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GUERRILLA WARFARE -
DISCUSSING THE USE OF SRI
LANKA’S FLEET
OF
APV’S AND MBT’S

BY

LT COL RAVI PATHIRAVITHANA psc

COMMANDING OFFICER 8TH SLAC

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CONTENTS
 INTRODUCTION
 AIM
 SCOPE
 CHAPTER ONE
 THE CURRENT USE OF SRI LANKAN APV’S AND MBT’S WITHIN
THE ARMY
 CHAPTER TWO

 THE USE OF ARMOUR IN SRI LANKA’S CONFLICT

 Employment of Armour in Attack/Def

 Use of Tanks/APC’s in FIBUA/Close Quarter Battle

 Use of Armour and AFV’s in Theaters of War

 LTTE Means of Countering Armd Vehs.

 Assessment
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 CHAPTER THREE

 THE FUTURE USE OF THE APV’S AND MBT’S WITHIN THE SRI
LANKAN ARMY
 The Induction of Armr.
 Military Planning
 Future Challenges
 Assessment
 Grouping
 Deployment

 CHAPTER FOUR
 DETERMINING HOW THESE VEHICLES WILL CHANGE/BE
DEVELOPED TO CATER FOR FUTURE REQUIREMENTS
 Technical Improvements
 Grouping and Battle gp Concepts
 Suggestions / Recommendations
“Fourth Generation Warfare in Which At Least One Side Uses Non – Traditional Tac and its
Composed Of a Non Govt Mil Force”

GUERRILLA WARFARE - DISCUSSING THE USE OF SRI LANKA’S FLEET OF

APV’S AND MBT’S

INTRODUCTION

1. The successful conduct of warfare is a rational exercise that req from any indl, not only
an int of the en, but also the understanding of all assets opens to him. The utilizing of force has
diverse results according to the ways that he makes use of the assets. In addition, the array in
which these assets are used is a prime importance. Warfare can be conventional or may be
guerrilla still the prioritizing of use of force, assets, and when and where has to be deal more
realistically and practically.

2. The common exception in the conventional war is 3:1 ratio. In other way it is
proportionately three against one. However in the guerrilla warfare the balanced ratio is 10:1,
although at times it’s more than that even. The “tk against guerrilla”, “conventional force against
insurgency”, and “insurgents against a conventional force” can be hypothetically described as a
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civil war. Hence tks against the guerrilla warfare have created a new chapter in all forms of
warfare’s, since the modern day armies find it difficult to curtail or restrict such uprisings. As we
have stepped in to the fourth generation warfare it is sensible to appraise the tac, handling and
empl of tks against such outfits. What would be the accurate and balance ratio while employing
tks against insurgents? Is it “one tk against an insurgent” if not how many “insurgents against a
tk”? Response has to be more theoretical but has to be much practical.

3. Present day principle is that an en loc should not be attk dir by foot inf without the prep
bombardment of arty or air strike before inf moves out’. In this context of war, comd has two
choices through which he can designate force: inf and arty. The common prac is that use of arty
and air strikes to soften the tgt and the inf to assault. As of the doctrinal and theoretical prac of
an inf attack describe as; the one third of the unit provides a “base of fire” which forces the en to
keep his head down, while the mnvr forces to take the advtg of the obj.

4. Thus we are no more in the third generation of war neither a traditional nor a
conventional war is in reach of us. The fundamentals have changed; hence in near future the
basic for the future generation warfare has to be appraised in order to find exact principles for the
new innovation of war. Still any army in the world may abide by their doctrinal norms and may
exercise their cbt power to overcome conventional war, sometimes may be for a small war such
as an insurgency. Let us see the definition of small wars and insurgencies abound. Almost all of
them are descriptive, in other words they focus on the main characteristics of insurgents and of
the ways they operate in. The Oxford English Dictionary defines guerrilla warfare as: “an
irregular war carried on by small bodies of men acting independently. There are very few
analytical definitions, which describe insurgents in context with conventional armies. One of
them belongs to T.E. Lawrence “Lawrence of Arabia”. He described guerrilla warfare by using
six fundamental principles of Guerrilla War:

a. First, a successful guerrilla mov must have an unassailable base.

b. Second, the guerrilla must have a technologically sophisticated en.
c. Third, the enemy must be sufficiently weak in numbers so as to be unable to
occupy the disputed territory in depth with a system of interlocking fortified posts.
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d. Fourth, the guerrilla must have at least the passive support of the populace, if not
its full involvement.
e. Fifth, the irregular force must have the fundamental qualities of speed, endurance,
presence and log indep.
f. Sixth, the irregular must be sufficiently advanced in weaponry to strike the
en’s log and sig vulnerabilities.”

AIM

5. The Aim of this paper is to discuss the use of Sri Lanka’s fleet of APV’s and MBT’s
during guerrilla warfare.

SCOPE

6. The mech warfare against insurgency and the use of MBT, s and AFV’s are out lined and
discuss in gen terms. The future empl of MBT’s/ AFV‘s in COIN and the devp and changes to
the present fleet of veh‘s will be discuss with suggestions and recm to suit the future reqmts.

7. Chapter One. The whole chapter is focused on to the Tech and Mech data’s of the pres
fleet of veh’s.

8. Chapter Two. The first part describes the background to the conflict and the next part
explains the empl of MBT’s in offensive and defensive ph of the war. Further describe the
theaters of war including how armr had been used and empl at each theater of war. It then
analyzes the conduct of armr during all phases of Elam War in nut shell, the func and the
tac/skills of en.

9. Chapter Three. Discuss the future use of MBT’s and AFV’s within the Sri Lanka Army.
The initial sub headings cover the origin of armr and analysis of the threat perception/challenges
in the future. Next part concludes with the poss re grouping of pres fleet of MBT’s and AFV’s,
while introducing the new concept of mech re structuring.
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10. Chapter Four. The first part deals with the how the veh will change and devp to cater for
future reqmt’s. Second part analyzes the poss tech and mech improvements needed. Finally sum
up with the recms for re gp, upgrading of pres fleet of veh’s and the most appropriate MBT’s for
the future empl.

CHAPTER ONE

THE CURRENT USE OF SRI LANKAN APV’S AND MBT’S WITHIN THE
ARMY

11. The Sri Lanka Armoured Corps (SLAC) is currently a collection of eight regular regts
and a vol regt. It provides the Armr capability of the Sri Lankan Army, with vehs such as the T-
55, T-55AM2, MBT’s, BMP Inf fighting veh and BTR-80, 80A, T86 Chinese APC, WMZ551
APC’s. The list of AFV’s and MBT’s and their tech characteristics are listed as fols:

a. BTR 80 APC. Induct in to the fleet of armr in year 1998.

(1) Country: Russia

(2) Arm: 14.5 mm MG

(3) Secondary Arm:7.62 mm co –ax

(4) Wt: 13.6 tons

(5) Crew: 02 + 08

(6) Rd Speed: 90 kmh

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(7) Afloat: 9 kmh

(8) Fuel Consumption: 1.0 km/l

b. BTR 80 A APC. Induct in to the fleet of armr in year 1998.

(1) Country: Russia

(2) Arm: 30 mm Cannon

(3) Secondary Arm : 7.62 mm co –ax

(4) Wt : 14.5 tons.

c. WNZ 551 B WHEELED AFV .Induct and commissioned as an APC in Armr

and Mech Inf in year 2007

(1) Country: China

(2) Arm: 12.7 mm Main

(3) Wt: 16 tons

(4) Crew: 12

(5) Rd Speed: 100 kmh

(6) Afloat: 8 kmh

(7) Fuel Consumation: 4.5 km/l

d. T 85 ICV. Induct and commissioned as an AFV in year 1991.

(1) Country: China

(2) Arm: 73 mm Main

(3) Secondary Arm : 7.62 mm co –ax

(4) Wt: 14.0 tons

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(5) Crew: 11

(6) Rd Speed: 65 kmh

(7) Afloat: 6 kmh

(8) Fuel Consumption: 1.5 km/l

e. T 86 (W) ICV. Induct and commissioned as an AFV in year 1991.

(1) Country: China

(2) Arm: 73 mm Main

(3) Secondary Arm : 7.62 mm co –ax

(4) Wt: 15 tons

(5) Crew: 11

(6) Rd Speed: 85 kmh

(7) Afloat: 8 kmh

(8) Fuel Consumption: 2.0 km/l

f. T 86 (T) ICV. Induct and commissioned as an AFV in year 2001.

(1) Country: China

(2) Arm: 73 mm Main

(3) Secondary Arm : 7.62 mm co –ax

(4) Wt: 15 tons

(5) Crew: 11

(6) Rd Speed: 85 kmh

(7) Afloat: 8 kmh

(8) Fuel Consumption: 2.0 km/l

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g. T 55 A. Induct and commissioned as an MBT in year 1991

(1) Country: Czech Republic

(2) Arm: 100 mm Main,

(3) Secondary Arms : 12.7 mm AA, 7.62 mm co –ax

(4) Wt: 38.5 tons

(5) Crew: 04

(6) Armr: 203 mm

(7) Rd Speed: 50 kmh

(8) Fuel Consumption: 1.9 km/l

h. T 55 AM 2. Induct and commissioned as a MBT in year 1998.

(1) Country: Czech Republic

(2) Arm: 100 mm Main,

(3) Secondary Arms : 12.7 mm AA, 7.62 mm co –ax

(4) Wt: 41.5 tons

(5) Crew: 04

(6) Armr: 203 mm + Add-On

(7) Rd Speed: 50 kmh

(8) Fuel Consumption: 1.9 km/l

i. BMP 2. Induct and commissioned as an AFV in year 1994

(1) Country: Russia

(2) Arm : 30 mm Cannon

(3) Secondary Arm : 7.62 mm co –ax

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(4) Wt : 14.3 tons

(5) Max Rd Speed : 65 kmh

(6) Afloat : 7 kmh

(7) Fully Amph

j. BMP 2 K. Induct and commissioned as an AFV in year 1994.(Comd Veh)

(1) Same as BMP 2

(2) 02 x Addl radio sets

(3) Telescopic Ant

(4) Portable Power Plant

(5) Navigational Aids

(6) Addl Space

k. T 63-II. Induct and commissioned as an AFV in year 1994.

(1) Country: China

(2) Arm : 12.7 mm AAMG

(3) Wt : 13 tons

(4) Crew : 08

(5) Max Rd Speed : 60 kmh

(6) Afloat : 6 kmh

(7) Fuel Consumption : 100 km 80 – 90 ltrs.

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L. T 89 ICV. Induct and commissioned as an AFV in to Mechanized Inf in year

2007.

(1) Country: China

(2) Arm: 12.7 AA

(3) Wt: 14.0 tons

(4) Crew: 11

(5) Rd Speed: 65 kmh

(6) Afloat: 6 kmh

CHAPTER TWO

THE USE OF ARMOUR IN SRI LANKA’S CONFLICT

12. Background. For the duration of thirty year old long lasting conflict, Armr had been a
decisive arm at all lvls of fighting. During the early days (1980-1989 Elam War I) of the conflict
in Sri Lanka, fleet of wh veh consists of SAC’s and SARACEN’s were the aggressor at all
phases of the war. With the expansion of the Army and with the change of the battle in to semi
conventional lvl, Army had to go for tracked APC’s and AFV’s. In the light of above facts the
first bunch of tr/wh APC’s from China arrived in Sri Lanka in year 1991.

13. The new era of the cavalry family initiate with the T-85 AFV (Chinese) tr veh in
WANNI OPERATION’s in year 1991-92. Concurrently during the battle in WELI OYA
(Haye Para) Army empl the Chinese made T-86 wh vehs. Wh APC’s couldn’t prove much of a
success during the Op. However the Army quickly realized the disadvtg of empl wh APC’s in
close quarter battle. Subsequently Army pulled out all wh veh from the Fwd Zone and empl them
as tp carrying veh’s.

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14. With the demanding sit and with the success of the tr APC’s in North and Wanni Army
urgently needed more mobility with added fire power. Since then the Army searched for a better
mech with addl “Fire Power with Mob and Shock Action”. Eventually, appro mech was found in
the form of T-55 in late 1991.

15. Apparently the first Armed Regt of Sri Lanka was raised and inducted in to the theater of
war in late 1991 and early 1992 in JAFFNA PENINSULA. Thereon this MBT contributed
immensely to the success of the war at all levels.

16. Employment of Armour in Attack. Empl of Armr in insurgency has to be scrutinized

properly. However, COIN Ops may extend into the realm of limited War. Fol considerations are

based on the need to empl Armr tps so as to allow them to make max use of their inherent
capabilities in all Ops of war:

a. Aggressive and Bold Empl.

b. Mob.

c. Flexibility.

d. Surprise.

e. Coop.

17. Special tasks in Insurgency may be:

a. Armr close sp of inf, in cases where our tks cannot be quickly intro into a theater,
or cannot be used effectively due to trn and the comm sys.

b. Fire Sp.

18. The tasks allotted to the regts are listed on the order as to how the battle devp. Fol are the
Roles and Tasks which the Armr Regt was abide throughout:
a. Roles

(1) Aggressive mob act to destroy en Armr.

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(2) Close cbt in conjunction with inf.

(3) Shock action.
b. Tasks

(1) The adv to contact and the adv in contact.

(2) The asslt and destruction of the en.

19. Employment of Armour in Defence. The Armr/AFV’s were act as a mob res during all
def Ops’s and formed as indep strike force of the div res. Fol are the some of the def tasks
performed by the Regt:
a. To provide a mob res for c attk.

b. To provide anti – tk def in conjunction with bn wpns.

c. Provide sp to fighting ptls.

d. To form part of a screen force.
e. Provide Fire Power.

f. Rft.

20. Use of Tanks/APC’s in FIBUA/Close Quarter Battle. Whilst considering the gr factor,
many obvious reasons are there on the subject of the cohesiveness of Armr and Inf. Fol are some
of the co- issues:
a. Close country.
b. Less Mob.
c. Close Quarter Battle.
d. Less Fd of Fire.
e. Obs.
f. Less space for Dispersion/Empl.
g. Hy built up.

21. LTTE had made full use of the disadvtg of the attacker in FIBUA and close country, such
as limited obs, concealment, reduce fds of fire, cover, protection and restricted space. They
exploited these limitations by making max use of RPG mob teams, snipers and anti – tk ditches
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across rds to counter the thrust of Armd vehs. Due to mov on rd being restricted, hardly any anti
– tk mines were encounter. Aslts and fire sp had to be through built up blocks between rd apchs
as the rd apchs were obstr by en.

22. With all above co- issues Armr –Inf coorp was intro and conducted battle oriented trg.
Further, spared several traditional Inf Regt as dedicated tps in sp of Armr. Moreover the trn
factor restricted Armr Ops to certain extend. Careful studies on IPB /est process had to carry out
in order to cater for large scale Op’s. Fol are some of the successful offensives conducted during
Ealam War II where Armr/AFV’s greatly contributed:

a. Op Wanni Wickrama -1989

b. Op Chandamaruthaya -1991
c. Op Balawegaya II - 1992
d. Op Boomikampa - 1992
e. Op Leap Forward - 1994

23. Terrain. The theater of Op in Sri Lanka can be divided in to 3 different entities. Fol are
the trn imperatives in each theater of war:
a. Wanni Theater.
b. Eastern Theater.
c. Northern Theater.
24. Northern Theater. Northern theater is a flat trn with a buildup. Mainly intersperse with
vegetable plots and scrub in certain areas. Maneuverability is not extremely friendly. Large
townships with higher pop live close to commercial hubs.

25. Eastern Theater. This can be divided in to two sec as inland and coastal line. Inland trn
basically consists with scrub and open intersperse with undulated gr. Traficability is much better
when compare with Wanni and Northern theaters.

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26. Wanni Theater. Flat gr largely covered with secondary jungle and interspersed with
vegetations. Less buildup in unless in main comm hubs. Traficabilty is not friendly in certain
areas except for open patches in abandon paddy fds and vegetations etc.

NOTHERN THEATER

27. Use of Armour and AFV’s in Northern Theater. Northern theater is a flat terrain with
a buildup. Intersperse with vegetations and scrub jungles in certain areas. Maneuverability is not
extremely friendly but committed and dedicated trg be capable of simplify the complexity to
some extent. Further the buildup in the city limits may curtails the fd of fire and the obs. By
looking at the trn and the tankabilty in the area it was an extremely difficult trn to empl Armr.
But with all the difficulties MBT’s together with APC’s were tasked to start up its msn oriented
trg with model trg etc. Due to vulnerability and exposure the tactics had to re adjust according to
the sit. It was comprehended with the past experiences and Armr was utilized as a decisive arm
at all phases of the war.

28. Elam War II. During Elam War II MBT’s were empl in JAFNA PENINSULA for few
major Ops such as Op Chandamaruthaya, Op Boomi Kampa and many limited Ops in form of
quick attks to cause attrition and as a show up force. The biggest success was achieved during
Op Balawegaya II conducted south of JAFFNA to capture VETTALAIKERNI in order to
provide a depth to the isolated ELEPHANT PASS div. The MBT’s were more efficient and
agile since the fleet was straight away after series of successful Ops in JFN. Two sqns of Armr
were engaged throughout the month long battle with many difficulties and with the scarcity of
log and spares backing. Since the battle was fought at a place where no rd access, find it difficult
in providing constant log sp. But with all these difficulties MBT’s were much aggressive and
offered constant close fire sp at all stages of the war. It is significant that MBT’s were in line
with foot inf during all asslt phs of the battle. Many vulnerable areas such as open patches/dried
lagoon areas were independently negotiated by the armr. The Op Jaya Handa the first ever Op
conducted without ordinary inf. More than 40 tks were inducted during the limited Op to push
the LTTE def lines further south from ACHCHUVELI in the year 1994. During this Op 1x Regt

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of MBT’s and 2 sqn’s of AFV’s were empl. Op successfully concluded and the advantage of
maneuver, speed and swift action gave an indication to focus more on mech concept.

29. Elam War III. For the first time in history of Sri Lanka Army, mech colm (Armr crew
with mounted Foot Inf) was launched at a brief encounter just prior to successful Op Riviresa.
Op took place in two diff apch’s, one axis was totally dedicated with mech colm while the other
axis was dominated by Inf with the sp of MBT’s. Op Leap Forward a limited Op planned for 72
hrs to see the feasibility of mech concept and to assess the sustainability and the success.
Disparities and past experiences of the Op Leap Forward was carefully scrutinized by the
higher lvl while empl AFV’s and MBT’s as a cohesive unit during the Op Riviresa. The Op
Riviresa one of the most successful Ops conducted in JAFFNA PENINSULA to capture the
heart of JAFFNA City in 1995. The MBT’s and AFV were immensely engaged throughout the
whole episode of the battle. During the pd Fire Power and Shock Action of Armr provided extra
advtg to the foot Inf. The areas where Armr operated

in the battle to capture JFN city was highly built up. There for the mov of AFVs were very much
restricted to lanes made by Engrs as the main rds and minor rd/lanes were mined and cut off by
the LTTE. Although the Armr tps that were made aval for the op were to maintain mutual sp
within the tps, due to the density and complexity of the built up, this was never poss while
putting in to prac. Many times a single tk had not provided fire sp to the inf. Due to the built up it
was difficult for the main gun of the T 55 to provide fire at the exact point. This was mainly due
to the very short rng where the gun could not be depressed to take the gr lvl bunkers. Mnvr in to
fire posn were also restricted. However utilizing the Dozer tr and other improvised methods fire
was dir at vital times in sp of inf mnvrs.

30. During the Elam War III Army managed to capture many key trn of en with the existing
eqpt. Meantime the battle was quickly devp in to a fluid battle. The en switched his gears from
“Running Battle” to more of a “Stay and Fight Battle”. LTTE’s been more aggressive and acq
many sophisticated items incl Arty, HMG’s and Msls during the above pd. Even some of the
captured MBT’s were in the charge of the en. During Elam war III Army managed to capture
KILINOCHCHI one time LTTE’s strong hold during the Op Sath Jaya III.

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31. Elam War IV. Elam War IV begun aftermath of the several ceasefire breaches by the
LTTE. During the pd of time the SF were holding on to the Fwd def lines in MUHAMALAI
from the North. Several attempts made by the SF to break away from the def in order to capture
Key Trn of ELEPHANT PASS were successfully denied by the LTTE. Basically the SF were
holding on to a narrow strip of a land which bordering the Sea from the East and the Lagoon of
KILLALY from the West.

32. Empl of Armr was a constrained due to gr restrictions. Thinning out and dispersion was
totally limited. Number of occasions 4th Armoured Regiment sustained severe damages whilst
trying to breach out. It was realized and comprehends the difficulty in empl Armr with such gr
restrictions.

EASTERN THEATER

33. Use of Armour and AFV’s in Eastern Theater. As per the trn comparatives the
traficability in the area is not extremely difficult in use of AFV’s and MBT’s. Since the Eastern
Theater was not that critical and due to less en resistance, Army hasn’t empl any tr APC’s neither
MBT’s in East. But wh veh such as SAC’s /SARACEN’s e were empl in order to cater for
convoy protections and tp carrying duties. After the arrival of new BTR 80/80A’s in year 1998,
one sqn of BTR’s were empl in Eastern Theater for rft, cvy protection and tp tpt. Subsequently
the SAC’s and SARACEN’s were gradually phased out from the fleet.

34. During the final battle in WAKARAI and THOPPIGALA in Elam War IV, MBT’s
were used to a great extent. Since the final battle in East was a small group Op and the role and
the tasks of Armr was bit unorthodox. Since the en in East never posses with tks nor they fought
in fortified bunker lines, hence armr was not empl to cater for hy armr asslts. Mainly armr was
used for Fire Power and Mobility.

WANNI THEATER
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35. Use of Armour and AFV’s in Wanni Theater. As it was a flat trn covered with
secondary jungle mobility was restricted and the obs too limited. While empl armr careful
studies were made on IPB and many aerial recce’s were carried out in order to finalize the
avenues of apchs. It was a huge challenge to use armr during the initial stages of the battle.

36. Elam War II. During the late eighties initial empl of tr AFV’s were made at an Op
conducted under the name of Wanni Wickrama. Many Inf Bn’s and Div’s took part in the
offensive. Since the en had never confronted armr thrust before the entire Op was a success. The
reqd speed and the momentum was the key to success. Total credit should go to the Chinese T –
85 AFV’s and its crew members for the incredible skill lvls that they demonstrated during the
entire Op. It is noteworthy that the AFV’s were in total control of the sit and the enthusiasm of
the foot Inf was even boosted up with the newly added element.

37. Elam War III. The Op Jayasikuru was the longest and most high intensity battle fought
during Elam War III. One Armr Regt and 2x Recce Regts were engaged throughout the Op. 3 rd
Recce Regt with AFV’s mounted with inherent asslt pers provided reqd fire sp while assisting
the foot Inf to negotiate obs such as open and vulnerable areas. AFV’s were basically used for
swift act when the intensity is so high in the battle in order to gain the momentum; Fire power
and Protection for foot inf. The MBT’s were mainly used as an indep entity in sp of AFV’s and
ordinary inf. As a whole the MBT’s were in sp of inf in order to provide fire power and to
negotiate the fortified bunker lines.

38. Elam War IV. The most decisive battle was fought in Wanni in the form of
Humanitarian Op and in part of the Eastern Theater of war. During the initial stages of the battle
armr was partially used due to boggy and wet conditions in the MANNAR and
VEDITHALATIVU areas. Armr was so decisive during the middle stages of the battle where
many open and abandoned paddy fds were supposed to negotiate in gen area South East of
VEDITHALTHIVU. Armr carried out a pivotal role during the latter part of the battle by
providing close fire sp to inf. The Mech inf joins the battle from the North East coastal area
CHUNDIKULAM where inf move is very vulnerable and restricted. Mech colm marches its
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way up to WELLIMULLIWAIKAL through a narrow strip along the coastal belt encountering
series of bunker lines while inflicting hy cas. During the move armr provided intimate fire sp
using its main arm to hinder the en resistance towards the advancing mech colms.

39. The final phase of the battle obviously reflected the extremely poor mil performance of
LTTE. LTTE's mil weakness has been in striking contrast to the very impressive performance of
Sri Lankan Forces. LTTE never had time to equip itself with IEDs/Land mines and to train its
new cadres how to use them against the striking armr. Since the battle was so fluid and swift
LTTE’s never had their second thoughts. Secondly the battle was conducted in multiple apchs to
deceive the en. LTTE would have provided plenty of opportunities to inflict significant cas on
the MBT’s during the early stages of the battle. But till the end LTTE terr have had negligible
impact on armr.

40. LTTE Means of Countering Armd Vehs. The LTTE did its best to counter
AFVs/MBT’s, throughout the past battles. Anti – tank ditches were cut across roads at quite a lot
of places, mob RPG teams were depl to destroy AFVs with special instr on where to aim so as to
destroy an AFV or at least its comd, Anti – tk mines were buried, some of these on the likely
apchs, once the gen dir of the SF adv was known. Anti – tk mines were effectively placed by en
on the edge of rd/track juncs especially where the tr leads from the main rd/tr to an open patch
area, based on the likelihood of AFVs moving into/out of these open patches/areas.

41. Additionally the LTTE were resort to the fol for further counter act:

a. Try to acquire anti – tk msls.

b. Improve the anti – tk capability by concentrating on more RPGs. RPG teams, anti
tk mines, ditches and inundations.
c. Empl of more tk hunting teams.
d. Attempt to infiltrate and destroy as many tanks as possible in the rear areas.

ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

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42. Even though the main impact of the LTTE was borne by the inf, if not for the close Armr
fire sp and the shocking effect of Arty fire, inf couldn’t keep the tempo as they did to accomplish
the objs. This was very much obvious in the past battles fought since Elam War II till the end of
Elam War VI. The LTTE would not have thought that they will have to face this much of fire
power from the especially from Armr and as a whole from the SF’s. Therefore Armr become one
of the main threats and the decisive arm at all ph of the war. Especially the tac which Armr was
adopted during the Op Riviresa is unique. Fighting in Built up Areas in Armr has never been in
the manuals earlier. Hence with the induction of MBT’s together with AFV’s had proven a point
in latest trends in mech warfare/FIBUA.

CHAPTER THREE

THE FUTURE USE OF THE APV’S AND MBT’S WITHIN THE SRI LANKAN ARMY

43. The Induction of Armr. The MBT’s were intro to Sri Lankan Army nearly two decades
ago. Hence the wh APC’s such as SACs and Scout Cars were intro as a recce veh’s much earlier
than the MBT’s. This mech was created to save the lives of its unprotected soldier on foot, to
defeat the machine gun, barbed wire and the trench, a combination which brought about a virtual
stalemate in the Great Wars. Since then this huge machine has immensely contributed to the
insurgency in Sri Lanka where no one has made any prediction.

44. “Generational warfare is based on technology and tactics”. As off now we have stepped
on to the fourth generation warfare and this is defined as; ‘4GW is conflict characterized by a
blurring of the lines between war and politics, soldier and civilian”. Mnvr and armd warfare was
discussed and experienced throughout during the third generation warfare (WW2 and
beyond).Sri Lanka as a nation has lot of bitter experiences with regard to bloody civ war within
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the country for more than three decades. It is a must that we should research on the future poss
threats while cont with the long term post insurgency plg. The analytical and probable threats in
the future:

a. Internal Dispute (Ethnic Crisis).

b. Revolution.

c. Hostilities between neighboring countries.

d. Forceful tp enforcement by any other state.

e. Rural base Insurgency.

f. Urban base Insurgency.

45. Since we are into the 4 GW it is clearly evident that Para c and d of above will not be a
poss threat to Sri Lanka in the future. Further with the International relations and the foreign

policy which Sri Lanka is adopting at pres will not harm the good will between the regional
states. Pres Sri Lanka is experiencing the peace after a long lasted civ war. Therefore the main
concern should be on to the peacekeeping, such as peacetime mil acts to curtail and to prevent
the outbreak of a conflict in future. Terr can be considered a tac that can be used in any type of
warfare. Peace keeping msns are meant to prevent the eruption of a conflict. The essn difference
between war-fighting and peace-keeping msns is that one makes the max use of force while the
latter is committed to the min use of force. Dir act msns tend to be high in intensity but short in
duration. Moreover a high intensity cbt cannot be ruled out; moreover with the prevailing sit in
the country a high intensity war is more unlikely. The lvl of intensity is usually associated with
the probability of occurrence of a certain lvl of conflict. Terr is at one end of the spectrum and is
slightly probable while high intensity hostilities are at the other end and is least likely.

46. Moreover coordinated national plan should cover the entire political, economic, admin,
and operational and int fds based on the analysis of the type of insurgency expecting. Thus it can
be urban base insurgency, rural base insurgency or any other mean. Once it has been assessed
that an insurgency has or could be developed, the govt should move rapidly to provide an
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analysis of the type of insurgency it faces and its subsequent implications: At the same time the
govt and its agencies with armed forces have to respond positively to the violence and
intimidation generated by the insurgency.

47. Military Planning. The mil comd will adopt a similar apch to making his campaign est
for a COIN campaign as he would go for a more conventional war .Ideally starts with the issue
of strategic directives, precisely the govt strategic goals desired national aims. The probable’s
and likely threats can expect in future will be between sldr and the civ. The aim can be achieved
using all of the conventional methods: narrowing of bdrys, gp, CS and CSS allocation etc. To
these can be added specific COIN aspects like reorg and distr of staff effort, int, PSYOPS etc.
The Comd can utilize Mnvr Resources to concentrate force against insurgents, unhinging him
by means of Surprise, Speed and Fire Power.

48. Since this is the threat perception, carful study has to carryout to perceive the
practicability of empl tks in the future generation warfare moreover on low intensity conflict. If

so what is the role of armr, what will be the task, what will be the most appropriate mach, what
are the upgrades, and do we need any sophisticated technology, do we need to emphasize more
on li veh; these are the questions that we have to look ahead. Still the Armr has a role to play,
armd recce veh and tr APC’s may be useful in strictly controlled Ops. In certain circumstances
they are likely to be described as Tks in Sensational Journalism, with the implications that the
SF’s are over-reaching. However recce veh have an essn role to play in patrolling, cvy and VIP
protections and for estb a cordon quickly. Wh APC’s are useful carrying addl tps and, on
occasions for re sup, in areas where stoning, small arms fire bombs and grns may be used. If
there is a serious mining threat, especially constr (HAPC) APC hull may be needed to deflect
blast. As in conventional war, Armr can be vulnerable to close range attks in built up areas and
close country unless supported.

49. Future Challenges. The peacetime emphasis has to move from fighting skills to
procurement and the management of technology. The best way to a promotion is through running
a successful procurement pgme in the NSC. Leadership in the fd is a secondary consideration. As

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a force we have to devp the sense of priorities to increase a passion for hardware and wk for it.
Further we should not neglect our strategy, tac, and the intangibles of warfare.

ASSESSMENT

50. In spite of all this modern-technology, it has never been the decisive factor in the past
wars fought against rebellion. The struggle to exercise technology and to deal with the en’s skills
has been much more important. Using history as a guide, as a proud Army we should mixed the
latest trends of Armr and concepts more suited to our own scenario of war.

51. Grouping. Let’s consider the pres fleet of MBT’s and AFV’s within the Army. With the
aval assets of 2 x AR and 3 x Recce Regt’s the best poss grouping could be CT concept. While
considering the newly formed mech Bde we are capable of regrouping the mech colm with the
existing fleet of Armr as an alternative. Hence the lack of AR within the Army will not sustain
the issue. Therefore the no of Regts has to increase in the form of AR’s to cater for the reqmt.
While considering the re gp/re org and induction of new MBT’s should deem on the
compatibility with the pres fleet of veh and the concept of Op.

52. At pres, almost all inf units from industrialized nations are provided with some type of
motor tpt. Inf units equipped with IFVs rather than lighter vehs are commonly designated as
"hy", indicating more cbt power but also more costly long-range transportation reqmts. In certain
countries the concept is different, the units consist of wh APC’s are called as "Mechanized
Infantry" and the units with tr AFV’s are called as “Armoured Infantry”. Since the Mech Inf
Bde in Sri Lanka is motorized with tr and wh both, it is high time to reform the structure of
Armr, Armd Inf and Mech Inf as per the latest trends of mech warfare.

53. Deployment. Future depl must cater for decentralized comd structure incorporated with
combined arm concept. While looking at the threat perception, it is noticeable that urban base or
rural base insurgency is more fragile. Since we are experiencing the fragile peace after a conflict
and the poss are there for an outbreak for a fresh insurgency. Hence we have the knowledge and
the understanding of the sit and state of the conflict; it is more practicable in deploying the fleet
according to its capability, potential and the reqmt.

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54. As a matter of pri the depl plan must cater for an island wide strategic positioning. Since
the state of veh and the no requisite is not meeting with the reqmt for a wide rng depl, it is
suggest accommodating most intimidated areas initially. The best poss empl will enhance the
usage and the economical factor up to certain extent. When considering the pres theaters of war,
it will be more feasible to depl wh type veh in the southern most theater of Ops. Since this will
improve the flexibility in shifting assets from one theater of Op to another in a crisis sit.
Consequently the tr type veh can be depl according to the viability of the gr, trn and the threat
lvls in other remaining theaters of war.

CHAPTER FOUR

DETERMINING HOW THESE VEHICLES WILL CHANGE/BE DEVELOPED

TO CATER FOR FUTURE REQUIREMENTS

55. The changes and devp of the current fleet of veh must be a concurrent activity in parallel
to the grouping process. The scope and the vision of the Army for the future reqmts and empl
have to be in similar lines and ought to be compatible. What would be the scope of Sri Lankan
Army in future generation of War? Hence the reqmt of making changes, modifications and
regrouping of own assets be obliged with the accordance of the intended scope. What are the
areas to be address when making changes or any devp to a subject which generate strategic
value? Further it should be in the lines of National interest and reqmt of the nation.

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56. National reqmt would be to maintain the normalcy within the country without hindering
the economical and political will of the state. The interest would be the socio economic devp
within the country in order to stand tall against any foreign/local threats in the future. Whilst
considering the changes and devp economic factor has to be address. Changes /Devp should be
very lucrative and cost-effective. Beyond economical changes should not encourage. Only
upgrading, improvement and enhancing could be poss as per the economic disparity in the
country. At pres many Armies in the world in the verge of replacing, devp and upgrading current
stocks of obsolete MBT’s /AFV’s. Many concern about the economy, robustness and
compatibility of the mechanism while making changes.

57. As an example the transport and other log reqmt have led many armies to adopt wh APCs
when their existing stocks of tr APCs require replacement. A recent trend seen in the Israel
Defense Forces, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is the development and intro of
exceptionally well-armd APCs (HAPC) such as the IDF ACHZARIT which are converted from
obsolete Main Battle Tanks (such as the Russian T-55). Such veh are usually expedients, and
lack of space prevents the arm of an IFV being carried in addition to an inf sec or squad. In the
Russian Army, such veh were intro for fighting in urban areas, where the risk from short rng inf
anti-tk wpns such as the RPG-7 is highest.
58. Many APCs and IFVs currently under devp are intended for rapid depl by aircraft. New
technologies which promise reduction in wt, such as electric drive, may be incorporated.
However, facing a similar threat in Post-invasion Iraq to that which prompted the Russians to
convert tks to APCs, the occupying armies have found it necessary to apply extra armr to
existing APCs and IFVs, which adds to the overall size and wt. Some of the latest designs (such
as the German Puma) are intended to allow a li, basic model veh which is air-transportable to be
fitted in the fd with addl protection, thereby ensuring both strategic flexibility and survivability.

59. Many countries look for li and well protected veh which can carry at least a sec of men.
All these trends are always changing with the skill lvls of the en that we are facing in the future.
Several Armies in the world are gearing up to face the next generation of war. As an Army and
as a nation we have the experience of beating the most ruthless guerilla org the world. With all
the past experiences it is evident that small gp Ops in the form of maneuverist apch brought us
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the glory. Future threat can be in the form of insurgency and may be in the form of low intensity
conflict. Anyhow the conflict moreover will be restricted on to urban fighting. By looking at the
future Armies and the future generation war it is explicable that small gp Op with speed and
flexibility will accomplish the requisite.

60 Technical Improvements. Future tk gun has to be replaced or if not upgrade as 120

mm/125mm smooth bore fitted with auto loader. This will enabled the crew to be reduced to
three, comd, gunner and dvr. Further this will restrain the crew fatigue and addl man power
reqmt as well. Other maj improvements reqd are as fols:

a. Original diesel engine to be replaced with a new higher performance diesel engine
to give a much higher power-to-wt ratio and therefore greater acceleration on the
battlefield.
b. APFSDS ammo for the 120 mm gun.
c. NBC sys.
d. Gun stab in elevation and traverse, simplified fire-con sys, / laser rangefinder.
e. New radios and comm. sys.
f. Add-on armr.
61. With the above all Improvements the veh will enhanced with greater survivability and
lethality. While considering the advtg in improving the pres fleet of MBT’s it is assumes that
careful analysis has to be focus on to the time factor and the financial issue.

SUGGESTIONS / RECOMMENDATIONS

REGROUPING

62. The ratio of mech inf in most combined arms fm was increased by many armies as the
war progressed. Fol proportional bodies to be consider in re grouping and re structuring of
different entities in simplifying the mech warfare to enhance far more cbt capability in future
empl:

a. Forming of addl Armoured Regts.

b. Stream lining the Mech Inf Regts.
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d. Introduction of Armoured Inf Regts.

63. If the Army is much concern on the cbt gp or battle group concept in the future, all
Recce Regts should equip with MBT’s to facilitate the perception of armr bias concept.
64. All wh type APC’s/AFV’s should stream line as Mech Armr and indep comd
responsibility has to be set up.
65. All tr APC’s /AFV’s should stream line as Armd Inf and the Comd structure has to be
vested on separate entity.
66. The CT / CG concept has to be simplified and the battle gp lvl comd composn’s has to be
concentrate as per the basis of empl of each arm (Armr Hy/Inf Hy).

PROPOSED MECHANIZED INF BDE

BDE HQ

Bn of BTR Bn of Bn of
80/80A WMZ WMZ

PROPOSED ARMOURED INF BDE

Battle Gp
HQ
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Bn of Regt of Regt of
BMP AFV T-89 AFV T-89/85

67. The Mec and Armd concept was discussed at Chapter 3 to this paper and the specimen of
the ideal mech bde and of an ideal Armd Inf Bde is shown above.

PROPOSED ARMOURED BDE

BDE HQ

1 AR ? 3 AR T-55 4 AR T-55 5 AR?

Note: Best suitable MBT for 1st and 5th AR’s will be discussed in chapter 4 to this document.
PROPOSSED BATTLE GROUP SPECIMEN 1

Battle Gp
HQ

Regt of Regt of Bn of BTR

T55 T89

PROPOSSED BATTLE GROUP SPECIMEN 2

Battle Gp
HQ
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Bn of T89 Regt of
Regt of
BMP
T55

68. The above simple diagrams represent combined arms concept, while providing equal distr
of assets to split each bde/battle group with variety. As a model if you closely study the
specimen 1 and 2 of the battle group concept, however specimen 1 provides variety in its eqpt
and where as the specimen 2 provides parity in every eqpt since all assets are in the form of tr
veh’s. The below Armd Div structure caters for three different battle group structures under an
armd div comd. This will enhance the systematic depl of armd and mech assets whilst
decentralizing the comd. Each arm will get their fair share of comd in this context of armr div
structure.

STRUCTURE OF PROPOSED ARMOURED DIVISION

XX
II

3MIR DIV RES

x x x

II II II
4AR 3 AR 1AR

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II II II
5 AR 2 AIR 1 MIR

II II II
1AIR 3AIR 2MIR

I I I
EME E
EME EME

I I I

UPGRADING
69. Fol are to be consider while developing and making changes to the present fleet of veh in
order to curtail the surplus in costs to make it more dynamic and unique.
70. Obsolete T-55 MBT’s with defective armaments be capable of transformed in to
additionally protected APC’s/AFV’s.
71. Converting T-55’s in to AFV (HAPC) Heavy APC will enhance the tp carrying
capability, in addition the protection and better x country mobility.

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IDF ACHZARIT converted Main Battle Tanks (Russian T-55)

72. Many SAC’s are phased out due to economical factor and due to engine defects, since the
arm of these veh are in working order, capable of upgrading outdated tr veh by fitting these
canisters to enhance the firepower.

76 mm Canister fitted to a T-63 –II chasey- Captured during final battle in Wellamulliwaikal
73. Upgrading process and the procedure may take considerable time and considerable
amount of monetary reqmt. Further the technical, industrial knowledge and trained labour will be
a huge constrains to deal with. Since the course of action is not much favorable, it is suggess
purchasing a MBT which has the identical tech data indicated in para 60. The best aval MBT in
the current field is the upgraded version of T-59. This particular Tank T-59, which has been in
use for over 30 years with Pakistan Armoured Corps, is being upgraded by HIT under a phased
pgme since 1990 with a total of 50 upgraded features giving a quantum technological leap to this
old tank.

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Al-Zarrar MBT

PECIFICATIONS (Al-Zarrar MBT)

General
Combat Wt 40 Ton
Crew 4
Power to Wt 18.3 HP/Ton
Max Torque/rpm 305 kgm/1300-1400rpm
Running Gear Suspension
Track Rubber
Bump Stop 2 each side
Support Roller 3 each side
Shock Absorber Friction Type
Torsion Bars 10
Armament
Main Gun 125mm Smooth Bore
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Projectiles APFSDS, HEAT, HE

Co-Axial MG 7.62 mm
AA MG 12.7 mm
Autoloader
Type Semi Auto Loading/Ramming System
FCS/GCS
Image Stabilized Fir Control System with LRF and
Type
ballistic computer
Firing Capability S-S, S-M, M-S, M-M
Protection
ERA Optional
Fire Extinguishing & Explosion
YES
Suppression
Thermal Smoke Screen Installed

74. Other than the AL-ZARRAR MBT, our experience and knowledge showed that, we
require a light tk in the mould of the BMP with a greater caliber main armament to be used in
any type of warfare, has to be light enough to be maneuverable, agile and capable of destroying
en and their strong pts. As of the pres availability in the world, a BMP III could be perfect and
ideal. It has a 100 mm gun a 30 mm cannon, a Co – ax MG and an MG for the dvr. However the
cost factor is in high side.

BMP MK III

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75. While recommending MBT AL-ZARRAR and BMP MK III as the ideal MBT’s for the
1st and 5th Recce Regts, It’s reasonable to leave the discussion open for any critics and
suggestions.

76. With all experience gain out of the armd and mech warfare, it is recommend that to cont
with combined Armr – Inf trg with engineers (if poss with Armd Engrs). This will enable us to:

(1) Have a better understanding with the other Arms.

(2) Min eqpt and per as.
(3) Impart knowledge on capabilities and limitations of Armr which at the end will save
much ammo that is fired unnecessarily.
(4) Effectively utilize combined Armr Groups.

CONCLUSION

77. Nevertheless the tks have much vulnerability in different aspects of modern guerrilla war,
it is impossible to conquer a country, win a full-scale battle or hold occupied hostile territory
without them. The striking success of T-55 Main Battle Tanks/AFV’s in the 30 year old conflict
proves how crucial tks remain to the conduct of modern war. Part of the contrast obviously
reflects the renewed emphasis on trg, cohesion and sheer disciplinary toughness that Sri Lankan
Forces and the Fmn Comds have had upon the men during the last three decades.

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