ral' nyi Nauc hno - C e n t r a l Institute of A i r c r a f t

Issledovatel'skii Institut Engine Construction
Aviamotorostroeniya

VKP(b) Vsesoyuznaya Kommunisti- All- Union Communist P a r t y

cheskaya P a r t i y a (Bolsheviks)

5168 186
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