Delaware, Earl Faircloth of Florida, Arthur K. Bolton of Georgia, Allan G. Shepard of Idaho,William G. Clark of Illinois, Robert C. Londerholm of Kansas, Robert Matthews of Kentucky,Jack P. F.
[384 U.S. 436, 439]
Gremillion of Louisiana, Richard J. Dubord of Maine, Thomas B.Finan of Maryland, Norman H. Anderson of Missouri, Forrest H. Anderson of Montana,Clarence A. H. Meyer of Nebraska, T. Wade Bruton of North Carolina, Helgi Johanneson of North Dakota, Robert Y. Thornton of Oregon, Walter E. Alessandroni of Pennsylvania, J. JosephNugent of Rhode Island, Daniel R. McLeod of South Carolina, Waggoner Carr of Texas, RobertY. Button of Virginia, John J. O'Connell of Washington, C. Donald Robertson of West Virginia,John F. Raper of Wyoming, Rafael Hernandez Colon of Puerto Rico and Francisco Corneiro of the Virgin Islands.Duane R. Nedrud, by special leave of Court, argued the cause for the National District AttorneysAssociation, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance in Nos. 759 and 760, and reversal in No. 584.With him on the brief was Marguerite D. Oberto.Anthony G. Amsterdam, Paul J. Mishkin, Raymond L. Bradley, Peter Hearn and Melvin L. Wulf filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, as amicus curiae, in all cases.MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts of American criminaljurisprudence: the restraints society must observe consistent with the Federal Constitution inprosecuting individuals for crime. More specifically, we deal with the admissibility of statementsobtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessityfor procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the FifthAmendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself.
[384 U.S. 436, 440]
We dealt with certain phases of this problem recently in Escobedo v. Illinois,378 U.S. 478(1964). There, as in the four cases before us, law enforcement officials took the defendant intocustody and interrogated him in a police station for the purpose of obtaining a confession. Thepolice did not effectively advise him of his right to remain silent or of his right to consult withhis attorney. Rather, they confronted him with an alleged accomplice who accused him of havingperpetrated a murder. When the defendant denied the accusation and said "I didn't shoot Manuel,you did it," they handcuffed him and took him to an interrogation room. There, while handcuffedand standing, he was questioned for four hours until he confessed. During this interrogation, thepolice denied his request to speak to his attorney, and they prevented his retained attorney, whohad come to the police station, from consulting with him. At his trial, the State, over hisobjection, introduced the confession against him. We held that the statements thus made wereconstitutionally inadmissible.This case has been the subject of judicial interpretation and spirited legal debate since it wasdecided two years ago. Both state and federal courts, in assessing its implications, have arrived atvarying conclusions.1A wealth of scholarly material has been written tracing its ramificationsand underpinnings.2Police and prosecutor
[384 U.S. 436, 441]
have speculated on its range anddesirability.3We granted certiorari in these cases,382 U.S. 924, 925, 937, in order further to
explore some facets of the problems, thus exposed, of applying the privilege against self-