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Update Memo NIE-93-22

Update Memo NIE-93-22

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This five- page memorandum, classified “Secret”, is an update to the May 1993 NIE 93-22: Prospects for Bosnia [Redacted].
This five- page memorandum, classified “Secret”, is an update to the May 1993 NIE 93-22: Prospects for Bosnia [Redacted].

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Published by: Rob on Mar 30, 2011
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04/25/2012

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T1
OB
,M-
I
Director
of
Central
Intelligence
(bx1)
(b)(3)
n
UpdateMemorandum:
NIE
93-22
Fromthe
Chairmon,National
Intelligence
Council
Prospects
for
Bosnia
Key Points
.
A
Bosnianconfederation
will
not
long
surviveany
agreement reached
in
Geneva.
Serbia
and
Croatia
will
begin
to
absorb
their client
ministates,Ieavinga
Muslim
rump
either
dependent
onWesternsupport
or-in
the unlikely
eventBosnian-Croatiantalks
succeed-
associated
with
Zagrebl
I
.
A
three-way
partitionof
Bosnia-Herzegovina-which largely
reflects
Serband
Croat
aims-will
be easier
to
implement
thancle4li4g
a
multiethnic
state
as
envisioned
bythe Vance-Owen
Plan.l
i
.
Even
so,.international
forces
will
have
trouble
separating
anddisarm-ing combatantsand
protecfinxcivifian
populationsand
will
be
vulnerable
to
terrorist
actsl___
I
.
Europeans
will
be unabletosustain
a
large:scale
open-ended
deploy-ment
in
Bosniaand
will
link
additional
troopcontributions
to a
USground
commitment;they
wouldblamethe
United
States
for
a
Eosnian
failure
if
Washington
does
not
commit
t.oont.[__]
oNew
hostilitiessettlement
and
in
Croatia
could
derail
implementatioq_Al
a
Bosnian
put
Western
forces
in
greater
danger.
U/M
NIE
93.22
October
1993
copy
No.
4
40
=.---l
IAPPROVEDFOR RELEASEN DATE:
i
I
|
01-31
-2011
i
-l
r#
tJ:"I
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c05621708
t.'r
o
rscussron
ErTcS
In
NIE
93-22,
Prospects
for
Bosnia,
the
IntelligenceCommunity
concluded
that
there
was
little
prospect
ofholding
togeth
er
a
multiethnic
Bosniaand
that
thecountry
was
headed
toward
some
formofpartition.
TheEstimatesaid
that
the
warring
partiesdoubt-
ed
theinternationalcomrnunity's
will
to
un-
dertakemajor
military
operationsand
to
sustainalong-terp_Ug$qnce
to
maintain
a
multiethnic
statr.l
I
These
judgmentsremain valid. The
agree-
ment
negotiated
in
Genevaleaved
unsettledkey
territorial
questions
that
would
have
tobenegotiated
in
bilateral
working
groups.
Within
two
years,BosnianSerbs
and
BosnianCroats
probably
will
secede
fromthe
Bosnianunion.
It
is
unlikelythat
the latest round
of
secret
bilateral
talks
between
Tudjman
and
lzetbe-govic
will
succeed
in
associating
the Muslirn
partof
BoSnia
with
Croatia.
If
thosetalks
fail,
onlya
Muslim
rump
state
will
remainand
will
be
heavily dependent
for
its
survivalon the
internationalcommunity.Absent
eco-
nomic and
military
support,
this
rump
Bosnia
will
be
absorbed
or
split
by
Croatia
or
Serbial
I
I
This
Memorandum
updates
the findings
of
National
lntef
ligenceEstimate93-22,
issued
May
1993.
It
was
preparedunderthe
auspices
of
the
National
IntelligenceOfficer
for
Europeand
was
coordinated
with
the
Deputy
Director
for
Intelligence,
CcntralIntclligcncc
Agcncy;the
Director,
Defense
lntelligenceAgency;
the
Director,
NationalSecurity
Agcncy; and the Assistant Secretary
for
Inlelligence and
Research,
Department
of
State.
tl
We
believethethree
sides
are
likely
to
finalize
an
agreernent
that
eventually
will
reduce the
fighting.
Although
Serbia
and
Croatia
could
reject
the
diplomatic
process
and
divide
Bosniaby
force,neither Zagrebnor
Belgradewants
to
risk
Western
military
reactions
or
economic
sanctions.
TheBosnianGovernment
will
not
be
able
to
hold
toits
conditions
once
winter
sets
in,
and
it
is
even
clearer
it
has
dwindlinginternational
suppor,.[]
If
there
isno
negotiatedsettlernent, localizedheavy
fightingis
likely
to
continue
indefi-
nitely,
especially
between
Muslim
and
Croat
forces
in
central
and southernBosnia.
Thiswouldrnagnify
the
war's
human
costs,pre-
vent
implacement
of
an effective
internation-
al
forc€,
and
wouldprobably
lead
to
thecornplete
disappearance
of
a Bosnian
state.
Prospects
for
Implementing
an AgreementProspects
for
a
lasting
cease-fire
and
for
enforcing
a three-way
territorial
division
are
higherthan
the
earlier
Vance-OwenPlan:
The
agreementunder
discussion
enables
the
Serbs
and,to
a
lesser
extent, theCroats
to
achieve
their
major
territorial
aims.
The Muslims
are deeplydissatisfied
withthe
emergingpostwarmap
but
must
have
international
support
for
their
survival.
b.tt(
 
c0562I708
o
Prospects
ofa harder
winter
than
last
year
andmore
severe
fuel,
food,andother
shortages
addincentives
for
all
tfleqy,ar-
wearycomrnunities
to
cooperate.l
I
Bosnia:
MuslimMinistate
for
Muslims
With
a
multiethnic
state
including
allof
Bosnianolonger
possible,
PresidentIzetbe:
govicandhiscolleagu6s
are
intent
onmaxi-
mizingthe
territorial
boundarics
of a
Mus-
lim
entityto
improve
its
dim
chances
of
survival.
Izetbegovicis deeplydisappointed
in
the
internationalcommunity's
readinessto
accepta
"Serb
victor
y,"
and
will
continue
topress
for
more
concessions.Nevertheless,
economic
privations,the
specter
of
still
rnore
humansuffering,andthe likelihood
that
the
Bosnian
military
offensive
will
stall
leave
him and
his
colleagues
few
optionsother
thanto
signbefore
the
onset
of
winter.[--l
Even
if
the
Bosnian
Government
agrees
to
a
deal,
Muslim
hardlinersare
likely
to
contin-ue
to
fight.
Periodic
clashes
are
likely
over
the
dividing
line
between
the
Muslim
and
Limited
information
as
to
eachside's
motivds
Croatian
ministatesand
around
Brcko,
suggests
theMuslims
haveengaged
in
these
whereSerband
Muslim
claims
overlap.
In
talks
because
Izetbegovic
despairs
of
reach-
addition,
some
Muslim
radicals
may
stage
ing
a
viable
settlement
with
the
Serbs.
For
terrorist
actsagainst
Muslim
moderates,
his
part,Tudjman
is
trying
to
expandhisSerbs, andCroats:influence
to
as
much
of
Bosnia
as
possible
and
may
hope
anagreement
with
the Mus-
Bosnia:
Losingthe
War
Against Winter
tffishting
continues,about'2.8
millt:on
people-about
double
thatof
last
,
lear-will
need
asslsl
ance.
Tens
of
thousands
could
perish
from
disease,
hunger,and
hardship.
Assuming
contin-
ued
combat,
total
needs
during
the
next
six
months
couldeasily
reach3l5,000
metric
tons
of
food
and
75,000
metric
tons
of
nonfood
items
at
acostap-
proaching
$
300-3
50
million.
Even
tf
the
fishting
ends,
hundreds
of
thousands
of
rdugees
anddisplaced
persons
will
at-
temptto relocete,
keepin7
humanitar-ian
needs
hish
through
the
winter.
Inthat
case,
theUnited
Nations
Office
of
the
High
Commtssioner
for
Refugees
planning
figures
suggest
the
six-month
cost
of
reliefwouldstill
be
at
least$200
million.In
any
case,
relid
will
be
diffi-cult
to deliver
because
of
damagetoBosnia's
main
roads
'
Muslim
resistance
may
pose
the
greatest
lims
will
bolstqrhis
sagging
international
risk to
Westernforces
implementing
antuppott.ll
agreement,
although
lopal Serbs
and
Croats
may
also
resist
territorial
adjust-
men,r[_l
Serbiaand
Croatia:
Consolidating
ControlContinued
fighting
between
Muslims
and
Hardlinersin
Belgrade
and Zagreb
will
wantCroats
will
be
a
majorimpediment to
secret
to
dispense
with
the
formalityof
Bosnian
Muslim-Croat
negotiations
to
merge'their
union
andabsorb
into
Serbiaand
Croatia
areas
into
a confederation
with
Croatia.
E=r.*.-

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